The Mystery of Free Will

What’s the mystery exactly?

We all think that we have this power called free will... that we have the ability to make our own choices and create our own destiny

We think that we do what we want to do... that we have a host of legitimate options... that we make choices based upon those options... that we’re in control of our own future

In other words, we all think the future is open and undetermined, like a garden of forking paths in front of us

When we deliberate we think we are actually trying to decide which possible future is the one that we want to make actual

But is the future really open and undetermined in this sense?

Many scientists believe that the universe is deterministic (or mechanistic) in the sense that everything that happens in the universe operates in accordance with a very structured set of natural laws

Determinism is the theory that the state of the universe at any point in time is entirely fixed by the state of the universe at a prior time and the laws of nature

The laws of nature refer to the various principles/forces/powers which govern the natural phenomena of the world…

For instance, no object having mass is accelerated beyond the speed of light

The idea of determinism

“All events, even those which on account of their insignificance do not seem to follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as necessarily as the revolutions of the sun… [As such], we ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the one which is to follow...”

The way the world was 1 second ago

The laws of nature

The way the world is right

now+ =

How exactly is determinism a threat to free will?

If the universe is deterministic, then the future is determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature, which means that the future is NOT open and undetermined

If determinism is true, then only one future is genuinely open to us and all other “futures” are merely illusions

X

X

What do we mean when we say free will exactly?

According to Hume, the question of the nature of free will is “the most contentious question of metaphysics...”

A few different ways of understanding “free will”

Defining  free  will  in  terms  of  doing  what  you  want  to  do...  

According  to  this  op.on,  “free  will”  (or  ac.ng  freely)  merely  consists  in  doing  what  you  want,  or  choose  to  do  

Defining  free  will  in  terms  of  the  ability  to  do  otherwise...  

According  to  this  op.on,  “free  will”  (or  ac.ng  freely)  consists  in  one’s  having  the  power  to  do  otherwise

A helpful example to help understand the difference

John  Locke’s  famous  ‘locked  room’  example...  

“Suppose  a  man  be  carried  whilst  fast  asleep  into  a  room  where  there  is  a  person  that  he  longs  to  see  and  speak  with...  And  be  there  locked  fast  in,  beyond  his  power  to  get  out,  he  awakes  and  is  glad  to  find  himself  in  so  desirable  company...  so  much  so  that  he  decides  to  stay  willingly  in  the  room  and  converse  rather  than  leave...”  

Alan’s Mystery RoomStay or Leave?STAY!!!!!

Did Alan have free will in this case? Was it really in his power

to do anything but stay?

Free will is best defined in terms of possessing the ability to do otherwise. So we act freely in doing X if and only if, at the time just before we do X it is in our power to do otherwise than X

Defining free will as the ability to do otherwise...

Defining  the  “free  will”  thesis...  

To  say  that  we  have  free  will  means  that  we  are  some.mes  in  the  following  posi.on  with  respect  to  a  contemplated  future  act:  

We  simultaneously  have  the  ability  to  both  perform  “X”  AND  refrain  from  performing  “X”  

In  other  words,  we  freely  do  “X”  if  and  only  if,  at  the  Gme  just  before  we  do  “X”  it  is  in  our  power  to  do  otherwise  than  “X”

The million dollar question!!!

Is it possible for free will to exist in a deterministic world?

Answering the compatibility question...

If  you  answer  “No”,  then  you’re  an  incompaGbilist  

The  “incompaGbilist  thesis”  is  the  thesis  that  determinism  and  the  free-­‐will  thesis  could  not  both  be  true  

If  you  answer  “Yes”,  then  you’re  a  compaGbilist  

The  “compaGbilist  thesis”  is  the  thesis  that  determinism  and  the  free-­‐will  thesis  could  both  be  true

A fairly intuitive argument for compatibilism

(1) It  appears  that  I  have  free  will  and  that  the  future  is  genuinely  “open”  like  a  garden  of  forking  paths  

(2) It  appears  that  the  universe  is  determinisGc  such  that  given  its  state  at  one  .me  and  the  laws  of  nature,  every  future  state  of  the  universe  follows  of  necessity  

Therefore,  

(3) It  appears  that  free  will  and  determinism  are  compaGble  with  one  another

Peter van Inwagen

“It  has  seemed  obvious  to  most  people  who  have  not  been  exposed  (perhaps  ‘subjected’  would  be  a  beLer  word)  to  philosophy  that  free  will  and  determinism  are  incompaGble...  Indeed,  people  who  have  not  been  exposed  to  philosophy  usually  understand  the  word  ‘determinism’  (if  they  know  the  word  at  all)  to  stand  for  the  thesis  that  there  is  no  free  will.  And  you  might  think  that  the  incompa.bility  of  free  will  and  determinism  deserves  to  seem  obvious-­‐-­‐because  it  is  obvious…  However,  many  philosophers  are  compaGbilists...  In  fact,  compa.bilism  has  an  illustrious  history  among  English-­‐speaking  philosophers...  [and  according  to  some  compa.bilist  accounts]  compaGbilism  can  look  like  nothing  more  than  robust  common  sense...

“I think that compatibilists can make their doctrine seem like common sense only by sweeping a mystery under the carpet and that, despite their best efforts, the bulge shows. People are aware that something is amiss with compatibilism even when they are unable to articulate their misgivings. [And] I believe that it is possible to lift the carpet and dispel the hidden mystery. [For] the notion of ‘not having a choice’ has a certain logic to it...”

Van Inwagen’s consequence argument...

The  ‘consequence  argument’  is  widely  regarded  as  the  best  argument  for  the  conclusion  that  if  determinism  is  true,  then  no  one  ever  really  has  a  choice  about  anything  

For  if  determinism  is  true,  then  our  acts  are  just  a  consequence  of  the  laws  of  nature  and  events  in  the  remote  past.  And  since  it's  not  up  to  us  what  went  on  before  we  were  born  nor  what  the  laws  of  nature  are,  the  consequences  of  these  things  (including  our  present  acts)  are  not  up  to  us

Van Inwagen’s consequence argument...

A  non-­‐technical  formulaGon  of  van  Inwagen’s  consequence  argument    

(1) No  one  has  power  over  the  facts  of  the  past  and  the  laws  of  nature  

(2) No  one  has  power  over  the  fact  that  the  facts  of  the  past  and  the  laws  of  nature  entail  that  only  one  future  is  possible  

Therefore,  

(3) No  one  has  power  over  the  facts  of  the  future

Van Inwagen’s consequence argument...

The  consequence  argument  seems  to  preclude  the  common  sense  no.on  of  free  will  that  we’ve  been  considering.  For  if  determinism  is  true,  then  our  acts  are  just  a  consequence  of  the  laws  of  nature  and  events  in  the  remote  past.  And  since  it's  not  up  to  us  what  went  on  before  we  were  born  nor  what  the  laws  of  nature  are,  the  consequences  of  these  things  (including  our  present  acts)  are  not  up  to  us  

So  it  looks  like  free  will  is  inconsistent  with  determinism,  which  means  that  the  thesis  of  compaGbilism  is  false  aNer  all

Is van Inwagen a determinist?

Van Inwagen’s consequence argument...

An  important  to  point  to  emphasize:  Van  Inwagen  is  an  incompaGbilist,  not  a  determinist!  

In  other  words,  all  that  Van  Inwagen  wants  to  do  is  show  that  the“compaGbilist  thesis”  (namely,  the  thesis  that  determinism  and  the  free-­‐will  thesis  could  both  be  true)  is  false

+ =

What do you think?

The reasoning underwriting the consequence argument is captured in what van Inwagen calls the ‘no choice principle’ (NCP)

The No Choice Principle - Peter van Inwagen

“Here  is  an  example  that  will  illustrate  what  this  thesis/principle  implies.  Suppose  it’s  an  untouchable  fact  that  the  last  dinosaur  died  long  before  I  was  born.  And  suppose  also  that  the  following  condi.onal  statement  expresses  an  untouchable  fact:  if  the  last  dinosaur  died  long  before  I  was  born,  then  I  have  never  seen  a  living  dinosaur.  It  follows  from  these  two  supposi.ons  that  it’s  an  untouchable  fact  that  I  have  never  seen  a  living  dinosaur.  Is  the  Principle  correct?  It  is  hard  to  see  how  anyone  could  deny  it.  How  could  anyone  be  able  to  do  anything  about  something  that  is  an  inevitable  consequence  of  something  no  one  can  do  anything  about?  But  if  determinism  is  true  and  if  the  Principle  is  correct,  then  all  facts  are  untouchable  facts.  So  it  follows,  given  the  Principle,  that  determinism  implies  that  there  is  no  free  will...”  

“This is the hidden mystery that, I contend, lies behind the facade that ‘common sense’ compatibilism presents to the world: the compatibilist must reject the Principle, and the Principle seems to be true beyond all possibility of dispute...”

The consequence argument is just a particular application of the No Choice Principle

Van Inwagen’s argument against compatibilism

(1) The  theory  of  CompaGbilism  is  true  only  if  the  No  Choice  Principle  is  false  

(2) But,  the  No  Choice  Principle  is  not  false  

Therefore,  

(3) The  theory  of  CompaGbilism  is  not  true  

Therefore,  

(4) The  free  will  thesis  and  the  theory  of  Determinism  cannot  both  be  true  simultaneously  

This is really bad news for compatibilists...

Where do we go from here?

“Since compatibilism hides a mystery, should we not therefore be incompatibilists?”

Why not just reject the thesis of determinism and accept an indeterministic incompatibilism?

How about indeterministic incompatibilism?

Quantum  intederminism?  

Suppose  that  our  world  works  in  the  way  that  a  quantum-­‐mechanical  theory  claims  that  it  does—indeterminisGcally  

On  this  account,  if  the  laws  of  nature  are  quantum-­‐mechanical,  then  they  merely  probilify  a  set  of  outcomes  rather  than  determine  a  single  unique  outcome  

And  so,  perhaps  this  indeterminisGc  view  of  the  world  makes  room  for  the  no.on  of  free  will

But do such appeals to indeterminacy really help solve the problem? Is indeterminism any more compatible with free will than Determinism?

“Unfortunately, incompatibilism also holds a mystery... since the indeterminism that seems to be required for free will seems also to destroy free will...”

The Liar example - Peter van Inwagen

“Suppose  Jane  is  in  an  agony  of  indecision;  if  her  delibera.ons  go  one  way,  she  will  in  a  moment  speak  the  words,  ‘John,  I  lied  to  you  about  Alice,’  and  if  her  delibera.ons  go  the  other  way,  she  will  bite  her  tongue  and  remain  silent.  Let  us  look  carefully  at  the  consequences  of  supposing  that  human  behavior  is  undetermined...  Let  us  suppose  that  there  is  a  certain  current-­‐pulse  that  is  proceeding  along  one  of  the  neural  pathways  in  Jane’s  brain  and  that  it  is  about  to  come  to  a  fork.  And  let  us  suppose  that  if  it  goes  to  the  leN,  she  will  make  her  confession;  and  that  if  it  goes  to  the  right,  she  will  remain  silent.  And  let  us  suppose  that  it  is  undetermined  which  way  the  pulse  goes  when  it  comes  to  the  fork:  even  an  omniscient  being  with  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  state  of  Jane’s  brain  and  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  physics  and  unlimited  powers  of  calcula.on  could  say  no  more  than:  ‘The  laws  and  present  state  of  her  brain  would  allow  the  pulse  to  go  either  way...”  

The Liar example - Peter van Inwagen

Consequently,  no  predic.on  of  what  the  pulse  will  do  when  it  comes  to  the  fork  is  possible;  it  might  go  to  the  le`,  and  it  might  go  to  the  right,  and  that’s  all  there  is  to  be  said.’  Now  let  us  ask:  does  Jane  have  any  choice  about  whether  the  pulse  goes  to  the  leN  or  to  the  right?  If  we  think  about  this  quesGon  for  a  moment,  we  shall  see  that  it  is  very  hard  to  see  how  she  could  have  any  choice  about  that...  If  it  goes  to  the  leN,  that  just  happens.  If  it  goes  to  the  right,  that  just  happens.  There  is  no  way  for  Jane  to  influence  the  pulse.  There  is  no  way  for  her  to  make  it  go  one  way  rather  than  the  other.  Or,  at  least,  there  is  no  way  for  her  to  make  it  go  one  way  rather  than  the  other  and  leave  the  ‘choice’  it  makes  an  undetermined  event...”  

The gist of this reasoning is sometimes referred to as the “mind” argument

The basic idea behind the mind argument is this...

The  “Mind  argument”  is  a  kind  of  argument  designed  to  show  that  indeterminism  and  free  will  are  incompaGble.  More  precisely,  it  is  designed  to  show  that  posiGng  indeterminism  in  key  places  in  the  causal  chain  leading  to  the  agent’s  ac.on  undermines  rather  than  makes  room  for  free  will,  by  making  the  relevant  acGons  seem  random  and  hence  unfree

What’s the point?

The basic idea behind the mind argument is this...

If  my  acGons  are  caused  by  events  or  processes  that  are  themselves  indeterminisGc,  then  they  won’t  be  any  more  “up  to  me”  than  if  they  were  caused  by  events  that  follow  determinis.cally  from  events  that  occurred  before  I  was  born  

So  it  seems  like  if  we  lack  freedom  of  ac.on  in  a  determinis.c  world,  it’s  not  clear  that  we’re  going  to  get  it  by  moving  to  an  indeterminis.c  world  

So,  in  the  end,  it  appears  that  denying  determinism  is  really  no  help  in  making  space  for  genuine  freedom  

All of this leaves us with a very troubling dilemma to consider

“Perhaps the explanation why both compatibilism and incompatibilism seem to lead to mysteries is simply that the concept of free will is self-contradictory... If free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, then, since either determinism or indeterminism has to be true, free will is impossible. And, of course, what is impossible does not exist...”

A very troubling anti free will dilemma to consider...

(1) If  the  thesis  of  determinism  is  true,  then  the  free  will  thesis  is  false  (by  the  consequence  argument)  

(2) If  the  thesis  of  indeterminism  is  true,  then  the  free  will  thesis  is  false  (by  the  mind  argument)  

(3) Either  the  thesis  of  determinism  or  the  thesis  of  indeterminism  is  true  

Therefore,    

(4) The  free  will  thesis  is  false  whether  the  world  is  determinisGc  or  indeterminisGc

Since the dilemma argument is clearly valid, and all three premises seem to be well supported (if not true), it looks like we have a very persuasive argument for the conclusion that: contrary to our common sense intuitions there is no such thing as free will after all

Where do we go from here?