The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders How to Function in the Edge of Chaos

8/10/2019 The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders How to Function in the Edge of Chaos

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HOMELAND SECURITYAFFAIRS

THE JOURNAL OF THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY

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HOMELANDSECURITYAFFAIRS,VOLUME 8,ARTICLE 8(JUNE 2012)WWW.HSAJ.ORG
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The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident CommandersHow to Function in the Edge of Chaos

Cynthia Renaud

ABSTRACT

The National Incident Management System(NIMS) has become a subject of controversy,as many practitioners find severe limitationswith the systems field effectiveness. To label

NIMS a complete failure and look for adifferent response tool would be rash and

premature. A deeper exploration of NIMSshows that it is very useful in structuringresponse efforts for large-scale incidents, butonly in later operational periods, when a

certain amount of order has been restored.The NIMS failure point, however, is that itoffers limited help to those first-arrivingresponders who must deal with the initialchaos inherent at the outset of every scene.This article explores the dynamics of theinitial edge-of-chaos that characterizes the

first phase of every large-scale incident andoffers recommendations for additions to

NIM S th at wi ll bet te r prep are fi rst -responding incident commanders to worktheir way through that chaos and laterapply the NIMS process with purpose.

INTRODUCTION

Public safetys handling of large-scaleincidents is always judged by how well theyended. How many lives were saved or lost?How much property was lost or destroyed?How quickly was the affected communityreturned to normal? Some response effortsare judged kindly (Oklahoma City Bombing),some mercilessly (Hurricane Katrina), andothers reveal learning points and spark

national growth in the discipline (9/11).Critiques of New York Citys response

efforts to the cataclysmically overwhelmingevents on September 11, 2001 can be found inmany sources.1 Through a fairly surgicaldissection of 9/11 that benefits from theclarity of hindsight, two main points haveemerged: (1) the lack of interoperablecommunication severely hindered response

efforts; and (2) there was little cross-discipline coordination, and no framework inplace to foster or create the ad hocorganization needed to respond to such amassive event.

Having these tangibles to tackle, thefederal government has given large amountsof Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)grant funds to local agencies as they furthertheir regional interoperability goals. It hasalso created and mandated the use of theNational Incident Management System(NIMS) as the framework all agencies mustuse when responding to large-scale events.The first-responder community has beengalvanized to address these two main points,subsequently focusing on the ancillaryequipment and training necessities that goalong with them. Over the past ten years,

working on just these two points has becomequite a cottage industry in and of itself.

But something is missing in this critique.We have looked at the parts so individuallyand specifically that we have divorced them

from the context in which they need to beconsidered. The question, considered on thenational stage, of how does one attempt totackle a spontaneous event the size of 9/11?has resulted in an over-zealous focus on

breaking down that event into manageableparts. In doing so, we have gone after the l o w - h a n g i n g f r u i t o f i m p r o v e dcommunication, radio interoperability,uniform planning forms, and creating acommon language among responders. Wehave created checklists and terms. But wehave not yet taken a step back to consider the

problem as thinking practitioners.

IMPETUS FOR THE CREATION OF THENATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENTSYSTEM

After 9/11, Homeland Security PresidentialDirectives (HSPD) 5 and 8 mandatedestablishment and implementation of the

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National Incident Management System(NIMS) as the standard that all firstresponders must use when handling large-scale incidents. The stated purpose of HSPD5 is To enhance the ability of the UnitedStates to manage domestic incidents by

establishing a single, comprehensive nationalincident management system. 2 Two keypoints in the HSPD 5 policy section standout:

(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security isthe principal Federal official for domesticincident management. Pursuant to theHomeland Security Act of 2002, theSecretary is responsible for coordinatingFederal operations within the United Statesto prepare for, respond to, and recoverfrom terrorist attacks, major disasters, andother emergencies. The Secretary shall

coordinate the Federal Governmentsresources utilized in response to orrecovery from terrorist attacks, majordisasters, or other emergencies if and whenany one of the following four conditionsapplies: (1) a Federal department or agencyacting under its own authority hasrequested the assistance of the Secretary;(2) the resources of State and localauthorities are overwhelmed and Federalassistance has been requested by theappropriate State and local authorities; (3)more than one Federal department oragency has become substantially involved

in responding to the incident; or (4) theSecretary has been directed to assumeresponsibility for managing the domesticincident by the President.

(6) The Federal Government recognizesthe roles and responsibilities of State andlocal authorities in domestic incidentmanagement. Initial responsibility formanaging domestic incidents generally fallson State and local authorities. The FederalGovernment will assist State and localauthorities when their resources areoverwhelmed, or when Federal interests areinvolved.3

These two sections need to be evaluatednot so much for what they say, but moreimportantly for what they dontsay, and forthe vast, unexplored terrain they create. Forin these two policy sections, HSPD 5 says thatlocals are responsible for handling the initial

phase of large-scale event response. Whenthat event gets so big, as described in the four

subsections of policy item #4, then thefederal government comes in to help andNIMS is deployed. Clearly, by the time thefederal government assets arrive on scene,the event will be well past its initial phase andinto later operational periods. And it is at this

point that HSPD 5 says NIMS will be able tomanage effectively the ad hoc organizationcreated to respond to the event. And HSPD 5is probably correct.

HSPD 8 goes on to elaborate on the statedpurpose of NIMS:

[To] prevent and respond to threatened oractual domestic terrorist attacks, majordisasters, and other emergencies byrequiring a national domestic all-hazardsp r e p a r e d n e s s g o a l , e s t a b l i s h i n gmechanisms for improved delivery ofFederal preparedness assistance to State

and local governments, and outliningactions to strengthen preparednessassistance to State and local governments,and outlining actions to strengthenpreparedness capabilities of Federal, State,and local entities.4

HSPD 8 is an all hazards approach topreparedness, prevention, and response. Itdefines several terms, including firstresponder. First responders are those whoin the early stages of an incident (italicsadded) are responsible for the protection andpreservation of life, property, evidence, and

the environment. 5Taken in total, then, HSPD 5 and 8 both

realize that local first responders will be theones handling major events at their outset.Both HSPD tacitly understand that there isan initial phase of every event and thatfederal resources will probably not be calledin until after this initial phase has passed.

And yet, these HSPD mandate the use of aNIMS that does not address this initial phaseof an event clearly enough to help firstresponders work their way through it.

Because the HSPD do mandate that all localstrain and be proficient in NIMS and use itduring response efforts to large-scale events,many in the first-responder communitycomplain that NIMS does not work. Is it fairto label NIMS a failure, or should we perhapsconsider what piece now missing could, ifadded, make it a useful tool?

RENAUD,THE MISSING PIECE OF NIMS 3

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STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONALINCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Consider how NIMS looks when in use. Basedon the Incident Command System (ICS), itestablishes sections, divisions, and branches,

and describes the job duties of each. It is amanagement organization that can expand orshrink based on the size and complexity ofthe incident. In its most basic form, it givesan incident commander the responsibility form a n a g i n g t h e a d h o c r e s p o n d i n gorganization. It establishes an operationssection chief to order the troops carrying outthe mission decided upon by the incidentcommander, planned by the planning sectionchief, supported by the logistics section chief,and paid for through the finance sectionchief.

If the incident or event happens in a cityw i t h a s t at e -of - t h e -ar t De part me ntOperations Center or Emergency OperationsCenter, all of these people come together in aroom wired with flat screen televisions to

watch the event unfold on the news. Phones,

radios, and computers are connected so theycan talk to each other and to their troops inthe field. All the ICS forms they need are in atemplate on the computer, ready to be filledout for federal compliance and possible laterreimbursement. Anyone who has been in one

of these rooms during a large-scale event orincident, whether planned or unplanned,knows that it quickly becomes quite a

bureaucratic machine.To help manage an event, NIMS creates

operational periods, usually twelve hours inlength, so that incident commanders canconsider the event in specific, shorter timeframes. Each operational period begins witha briefing so that mission objectives can bedefined, or re-defined, and communicationamong all levels of the ICS organization can

be fostered. These operational periods help

NIMS operate in a very linear fashion, fromthe outset of the event through the responseefforts and into recovery. It forces the eventand response efforts into a sort of organized,chronological timeline, as represented below.

"#$%& "#$%& '(%)*+%, "%)!"#$#%$#&" '()#$ #"$& +(,-%$#&"%) .,-#&/0 &1 23,"$ 4,5&6#)#7%$#&"

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Figure 1. Event/Incident Chronological Timeline Representation

While this looks good on paper, every firstresponder knows that no event is so neatly orquickly organized. Consider that NIMS wasused to structure the organization created tohandle Hurricane Katrina. Does anyone in

the first-responder community considerthose initial response efforts an unmitigatedsuccess?

Perhaps it is unfair to judge NIMSeffectiveness by such catastrophic events asHurricane Katrina or something akin to the9/11 attack. Truly, events of that type are solarge, so unimaginable, so horrific to handle,that no first responder could adequately

provide any sort of immediate, effectivemanagement. Yet someone must.

NIMS instruction for the first responderstates that he/she must size up the incidentand then, as quickly as possible, resolve it.6

After this brief mention, the remaining thrustof NIMS is focused on creating theorganization that manages those working toresolve the issue. Little attention is paid tohow one must first size up the incident. TheNIMS focus on resolving the issue withoutfirst understanding it can lead to inaccuratedirection and potential loss of life andproperty.




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THE MISSING PIECE OF THE NATIONALINCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

What is the missing piece of NIMS? Toanswer this question, we must first considerone all-important, never-talked-about, fact

regarding the culture of our discipline. Asfirst responders, we are supposed to be calm,cool, and collected at all times. Nothingshould faze us, nothing should scare us, andnothing should jolt us out of our comfortzone. We arrive, we solve the problem, we gohome. In some sense, NIMS has incorporatedthat cultural philosophy into its content. TheNIMS calmly discusses how forms are filledout and checklists are followed in order torestore order.

What NIMS does not discuss in enoughdetail is that when first responders are called

to a large-scale event, they can arrive to thesounds of gunfire, screaming or mortally

wo unde d pe op le , fires rag in g, crow dsrushing, mobs forming, and other officers orfirefighters so overcome by events that theycannot function. Responders are confronted

with having to understand this utterlyconfusing problem and then somehow solveit. In short, first-responding incidentcommanders arrive to a scene of completechaos.

Every first responder knows this initialphase exists. Retired Los Angeles Police

Department Deputy Chief Mike Hillmanncalls it The Golden Hour. 7 Other firstresponders probably have their own term forit. But while everyone knows it exists, fewdiscussions focus on it. And no organizationtrains its incident commanders how tofunction in it, how to understand it, and howto end it.

Also never acknowledged is that this chaosis a normal, natural part of the event.Because this is not routinely taught orpracticed, first-arriving incident commandersfeel a push to end the chaos immediately andif they cannot do so, believe they areineffective failures. This can result in incidentcommanders taking action even if they arenot quite sure yet what they have or whatthey should be trying to accomplish. Thesefirst actions, taken for the sake of appearingefficient and effective, can lead eventresponse efforts down drastically wrongpaths and ultimately cost lives.

Wh at tr ul y de te rm in es an inc id entcommanders final success in restoring orderis how effectively he/she can understand

wh at is happeni ng in the cha os anddetermine a course of action. How quicklycan he or she work through a mental process

that asks and answers the followingquestions?

What has happened here?

What have I never seen before; what

is completely foreign to me?

What have I seen before; what is

familiar to me?

What do I know?

What do I need to know?

Once these questions are answered, the

incident commander can then consider:

What do I wantto do?

What do I haveto do?

What canI do?

Once these questions are answered, anorder emerges from the chaos and theincident commander can consider the last,most important question:

What am I trying to accomplish

here?

From here, the forms, checklists, andorganization of NIMS can structure aresponse to the event and bring order tochaos. But without dealing with thesequestions first, response efforts will either failor be seriously misguided. Without them,field practitioners operate by what retiredLong Beach Police Department LieutenantSteve Nottingham calls check-box tactics.8

The NIMS must expand to include a full,complete discussion of this first phase ofchaos. It must teach ways to think throughthe problem at hand and apply process withpurpose. It must find a way to teach theseskills to incident commanders. This is thecrucial, missing piece of NIMS.




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THE CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK: ADIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE INCONSIDERING THE LIFE OF AN INCIDENT

The NIMS currently offers a linear,chronological timeline upon which to

structure event response efforts. Consider,though, if the premise of the Cynefinframework might be more a more applicabletool. 9 Cynefin (pronounced ku-ne-vin) is a

Welsh word that signifies the multiple factorsin our environment and our experience thatinfluence us in ways we can neverunderstand. 10 David J. Snowden has

borrowed this term and applied it to aframework of his creation that separates thedifferent spheres in which leaders operateinto the following contexts: simple (orknown), complicated (or knowable),

complex, and chaotic.

Figure 2:Depictionof the Cynefin Framework11

Having done a great deal of research intothe characteristics of each context, Snowdendistilled the leaders job within each of these

contexts and determined danger signals thatindicate when a leader is not functioningproperly within that context as well as wayshe or she can respond to these danger signalsto ward off disaster. This framework, andSnowdens subsequent research relating to it,is intended to help leaders operate moreeffectively in whichever context they findthemselves.

Snowden has been apply ing thisframework to governments, industries,

businesses, and fire responders for the pastdecade. He believes that the purpose of theCynefin Framework is to help leadersdeterminethe prevailing operative context so

they can make appropriate choices.12

Recently, it has also been applied to helpunderstand the field of homeland security as

well. Christopher Bellavita describes itscomponent parts as follows. 13

1. The known: a space where cause andeffect are understood and predictable,hence everyone knows what to do aboutthe issue.

2. The knowable: a space where cause andeffect relationships may be difficult to

derive or understand, but researchers andexperts given sufficient time andresources can determine.

3. The complex: a space where one knowscause and effect only retrospectively.

What appears logical after the fact i.e.,when the dots have been connected isbut one of many other logical outcomesthat could have occurred.

4. The chaotic: a space so turbulent thatc a u s e a n d e f f e c t a r e u n k n o w n ;strategically, it is not clear what to do withany measure of certainty.1

Instead of using the linear approach(presented earlier in Figure 1) to evaluatere s po n s e e f fo r t s i ma gi n e , i n s t e a d ,understanding the life of an event as seenthrough the lens of the Cynefin Framework.

Analyzing the response to a large-scale eventthrough this framework shows that the TheGolden Hour exists in the realm of thechaotic. Here, the forms, structure, and

checklists of NIMS are of little use. As anincident commander effectively worksthrough the chaos, or what Sid Heal details inhis book Tactical Primer as fog andfriction, 14the event gives way to a phase ofcomplexity. Now the incident commandercan begin to establish some of the NIMSpositions and responsibilities that can assistin restoring full order, such as Operations,Logistics, Planning, and Intelligence. Then,




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as the event subsides into the knowable, theNIMS organization is now valuable inmanaging the organizational structure.Finally, the known realm offers that place

where NIMS can supervise the business ofrecovery.

THE EDGE OF CHAOS

Another, complementary way to consider theproblem of response efforts during the initialphase of chaos is through an analogy usingthe edge of chaos. 15 Molecular biologyresearch has defined the edge of chaos as aplace on the edge of every living cell whereactors and agents interact with each otherand their environments in seeming chaos anddisorder. 16 In this space, the interactionsaffect the life or death of the cell. In this

space, a self-created order emerges from thechaos.

Based on this definition, the edge of chaosis a place one can be in, and a place thatremains in existence until order emerges. Ifactors and agents (suspects, victims, officers,firefighters) can interact appropriately withtheir environment (scene of the event,

weather conditions, crowd formations, mediaattention, elected officials responding to thescene), then order can begin to emerge fromthe chaos. This chaos is that white space

between the words in HSPD 5; that initialperiod when the local first responder is onscene before federal assets arrive and theNIMS is stood up to manage the organizationrespondingto the event.

This analogy means that the first-responder community must look at how,holistically, they can establish ways toinfluence these actors and their environmentduring that crucial, initial period. But thisapproach must be based on overarching,main point beliefs, not a NIMS checklist ofitems to be accomplished by each ICS section

position. To work effectively in the edge ofchaos, or the golden hour, actions must bebased on the following tenets.

WORKING IN THE EDGE OF CHAOS

Like the national defense effort described inchapter 1, the emergency response to theattacks on 9/11 was necessarily improvised.

In New York, the FDNY, NYPD, the PortAuthority, WTC employees, and the buildingoccupants themselves did their best to cope

with the effects of an unimaginablecatastrophe unfolding furiously over a mere102 minutes for which they were

unprepared in terms of both training andmindset. 17

THE FIRST TENET OFWORKING INCHAOS: FIND THE RIGHT INCIDENTCOMMANDER

Not every person can be a doctor. Not everyperson is geared toward being an engineer.Not every police officer will make an excellentdetective. And not every police officer, high-ranking or not, can be an effective incident

commander. In the ideal situation, agenciesdetermine well ahead of a large-scale eventw h i c h o f t h e i r c o m m a n d s t a f f a r eexperienced, educated, and trained forassuming the role of incident commander. Inthe next-to-best case scenario, agenciesdispense with niceties and remove from thescene of the event those officers who trulycannot function in this role. In the reality ofthe middle ground we occupy, agenciesusually go with the theory that hope is indeeda strategy, and they just hope that the rightperson is on-duty when a major incident

happens. In most agencies, help will beshortly on the way as tactical teams andcommand teams are called out from home,

but the work done by the first arrivingincident commander in that golden hour

will certainly set the initial tone, pace, anddirection of the response efforts.

In The Unthinkable, Amanda Ripleydedicates a section to finding the rightperson, entitled Special Forces Soldiers AreNot Normal. 18 She details what CharlesMorgan III, an associate clinical professor ofpsychiatry at Yale University, found after

fifteen years of studying how people arep h y s i c a l l y , p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , a n dphysiologically wired differently. Somepeople with certain chemical make-ups andpsychological profiles react efficiently andeffectively under extreme stress, while otherscannot optimally function in such anenvironment.




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He found that blood samples of specialforces soldiers and enlisted militaryservicemen who fare well in survival schoolshowed higher levels of the chemicalneuropeptide Y, a compound that helps onestay focused on tasks performed under

stressful conditions. These soldiers reportedfew-to-no incidents of disassociation inevents they had endured up to that time.Some psychological profiles indicated most ofthem had suffered through difficultchildhoods or previous traumatic events.Morgans research, in total, explained whynot all soldiers are alike and why some canendure stressfully chaotic situations betterthan others. Applying this finding to lawenforcement officers is not a far stretch.Clearly, the implications of these findings forlocal first responders working in the chaos of

early large-scale response efforts arewidespread.

The NIMS is a useful frameworkcomprised of section descriptions, checklists,and job duties that most people can be taughtto apply in managing complicated incidents.However, the unique skills, abilities and evenchemical-physiological makeup that compriseeffective incident commanders probablycannot be taught or cultivated in every firstresponder, but rather must be developed inthose found to possess the natural proclivityfor performance under stress.

THE SECOND TENET OFWORKING INCHAOS: NOT EVERY INCIDENT HAS APLAY BOOK! SOMETIMES YOU JUSTNEED TO THINK19

How does one think when confronted witha scene that could encompass masses ofinjured people, hurt first responders,environmental destruction, conflictinginformation, and the stubborn refusal of thatincident to bend, initially, to the playbook

checklists supplied in the NIMS forms andsection responsibilities? Law enforcementliterature and teaching curricula are curiouslysilent on this topic. Yet it must be explored ifpublic safety is to better handle the next 9/11or Hurricane Katrina.

Karl Weick has researched this question asit pertains to emergency response, andframed answers using the concept of

sensemaking the way human beings makesense out of complex situations. It is thesociological study of how people confrontingchaotic, challenging events manage to work

with and through the myriad components tobring some sort of resolution and calm to a

turbulent or uncertain situation. To engagein sensemaking is to construct, filter, frame,create facticity and render the subjective intosomething more tangible. 20

When shouldsensemaking be used? Notevery situation one confronts is problematic.Many everyday events follow known, readilyu n d e r s t o o d p a t t e r n s a n d o r d e r s .S e n s e m a k i n g i s n e c e s s a r y w h e n apractitioner confronts a situation falling intothe Cynefin framework area of complex orchaotic. When the practitioners goal is tomove that situation out of these realms and

into the complicated, and eventually theunderstandably simple, he or she mustengage in sensemaking. As Weick describesit, In order to convert a problematicsituation to a problem, a practitioner must doa certain kind of work. He must make senseof an uncertain situation that initially makesno sense. 21This type of situation presents adaunting task in which known methods rarelyprovide applicable resolutions because thesituation is new and untested. And so,

Sensemaking begins with the basic

question, is it still possible to take thingsfor granted? And if the answer is no, if ithas become impossible to continue withautomatic information processing, then thequestion becomes, why is this so? And,

what next?22

Sociologists and social anthropologistshave found that East and West appear toapproach problems differently. P.E. Druckerfound that the West focuses on the answertoa problem where the East focuses on definingthe question . 23 Sensemaking causespractitioners first to define the question and,

in doing so, to consider how the various partscan work together to frame the answer. TheNIMS, as a framework, rightly focuses on theanswerto a crisis situation. Because it meansto impose order as quickly as possible, itoffers a robust management structure toperpetuate order. Defined managementpositions break an incident into workablepieces so that one person or group can focus




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on logistical tracking, another on intelligencegathering and dissemination, another still onoperational and tactical concerns, et cetera.

But what of defining the question? Whendo practitioners responding to the initialphase of a large-scale event have the

opportunity to first define the question?What are they trying to accomplish at thatparticular scene? How did this happen? Whattype of enemy are they facing? Is there still anactive force inside the event that must beneutralized, or is the event past that and arelife-saving measures the main focus? Thesequestions, and many others like them, mustfirst be considered and answered so the veryapplicable structure of NIMS can effectivelymove the event further toward the Cynefinrealm of simple. Without answers to thesequestions, incident commanders and first

responders could make missteps costing livesor delaying the apprehension of dangeroussuspects.

THE THIRD TENET OFWORKING INCHAOS: MANIPULATION ANDIMPROVISATION ARE NOT DIRTY WORDS

Imagine a large earthquake in the SouthernCalifornia area; a terrorist event in the Los

Angeles/ Long Beach Por t co mplex; aMumbai style attack in a crowded tourist

area. From the outset, a host of policeofficers, fire fighters, private security, media,innocent bystanders, critically wounded

victims, business firms, politicians, and ahost of other entities will implode on thescene and create an ad hoc working group

with all representatives dependent upon eachother for survival and a successfulconclusion. In the eye of this hurricane,however, will be one person carrying the 500-t o n w e i g h t o f t h e t i t l e I n c i d e n tCommander. In any of these events, one factstands out: the incident commander (most

likely a law enforcement officer) will becharged with making disparate groups worktogether toward a common goal. Most ofthese groups do not work for the lawenforcement agency and cannot be orderedto act in a particular way. In this situation,the ability to manipulate people, things, andevents can be the difference between successand failure.

The Oxford English Dictionary definesmanipulate as being able to handle; esp.

with dexterity. 24One way of considering theskill of manipulation during incidentcommand is to look at Mike Hillmanns ideasabout in extremis decision making and in

extremis leadership; the latter is defined asgiving purpose, direction and motivation topeople where there is eminent physicaldanger and where followers believe thatleader behavior will influence their physical

well-being or survival. 25

Based on a several-decade career ofresponding to large-scale incidents, Hillmannhas found the challenges for the incidentcommander working in the initial phase ofchaos involve the reality of: imminent deathor serious bodily injury; problems withcontrol versus truecommand; overwhelmed

by events (OBE) and the inability to react;confusion and ambiguous and conflictinginformation; environmental problems (suchas noise, destruction, death, chaos, dark, wet,uncertainty); competitive issues of time andpriority; a lack of think time; and the weightof the consequences resulting from success orfailure. 26 Hillmann further believes that theeffective incident commander must be: calmin the face of danger; focused; possess theability to prioritize; have a positive attitude;

be decisive and relentless in achievingobjectives; apply experience from priorassignments; be able to set aside his or herego; be in good physical condition; have theability to overcome obstacles; and anticipate/manage change.27 The successful incidentcommander must fulfill the followingexpectations those in the event have of him orher: assume command; focus on the missionand get it done; establish priorities;determine objectives; define expectations;maintain situational awareness; trustsubordinates; constantly evaluate andreadjust; at the right time, develop incident

organization (ICS); and be decisive.28

I saved decisive for last. It appears a littleearlier on Hillmanns bullet-point list, but itprovides a nice segue into another topic fewpeople like to discuss openly, for it seemssomewhat akin to calling for treason againstthe King. But here it is: some of us (and whenI say us I mean ranking officials in lawenforcement agencies who will be called uponas incident commanders in large-scale




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events) are not good at making decisions.Some of us are simply incapable of makingdecisions quickly. Its not our fault, really.Once we hold rank in a police department we

become managers as well as leaders. Wehave to learn to work with our fellow

command officers, liaise with electedofficials, accommodate community groups,mediate employee problems, mete outdiscipline, work through union meet-and-confer issues, et cetera. All of that teaches usto make decisions carefully and thoughtfullyi n o u r d a y - t o - d a y b u s i n e s s l i f e .Unfortunately, that carefully developed skill carried over into responding to the initialchaos of a large-scale incident could provedisastrous.

We all remember from our PoliceAcademy recruit training days that how we

train translates to how we perform in thefield. We, as leaders, must train ourselvesdaily to make decisions. Even if the decisionsare small, do not put off until tomorrow what

you can decide upon today. That way ofthinking and acting will carry over intoactions taken and decisions made at theoutset of large-scale events. This seeminglysmall point is a vitally important one.

Finally, because it has been establishedthat checklists will not work in chaos, onemust ask, then, what is the opposite of achecklist? The answer is improvisation andcreativity. Weick asserts: What we do notexpect under life-threatening pressure iscreativity. 29However, when confronted witha situation never exactly encountered before(e.g., 9/11) or one of an unfathomablemagnitude (e.g., Hurricane Katrina), thesuccessful f irst responding incidentcommander must employ creativity andimprovisation as quickly as possible.

THE FOURTH TENET OFWORKING INCHAOS: FIND LEVERAGE POINTS ANDCREATE MENTAL SLIDES

Leverage points are the starting point forinsightful problem solving, the focus for

building a solution. 30Leverage points can bespecific things, events or people. They canrise from relationships established long

before the event occurs and involve socialcapital. As defined by Don Cohen and Larry

Prusak inIn Good Company, social capital isthe stock of active connections amongpeople; the trust, mutual understanding, andshared values and behaviors that bind them e m b e r s o f h u m a n n e t w o r k s a n dcommunities and make cooperative action

possible.31

Finding leverage points in thechaos can help incident commanders work torestore normalcy.

Finding leverage points means that onefirst needs to be able to recognize them andthen understand what to do with them in thecontext of that situation. How does thishappen? Arjen Boin and others researchedresponse efforts to several national, large-scale incidents for their book The Politics ofCrisis Managementand found the following:

Experienced incident commanders rarelyarrive at situational assessments throughan e xpl i c i t c o n s c i o u s pro c e s s o fdeliberation, as researchers of many stripesand colors were long wont to assume.Professional commanders of this kind havedeveloped a rich store of experience and arepertoire of tactics upon which they draw

when confronting a critical incident. Theminds of these crisis commanders work likea mental slide carousel containingsnapshots of a wide variety of contingenciesthat they have encountered or learnedabout. When they find themselves in a newsituation, this is immediately compared

with their stored experiences. This mentalslide carousel quickly revolves until anadequate match is found. Each slidecontains not only an image of the situation

but also a recipe for action.32

Incident commanders with a vast store ofthese mental slides recognize leveragepoints and use them to their advantage. Buthow do we create such slides among ourcommunity of first-responding incidentcommanders? Anyone who has endured theICS 100, 200, 300, 700, or 800 classroomlectures knows that the current NIMS

training model certainly does not support thecreation or use of mental slides. And it isimportant, here, to differentiate betweeneducation and training. Where trainingmolds ones brain to perform a specific taskin a way an outside influence wants itperformed, education enables the person tothink for him/herself. First responders need

both training and education to perform their




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jobs effectively. Unfortunately, in police workand firefighting, the emphasis is mostly ontraining and much less on education.

Although NIMS is useful training, it lacks theeducational component needed to make iteffective for event response.

Such a vast area of need within the firstresponder community must be immediatelyaddressed. This article will recommend waysto train and educate incident commanders t0create, enhance, and strengthen the mentalslides needed to respond to the initial phaseof chaos inherent in large-scale incidents.

THE FIFTH TENET OFWORKING INCHAOS:THE PARTYALREADYSTARTEDYOURE LATE

Another importan t poin t all inci de ntcommanders must remember is that whenthey arrive at the scene of large-scale eventthey are, indeed, late. Whenever they arrive,others who were there at the outset were, in asense, part of that cataclysmic incident trained first responders or civilians andcitizens caught in the vortex of being indecidedly the wrong place at the wrong time.

In certain situations, though, thesevictimized people might be acting heroically.They might be further along in thesensemaking process than the arriving

incident commander is or can be. Withwhatever little piece of their contributingcomplexity making up the chaos that theyhave latched on to, they might very well bedoing something right. They might be doingsomething positive in one little area that willstart a chain reaction among other aspects ofthe chaos. Arriving incident commandersoften blunder by stopping those actions and

breaking that forward momentum becausethey do not understand what is going on.They feel extremely uncomfortable andunable to make any sense of the situation

until they have been fully briefed. Theirquest for situational awareness and theirneed to feel and be seen as in commandof the situation can cause them to interfere

with positive action at the event.While it seems counterintuitive to the

need to take immediate and decisive action, agood incident commander will take amoment to go through some simple, cognitive

sensemaking steps on arrival. He/she willthink, what has happened here? What am Itrying to accomplish? What do I recognize inthis event? What have I never seen or heardabout before? What do I know? What do Ineed to know? What can I begin to do? In

doing this, the incid ent commanderschallenge is to catch up to the event, notattempt to stop the quickly spinning carouselof chaos so he/she can step on to participatein the ride.

CHANGING POLICE CULTURE:MULTI-ASSAULT COUNTER TERRORIST

ACTION CAPABILITIES (MACTAC)ANDTHE USE OF EMERGENCYACTION TEAMS(EAT)

The Los Angeles Police Department hasinitiated a training course for its line-levelofficers in response to tactics used in suchincidents as the Beslan School Massacre andthe more recent Mumbai attack. Multi-

Assault Counter Terrorist Action Capabilities(MACTAC) was created to respond to thechallenges of highly dynamic violentincidents involving a combination ofmultiple subjects, victims, and locations;simultaneous attacks; seizure of hostages;active shooters; barricaded subjects; and useof explosives. MACTAC is aimed at the first

responding officers tasked with neutralizingthe threat. It teaches the importance ofImmediate Action Rapid Deployment(IARD), The swi ft and immediatedeployment of law enforcement resources toon-going, life threatening situations wheredelayed deployment could otherwise result indeath or serious bodily injury to innocentpersons. 33 The imperative of MACTAC is to:

Stop the violence now [by] engagingadversary(s) with a minimally safe team;move quickly to the sounds/sources of

violence; search only when the source ofthe violence is unknown; move past victimsand threats (IEDs, etc.) and engage andneutralize adversaries.34

MACTAC is essential training for line-levelofficers. The Long Beach Police Departmentinstituted similar training about twelve yearsago after the Columbine shooting throughteaching Emergency Action Teams (EAT) and




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the concepts discussed above that involvemoving toward the sound of gunfire andneutralizing the threat without waiting for acommanding officers order to do so. 35

MACTAC and EAT training raise analmost explosive question. Why do we do this

type of training for our line-level officersspecific to their jobs, yet we do nottrain andeducate our incident commanders in theskills specific to their jobs? While there isNIMS and ICS training, these checklists andforms are not helpful in that first, crucialresponse timeframe. If our industry is nowrecognizing that certain events such asMumbai and Beslan require different trainingto equip the mind and body of those line-levelofficers to think about handling activeshooters, why does it not recognize thatincident commanders have their own unique

circumstance they must train for? They mustlearn how to work in the edge of chaos, thatinitial golden hour that exists in everylarge-scale event. Tactics of old that dictateda contain and wait for SWAT mentalityhave been replaced by MACTAC and EAT andan immediate engagement of active shooters.Now we must move our first-respondingincident commanders into a comparableeducation and training model that teachesthem how to work in the initial chaos so thatthey can bring the event through thecomplexity and into an area where thechecklist, forms, and structure of NIMS areso useful in allowing disparate agencies to

work together and restore order.

CHANGING THE COMMAND OFFICERCULTURE

Just as MACTAC and EAT were a cultureshift in law enforcement, so is the idea ofeducating and training incident commandersto work in the edge of chaos. Chiefs andcommanding officers often question how they

can change the culture of an organization.The most common response is throughhiring and training. And while that is still a

valid place to instill cultural changes,another, often overlooked place is throughinternal promotional testing processes.

The Long Beach Police Departmentconducts a lieutenants exam consisting ofmultiple phases. One of those phases is, and

has been for decades, a Critical IncidentManagement exercise. It simulates a real-time event and begins when candidates areplaced in a room for about fifteen minutes

with an initial scenario description. Eachcandidate is allowed to make notes, look at

their patrol resource list and generallyconsider the problem at hand. The candidateis then taken into another room where arating panel sits behind a table. He or shestands at a board with a map of the city and isgiven additional updates to the situation attimed intervals. Candidates are expected tomanage the critical incident as a lieutenant

would in the field by talking aloud and tellingthe raters how they would assign resources,

what missions they would assign, et cetera.A routine tactical exam goes something

like this: it might start with a shooting and

one victim down with a suspect who fled in acar. There might be a vehicle pursuit, a crash,and an officer-involved shooting. Finally, thesuspect might run into a house, barricadehimself and take hostages. All of thisi n f o r m a t i o n i s g i v e n n e a t l y a n dunderstandably to the candidate. The finalquestion is always The duty chief is onscene. Please brief him on this incident.

The exam is stressful and requires anability to demonstrate supervisory andleadership skills as well as knowledge ofpolicy. Over the years, however, this test has

become fairly incestuous, as the past group ofrecently promoted lieutenants trains the nextgroup of sergeants preparing to take thelieutenants test. There are different theoriesabout how candidates should address andsolve the tactical scenario. Some opt for theclock method, in which you remember tocircle back to each crime scene continuouslyin a clockwise fashion to ask for updates andensure you have handled everything. Othersoperate in the quadrant philosophy where

you separate the map into four quadrants and

work one quadrant of crime scenes tocompletion before moving to the next.Our field supervisors have been studying

for these tactical exams for years. Becausethey have prepared and memorized ahead oftime, every candidate regurgitates thenecessary lists, stating, I am the incidentcommander, my command post location is

_______ (fill in the blank), I need porta-potties, barricades, Public Service to respond




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teams and move toward the threat using thebest possible cover and practicing suchproven building search techniques as pie-ing around corners. But who knows how torespond to planes being flown into buildings?

Who can prepare for the mass chaos of

attempting to manage a response toHurricane Katrina?There is certainly no suggestion here that

NIMS be abandoned nor training for specific,known events halted. But the first-respondercommunity would greatly benefit from anaddition to the NIMS literature recognizingthe initial, edge-of-chaos phase existing at the

beginning of large-scale events. This chaos isnormal and to be expected. First respondersarriving at a scene should not believe they areineffective if they cannot issue direct ordersthat end the chaos immediately. Instead, they

should realize that it might take some time towork through the chaos and that theirbarometer for success is not whether they canimmediately end the chaos, but rather, howquickly and effectively they can manipulateall elements to work through it.

While there are no checklists for workingthrough chaos, evidence suggests thatsensemaking is useful for first responders

who find themselves in these situations.While NIMS currently teaches organizationalstructure, it is silent regarding how anincident commander comes to determine

what that structure should be trying toachieve and the direction in which it should

be moving. Some work with sensemaking as astrategy for determining mission, path, anddirection for the ICS structure created tohandle subsequent phases of the event would

be invaluable. In fact, it is everything. A well-functioning team is useless if they havemisidentified the problem and are, therefore,following the wrong path.

As Boin found, Leaders are important notas all-powerful decision makers but rather as

designers, facilitators, and guardians of aninstitutional arrangement that produceseffective decision-making and coordinationprocesses. 38 These concepts cannot betaught by simply including them in thecurrent NIMS checklists written for eachsection position.

Because of this, NIMS should alsorecognize that not every person has theinnate skill set necessary to perform well in

crisis situations. Not every first responderwill be able to grasp and apply the concepts ofsensemaking in chaos. In any local firstresponder community, however, there arepeople who do have those innate skills. Thesepeople should be sought out and developed. A

federal approach to supporting andstandardizing some of the education theyundergo would create a nationwidecommunity of best practices. As theseexperienced first responders come together totalk about how to work an edge-of-chaossituation, they contribute to the usefulliterature on the subject and to creating and

broadening the education thatcould lead tolives saved in future large-scale events,

whether caused by terrorists or nature.Thousands of years of warfare teach us the

striking importance of the leader at a crisis

event. As Philip II of Macedon said, An armyof deer led by a lion is more to be feared thanan army of lions led by a deer.39Decades oflaw enforcement experience prove what mosthave felt that leaders must possess the onetrait that cannot be taught or acquired:courage, for everything rests uponcourage. 40What can be acquired, though, isexperience.And experience is another vitallynecessary component to effective leadershipin an edge-of-chaos event because it helpsfirst responders recognize component piecesimbedded in the overall chaos. These pieces,if thoughtfully considered, can help incidentcommanders make sense of an unusualsituation and begin to formulate plans torestore order.

It has been said that a warriors mostformidable weapon is his mind. It followsthen that the sharper the commanders mind,the sounder the decisions.41 The mosteffective way to sharpen the mind is througheducation built on realistic scenarios thatforce the student to become actively involvedin the course of study. The NIMS currently

hosts large area-wide events in different partsof the nation meant to bring varying localagencies and disciplines together toparticipate in a table-top exercise. Scriptedand publicized well in advance, they allowagencies to practice using the NIMSorganizational framework to manage theevent and allocate and track resources. Whilethere is certainly value to these exercises, afew adjustments to this practice could leave




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first responders better prepared to deal withthe initial phase of chaos inherent in large-scale events.

A small group should be brought togetherto research this phenomenon of edge ofchaos further. Such a body would include

experienced, open-minded practitionersalong with a selected mix of academicallyfocused teachers. Together, this group wouldcraft the most realistic scenario possibleevolving in actual time. This is no smallundertaking. It means having a physicalfacility where some type of chaos can beconvincingly played out. The coordinationalone of resources and role-playing actors

will be challenging. First responders will thenbe let loose in this environment to interact inthe chaos and attempt to bring aboutresolution. This will be the antithesis of a

controlled, table-top exercise in the safety ofan Emergency Operations Center.

Along with what happens during thescenario itself, the debrief and observation ofthe instructors afterwards will be invaluable.This type of continuous discussion andlearning focused on a sensemaking approach

will create a body of knowledge about howfirst responders can best work within thechaos known to exist at the outset of large-scale events. Truly devious instructors whocraft the scenarios their unsuspectingstudents will live through at this trainingfacility will undoubtedly add to the mentalslides of every student they affect. Because ofthis, first responders who arrive at the sceneof what would otherwise have been acompletely new experience to them shouldfeel more confident beginning theirsensemaking of the situation because theyhad experienced something close to it oranalogous to it in their scenario work. Whileexpensive, such a realistic trainingpresentation will undoubtedly pay for itself

by how it readies first responders.

Ultimately, this type of education providesthe all-important whybecause, as General A.M. Gray found, Tactics is not whether you goleft or right, tactics is why you go left orright.42Understanding the chaos of an eventenough to piece together why certain thingsneed to be accomplished will allow firstresponders to make the best decisionspossible.

Finally, these small classes participating inthe realistic scenarios must include cross-discipline and multi-jurisdictional students.The value of pre-existing relationships cannot

be emphasized enough for effective eventresponse. Personal relationships that have

created a level of trust among parties providethe foundation for the strong bondsnecessary to achieve a coordinated responseto any event. As the 9/11 Reportfound:

While no emergency response is flawless,the response to the 9/11 terrorist attack onthe Pentagon was mainly a success for threereasons: first, the strong professionalrelationships and trust established amongemergency responders; second, theadoption of the Incident Command System;and third, the pursuit of a regionalapproach to response. Many fire and police

agencies that responded had extensiveprior experience working together onregional events and training exercises.43

The NIMS and ICS are an invaluable toolfor a structured event response and providean organization that best handles thecomplicated nature of a coordinated responseeffort. But in the initial, chaotic phaseinherent in every large-scale event, theorganizational structure of ICS is not yetuseful. First responders with the inherentskill set to function in an environmentfraught with uncertainty, friction, and risk

will have the most profound impact on thesuccessful resolution of a conflict. 44 Thesefirst responders must be educated throughparticipation in reality-based scenariotraining that will help them practicesensemaking techniques, add to their libraryof mental slides, and foster relationships withe a c h o t h e r a c r o s s d i s c i p l i n e s a n d

jurisdictions so that, if the unthinkable doesoccur yet again, those men and women will

be as ready as possible to insert themselvesinto chaos and wrestle it back to normalcy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Cynthia Renaud currently serves as policechief in Folsom, California. Prior toaccepting this position, she served with the

Long Beach Police Department for twentyyears. During her career, she has been onthe scene of many large-scale incidents and




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has participated in pre-planned events andprotests. Chief Renaud holds a Master ofArts Degree from the Naval PostgraduateSchool in national security studies and aMaster of Arts Degree from California StateUniversity, Long Beach, in english literature.

She is a graduate of the FBI NationalAcademy, Session 214, and a member of theNational Tactical Officers Association.




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1Sources reviewed for critiques of 9/11 and subsequent government actions based on those critiquesinclude Thomas H. Kean, Chair, The 9/11 Commission Report(New York: Norton, 2004); U.S.Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Security Council,National Strategy for Homeland

Security (Washington, DC: DHS, July 2002); DHS Homeland Security Council,National Strategy forHomeland Security (Washington, DC: DHS, October 2007); DHS,Homeland Security PresidentialDirective 5(Washington, DC: 2003); DHS,Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8(Washington,DC: 2003);and DHS,National Response Plan(Washington, DC: DHS, 2004).

2DHS,Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5,1.

3Ibid.

4DHS,Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, 1.

5Ibid.

6DHS,National Incident Management System, 4-11.

7Mike Hillmann (retired deputy chief of police, Los Angeles Police Department; retired assistant sheriff,Orange County Sheriffs Department), in discussion with the author, November 2010.

8Steven Nottingham (lieutenant, Long Beach Police Department), in discussion with the author, January2010.

9David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, A Leaders Framework for Decision Making,Harvard BusinessReview (2007): 68-76.

10Ibid., 69.

11Christopher Bellavita, Changing Homeland Security: Shape Patterns, Not Programs,HomelandSecurityAffairs 2, article 5 (October 2006): 5.

12Snowden and Boone, A Leaders Framework for Decision Making, 71.

13Bellavita, Changing Homeland Security: Shape Patterns, Not Programs, 5.

14Sid Heal,Sound Doctrine. Tactical Primer(New York: Lantern Books, 2000),133.

15Cynthia Renaud,Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos: A Framework for Effective Initial ResponseEfforts to Large-Scale Incidents(masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).

16Mitchell M. Waldrop, Complexity. The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos(New York:Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1992).

17Kean, et al., The 9/11 Commission Report,315.

18

Amanda Ripley, The Unthinkable: Who Survives When Disaster Strikes and Why (New York:Crown, 2008), 93.

19Mike Hillmann,Incident Command Challenges(PowerPoint presentation, n.d.).

20Karl Weick,Sensemaking in Organizations (USA: Sage, 1995), 14.

21Ibid., 9.

22Ibid., 21.


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23Ibid.

24Oxford English Dictionary,(USA: Oxford University Press, 1971), 1716.

25Mike Hillmann,In Extremis Decision MakingDefining the Critical Incident(PowerPointpresentation, n.d.), quoting Colonel Thomas A. Kolditz, professor and head of Department of BehavioralSciences and Leadership at U.S. Military Academy, West Point.

26Ibid., 3

27Ibid., 4

28Ibid., 5

29Karl Weick, The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster,Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 639.

30Gary Klein,Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Instituteof Technology, 1998), 113.

31Patti Anklam,Net Work.A Practical Guide to Creating and Sustaining Networks at Work and in the

World(Oxford, UK: Elsevier Inc., 2007), 14-15.32Arjen Boin et al, The Politics of Crisis Management. Public Leadership Under Pressure(New York:Cambridge University Press, 2005), 35.

33Mike Hillmann,Multi-Assault Counter Terrorist Action Capabilities(PowerPoint presentation given atthe FBI National Academy Associates 2010 Annual Training Conference), 4.

34Ibid., 5.

35Lieutenant Steve Nottingham, Long Beach Police Department. Course Curricula for Advanced OfficerTraining Class, (1999-2001).

36Boin, et al, The Politics of Crisis Management, 63.

37Ibid., 64.

38Ibid.

39Heal, Tactical Primer, 39.

40Ibid., 38.

41Ibid., 39.

42Ibid., 71

43Kean, et al., The 9/11 Commission Report,314.

44

Heal, Tactical Primer, 39.


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Documents

The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders How to Function in the Edge of Chaos