The Moral Status of the Non-Human World

Baxter and Taylor

The Environment and Moral Standing An even more controversial expansion of

the concept of moral standing attempts to extend it to biological (a rare fungi) or non-living features (a wild mountain stream) of the natural world, or even to the interconnected whole of nature.

As always we want to ask both if such things have moral standing, and if they do, what are our obligations to them.

4 Perspectives on Moral Standing As we've now seen, the question of the

limits of the moral community (of where DMS ends) has been answered in a variety of (increasingly expansive) ways:

1. Anthropocentrism: All and only human beings have DMS;

2. Sentientism: Singer: all sentient creatures have DMS;3. Biocentrism: All living things, because they are living,

have DMS;4. Ecocentrism: because of their integral, functional

character, ecosystems have DMS.

Ethics and the Environment If something like an environmental

ethics is possible, either biocentrism or ecocentrism has to be true.

An Environmental Ethic must include (ala Regan):

1. A commitment to the DMS of non-human beings;

2. The assumption that consciousness is not a necessary condition for DMS.

Baxter, "People or Penguins" Baxter begins by suggesting what he thinks

is an appropriate general framework for addressing questions that have broad social significance, like that of the moral status of the environment:

○ Spheres of freedom: freedom from interference where such freedom does not interfere with freedom of others.

○ Waste is a bad thing.○ Humans should be viewed as ends, not means.○ As part of respect owed to each human being, each

individual should be given the opportunity and incentive to improve their situation.

DDT and Penguins The case of DDT gives Baxter on

opportunity to apply his framework. Baxter makes it clear that the negative

impact of DDT in Penguins (interrupting reproduction and thus threatening population) does not necessarily imply that we should stop using DDT.

Why? The only appropriate criteria are oriented toward "people, not penguins" (514c2).

Anthropocentrism Baxter offers an example of an anthropocentric

approach to environmental ethics. For Baxter, this is the only tenable starting point:

○ Most people think and act like this.○ Doesn't necessarily imply mass destruction of nature.

Humans act as surrogates for non-human life.

○ Only starting point that provides workable solutions. Only humans vote so only humans count in social decision making.

○ Contrary position theoretically untenable—how can animals be ends and how can they express their preferences?

○ Nature has no normative dimension. Normativity restricted to humans. Any normative implications make necessary reference to human desire. What is clean air? What is polluted air? These questions are only meaningful in a particular human context.

What are we left with? A set of trade-offs, where we seek to

maximize in a rationally appropriate way, the benefits produced by our expenditure of resources.

Pollution control is just one, not necessarily the most important, expenditure.

What we should be seeking is not pure air or water, but optimally polluted air and water.

Taylor, "Ethics of Respect" Taylor defends a biocentric environmental

ethic. Taylor argues for the view that all living

things have inherent value, and so are deserving of equal moral respect.

He grounds his view in the idea of "Respect for Nature", which is an extension of the Kantian principle of Respect for Persons.

Biocentrism, not Ecocentrism Taylor clarifies his position by distinguishing it from

an ecocentric view. The 'balance of nature' does not lead us to any

moral principles. Rather, the good or well-being of all individual living things is of primary concern (so it is not anthropocentric either).

There may be duties which require us to protect ecological systems (which thus have for Taylor Indirect Moral Standing), but these are only indirect duties to the individual living things that inhabit the ecological system.

We Need a New Attitude.

Taylor argues that a biocentric ethic can be justified only when we take on a new kind of moral attitude.

This is the attitude that all living things, and not only humans, have a good of their own (that is, not relative to our good) and that they have inherent worth.

A Biocentric Outlook on Nature Underlying this attitude is a biocentric ecological

outlook, the key idea of which is the interdependence of living things.

1. Humans are merely members of the biotic community.

2. All ecosystems are built up of a web of interconnected and interdependent organisms.

3. Each individual living thing is "conceived of as a teleological center of life" -- i.e., with its own goals, its own "biological function."

4. Humans are not in any way superior to other living things.