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Análisis moral del derecho de responsabilidad civil. Preguntas y respuestas.
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The Morality of Tort LawQuestions and Answers
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ThePhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLawDavidG.Owen
Printpublicationdate:1997PrintISBN-13:9780198265795PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:March2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001
TheMoralityofTortLawQuestionsandAnswersTONYHONOR
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0004
AbstractandKeywords
H.L.A.Hartwaswritingaboutpunishment.Inhisview,thosewhoarepuzzledaboutthejustificationofpunishmentshouldbeginbydisentanglinganumberofquestionsaboutthecriminalprocess.Moreover,onceoneseesthatasingleaimwillnotjustifyeveryaspectofthesystem,oneshouldnotreplacethesingleaimbyacompoundaim.Oneshouldnot,forexample,saythatthejustificationofpunishmentisamixtureofdeterrence,retribution,reform,anddenunciation.AccordingtoHart,atleastsixquestionsaboutpunishmentneedtobeansweredseparately.Hartmeanthisremarktoapplytoinstitutionsotherthancriminallaw,anditcancertainlybeappliedtotortlaw.Thetheoryoftortlawisnowthesubjectofasophisticateddebate,especiallyinNorthAmerica.Thischaptertriestounravelsomeofthequestionsandtosuggestsomeanswers.
Keywords:Hart,punishment,justification,criminalprocess,tortlaw,deterrence,retribution,reform,denunciation,criminallaw
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Inrelationtoanysocialinstitution,afterstatingwhatgeneralaimorvalueitsmaintenancefosters,weshouldinquirewhetherthereareany,andifsowhat,principleslimitingtheunqualifiedpursuitofthisaimorvalue.
H.L.A.HART1
I.TheQuestionsPosedHartwaswritingaboutpunishment.Inhisviewthosewhoarepuzzledaboutthejustificationofpunishmentshouldbeginbydisentanglinganumberofquestionsaboutthecriminalprocess.Itisamistaketosearchforasinglejustification(deterrenceorretribution)forthesystemasawhole.Moreover,onceweseethatasingleaimwillnotjustifyeveryaspectofthesystem,weshouldnotreplacethesingleaimbyacompoundaim.Weshouldnot,forexample,saythatthejustificationofpunishmentisamixtureofdeterrence,retribution,reformanddenunciation.AccordingtoHart,atleastsixquestionsaboutpunishmentneedtobeansweredseparately:(1)Whyarecertainkindsofconductforbiddenbylawonpainofpunishment?(2)Whatisthedefinitionofpunishment?(3)Whatgeneralaimsjustifyusinhavingasystemofcriminallaw?(4)Whomayproperlybepunished?(5)Subjecttowhatmentalandotherconditionsmayapersonbepunished?and(6)Howmuchpunishmentarewejustifiedininflicting?Theanswerstoquestions(4)to(6),whichconcernthedistributionofpunishment,limittheextenttowhichitispropertopursuethegeneralaimsthatemergeinanswertoquestion(3).
Hartmeanthisremarktoapplytoinstitutionsotherthancriminallaw,anditcancertainlybeappliedtotortlaw.Thetheoryoftortlawisnow(p.74) thesubjectofasophisticateddebate,especiallyinNorthAmerica.2Buthasenoughgroundworkbeendoneindistinguishingthevariousquestionstobeanswered?Thisessaytriestounravelsomeofthequestionsandtosuggestsomeanswers.
Tortlawandcriminallawhavecommonfeatures.Eachaimstoeliminateorreduceundesirablebehavior,eachprovidesforsanctionstobeimposedonthosewhoseconductisundesirable,andeachposesdifficultquestionsabouttheconditionsforimposingsanctionsandtheextentofliabilityofwrongdoers.Ontheotherhandtheaimsofthetortsystemareinsomewayswiderthanthoseofthecriminaljusticesystem;and,correspondingly,thedefinitionoftortliabilitydiffersfromthatofpunishment.
HerearesomequestionsabouttortlawcorrespondingtothoseputbyHartaboutcriminallaw.Wemayask(1)Whyarecertaintypesofconductmadetortious?(2)Whatisthedefinitionoftortliability?(3)Whatgeneralaimsjustifythestateinmaintainingasystemoftortlaw?(4)Whatjustifiesthepersonwhoserightshavebeeninfringedinclaimingcompensationfromthewrongdoer?(5)Subjecttowhatconditionsmayonewhobyhisconducthasinfringedtherightsofanotherberequiredtopaycompensation?and(6)Whatlimitsshouldbeplacedontheextentofthedutytocompensate?
Onlythemoralaspectsofthesequestionswillbeexamined.Efficiency,anditselaborationbyRichardPosner,3areleftononeside,asareproblemsofproof.Tortlaw,liketherestoflaw,mustsatisfyseveralvalues,ofwhichefficiencyinpursuingworthwhileobjectivesis
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onlyone.4Efficiencymustbepursuedwithinamorallydefensibleframework5;sowemustask,andaskfirst,whataimsitismorallydesirableanddefensibletopursuebyimposingtortliability.
(p.75) II.TheQuestionsAnswered
A.TheDescriptiveFrameworkofTortLawThefirsttwoquestionslisted,thoughconcernedwithnorms,callfordescriptive,notnormativeanswers.
(1)WhyareCertainTypesofConductMadeTortious?ThefirstquestionHartaskedinhisanalysisofcriminallawwaswhycertainkindsofconductareforbiddenbylawandsomadecrimesoroffences.Hegavetheanswer[t]oannouncetosocietythattheseactionsarenottobedoneandtosecurethatfewerofthemaredone.6Muchthesamemaybesaidofconductthatbycommonlaworstatuteismadeatort.Whenthelegislatureorcourtsmakeconductatorttheymean,bystampingitaswrongful,toforbidordiscourageitor,ataminimum,towarnthosewhoindulgeinitoftheliabilitytheymayincur.Itistruethatthetermsusedtodescribeit,tortiousorwrongful,arenotasstrongasthetermoffenceincriminallaw,andtheydonotcarrythesamestigma.Butthatisamat-terofdegree.Intortlawnotonlyactionsbutomissionsareattimestreatedaswrongful;thatisalsothecaseincriminallaw,forexampleinthelawofhomicide.Again,tortlawsometimestreatsaswrongfulnotanactionoromissionassuchbutthecausingofharmbyconductofapotentiallydangeroussort,forexamplesellingadefectiveproductorsettingoffexplosives.Insuchcasestheharm-causingactionitselfneednotbewrongful,thoughitisdoneattheagentsrisk.Criminallawalsousesthistechnique,butmostlywiththeimplicationthattheconductiswrongfulevenapartfromitsconsequences.Thinkofthecrime(intheU.K.)ofcausingdeathbydangerousdriving,dangerousdrivingbeingitselfanoffence,thoughalessseriousone.Thewordthatbestcoversallthesecases(actions,omissions,causinguntowardconsequences)isconduct.Ifconductisunderstoodtoincludethemall,wecansaythattortlaw,likecriminallaw,announcesthatcertainconductisforbiddenandtriestosecurethatlessofittakesplace.Tortiousconductisgenerallywrongfulinitself,thoughifnoharmresultsnoliabilitymaybeincurred.Whenstrictliabilityisimposed,theconductisgenerallynotwrongfulinitselfbutthewrongconsistsincausingharmbyengagingincertaintypesofriskyactivities.
Butthatisnottheonlyreasonwhythestateanditscourtsmakeconducttortious.Onepointofcreatingatort,asopposedtoacrime,istodefineandgivecontenttopeoplesrightsbyprovidingthemwithamechanismforprotectingthemandsecuringcompensationiftheirrightsareinfringed.
(p.76) (2)WhatistheDefinitionofTortLiability?Thesecondquestionfollowsnaturallyfromthefirst.Itconcernsthedefinitionoftortliability.Liabilityintort(a)isimposed,ifthedisputecannotberesolvedwithoutlitigation,bythecourtsofthelegalsystemhavingjurisdiction(b)attheinstanceofanindividual
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whoserighthasbeeninfringed(c)onapersonwhohascommittedacivilwrong(tort)againstthatperson,and(d)normallyimposesononewhohascommittedthewronganobligationtopaymoneybywayofcompensationtothepersonwhoserighthasbeeninfringed.7Onemaytreatassubsidiary,thoughtheoreticallyimportant,otherremediesintortlawsuchasmandatoryordersorinjunctionsand,outsidetortlaw,administrativemeasureswhichmayprohibitorregulateharmfulconductandmayimposepecuniarypenaltiesforsuchconduct.
B.TheJustifyingAimsofTortLawThefirsttwoquestionscalledforadescriptionofhowthesystemoftortlawoperates.Theanswersdonotjustifytheexistenceoftortlaw,stilllessanyparticularpartofit.Thethirdquestionconcernsthejustificationoftortlaw:
(3)WhatGeneralAimsJustifytheStateinMaintainingaSystemofTortLaw?Twodifferentaspectsofthisquestionneedtobedealtwithhere:(a)isthestateentitledtotakestepstodiscourageundesirablebehavior?and(b)ifso,mayitdosobytreatingcertaininterestsofindividualsasrightsandgivingthemthelegalpowertoprotectthoserightsandobtaincompensationiftheyareviolated?
Thetortsystemisonemeansbywhichthestate,onbehalfofthecom-munity,seekstoreduceconductthatitseesasundesirable.Othersincludethecriminallaw,education,administrativemeanssuchaslicensingandinspection,differentialtaxes,andmanymore.Thestatenotonlymaybutmust,ifasocietyistobeviable,trytominimizeatleastsometypesofdis-ruptiveconduct.Istortlaw,likecriminallaw,asuitablemeanstothisend?Whattortandcriminallawhaveincommon,andwhatdistinguishesthemfromsomeothermeansofsocialcontrol,isthattheyworkbymarkingoutconduct,orthefailuretoattainarequiredstandardofconduct,aswrongful.Ontheotherhandlicensing,inspection,differentialtaxation,andrationingdiscouragebehaviornotbymarkingitaswrongfulbutbylimitingopportunitiestoindulgeinit,forexamplebyrefusinglicensesforsexshops,orbydenyingbenefitstothosewhodoindulgeinit,forexampleby(p.77) chargingmoreforleadedpetrol.Otherbranchesofthelawofcivilresponsibility,suchasthelawofcontractsorrestitution,thoughtheyprovideremediesforwhatareseenaswrongs,actprimarilynotbytreatingconductaswrongfulbutinotherways.Thus,contractlawmainlymarksouttheconditionsinwhichagreementswillbeenforceable,andthelawofrestitutionmainlyspecifieswhatistocountasanunjustbenefit.
Thetechniqueoftortlawthereforeistolabelcertainthingsasnottobedoneoromittedorbroughtabout,thoughinalessstigmaticwaythancriminallaw.Ifthestateisjustifiedinmakingconductcriminalandattachingtoitpenaltiesthatmayincludeprison,itmustalsobejustifiedinmarkingconductastortiousandattachingtoitthelessersanctionofcompensation.Inallsocietiessomepeoplebehavedisruptivelyor,withoutmeaningtobedisruptive,exposeotherstounduerisksofinjury.Thestatemusthavetherightanddutytominimizetherisksandremedythedisruption.
Butitdoesnotfollowthatthelegislatureorcourtsarerighttomakeanyparticularsort
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ofconducttortious.Thatmustdependonfactorslikethosefamiliarinthedebateaboutcriminallaw.Isthestatejustifiedinrenderingtortious(orcriminal)onlyconductthatthreatensharmtoothers?Ifso,musttheharmbephysical/economicorshouldinroadsonpersonal,emotional,andotherintangibleinterestscoijntasharm?Thisisnottheplacetopursuethisimportantdebate.
Assumingthatthestatecanrightlymakeconducttortious,isitentitledtodosobytreatingindividualinterestsasrightsandthreateningeconomicsanctionsagainstthosewhoinfringetherights?Canthestateproperlyuseitsresources,prestige,andpowerforthispurpose?Thequestiongoesdeepintopoliticaltheory.Asupporteroftheruleoflaw,andhenceoftheRechstaatidea,8isdriventoapositiveanswer.Theruleoflawdepends,amongotherfactors,onaframeworkofindividualrightsthatmustberespectedbyothersandbythestateitself.Thisgivespeopleadegreeofindependencefromoneanotherandfromthepowerofgovernment.Onewhoacceptsthisidealwillthinkthestatejustifiedintryingtominimizeundesirablebehaviorbyatechniquethattreatssomeinterestsasrightsandgivesthosewhohavetherightsthepowertoavertorredresstheunwantedconduct.
Assumingthatthisisaproperroleforthestate,itmayalsobejustified,withinlimits,insubsidizingright-holdersbysettingupandpayingforaframeworkofcivilcourtsfortheenforcementoftortclaims.Butevenacriticwhoisnotopposedtotheruleoflawcanarguethattosubsidizeprivaterightsinthiswayisnotaproperuseofthestatesresources.While,sofarasIknow,thereisnostateinwhichthisviewhassofarbeentaken,(p.78) itmayberashinanageofprivatizationtoassumethatnostateinthefuturewilleverrefusetosubsidizetheuseofitscourtstogiveeffecttothetortsystem.Insuchastate,thosewhopursuetortclaimsinthecourtswouldhavetopaythecostofjudicialenforcement.Itwouldbemorallyandpoliticallyobjectionableforastatetogoevenfurtherandrefuseaccesstoitscourtsaltogethertothosewishingtobringclaimsintort.Closingthecourtstotortclaimswouldbetogiveupanimportanttechniqueforlesseningundesirableconductandwouldjettisonacentralelementinthestructureofrightsthatunderliestheruleoflaw.Ofcourseinsomesocieties(pastandpresent),moreemphasisisplacedonreducingbadconductbysocialpressuresandadministrativemeansthanonenforcingindividualrights.Butthesesocietiestendtobelesscommittedtotheruleoflaw.
Assumingthattheargumentsinfavoroftheruleoflawarepersuasive,thestateisjustifiedinmaintainingasystemoftortlawthatseekstoreducetheincidenceofundesirableconductbytreatingcertaininterestsofindividualsasrightsandprovidingthosewhohavethemwiththelegalpowertoavertinroadsonthoserightsand,iftheyareinfringed,toobtaincompensationfortheirviolation.
C.TheDistributionofTortLiability(4)WhatJustifiesthePersonWhoseRightsHaveBeenInfringedinClaimingCompensationfromtheWrongdoer?Whatwassaidinanswertoquestion(3)isincomplete.Tojustifythetortsystem,itisnot
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enoughtoshowthatthestateisentitledtotakestepstominimizeundesirablebehaviorandtogiveindividualsthepowertoprotecttheirrightsandobtaincompensationiftheyareviolated.Itmustalsobeshownthatsomeprincipleorprinciplesofjusticeentitletheright-holders(tort-plaintiffs)tosuethewrongdoers(tort-defendants)forcompensation.Forthoughthestatemaybeentitledtodesignatecertaininterestsasrightsandcertainsortsofconductaswrongs,itcannottherebymakeitjustfortheright-holderstosuethewrongdoersforcompensation.Itcannotbyfiatcreateaprincipleofjusticelinkingthetwo.Theissueheretheniswhetherthereareoneormoreindependentprinciplesthatjustifytortclaimsagainsttort-defendants.
a.CorrectiveJusticeTheprinciplemostoftencitedforsuchanapproachisthatofcorrectivejustice.9Thiscanbeputinvariousways.Onawideviewitrequiresthosewhohavewithoutjustificationharmedothersbytheirconducttoputthe(p.79) matterright.10Thistheymustdoonthebasisthatharm-doerandharm-suffereraretobetreatedasequals,neithermoredeservingthantheother.Theoneisthereforenotentitledtobecomerelativelybetteroffbyharmingtheother.Thebalancemustberestored.
Ihavesaidwithoutjustificationratherthanwrongfully,notbecausethelatterisincorrect,buttoputasidethequestionwhethertoharmsomeonewithoutjustificationisawronginitself11orwhetheritisawrongonlyifthepersondoingtheharmwasatfault.Tuttingthematterright(repa-ration)12isaconceptthatmay(accordingtothecircumstances)requiretheharm-doertorestoresomethingtothepersonharmed,ortorepairadamagedobject,or(whentheunharmedpositioncannotberestored,asitusuallycannot)tocompensatetheharm-sufferer.Compensatinginturnmeansdoingsomethingconventionallyregardedasrestoringtheharm-sufferertohisunharmedposition.Compensateisusedtocoverwhatevermaybedonetomakegoodthelosswhenreparationisnotliterallypossible;whatcountsascompensationislargelyamatterofconvention.Nothingintheideaofcorrectivejusticerequiresthecompensationtobeinmoney.Thoughintortlawitnearlyalwaystakesthatform,outsideoftortlawvariousformsofsubstituteprovisionsinkindorservicesaretreatedasproperwaysofmakinggoodtheharmtothesufferer.13
Theclaimtoputthingsrightliesagainsttheharm-doer,andsometimesonlytheharm-doercansatisfyit,forexamplewhenitincludesanapology.Butinothercases,forinstancewhentheclaimispurelyformoney,theharm-doercanarrangeforsomeoneelsetopay,perhapsthroughthird-partyinsuranceorthegenerosityofafriend.Ifthematterisputrightinthatway,theharm-doersatisfiesthedemandsofcorrectivejustice.14Moreoverthelossmaybecoveredbytheharm-sufferersowninsurance,orthroughastatescheme,inwhichcasetheharm-doermaytothatextentbefreedfromtheneedtocompensatetheharm-sufferer.Theharm-doer(p.80) haswrongfullycausedthephysicalharmbut,ultimately,notaneconomicloss.Butthentheharm-doer,nothavingsatisfiedtheliabilitypersonally,maynotunjustlyberequiredtocompensatetheinsurerorthestateinsteadofcompensatingtheharm-suffer.Inlawthistakestheformofsubrogation.
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Fromwhathasbeensaiditwillbeclearthatinmyviewcorrectivejusticeisarelationalprinciple.Itcanexistonlywhentheharm-doerswrongviolatestheharm-sufferersright;thetwocannotbedissociated.OnthispointIagreewithErnestWeinribanddisagreewiththeviewformerlyembracedbyJulesColeman.ForColemanatonetimethoughtthattherecouldbewrongfullosses,callingforredress,intheabstract,eventhoughonecouldnotpointtoanyparticularwrongdoerasthepersonwhooughttoputthemright.15
Correctivejusticepresupposesthatthedefendanthascausedharmtotheplaintiff.Itisthisdoingofharmthatneedstobecorrected.Sotheremustbeacausallinkbetweenthedefendantsconductandtheplaintiffsloss.Theconductneednotbethecauseoftheharm.16Itisenoughthatitisacause,andtherecanbemorethanonehumancauseoftheharminquestion,inwhichcaseboth(orall)harm-doerscanberesponsible.17Theexistenceofthecausallinkisanecessaryconditionofcorrectivejusticeandofthedutytocompensateinatortaction.Itisnotasufficientcondition,however,fortworeasons.First,forcompensationtoberightlyclaimed,theremusthavebeennojustificationforinflictingtheharm.Iftherewasajustification,thepersonharmedcannotonthesamefactsbejustifiedinclaimingcompensation.Secondly,thoughsomeonewhoharmsanotherwithoutjustificationmustinprinciplemaketheharmgoodasamatterofcorrectivejustice,whatformhisresponsibilityshouldtake,whetherlegalorextra-legal,andsubjecttowhatfurtherconditions,18remainsanopenquestion.
Sinceacausallinkisnecessarytobothcorrectivejusticeandtortliability,muchturnsontheviewwetakeoftheresponsibilityofonewhocausesanotherharm.Awidespreadviewisthatapersonwhoharmsanotherisresponsiblefortheharmonlywhenheisatfault.19Ifthisviewisaccepted,correctivejusticehastobedefinedmorenarrowlythaninmyearlierformulation,Itwillrequirereparationorcompensationonlyifthepersoncausingtheharmwasatfaultindoingso.Thisviewwouldsetanarrowerlimittocorrectivejusticeand,inparticular,wouldexcludestrictliabilityin(p.81) tortlaw.20Onthewiderview,whichIfavor,theimportanceoffaultisnotdenied,butthefaultrequirementoperates,sofarasitdoes,asanindependentlimittothepursuitofcorrectivejusticeratherthanasanelementinit.Ifso,itfallstobediscussedunderthenextquestion(5),whichconcernstheconditionsforimposingtortliability.
b.OutcomeResponsibilityTheviewthatthosewhocauseharmareresponsibleforitevenintheabsenceoffaultfitswhatIhaveelsewheretermedoutcome-responsibility.21Onthisviewweare,ifoffullcapacityandhenceinapositiontocontrolourbehavior,responsiblefortheoutcomesofourconduct,whetheractoromission.22Thisresponsibilityisanessentialconstituentofourcharacterandidentity,withoutwhichwewouldlackbothachievementsandfailures.Lackingapositivehistoryofwhatwehavedoneanditsoutcome,weshouldatmostbehalf-persons.23Outcome-responsibilityfigurespromi-nentlyinoursenseofourownagencyandisimportantforboththetheoryofagencyandmoraltheory.24Thisisnottosaythatweareresponsibleforeverythingthatwouldnothavehappenedhadwenotacted,orrefrainedfromacting,aswedid.25Thatwouldbeamisconception.Theconduct
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thatgroundsoutcome-responsibilityincludeswhatwedobutdoesnotincludeournotdoingallthatwedonotdo.Undernon-doingitcomprisesonlyomissionswhichareviolationsofanorm.26
Thereisnothingmysteriousaboutthislimitationofourresponsibilitytoactionsandthoseomissionsthatviolatenorms.Whenweact,welaunchourselvesupontheworldandimplicitlychoosetoberesponsibleforwhatwedo,includingitsoutcome.Whenwedonotact,weareresponsibleonlysofarasresponsibilityisthrustuponus,becausesocietyrequiresofuscertainactionsthatweomittodo.Moreover,theoutcomestowhichoutcome-responsibilityappliesdonotconsistofeverythingthatwouldnothavehappenedbutfortheconductinquestion,butarelimitedtoconsequences(p.82) properlyattributabletotheconductratherthantolatervoluntaryorabnormalinterventionsbyotherpeopleandevents.
Outcome-responsibilityservestofosterasenseofidentitybecauseitdoesnotstretchindefinitelyintothefuturebutenableseachofustoclaimforourselves,ortosharewithafewothers,outcomesoflimitedextent,whethersuccessesorfailures.27Yetoutcome-responsibilityforharmtoanotherdoesnotbyitselfcreateadutytocompensate.Theformthatourresponsibilityforanoutcomeshouldtakeremainsanopenquestion.Anapologyortelephonecallwilloftenbeenough.Butoutcome-responsibilityisabasisonwhichthelawcanerectadutytocompensateifthereisreasontodoso.Therewillbesomereasontodosoiftheconductinquestionissociallyundesirableandifthereisalsoreasontotreattheharmsufferedastheinfringementofaright.
Iftheoutcomeofconductisharmfultoanotherthenextquestioniswhetherinthecontexttherewasajustificationforinflictingtheharm.Wearesometimesjustifiedininjuringothers,forexampleinself-defence.Whenwecompetewearejustifiedininflictinglossesorsetbacksonourrivals.Whetherthoseinjuries,losses,orsetbackscountasharmdependsonwhetherthatproteanwordisthoughttocarrywithittheimplicationthattheinjuryorlosshasnotbeenjustifiablyinflicted.28Iwinthe100metersandyoulose.Outcome-responsibilitymakesmeresponsibleforyourdefeataswellasformyvictory.Butthenatureoftheracejustifiesmeininflictingthatsetbackonyou.Thesameistrueofotherformsofcompetition,forexampleintrade,business,politics,literature,andlove.Ifsomesucceed,othersfail.When,however,thereisnojustificationforinflictingalossonanother,outcome-responsibilitysupportstheclaimsofcorrectivejustice.SinceIamresponsibleforalossinflictedonyouwithoutjustification,IhaveadutytoanswerforwhatIhavedone,andtomakewhateveramendsareappropriatetothesituation.Itwillthenbeinorderforthestateto(p.83) imposetortliabilitytocompelmetomakegoodyourloss,ifmyconductwasundesirableandyourlossaninfringementofyourrights,providedthattodosoisnotinconsistentwithothervaluesimportanttomaintain.29
c.DistributiveJusticeButifoutcome-responsibilitysupportsthewiderviewofcorrectivejustice,30wemustnotethatthejustificationforimposingoutcome-responsibilityonthosewhocauseharmto
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othersrestsnotoncorrectivebutondistributivejustice.Perryrightlypointstothedistinctionbetweenoutcome-responsibilityfromtheagentspointofviewsomethingthathelpstheagentfosterasenseofhispersonalidentity,characterandhistoryandoutcome-responsibilityasajustificationforholdingpeopleliabletoothersfortheharmfuloutcomeoftheirconduct.31ButIdonotagreewithhimthatthesetwoaspectsofoutcome-responsibilityareinconsistent.Theargumentforholdingpeopleresponsibletoothersforharmfuloutcomesisthatitisfairtomakethepersontowhomtheadvantageswillflowfromanuncertainsituationoverwhichhehassomecontrol(orwhichhehaschosentoenterinto)bearthelossesthatmaylikewiseflowfromthatsituation.Itisfairtotreattheagentasifhehadmadeabetontheoutcomeofhisaction.Thisargument,somewhatlooselyexpressed,triestospelloutwhatjusticerequiresinsituationsofuncertainty.Itisafamiliarnotioninlegalandextra-legalcontexts.Forexamplethepersontowhomtheincomeofpropertyorabusinesswillaccrueifitdoeswellhasnormallyalsotobeartheriskoflossifitdoesbadly.Inthelawofsales,whentherighttoincomeorfruitspassestothebuyer,theriskofdeteriorationordestructionnormallypassestohimaswell.
Aristotleandsubsequentphilosopherswhohavedevelopedthetheoryofdistributivejusticedonotexpresslymentionthisprincipleofrisk,nodoubtbecauseithasarisenmainlyinlegalcontexts.But,despiteappearances,theriskprinciplerestsonaformofdistributivejustice.32Thoughthisformofjusticeisgenerallyconcernedwiththedistributionofgoods,italsocoversthedistributionoflossesandburdens.Forexample,itappliestotheinci-denceoftaxation.Thejustdistributionofburdensandlossesamongthemembersofasocietyrequiresthatacriterionbefound(saybenefitorcapacity)accordingtowhichtheymayfairlybeallocated.Thereisnoreason(p.84) whythedistributionoftheriskofgainsorlossesinasituationofuncertaintyshouldnotequallybepartofdistributivejustice.Tobespecific,wecanspeakofthejustdistributionofrisksasrisk-distributivejustice.Itmightseematfirstsightthatthissortofjusticeisnotdistributive,becausethebenefitofsuccessandtheriskoffailurefallonthesameperson,whereasdistributivejusticeisconcernedwiththeallocationofassetsandburdensamongallormanyofthemembersofacommunity.Buttheriskprincipleisentirelygeneral.Itplacesoneverymemberofthecommunitytheburdenofbearingtheriskthathisconductmayturnouttobeharmfultoothersinreturnforthebenefittohimselfthatwillaccrueshouldhisconductturnoutasheplans.Itdistributesthroughoutsocietytherisksofharmattributabletohumanconduct.
d.TheBlendofCorrectiveand(Risk-)DistributiveJusticeIthereforetakecorrectivejusticetobeinonewaydistinctfromdistributivejusticeandinanotherdependentonit.Itisdistinctinthesensethattheinterests(holdings)thatcorrectivejusticeprotectsneednotbejustfromadistributivepointofview.Thefilthyrichcanappealtocorrectivejusticeiftheirholdingsarefilchedbythegrindingpoor.Buttojustifycorrectivejusticeinvolvesappealingatacertainstagetothejustdistributionofriskinasociety.Inthatrespectcorrectivejusticedependsondistributivejustice.Correctivejusticeisagenuineformofjusticeonlybecausethejustdistributionofrisksrequirespeopletobeartheriskofharmingothersbytheirconductevenwhentheyare
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notatfaultindoingso.33Forthisreason,correctivejusticeisasubstantive,notamerelyformal,principle.Itneeds,andcanbegiven,amoralbasis.
Thisprincipleofriskdistributionhasanintuitiveappeal.Itmayrestonthesortofmoralintuitionthatonecannotgobehind;oritmaybethatdeeperanalysiswillshowthatitturnsonsomethingmorefundamental.Atanyrate,riskdistributionservestojustifyoutcome-responsibility,andoutcome-responsibilityopensthedoortoimposingadutyofreparationinsuitablecases,andsotocorrectivejustice.Thisconclusioniswelcome,sinceitputssomepartsoftortliabilityonamorallysoundbasis.Butitdoessoonlywhenthedefendanthaspersonallyinfringedtheplaintiffsrights.Foritisonlywhenthisisthecaseandtheharm-sufferersuesthepersonwhoisoutcome-responsiblefortheharmthatcorrectivejusticebyitselfjustifiestheclaim.
Incriminallawtheoffenderisnearlyalwaysheldresponsibleforwhathehasdonepersonally.Vicariousliabilityor,whatcomestothesamething,theliabilityofcorporationsandotherbodiesfortheconductoftheirmembers,isexceptional.Tortliabilityisdifferent.Manytortactionsgive(p.85) effecttopersonalresponsibility.Butothersfollowadifferentpattern.Theyarebrought,forexample,againstanemployerfortheactofanemployeewho,inworkingforhim,hasharmedtheplaintiff.Inthatcaseoutcome-responsibilityandcorrectivejusticedonotservetojustifyanactionagainsttheemployer,34thoughtheymayjustifyoneagainsttheemployee.Issomeotherjustificationavailable?Theconventionalreasonsgivenforholdingthattheemployeroughttobeartheriskoflosswithincertainlimitsfortheemployeesharmfulconductinthecourseofhisworkarethattheemployer(i)hascontroloverthebusiness,includingtheworkofemployees,and(ii)standstoprofitfromtheemployeesservices.Acombinationofthesereasons,itisgenerallythought,justifiesusinimposingvicariousresponsibilityontheemployer.Asinoutcome-responsibility,thepersonwho,inasituationofuncertainty,hasadegreeofcontroloverhowitwillturnout,andwhostandstogainifitgoesinhisfavor,mustbeartheriskthatitwillturnouttoharmanother.Thisreasoningappealsoncemoretoaprincipleofjusticebasedonriskdistribution.Thejustificationoftortliabilityis,asbefore,acombinationofcorrectiveanddistributivejustice.Butdistributivejusticenowappearsattwopointsratherthanone.Itdoesso,first,tosupporttheoutcome-responsibilityoftheemployeeand,secondly,tosupporttheactionagainsttheemployer,whohasnotpersonallyharmedtheplaintiff.
Intheend,thejustificationoftortliabilitybothagainsttheharm-doerpersonallyandagainstsecondarydefendants,suchasemployersheldtobevicariouslyliable,restsonbothcorrectiveand(risk-)distributivejustice.
(5)SubjecttowhatConditionsMayOneWhobyHisConductHasInfringedtheRightsofAnotherbeRequiredtoPayCompensation?Themainquestionsarewhetherfaultis,morallyspeaking,anecessaryconditionoftortliability,andwhethermodernconditionsjustifyusinglossspreadingtosupportliabilitythatmaybeoutofproportiontotheblameworthinessofadefendantsconduct.Thesecondquestionisnotstrictlyaboutthelegalconditionsoftortliabilityinindividualcases
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butaboutabackgroundstateofaffairsthatmaybenecessaryifthepursuitofcorrectivejusticebytortlawistobemorallydefensible.Bothquestionsraisetheissueofhowfar,ifatall,correctivejusticeshouldbetemperedbyconsiderationsofretributivejustice.
(p.86) a.RetributiveJusticeandFaultinCriminalLawTobeginwithfault,thereisnodoubtthat,howeverthiscomplexnotionisinterpreted,itisingeneralanecessaryconditionofconvictionforacriminaloffence,atanyrateforaseriousoffenceforwhichimprisonmentispossible.Onereasonisthatthelawsprohibitionsaremeanttoguidethepotentialoffenderschoices.Theiraimistoinfluenceconductandtheirsanctionsaredirectedatthosewhochoosetodowhatthelawforbids,notthosewhodotheforbiddenactionwithoutchoosingtodoit.If,therefore,thedefendanthadnochoice,butwascompelledtoactashedid,forexampleifhewasforcedtostealagainsthiswill,itcannotbesaidthathedisregardedtheprohibition.Hecontraveneditbut,sincehedidnotdisregardordefyit,heshouldnotbesubjecttopunishment.
Butthefocusonchoicedoesnotstopthere.If,thoughnotcompelled,theoffenderdidnotintendtodothewrongthatthelawforbids,heagaincannotbesaidtohavedefiedtheprohibition.Forexample,ifhedidnotmeanthevictimheassaultedtodie,orif,oddly,hedidnotrealizethatthewomanwithwhomhewashavingintercoursedidnotconsenttoit,hecannotbesaidtohavefloutedtheprohibitionofmurderorrape,thoughhemayhavedefiedsomelesserprohibition,sayofassaultorsexualharassment.
Thisconditionofpunishment,thattheoffendershouldhavefloutedthelaw,byintentionallydoingwhatitforbids,iswellsettledforseriouscriminalcasesthatcarryheavypenalties.Thisremainstruethoughtheoffender,giventhedifficultiesofproofandthedesirenottorewardignoranceofthelaw,neednothaveknowntheexacttermsinwhichtheprohibitioniscouched.Whenthewrongdoersfaultislessserious,sayrecklessnessornegligence,35mostlegalsystemswillstillpermitlesserdegreesofpunishment.Intheselattertypesofcases,theoffenderneednothavedeliberatelyfloutedtheprohibition.Itissufficientthathebehavedinawaythatdisplayedtoomuchself-regardandtoolittleconcernfortheinterestofothers.Indifferenceorunconcern,fallingshortofdefiance,isenough.Moreover,whenthepenaltyisonlyamodestfine,faulteveninthesenseofindifferenceorunconcernmaybedispensedwithaltogetherandstrictliabilityimposed.Yeteveninthecaseofstrictliability,thedefendantmusthavechosentoactashedid.Compulsionwillexcludepunishment.Butgiventheelementofchoice,thecaseforpunishmentheredependsonthejustdistributionofrisks.Thecriminallawmayproperlybeusedtoensurethatthosewho,actingintheirowninterest,createarisktoothersshouldsufferamodestpenaltyfortheharmthattheiractivitybringsabout.For(p.87) examplethesellerofmilkwhich,unknowntohim,isadulteratedmayproperlybefinedinamodestsumforsellingadulteratedmilk.Thereisthereforeinpracticearoughcorrelationbetweenthetypeoffaultorconductandtheweightofthepunishmentimposed.Forthemostseriouspenaltiestheoffendermusthavechosentodefythelaw,forthesomewhatlessserioushemusthavechosentoactwithindifferencetotheinterestsofothers,andfortherelativelyminorhemustatleast
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havechosentodosomethingthatispotentiallyharmfultoothers.
Whathasbeensaiddescribesinoutlinethecorrelationbetweenfault/conductandpenaltyinmostsystemsofcriminaljustice.Canthisroughcorrelationbemorallyjustified?Ithasacertainintuitiveappeal.Theprincipleonwhichitseemstorestisretributive.Theretributiveprinciplehas,however,twoaspects,bothgroundedintheprincipleofproportionality.Onerequiresthatasanctionbeimposedthatisroughlyproportionatetothemoralgravityoftheconduct.Theotherforbidsthatasanctionbeimposedthatisoutofproportiontothegravityoftheconduct.Itisthissecond,limiting,aspectoftheretributiveprinciplethatisinplayhere.Thelimitingprinciplerequiresthesanctiontobenogreaterthanisjustifiedbythegravityoftheconduct,ofwhichthedegreeofthewrongdoersfaultisperhapsthemostimportantingredient.Ofcourse,thecorrelationisextremelyrough.
Itmaybeobjectedthattalkofretributiveprinciplesisoutofplace.Accordingtosomeversionsofretributivejustice,therecanbenopunishmentintheabsenceoffault,sinceconductthatisfreefromfaultdoesnotpossessevenaminordegreeofmoralgravity.Hence,thereshouldbenostrictliabilityincriminallaw.Butapersonwhofreelydoessomethingchoosestointerveneintheworldand,whilewhathedoesmaydisplayneitherdefianceofnorindifferencetotheinterestsofothers,itmay,inpursuitofhisowninterests,putothersatrisk.Itseemsreasonabletoputconductthatexposesotherstoariskthatmaterializesforexample,sellingmilkthatmaypossiblybeandisinfactadulteratedatafairlylowpointonthescaleofmisconductonwhichconductshowingindifferencetoanddefianceoftheinterestsofothersoccupythehigherreaches.Thebehaviorlocatedlowonthescaleisnotmorallybad,anddoesnotamounttofault,butneitherisitmorallyindifferent;conductthatmayaffectotherscannotbethat.Itistakingachanceofharmingothers.36Suitablyextended,therefore,theretributiveprinciplecansurelytreatasjust,andnotmerelyexpedient,theimpositionofminorsanctionsforrisk-creatingconductthatgoeswrong.Theretributiveprinciple,thusmodified,wouldstill(p.88) requirethegravityoftheconducttoberoughlyproportionatetothesanction.
Ofcourse,evenwithoutthissuggestedextension,retributionasatheoryintendedtojustifythecriminalprocesshasbeenfiercelyattacked.Butithasitsdefenderssofarassentencingisconcerned,andeverysystemofcriminaljustice,sofarasIknow,payssomeattentiontoitatleastinthatcontext.Thisisnottheplaceforadetaileddiscussionofthecaseforit;Imerelyassumethat,initslimitingform,ithassomemerit.Andifitisrighttorequiretheconducttobeofsufficientmoralgravitytocorrespondroughlytotheseverityofthepenaltyimposedincriminallaw,somethingsimilarshouldinprinciplebetrueintortlawaswell.
b.RetributiveJusticeandFaultinTortLawHowshouldtheretributiveprincipleapplyintortlaw?First,thetortfeasor,likethecriminaloffender,presumablyoughtnottobemadetopayunlesshehaschosentodowhatthelawforbids.Thereshouldbenotortliabilityforanactdoneundercompulsion.Somuchseemstoberequiredbythefactthattortlaw,likecriminallaw,ismeantto
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influenceconductbyinducingpeopletoabstainfromundesirablebehavior.But,astortlawdoesnotimposeimprisonment,thereisontheretributiveprinciplenostrongcaseforrequiringthatatortfeasorhadintendedtodefythelaw,though,ifhedid,thecaseforasanctionisstrengthened.37Providedthebehaviorwasselfishorinconsiderate,whichnegligentconductoftenis,hemayproperlybemadeliableintort.Buttheburdensoftortliability,thoughlessgravethanlosingonesphysicalfreedom,canbeveryserious,especiallyifthedefendantisnotinsured.38Insuchcases,theretributiveprinciplewillnotmerelyjustifybutwillrequirefaultasaconditionoftortliability.
Inothercases,however,faultwillnotbenecessary.Atortdefendantisofteninsuredandinsomeofthecommonesttypesoftortliability,suchasmotoringaccidents,insuranceiscompulsory.Hencethedefendantdoesnothavetopaythedamagespersonally,excepttotheextentthathepaysthemindirectlythroughhisinsurancepremium.Providedthattheinsurancepremiumismodest,therefore,thereseemsnomoralreasontorequirefaultasaconditionofliabilityinthesecases.39Inpracticemanycountries,suchas(p.89) FranceandGermany,imposestrictliabilityfortransportaccidents,relyingonliabilityinsurancetominimizetheburdenonindividualdefendants.Again,whenthedefendantisvicariouslyliablefortheconductofanemployee,40theretributiveprinciplemaynotrequirethathisliabilitybeconfinedtocaseswheretheemployeeisatfault.Sincetheprofitthatfallstotheemployerisnotalwaysmerelytheamountthathedeservestomake,butmayincludewindfalls,anemployersvicariousliabilityneednotbeconfinedtoaccidentscausedbyfaultonthepartoftheemployeebutmaysometimesextendtoharmthatispurelyaccidental.41
Often,therefore,thereshouldbeinprinciplenomoralobjectiontostrictliabilityintortlaw,42providedthatitdoesnotimposeanundueburdenonthedefendantpersonally.Henceitisnotsurprisingthatthedegreeofcareandskillrequiredintortlawisastringentone.Thestandardofnegligenceisnearlyalwaysobjective.Thedefendantmaythereforebeheldliableforfaultsthatareasonablepersonwouldnothavecommittedbutthathecouldnothelpbecausehewastoorash,clumsy,orstupid.43Thoughnominallytheliabilityisforfault,thedefendantisineffectsubjecttostrictliability.Ofcourse,oftenfaultisactuallypresent,butthefaultsinquestionmayberatherminoronesofinattentionandslownesstoreact.
Whathasbeensaidsofarshowsthatcorrectivejusticeastemperedbytheretributiveprinciplesupportssomestrictliability,butnotuniversalstrictliability.Butitalsoshowsthatthelinebetweenfaultandstrictliabilityisoftenblurred.Andevenwhenfaultisgenuinelyaconditionoftortliability,andstillmorewhenliabilityisobjectiveorstrict,thecompensationpayablemaybedisproportionatetowhatisoftenaminorfault.Toavoidthisdisproportion,theretributiveprincipleseemstorequirethatdefendantsshouldnotbeexposedtodisproportionatelyheavylosses.Iftheclaimsofcorrectivejusticearetobemorallyviable,waysmustthereforebefoundofspreadingsuchlosses.
Insuranceisacommonmechanismforspreadinglosses,andhelpsatthesametimetoprotecttheplaintiffsclaimtocompensation.Lossspreadingisindeedoftenachievedbyaformofdistributivejusticethatallocatesburdensroughlyinproportiontobenefits.
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Thosewhobenefitfromsomeactivity,saymotoring,aremadetobearaproportionateshareofthelossesthattheactivitycauses,forexamplethroughcompulsorythird-partyinsurance.Thisiscertainlynotaninfallibleinstrumentofjustice,sinceinsurance(p.90)premiumsmaybeexorbitant.Nevertheless,ithelpstoensurethattortdamagesareinmostcasesnotgrosslydisproportionatetothefaultofthedefendantwhohascausedtheharm.Hence,thoughlossspreading(throughthird-partyinsurance)isdistributive,thereasonwhyitisneededasanadjuncttothetortsystemis,inpartatleast,tosatisfythedemandsofretributivejustice.Itservestocushionlosseswhich,whetherdefendantsareatfaultornot,areoutofscalewiththegravityoftheirconduct.Thisdoesnotentailthatlossspreadingisanaimofthetortsystemassuch,merelythatsomeformofinsuranceisessentialifasystemofcorrectivejusticeistooperatefairlyinmodernconditions.Correctivejusticecanoperateasamorallydefensiblesystemonlyinharnesswithretributivejustice.Thisinturnmayrequirerecoursetoaformofjusticethatdistributesburdensequitably.
So,whilecorrectivejusticeinisolationwarrantsholdingpeoplestrictlyliabletomakegoodthelosstothosewhomtheyharmwithoutjustification,thetortsystemisnotboundtotranslatethisintoalegalliabilitytocompensatewhentodosowouldbeundulyburdensometothedefendant.Onthecontrary,theretributiveprinciplerequiresthattheburdenbemaderoughlyproportionatetothegravityoftheconduct.Inmanyinstancesthiscantosomeextentbeachievedbymakingfaultaconditionofliability.Inothers,thepersonalburdenonthedefendantmustbereduced,whetherheisatfaultornot,byasystemthatredistributeslossesamongthosewhobenefitfromtheactivitiesthatcausethem.Inthatwayfullcompensationfortheplaintiffcanbeachieved,ascorrectivejusticedemands,whilethepersonalliabilityofthedefendantistemperedbylossdistribution.
(6)WhatLimitsShouldbePlacedontheExtentoftheDutytoCompensate?Retributiveanddistributivejusticearenottheonlymoralconsiderationsthatmaylimittheuntrammelledpursuitofcorrectivejustice.Threeotherreasonsarecommonlygivenforrestrictingthecompensationpayableintortactions:thescopeoftheruleviolated,theforeseeabilityoftheharmforwhichcompensationissought,andtheconductoftheplaintiff.Afourthismoreradical.Itissometimessaidthattortliabilityshouldbereplaced,entirelyoraboveacertainamount,byastatecompensationscheme,atleastincertainareasoflife.44Whatisthemoralstatusofthesearguments?
a.TheScopeoftheRuleViolatedArulemakingconducttortious,forexamplerequiringdangerousmachinerytobefenced,mayhavealimitedscope.Itmaybethat,properlyinterpreted,(p.91) theaimoftheruleistopreventpartsoftheemployeesbodyorclothescatchinginthemachineryratherthantopreventpartsofthemachineryflyingoutandinjuringsomeone.Thereisnothingspecialtotortlawaboutthisneedforinterpretation.Everyrulethatmakesconductwrongful,whetherincriminallaw,tortlaw,thelawofcontract,trustlaw,orwhatever,requiresinterpretationandtheinterpretationwillsetlimitstothescopeoftheruleinquestion.Whentheinterpretationexcludescertaintypesofharm,thepursuitof
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correctivejusticebytheuseofstatejudicialmachineryistothatextentruledout.Butisitjusttoexclude,forexample,certainoftheplaintiffseconomic,psychological,oremotionalinterestsfromthescopeofatortlawruleorfromtortlawasawhole?
Itseemsthatthestatemustbejustifiedinimposingsomelimitsonthetypeofharmforwhichcompensationmaybeclaimed.Torequirecompensationforeverytypeofharminthecontextofeveryruleoftortlawwouldtobeimposeaburdensomeliabilityondefendants.Itwouldbeinefficientwhen,especiallywithsometypesofharmdifficulttoascertain,thecostofimposingtortliabilitywouldmuchexceedthelikelybenefit.Thelegislatureandcourtsmustbeentitledtotaketheviewthatsomeinterestssay,wrongfullyinflictedbuttrivialpsychologicalharmdonotdeservethestatusofaright.Ofcourse,thestatemaymakemistakesinthesematters,butitmustsurelybejustified,indeedbound,tomarkoutsuchlimitsonliability.Ifthestateisboundtodecidewhatconductshouldbemadecriminalortortious,fallibleasitsjudgmentmaybe,itmustalsobeboundtofixthelimitsofresponsibilityforvarioustypesofharm.
b.TheForeseeabilityoftheHarmTheunforeseeabilityoftheharmforwhichcompensationisclaimedisoftenputforward,particularlyintortclaimsbasedonnegligence,asanindependentgroundforlimitingtheextentofthedefendantsliability.Thegroundforthislimitationissometimessaidtobethat,whentheliabilityisbasedonnegligentlyfailingtoforeseeandtakesstepstoavoidharm,theresultingliabilityshouldlogicallyberestrictedtotheharm,ortypeofharm,thatshouldhavebeenforeseen.Thus,ifthedefendantshouldhaveforeseenharmbyimpactaloneheshouldnotbeliablefortheharmbyfireorexplosionthatunexpectedlyresults.Thisargumentassumesthatthereisneveracaseforplacingtheriskofanunexpectedoutcomeonthepersonatfaultincreatingtherisk.45Theargumentisnomoreconvincingthantheviewthatwhereitisaconditionofliabilitythatthedefendantintendedharm,theharmforwhichheisliableshouldbeconfinedtowhatheintended.Theconditionsofliability(question(5)above)andtheextentofliability(thisquestion(6))presentsomewhatdifferentmoralandpolicy(p.92) issues.Buttheretributiveprincipledoesrequirearoughproportiontobepreservedbetweenthedegreeoffaultandtheburdenofthesanction.Toruleoutrecoveryforunforeseeableharm,orharmofanunforeseeabletype,enablescourtstolimittheextentoftheburden,thoughinasomewhatarbitrarywaygiventhefluidityofthecriteriausedtoidentifyunforeseeableharmaftertheevent.Butitmustbestressedthattheargumentforproportionalityweakenswhenthedefendantdoesnotpaythecompensationpersonally,asincasesofinsured,vicarious,andorganizationalliability,whichbulklargeintortliabilityfornegligence.
c.ConductandFaultofthePlaintiffCorrectivejusticesuggeststhatthedefendantsdutytocompensatetheplaintiffshouldbelimitedwhentheplaintiffsconduct,alongwiththatofthedefendant,isacauseoftheharm.Inthatcasetheplaintiffaswellasthedefendantisresponsiblefortheoutcome.Iftheyarebothresponsible,theplaintiffshouldbearpartofthelosshimself.Howgreat
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thatpartshouldbewilldependonwhethercausalcontributioncanbequantified.Thequestioniscontroversial,thoughinmyviewthenotionofcausalcontributionisacoherentone.46Ifcausalcontributioncanbeassessed,theplaintiffsclaim,fromtheviewpointofcorrectivejustice,shouldbereducedproportionatelytothatcontribution.Ifnot,retributiveprinciplesmustbetakenintoaccount.
Supposethattheplaintiffsconducthasnotmerelybeenacauseoftheharmalongwiththeconductofthedefendant,butthattheplaintiffhasbeenatfaultinbehavingashedid,orhasactedwithdeliberation.Shouldtheplaintiffsfaultordeliberationbarorreducehiscompensation?Theplaintiffmaybemorallydisentitledtosue,forinstancebecauseheconsentedtothedefendantsconductorintentionallyprovokedit.Moredifficultisthequestionhowfarhisrecoveryshouldbeaffectedbythefactthat,shortofintentionalprovocation,hisfaultcontributedtotheharmdone.Doestheexistenceofcontributoryfaultmodifytheclaimtocom-pensationonthebasisofcorrectivejustice?Toreducetheplaintiffsclaimfromwhatcorrectivejusticeonitsownwouldwarrantistoimposealossonhim.Theretributiveprinciplerequiresthelosstobenotdisproportion-atetohisfault.Thissetsalimittothepossibleextentofthereduction,butdoesnotsettlethequestionwhetherareductionproportionatetofaultismorallyrequired.Ifbothplaintiffanddefendantwereatfaultincausingtheharm,thestraightforwardretributiveprinciplewouldmakebothplaintiffanddefendantresponsibletoanextentroughlyproportionatetothegravityoftheirrespectivefaults.Puttingtheseconsiderationstogether,theplaintiffsclaim,whenbothheanddefendantareatfault,shouldbe(p.93) reducedbyanamountthatresultsinplaintiffanddefendantbearingashareofthelossroughlyproportionatetotheirrespectivefaults,butnotsoastoimposeontheplaintiffalossdisproportionatetohisfaultconsideredinisolation.Inpractice,thoselegalsystemsthatapportiondamagesforcontributorynegligenceadoptthesecriteria,orsomethingratherlikethem.
d.TheReplacementofTortLiabilitybyaStateSchemeofCompensationAccordingtoRichardWright,thereplacementoftortliabilitybyacompulsoryno-faultstatecompensationschemewouldbeinconsistentwithcorrectivejustice.47Itwouldfailtoimposethedutytocompensateonthepartywhooughttobearitandwouldimposeitonpersonswho,fromthepointofviewofcorrectivejusticeatleast,havenodutytobearit.Theeffectofsuchaschemeistotransferthewholeorpartofthedutytocompensatefromtheharm-doertothetaxpayerorthecontributorstoaninsur-ancefund.
Thereis,however,anargumentfordoingpreciselythis,basedonthejustdistributionofrisks.Ifitisfairforeveryonetohavetocontributethroughtaxestothedefenseofthecountry,sinceeveryoneinthecountrybenefitsfromitsbeingdefended,soitisfairforeveryonewhoownsordrivesavehicle,orwhobenefitsfromtheexistenceofatransportsystem,tocontributetotheaccidentcoststhatsuchasystemcarrieswithit.Toargueinthiswayissimplytoextendtoawidergroupthesortofargumentthatleadstoanemployerbeingheldliablefortheharmdonebyhisemployeewhenengagedinworkingforhim.Ofcoursethereisatechnicaldifferenceinthat,undertheimaginedstatescheme,theharm-doerwouldnotbeliableintort,whileinthelawofvicariousliabilityas
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itstandsinmostcountriestheemployeeremainsliableevenwhenhisemployerisvicariouslyliable.Butinpracticetheemployeeisnotsued,becausehewillusuallynotbeabletopaythedamages,ornotsoeasilyastheemployer,andusuallyhedoesnotevenpaytheinsurancepremiumthatcoverstheemployerspotentialliabilityforhisharmfulconduct.Itwouldhardlybeaninjusticetotakefromtheharm-sufferer(whoisentitledtocompensationfromanothersource)amerelytechnicalrighttosuetheharm-doer.
Thatisnottosaythatthereisamorallycompellingcaseforreplacingtortliabilitybyastatecompensationscheme.Todosowouldtendtounderminethesenseofpersonalresponsibilityofsomepotentialharm-doers,justasvicariousliabilitytendstounderminethesenseofpersonalresponsibilityofsomeemployees.Buttointroduceastatecompensationschemewouldnotinmyviewviolatecorrectivejustice.Theproprietyofcorrectivejusticedepends,Ihaveargued,onourtakingacertainviewaboutthejustdistributionofrisksinasociety,aviewforwhichindividual(p.94) outcome-responsibilityprovidesabasis.Butitispossibletotakeawiderviewabouthowrisksshouldbedistributed,atleastincertainareasoflife.Onecanarguethatthedistributionofrisks,frommotoringforexample,shouldtakeplaceatthelevelnotoftheindividualbutofthevehicle-owningpopulationorthewholecommunity.Thelevelatwhichrisksshouldbedistributedinaparticularareaofcommunitylifeseemspre-eminentlyamatterofpoliticaljudgement.
III.TheAnswersSummarizedAbriefsummaryofthesuggestedanswerstothesixquestionsdiscussedmaybehelpful:
(1)and(2)Bythetortsystemthestateaimstoreducetheincidenceofundesirableconductbytreatingcertainindividualinterestsasrightsandgivingtheright-holderthepowertoprotecthisrightsandobtaincompensationiftheyareinfringedbyundesirableconductmarkedasacivilwrong.
(3)Thestateisjustifiedinmaintaining,andprobablyinsubsidizing,atortsystemandaninstitutionalframework,includingcourts,togiveeffecttoit.
(4)Subjectto(5)and(6)below,tort-plaintiffsinprinciplearemorallyentitled,onthebasisofcorrectivejustice,torecoverdamagesfromtort-defendantswhohavewithoutjustificationpersonallycausedthemharm.Onawideview,correctivejusticerequiresthosewhohavewithoutjustificationharmedothersbytheirconducttoputthematterright,eveniftheywerenotatfault.Thereasonisthatweareresponsiblefortheoutcomeofourconduct(outcome-responsibility)andthatajustdistributionofrisksrequiresustomakegoodtheharmourconductcausestoothersinreturnforthebenefitandcreditthataccruestouswhenourplanscomeoff.Thecaseforimposingvicariousliabilityintortonemployersandorganizationswhohavenotpersonallycausedtheharmalsorestsonthejustdistributionofrisks.
(5)Butthepursuitofcorrectivejusticemustbetemperedbytheneedtokeepaproportionbetweentheburdenofcompensationthatfallsonadefendantpersonallyand
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thegravityofhisconduct.Therearecasesinwhichitisunjusttoholdthedefendantliableintheabsenceoffaultandinwhich,evenifheisatfault,theextentofhispersonalliabilityshouldbelimitedbylossspreading.Themoralbasisforproportionalityistheretributiveprinciple,whichrequiresthatthesanctionshouldnotbedisproportionatetothegravityoftheconductforwhichitisimposed.Theargumentforproportionalitydoesnotapply,orappliesmoreweakly,whentheliabilityisvicariousratherthanpersonal.
(p.95) (6)Thepursuitofcorrectivejusticeisalsotemperedbythedutyandpowerofthestatetodecidewhichharmsaretocountasinfringinglegalrights.Thestateisjustifiedinreducingorrefusingcompensationwhentheharmliesoutsidethescopeoftheruleoflawonwhichtheplaintiffreliesorwasofanunforeseeabletypetheriskofwhichshouldnotbeimposedonthedefendant.Whentheplaintiffsconductcontributestotheharmhesuffers,theextenttowhichhisclaimshouldbereduced,ifany,shouldbesettledaccordingtotheprinciplesofcorrectivejusticeandtheretributiveprinciple.Lastly,itwouldnotbeunjust,thoughitmightbeunwise,forthestatetoreplacetortliabilityincertainareasbyaschemeofno-faultinsurancebasedonthejustdistributionoflosses.Theprincipleofcorrectivejusticethatjustifiesthestraightforwardcasesoftortliability,inwhichthedefendanthaspersonallydonetheharm,hasthereforetobetemperedbyconsiderationsofdistributiveandretributivejusticethatlimittheextenttowhichitcanproperlybeapplied.(p.96)
Notes:(1)H.L.A.HART,PUNISHMENTANDRESPONSIBILITY:ESSAYSINTHEPHILOSOPHYOFLAW(1968),10.
(2)SeeRichardW.Wright,SubstantiveCorrectiveJustice,77IOWAL.REV.625(1992)(discussingespeciallytheworkofJulesL.ColemanandErnestJ.Weinrib).SeegenerallySymposium,CorrectiveJusticeandFormalismTheCareOneOwesOnesNeighbors,77IOWAL.REV.403(1992).
(3)See,e.g.,RichardA.Posner,WhatHasPragmatismtoOfferLaw,63S.CAL.L.REV.1653,1657,16623(1990).
(4)Tortlawimplementsavarietyofdifferentprinciplesandpolicies:JulesL.Coleman,TheMixedConceptionofCorrectiveJustice,77IOWAL.REV.427(1992)[hereinafterMixedConception],cfJulesL.Coleman,TortLawandtheDemandsofCorrectiveJustice,67IND.L.J.349,357(1992)[hereinafterTortLawandDemands].
(5)ErnestJ.Weinrib,TheCaseforaDutytoRescue,90YALEL.J.247,263(1980);GUIDOCALABRBSI,THECOSTSOFACCIDENTS:ALEGALANDECONOMICANALYSIS(1970),246,291308.Foraviewthatthisleavesminimalroomforthepursuitofefficiency,seeRichardW.Wright,TheEfficiencyTheoryofCausationandResponsibility:UnscientificFormalismandFalseSemantics,63CHI.-KENTL.REV.553,5627(1987).
(6)HART,supra,note1,at6.
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(7)SeeWright,supra,note2,at634,n.38.
(8)Theideathatthestatehasadutytosetoutandenforcecertainrightsofthecitizen,evenagainstitself.
(9)Wright,supra,note2,at6271.
(10)Theapplicationofcorrectivejusticetounjustgainsisnotdealtwithhere,thoughasimilaranalysiswouldbepossible.
(11)Onthiswrong-in-itselfview,whichIprefer,thedefendantsconductmaynotbewrongfulinitself,butcausingharmwithoutjustificationisneverthelessawrongthatgroundsaclaimforcompensation.JulesColemanexpressesitdifferently:[T]hedutytorepairwrongfullossesisgroundednotinthefactthattheyaretheresultofwrongdoing,butinthefactthatthelossesaretheinjurersresponsibility,theresultoftheinjurersagency:Coleman,MixedConception,supranote4,at443.UnlikeColeman,Iregardthetwoascorrelative:thelossesarewrongfulifandonlyifcausedbytheagentwithoutjustification.
(12)NEILMACCORMICK,LEGALRIGHTANDSOCIALDEMOCRACY(1982)212.
(13)ContrarytoColeman,TortLawandDemands,supra,note4,at366,Wrightarguesthatincaseswherecorrectivejusticerequirestherightfulpositiontoberestored,themodeofrectificationisimplicitinthegroundsofrecoveryandliability:seeWright,supra,note2,at683.But,unlesssettledbyaparticularlegalsystem,theprecisecontentofthevictimsrightandtheappropriatemodeofgivingeffecttoitagainsttheharm-doerseemsanopenquestion,thoughtherectificationmustbeadequateincontext.
(14)Wright,supra,note2,at703.
(15)NotentirelyabandonedinhisMixedConceptionarticle,supra,note4.
(16)See,e.g.,StephenR.Perry,TheMoralFoundationsofTortLaw,77IOWAL.REV.449,464,n.58(1992).
(17)Seeinfra,question(6).
(18)Seeinfraquestion(6).
(19)See,e.g.,Coleman,MixedConception,supra,note4,at4423;Perry,supra,note16,at497.
(20)Itakestrictliabilitytobeliabilitywithoutfault,whetherornotthedefendantwasengagedinadangerousactivity.Toengageinadangerousactivitygivesthelawareasontoimposestrictliabilityonthepersonengaginginit,butitdoesnotformpartofthedefinitionofstrictliability.Wright,interpretingAristotle,takesadifferentview,distinguishingbetweenstrictliabilityforriskandabsoluteliability:Wright,supra,note2,at
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697,n.335.ButareAristotlesunjustlossesnotsimplythosecausedbyanotherwithoutjustification,forexamplebyaccident,eveniftheconductdidnotapparentlycarrywithitanyspecialrisk?
(21)TonyHonor,ResponsibilityandLuck,104L.Q.R.530,541,5456(1988).
(22)Cf.Perry,supra,note16,at4889.Mythesiscanstandonitsownfeet.ButitisarguablethatAristotletookasimilarview,viz.,thatwrongful,mistaken,andaccidentalcon-duct(coveringbothfaultandstrictliability)causingharmtoothersobligestheharm-doertorepairtheharmasamatterofcorrectivejustice.Wright,supra,note2,at6978.
(23)Theothernegativehalfofourhistoryconcernswhathashappenedtous.
(24)Perry,supra,note16,at490.
(25)AsarguedbyWright,supra,note2,at682.
(26)TonyHonor,AreOmissionsLessCulpable?,inESSAYSFORPATRICKATIYAH(PeterCane&JaneStapleton(eds.),1991),31,3642.
(27)Thediscussionofoutcome-responsibilityherefitsananalysisofcausalconceptsbyHartandmyselfthatneednotberepeatedinthisessay:seegenerallyH.L.A.HART&TONYHONOR,CAUSATIONINTHELAW(2ded.1985),6883passim[hereinafterHART&HONOR].StephenPerrytreatsthisasananalysisofresponsibilityratherthancausation:seePerry,supra,note16,at503.Butsinceourapproachisregularlycriticizedforcontainingnormativeelementsthatareforeigntocausation,see,e.g.,id.,itisworthstressingthattheanalysisofcausalconceptsthatweputforward,thoughnotnormative,isfunctional.Thesecausalconceptstaketheshapetheydobecausetheyaretailored(ofcoursenotconsciously)tofitcertainpurposes,especiallyexplanationandtheattributionofresponsibility.Thosepurposesrequirethemtoincorporatecut-offpoints.Withoutcut-offpoints,bothbackwardandfor-ward,causalconceptswouldnotplaytheprominentroletheydoineverydaylife,becausetheywouldnotserveanyworthwhilepurpose.Buttheseconceptsarenotnormative:theyareneutralbetweendifferentwaysofbehavinganddifferentassessmentsofconduct.Thus,theresponsibilitythattheyservetoidentifyisasmuchresponsibilityforgoodconductandgoodoutcomesasforbadconductandbadoutcomes.
(28)AccordingtoJulesColeman,theimplicationofharmisthatalegitimateinterestoftheplaintiffhassuffered:seeColeman,TortLawandDemands,supra,note4,at350.
(29)Seeinfra,question(5).
(30)Widerinthesensethatreasonsotherthanfaultmaysupportadutytocompensate.
(31)Perry,supra,note16,at4901.
(32)ThisisnottoacceptNickelsargumentthatcorrectivejusticeappliesonlytothe
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impairmentofdistributivelyjustholdingsofgoods:seeJamesW.Nickel,JusticeinCompensation,18WM.&MARYL.REV.379,3813,3858(1976);cf.JulesL.Coleman,JusticeandtheArgumentforNo-Fault.3SOCIALTHEORY&PRACTICE161,174,180,n.19(1975)[hereinafterArgumentforNo-Fault],Correctivejusticeappliestoactualholdings,whetherornotthoseactualholdingsinjusticeoughttoberedistributedinwholeorparttoothermembersofthecommunity.
(33)Howfarthisresponsibilityshouldbetranslatedintostrictlegalliabilitydependsontheanswerstoquestions(5)and(6)infra.
(34)RichardWrightarguesthatcorrectivejusticerequirestheemployertocompensatethevictimforinjuriesthataretortiouslyinflictedinpursuanceoftheemployersobjectives:Wright,supra,note2,at674,n.219.But,ashehimselfrecognizes,id.at674,itisunjusttocompelsomeonetobeaninsurerforthefaultofanother,unlesshehasundertakentodoso(or,Iwouldadd,thejustdistributionofrisksrequireshimtodoso).Itseemsamerefictiontoarguethattheemployeesactisreallytheemployers,ormustbetreatedassuch.
(35)Offencesofnegligencesuchasnegligentwoundingandkillingareofcoursecommonerincivillawthancommonlawsystems,buttheyarebynomeansabsentfromthecommonlaw.
(36)StephenPerrysaysitisbasedonsomethingresemblingfault:seePerry,supra,note16,at504.Thedifferenceisbetweenwhatoneshouldnotinanycasedoandwhatonemaydoprovideditdoesnotturnouttobeharmfultoothers.
(37)SeegenerallyDavidG.Owen,TheMoralFoundationsofPunitiveDamag,40ALA.L.REV.705(1989).
(38)Orifhisemployerisvicariouslyliableforhisconductbutexercisesrightsofsubrogationagainsthiminpracticearareevent.
(39)SeegenerallyArgumentforNo-Fault,supra,note32,at1734;JulesL.Coleman,MentalAbnormality,PersonalResponsibilityandTortLiability,inMENTALILLNESS:LAWANDPUBLICPOLICY(BaruchA.Brody&H.TristramEngelhardt,Jr.(eds.),1980),107,11821,1234.CfJulesL.Coleman,TheMoralityofStrictTortLiability,18WM.&MARYL.REV.259,2834(1976).
(40)Forwhoseconducttheemployerproperlybearstheriskaccordingtoprinciplesofdistributivejustice.
(41)Itistruethatinpracticelegalsystemstendtoconfinevicariousliabilityofemployerstoaccidentsattributabletoemployeefault.
(42)AsColemanhaspointedout,theretributiveargumentsinfavoroffaultliabilityintortlawasitoperatesinpracticeareratherweak:ArgumentforNo-Fault,supra,note32,at16272.ButseeDavidG.Owen,TheFaultPit,26GA.L.REV.703(1992).
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(43)Honor,supra,note21,at536.
(44)AsinNewZealand,withrespecttoaccidents.
(45)HART&HONOR,supra,note27,at2595.
(46)HART&HONOR,supra,note27,at22535.
(47)Wright,supra,note2,at704.
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