The Metaphysic of Aristotle

7/21/2019 The Metaphysic of Aristotle

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-metaphysic-of-aristotle 1/19

"#$%& '()$*#% +(*,-*, (* './012 3$-- ,( 4*&(*- 5* ,6- 7($%8

/659 #$,5:%- 59 (*- (; *-#$%& <==2=== 9:6(%#$%& >($?9 85@5,5A-8 #*8 B#8- ;$--%& #C#5%#D%- ,( -C-$&(*- 5*

,6- >($%8 D& './01E

F*(>* #9 ,6- "#$%& '()$*#% +(*,-*,2 ,659 9-, (; >($?9 5*:%)8- $-9-#$:6 #$,5:%-92 *->92 %-,,-$92 #*8 (,6-$

>$5,5*@9 G)D%596-8 5* B($- ,6#* H== (; ,6- (%8-9, %-#85*@ #:#8-B5: I()$*#%9E /6- >($?9 8#,- ;$(B ,6-

B58J9-C-*,--*,6 ,( ,6- -#$%& ,>-*,5-,6 :-*,)$5-9E

7- -*:()$#@- G-(G%- ,( $-#8 #*8 96#$- ,6- "#$%& '()$*#% +(*,-*, (G-*%& #*8 ,( ,-%% (,6-$9 ,6#, ,659

$-9()$:- -K59,9E L-(G%- B#& G(9, ,659 :(*,-*, (*%5*- ($ $-859,$5D),- 5* #*& >#& ;($ *(*J:(BB-$:5#%

G)$G(9-9E

1-#8 B($- #D(), "#$%& '()$*#% +(*,-*, #, 6,,GMNN#D(),EI9,($E($@NG#$,5:5G#,-JI9,($N5*85C58)#%9N-#$%&J

I()$*#%J:(*,-*,E

'./01 59 # 85@5,#% %5D$#$& (; #:#8-B5: I()$*#%92 D((?92 #*8 G$5B#$& 9()$:- (DI-:,9E './01 6-%G9 G-(G%-

859:(C-$2 )9-2 #*8 D)5%8 )G(* # >58- $#*@- (; :(*,-*, ,6$()@6 # G(>-$;)% $-9-#$:6 #*8 ,-#:65*@

G%#,;($B2 #*8 G$-9-$C-9 ,659 :(*,-*, ;($ ;),)$- @-*-$#,5(*9E './01 59 G#$, (; O/P4F42 # *(,J;($JG$(;5,($@#*5A#,5(* ,6#, #%9( 5*:%)8-9 O,6#?# .Q1 #*8 L($,5:(E 3($ B($- 5*;($B#,5(* #D(), './012 G%-#9-

:(*,#:, 9)GG($,RI9,($E($@E



Vo

u

m

VII.

July,

1898.

Whole

Number

.

Number

o.

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

THE

METAPHYSIC

OF

ARISTOTLE.

IV

Potential nd

Actual

Reality.

SO

far

Aristotle has

considered the

real

mainlyfrom

stat-

ical point of view,though he has beenincidentallyed

to

point

out that

all

definite

eality

nvolvesa

dynamical

process.

It

is

this

last

aspect

of

things

to which

he

now draws

special

attention,

nd

indeed what s most

distinctivef his

doctrine

s

his

conception

of the

world

as

a

process.

Reality,

s

he has

con-

tended,

s

neither

mere

series

of

changes,

nor

is

it

fixed

and

unchanging.

The former

iew

makes

reality

he

perpetual rise

and

disappearance

f

the

particular,

he

atter ransforms

he

iving

reality

f

things

ntothe

dead

unchanging

being'

of the

Eleatics,

or

the

equally dead 'ideas'

of the

Piatonists. There

is

change

and there

s

permanence,

ut

change

takes

place

in

fixed

nd

un-

alterable

ways,

so that

each

thing

contains within tself

and

is

constituted

y

the

universal nature

which t realizes

under

par-

ticular

conditions. This

universal

nature,however,

s

he

now

goes

on to

maintain,

s

in

finite

things

not

something

which

they

possess,

but

something

which

they

are

in

process

of

realiz-

ing, and therefore

e

are

compelled

to

distinguish

etween

what

they

are

'actually'

(Yvepre

)

and what

they

are

'potentially'

(8ocv&s).

The clear

comprehension

f

the

relationof the

po-

tential to the

'

actual' is

therefore

ndispensable

to

a

true

knowledgeofthe real.



338 T

HE

PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL.

VII.

Now,

the

distinction etween he potential'and the actual,'

betweenwhat a thing s capable of being, and

what t actually s,

was in Aristotle's day, as in ours, ignored or denied. The

Megarians

held that

nothing

can

be said to be

which s not in

activity. A man is a builderwhen he is actually

building,but it

is absurd to speak of a man as having a faculty

which s not in

actual

exercise. To this view Aristotleanswers

that t ignores

theprocess by whichthe art of building s

acquired, onfusing n

original ndowmentwiththe resultof a process

by which the in-

dividual attains power whichhe did not at first ossess. If we

generalize

the

doctrineof the Megarians,we shall be forced o

conclude

that

reality onsists

n

an evanescent

eries of particu-

lars,

since

nothing

s

real

except

in

the actual moment of its

existence. Accordingly, sensible object must

be supposed to

exist

only

at the time

when it

is

apprehended, nd

this

apprehen-

sion itselfmust be held to be a momentary

ensation. Thus the

doctrine f the

Megarians

s at bottom denticalwith hatof Pro-

tagoras,

the

imperfectionf which has alreadybeen

shown.

All

such doctrines

estroy

he

possibility

f real

change, ubstituting

for

t

a

discontinuous

eries of

particulars,

nd

thus

making

both

reality and knowledge impossible. We cannot,

then,deny

the

distinction f

potential' and

'

actual'

reality

without

making

the

factsof

experience nexplicable.'

What, then,

s

the

relation

f

the

potential'

to

the

actual'?

The

answer s to be

found

n the

distinction etween

the

pos-

sible

and

the '

impossible.'

The

'

potential'

must not be con-

fused

with mere

possibility,'

.e.,

with the

'possibility'

of

any-

thing

whatever.

The

only possibility'

hat

we

can admit s

the

'

possibility'

of

the

actual.'

We cannot

say,

to

take

Aristotle's

own

instance,

that it is

'possible'

that

the

diagonal

of the

square

should

be

measured,

nd

yet

never

will be

measured,or,

to

take

a modern

nstance,

withwhich Mill has made

us

familiar,

that t

s

possible

that

+

3 may

be

=

6.

What cannot be

actu-

ally

realized

s

'impossible,'

and

therefore

possibility'

is

deter-

mined

by

'

actuality.' Nothing

s

'

possible'

which, y

the nature

of

things,

annot

become

'

actual;'

so that he

possible'

or

'

po-

I

Met.

0, io46b

29-I047a 2.



No. 4.] THE

METAPHYSIC

OF

ARIS[O

TLE.

339

tential is not

abstract r unlimitedpossibility,' ut determinate

'

possibility,' .e.,

the

possibility f

realization n a

certaindefinite

way. The 'impossible' is therefore hat whichis incompatible

with he

actual;' the possible' thatwhich

s

compatible

with he

actual.

The

'possible' may

or

may

not become

'actual,'

but

nothing s

'

possible' which underappropriate onditionswill not

become

'

actual.' What Aristotle, hen,

s

contending or,

s

that

the

transition rom

possibility' to 'actuality'

must take

place

incertain

fixed nd unchangingways, n

which the

true

nature

of the real is manifested. Thus we get,as the meaningof the

'potential,' the persistent endency

owards

the

actual.'

1

The

world

s

not a chaos

but

a

cosmos, and there can be no cosmos,

if

reality s

conceived as the infinite

ossibility f any actuality

whatever. The acorn is the

possibility

f

the oak,

but

not of

the

fir; the

child

is

the possibility of

the man, but not of

the horse or

dog; and so in all cases. We can thus under-

stand why, n the case of ' natural' things, moving principle,'

'form,'

and

'

end' become identical. The

principle

which

deter-

mines

the transition rom

potentiality

to

actuality

is

the

end'

or

determinatemode

of

'actuality'

which

a

thing

s

capable

of

becoming, .e.,

ts

form

'

and

the

end

is therefore

nvolved

n

the

'

potentiality.'

The

distinction nd

the correlation f

'

potenti-

ality'

and

'

actuality'

s

therefore fundamental

rinciple

n the

Aristotelian

hilosophy.

In

every

potentiality,'hen,

here is a

tendency

o

pass

into

'actuality.'

This

tendency, owever,

s

not

always realized,

be-

cause it can

be

realized

only

when the external

onditions ermit

of ts

realization;

in

other

words,

when the matter'

s

capable

of

being

acted

upon. Thus,

the

seed tends

to

develop

into the

plant,

but it

cannot do so without avorablesoil, moisture, ir,

and

sunlight,

hich are its

material' conditions.

But, provided

the

'

matter'

permits

f

it,

the

potentiality'

will

pass

over

into

'actuality.'

We

have

therefore o

observe that the

potential'

is

thatwhich

s in

a condition o become

actual.'

Nothing

can

in

the

proper

ense

be

called

'

potential'

which

will

not become act-

ual

under ppropriate onditions,nd thatwithout

irst ndergo-

1

Met. 0,

1047b

3-31I



340

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

[VOL.

VII.

ing

an internal

hange.

It follows hat

here re

various

tages

or

degrees

of the

'

potential'

and

'

actual.'

Earth is the

potenti-

ality' of which wood is the actuality; but wood again,is the

'

potentiality'

of which

a box

is

the '

actuality.'

And

it will

be observed that,

however far we

carry

back

the

process,

we

never reach

an

unformed

matter,'

ut only that

which

is

'

mat-

ter' relatively

o the '

form' which

s

expressed

s

'actuality.'

In

the process

of

the

world

we therefore ind

hat nothing riginates

from

mere

'matter,'

but

always

from

something

determinate,

which s the matter' relativelyo thatwhich s moredeterminate.

We

may

suppose

a

primary ubstance,

as

the

matter or sub-

strateunderlying

he

whole complex organism

f the

world,

but

we cannot conceive

of a

primitive

r

unformed

matter s the

nucleus of all determinate eality.

This

will

become

obvious

if

we ask whetherthe

'

potential'

is

prior

to the

'

actual,'

or the

'actual' to the potential.'

1

Now,thatwhich s 'prior' must be so either

I)

inknowledge,

or (2) in time,or

(3)

in

'

substance;'

and it may be

shown that

in all these senses the

actual' is

prior

to the

'

potential.'

For

(i)

we

cannot know

in

any

case what

is

'potential'

without

a

knowledge

of the

'actual.'

The 'potential,'

s we have seen, is

not a

bare

'

possibility,' ut the possibility'

of somethingdeter-

minate,

nd

there is

nothingdeterminate

xceptthat

which s in

' actuality.' We could not tell that an objectis capableof being

seen

if

no one had ever seen

it;

that an

animal has

thefaculty

of

seeing,

did

we not

find

hat animals

actually do see;

nor that

a

man

s

capable

of

building,

who

does

not

actually' possess

the art

of

building. Thus,

our

knowledge

f the

potential'

always pre-

supposes

a knowledgeofthe actual.'

(2) It may seem

as ifthe

'potential'

were

'prior'

in time

to the

'actual,'

because in the

case of

any given

individual

t

is

so.

Bricks must

be in

exist-

ence before

they

can be

made

into a

house;

the

'seed-corn'

must

precede

in existence

the

corn;

a man must have the

faculty

of

sight

before he

sees. And

no

doubt

this is

true,

but

we

forget

that the

individual

n

question

presupposes

the

'

actual' existenceof that which n

each case is

'

potential.'

The

'Met. 0, i048b

38-1049b .



No.

4.]

THE METAPHYSIC OF

ARISTOTLE.

341

house must exist

as an

'

actual' conceptionn the mind of

the

builder before t is

built; the seed-corn

has come from actual

corn, and the man from another man. It must, further, e

observed hat n

all

the rational' faculties,

he actual'

is

always

prior

to

the potential.'

Every 'art' is

a

faculty,which

is ac-

quired only by actual

exercise, nd in

fact he Sophistical argu-

mentthat nothingcan be learned is based

upon this very

fact,

that 'learning' consists n the 'actual'

doing of a thing, s

the

condition of the

'

capacity' to do it

well. (3) It may also

be

shown that the 'actual' is prior in 'substance' to the poten-

tial.'

The

'

substance,'

essential nature,'or 'form' of

anything

is thatwhich t is

as

actualized,

nd the potential' is

merely

hat

phase

of

the actual'

in

which

as

yet

thething annot

be

said

to

have existence

o&aza).

For,

as

the

'potential'

is that which,

under appropriate

onditions,must

become

'actual,' each

thing

has

a certain end,'

without he

realization f

which it

cannotbe

said to exist. As it is this 'end'

(rAo;)

which determineshe

'actual' existence

of the thing, heend

is

also the beginning'

or

'principle'

(dpxy).

ince, herefore,othingan be called

po-

tential'

except

that which

is

capable

of

realizing

ts

'

end,'

it

is

obvious

that

the

'end'

must be the active

principle

determin-

ing

the character

f

the faculty.'

We

have

now reached the

point

where Aristotle enters

upon

the final tage of his enquiry, eeking to determine he ultimate

nature

of the universe rom he

vantage

ground reached by these

preliminary

nvestigations.

In

what follows

an

attempt

will be

made

to

give

as full an

account

as

seems

necessary

of the

con1-

tents

of

the twelfth ook

(A)

of the

Metaphysic,

s

viewed n

the

light

thrown

pon

it

by

what

he

says

elsewhere.

IV.

THE DIVINE REASON.

In

seeking

to

determine

he

ultimate

eality

which

s the

prius

of all

other

reality,

Aristotle

follows,

as

usual,

the

regressive

method

of

starting

with

what

s

'

best

known

to

us,'

and

asking

what

is ' best

known n

itself,'

.e.,

what

must

be

presupposed

as

I

Met.

0, 1049b

4-IO50a

5S



342

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL.

VII.

essential

o

its

existence.

Now,

we

are all familiar ith

sensible

reality, n the form of

particular

hings

which arise

and

perish,

such as plants and animals; and, therefore, e shall startwith

this sensible nd

perishable

reality.

Every sensible

thing

is an

instance

of a

specific

lass,

and

by

itsvery

nature

s

subjectto

change.

As

belonging

o

a

class, it

necessarily

onforms

o the law

of

ts

class;

and,

therefore,

hat-

ever

be

the mode in which t

manifests

ts

changeable

or

perish-

able

nature,

t

cannottranscendthe

limits of its

class. Herein

we see thefinite haracter f all sensiblethings. Changeneces-

sarily nvolves

transition,

ut in

sensible

things

the

transition

s

from

one

contrary

nto

another, .e.,

it takes

place,

not between

all

opposites,but

only

between

opposites

of

the same

genus.

Moreover,

t

is

characteristicf

changeable

things,

hat the con-

trariesare

mutually

xclusive, o thatwhen

the one exists

the

other

ceases,

or

the

change

from

ne

to the

otherconsists

n

the

substitution f the one for the other. If,therefore,eality on-

sisted

n

nothing

ut

change,

we should

have

no individual

ub-

stance

whatever,

ut

merely succession

of

particulars.

Change,

therefore,mplies that there

s

some

underlying

asis,

which

per-

sists

in

the

change,

or

which is

capable of

existing

n

contrary

states,

hough

not

at

the

same

time. This

underlying

asis

or

'matter'

is,

therefore,

he '

permanent

possibility'

of

contrary

states. We can thus see that sensible

things

are

necessarily

finite

r

transitory,ust because

the mode

in

which

theyexistat

any given

time

does not

express

all

that

s

implied

n

them. The

plant

passes

through

succession

of

states,

ut in no one

of them

is

its whole

nature

realized;

in

each

phase,

only

part

of ts

reality

is

'actual,'

and, therefore,ts

'matter'

and its

form,' what

t is

'potentially'

and what it is '

actually,'

do not

coincide.'

This

separation

etweenwhat

a

thing

s

'

potentially'

nd

what

it is

'actually'

may

be shown to

obtain n

all the

ways

in

which a

sensible

thingmay

change.

There

may

be

change

(i)

of

the

'

what

(xara

tb

ti), (2) in

quality

wrotvd),3)

in

quantity

woa0)6,

(4)

in

place

(7ro):

in other

words,

this

particular

ensible

thing

(t-80)

may either

originate'

(Ovsetc)

or

'

perish

(sOopd);

it

may

1

Met.

A,

io69a

i8_ b34.



No.

4.1

THE METAPHYSIC OF

ARISTOTLE.

343

undergo alteration'

d2Aoiewct)

or change in

its accidentalprop-

erties

(xara

o 7rdt9o3); it

may ncrease'

(av$?tc) or ' decrease'

((peae;);

or it may

'

move' (xara'

r0rov

uszapo2).

In none of

thesemodes of change is

there any absolute

origination ut of

nothing, or is there ny

absolute destruction. (a) When a par-

ticular

hingcomes into being or goes out

of being,there s a

transition rom

potentiality'to 'actuality,' or from actuality'

to

'potentiality,'

ut there

s no creation out

of nothing. The

energy

s a genericprocess

existing prior and subsequentto the

particular hing. (b) After oming ntobeingthe particular hing

mayalter n quality,

passing from ne contrary

o another,but it

can

only exist in the

particular tate which

its

naturepermitst

to

assume. (c) It may

ncreaseor decrease; but only because it

is capable

of quantitative hange. (d) It

may change in place,

but

only because it is in its

nature

capable

of

motion.

It is

thus

evident

hat sensible changes are in all cases the realization

f

what s

'potential,'

.e.,

that there

s a

certain

determinate

ature

which

confines he changes

of each thingwithinmpassable imits.

The

reality f each thing is determined y the

generic energy

which

is

immanent

n

it.

And not only

is

there no absolute

origination, ut the

changes

which finite

ealityundergoes

are

always of a

fixed haracter. This

truth

was

very mperfectlyp-

prehended

by the earlier

thinkers,

who rather

magined

that

'matter'

is

the abstract

possibility

of

any

and

every change.

Were

this

the

case,

it

would be

impossible

o

explain

how

there

should be such

infinite

ariety

n sensible

things,

r how certain

things

are

capable of change only

in

place, while others also

arise and

perish,

nd

undergo changes

of

quality

and

quantity.

From

this

distinction,

n

fact,

rises

the fundamental ifference

between the

celestial

bodies,

which never

arise or

perish,

but

change

only

n the

way

of

motion,

nd terrestrial

hings

which

are

perishable,

nd

change

n

quality

and

quantity

s well

as in

place.

Anaxagoras,

Empedocles,Anaximander,

nd Democritus

saw

that

we must

presuppose

matter'

n

order to

account for

change,

but

they

did not see

that

'

matter'

is not the universal

possibility

of

change,

but

the

possibility

of

certain fixed

and

definitehanges which occur in accordancewiththe specialna-



344

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL.

VII.

ture of that which changes, and that each kind of change has

its own law.1

In the case of finite ensiblethings, hen,we find a perpetual

process

of

coming to be and ceasing to be, and a process of

change accordingto a fixed law or principle. It may therefore

seem that there s no eternal nd immutable substance.' If the

changesof theworld are possible only under presupposition f

the existence of particular substances,while these only endure

for

a

limited

imeand

then

pass away, why should not all finite

substancesperish, nd with hem he whole universe It is obvi-

ous

that

f there

is

no reality xcept that which is sensible nd

perishable, here s nothing o hinder us from upposing hatall

realitymay disappear

n

absolute non-entity. We cannot, here-

fore,

dmit

that sensible

reality

s

self-sustainingr complete

n

itself, nless we are preparedto maintain hat there s no distinc-

tion between being and non-being. Let us, therefore,nquire

whether he process of sensible realitydoes not presuppose a

reality

which s

supersensible.

If

finite

hings re the only reality, here mustbe

an

absolute

beginningand cessation of reality, or ach finite hing

as

such

begins

to

be

and

ceases

to

be.

Now,

we have

seen

that no

finite

thing

is

self-originating,ut, on the contrary,s

a

manifestation

of the

activity

which s

immanent

n all

members

f

the

class

to

which tbelongs. It follows hatnothing initeancome intobe-

ing except under

he

presuppositionf something

lse

which con-

tains

t

potentially,nd that

this

potentiality

an

be

realized

only

through

he

generative ctivity f the species. Now,

if

no finite

thingoriginates

r

destroys

tself,

he process

of

the

world

must

be

eternal. Process implies ime,

nd we

cannot

onceive of time

as

beginning, ecause,

n

order o explain

its

beginning,

e should

have to suppose something romwhich

t

proceeded,

nd which

was therefore

prior'

to

it;

in

other

words,

time

would

be

'prior'

to itself.

But

this

s

simply

nother

way

of

saying

that

time

never

began

to

be,

but is

eternal.

As there

an be no

pro-

cess without

ime,

nd

no time without

process,

the

process

of

the

world is

eternal.

It is

also

continuous,

ince

any

break in

I

Met.

A, xo69b

3-26.

2P/zys.

VIII, I, 25lb IO.



No. 4.] THE METAPHYSIC OF ARISTOTLE.

345

the process would mean that therewas an absolute beginning r

end.' We have, therefore,o

ask

what

s

the necessary ondition

of an eternalprocess. The answerto this question leads to the

highestpoint reached by Aristotle. It will be well to quote his

own words: To suppose thatthere s somethingwhich s ca-

pable of producing hange

(xtvrTrtx0)

r

is

originative

roartxodv),

but

that

t does not

actuallyproduce

or

originatechange dvep-

rovp),

oes

not

account

for

change;

for hat

which has

the

power

(86vapct)

to originate change may not actually originate it.

Hence it is no explanationof change whatever, o say that there

are

eternal ubstances, s is done by the advocates of

'

ideas,' so

long as these are not conceived to contain a principle apable of

originating hange.

And even if we did

hold that

'

ideas' con-

tain such

a

principle, r,that there

s

besidesthemanother ub-

stance capable

of

originating hange,

we should not

account for

change

nasmuch

s neithers

conceived

to

be actually productive

ofchange. But, further,ven iftherewerea principlewhichwas

actually productive

of

change,

we

should

not

account

for

the

change being eternal,

f we held that

therewas

any potentiality

in its inner

nature

ovoia),

for

hat

which

s

potentialmay

not

be.

There

must,therefore,

e a

principle

which s

by

its

very

nature

actuality

pvePreoa).

And

such

substances

must

be

free from

'

matter;'

for

if

there

is

anything

t all

eternal,

hese

must

be

eternal, nd, therefore,n 'actuality.'

2

In this pregnantpas-

sage Aristotle rgues

that

he

process

of

the world

s

inexplicable

unless we

suppose

an

originative

r self-active

rinciple.

All

process implies

that

something

comes

to

be

which

before

was

not,

and

nothing

can account

for such

origination xcept

that

which

not

only

has the

capacity

of

origination,

ut

actually

is

originative;

while

again nothing

can

actually originate

ome-

thing lse,

which s notin its

very

nature

riginative

r self-active.

If, therefore,

he

process

of

the

world

s

eternal,

here

must

be an

eternally riginative eality,

.e.,

a

reality

which is free from

all

'matter

or limitation.

The conclusion

to which

we

have been

led

is that there s

an

eternally omplete

or self-active

nergy,

which is manifested

n

I

Phvs.

VIII, 6,

259a i6.

2Met.

A,

107lb

12-22.



346

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW

[VOL.

VII.

the

eternal process of

the

world. But this

gives

rise to a diffi-

cult

problem. It

is

usually

assumed

that,

whilenothing

an be

'actual ' which is not 'possible,' all that is 'possible ' is not

'

actual.' Must we

not,

herefore,ay

thatthe

possible' is prior

to

the actual ?'

Must we

not, n other

words,

hold

that he uni-

verse as a

whole

develops from the

possible'

to the

actual

?

From

what has

already

been

said as to the

priority fthe

actual

'

as

comparedwith

the

potential,'we can

readily

nticipateAris-

totle's

answer.

It is true that n

finite

hings

the

potential

is

prior to the actual,' and indeed this constitutes heirfinitude;

but

in

reality s

a

whole

therecan be no

separation

f

'potenti-

ality and

'actuality.' For,

if

all

'

actual'

reality

were

referred

back

to

'potential'

reality,

herewould be no

possibility

f tran-

sition

from

he

'

potential'

to the

'

actual.'

That

which is not

cannot

originate hat

which

is, and

thereforehe

actual

would

remain

for

ever

'potential.'

This

assumption

f the

priority f

the potential to the actual' is the fundamentalmistakeof the

early poets

and

philosophers,

who

suppose

the

cosmos to have

developed

out

of a

primitive

haos

or unformed

matter.'

But,

if

reality

s a

whole

is thus

reduced to

inactive

matter,'

whence

is

the active

principle

o come which

is

to

develop this

mat-

ter'

into

actuality' ?

We

do notfind

ricks

forming

hemselves

into

a

house

withoutthe

self-active

principle f

intelligence, r

earthbecoming plantapart from heself-activityresentn the

seed; and

similarly,

he eternal

process

of

theworld

demands

an

eternal nd

self-active

rinciple o

account

for t.

Leucippus

and

Plato,

rightly

olding

that the

process

of the world

is eter-

nal,

ought

to have

seen that

an

eternalprocess

implies an eter-

nal

originative

nergy.

A

glimpse

of this truth

was

obtained

by

Anaxagoras, when

he

made reason

(vova)

the

principle

of

the

world,

forreason s a

pure

energy

or

self-activity.

It is

of

fundamental

mportance

or

he

understanding

f

Aris-

totle

that

his

argument

or

he

existenceof

an

eternal

originative

energy

hould be

properly

nderstood;

and

it

may

therefore e

well

to

restate t

in

a

freer

way.

There are three main

points

which he

seeks

to

establish.

In

the

first

lace,

his

aim s

to

show

'AMet.

A, 1071 b22-1072a 7,



No. 4.] THE

METAPHYSIC OF

ARISTOTLE.

347

that,while

within he

sphere of the sensible or

transitoryhere

is a continual

rocess, the

process s not

self-explaining. Look-

ing at theperpetualalternation f finitehings, tseems as if we

must

say

that

reality

s

continually riginating nd

ceasing, or,

what s

the same

thing,

hat

things ome into being

without ny

cause. But

such

a

view

owes its

plausibility o the assumption

that

something anoriginate ut of

nothing. The

earlier hinkers

were unaware of the

difficulty,ecause

they simply accepted

change as a

fact which did

not require ny principle

to explain

it,and hencethey saw nothing bsurd in the doctrine f an ab-

solute

origination

f

reality.

But

change

necessarilydemands

some cause, and this cause

cannot be itself

riginated, ecause,

if it

were,we

should

ultimately e forcedupon an

infiniteeries

of causes, i.e., we should

never reach

a true

cause at

all. It

is

thus evident hat, o long

as we confine

urselves to the alterna-

tion of

finite

hings,we have

not reached real explanationof

the

processof theworld. A true ' cause' or ultimate principle s,

therefore,n

Aristotle,

ecessarily

nproduced;

t

cannot have

an

origin

because

then realitywould arise

from

non-entity;

n

short,

it is

self-determining.We may speak of one

finite

hing

as the

'

cause' of

another;

but what we

here call

' cause'

is

merely

a

particular hase

in the

process

of

the

world,

the true

'

cause'

of

which

s

separate

from r

independent

f

everyparticular hase.

Aristotle,

hen,

maintains that the true 'cause' of

anything

s

uncausedor

self-caused.

But,

n

the

second

place,

a

true

cause'

cannot

be

merely

hat which exists

s

self-dependent,

ut

it must

express

tself,

r must

be

actually riginative.

A

'cause' must

be,

as we

may say,

self-separative;

t cannot

be

a

dead,

inactive

being, doing

nothing

nd

enjoying

mere otium

um

dignitate.

If

self-dependent

eality oes not

pass

over into

actuality,'

r

utter

itself,t

is

'as good as

nothing.'

The

process

of the

world

s

not

in

the least

explainedby

the

supposition

f

a self-existent

eality

which

n

no

way affects,

r

expresses

tself

n,

that

process;

and

hence the

Platonists,while

they

see that

the

changes

in finite

things

must be

referred

o

that

whichdoes

not

change,

do not see

that true

reality annot be dead

and

inert,

ut

must

be

actually

causative or originative. Hence the self-dependenteality

must



348

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL.

VII.

be

a self-active

r self-manifesting

eality;

it must

be a

real

'cause,'

not

a mere

nactive

being.

But, thirdly,

hile t

is

self-

dependent nd self-active,he truecause mustnot ose its identity

with

tself

n

exercising

its causal

activity;

t

must

express

itself

and yet

remain

equal

to itself

n its expression;

in other

words,

itmust

be eternally

elf-manifesting

nd

yetself-identical.

Thus

we reach

the necessary

onclusion

hat there

mustbe an

eternal

or uncreated

eality,

which

must

eternally xpress

itself

origina-

tively,

nd yet

eternally

reserve

ts

self-identity.

From thepointof viewnow reached we can understand ow

Aristotle

s

led to

maintain

hat

the

process

of the

world

must be

eternal.

If there

were

a cessation

f that

process,

we should

have

to

suppose

that an eternal

self-active

rinciple

eased

to be

self-

active; which

s the same

as saying

that

twould

cease

to exist,

since an inactive rinciple

s

a mere potentiality,'

nd

indeed

the

'potentiality'

of

nothing.

This is

the

fundamental

dea

which

underlies

Aristotle's

contention hat

a

self-active

rinciple

must

manifesttself

n the eternal

circular

movement

of the heavens.

The imperfectstronomical

knowledge

of

his day was

no

doubt

partly

responsible

or

he doctrine

that

the spheres

of the

stars

revolve

n an

absolutely

uniform

way,

but it

should be

observed

that

he

regards

he

argument

or he eternal

process

of the

world

as

independent

f

actual observation,

hough,

as

he

thinks,

on-

firmed

y it.1

Admitting

he

astronomical

rror,

he

contention

that

the

process

of theworld

cannot be

a creation

r

exhaustion

of

the

eternal nergy

of

the

whole

remains

ntact. The

essential

point

is

that a self-active

ause

must

express

itself

n the

pro-

duction

of

change,

and

must

yet

return

nto

itself,

r retain

ts

self-identity,

n this

expression.2

Granting hatthere s an eternal nergy, bsolutely

nexhausti-

ble

in

its

origination

f

change,

there

remains

he

supremely

m-

portant

uestion

as to

its

ultimatenature.

Aristotle

has,

n

vari-

ous

passages,

ntimated

hat

the ultimate

rinciple

f

the

universe

must

be

Reason

(vos),

and

he now

seeks to show

that

an eternal

self-activeeality,

s

already

proved

to

exist,

must be referred

o

an

absolute,

self-originative

eason.

To

understand his

culmi-

1Met.

A,

1072a 21.

2Met.A,

6,

1072a 25.



No. 4.] THE METAPHYSIC OF ARISTOTLE.

349

nationof

his

whole metaphysic,

t will

be

well

to preparethe way

by

a referenceo the

discussion

of

the nature of

reason,

as set

forth n the third ook of the

De

Anima.

Reason, as we find t

in

ourselves,

is

essentiallyself-active.

Reason (ro voscvj), says Aristotle, cannot be passive, but

must be receptive f 'form,'and

'

potentially,' hough

not

'

ac-

tually,'

denticalwith form.' The relation

f reason

vobc)

to

its

object ra' voucd)

will thus be similar o that of the

faculty

f sense

(To

ai'Oizrexov) to the sensible rZ

alord0^q).

1 Reason, in other

words,cannot exist at all except in so far as it is capable of

grasping

he

form,' essence,' or permanent

nature' of

reality,

and

this t cannot

do,

if

it is

merely passive,

or acted

upon

in

a

purely

externalor mechanical

way.

Just as sensible

perception

is

not

the

transference

f

the

sensible

thing into the

sensible

being,

but

the active

apprehensionby

that

being

of the sensible

'form,'

so reason is

capable

of

grasping

the

intelligible form,'

in virtueof its own self-activity. n man reason at first xists

only potentially,'

and it cannot

be

said to exist until

t

is

exer-

cised; but it is, nevertheless,mplicit

n

the

lower

phase

of sen-

sible

perception.

Thus

the

transition rom ensible

perception

o

reason

is

a

development

rom

potentiality'

o

actuality,'

o that

the former

s

related

o

the

latter s

'

matter'

to

'

form.' Sensible

perception,

iewed n

itself,

s

not

mere matter'

or

'potentiality,'

but has its own 'form' or 'actuality;' relativelyo themore de-

veloped stage of reason, however, thas to be viewed s the mat-

ter' to

which reason

gives 'form.' Since

reason

thinks

all

things, roceeds Aristotle, it must be unmixed, s Anaxagoras

says,

n order

hat t

may

master

hings,.e.,knowthem;

or tchecks

and excludes

whatever

s

foreign

o its own

nature.

Hence

rea-

son has no

'

nature' but

this, hat t

is

capable

Juvazdv). 3

Here

Aristotleexplicitly ejectsthe idea of an absolutelimit o intelli-

gence. To supposethat ntelligence as a peculiar naturewhich

prevents

t from

grasping

he real natureof

things,

s

to

deny

the

'De An.

III, 4,

429a I5-I8.

2

The developmentf sensible erceptionnto ctive eason

voiC

7ro1o7rtK6g)

nvolves

the

intermediatetages

of

memory

av'

v),

imagination

Oavraaia)

and

reflection

(taivota).

The wholeof theseconstitutehe passive eason'

(voiw

7raO7rr7K6C).

3,bid.,

429a i8-22.



350

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW. [VOL.

VII.

possibility

f

knowledge.

What is distinctive

f reason is that ts

capacity

s not

limitedto the apprehension

of some particular

mode of reality, ut it is the capacityof graspingthe essential

natureof all reality.

It

is

'potentially,'

.e.,

before

t is

actually

exercised,by

its

very

nature

identical

with

reality, nd

when it

becomeswhat

n essence

t

is,

what t thinks

nd what s are

ab-

solutely dentical.

This identity

f thought nd reality,

t will

be

observed,

s not

incompatible

with their

distinction;

but

the

dis-

tinction

s that of

potentiality

nd

actuality,

nd

when the transi-

tion is made fromthe former o the latter he distinctionisap-

pears.

Reason,

therefore,

s

free from 'matter,'

.e.,

there

is

nothing

which

t

cannot

make an

object,

nd thereby ring

within

itself. When,

therefore,

e

speak

of it

as 'potential,'

this

does

not

mean that

it

is

infected

ith a limit

which

it

cannot

tran-

scend,

but

merely hat,

n the

individual

man,

t is

not yet

real-

ized,

or

has not

by

its inherent

elf-activityeveloped

into actu-

ality.

That

reason is different rom

perception

is manifest.

Sense

cannot

perceive

when the sensible

is too

strong; e.g.,

we

cannot

hear after

very

oud

noise,

nor see or smell after

oo

vivid

colors

or too

pungent

odors. Reason,

on

the

other

hand,

when

it thinks hat

which s in

the

highestdegree

intelligible,

s

not

therebyncapacitated

or

hinking

hat

which

s less

ntelligible,

but

it thinks

he

latter better. For sense

is not

independent

f

the

body,

whereas reason

is

separable

(xwpeazc6)

rom

t. 1

In

sensible perception,

ristotle

argues,

the

mind

s

self-active,

ut

its

self-activity

s limited

by

the

condition of

the

bodily

organ,

whereas

reason

is

pure

self-activity,

nd

therefore

t

is

self-de-

veloping.

While,therefore,

eason

s

not

in

union with

ts

object

except

when

t is

actuallydeveloped,

ts

potentiality

s the

poten-

tiality

f

pure

or

independent

elf-activity.

Hence we are told

that

reason

s

'

potentially'

ll that

s

thought,

hough

actually'

it

is

nothing

before

t thinks. ' In other

words,

reason cannot

be said

to

have

any

existence

except

as

self-active;

t is

incapa-

ble

of

being

acted

upon

from

without,

nd its

actuality'

is

there-

fore dentical

with

he

thinking

of its

own

activity.

Reason

is

therefore

potential'

only

n the

sense

that its capacityfor

hink-

1

Ibid.,

429a

29-Jb5

2

Ibid.,

429a

22-24.



No. 4.] THE METAPHYSIC

OF

ARISTOTLE.

35

1

ing the

real

may

not

be developed

into

the explicit

omprehen-

sion of the real.

It

is

in this sense that it is compared to

a

tabula rasa, not in the sense of Locke, forwhom the mind was

the mere

recipient

f ideas

produced

in it

by

external things.

There

is forAristotle

no

content

of reason

apart from ts self-

activity, nd

when

reason

comes to

an

explicit

knowledge

of

itself r

is

'

active,'

what

t

knows

are

the

forms' of tself, r the

modes

of

its own

self-activity.

Thus man,

when he

reaches the

stage of active

reason

(vov

rotprx6)

grasps

the self-active rin-

ciple which is operative n himself nd which is the source of

the eternal

process

of

the

world.'

We are

now in

a

better

osition

to

understand

he final

iscus-

sion in

the Metaphysic,

n whichAristotle eeks to

determine he

nature

of the Supreme

Reality upon

which the

whole universe

depends.

Turning

o the world

of

finite

hings,

Aristotle

points

out that

there s in

each

being an

effort r

desire

or

striving

owards an

end,

and.that

this

end

is not

changeable

but

is

involved n the

very nature

of the

being

n

which the desire

s

operative.

In

ra-

tional beings,

there

s

also

an

end,

and the whole

of the

rational

life is directed owards

it.

Now,

here we have

a fixed

or un-

changeable principle,

which

s

yet

the

moving principle

n

the

whole lifeof

the

beings

n

which

t is

operative.

It is

not

possi-

ble to

account

for he

persistent

endency

owards certain end

by saying

that an

object

seems

'

good'

because

it is

desired,

or

thiswould

mean that desire

has no definite

nd;

the

onlypossible

explanation

s

that

it is desired because

it seems

'good,'

ie.,

because reason

grasps

the

principle

which satisfies

ts

tendency

towards he

rational-that

which

will

afford

complete

atisfaction

to desire. Everybeingis therefore triving ftercomplete

elf-

realization,

nd the whole

process

of

ts ife

s

a

means to this

end.

Now,

whatever

s in

process

s of

necessity ncomplete,

nd,

there-

fore,

he original

ource

of

all

the

process

of

finite

hings

must

be

the

unchangeable

or

self-complete

Reality,

which admits

of

no

process

of development

rom he

less to themore

complete.

The

Absolute

Reality

s

eternally

omplete,

nd

in

its

free

nd

inde-

1

De An., 4,

429a 3I_430a

2.



352

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL.

VII.

pendent iferealizes

eternally

hat which man

only

realizes

n

his

best

moments.

Being

thus

always

completely

elf-active,

t must

always enjoyabsolutefelicity,or felicitys proportionate o the

realization f

self-activity,nd the

Supreme

Reality

s the

com-

plete

realizationof

self-activity,

nd,

therefore,

bsolute

felicity.

Now,

the essentialnature

f

thought

s

to

grasp that

which

s

real,

and the

supreme

hought

is the

thought

of

that which is

abso-

lutelyreal.

Intelligence,

n

thinking

he

intelligible,

herefore

thinks

hat which

s the

very

essence of

intelligence.

When in-

telligence husgrasps its own nature, t actually s intelligence,

whereas before

t

was

only

the

potentiality

f

intelligence. The

highest

eachof

ntelligences,

therefore,

o

grasp

tself s a

whole,

i.e.,

to

become

conscious of the formsof

its own

self-activity.

When for fewbrief

moments

man

reaches this

stage,

he enjoys

the

greatest

felicity

f

which he is

capable.

But

God

is

always

what

we are

only

at

times; nay,

He

eternally njoys

a

felicity

still more complete. He is thus the self-active,iving, ternal,

best.

Nor has He

any

sensible

nature,

because he would

then

be extendedand

divisible;

He

is,therefore,

purely upersensible

or

incorporeal

Being'

Certain

ropiat

may

be

raised

n

connection

withthis

concep-

tion of

God.

(i)

What is

the

object

of

the Divine

Reason? It

will

be admitted hat Reason

(pour)

s

the

highestfaculty

mani-

festedby a finitebeing. The Supreme Reason musttherefore

think

hat which s in

the

highest

sense real,that which s

most

divine. And this

highest

reality

t must

eternally

think, for

anychange

in

thought

would

be for he

worse,

and would

imply

incompleteness.

(2)

Is

there any'

potentiality'

n

the Divine

Reason ?

Manifestly

not,

for

this

would

imply

that it did

not think

uninterruptedly,

ince that which is not

continually

thinking

hows

that it is

fatigued

by the continuous

activity

f

thinking.

Moreover,

3)

if

n

the

Divine

Reason therewere

any

'potentiality,'

hat

which is

thought

would

be

higher

in

nature

than the

Divine

Reason

itself. For,

since it

would

be depen-

dent

upon

whatever

was

presented,

t

would

exist no

matterwhat

was

thought.

If therefore

he

Divine Reason must think

he

'

Met.

A,

7,

I072

a

26-I073

a

13.



No. 4.]

THE METAPHISIC

OF ARISTOTLE.

353

highestreality,

t must

think itself, nd thus it

consists in the

thinking f thought

Voweq

vofasrw).

The mode

of its activity

is not perception

ac'vaftO),

opinion

80da)

and externalreflection

(edvoea),

in which the

object of thought

ppears

as distinct rom

thought,

but the totalor

concrete ctivity,

n

which

thought s

at

once subject and object

or thinks tself. Further,

4)

if the

Divine Reason and

its

object

were

different,

ow could it

be the

highest form

of reality?

This difficultyan only

be resolved

when

it is seen that

even

in

human thinking

the essence of

thingss thoughtwithout he ' matter.' This holdsgood both in

the

productive

and the

theoretical ciences,

where

thought nd

its object

are identical.

In the

Supreme

Reason, however, he

object

which

is

thought

must be identical with Reason itself.

(5)

Nor

can the Divine Reason

be

composite.

That which

is

composite

an be thought nly by

a transition rom art to part.

Now human

reason

only grasps

the

meaning

of the universe

when t conceives t as an indivisiblewhole. Hence the Divine

Reason,

which s its own

object,

must be an absolute whole or

individual,

nd this whole it

must

eternally

ontemplate. God,

therefore,

o sum

up

the

result of the

whole

enquiry,

s

eternal,

unchangeable,self-dependent,

elf-originative,

elf-knowing,

nd

immaterial,

he

first nd finalcause of

the whole process of the

universe.

The Divine Reason is thus self-originativend self-knowing.

It

must,

however,

e added that,

while t

is the

primary

ource of

all

energy,

here

s communicated

o the universe n

energy

of its

own.

The

highest

form

f

this

energy

s

exhibited

n

the eternal

substances

of the

stars;

a

less

degree

of

energy

s found

n

those

beings

which arise and

perish,

nd which are

therefore

ubject

to

change

and accident;

but all things

work

harmoniously,

nd thus

the universe s a cosmos.

The

principle

which

in its

perfection

constitutes

he

Divine

Reason

is

immanent

n

each

part,

nd mani-

fests

tself s an effort

fter

ompleteness;

so that

there s a

regu-

lar

gradation

of

existence,beginning

with lifeless

things

and

ascending

through

he intermediate

tages

of

vegetative

nd

sen-

sitive

ife,

o the rational

ifeof

man,

the

highest

form f which

s

1

Met.A, 9,

I074b I5-I075a IO0



354

7HE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

[VOL. VII.

speculative nsight

nto the first rinciplesof all reality.

Thus

Aristotle eeks

to

provide

for he self-activity

f each part,

while

he maintains he independence f theDivine Reason and its sep-

arationfrom

he world. The Divine

Reason,

while

it is

the

original ource

of all the process of

the world,does

not act upon

it mechanically,

ut each being,through

the self-activity

om-

municated

o and immanent

n it, strives fter that

completeness

of nature

which onstitutes

he movingprinciple f

all its activity.

There is thus a complete

circle of

reality, heDivine Reason

beingat once thebeginningnd theend ofall existence. Hence

Aristotle compares

the universe as

a whole to a

well-ordered

army

witha

general at

the head, and to an organized

State,

n

which each

member

discharges his

own function, hough

the

function s not in all the same. The

inexhaustible

and rational

Divine

Energycommunicates

tselfto the eternal

substances

of

the stars,

which communicate heir

energy o finite

nd change-

able things,

nd these

ever strive owards heiroriginal

ource

in

virtue

f

the

energy mmanentn

them.'

JOHN

WATSON.

QUEEN'S

UNIVERSITY.

I

Met.

O, 1075 I

I-25.

Documents

The Metaphysic of Aristotle