The 'Matters' of Science Diplomacy: Transversal Analysis

USING SCIENCE DIPLOMACY FOR ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES

POLICY BRIEF #1OCTOBER 2018

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The 'Matters' of Science Diplomacy: Transversal Analysis of the S4D4C Case StudiesMitchell Young, Charlotte Rungius, Ewert Aukes, Lorenzo Melchor, Elke Dall, Eliška Černovská, Eliška Tomolová, Laure-Anne Plumhans, Pauline Ravinet, Tim Flink, Ana Elorza Moreno

The S4D4C project is coordinated by the Centre for Social Innovation (ZSI).This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 770342.

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PrefaceThis transversal analysis is the second in aset of two volumes coming out of the casestudy work package of the Horizon 2020project S4D4C, 'Using science for/indiplomacy for addressing grand societalchallenges' (see box 1). The first volume,'Science Diplomacy in the Making: Case based insights from the S4D4C project',individually presented the nine case studiesthat we researched in the project (see box2), delving into the governance arrange-ments, knowledge dynamics, multilevel actor constellations, and the ways that specific case could advance and refresh our understanding of science diplomacy. In this second volume, we take a comparative approach, looking across all nine cases for insights and lessons that can inform and improve both the practice of science diplomacy and future academic work on the topic.

When we began the transversal analysis ofour case studies, we asked a simplequestion: What matters in sciencediplomacy? The idea here was threefold,playing on different meanings of the word'matter'. First, there appeared to besomething 'the matter' with attempts todefine the concept of science diplomacy.While there is a well-established and usefultypology (AAAS/Royal Society 2011), thetransition from that to a comprehensive defi-nition and/or theory of science diplomacy has been elusive, likely because the concept covers such a vast and complex array ofactors, institutions and practices. Our initialcase study design was intended to bothcapture this conceptual breadth, as well asto provide a different set of lenses throughwhich to examine it. We divided our casesinto three categories, based on what we sawas the primary (though not exclusive)driving force behind them as they engaged

the intersection of science and diplomacy inthe pursuit of addressing global challenges.There were foreign policy-driven cases,which use science to advance alreadyexisting European foreign policy goals and itsposition in the global community; these wecalled diplomacy challenges, as thechallenge was getting the science moredeeply integrated into diplomatic activities.There were science-driven cases, whichlooked at areas where European science andresearch communities were positioned asglobal leaders, and thus provided likelyopportunities to potentially impact oninternational affairs. Finally, there wereinstrument-driven cases, in which existingpolicy instruments, infrastructures andinstitutions were being extended externallyand used as models globally by the EU andMember States. This wide-ranging, three pronged approach provided a diverse arrayof empirical data from which to explore andseek out new themes in science diplomacy.

Second, we draw on the meaning of matteras a 'subject or substance'. We have soughtto find concrete, though not physical,aspects of science diplomacy that run acrossmultiple cases. We recognize that sciencediplomacy is not singular in its actors,institutions, processes, or activities. Theresultant multiplicity of variables leads us toput forward a diverse set of 'matters' ofscience diplomacy, each of which homes inon a specific aspect of science diplomacy andthrough examples derived from our casestudy research, investigates its significance.

The third meaning of matter is to be'important or consequential'. This is themost critical of the three meanings for ourpurposes in this volume. The aspects ofscience diplomacy that we explore in thepages below are, we believe, important for

USING SCIENCE FOR/IN DIPLOMACY FOR ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES

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advancing the understanding of sciencediplomacy as a concept and a practice.

We conceive of the matters in this report asan integrated mosaic with a myriad ofpossible linkages and intersecting effectsbetween them: like in complex systems,when the metaphorical butterfly flaps itswings in one matter, it affects - perceptiblyand imperceptibly - other matters as well.Some linkages between the matters areidentified in the text below, but many remainas a task for future research, and we hopethat you will join us in furthering thisdiscussion. To that end, we have identifiedthe main authors of each matter, both togive credit where it is due, but also toprovide you, the reader, with contact points for the various topics.

Finally, we wish to express our appreciationto the participants in two focus groups thatwere held in the autumn of 2019 in Berlinand Budapest, in which we preliminarilyexplored some of these matters anddiscussed future scenarios for sciencediplomacy. As well, we would like to thankthe whole S4D4C project team, as thefindings in this volume are the results ofdiscussions that have occurred throughoutthe projects lifetime and across the workpackages.


Box 1 – The S4D4C project – “Using science for/in diplomacy for addres-sing global challenges”

“In the current political and societal landscape, the needs, stakes and opportunities pertaining to science diplomacy have increased. However, communication between the scientific and diplomatic communities is not straightforward. There is potential for better harnessing European science and science cooperation for European science diplomacy and foreign policy goals, both at the EU and EU Member State-level. Not only can new approaches to scientific advice in EU foreign policy benefit from advances in research, but science diplomats can also harness new ways of carrying out research that offer opportunities for foreign policy impact. The overall objective of S4D4C is to support current and future European science diplomacy for the benefit of European capacities, EU foreign policy goals and especially the development of solutions for grand societal challenges. S4D4C has shaped its partnership so that it can effectively address this objective from an academic as well as a practitioners’ perspective.” (www.s4d4c.eu)

To access other publications of the S4D4C project, please visit www.s4d4c.eu/outputs.

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Mitchell YoungPrague, Czech Republic



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Box 2 – S4D4C case research

Diplomacy challenges – Foreign policy driven cases

• Science diplomacy and infectious diseases: Between national and European narratives (Šlosarčík et al., 2020)

• Water diplomacy and its future in the national, regional and European environments (Tomalová et al., 2020)

• Cyber Security: Mapping the role of science diplomacy in the cyber field (Kadlecová et al., 2020)

Science opportunities – Science driven cases

• The science and diplomacy of global challenges: Food security in EU-Africa relations (Ravinet et al., 2020)

• International dimensions of the EU’s FET Flagships: Large-scale strategic research investments as a site of de-facto science diplomacy (Degelsegger-Márquez, 2020)

• Open Science Diplomacy (Mayer, 2020)

Coordination options – European instrument driven cases

• SESAME – a synchrotron light source in the Middle East: an international research infrastructure in the making (Rungius, 2020)

• Joint international research programming as a case of science diplomacy (Flink, 2020)

• Science advice in the European Union: Crafting collective understanding of transnational issues (Montana, 2020)

To access the case studies please visit https://www.s4d4c.eu/s4d4c-cases/

The compiled nine-case volume, Young, M., Flink, T. and Dall, E. (2020). Science Diplomacy in the Making: Case-based insights from the S4D4C project, can be downloaded directly here: https://www.s4d4c.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/S4D4C_REPORT_Science-Diplomacy-in-the-Making.pdf

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Matters of Science Diplomacy 1

1. Explicitness/Implicitness (Mitchell Young, Charlotte Rungius) 1

2. Interests (Charlotte Rungius, Lorenzo Melchor) 5

3. Values (Elke Dall, Pauline Ravinet, Tim Flink) 9

4. Scale (Charlotte Rungius) 13

5. Levels (Eliška Černovská, Ana Elorza Moreno) 16

6. Individuals (Charlotte Rungius, Lorenzo Melchor) 20

7. Geography (Lorenzo Melchor, Elke Dall) 23

8. Governance systems (Ewert Aukes, Mitchell Young) 26

9. Instruments (Laure-Anne Plumhans) 30

10. Rhythm and timing (Ewert Aukes) 33

Notes on contributors 36

References 39

Contents

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List of AcronymsAAASAEGIS

AUCERNCFCsDGsDEVCODG AGRIDG ECHODG RTDECECDCEEASERA-NetEUFAOFETGHSIHEGloPID-RHLPDICPDR

ICTJPIMSNATONCISANGOsPRIMAR&ISAGESPIDERSESAMESTIUKUNUSWASPWHOZIG

American Association for the Advancement of ScienceAccelerating EU-US Dialogue for Research and Innovation in Cybersecurity and Privacy (Horizon 2020 project)African UnionEuropean Organization for Nuclear ResearchChlorofluorocarbonsDirectorate-Generals of the European CommissionDirectorate-General for International Cooperation and DevelopmentDirectorate-General for Agriculture and Rural DevelopmentDirectorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid OperationsDirectorate General for Research and InnovationEuropean CommissionEuropean Centre for Disease Prevention and ControlEuropean External Action ServiceEuropean Research Area networks (a project type in the Framework Programme) European UnionFood and Agriculture OrganizationFuture Emerging TechnologiesGlobal Health Security InitiativeHigher EducationGlobal Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease PreparednessEU-Africa High Level Policy DialogueConvention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube RiverInformation and communication technologyJoint Programming InitiativesMember State (of the EU)North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNational Cyber and Information Security Agency (Czechia)Non-governmental organizationsPartnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean AreaResearch and InnovationScientific Advisory Group for Emergencies(UK)Science Policy in Diplomacy and External Relations networkSynchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle EastScience, Technology, and InnovationUnited KingdomUnited NationsUnited StatesCentral Asian Regional Water Stakeholder´s PlatformWorld Health OrganizationCentre for International Health Protection

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Matters of Science Diplomacy

Explicitness (or implicitness) refers to the use (or non-use) of the term ‘science diplomacy’ by particular actors in particular situations to label themselves or their activities. While the term science diplomacy has been gaining increased traction in both academic and policymaking circles, it is neither universally embraced nor entirely consistently used. The reasons for this are undoubtedly manifold: sometimes they are intentional and other times they reflect a lack of awareness of the concept or a preference for alternative language. In this matter, we look at the conditions under which actors choose to use or to avoid the term science diplomacy, and by distinguishing between explicitness and implicitness, seek to make sense of one aspect that underlies the ambiguity of science diplomacy as a term.

Our basic premise is that the act of applying (or not applying) the label science diplomacy to a concrete interaction, practice or actor is political, that is, it creates and changes power relations and affects outcomes. Casting the term this way makes it especially important not to overlook instances at the intersection between science and diplomacy that are not named explicitly as science diplomacy. In our S4D4C cases, we found quite a few examples of things that we believe should be considered science diplomacy even though they are not labelled as such or occur under the label of an alternative (sub)type of diplomacy or policymaking. Science diplomacy, in other words, is not solely identifiable through self-conscious labelling but requires looking more broadly into what occurs at the intersection of science and international relations. Understanding when, in what context, and for whom the

explicit use of the label science diplomacy is helpful in efforts to advance scientific and foreign policy objectives, and inversely, understanding when, in what context, and for whom science diplomacy may be more effectively deployed by leaving the term unstated, provides insight into science diplomacy as both a practical and theoretical concept.

The term science diplomacy is used to label both actors and practices. There are three main types of actors that engage in activities of science diplomacy: (1) political/diplomatic actors, (2) science-based actors, and (3) science administration/ management-based actors. In each of these three actor types, we can distinguish between explicit and implicit actor self-definition. In the first type, we find both explicit and implicit actors. There are actors with explicit roles and titles that include the term science diplomacy: Science Diplomats, Science and Technology (S&T) attachés, and Special Envoys, whose role is to practice science diplomacy. More precisely, their role is typically to practice ‘diplomacy for science’, that is, assisting scientists in bridging national divides, and these actors have little to do with high politics or sensitive diplomatic issues. Inversely, in this first type, we also find political actors (from civil servants to high-level politicians) that work on knowledge-intensive issues and are thus engaged in practices that we could consider to be science diplomacy, but they do not define themselves as science diplomats. The second type, science-based actors, mainly do not use the term science diplomat to define themselves or their actions, though there is a small but growing cadre of scientists that would do so. In


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this second type, we distinguish between government-appointed and self-appointed science diplomats. Government-appointed science diplomats are scientists who are brought in by the government to assist in knowledge-intensive negotiations and decisions on what may be sensitive diplomatic topics. A prototypical example here is the Iran nuclear negotiations. These government-appointed actors would not likely call themselves science diplomats, though we would classify them that way. Self-appointed science diplomats, on the other hand, are activist in nature. These are scientists who attempt to impact on issues of international affairs, engaging with a wide range of global challenges and sustainable development goals. This sub-type of actor uses the term explicitly, and these actors are often associated with institutions that promote science diplomacy activities, such as the trainees and members of various networks (e.g. “Science Policy in Diplomacy and External Relations” (SPIDER)). Finally, the third type of actor, science administrators, are engaged in international issues and have responsibilities that entail some degree of diplomatic activity – joint programming, grant and infrastructure management – but who would not explicitly refer to themselves as science diplomats. Overall, we can say that the explicit identifier ‘science diplomat’ is generally reserved for a sub-set of the actors that actually practice science diplomacy. Interestingly, while the term science diplomat is used rather cautiously and often seems to be a conscious and considerate choice, the term science diplomacy, referring more to practices than actors, has gained wider traction.

Turning our attention to practices, the cases we have studied provide a number of different ways of looking at the implicit or explicit use of the term. The key to understanding its use in practice relates

to two factors: objectives and legitimacy. Regarding objectives, it is important to ask whether or not the term science diplomacy advances or hinders diplomatic objectives. While we find many examples of the positive impacts of the explicit use of the term in our cases and in the general literature on science diplomacy, two of our cases shed a slightly different light on this question. In the case on food security, we found that explicitly labelling an activity as one of science diplomacy can be seen to introduce a non-cooperative dimension – or a quid pro quo, which changes the dynamics of what otherwise would be purely scientific cooperation (Ravinet et al., 2020). In this way, an action that is altruistic may be seen as self-interested. In such situations, the word science diplomacy is better avoided, as it is likely more effective to keep to the language of scientific cooperation, steering clear of any invocation of politics. The political effects this term has also depend on the institutional logic in different sectors of government. While science diplomacy, practised as cooperation by those in the science and research sectors of government, is most often undertaken with the universalistic aim of advancing science, for other sectors, it has different uses. Within the foreign policy apparatus, it is often viewed as a trading chip within a broader negotiation framework. For example, funding for food research cooperation may be traded for concessions in other areas, such as strengthening control over migration. What is perhaps unexpected then, is that we find a reluctance to use the term in foreign policy, particularly in the European External Action Service (EEAS), and we find its strongest promoters in the research ministries, for which it is something of a double-edged sword.

The second case which sheds light on this issue is Synchrotron-light for Experimental


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Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME) (Rungius 2020). The SESAME infrastructure is commonly presented as a poster child of science diplomacy. The narrative, in its most simple form, is that SESAME promotes world peace by bringing together countries traditionally in conflict through a joint scientific infrastructure. While there is truth behind this narrative, and there are examples of the participating countries coming to agreements in order to establish and run the facility, the cooperative successes, somewhat paradoxically, tend to relate to administrative issues (such as budgets) rather than scientific ones. Notably absent, for the time being, is evidence of individual-level cooperation between scientists of different nations as a means of building cross-cultural understanding. What is important for the discussion on explicitness, is that the most prominent narrative, peacebuilding through science diplomacy, is potentially counterproductive for achieving what most of the regional participants want from the project – the ability to conduct cutting edge research. Internally, SESAME strives to define itself by excellent science, but the narrative of peacebuilding tends to overshadow the scientific goals.

A second key factor for understanding the use/non-use of the term in practice is that of legitimacy. The explicit use of the term should enhance the legitimacy of the relevant actors and their practices, or else there is no reason to use it. Since it is difficult to identify empirical evidence that would prove a positive correlation, we, therefore, look at it the other way around, seeking reasons for not using the term in situations where science diplomacy is known to be happening. In our case studies, we find two main reasons: a lack of awareness of the concept and/or a preference for alternative concepts. There were a significant number

of interviewees who were not familiar with the term until it was explained to them, at which point the interviewees generally responded positively to it and agreed that their activities fit within this category. Concomitantly, we found that other related concepts often had more salience within policy communities. In our three foreign policy driven cases, infectious diseases (Šlosarčík et al., 2020), water security (Tomalová et al., 2020), and cybersecurity (Kadlecová et al., 2020), there are corresponding diplomacies which compete with science diplomacy, namely health diplomacy, water diplomacy, and cyber diplomacy. These thematically oriented diplomacies tend to be used more often than the broader and more cross-cutting term science diplomacy. The same effect is seen in stakeholder organizations, that also tend to prefer the more thematically-specific terminologies, i.e. health diplomacy, over science diplomacy. The exception to this is in the area of science and research policy, where the term science diplomacy is common, but where it also, of course, fits the thematic focus of the ministry or agency.

The relations between actors in science diplomacy and the thematic diplomacies can be more clearly uncovered in cybersecurity, which has become a primary issue for foreign policy in a way that none of the other case topics have. There are cyber diplomats (and attachés), who often work alongside science diplomats (and attachés) in the same embassies and foreign representation offices. The distinction between their two positions and roles exposes the institutionalized gap between these interrelated concepts of diplomacy. We find that in actuality, they are treated as almost entirely separate activities: there are no formal structures or institutionalized practices to guide the relationships


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between them, even when they are in the same embassies. There is, nevertheless, evidence of ad-hoc cooperation (Kadlecová et al., 2020). There are significant overlaps between these types of diplomacy but also differences and gaps such that neither term fully encompasses the other. We suggest, therefore, that better articulation of science diplomacy as a cross-cutting/umbrella-like concept and sector-based types of diplomacy is needed both theoretically and in practice.

Finally, we also find that there is a great deal of variance between national approaches to the use of the term. For example, the UK tends to explicitly refer to science diplomacy more than other countries. There is also a difference in the way states make use of the term. In the Czech Republic, the term often shades in meaning towards economic diplomacy, something which we also see in the Netherlands and the UK regarding how each state addresses water diplomacy (Tomalová et al., 2020). These differences are both cultural and linguistic, and much as the word science itself varies in meaning, the concept of science diplomacy has different national meanings and connotations, furthering an already complicated question of when, in which context, and with whom to be explicit about science diplomacy.


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National interests are a matter of principalimportance in science diplomacy. On the onehand, the concept of science diplomacyproblematizes (national) interests aspotential obstacles to tackling globalchallenges. This dimension is mostlyreflected in the understanding proposed bythe American Association for theAdvancement of Science (AAAS) and theRoyal Society model, which frames sciencediplomacy as a matter of fostering collectiveaction between nation states (Rungius andFlink, 2020). In that sense, sciencediplomacy is proposed to mitigate intereststhat are defined too narrowly and that do notincorporate scientific evidence. However, theconcept of science diplomacy acknowledgesthat nation states follow their own interests.In that regard, science diplomacy is alsoframed as part of a country’s soft power - aforeign policy instrument in the diplomatictoolbox. This soft power dimension isparticularly reflected within the Science forDiplomacy dimension that is part of theAAAS/Royal Society definition. The accentu-ation of interests rather than practices was prominently re-accentuated by the pragmatic taxonomy of science diploma-cy, brought forth by four national sci-ence advisers (Gluckman et al., 2017).This taxonomy suggests distinguishingbetween science diplomacy to advancenational interests, to settle cross-borderissues and to tackle global challenges. Thisnotion relies on science as part of a countryssoft power, the attention of which is largelyfocused on advancing national interests. Thisunderstanding closely reflects the originalsense of the term, when it was for the firsttime explicitly introduced into a foreignpolicy strategy. The president of the UnitedStates, Barack Obama, appointed scienceenvoys and implemented other traditionalscience diplomacy measures in order to

restore the damaged reputation of theUnited States among Arab countries and theMiddle East. When science diplomacy isdiscussed in light of foreign or innovationpolicy strategies, it is primarily with an aimto represent a nations interests. In thatsense, interests matter as key dimensions atleast in two different ways within the conceptof science diplomacy.

This ambivalent meaning of nationalinterests within science diplomacydefinitions produces an 'interest paradox'between 'competition' and opennessrationales: on the one hand the promotion ofa countrys scientific competitiveness andinnovation potential, on the other hand,efforts to foster collaboration amongcountries in the international arena to tackleglobal challenges. How can these two scopes(competition vs cooperation) be harmonizedor jointly approached, acknowledging that,in particular, competition means differentthings in economic (productive advantagesover scarce resources), political (struggle forpower) and scientific (competition for firstand valid findings, and reputation games)terms? The cases of Open Science (Mayer,2020), Future Emerging Technologies (FET)flagships (Degelsegger-Márquez, 2020), andFood Security (Ravinet et al., 2020) shedsome light upon this conundrum. While OpenScience is generally geared to triggercollaborative science on a global scale and isincluded in the international efforts to tackleglobal challenges, our case study alsoreflects the conflicts of interest that pertainto objectives of fair cost sharing, intellectualproperty rights, and other competitiveinterests (Young, 2020). Open Data or OpenEducational Resources potentially face a lackof reciprocity and a dilemma of collaborativevs competitive science (Mayer, 2020). Bycontrast, the Future Emerging Technologies


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flagships were designed as a strategic and competitive science, technology, andinnovation (STI) instrument to ensureinnovation and economic impact remain inthe EU. Third countries were principallyexcluded from full participation. However,within a highly internationalized science andinnovation system, these protective policies did not reflect the necessary de factointernational collaboration taking placebehind the scenes (e.g. review system). Thestudy identified a major challenge " forresearch policy instruments of the scale ofthe flagships to define a balance betweenopenness and restriction, cooperation andcompetition." (Degelsegger-Marquez, 2020:p.127) Furthermore, this approach collideswith the approaches such as thecollaborative 'Open to the World' policy(European Commission, 2016), althoughcertain cooperation regimes have beenexplored and established in light of thechallenge to find a practicable balancebetween openness and competition.

On a similarly general level, but apart fromnational interests, one could argue thatscience diplomacy is also driven by theinterests of the scientific system alongsidepolitical, economic, and personal interests(see Young, 2020). The 'Diplomacy forScience' dimension of the AAAS and RoyalSociety models highlight science as aninternational endeavour that comes with anumber of tangible requirements, partiallyserved or facilitated through diplomacy. Inthe broadest sense, the most optimisticframing of science diplomacy is thepossibility of generating synergies betweendifferent systems (science and foreignpolicy) acting in their own interests. Framingscience diplomacy as a "boundary object",bringing together the world of scientific andtechnological research with the world ofinternational affairs, implicates profoundchallenges on the basis of seeking and

combining mutual interests. Scientists anddiplomats have different backgrounds andrepresent different interests which may beconflicting. Working closely together withdiplomats and political actors, scientists mayfear they will be instrumentalized fornational or political interests that are nottheir own. Indeed, epistemic interests (thequest for knowledge) may be politicised andreinterpreted by others within a politicalcontext, e.g. they may include a politicalmission. This reinterpretation reverberatesand can have an adverse effect on theoriginal scientific interests that are expectedto be disinterested (see Merton, 1973),apolitical or disconnected from purelypolitical goals.

This is particularly a risk in Science forDiplomacy, or Science for Peaceconstellations, as demonstrated in the example of Synchrotron-light forExperimental Science and Applications in theMiddle East (SESAME) (Rungius, 2020).Large scientific endeavours provide commonground to build cooperation among nonalliednations. This is the classical 'Sciencefor Diplomacy' approach that is illustrated inthe SESAME case study. In the SESAMEcase, scientists from across Middle-Eastnations collaborate in a large researchinfrastructure to unveil the secrets of particlephysics. Such examples highlight science asa means to enhance cooperation andunderstanding among civilisations. Whilescientific development is not unique to anyone civilisation, Western cultures embracescientific development as their own.Understanding how scientific and diplomaticinterests may be intertwined to preventfriction among civilisations will be key forhuman progress.

The ways in which interests mattered in science diplomacy constellations investi-gated in our case studies were often


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more subtle and unexpected than traditionalconceptions of science diplomacy wouldbroadly suggest. The constellations weinvestigated struggled less with basicconflicts of interest between generalstakeholder groups than with establishing,fine-tuning and maintaining commonprocedures across institutional and nationalborders in environments with a multitude ofimplicit, hidden and impalpable individualand organisational interests.

The case study about joint programming looking at bilateral and multinationalcollaborations in science funding (Flink,2020), showed that there was usually noconflict of interests carried out over generalfinancial shares or budget increases. Theseconflicts are usually settled before enteringinto joint programming. In the same way,fundamental interests of the collaboratingpartner are not challenged as such, butpartners have a general willingness to takethem into account as much as possible. Thedifficulty lies in reaching and securingcommon evaluation standards in the face ofdivergent legalisation frameworks, routinesand customs. It is also difficult to balanceoccasional interventions and influences fromthe outside that could not be predicted andsometimes could not even be explained inretrospect, because the actual reasonsmay they be personal, organizational orpolitical remained in the dark. In someinstances, even " insignificant decisionsneeded clearance from a non-transparentministry in the back" (Flink, 2020: p.266)leading to "tedious stop-and-go decision making whilst deciding upon the procedure and the evaluation criteria" (Flink, 2020: p.266). In another case, a funding scheme was set and subsequently a ministryinterfered, which in itself was not consideredto be a problem. But responding to thesepolitical requests and thereby deviating fromformalized procedures was feared to signal

inconsequent behaviour. This may haveadverse effects on further spending rounds.

Even though structurally different, the casestudy on European science advicemechanisms in fisheries (Montana, 2020)points in a similar direction. The supremacyof the Commission to define policies and toframe the general epistemological interest isnot contested in this case. The mechanism isgeared towards reaching consensus on thegrounds of representing different opinions.Therefore, it is important that generalinterests are defined and negotiated in theterms of reference, providing concreteinstructions for the science advice bodies,but also defining the limits of their authority(Montana, 2020: p.307). Additionally, thecase study underlines that the authority andcredibility of such advisory bodies also relieson " including diverse representation ofexperts from both different national settings,but also from a wide range of disciplinaryperspectives" (Montana, 2020: p.301).General interests must be defined and madeexplicit for science advice to be efficient:first, because political interests may befought over on scientific grounds; second,because scientists themselves often pursuepolitical goalsin the broad sense ofpursuing ones own convictions about thesubject matter or wanting to " make theworld a better place"; and third, becausescientists often cannot avoid acting onnormative grounds in the way their researchquestions and objects are framed. While aresearchers own values unconsciously (andsometimes intentionally) play into questionsof methodology and research design,research questions are often designed in away that instrumentally reflects political andsocietal needs. "While national political interests cannot be ignored or avoided in science diplomacy, they are just one of a number of interests that must be considered and made visible for


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achieving policymaking results. The S4D4Ccases reveal that a unified or unitary interestseldom exists on any level; rather, we findthat there is a complex array of competingand cooperating interests of different types(political, scientific, economic, and personal)that operate on different levels and scales.[...] a challenge for science diplomacy is tofind an optimal balance between cooperationand competition." (Young, 2020: p.5)

The case studies show that interestsprofoundly matter in science diplomacy.However, this is less the case in the broadsense of nation state interests thattypological models of science diplomacy maysuggest. In concrete science diplomacyconstellations, national interests do not posea challenge to international cooperation asthey are generally assumed and accepted.By contrast, institutional, procedural andpolitical interests pose tangible challenges ina more granular sense, especially withregards to creating and maintaining concreterules and procedures.


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Science diplomacy is located at theintersection of (i) science, (ii) science,technology, innovation (STI) and highereducation (HE) policy as well as (iii) foreignpolicy and international relations, bringingtogether scholars and practitioners fromthese policy areas. These different realms orsocial spheres (i-iii) are also borne bydifferent priorities and value structures, aswell as terminologies, while each has its ownsense-making mechanisms and regimes oflegitimacy. Within the political sphere ofEurope (Manners, 2002), especially indiplomacy, values are ideally related topeace, human dignity, freedom, democracy,equality, the rule of law, human rights,pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity,gender equality, non-discrimination,sustainable development, and goodgovernance; whereas values within the scientific normative sphere correspond to universalism, communality, disinterestedness, organized scepticism, responsibleness, precautionarity, openness, systemic (not purely technical) solutions, truth and originality.

These two sets of values seem to provideguidance to actors in different ways whiledemonstrating structural similarities andcorrespondence. Political and diplomaticvalues provide the grand objectives forscience diplomacy initiatives. Peace anddevelopment as end goals of sciencediplomacy, for instance, are largelyconsensual in EU official documents as wellas the interviews we conducted. Scientificvalues are used less in regard to framing thegrand objectives of science diplomacy thanto qualify and legitimize the contribution ofscience to the deliberations and reflectionsrelated to addressing complex problems.

Given the multitude of practices at theintersection of science, STI and HE policyand foreign policy, we observe that valuesmatter in science diplomacy because theyenable actors to make sense of theseintersecting practices. Values operate as acognitive and often moral frame of theirrepresentation of the world, and asnormative guidelines or reference points fortheir practices. This particularly relates to "global challenges" and the responsibility ofscience to address them together with non-scientific actors beyond national realms (Flink and Kaldewey, 2018). Values also provide legitimacy to various actors roles and positions: In a situation in which science diplomacy does not correspond to a recognized professional field or an institutionalized policy sector, relating science diplomacy practices to values is important as it contributes to providingactors with legitimacy.

In international relations, actors cannotforce positions or resort to imposingsanctions on others. If collaborations aresought, actors share a minimal consensus,which presupposes a set of shared values orinterests, even to the point that they mightimplicitly or explicitly agree to disagree. Inour analysis, this matters because sciencediplomacy brings hitherto unexpected valuesto the sphere of international politics, i.e.values from the social system of science. Wethus ask what these values are that sciencediplomacy relates to and offer sense forpractitioners at this intersecting sphere.Comparing these values, we see that insome cases they actually differ from others,whereas in other cases values from science,science policy and foreign policy only appearas different but represent cross-cuttingsocial principles. In any case, we may begin


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from the consensual consideration that weoften find normative values in operation, i.e.actors share an implicit understanding aboutwhat is good or bad, proper or improper, anddesirable or undesirable. Mutual recognitionirrespective of provenance has beenidentified as a cross-cutting value, both ininternational science and internationalpolitics and as a prerequisite for conjointlyaddressing global societal challenges.

Based on the different notions of valuesoutlined above, our transversal analysisshows that European support for researchand innovation frequently referencesupholding good governance, openness,sustainable development, equality andresponsibleness. In particular, theargument for 'supporting development'appears crucial to understanding severalcases, e.g. EU-Africa cooperation in foodsecurity, water management, open science,the case of SESAME, and joint internationalprogramming, etc. Despite differences,science diplomacy offers an organizedplatform of exchange on contested values:How is research funding allocated in atransparent and 'fair' way; how do weorganize selection processes when scientificexpert evaluations give results that are notin line with political objectives andframeworks. The idea of being 'fair' couldthus bring about different results in a morepolitically driven or in a more scientificallydriven context.

Tracing the values dimension across ourproject and nine case studies, there seemsto be a contrast between:

- values when talking of science diplomacyas a process and policy goal in general, whenvalues whether political or scientific arerarely defined but easily put forward. Here,the mechanism of sense-making andlegitimization, and the reference to values is

quite obvious. The EUs Global Strategy2016 provides the references to a sharedvision and common action for a strongerEurope based upon interests and values(European Union, 2016). In the "MadridDeclaration on Science Diplomacy", we alsostressed "the need to strengthen science diplomacy strategies and practices worldwide for the support of universal scientific and democratic values" (S4D4C, 2019a). While science diplomacy does not requireshared core values, cooperation is facilitatedwhen they are not conflicting. For example,in our case study on water diplomacy, welearn that it may be easier to agree on jointresearch related to water quality rather thanstarting from the understanding of water asa scarce and contested resource. On theother hand, the value of 'openness' hastaken a prominent role with Europeanscience diplomats promoting open science,open innovation and openness to the worldas well as responsible research andinnovation. Values lend legitimacy tonegotiations, with science diplomacyborrowing from the two worlds it combines,for example referencing both peace as wellas excellence in the set-up of the researchinfrastructure in the Middle East, such as inthe case of SESAME (Rungius, 2020).

- values when talking of science diplomacyin specific contexts and contents. As wedetail below, explicit references to valuesare much scarcer than one may have expected. When discussing interfaces, actors rarely refer to values as we defined them above. They might share (and mention) determination, ambition, commitment, patience, endurance, curi-osity, accountability and reproduci-bility. Beyond the variety of cases, and the diverse implicit under-standings of values that may be covered, it seems that the dominant transversal


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value discourse that operates as a cognitive and moral frame in most cases isgeared toward development. Many casestudies have investigated the interactions of actors in socio-economically asy-mmetrical relations, be it infectious diseases (Šlosarčík et al., 2020), water management (Tomalová et al., 2020), joint international programming (Flink, 2020), SESAME (Rungius, 2020) or food safety and security (Ravinet et al., 2020). Strong Western partners thus aim to collaborate under the umbrella of official development assistance, or with lesser developed countries. Different values are thus attached to the purpose of collaborations, most of which were based on R&D funding opportunities. Science diplomacy in these contexts often qualifies as development cooperation in the field of research according to which capacities can be raised, as well as in terms of administrative procedures or professiona-lization of fund-raising. Some case studies speak to differences between cultures and critical negotiations, such as in joint programming situations (Flink, 2020) and in the case of open science diplomacy (Mayer, 2020).

Due to its focus on collaboration, sciencediplomacy has also been regarded as a toolfor connecting and communicating withactors in autocratic and semi-autocraticstates, or at least with those showingproblematic statehood properties. This isreflected in some case studies, such asSESAME (Rungius, 2020) or jointinternational research programming (Flink,2020), and here the goal of sciencediplomacy is to strengthen connections withthe civil society in those states, not least inanticipation that their scientific leaders arealso likely to seize leading positions as futurepolicy-makers. In terms of sense-makingand contributing to building a collective

identity for science diplomacy actors, wenotice that this value of maintaining ordeveloping communication through sciencewith the more or less explicit horizon ofpolitical reform is more likely to favourconsensus rather than directly referencingthe value of democracy or freedom. Thisstrategy rests on the corresponding scientificnorm of universalism and civic/politicalcosmopolitanism. Often, scientific uni-versalism is made explicit to conceal thatpolitical reform processes in a foreigncountry are the actual goal, while foreignpartners should not be rebuffed by that.Open science, which aims to change howscience is done, is led by Europe, and thecase study (Mayer, 2020) shows how thisapproach of opening scientific com-munication processes and resultsunfolds a soft power that promotes Europeglobally as an open region that sharesknowledge for the benefits of the worldsentire society.

Overall, our transversal analysis of the valuedimension across the cases results in aparadoxical observation: values in sciencediplomacy matter because they enableactors to make sense of their practices, butin most of the case studies, values operateas sense makers indirectly. Values areimportant but are mainly internalized andimplicit. As texts and interviews revealed fewconcrete references, all case authorsreported in an internal survey (S4D4C,2019b) if values were addressed during theirempirical works. We found that they arepresent, for instance, in a fuzzy and implicitway within the discourse aboutdevelopment, or they may be highlighted asunmet needs, e.g. conflict is addressed andnot peace. If we take the scientific value oftruth, for example, the common narrative ofscience diplomacy suggest that it is can beused to bridge and unite partisan politicalperspectives. Our case studies reveal that


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truth is relative to what actors make of it,but it can offer some leeway incommunication when it is treated as a valueby all parties. It is also clear that values that are less contested, or that are more likely to beinterpreted in diverse or even ambivalentways, are preferred as focal points in mostscience diplomacy cases. We observereferences to scientific values related toexcellence, openness, innovation or impactof science, but rarely to ethics or academicfreedom.

Lastly, from an analytical standpoint, it is hard to deconstruct to what extent 'scientific norms' operate in the realmof science diplomacy. Scientists and theirendorsers explicitly resort to norms, e.g.those stylized by Robert K. Merton (1942),such as universalism and 'organizedscepticism', has often been deconstructed asa strategy of boundary work, i.e. todemarcate science from non-science(Gieryn, 1983) and present the former assublime, self-regulating and, therefore, uncontestable. This boundary work and

demarcation strategy may not fit with theidea of science diplomacy precisely takingplace at the boundary, or rather interface. Inaddition, scientific norms, such as organizedscepticism, are usually observable in arather idiosyncratic manner at field-specificor disciplinary levels. It is common thatmembers of specific scientific disciplinesprovide the 'right to be wrong'(Fuller, 2000: p.151) to their kindred spirits, in order tokeep up the flow of scientific knowledgeproduction. Moreover, neither doesuniversalism mean that scientificcommunities are open to examining anyfinding or argument regardless of where thefinding is from. Against this backdrop, thecalling upon scientific norms by advocatesand endorsers of science diplomacy is a formof sense-making. An open attitude to newfindings, critique and different positions isdesirable for the world of diplomacy, inparticular, if political particularities can bebridged.


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Scales matter profoundly for theconceptualization of science diplomacy: theyare central to framing the means (solutions)and ends (problems) of science diplomacy.Generally speaking, science diplomacytargets issues on a transnational scale(global challenges) and aspires to addressthese ends by means of strengthening orredesigning the interplay between scientificactivity, science policy and foreign policy atpotentially all governance levels (Aukes etal., 2019; Berkman, 2011; Melchor et al.,2020; Stone, 2020). In that sense, scaleseems to be ubiquitous for what we think ofas science diplomacy. But how does scalespecifically matter for science diplomacy?How does it play a role in the individualscience diplomacy cases? Can it help usmake sense of science diplomacy?Looking at the case studies, scale appears tomatter in various ways. In this section, weexamine science diplomacy as a policymakingarena that is largely based on scaleframing. Borrowing from (Van Lieshout etal., 2012; 2014) scale is regarded as adimension that is raised to constitute a policyproblem and scale framing as a "powerfulmechanism in shaping the meaning of policyissues" (Van Lieshout et al., 2014: p.550),with scale being defined as the " spatial,temporal or administrative dimensions usedto describe a phenomenon, and levels arethe different locations on a scale" (Van Lieshout et al., 2014: p.551). Thisperspective builds on the understanding thatpolicymaking is a constant struggle overideas, and specifically, "a struggle over thecriteria for classification, the boundaries ofcategories and the definition of ideas thatguide the way people behave"(Stone, 1988: p.11 from Van Lieshout et al., 2012). Basedon that understanding, scale provides an

elucidating, almost heuristic perspective onscience diplomacy.

Science diplomacy can be conceptualized as a matter of scale framing on the grounds ofthe following three dimensions: spatial,administrative and epistemic. Additionally,science diplomacy may distinguish betweenproblem and solution framing. Sciencediplomacy-specific problem framing largelyresorts to the spatial scale, ranging from thesub-national to the global level. Theadministrative scale refers to differentgovernance levels from the organizationaland national, to the supranational and theinternational level. The administrative scaleis usually referred to in terms of sciencediplomacy solution framing, including callsfor improved governance frameworks totackle global scaled challenges. Theadministrative scale may also be addressedas part of the problem framing. This mayoccur when science diplomacy becomes asynonym for enacting towards changes inadministrative procedures, usually towardsmore collaboration and knowledge-baseddecision-making. The epistemic scale refersto different levels of knowledgespecialization: specialized epistemiccommunities1, disciplinarily specialized,functionally/professionally specialized andunspecialized epistemic communities. Weborrow the notion of epistemic communitiesas a "network of professionals withrecognized expertise and competence in aparticular domain" from Peter Haas (1992: p.3), though we do not confine it to expertnetworks exclusively concerned with scienceadvice, but broaden it to professionalcommunities sharing a "commitment to theapplication and production of knowledge"based on " shared patterns of reasoning"


4. Scale

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1 The epistemic scale was added to the original model representing a constitutive aspect of sci-ence diplomacy. By contrast, the temporal scale, which was originally part of the model, has been dismissed here. The temporal scale is discussed in the "rhythm and timing"section below.



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(Haas, 1992: p.3). This includes diplomatsand scientists. The insufficiency of 'standard science´ (Gibbons et al., 1994) and traditionaldiplomacy to tackle global challenges is aprincipal and characteristic claim of science diplomacy (Aukes et al., 2019: p.9). It iscentral to the problem framing behindscience diplomacy, which depicts the formalseparation, institutional disconnection andfunctional differentiation of the twoprofessional communities – scientists anddiplomats – as a fundamentally epistemicproblem: "The complexity of grand societal challengesrequires a deep understanding of thescientific dimension as well as thegeopolitical dimension of the issue at hand.It requires both 'transformative science' anda 'knowledge-based' diplomacy. It isprobable that neither of the communities cansolve the challenges we face on their own"(Aukes et al., 2019: p.9).

This epistemic problem framing is reflectedon the administrative scale by identifying alack of coordination between science andforeign ministries, and the EU betweenEEAS and science and innovation relatedDirector Generals (DGs) respectively.

In terms of solution framing, the mostprominent declaration brought forth in thename of science diplomacy, The MadridDeclaration on Science Diplomacy, calls tobetter integrate science into foreign policyon all governance levels (S4D4C, 2019a).Yet, behind this claim stands anotherepistemic scale framing: It is the claim thatacademia, with its highly specializedorganization of research (into scientificdisciplines), is ill-suited to grasping andresponding to the genuine complexity ofgrand societal challenges (Aukes et al.,2019). Science must be open to the inclusionof different perspectives and experiences of

stakeholders from outside academia.Science advice, effective knowledge transferand the "necessity of collaboration betweenthe diplomatic, scientific and policycommunity" (Aukes et al., 2019: p.6) areanother set of remedies suggested byscience diplomacy that locate theproblem/solution framing on the epistemicscale. Finally, science diplomacy framesglobal challenges as a problem of collectiveaction between nation states. Thetransnational nature of global challenges isframed on the level of international actors(administrative scale) as a problem ofnationalism and protectionism, lackinginternational cooperation, trust andwillingness to act in shared interest by statedecision-makers (Melchor et al., 2020;S4D4Ca, 2019).

The case studies on infectious diseases andon water diplomacy highlight this point.Viruses transcend national borders and posean even greater threat in a highlyinterconnected and globalized world, whichmerits concerted efforts: " The fight against infectious diseases has frequently outreached national borders and provided aplatform for deepening of internationalcooperation as well as for the formation ofglobal governance in the field of medicine"(Šlosarík et al., 2020: p.7). The problem isspatially located at the global level, while thesolution logic to this problem is located onthe administrative scale, calling for bettergovernance on all levels. The case study oninfectious diseases reveals a wide variety ofpolicy actors and legislative frameworks thatare part of public health strategies and thataddress fighting infectious diseases onnational, EU and international levels with theWorld Health Organisation (WHO), theGlobal Research Collaboration for InfectiousDisease Preparedness (GloPID-R) andGlobal Health Security Initiative (GHSI).


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At the same time, while the administrativescale generally serves as a solution frame,the case studies also reveal scale relateddifficulties that are becoming relevant interms of proposed solution framing, with thenumber of actors and administrative levelsincreasing. The study lists ten differentgovernment and government-related actorsfor global health in the UK alone, includingministries, research organizations andresearch funding organizations (9 forGermany, 8 for the Czech Republic), with asimilarly diverse landscape at the EU leveland internationally. Science diplomacyrhetoric often seeks to raise awareness formore cooperation and inclusion of all actorsin a policy field on the basis of anadministrative scale logic. However, thisdoes not provide a clear approach to asolution. The case study on infectiousdiseases identifies an "institutional mix" andclaims that " a preferential institutionalpattern cannot be identified. Instead, thereaction resembles an evolving nebulousstructure" (Šlosarík et al., 2020: p.25).

A similar multitude of stakeholders, policyagendas and understandings was identifiedin the water diplomacy case (Tomalová etal., 2020) and in the food case (Ravinet etal., 2020). While the perspective of sciencediplomacy highlights the importance ofvarious relevant stakeholders to interactmore closely due to its scale-based problemframing, the difficulty of specific suggestionsor prescriptions apart from a general call formore cooperation in light of the identifiedcomplexities becomes apparent. Thisdifficulty seems itself to be scale related; themore science diplomacy is understood as amatter of inclusion and bridging actors fromall administrative levels, the more theoriginal distinction between levels isquestioned and would have to be re-organised. In light of the various understanding of policy areas, multiple de

facto governance practices and nationspecificapproaches identified within eachcountry, whether or not policyrecommendations can be "scaled-up", bothspatially and administratively, within andacross different topics in the name of sciencediplomacy is questionable.

In terms of problem framing, sciencediplomacy strongly relates to a spatial andepistemic scale. To a lesser extent, this isalso the case for the administrative scale. Interms of solution framing, science diplomacyrelates largely to the administrative and theepistemic scale. In that sense, sciencediplomacy is a matter of inferring the spatialand the epistemic with the administrativescale. As a result, science diplomacy pointsto a number of problem constellations whilehighlighting the complexity of theinteractions involved. With regards to scale,we may draw from the cases that" consistency and boundaries of 'sciencediplomacy' shouldnt be overstated becauseof remaining vague and unclear" (Ravinet etal., 2020: p.112). This should not only beviewed as a weakness. Rather, it is a resultof the complex, scale-based problemframing behind science diplomacy. At thesame time, the specific scale-framing logic ofscience diplomacy allows us to perceive the "raising concerns over global challenges inscience funding", " the emergence of thededicated science diplomat role" (Ravinet etal., 2020: p.112), the institutionalization ofscience advice mechanisms, jointprogramming or the setting up of largeresearch infrastructures as elements of onetheme.


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Levels matter for science diplomacy becausethey are key in structuring ourunderstanding of how different actors andstakeholders can jointly respond to globalchallenges. This section digs deeper into oneof the three elements (spatial, temporal, andadministrative) that are studied in the scalematter. It serves as a close up examinationinto the spatial scale and how levels ofinternational governance determine policyproblem framing (Van Lieshout et al., 2014:p.551). Levels are critical elements inunderstanding how policy problems andscience diplomacy responses to problemsare formulated depending on which level aproblem is addressed. Therefore, weintroduced a proposed framework of fourlevels based on science diplomacy activities,i.e. (1) global, (2) sub-global, (3) national,and (4) sub-national levels. Moreover, twosub-levels – sub-global and sub-national –consist of several dimensions depending onthe stakeholders involved and the relationsamong them, which lead us to distinguishthree dimensions within sub-levels: (1)bilateral, (2) multilateral, and (3) regional.

First, we explain what we understand bythese individual levels and dimensions: Theglobal level is perceived as a platformcoordinating science diplomacy activities ofactors concerned with matters of global scalesuch as the WHO, the United Nations (UN)but also non-governmental stakeholders,such as private companies and civil society.Sub-global level activities address lessextensive cross-boundary issues, though theactivities fall within the worldwide narrativeof global problems, driven by physical and/orhuman elements of geography (see more inthe geography matter). National levelactivities are primarily driven by

governmental actors to protect citizens, butnon-governmental stakeholders may beinvolved as well. The sub-national levelconsists of all activities underneath the national level involving local stakeholders,such as cities or sub-national regions. As forthe dimensions, the bilateral dimensioncontains the cooperation of two stakeholdersbased on elements of physical or/and humangeography; the multilateral dimension isperceived as a category consisting ofcooperation among more than two actorsbased on human geographical aspects; andthe regional dimension encompassescooperation among more than two stakeholders building either on physicalgeography or on both physical and humanaspects of geography.

Science diplomacy processes naturallypervade all levels. Similarly, stakeholdersare involved in various levels parallelly.Therefore, science diplomacy is usually amatter of mixed levels and mixeddimensions2. This reflects the complexity ofscience diplomacy processes that are neededfor an effective response to globalchallenges. In most cases, a stakeholder isinvolved in several organizations and hasestablished cooperation with a variety ofactors, producing a complex network ofscience diplomacy ties, cooperation andactions on multiple levels and dimensions.This results in many mixed categories ofscience diplomacy that combine differentlevels and dimensions.

The global level serves as a stage for theidentification and definition of globalchallenges, e.g. WHO in determininginfectious diseases or the Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO) in delineating


5. Levels

2 Since dimensions are lower categories than level, we understand the mixed-level science diplomacy as the term.

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food security as a problem on the worldwidescale (Ravinet et al., 2020). Therefore, theglobal level provides the broadest policyproblem-framing involving a wide range ofstakeholders, which adds to the complexity.The sub-global level encompasses all crossboundary activities driven by physical and/or human elements of geography. Sub-global science diplomatic cooperation stems from two principal issues. There is a need for tackling cross-boundary issues that are partof the worldwide definition of globalproblems. Further, concrete cross-boundaryproblems influence policy problem-framingthat comes from global-level understanding,but it is more specific, e.g. bilateralcollaboration over water supplies from Israelto Jordan as a part of the globallyacknowledged problem of water security. Inthis respect, physical geography is the maindriver of bilateral or regional dimensions asgeographically close actors face similarchallenges. It is worth mentioning here thatthere is advanced regional collaboration inscience diplomacy over water issues that areshaped around river basins, e.g. the MekongRiver Commission unifying riparian states tocoordinate environmental protection andwater security (Jacobs, 2002) or theConvention on Cooperation for theProtection and Sustainable Use of theDanube River (ICPDR, 1998).

Secondly, science diplomacy at the sub-global level is a potential way to strengthenscientific capabilities through knowledgesharing and therefore, jointly advance ideasthat address global challenges. This isdemonstrated, for example, in bilateralcooperation between France-Germany andIsrael-USA in cyber security and infectiousdiseases prevention (Kadlecová et al., 2020;Šlosarík et al., 2020), France-Japan incyber security research, and a science

diplomacy facilitated partnership betweenMasaryk University in Brno (Czech Republic)and Georgetown University (USA) in thesame field (Kadlecová et al., 2020). In thisregard, not only physical geography but alsohuman geography, affect sciencecooperation on the sub-global level based onthe cultural and/or historical relationshipsamong stakeholders.

It is worth highlighting the case of the EU,which represents a model of sub-globalscience diplomacy with its commitment tocontribute to tackling global challenges, suchas infectious diseases or food, water, andcyber security. Not only does the EU operatewithin its borders, e.g. establishingEuropean Centre for Disease Prevention andControl (ECDC) or European Union Agencyfor Cybersecurity (ENISA), but also outsideof the EU, as for example in the Partnershipfor Research and Innovation in theMediterranean Area (PRIMA3). The EU is thusengaged within the broader region, theMediterranean, rather than only the regionof the EU per se. The regional dimension ofscience diplomacy can also be perceived asa tool for enhancing the actors role inresponding to global challenges. Thismotivation may extend beyond regionalcollaboration and lead to so-called inter-regional cooperation, e.g. Central AsianRegional Water Stakeholder´s Platform(WASP) or joint research collaboration infood security of the EU and the African Union(AU) (Ravinet et al., 2020; Tomalová et al.,2020).

The national level oftentimes refers to policyproblem-framing from the global level butfocuses on aspects relevant for a countrywithin its legal and regulatory space as wellas its foreign affairs. Therefore, states undertake science diplomacy activities


3 PRIMA is a joint science diplomatic program searching for a scientific and technological solution on water scarcity and agriculture sustainability in the Mediterranean region.

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jointly with non-governmental institutions toestablish solid knowledge in the prioritizedarea in order to ensure the security4 of itscitizens. For example, in the case of theCOVID-19 outbreak, the priority of stateswas to protect citizens and stabilize thesituation within national borders; however,in addition to ensuring security, countriesalso advanced know-how on other levels -especially upper ones, and thereforecontributed to addressing the challenge on a global scale. For example, the CzechRepublic stressed in its National CyberSecurity Strategy for the period 2015 to2020 the will to "play a leading role in thecyber security field within its region and inEurope" (NSA, NCSC, 2015: p.7). Thus, theNational Cyber and Information SecurityAgency (NCISA) was established, and cyberattachés were deployed to the US, Belgium,and Israel while cooperation in researchwithin the EU and the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) was reinforced(Kadlecová et al., 2020). Similarly, Germanyand the United Kingdom used nationalscientific knowledge, including governmentaland private research capacities, to firstlyensure citizens security in the field of publichealth, and, secondly, to contribute tointernational activities during the Zikaoutbreak in 2015-2016 (Šlosarík et al.,2020). While the national level prioritizescitizen protection in the face of challenges,the ambition to become an important playerby advancing knowledge on the sub-globaland global level is no less important a driverof state science diplomacy engagement.

The sub-national level contains all activitiesunderneath the national level as determinedby geographical elements. As mentionedabove, science diplomacy activities mayinclude bilateral, multilateral, and regionaldimensions based on the type of

stakeholders and the relationships amongthem. Dimensions of the sub-national levelacquire the same features as those of sub-global levels, but they unite differentstakeholders, such as cities, researchinstitutions and sub-national regions.

Even though global, sub-global, national,and sub-national levels are understood asbuilding blocks for the science diplomacyprocess aimed towards addressing globalchallenges, these categories oftentimesoverlap, and therefore many examples ofmixed-dimensions science diplomacy canbe found. For example, the EU-India WaterForum or China-EU Water Platform compriseboth regional and bilateral dimensions of the sub-global level. The EU is considered a sub-global level actor, while concomitantly, EU Member States are nationally involved inbilateral or multilateral cooperation based ontheir expertise in the field and on historicalties (Tomalová et al., 2020). Similarly, EU-USor EU-Japan cyber relations can be addedto this mixed category (Kadlecová et al.,2020).

Moreover, one stakeholder can simulta-neously operate in multiple dimensionsand on multiple levels of internationalcooperation that follow the actors priorities,expertise, and privileged relations in sciencediplomacy. To illustrate this phenomenon,the German government coordinatesresearch in public health on the nationallevel in cooperation with the private andnon-governmental sectors. Germany is also actively involved in global health protectionin numerous regional institutions, e.g. G7,G20, EU. Finally, Germany is vigorouslyengaged within the framework of theGloPID-R and the WHO (Šlosarík et al.,2020) on a global level. Thesesimultaneously overlapping memberships


4 Security is understood in a broad sense referring to the concept of human security. In the context of this study, security includes elements of water and food security, public health etc.

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and activities vary along with situationally defined interests, expertise in the field, andhuman and physical geography.

To sum up, we have identified four levels ofthe science diplomacy process; global, subglobal, national, and sub-national. Additionally, sub-levels are divided based on the number of actors and type of stakeholder relations to three dimensions; bilateral, multilateral, and regional. Nevertheless, science diplomacy actors rarely participate on only one level or dimension; more often, they are simultaneously involved in multiple levels and dimensions, cooperating with a wide range of distinct actors. Indeed, only agglomerating activities throughout levelsoffers the potential to address challengescomprehensively. Therefore, tackling globalchallenges through science diplomacy willonly be effective if approached as a "mixedlevel"effort.


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Science diplomacy is often conceptualizedacross-the-board as the intersection ofscience and diplomacy. In some cases thisintersection can be viewed as an interactionbetween a wide variety of differentprofessional communities of scientists anddiplomats. However, the relevance ofindividuals within these professionalcommunities carrying out activities that webroadly summarize as science diplomacy israrely discussed. In our case studies, wefound that individuals 'matter' profoundly forscience diplomacy as creative andresponsible actors within their respectiveprofessional realms, despite the fact that notall of them are explicitly identified as 'sciencediplomats'.

Science diplomacy is not well defined interms of job descriptions. This is partly dueto the novelty and conceptual breadth of theconcept. The term science diplomacy doesnot come with clear-cut understandings ofrelated tasks, responsibilities and strategies.There are no manuals on how to 'do sciencediplomacy'. Science diplomacy trainings andseminars are nascent but evolving5.Furthermore, the need for science diplomacyhas not translated into distinct professionalidentities to date (Degelsegger-Márquez etal., 2019). In addition to this, fewgovernments have systematicallyimplemented policies in the sense of tailoringscience diplomacy positions andresponsibilities, for instance, dispatchingscience attachés (Flink and Schreiterer,2010) or other field expert delegates abroad,like the case regarding cyber attachés(Kadlecová et al., 2020) or water envoys(Tomalová et al., 2020). Since there are fewrole models to which one may relate,working " at the intersection of science and

diplomacy" often requires individuals todefine their roles, tasks and professional identities themselves. It is thereforeincumbent on the individual to frame sciencediplomacy issues and bundle a wide varietyof previously unrelated resources. In thisway, individuals play an integral role inscience diplomacy.

As the interaction between scientists anddiplomats are not often formalized orinstitutionalized, personal networks,previous positions and affiliations andinterests of respective persons all play acrucial role. The case studies highlight thatthe impact of science diplomacy dependsstrongly on how individuals promote theseefforts. For instance, in the case of cybersecurity, "all of the national cases show thatthe relationship between diplomats andscientists remains quite narrow and involvesvery few actors. Their relationships are ofteninformal and very weakly institutionalised.This inevitably leads to the conclusion that inmost cases, cooperation very much dependson the personal interests and previousexperience of those in charge, who are ableto determine their own approach todiplomacy and undertake particular activitiesindependently" (Kadlecová et al., 2020).The cases on food security and jointprogramming provide other examples of thesignificance of individual ability (andeagerness) of officials, especially to serve asbrokers, mediators or interlocutors, all ofwhich are roles and duties that require tact,discretion and involvement, rather thanbeing a matter of technical execution(Ravinet et al., 2020; Flink, 2020). In thatregard, individuals soft skills, such ascommunication, negotiation, and capacity tobuild trust, are reported to be of high


6. Individuals

5. See for example: https://www.s4d4c.eu/european-science-diplomacy-online-course/

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importance (Degelsegger-Márquez et al.,2019).

As a result, science diplomacy builds on thecreativity, initiative, advocacy, abilities,networks, priorities and professionalidentification of the individuals involved.Certainly, this sort of bureaucratic discretion(Rourke, 1984) applies not only to sciencediplomats but also to all senior servicepositions in public administration anddiplomatic missions. Within legal confines,officials have unfettered freedom of action inhow they understand, implement, or executepolicies. However, with regards to thematter of science diplomacy, the role of theindividual agent in this field may be requiredto transcend traditional confines related tojob creativity, becoming proactive in theirrole (Young et al., 2020). Identifying thosewho perform science diplomacy in their dailyjobs may be a matter of personalperspective. Some actors choose to identifypro-actively as science diplomats, therebycreating new forms of political intervention(Gluckman et al., 2017), while others act inwhat many would consider to be a sciencediplomacy interface without ever using theterm. In this respect, the variability ofscience diplomacy sometimes works to anindividuals’ advantage: the fact that sciencediplomacy is so variable makes individuals’capabilities of framing science diplomacy forall sorts of interests very useful. Proficiencyin manoeuvring within this ill-defined spacebecomes a very important ability.

As part of this set of individual abilities,another feature that stands out in thedeployment of science diplomacy isinnovation and leadership. Leadership isrequired to overcome administrative,financial, and cultural barriers. Sciencediplomacy transcends the understanding oftraditional domains not only on a conceptuallevel but, if translated into concrete policies,

it usually requests collective efforts acrossdepartments, sometimes cutting throughministerial domains, working cultures,hierarchies, and budget lines. This againrequires steady and firm political leadership.In our case studies, the importance ofpolitical leadership is apparent in jointresearch programming, in light of the factthat " bilateral initiatives are launched in thecourse of high-level meetings betweenministers or state secretaries" who expresstheir intention for their countries tostrengthen collaborations (Flink, 2020).Additionally, the role of individuals who showstrong political leadership is highlighted inthe cyber security case, with the firstdeployment of science diplomats in thehistory of the Czech Republic under theDeputy Prime Minister for Science, Researchand Innovation, Pavel Belobrádek(Kadlecová et al., 2020).

At the same time, the effect of individuals inscience diplomacy often builds oninstitutional affiliations and traditionalprofessional identities. The evolution ofmany science diplomacy cases do not followstandardized procedures or roadmaps. Theyevolve in unforeseen and unique ways, andsome are brought forth by the initiative andintuition of a few individuals using theirreputation and networks. SESAME is a casein point that owes a lot to the commitmentof individuals (Rungius, 2020). It alsoprofited largely from the institutionalaffiliations and the institutional backing ofthose involved. The synchrotron was largelyinstigated and pushed by retired directors ofEuropean Organization for Nuclear Research(CERN), who later took on the position asdirectors of the SESAME Council. In additionto their expertise, they have contributedreputation and credibility that helped toelevate the projects critical standing vis-à-vis the project partners/national andinternational institutions. At the same time,


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institutions and professional structures mustalso create space for agency in terms ofscience diplomacy. Therefore, when we saythat individuals matter for sciencediplomacy, this is only true in relation to thestructural and institutional affiliations uponwhich agents are allowed to act and on which they may transform and shape existingboundaries.

Assessing the role of individuals hasimplications also for the conceptualization ofscience diplomacy. Science diplomacy tendsto be understood as a matter of interfacesbetween science and diplomacy, andtherefore between at least tworepresentatives of the respectivecommunities; however, 'interfacing' mayalso occur within one person. This oftenoverlooked aspect refers to those situationsin which one person wears two different hatssimultaneously within one function oraffiliation. It may seem unexceptional that aphysicist negotiates for public funding or forthe support of nation states in aninternational arena to establish asynchrotron (Rungius, 2020), or that aministry official has a say in determiningacademic review procedures and setsprocedural standards in funding joint binational research activities (Flink, 2020).But at a closer look, these configurationsprove to be the crucial piece that brings fortha bigger picture of science diplomacy.

The science diplomacy debate challengestraditional understandings of professionalprofiles and career paths in the interaction ofscience, diplomacy and policy. At aminimum, assessing how individuals matterfor science diplomacy adds a newperspective on 'professional hybrids' whichmay have previously existed but not beenacknowledged or given terminologicalconsideration. It may also allow for newperspectives on the configuration ofprofessions and professional duties. Sciencediplomacy constitutes an undefinedprofessional arena, in which individuals mustchoose how they want to constitute, shape,and take on responsibilities, and how theytake up duties, carve out responsibilities,play out formal positions and institutionalaffiliations, and are able to build exchangesand professional collaborations. Therefore,individuals matter as far as sciencediplomacy builds in practice on theirpersonal initiative, advocacy, creativity,abilities, networks, priorities and professional identification.


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Our S4D4C empirical case studies argue thatgeography continues to be influentialregarding how nation states approachdiplomacy in general and science diplomacyin particular. The concept of sciencediplomacy emphasizes factors such asscientific, technology and innovativecapacity of a country when determining itsoverall power, next to economic power,competitiveness or education. As aconsequence, the relevance of geography(or population, raw materials, etc.) as adefining factor in international affairs hasdeclined in relation to these other elements(Nye, 1990). Yet geography does play a role.First, physical geography has an impact onthe needs of any country and, by extension,geographical regions. Countries or regionsmay be located in mainland or coastal lands,upstream or downstream a river, in a flat ormountainous area, etc. which will determinein part their access to natural resources,such as water, food or fish, among others.Consequently, over time, these countries orregions have developed certain expertise toaddress their access to these resources or bepart of related negotiations, which ultimatelyleads to technological innovation andeconomic growth. Second, humangeography matters because of the extent ofcultural, scientific, historical or bilateralrelationships either facilitate or hampercollaborations, influence mobility patterns,and shape institutional arrangements. Takenaltogether, we argue that geographymatters in science diplomacy.

The S4D4C case study about watermanagement directly exemplifies how theNetherlands, and to a lesser degree the UK,has positioned itself as a global expert inwater management and water diplomacydue to purely physical geographicalelements (Tomalová et al., 2020). The

Netherlands is globally considered a reliablepartner for water-related projects on alllevels (sub-national, national, sub-global,global) largely due to its long cultural, scientific and technical experience with risingsea levels and floods. This expertise haspropelled a complex public institutionalframework with strong public policies relatedto water, leadership in coalitions of countriesand diplomatic positions (the Water Envoy),and a richness in environmentalconsultancies, water technology companies,and non-profit organisations that operatetransnationally. The case study alsoprovided insight into how geographicallocations may drive the use of water as wellas related interactions between science anddiplomacy in Central Asia.

The case study about food security (Ravinetet al., 2020), underlines how regions withpoor physical geographical conditions,characterised by deprived-nutrient soilsand/or severe droughts, have shapedpriorities in the African Union and theEuropean Union as part of their agriculturediplomacy. In doing so, a complex variety ofpolicy and funding instruments have beendeployed for international scientific andtechnological collaborations to find solutionsfor food security and availability issues inthose regions. For instance, the Partnershipfor Research and Innovation in theMediterranean Area (PRIMA) fundinginitiative between countries in the North andSouth of the Mediterranean region fosterscollaborative research surrounding issuesrelated to water and food availability,agriculture, soil, etc.

The case study about fisheries management(Montana, 2020) also highlights how anelement from physical geography such aseasy access of a country to open waters, and


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therefore fish stocks or fisheries influencesits science diplomacy actions. Again, thisphysical geographical factor shapesexpertise and complex institutionalframeworks: for instance, science advicemechanisms that operate among differentscientific and political communities. Thesemechanisms prove to be important for a country when negotiating with others forfishing quotas and regulating fishing efforts(Montana, 2020).

Based on these case studies, physicalgeography elements such as being mainlandor coastal land, flat or mountainous lands,access to rivers or sea, richness in naturalresources, and other elements have led tosocietal pressure over centuries. Thedevelopment of innovative technologies totackle these geographical hurdles or makethe most out of them has pushed growth andprosperity. Physical geography has animpact on the level of development, growthand prosperity of countries, partially shapingprofessional expertise in certain fields, aswell as complex public institutionalframeworks, and the development of privateindustry and technological competitiveness(Gallup et al., 1999; Henderson, et al.,2001; Hibbs and Olsson, 2004). Physicalgeography thus matters in science diplomacy because of the scientificand technological expertise developed as adirect consequence of physical geographi-cal factors. Physical geography can beharnessed as a soft-power element of acountry (in the international system), toposition itself as the leading country in thefield, promoting its own industry worldwideand fostering global alliances with countrieswith the same needs.

On the other hand, human geographyunderstood as the series of cultural andhistorical linkages that brings togetherdifferent countries and culturesgoes

beyond physical geography. For instance,the Commonwealth brings togethercountries that are geographically distantapart, and so it happens with all thehistorical linkages between Spain andPortugal with Latin American. In ourempirical case study analyses, this humangeography dimension has played a particularrole in the spreading pattern of infectiousdisease, which preferentially links countrieswith strong trade, business, and bilateraltourism relationships (Šlosarík et al.,2020). Additionally, research may fosterscientific collaboration between physicallydistant countries, which may incorporatedivisions of scientific labour advantageously.For example, scientists from Germany or theUK who are active in investigating Zika mayprovide appropriate technology to advanceresearch, while Brazilian scientists wouldhave the local knowledge and naturalresources required to do the tests.Diplomatic approaches play a role innegotiations related to the exploitation andownership of results stemming from thesepartnerships.

Lastly, analysing cooperation initiatives in aregion with histories of conflict, the SESAMEcase study examining the joint researchinfrastructure the Middle East (Rungius,2020) as well as the case focused on jointprogramming initiatives (Flink, 2020), showa further aspect of the influence of humangeography and the challenges andlimitations of 'science for peace'. Thepurpose of building scientific linkagesbetween different cultures was depicted inthe 'science for diplomacy' dimension fromthe Royal Society-AAAS (2010) taxonomy.In these instances, human geographymatters in the sense of poor qualityrelationships (conflicts driven by religion,politics, national borders, access toresources, etc.) influencing the initialcondition upon which science diplomacy

SEPTEMBER 2020USING SCIENCE FOR/IN DIPLOMACY FOR ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES

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approaches are conceived and/orimplemented. Human geography mattersbecause it influences the interdependence ofdifferent stakeholders.

In conclusion, transversal analysis of ourS4D4C case studies demonstrates anunderlying influence of geography in sciencediplomacy. Physical geography mattersbecause it has shaped national needs thathave fostered scientific and technicalexpertise, as well as complex institutionalarrangements and industry developmentover time, which may be exploited asnational soft-power assets (in internationalrelations). Meanwhile, human geographymay increase or decrease interdependence, the need for negotiations and the likelihoodof shared challenges between regions/ countries, which influence generaldiplomatic approaches and the scope ofscience diplomacy.


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Governance systems are like policyfingerprints; each domain involves a uniqueconfiguration of actors, stakeholders,processes, instruments, and institutions.Governance systems are both planned andemergent, and they matter to sciencediplomacy because they organize howforeign and domain-specific policy addressgrand societal challenges in concert. Theymay emerge as the sum of dispersedgovernance activities or are intentionallyconstructed as a targeted response toaddress a specific challenge. In both cases,many governance levels tend to be involvedin science diplomacy sometimes exclusi-vely and sometimes in cooperation.The comprehensiveness of the governancesystem in place to address a given challengeconveys the degree of confidence that thereis that something can be done about thatchallenge. In this section, we examinegovernance systems across the S4D4C case studies that demon-strate these domain spanningcharacteristics, in particular, the environment (food security, water diplomacy), health (infectious diseases), technology (cyber security) and science policy (Open Science diplomacy, international joint research programming).

For that purpose, we look at the broaderpicture of the various governance systemsand seek to identify three types of nodalitythat affect science diplomacy. ChristopherHood and Helen Margetts introduce this termto public policy in the context of a cyberneticsystems-based model for understanding thetools of government. For them, the termnodality refers to the property of being inthe middle of a network (Hood andMargetts, 2007), and it provides thegovernment with the ability to traffic ininformation (ibid, p.6). In our analysis of

governance systems, we are interested notso much in how the government usesnodality as an information tool, but how thenodality of different parts of the governancesystem affects its overallconfiguration. Drawing on network analysis(Borgatti, 2005) in a qualitative manner, wethink about nodality in terms of differenttypes of centrality, such as the amount andthe quality or importance of the connectionspresent. In other words, the more central apart is in the system, the more influential itis. Hence, imagining governance systems asnetworks, the concept of nodality allows usto consider the importance of system partsfrom a structural perspective. We focus onthree nodalities to help us better understandthe dynamics of governance systems:

1. Nodality of science: how central isscience in the system vis-à-visdiplomacy?2. Nodality of level: how central arespecific levels of governance vis-à-visothers?3. Clustering of nodes: which actors orinstitutions cluster together, and arethey part of the core or the peripheryof the system?

Nodality of scienceScience nodes are actors, stakeholders,instruments or institutions that deal withscience-based policy substances.Governance systems may involve variousscience-based policy substances, such asstimulating transformations in systems ofknowledge production (e.g., Open Science,international joint research programming) orexchanging domain-specific knowledge(e.g., water diplomacy). There are alsopolitics-based policy substances that involvescience nodes, e.g., the preservation ofnational interests in the fields of cyber


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security, food security, or infectiousdiseases. In general, some policy domains inthe science diplomacy component arestronger than in others. These include cybersecurity and international joint researchprogramming. In other domains, thediplomacy aspect plays a secondary role vis-à-vis the domain aspect. Furthermore, some domains are situated on the intersectionbetween science diplomacy and internationaldevelopment, such as infectious diseases orwater diplomacy. To date, food security isstill weakly linked to European foreign policy.This overview demonstrates that sciencediplomacy efforts are undertaken in varioustraditionally national policy domains, thoughto different degrees.

Governance systems will be organizeddifferently depending on the prioritization ofissues on the policy agenda. For example,the recognition of cyber-attacks as a highpriority issue in some countries has spurredthe organization of a dedicated governancesystem with international ambitions. Inother words, the nodality of system partsmay change depending on reprioritizationsin the policy agenda. It also means thatgovernance systems of relevance for sciencediplomacy may not be present in all cases.The position of policy domains on the sciencediplomacy agenda ranges from very low tohigh in the cases. When a policy domain islow on the agenda, this may have to do withthe fact that there is little diplomatic room tomanoeuvre or it has not yet become arelevant foreign policy topic. The former isillustrated by the food security domain whichcan rather be characterized as a basic needand demand for a well-functioning foodsupply system that should not bejeopardized. Open science illustrates a policyissue in the science policy domain that ishigh on the international science policyagenda, but that has not yet risen on theforeign policy agenda. Intermediary or

mixed policy domain prioritization can beobserved in cyber security, water diplomacyand international joint researchprogramming due to various reasons. Forinstance, prioritization of water diplomacyranges from a strategic policy domain,including proactive promotion of expertisethrough a broad array of programs forinternational water governance knowledgeexchange (the Netherlands), to a lack of anational water diplomacy strategy (CzechRepublic). Only infectious diseases are to befound relatively high on the internationalpolicy agenda, not only recently due to theCOVID-19 pandemic, but also as a continuousfield of attention. Whether this relates tobasic health provision or dealing with crisesoften depends on the local context.

Nodality of levelIn many cases, domain-specific governancesystems pertaining to science diplomacystart from the national level. This is notsurprising as many domains covered in thecases, e.g., environment, health, technologyand science, are traditionally nationalresponsibilities. International joint researchprogramming is a typically nationalendeavour one for which structuralprocesses are fragmented. A structuralprocess that has been in place at theEuropean level, the European Research Areanetworks (ERA-Nets), have had somesuccess of institutionalizing this domain, butis dependent on EU funding to exist. Survivalof ERA-Net-induced international relationsafter EU funding ceased have been reported,but are not the norm. For cyber security,food security and water diplomacy, we alsofind sub-global structural processes in placeat the European level. A case in point is theWater Supply and Sanitation TechnologyPlatform or in the food domain the High-Level Policy Dialogue on Science, Technologyand Innovation. Water management aspects


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covered by sub-global European processesseem limited to technology transfer, which ismerely a small share of what watermanagement encompasses. As previouslymentioned, national and sub-globalstructural processes and mechanisms in thefield of Open Science are limited to thedomain of science policy. Processes in thatfield crossing the boundary into foreignpolicy, which would also make them relevantfor science diplomacy, are scarce to date.The most elaborate internationalinstitutional frameworks to be found in ourcase studies, where they clearly featureforeign policy objectives, exist in the fields offood security and infectious diseases.Especially in the latter domain, theframework is robust and tightly-knit. International and supranational systemsdominate the domain of infectious diseases.Bilateral relations in this field are notprominent. National systems link upimmediately to multilateral ones. It involvesinternational NGOs such as the World HealthOrganization, national governments andresearch organizations, e.g., the GlobalResearch Collaboration for InfectiousDisease Preparedness. In food security, theinternational governance system includesintensive bilateral and multilateral relationsbetween the EU, the UN and (countries from)the AU.

The capacities and capabilities supportinggovernance systems are very diverse andscattered across levels. Once again, foodsecurity and infectious diseases stand out aspolicy domains in which there are amplecapacities on all governance levels. In otherpolicy domains, the capacities dedicated toscience diplomacy are very much dependenton the country and specifically in the caseof cyber security the relative novelty of thedomain. The character of national capacitiesand capabilities in cyber issues may include,but is not limited to, the presence of hightech

sectors, such as ICT, whether thecountry has faced cyber-attacks, or whetherthere is sufficient budget to be redirected tothis domain. In the domains of waterdiplomacy and international joint researchprogramming, similar patterns are to befound. The odd one out is Open Science,where many countries have capacities inscience policy specifically, e.g. (inter-)nationally operating research fundingorganizations, but not interpreting this as aforeign policy issue.

Clustering of nodesIn most cases, similar actor configurationscan be found. Oftentimes, domain ministriesor their executive agencies formulate thenational policy position, including possibleimplications for foreign policy. Theysupervise sub-national domainorganizations, agencies or institutes, such asnational or sub-national health agencies,and in return receive science advice fromthem. Domain ministries are often also thepoint of contact and communication withactors on the international stage, in somecases coordinated by or even cooperatingwith the ministry of foreign affairs.Depending on the historical importance ofthe domain in the respective country oragreements/treaties about subsidiarity when it comes to the EU and current agenda setting, domains may be declared priority do-mains. Given the globalized andnetworked world we live in, this prioritizationoften entails (or perhaps must entail)ambitions on the international stage. Policypriorities then turn into overall strategiesand may initiate a process of (trans-)national system establishment. Dependingon bilateral or multilateral ambitions, suchsystems may then consist of domainministries, the foreign affairs ministry,dedicated EU institutions, dedicatedinternational organizations, NGOs and


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include mechanisms geared towards aligningpositions and monitoring or reviewingscientific research in the domain. The latterthen relies on domain-specific systems. Forexample, in the case of infectious diseases,this may involve medical informationsystems (cf. COVID-19).

We have sought to demonstrate thatgovernance systems matter for sciencediplomacy by describing the nodality ofscience and levels as well as how nodes areclustered in them. The nodality of science invarious systems needs to be considered inrelation to the nodality of levels. Apart froman equally central importance of bothaspects in some situations, the nodality ofone comes at the expense of the other. Interms of policy substances and positions onthe science diplomacy agenda, this entailsthe tension between dealing with a globalchallenge as a political or as a scientificproblem. Science diplomacy, then, is aboutfinding the right balance of these in differentstages of addressing global challenges.Nodality of level depends, on the one hand,

on the perceived locus of the challenge to be addressed. On the other hand, it depends onwhich level there are effective actions to betaken. For example, international foodsupply chains or the high risk of globallyfast-spreading infectious diseases makesthese domains prototypical for stronglyinstitutionalized governance systems on theinternational level. Other issues, such ascyber security, for now remain situated onthe national level due to aspects detailedabove. Hence, the notion of nodality offers adifferent way of looking at the state of andtrade-offs within governance systemspertaining to science diplomacy.


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Examining instruments is important as theyare part of, and therefore shape, any policyfield. Science diplomacy also relies on a setof instruments to achieve its objectives. Inthis section, we use the typology developedby Van Langenhove (2017) to explore therelationships that shape instruments andhow they interact with each other based onour case research. This analysis movesbeyond identifying what instruments areused and investigates how their interaction,or lack thereof, matters for sciencediplomacy. An integral part of the S4D4Cmission is to identify gaps, frictions,bottlenecks and ruptures that hamper thedevelopment of science diplomacy practices.Two types of bottlenecks have beenidentified. First, ruptures occur when there isa gap or missing type of instrument within ascience diplomacy practice or process. Theseoccur when the mix of instruments isdisjointed, shows a rupture or isinsufficiently coordinated. Second, frictionsarise during the development of instrumentsdue to a lack of consistency between theobjectives of different actors andinstitutions. This results in sub-optimaloutcomes. From the case studies, we identifyseveral examples that illustrate theseproblems.

Instruments of science diplomacy have beendefined by Van Langenhove as those "thatcan be used in promoting or supportingscience diplomacy" (2017: p.12). His typo-logy is used in this section as a guidingtool to investigate science diplomacyinstruments. For Van Langenhove (ibid),science diplomacy instruments may beclassified into three types: strategic,operational and support. Strategicinstruments are policies which setobjectives, describe how something is goingto be done and who is responsible for it. They

often set the scope and strategic goals forthe policy realm. In our cases studies, mostgoverning institutions develop their ownstrategies or action plans. Those strategiesrarely mention science diplomacy as anoverarching goal or way to an end.Nonetheless, they may state objectives inline with science diplomacy, such as settingup international research cooperationschemes and fostering internationalcooperation using scientific exchange.Strategies are important as they define thepolicy field. They are supported byoperational instruments. Operationalinstruments enable concrete action in a fieldand enact strategic objectives. Theyorganize mechanisms of action and resourcemanagement (Van Langenhove, 2017:p.13). These may be summits, bilateral andmultilateral agreements, science attachés,research programmes and funding schemes.Once again, those have been identified in allof our case studies. The third categoryencompasses support instruments, definedby Van Langenhove as instruments " that aimto promote or facilitate Science Diplomacyactivities" (2017: p.13). Those comprise anyform of dialogue and trainings involvingscientists and diplomats. In the case studies,networking activities are sometimes used asthey enable co-creation and internationalinformation exchange. They may take theshape of meetings and conferences, tradefairs, personal meetings between scientistsand policymakers, briefings and explanatorymeetings and roundtables.

In the case studies, we found evidence of thepresence of each type of instrument.However, ruptures and frictions have alsobeen identified which impede sciencediplomacy practices. They appear in differentforms, as illustrated by the examplesprovided below.


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Misalignment between support instrumentsand operational instruments are one sourceof rupture. This is apparent in the waterdiplomacy case (Tomalová et al., 2020).Czech scientists have been active in thecross-border transfer of their knowledge onwater sanitation and in educational activitieswith developing countries. However, thebroader reach of these types of activities ishindered by the lack of integration andcoordination between developmentassistance, requiring scientists to apply forfunding on a case by case basis. Here,support instruments are not met sufficientlywith an operational structure. Such ascenario is common in several case studies. In other instances, non-coordination arisesfrom the lack of strategic instruments whichwould enable operational activities tooperate smoothly. In the cyber security case(Kadlecová et al., 2020), the lack of clearstrategic instruments linking togetherscience diplomacy and cyber securityimpedes the division of work between theGerman cyber attachés and their sciencediplomat counterparts (Kadlecová et al.,2020). While there is an overlap between thetwo positions, the lack of formal recognitionof that overlap means that the extent towhich cyber and science attachés collaboratein the same embassy is limited by individualinterest. Similarly, in the Czech Republic,previous efforts to design a wide network ofscience diplomats, which successfullyestablished two science diplomats, but cameto an end when the deputy prime minister ofscience resigned. The plan was notfurthered, and the two science diplomats inposition have continued their activitieswithout direction or political guidance(Kadlecová et al., 2020).

In those examples, the instruments in placewere not sufficiently met by otherinstruments. The presence of each type ofinstrument does not necessarily mean that

the policy mix has been perfectly designed.Indeed, bottlenecks often arise during thedevelopment of instruments either becauseone instrument is missing (rupture) or dueto the presence of diverging objectives(frictions). In the joint programming case(Flink, 2020), joint funding negotiations thattook place between a European state withEgypt and Turkey were initiated as a resultof high-level bilateral meetings. Thus,networking discussions established thedevelopment of an operational instrument.However, during negotiations, problemsarose from the absence of anotheroperational instrument, which would provideguiding principles regulating theprogramming procedure (Flink, 2020).Without a pre-established framework, it tookfour years for both parties to agree on a jointevaluation strategy. Despite the statesworking on scientific cooperation at severalpoints for many years, there were noestablished methods to facilitatenegotiations. Interviewees recommendedintroducing mechanisms as simple asreporting examples of successful andnegative experiences as a base for furthernegotiations (Flink, 2020). Here, thecreation of an operational instrument wasslowed because negotiations were notsufficiently supported by a general policy onhow to establish guiding principles. Theabsence of a pre-designed operationalinstrument hampered the smoothdevelopment of the joint funding scheme.

Beyond ruptures, frictions can also arisewhen the different institutions involved inthe development of instruments pushforward diverging objectives. For example,in the food security case (Ravinet et al.,2020), the drafting of calls for Horizon 2020suffered from differences between the visionof the different Directorate Generals (DGs)on what kind of research should be fostered.While the DG for international cooperation


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and development pushed for more appliedresearch which would foster developmentimpact, DG Research and Innovation and DGAgriculture and Regional Developmentemphasized the need for excellence. Thediverging visions have consequences for thetype of research that is funded. In the foodsecurity case, calls that were drafted underHorizon 2020 fostered the excellence andinnovation perspective, which resulted inproportionately less participation fromAfrican countries than during previousprogrammes (Ravinet et al., 2020). Thediverging objectives worked against the aimof funding research which might have beenmore useful from a development goalperspective. In this case, frictions occurredduring the creation of an operationalinstrument.

Similarly, in the case on joint researchprogramming (Flink, 2020), frictionsappeared between the objectives of theministry and the funding agency negotiatingwhich research was to be funded. In thatcase, the funding agency decided againstfunding certain research proposals until theministry interfered and agreed to fund theprojects that were originally rejected (Flink,2020). Here, the political objectives of theministry hampered the practical objectivesof the agency, which lost credibility in thatprocess. In the above-mentioned examples, frictions shape the outcome of theinstrument, often in a sub-optimal manner.

Analysis of the case studies shows that whilea plethora of instruments is available in allpolicy fields, ruptures and frictions arecommon. Often, the policy mix is notsufficiently developed, which leads tomissing instruments, which creates rupturesin the workings of other instruments.Frictions, on the other hand, appear duringthe development of the instruments. Whilethey can also be triggered by a gap in theinstrument chain, they often arise fromdiverging objectives of the institutions whichshape them. Identifying frictions andruptures is important because they have animpact on how science diplomacy practicesunfold. The teachable moments identifiedabove illustrate the complex interdependenceof instruments and of the multiple actors shaping them.


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Many global challenges may only besuccessfully addressed by connectingdifferent epistemic communities andsubstantive domains with each other.Science diplomacy represents one such wayof connecting, specifically, the science anddiplomacy communities. How thesecommunities connect and may in concertaddress global challenges, depends inter aliaon their respective rhythms, i.e. typicalsequences of action, and the timing ofactions. As far as science diplomacy isconcerned, and particularly when it relatesto socio-ecological challenges, rhythms ofother epistemic communities, such aspolitics, must be taken into account to thesame extent as substantive domains, suchas the economy and nature. Acknowledgingthe differences of rhythm betweencommunities and domains is crucial forscience diplomacy to optimize the timing ofactions directed at addressing globalchallenges.

'Normal rhythms', i.e. sequences in whichactions routinely or traditionally follow eachother, differ between epistemic communitiesand substantive domains. Where theyinvolve 'manmade' communities anddomains, these rhythms are defined by theactors in their respective communities anddomains. As such, a rhythm describes thegeneral 'way things go' and not the rhythmof an individual actor6. Understood in thisway, a rhythm is an emergent property of acommunity or domain. For instance, inpolitics, electoral cycles are typical devicesordering the communitys rhythm. Anotherexample of different rhythms in that fieldpertains to the implementation of OpenScience (Mayer, 2020). When the EuropeanCommission (EC) proclaimed Open Science

as the new standard for scientific research,Member State reactions were mixed. Some complained that they had just transformedtheir national science sector into acompetitive system as per the ECs previousrecommendations and encouragements.Others accused the EC of moving too slowlyto keep up with the developments in thefield. Similarly, diplomacy has a rhythmdefined by specific recurring eventsdemarcated by international treaties, suchas the conferences of the parties under theUN Framework Convention on ClimateChange. These involve extensive sequencesof preparatory actions. But also science, theeconomy or policy have their own rhythms.When it comes to science, this may be linkedto processes of applying for researchfunding, executing research and starting thissequence over. The economy featuresrhythms of innovation, payback times orfiscal years. For many especially socioecological global challenges, rhythms of nature are also relevant. These may besequences of chemical reactions withdetrimental effects for human life on earth,as in the case of Chlorofluorocarbons and theozone layer. But these rhythms may alsorefer to incubation time or infectionnumbers, as we have so overtly experiencedin the COVID-19 pandemic (cf. Šlosarík etal., 2020). Various communities anddomains rhythms also have more than onemodality. Multiple modalities are visible inthe diplomatic community, which has to dealwith emergency situations, in addition to theplanned processes of treaty work. Inscience, the traditional rhythm of laboriouspeer review may be juxtaposed by the moreagile processes of Open Science. Finally, thedependence of different domains rhythmson each other is illustrated by the case of


10. Rhythm and timing

6. For more details on actors involved in science diplomacy, see section on governance systems.

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food security (Ravinet et al., 2020). The foodproduction system demonstrates theinterwovenness of this domain with othermarkets. For example, oil price fluctuations and their effect on costs of logistics mayrequire diplomatic reaction to protect foodproduction systems and supply chains.

From a science diplomacy perspective,'timing', then, refers to the way in whichactors purposefully or coincidentally alignthese various rhythms to interfere in'norma' rhythms and modulate their futurecourse to address global challenges. Forscience diplomacy, the timing of actionsdepends on whether they address an acuteevent or an ongoing process (response timeand organization), whether they respond toan external impulse or initiate a new process(origin of the stimulus), or whether theybreak into an existing sequence to modulateit (transformative action). We have observedsuch transformative action in the OpenScience case where science and policyrhythms aligned, generating internationalefforts to set up a European Open ScienceCloud; efforts that were perceived as timely(Mayer, 2020). This feeling of timelinessstemmed from the fact that the effort wouldhave gone awry ten years ago. On thecontrary, such a public Open Science wouldhave been obsolete in merely five years,when foreign companies, such as publishinghouses, could have jumped on theopportunity. Thus, connective activitiesinvolve interference in and modulation ofcommunities and domains rhythms that aresimultaneously evolving through time. Thetiming of these interfering or modulatingacts is crucial for them to be expedient.Whether timing is 'good' or 'bad' depends onthe way in which science diplomaticinterfering or modulating action hasinfluenced other communities' or domains'rhythm. Furthermore, 'response time', i.e.the time needed to respond to an often

unexpected specific event, is the time lagneeded to align a communitys rhythm toanother. The policy response to COVID-19infections illustrates this: the rhythms ofpolitics and policy had to be adjusted to reactto the diseases rhythm. For example, in theNetherlands, from March 2020 lasting forseveral weeks, the decisions of an outbreakmanagement team were communicated tothe public in a weekly press conference, andweekly update sessions were organized formembers of the Parliament. In severalS4D4C cases (Kadlecová et al., 2020;Ravinet et al., 2020; Šlosarík et al., 2020),the response time to crises plays a role. Todifferent degrees, countries have systems orcrisis management strategies in place torespond to cyber-attacks or outbreaks ofinfectious diseases very quickly. Timing theninvolves a call-and-response pattern wherea communitys rhythm adapts to modulatingactions initiated by actors from othercommunities or domains.

Another aspect of timing is the problem ofthe simultaneity of counteracting rhythms asdemonstrated by contrasting the two casesof Open Science and the FET Flagships(Mayer, 2020; Degelsegger-Márquez,2020). The principle of Open Sciencechampions collaborative and open sharing ofscientific results and data with the aim oftackling global challenges. FET Flagships, onthe other hand, were meant to significantlyboost certain scientific fields within the EU as a mechanism to change the gameregarding the availability of strategic STI.Here, timing the disclosure of scientificknowledge/results is caught in a conflictbetween scientific interests to share newknowledge as fast as possible, and economicor (geo-)political interests to share newknowledge only when certain actors havereaped the strategic and economicadvantages. For scientific knowledge, thesecounteracting rhythms of Open Science


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versus FET Flagships illustrate that there isno absolute 'right' time to publish it. Theexpedience of actions directed at modulatingother communities' or domains' rhythmsalso depends on the pursued interests.Science diplomacy can play different roles inrelation to the rhythm of epistemiccommunities and substantive domains. Firstof all, it is a means of connecting andaligning the rhythms of the science anddiplomacy community. Actions initiated asscience diplomacy can target, but should atleast take into account the rhythms of othercommunities and domains. Second, sciencediplomacy can serve as a means forunderstanding other rhythms by serving asan extra exchange channel for scientificknowledge, supported by mechanisms ofOpen Science. Third, science diplomacyaptness to connect communities anddomains can be instrumentalized in cases ofcyber-attacks or oil conflicts by attemptingthe alignment of counteracting rhythms.

Thus, with an eye to the future, sciencediplomacy contributes to the normalizationof relations between countries formerly orotherwise pitted against each other. Fourth,a perspective on timing as a means ofaligning rhythms running counter to eachother enables science diplomacy to lookbeyond emergency response exclusively,and work towards anticipation of crises aswell. In sum, science diplomacy representsthe purposeful synchronization of sciencesand diplomacys rhythms to achievesynergistic effects in timing actions directedat interfering with and modulating othercommunities and domains rhythms toaddress global challenges.


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Notes on contributors


Ewert Aukes is a postdoctoral researcher at Science, Technology and Policy Studies, adepartment of the Faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social sciences of the University ofTwente. Having obtained his PhD in 2017, with a dissertation on framing in Dutch coastal policy,he currently works on two EU H2020 projects in the fields of forestry ecosystem servicesgovernance innovations and science diplomacy. He has published in scientific as well asprofessional journals relating to water management and interpretive policy analysis andauthored reports for the Dutch public works agency concerning innovations in Dutch watermanagement. For S4D4C, he contributed to several case studies with information from theNetherlands and co-authored the working paper on meta-governance for science diplomacy.

Eliška Černovská is a Ph.D. student in Area Studies at the Institute of International Studies atthe Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. In her Ph.D. research, she focuses on agenda setting in EU water policy and diplomacy. She is a SYLFF Fellow (Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund). In S4D4C, she contributed to the case study on Water di-plomacy and its future in the national, regional, and European environments.

Elke Dall is S4D4C project coordinator. She joined the Centre for Social Innovation (ZSI) in2003 and has been representing ZSI in Brussels since February 2018. She studied Sociology atthe University of Vienna and has a background in research on networked organisations,quantitative and qualitative evaluation, and policy analysis in the field of S&T and innovation.Between 2007 and 2016 she was Head of Unit "Research Policy and Development" and BoardMember at ZSI. From October 2016 to February 2018 she acted as Policy Officer with a focus onStakeholder Engagement at the COST Administration and re-joined ZSI in 2018, taking over thecoordination of S4D4C.

Ana Elorza is a biomedical scientist by training, holding a PhD in Chemistry and MolecularBiology from the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and a Master degree on Humanitarian Aid(NOHA European Commission) from Uppsala University. She works as Science Advice andDiplomacy Coordinator at the Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology, FECYT. Ana Elorza is an expert on science-policy interfaces with extensive international experien-ce in academia, public administration and multi-lateral organizations. Her work focuses on science diplomacy, science advice, and scientific communities abroad and in Spain. Ana supports the science diplomacy strategies of different countries and trains scientists and diplomats for a sustainable future through science and innovation.

Tim Flink is a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer in science policy research and social studiesof science, based at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and at the German Center of HigherEducation Research and Science Studies (DZHW). Prior to his academic engagement, he workedas the personal board assistant to the EU Liaison Office of the German Research Organisationsin Brussels, especially supporting the German Research Foundations (DFG) President andSecretary General in representing the DFGs international interests vis-à-vis the EU institutions. He published the first comprehensive social history and policy analysis of the

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European Research Council and gathered expertise in many other science policy related fields, including science diplomacy (the first cross-country comparative study being carried out with Ulrich Schreiterer from 2008-2010), academic spin-offs, and university governance and incentivization regimes of researchers. In S4D4C, Tim Flink is the Conceptual framework work package leader and is the author of the case study Joint international research pro-gramming as a case of science diplomacy.

Lorenzo Melchor has a PhD in Molecular and Cellular Biology from the Universidad Autónomade Madrid (2008) and is a Master Student in Policy Analysis in the Universitat Oberta deCatalunya. He works as EU science advice and diplomacy officer in the Spanish Foundation forScience and Technology (FECYT). Lorenzo held the position of science adviser in the SpanishEmbassy in London between 2015-2018 and has many years of experience in biomedicalresearch. Lorenzo is a specialist in designing and executing different schemes to bring scientificknowledge and public policies together. He participated as a fellow in the Royal Society PairingScheme in 2013, designed and organized two editions of Ambassadors for Science anddeveloped different training workshops in Europe and Latin America. Lorenzo is also foundingpresident of the Society of Spanish Researchers in the United Kingdom, expert member inknowledge management and transfer in the Scientific Advisory Council of Fundación GadeaCiencia, and coordinator of #CienciaenelParlamento, an initiative to foster legislative scienceadvice in Spain.

Laure-Anne Plumhans is a junior researcher at the Centre for Social Innovation (ZSI) inVienna. She works on diverse projects for the " Research Policy and Development" departmentof ZSI. Laure-Anne has a background in EU affairs and socio-ecological economics. She isinterested in international cooperation and governance, especially regarding global challengessuch as climate change.

Pauline Ravinet is Assistant Professor of Political Science at CERAPS, University of Lille. Herresearch focuses on the emergence and governance of the European Higher Education Area,and, more generally, European knowledge policies. Within S4D4C, she is researching sciencediplomacy interfaces and actors and exploring the re-composition of higher educationcooperation in the context of globalization in her ongoing habilitation research. Pauline Ravinetis also Vice-President for European Affairs of the University of Lille, member of the editorialcommittee of Gouvernement et Action Publique and Policy Design and Practice, nominatedmember of the Council of the Association française de science politique and the InternationalPublic Policy Association, and member of the expert Board of the Agence Universitaire de laFrancophonie (Direction Europe de lOuest). She is co-author of the S4D4C case study Thescience and diplomacy of global challenges: Food security in EU-Africa relations´.

Charlotte Rungius is a research associate at the German Centre for Higher Education andScience Research (DZHW). She graduated in political economics at the University of Mannheimand Bilkent University, Ankara and holds a MA degree in Peace and Conflict Studies.She specialized in the sociology of science and International Relations at SIS in Washington DC. Charlotte worked at the German Embassy in the USA and the Federation of American Scientists. Between 2014 and

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2018 she was research associate and lecturer at the Chair for PoliticalSciences, Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Augsburg. Since January 2018 she has been a researcher in the EU H2020 project on science diplomacy (S4D4C) in Berlin.Charlotte is a mediator by training.

Eliška Tomalová is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Faculty of SocialSciences, Charles University in Prague. In her research and teaching activities, she focuses onsoft power instruments, cultural diplomacy and branding in international relations and on Czech-French relations. She has been recently involved in research projects on nation brandingstrategies with the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on the international organizations’agenda with the Czech Government Office. In the H2020 project S4D4C, she is leading the watercase study, researching best practices in science diplomacy and water management. EliškaTomalová is also the Head of the European Studies Department at the Institute of InternationalStudies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague and Programme Director of theEPS (European Politics and Society) Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree.

Mitchell Young is an Assistant Professor in the Department of European Studies at the Facultyof Social Sciences of Charles University. His research is focused on knowledge governance andscience policies in the EU and Member States both internally as a form of European integrationand externally through science diplomacy as a tool in foreign policy. He is a work package leaderfor the S4D4C project and is chair of the ECPR Standing Group on Knowledge Politics and Policies.He teaches courses on EU policies, comparative political economy, and European economicintegration. He holds a Ph.D. in Area Studies from Charles University, an M.A. from Universityof Chicago, and a B.A. from Williams College.

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PROJECT PARTNERS

Centre for Social Innovation – ZSI (Coordinator)

Charles University Prague – CU

German Aerospace Centre, Project Management Agency – DLR

German Centre for Science Studies and Higher Education Research – DZHW

The Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology – FECYT

The World Academy of Sciences – TWAS

University of Lille – ULille

University of Sheffield – USFD

University of Twente – UT

Vienna School of International Studies – DA

ASSOCIATE PARTNERS

Center for Science Diplomacy at AAAS, Washington

Higher School of Economics, Moscow – HSE

Indian Institute for Science – DST Centre for Policy Research

InterAcademy Partnership – IAP

International Institute for Applied Systems AnalysisLaxenburg – IIASA

National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan – GRIPS

s4d4c.eutwitter.com/[email protected]

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 770342

WE EXPLORE AND INFORMEU SCIENCE DIPLOMACY

Governance framework

Knowledge resources

Networks and dialogue

Trainings for science diplomats


Documents

The 'Matters' of Science Diplomacy: Transversal Analysis