THE MEANING OF THE MEANING OF TRUTHTRUTH

SUSAN HAACKSUSAN HAACK<shaack@law.miami.edu><shaack@law.miami.edu>

“[‘True’] is a word we all understand, but if we try to explain it, we can easily get

involved in a maze of confusion.” – Frank

Ramsey

1. CORRESPONDENCE THEORIES

2. THE SEMANTIC THEORY

3. THE LACONICIST THEORY

4. CONSEQUENCES OF LACONICISM

1. Correspondence Theories1. Correspondence Theories

some correspondence theories are some correspondence theories are toothless, saying no more than: “it is true toothless, saying no more than: “it is true that that pp if and only if if and only if really, in factreally, in fact, , pp””

more serious correspondence theories more serious correspondence theories turn those emphatic adverbs into serious turn those emphatic adverbs into serious metaphysics/philosophy of language – metaphysics/philosophy of language – giving them real “bite”giving them real “bite”

for example …for example …

the Logical Atomist correspondence theories of Wittgenstein and Russell

these require …these require …

heavy metaphysical apparatus of heavy metaphysical apparatus of factsfacts (atomic & molecular, positive & negative) (atomic & molecular, positive & negative)

propositionspropositions with a specific logical form with a specific logical form

& a relation of & a relation of structural isomorphismstructural isomorphism (which proved very difficult to spell out)(which proved very difficult to spell out)

then there wasthen there was

J. L. Austin’s version, with correspondence as a coincidence of demonstrative and

descriptive conventions – but this

applies only to indexical statements

many still find “correspondence” many still find “correspondence” attractiveattractive

but it has (I believe) never been spelled but it has (I believe) never been spelled out in a way out in a way

that gets beyond the toothless that gets beyond the toothless correspondence idea, andcorrespondence idea, and

doesn’t lead to excessive metaphysical doesn’t lead to excessive metaphysical commitments, or restricted applicability commitments, or restricted applicability

2. The Semantic Theory2. The Semantic Theory

has been enormously

influential, thanks in part to the support of Popper, Quine, and Davidson – but not

always well-understoodAlfred Tarski

Tarski proposesTarski proposes

Formal Adequacy ConditionsFormal Adequacy Conditions

the definition must not be circularthe definition must not be circular should not use semantic primitivesshould not use semantic primitives can be given only for a language that is can be given only for a language that is

formally specifiable &formally specifiable & semantically opensemantically open

the last formal requirementthe last formal requirement

is imposed to avoid the is imposed to avoid the Liar ParadoxLiar Paradox

This sentence is falseThis sentence is false

by requiring truth-in-O (the by requiring truth-in-O (the object object languagelanguage) to be defined in a ) to be defined in a meta-meta-languagelanguage

because of the Formal Adequacy because of the Formal Adequacy conditions, Tarski can define truth conditions, Tarski can define truth only for only for syntactically characterizable formal syntactically characterizable formal languageslanguages

& can define only & can define only “true-in-L,“true-in-L,” not “true”” not “true”

more famous ismore famous is

Tarski’s Material Adequacy Condition –Tarski’s Material Adequacy Condition –

any acceptable definition of truth must any acceptable definition of truth must have as consequence all instances ofhave as consequence all instances of

(T): S is true iff (T): S is true iff pp

(where S is the name of the sentence on the right)(where S is the name of the sentence on the right)

the Material Adequacy Conditionthe Material Adequacy Condition

is is notnot a definition of truth (but a condition a definition of truth (but a condition on acceptable definitions)on acceptable definitions)

& (according to Tarski) cannot simply be & (according to Tarski) cannot simply be generalized generalized

so his definition takes an indirect routeso his definition takes an indirect route

Tarski definesTarski defines

satisfactionsatisfaction of atomic open formulae (a of atomic open formulae (a relation to infinite sequences of objects) -- relation to infinite sequences of objects) -- enumerativelyenumeratively

then then satisfactionsatisfaction of molecular open of molecular open sentences -- sentences -- recursivelyrecursively

& then & then truthtruth of closed sentences: of closed sentences: “satisfied by all infinite sequences”“satisfied by all infinite sequences”

misunderstandingsmisunderstandings

this is not, as Popper suggests, a version this is not, as Popper suggests, a version of the correspondence theory – Tarski of the correspondence theory – Tarski wants to articulate Aristotle’s Insight wants to articulate Aristotle’s Insight WITHOUT relying on “correspondence” or WITHOUT relying on “correspondence” or “facts”“facts”

nor is it a “disquotationalist” theory, as nor is it a “disquotationalist” theory, as Quine suggests – if it were, Tarski could Quine suggests – if it were, Tarski could simply drop his last 100 pages!simply drop his last 100 pages!

for, according to Tarski …for, according to Tarski …

the quotation-mark name of an expression the quotation-mark name of an expression is a new word, of which the contained is a new word, of which the contained expression is not semantically a partexpression is not semantically a part

you can’t quantify into quotation marksyou can’t quantify into quotation marks

““((pp) (‘) (‘pp’ is true iff ’ is true iff pp)” makes no sense; the )” makes no sense; the T-schema can’t be generalized in this wayT-schema can’t be generalized in this way

ironically enoughironically enough

this is the “logical block” view of quotation this is the “logical block” view of quotation -- which Quine himself once accepted!-- which Quine himself once accepted!

when he wrote that a word in quotation when he wrote that a word in quotation marks is not semantically a part of the marks is not semantically a part of the whole expression – any more than “rat” is whole expression – any more than “rat” is of “Socrates” of “Socrates”

moreovermoreover

Tarski’s is not, as Soames suggests, a Tarski’s is not, as Soames suggests, a theory of the truth of propositions theory of the truth of propositions

propositions don’t have syntactic structure propositions don’t have syntactic structure (the same proposition can be expressed (the same proposition can be expressed by sentences with different structures)by sentences with different structures)

but T’s definition but T’s definition relies onrelies on structure of wffs structure of wffs

Tarski’s approach has real limitationsTarski’s approach has real limitations

it stratifies the truth-concept (treated not it stratifies the truth-concept (treated not as as one one concept, but concept, but manymany))

its application is limited to formally its application is limited to formally specifiable & semantically open languages specifiable & semantically open languages

which is why Tarski says truth cannot be which is why Tarski says truth cannot be defined for natural languagesdefined for natural languages

Tarski himself is ambivalentTarski himself is ambivalent

he says he doesn’t claim to have captured he says he doesn’t claim to have captured the “real meaning” of “true” – he would be the “real meaning” of “true” – he would be willing to use the word “frue” instead!willing to use the word “frue” instead!

and yet goes on to say BOTH that he and yet goes on to say BOTH that he doesn’t say the semantic theory is “right,” doesn’t say the semantic theory is “right,” AND that he can’t imagine what it would AND that he can’t imagine what it would mean to say it is “wrong” (!!!) mean to say it is “wrong” (!!!)

furthermorefurthermore

the failure of the “Davidson Program” confirms that Tarski was right in thinking his methods apply to formal, but not natural, languages

Donald Davidson

… not to mention the failure of Popper’s theory of verisimilitude, or the casualness of his assumption that Tarski’s theory applies to “the consistent parts” of natural language

Sir Karl Popper

I am inclined to concludeI am inclined to conclude

that Tarski’s work, though a very that Tarski’s work, though a very impressive technical achievementimpressive technical achievement

is not, in the end, fully satisfying is not, in the end, fully satisfying philosophicallyphilosophically

3. The Laconicist Theory3. The Laconicist Theory

““laconicist” is a better name for what is laconicist” is a better name for what is usually called the “Redundancy Theory”usually called the “Redundancy Theory”

““[A] belief is true if it is a belief that [A] belief is true if it is a belief that pp, and , and pp. . …. A belief that Smith is either a liar or a …. A belief that Smith is either a liar or a

fool is true if Smith is either a liar or a fool, fool is true if Smith is either a liar or a fool, and not otherwise.” – Frank Ramseyand not otherwise.” – Frank Ramsey

Ramsey is well awareRamsey is well aware

that while “it is true that” can be eliminated that while “it is true that” can be eliminated from (is redundant in), e.g., “It is true that from (is redundant in), e.g., “It is true that Hannibal crossed the Alps”Hannibal crossed the Alps”

it canit cannotnot be eliminated form, e.g., “Plato be eliminated form, e.g., “Plato said some true things and some false said some true things and some false things”things”

the new namethe new name

coined by Dr. Kiriake Xerohemonacoined by Dr. Kiriake Xerohemona

derives from the English word “laconic,” derives from the English word “laconic,” which means “short, terse”which means “short, terse”

& itself derives from the Greek word & itself derives from the Greek word “Laconia,” the name for the ancient city-“Laconia,” the name for the ancient city-state, Spartastate, Sparta

to call something “spartan” (in English) means that it is austere, simple

laconicism seems to capture the core laconicism seems to capture the core meaning of “true”meaning of “true”

& to conform precisely to the Aristotelian & to conform precisely to the Aristotelian InsightInsight

still, as Ramsey is awarestill, as Ramsey is aware

the theory is incomplete, requiringthe theory is incomplete, requiring

an account of propositional quantifiers an account of propositional quantifiers (which may not itself use the concept of (which may not itself use the concept of truth)truth)

to explain, e.g.: “Plato said some true to explain, e.g.: “Plato said some true things” -- “(Ethings” -- “(Epp) (Plato said that ) (Plato said that pp, and , and pp)”)”

&&

an account of an account of representationrepresentation

& an understanding of & an understanding of realityreality

which Ramsey takes to be involved in which Ramsey takes to be involved in saying that this is the belief that saying that this is the belief that pp [representation], and [representation], and pp [reality] [reality]

on propositional quantifierson propositional quantifiers

neither an neither an objectualobjectual nor a nor a substitutionalsubstitutional account will do account will do

because both involve the concept of truth, because both involve the concept of truth, explicitly or implicitlyexplicitly or implicitly

the “inference-ticket” approach (suggested the “inference-ticket” approach (suggested by Arthur Prior, C. J. F. Williams, Marby Arthur Prior, C. J. F. Williams, Maríía-a-JosJoséé Fr Fráápolli) might workpolli) might work

on realityon reality

laconicism is entirely compatible with my laconicism is entirely compatible with my Innocent Realism (itself fairly laconic!)Innocent Realism (itself fairly laconic!)

according to which there is according to which there is one real worldone real world

largely but not whollylargely but not wholly independent of us independent of us

a real world that includesa real world that includes

natural things, events, etc.natural things, events, etc. human artifactshuman artifacts social institutions, roles, and rulessocial institutions, roles, and rules mental states, processes, eventsmental states, processes, events imaginative creations such as novels, plays, imaginative creations such as novels, plays,

cartoons, etc. cartoons, etc.

4. Consequences of Laconicism4. Consequences of Laconicism

that when we say that it is true that that when we say that it is true that pp, what , what we say about we say about pp is the same, is the same, whatever whatever kind of proposition kind of proposition pp is is (scientific, (scientific, historical, literary, legal, etc.)historical, literary, legal, etc.)

this is one way to put what I mean by this is one way to put what I mean by speaking of the “unity of truth” speaking of the “unity of truth”

&&

that truth is that truth is objectiveobjective

i.e. (normally), whether or not it is true that i.e. (normally), whether or not it is true that pp does not depend on whether you, or I, or does not depend on whether you, or I, or anyone anyone believesbelieves it is true that it is true that pp

or on whether weor on whether we agree agree thatthat p p, or , or knowknow that that pp, etc., etc.

&&

that truth is that truth is not relativenot relative

for (just as there is no reference in the for (just as there is no reference in the account of truth to what anyone believes, account of truth to what anyone believes, etc.), there is no relativization to culture, etc.), there is no relativization to culture, community, theory, or even (as in Tarski) community, theory, or even (as in Tarski) languagelanguage

moreovermoreover

laconicism suggests a plausible laconicism suggests a plausible understanding of observations like: understanding of observations like:

a genuine inquirer a genuine inquirer seeks the truthseeks the truth

a scientific theory is successful (in a scientific theory is successful (in prediction, technology) prediction, technology) because it is truebecause it is true

““a genuine inquirer seeks the truth”a genuine inquirer seeks the truth”

means, not that there is a kind of Holy means, not that there is a kind of Holy Grail,Grail,The TruthThe Truth, that every genuine , that every genuine inquirer seeksinquirer seeks

but that someone who is genuinely but that someone who is genuinely inquiring into whether inquiring into whether pp wants to end up wants to end up believing that believing that pp if if pp, & that not-, & that not-pp if not- if not-pp

e.g.e.g.

““James Watson really wanted to discover James Watson really wanted to discover the truth about the structure of DNA”the truth about the structure of DNA”

means: “Watson wanted to end his means: “Watson wanted to end his investigation believing that DNA is a investigation believing that DNA is a double-helical, backbone-out double-helical, backbone-out macromolecule with like-with-unlike base macromolecule with like-with-unlike base pairs iff DNA pairs iff DNA isis a double-helical, ..., a double-helical, ..., macromolecule” (etc.)macromolecule” (etc.)

as, of course, it is, and he did!

Watson (L) & Crick (R) with their model of DNA, 1952 –

a model Watson

described as “too pretty not

to be true.”

againagain

““this scientific theory works because it is this scientific theory works because it is true”true”

means: “this theory works because it says means: “this theory works because it says that that p –p – and (in fact!) and (in fact!) pp””

for example …for example …

why does the plane not burst at the why does the plane not burst at the seams?seams?

because it is built using the assumption because it is built using the assumption that metal that metal mm can withstand pressure can withstand pressure pp, , and this assumption is trueand this assumption is true

i.e.: because i.e.: because mm cancan withstand pressure withstand pressure pp

furthermorefurthermore

laconicism can readily explain why “true” laconicism can readily explain why “true” plays the pragmatic roles it doesplays the pragmatic roles it does

e.g., the use of “that’s true” to express e.g., the use of “that’s true” to express agreement is just a short way to say agreement is just a short way to say yourself what the other person just saidyourself what the other person just said

Rorty suggests he is following RamseyRorty suggests he is following Ramsey

when he identifies truth with here-and-now when he identifies truth with here-and-now agreementagreement

but this is a big muddle but this is a big muddle

““that’s true” often has the force of “I agree”that’s true” often has the force of “I agree”

but (of course) we can agree that but (of course) we can agree that pp when when pp is is notnot true true

& (of course) we may & (of course) we may notnot agree that p agree that p when p when p isis true true

so “it is true that p” doesn’t so “it is true that p” doesn’t meanmean “we “we agree that p”agree that p”

laconicism can also explain the laconicism can also explain the concessive use of “true”concessive use of “true”

A says: “The price of gold will probably A says: “The price of gold will probably rise”; B replies: “True, but later it will fall”rise”; B replies: “True, but later it will fall”

= “yes, the price of gold will probably rise, = “yes, the price of gold will probably rise, but after that it will fall”but after that it will fall”

next time, I will explorenext time, I will explore

the many different kinds of true proposition the many different kinds of true proposition (the “plurality of truths”)(the “plurality of truths”)

specifically, how truths in science differ specifically, how truths in science differ from truths in history, in law, & in literaturefrom truths in history, in law, & in literature

but for now, I’d like to hear what

you think …