Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
With Quarterly Executive Letter
Volume 2, Issue 6
June 2013
ii© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
June 19, 2013
In Search of a More Balanced Market
The home price gains that made housing a standout in 2012’s economic picture have extended into 2013.
April’s 12.1 percent rise1 in the CoreLogic Home Price Index (HPI®) was not only the biggest year-over-year
gain since February 2006, it was the 14th consecutive monthly year-over-year increase in home prices. The
continued momentum in home price growth gives us renewed optimism that the housing recovery is becoming
more durable.
But double-digit gains also prompt caution, particularly among those who recall the unsustainable home
price increases before the last housing downturn. Are we witnessing a new housing bubble? While our recent
projected CoreLogic HPI™ indicates continued home price gains, bolstered by still-tight supply and strong
demand, we expect recent double-digit gains to moderate as markets normalize.
Too far, too fast?
Already the first signs of a shift have appeared, with some early post-recession investors in distressed single-
family properties declaring the market overheated and indicating their intentions to pull back. Yet, despite
strong price gains, the housing market remains more than 20 percent below the April 2006 peak and several
important factors could moderate rising prices.
Since the last quarter of 2011, 2.4 million underwater borrowers have benefited from the gain in housing
prices. Regaining equity creates options for those who might now consider selling their homes because they
can close a transaction with enough cash to make a down payment on the next home. Higher prices also attract
the interest of builders who see opportunity in increased demand. In both cases, a broader supply brings
inventory more in balance with demand.
Record low interest rates have prompted many homeowners to refinance since the downturn. Prospective
homebuyers are jumping into the market before rates trend higher. Over the longer-term, we expect rising
interest rates to be another moderating factor in home price appreciation, given their effect on affordability.
Also serving to moderate ongoing double-digit price gains is continuing tight credit as lenders position their
businesses to meet new regulatory standards.
In this month’s MarketPulse, CoreLogic Senior Economist Sam Khater provides perspective on the effects
of negative equity and reservation prices—or the price at which a borrower is willing to sell—on real estate
supply, comparing this housing cycle to earlier cycles. He anticipates moderating home price appreciation
ahead because the lid on constrained supply is being removed.
From the CEO
1 Including distressed sales
iii© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
Assessing risk
Accurately assessing market-related risk puts your business in a more secure position. In addition to business and economic risks, the risk from natural hazards is one that managers in the mortgage industry, where there are 48 million residential properties with mortgages valued at $9.4 trillion, need to weigh. And the risks can often be in areas not typically associated with a particular weather event.
Last month, tornadoes in Oklahoma, one of the eight states making up Tornado Alley, caused significant devastation to lives and communities. Looking at residential property damage within the eight Tornado Alley states from 2000 through 2011, our scientists estimated a total of approximately $2.5 billion. Perhaps more surprising was their estimate of total tornado damage—nearly $15.5 billion—in 16 states outside the region during the same period. Clearly, states beyond Tornado Alley face higher tornado-touchdown risk than we might imagine.
Another devastating storm hit the Northeast last year, with 72 lives lost in the United States alone. Hurricane Sandy set records for surge water and wave heights in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. The storm’s destruction is estimated at $50 billion, with some 650,000 homes damaged or destroyed.2 And importantly, it’s a reminder that states not typically thought of as hurricane targets can suffer overwhelming devastation.
On page three of this month’s issue, CoreLogic Chief Economist Mark Fleming examines two natural hazards: tornadoes and hurricanes. By correlating risk to outstanding mortgage debt, he shares new insights into locations
that have the most potential exposure to loss from hazardous weather related events.
CoreLogic welcomes Case-Shiller
In April, CoreLogic acquired Case-Shiller. As a pioneer in the development of home price indexes, Case-Shiller has established a strong brand and a broad industry following.
For us, the acquisition underscored our ongoing commitment to provide clients the superior data and analytics that help them better manage their businesses. The acquisition also cements our overall market leadership in property valuation analytics. As a complementary measure of home price trends to the CoreLogic HPI, the CoreLogic Case-Shiller Indexes® allow us to give our clients additional, powerful insights that facilitate their decision-making.
I hope you’ll find the insights in this month’s MarketPulse useful as you tackle challenges and opportunities that today’s business environment presents. On behalf of the CoreLogic team, thank you for allowing us to collaborate
with you for your ongoing success.
Sincerely,
Anand Nallathambi President and CEO CoreLogic
2 See http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf and http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2013/05/06/290936.htm
iv© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
The Authors
Anand K. NallathambiPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Anand K. Nallathambi is the president and chief executive officer of CoreLogic, a leading provider of consumer, financial and property information, analytics and services to business and government. Nallathambi is responsible for all aspects of the CoreLogic business.
Dr. Mark Fleming Chief Economist
Dr. Mark Fleming is the chief economist for CoreLogic. He leads the economics team responsible for analysis, commentary, and forecasting trends in the real estate and mortgage markets.
Katie DobbynSenior Economist
Katie Dobbyn is a senior economist for CoreLogic with the office of the chief economist. She is responsible for modeling all aspects of the mortgage and real estate markets.
Sam KhaterDeputy Chief Economist
Sam Khater is deputy chief economist for CoreLogic. He is responsible for providing in-depth economic, mortgage market and real estate analysis.
Thomas M. VitloResearch Analyst
Thomas M. Vitlo is a research analyst for CoreLogic with the office of the chief economist. Thomas utilizes statistical software to analyze the real estate market and uses data visualization techniques to illustrate trends.
Table of ContentsFrom the CEO ............................................................... ii
The Authors ................................................................... iv
Media Contacts ........................................................... iv
The MarketPulse...........................................................1
Reservation Prices and Housing Bubbles ............1
This Time Is Different ............................................2
Natural Hazard Risk- The Great (Known) Unknown ..................................3
Measuring MDO and Exposure .........................4
Will History Repeat Itself? .......................................6
In the News .....................................................................6
National Summary April 2013 ............................7
Largest 25 CBSA Summary April 2013 ..........7
State Summary April 2013 ..................................8
Home Prices .............................................................9
Mortgage Performance ...................................... 10
Home Sales .............................................................. 11
Variable Descriptions .......................................... 12
Media ContactsFor real estate industry and trade media:
Bill Campbell [email protected] (212) 995.8057 (office) (917) 328.6539 (mobile)
For general news media:
Lori Guyton [email protected] (901) 277.6066
The MarketPulse
1© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
Housing Statistics (April 2013)
HPI® YOY Chg . . . . . . . . . . . . .12.1%
HPI YOY Chg XD . . . . . . . . . . 11.9%
NegEq Share (Q1 2013) . . . .19.8%
Shadow Inventory (01/2013) . . .2.2m
Distressed Discount. . . . . . . .36.8%
New Sales (ths, ann.) . . . . . . . . .264
Existing Sales (ths, ann.) . . . . 3,362
Average Sales Price . . . . . . $242,855
HPI Peak-to-Current (PTC). . . -22.4%
Foreclosure Stock PTC . . . .-28.3%
Volume 2, Issue 6
June 19th, 2013
Data as of April 2013
n any type of goods market, economic
theory predicts that higher demand
either stimulates higher supply, higher
prices or both. The response to higher
demand is driven by the short-run
elasticity of supply. While over the long-
run housing supply is elastic as new homes
are built to satisfy increased demand,
in the short-run, typically as demand
increases and prices rise, more sellers
enter the market. The supply response
acts as a counterweight to the increased
demand and reduces the upward pressure
on prices. However, in the current market
one of those forces is missing: Existing
supply is inelastic or not very responsive
to increased demand, leading to a more
dramatic increase in prices.
Over the past few years, there have been
two forces restricting existing supply:
negative equity and “reservation prices”
(the reservation price is the lowest
price at which an owner is willing to
sell.) For homeowners with negative
equity, selling at a lower price usually
requires an undesirable choice between
a short sale or foreclosure sale. So most
underwater homeowners are locked
out of participating in the market. For
homeowners with positive equity, the
reservation price condition is met when
their willingness to sell is at a higher price
I
Cont...
FIGURE 1. TODAy'S PRICE CyCLES ExHIBIT LARGE SWINGSHPI Single Family Combined
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
-35
-31
-27
-23
-19
-15 -11
-7 -3
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41
45
49 53 57 61
65
69 73
Historical
Current
Fig 1 today’s price cycles exhibit large swings
Months Prior to Peak Months After to Peak
Peak in Prices
Note: Prices adjusted for inflation and indexed to 100 three years prior to the peak in the various states across the various decades. Both data series reflect the average price movements in the boom/bust states.
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
Reservation Prices and Housing BubblesBy Sam Khater
IN THIS ARTICLE:
♦ In past cycles, real estate prices were sticky, but in the current cycle prices have been more fluid
♦ The market impact is that the price adjustment process is moving much more quickly than in historical cycles
♦ The rebound in home prices is likely to be short lived ♦ Expected supply increases and tighter underwriting should deflate bubble risk
2© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
than the market currently supports. While CoreLogic® has often analyzed negative equity’s impact on prices, there has been much less discussion about the invisible lid on supply that homeowners’ reservation prices create.
The restricted existing supply is one of the main causes of the escalation in prices over the past year and has led some to question if the housing market is headed for another bubble. There are a variety of ways to answer the question, but in the context of historical regional price booms and busts, what appears to be occurring in the current real estate cycle is that the speed of the adjustment process in prices has greatly increased both on the downside and on the upside.
This Time Is Different
Between the early 1980s and early 1990s, there were three distinct boom and bust cycles that occurred in Texas, Massachusetts and California. Analyzing the combined state data reveals that in these historical cycles real home prices increased 39 percent cumulatively in
the three years leading to the peak, but only fell 21 percent in the three years after the peak or a little bit more than half way (Figure 1). In other words, prices were sticky on the downside due to strong reservation prices from market
participants and the ability to time their participation in the market. The most recent cycle is different from this past cycle in magnitude and speed of the adjustment process. Real home prices increased 62 percent in the three years leading to the peak and then declined 47 percent in the three years following the peak, or by about three-quarters, which is much larger than historical declines even after adjusting for differences in the pre-peak rise in prices.
Prior cycles had more downside stickiness and slower price appreciation over a longer period of time. After the
economy and the real estate market recovered, prices remained elevated above what fundamentals otherwise dictated. Prices remained stuck above what was fundamentally supported until, over time, the fundamental price rose
to meet the market price. In the current cycle, the combination of a faster adjustment process and very low rates caused a rapid upturn in national prices in late 2011 and early 2012. For example, the current recovery in California, Arizona and Nevada has already appreciated more in one year than
Texas and Massachusetts did after four years during the 1980s (Figure 2). Florida is the exception in this recovery, in part due to exceptionally long foreclosure timelines. Yet it is still appreciating faster than most states relative to historical post-trough price increases.
How much further can the rapidly appreciating markets go? Current real home prices in Florida, Arizona and Nevada reveal that Nevada still has the most upside potential relative to the other boom-and-bust states. The other states are currently close to their fundamental long-term real price trends relative to a long-term inflation adjusted trend. Given the rapid price increases and proximity to the long-term trend, many more homeowners with positive equity are back close to or above their reservation prices. The evidence is clear in the recent supply response. The current January to April year-to-date increase in the supply of existing homes is the third highest in nearly 30 years, a strong indication that the invisible lid that has been on supply is in the process of being removed. The increase in the supply in context of current tight underwriting standards should deflate the risk of any bubbles.
“The restricted existing supply is one
of the main causes of the escalation
in prices over the past year and has
led some to question if the housing
market is headed for another bubble.”
End.
FIGURE 2. PRICE RECOVERy TODAy IS MUCH HIGHER THAN PRIOR CyCLESHPI Single Family Combined
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
150
Tro
ugh 2 4 6 8 1
0 12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
60
Months After Trough
Arizona Current
California Current
Florida Current
Nevada Current
California Historical
Massachussets Historical
Texas Historical
Fig 2 recovery is much faster this decade and most likely more short lived than past
Change in YOY Prices
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
3© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
Footnotes
1 See http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?genericContentID=66226 and http://www.realtor.org/topics/home-ownership-matters/jobs-impact-of-an-existing-home-purchase.
Cont...
s the recovery in the housing
market continues to gain
steam, risk managers are
trained to look for potential risks
lurking around the corner. It is with
this concern in mind that we turn
our attention to the risk that natural
hazards place on the mortgage industry.
In today’s 24-hour-wired news age, we
are nearly instantly exposed to the
devastation that a natural disaster
can wreak. Weather events appear to
be becoming more violent and more
frequent. In the United States last year,
there were severe droughts, record-
breaking wildfires, and one of the
largest hurricanes on record. Already
this year, Oklahomans experienced two
devastating EF5 tornadoes during the
last two weeks in May, the latter one of
which was 2.6 miles wide, the widest
ever recorded.
Regardless of frequency and intensity,
the impact of a natural hazard
is particularly significant on the
residential housing stock. The total
stock of residential houses is currently
worth about $18 trillion—a lot less
than six years ago, but growing in
value once again. The housing sector,
either directly through construction
or through related consumption,
accounts for about 15 percent of total
GDP, according to estimates by the
National Association of Home Builders
(NAHB®). Every new home built creates
three jobs and every two existing home
sales creates one job, according to
NAHB and the National Association
of Realtors® (NAR) respectively.1 At
the current rate of about 1 million
single-family starts per year and just
under 5 million existing home sales,
the housing industry is supporting
5.5 million jobs. In addition, these
housing assets are made possible
through more than $9.4 trillion dollars in mortgage debt outstanding (MDO) that grew at about a 5 percent annual rate over the last two decades. Recently, MDO shrank moderately as consumers defaulted or paid down their debts. However, as household formation is expected to continue to gain steam and cash sales to investors fade, CoreLogic expects demand for mortgages will increase, especially demand for purchase mortgages.
Natural hazards caused $112 billion in total losses in the U.S. in 2012, according to Munich RE, and $62 billion in insured losses. The
A FIGURE 1. MDO IS HIGHLy CONCENTRATED ON THE COASTSTotal MDO Balance ($Billions)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
New
Yo
rk, N
Y
Lo
s A
ngel
es, C
A
Was
hin
gto
n, D
C
Chi
cag
o, I
L
San
Fra
ncis
co, C
A
Mia
mi,
FL
Phi
lad
elp
hia,
PA
Sea
ttle
, WA
Atl
anta
, GA
Riv
ersi
de,
CA
San
Die
go
, CA
Pho
enix
, AZ
Dal
las,
TX
San
Jo
se, C
A
Bal
tim
ore
, MD
fleming: fig 1
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
Natural Hazard Risk-The Great (Known) UnknownBy Mark Fleming and Katie Dobbyn
IN THIS ARTICLE:
♦ More than $18 trillion in values of residential homes is supported by more than $9 trillion of mortgage debt as of the end of 2012
♦ There is a total of $1.4 trillion in exposed mortgage debt, representing 18.5 percent of the total amount of U.S. mortgage debt outstanding
♦ Florida has the largest share of natural hazard-related risk ($326 billion) given its high exposure to both hurricane and tornado winds
4© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
National Hurricane Center estimated Hurricane Sandy’s damage at $50 billion, second only to the $108 billion caused by Hurricane Katrina in Gulf Coast states in 2005. Congress approved more than $60 billion in storm aid for Sandy victims and their communities2. What’s not clear is the direct impact of natural hazards on the $18 trillion in housing assets and $9 trillion of mortgage debt outstanding. To better understand this dynamic, this article examines the exposure risk of mortgage dollars outstanding to two natural hazards: tornado and hurricane winds.
Measuring MDO and Exposure
To measure the amount of mortgage debt outstanding (MDO) exposed to hurricane and tornado winds, all open liens (first and junior liens) on a nationwide population of 48 million mortgaged properties are added up at the property level and adjusted for amortization and HELOC utilization. This calculation provides the total property-level MDO. The sum of the
MDO over the nationwide population
is an estimate of the total current
unpaid principal balance of all open
mortgages in the U.S. potentially
exposed to natural hazard risks as
of the end of 2012. Exposure risk is
defined as MDO dollars scaled by the
probability of the risk event. A large
dollar amount containing little risk
of a natural hazard can have the same
exposure as a small dollar amount
containing a large risk of a natural
hazard. Property-level exposure
equals the property-specific MDO
multiplied by the property-specific
natural hazard probability. The overall
exposure equals the sum of all the
property-level cost-exposure amounts.
It should be noted that most of the
mortgage debt in the U.S. today is on
the coasts in the Washington-New
York corridor, coastal California, the
Northwest, Florida and the Southeast,
as well as in Texas and Chicago. The top
15 Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs)
in the U.S. ranked by MDO at the end
of 2012 account for half of the total
mortgage debt outstanding (Figure 1).
Therefore, the type of natural hazard
risk that a particular market is exposed
to will depend on its location. The East
Coast is at risk of hurricane winds, but
the West Coast is not. The middle of
the country, so called “tornado alley,”
is susceptible to tornado winds, but
not a hurricane.
When examining the mortgage
exposure risk from hurricane winds,
a few markets jump out (Figure 2).
Obviously, Miami has the highest
exposure level, $61 billion, in part
because it is a high-value market Cont...
Footnotes2 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf and Insurance Journal - May, 2013.
FIGURE 3. TORNADO ExPOSURE RISK IMPACTS A WIDE VARIETy OF MARKETSTotal Mortgage Exposure – Tornados ($Billions)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Chi
cag
o, I
L
New
Yo
rk, N
Y
Was
hin
gto
n, D
C
Dal
las,
TX
Mia
mi,
FL
Atl
anta
, GA
Ho
ust
on,
TX
Phi
lad
elp
hia,
PA
Den
ver,
CO
Tam
pa,
FL
Orl
and
o, F
L
Lo
s A
ngel
es, C
A
Bal
tim
ore
, MD
St.
Lo
uis,
MO
Det
roit
, MI
fleming: fig 3
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
FIGURE 2. HURRICANE ExPOSURE RISK ALONG THE GULF AND ATLANTIC COASTSTotal Mortgage Exposure – Hurricanes ($Billions)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Mia
mi,
FL
New
Yo
rk, N
Y
Ho
ust
on,
TX
Tam
pa,
FL
Orl
and
o, F
L
Was
hin
gto
n, D
C
Phi
lad
elp
hia,
PA
Cha
rles
ton,
SC
Po
rt S
t. L
ucie
, FL
Nap
les,
FL
No
rth
Po
rt, F
L
Cap
e C
ora
l, F
L
Vir
gin
ia B
each
, VA
Pro
vid
ence
, RI
Pal
m B
ay, F
L
Fleming: fig 2
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
5© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
($219 billion MDO) as well as
because it is prone to hurricanes.
It should be noted that a major
hurricane has not hit Florida
in a few years but the risk still
persists. New York is another
high-exposure market, with
$27 billion of exposure risk to
hurricane winds, more because it is
the single largest market for mortgage
debt outstanding ($646 billion) than
for hazard risk. Rounding out the
top three CBSAs is Houston, with
$120 billion of MDO and $17 billion
of mortgage exposure to hurricane
winds. The total amount of exposure
dollars nationwide to hurricane winds
is $226 billion, and 10 cities account
for 70 percent of the exposure.
Tornado wind exposure risk is more
broadly distributed across the U.S.,
although there is little risk west of the
Rocky Mountains. The Far West contends
with other types of natural hazards,
such as wild fire and earthquakes. The
highest tornado exposure risk city is
the aptly named “windy city,” Chicago,
with $92 billion of exposure (Figure 3).
Surprisingly New York and Washington
ranks second and third, respectively,
again because of their large mortgage
debt concentrations, but also because of consequential tornado risk. Finally, in fourth place is the Dallas market with tornado exposure risk of $64 billion. Clearly, tornado exposure doesn’t just exist in tornado alley, but in a wide variety of markets throughout the U. S.
Combining the risk of these two natural hazards, and, assuming the two are independent of each other, there is a total of $1.4 trillion of exposed mortgage debt, representing 18.5 percent of the total amount of U.S. MDO (Figure 4). It comes as no surprise that Florida has the largest share of risk given its high exposure to both hurricane and tornado winds, not to mention hurricane-driven storm surge and sink holes. Is the weather really worth the risk? Illinois and Texas are not far behind, because Illinois possesses the highest concentration of MDO with frequent tornados, and Texas possesses moderate levels of MDO combined with higher hazard-risk potential.
Of course, tornado and hurricane winds are not the only natural hazards that residential real estate is exposed to, and not all of the mortgage debt exposed is lost since damage is not always complete. Nonetheless, the risk exposure that natural hazards present is important to understand in order to arrive at a more integrated analysis and understanding of the risk that an asset-backed loan presents. As we have seen in recent natural disasters, natural hazard risk can quickly change the loss risk equation.
End.
“…there is a total of $1.4 trillion
of exposed mortgage debt,
representing 18.5 percent of
the total amount of U.S. MDO.”
FIGURE 4. TOTAL ExPOSURE TO TORNADO AND HURRICANE WINDS By STATEMortgage $ at Risk from Natural Hazards (in Billions)
5.0 326.1
$1.4 TrlTotal Exposure
18.5%of Total
U.S. Mortgage Debt
FL$326.1 Bln
TX$161.1 Bln NC
$49.4 Bln
MD$56.5 Bln
NJ$62.7 Bln
PA$41.7 Bln
VA$61.1 Bln
NY$65.3 Bln
CO$52.2 Bln
CA$56.3 Bln
IL$104.7 Bln
GA$60.0 Bln
OH$45.0 Bln
MI$29.8 Bln
TN$28.9 Bln
MN$17.0 Bln OK
$20.9 Bln
MO$29.7 Bln
IN$21.3 Bln
NE$10.8 Bln
KS$14.8 Bln
WI$18.6 Bln
DC$5.9 Bln
AR$9.5 Bln
IA$13.5 Bln
KY8.1 Bln
DE$5.7 Bln
RI$6.5 Bln
AZ$5.4 Bln
LA$15.4 Bln
AL$15.8 Bln
SC$25.5 Bln
Source: CoreLogic December 2012
6© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
Will History Repeat Itself? By Thomas M. Vitlo
Much focus in the last year has been centered on the actions of real estate investors and
on whether investor purchases are propping up some regional markets. In the past, rising home prices have been positively linked with increases in investor purchases. This chart shows the non-owner occupied share of originations (originations made for investment or for second homes) and the CoreLogic single-family combined Home Price Index (HPI) level from January 2000 to February 2013. During the run up in prices from 2004-2006, the rise in the share of non-owner occupied purchases was a leading indicator of price increases. The non-owner occupied share peaked at 27 percent in Florida, 26 percent in Nevada, and 25 percent in Arizona. As prices peaked, investors then pulled back, and prices fell dramatically,
erasing all of the early gains in the early 2000s. As recently as late 2011, the non-owner occupied purchase shares began to rise again in these three states, triggering home price increases. The right side of the chart shows a clear and obvious divergence in the non-owner occupied purchase share from the movement in the
single-family combined index with the share falling and prices increasing. History shows that this is an oddity. Are these states due for another slight correction, or are there other forces at work that aren’t captured in the non-owner share of originations, such as a surge in cash purchases by investors, driving this divergence?
260
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
2010
2011
2012
2013
HP
I SF
C In
dex
No
n-O
wne
r O
cc S
hare
(12
-mo
nth
mov
ing
ave
rag
e)
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
28%
26%
24%
22%
20%
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
HPI – Left AxisAZFLNV
Non Owner Occ Share – Right AxisAZFLNV
Note: The chart shows HPI SFC (lines left axis) and Non-Owner Occupied Share (12-month average - circles-right axis) over time. Color shows details about selected states.
Source: CoreLogic February 2013
End.
USA TODAY, June 12Rising home prices rescue underwater homeownersNationwide, 9.7 million, or 19.8% of homeowners with a mortgage, owed more on their homes than they were worth as of March, says market researcher CoreLogic. That's down from 12.1 million at the end of 2011.
The Economist, June 8Our new house-price indicators JUST seven years after the biggest housing bubble in American history began to deflate, could another be inflating? Prices in a 20-city index compiled by CoreLogic Case-Shiller rose by 11% in the year to the end of March, and by more than 20% in Phoenix and Las Vegas, both cities at the centre of the housing collapse.
Los Angeles Times, June 7Housing outlook is bubble free for now, economists sayDespite double-digit price gains in many markets, the housing outlook is bubble free for now as the sector recovers over the next several years, experts say.
Mortgage News Daily, June 7Home Equity Grew by $815 bln in Q1 - Housing ScorecardThe U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the U.S. Department of the Treasury today released the May edition of the Obama Administration's Housing Scorecard.
CalculatedRisk, June 4CoreLogic: House Prices up 12.1% Year-over-year in AprilThe CoreLogic Pending HPI indicates that May 2013 home prices, including distressed sales, are expected to rise by 12.5 percent on a year-over-year basis from May 2012 and rise by 2.7 percent on a month-over-month basis from April 2013.
The Wall Street Journal, May 31Politics Counts: Reading the Dow, Housing RalliesUsing a data crunch from CoreLogic, which creates the Case-Shiller Index, and measuring key points since 2000, you can see some big differences there. Residents of the “East North Central States” (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin) are still not even back to 2001 housing price levels.
In the News
7© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
NATIONAL SUMMARy APRIL 2013
May 2012
Jun 2012
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
Oct 2012
Nov 2012
Dec 2012
Jan 2013
Feb 2013
Mar 2013
Apr 2013 2010 2011 2012
Total Sales* 4,945 5,020 4,702 5,020 4,113 4,486 4,146 4,234 3,433 3,538 4,186 4,531 4,179 4,041 4,347
— New Sales* 348 357 321 354 306 325 312 330 243 252 275 264 347 301 314
— Existing Sales* 3,451 3,557 3,349 3,583 2,890 3,120 2,798 2,913 2,314 2,421 3,001 3,362 2,703 2,634 2,989
— REO Sales* 710 657 605 621 504 571 607 546 528 505 502 469 803 762 628
— Short Sales* 400 409 398 425 382 435 395 417 324 337 383 415 275 304 381
Distressed Sales Share 22.4% 21.2% 21.3% 20.8% 21.6% 22.4% 24.2% 22.7% 24.8% 23.8% 21.2% 19.5% 25.8% 26.4% 23.2%
HPI MoM 2.4% 2.0% 1.2% 0.6% -0.1% -0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 2.2% 3.2% -0.3% -0.2% 0.7%
HPI yoy 3.1% 3.7% 4.1% 4.9% 5.4% 6.2% 7.4% 8.5% 9.3% 9.9% 11.0% 12.1% -0.3% -4.1% 3.7%
HPI MoM Excluding Distressed 1.8% 1.6% 0.9% 0.4% -0.2% -0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.7% 0.7% 2.3% 3.0% -0.3% -0.3% 0.5%
HPI yoy Excluding Distressed 0.5% 1.5% 2.1% 2.9% 3.4% 4.2% 5.4% 6.4% 7.5% 8.6% 10.2% 11.9% -1.6% -3.9% 1.5%
90 Days + DQ Pct 6.9% 6.9% 6.8% 6.8% 6.7% 6.5% 6.4% 6.4% 6.3% 6.2% 6.0% 5.9% 8.1% 7.4% 6.8%
Foreclosure Pct 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.3% 3.2% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 3.2% 3.5% 3.3%
REO Pct 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4%
Pre-foreclosure Filings** 134 131 126 125 116 122 103 93 99 89 101 98 2,102 1,524 1,454
Completed Foreclosures** 71 68 64 71 82 65 61 48 51 40 52 52 1134 922 799
Negative Equity Share N/A 22.3% N/A N/A 22.0% N/A N/A 21.7% N/A N/A 19.8% N/A 25.3% 24.9% 22.7%
Negative Equity** N/A 10,779 N/A N/A 10,574 N/A N/A 10,515 N/A N/A 9,665 N/A 11,904 11,820 10,925
Months Supply SDQ Homes 6.98 6.84 7.29 6.72 8.11 7.22 7.72 7.46 9.08 8.48 6.92 6.21 10.24 9.59 8.02
* Thousands of Units, Annualized **Thousands of Units †April Data
LARGEST 25 CBSA SUMMARy APRIL 2013
Total Sales
12-month sum
Total Sales yOy
12-month sum
Distressed Sales Share (sales
12-month sum)
Distressed Sales Share
(sales 12-month
sum) A year Ago
SFC HPI yoy
SFCxD HPI yoy
HPI Percent Change
from Peak
90 Days + DQ Pct
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies
yoy Chg
Percent Change Stock of
Foreclosures from Peak
Negative Equity
Share**
Months' Supply Distressed
Homes (total sales
12-month avg.)
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL 92,749 27.0% 35.8% 35.9% 2.8% 8.9% -34.1% 9.1% -18.5% -28.2% 34.2% 14.0
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 91,195 9.8% 29.8% 41.0% 19.2% 18.4% -26.4% 4.5% -34.8% -61.7% 16.2% 6.7
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 78,001 20.5% 31.4% 38.3% 16.5% 13.3% -20.2% 6.3% -27.9% -38.2% 34.5% 8.9
New york-White Plains-Wayne, Ny-NJ 66,013 4.7% 9.7% 10.1% 7.3% 8.1% -10.5% 8.7% -2.7% -6.4% 11.0% 14.5
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
62,316 4.3% 20.4% 25.4% 7.8% 9.6% -20.0% 5.0% -15.6% -30.9% 22.0% 7.7
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, Tx 106,734 9.3% 18.0% 18.8% 10.0% 11.3% -0.5% 3.8% -24.4% -36.4% 9.0% 3.2
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ 100,170 -7.4% 26.6% 43.5% 19.1% 16.6% -36.7% 3.6% -47.3% -78.9% 32.5% 2.9
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 72,559 -1.9% 39.3% 52.5% 16.5% 16.5% -43.8% 6.0% -38.4% -72.6% 31.4% 6.3
Dallas-Plano-Irving, Tx 79,277 9.4% 19.1% 19.7% 10.2% 11.8% -1.9% 3.9% -20.9% -26.0% 8.3% 3.6
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 48,701 15.8% 19.5% 25.7% 7.4% 7.8% -24.5% 3.4% -28.0% -57.3% 18.4% 4.9
Philadelphia, PA . . . . 3.4% 4.9% -13.4% 5.7% -3.4% -16.2% 9.6% N/A
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 41,886 23.3% 20.1% 28.2% 15.8% 15.9% -18.9% 5.3% -21.8% -15.4% 12.9% 7.3
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 56,158 23.0% 19.9% 30.2% 11.8% 11.6% 0.0% 2.8% -34.1% -58.4% 14.6% 2.7
Baltimore-Towson, MD 33,566 10.0% 18.0% 19.6% 3.8% 6.0% -22.4% 7.6% -4.4% -21.2% 17.3% 12.0
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 43,915 14.3% 29.7% 41.2% 17.5% 15.8% -26.2% 3.5% -39.3% -66.9% 19.5% 4.2
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 36,238 18.5% 24.0% 35.1% 20.1% 18.7% -23.1% 3.0% -42.2% -61.6% 11.1% 4.3
Nassau-Suffolk, Ny 23,100 4.0% 7.1% 6.0% 2.6% 3.4% -24.3% 10.7% -0.6% -8.5% 9.2% 23.7
St. Louis, MO-IL 47,091 9.7% 27.4% 27.0% 2.3% 7.2% -20.5% 4.1% -18.3% -32.9% 15.7% 4.4
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 64,032 15.7% 29.5% 29.5% 10.4% 12.8% -39.8% 14.4% -21.8% -28.1% 41.1% 11.3
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 37,804 6.4% 31.2% 45.5% 22.9% 18.6% -30.2% 3.6% -41.6% -69.0% 22.6% 4.8
Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI . . . . 13.4% 13.1% -32.1% 3.9% -31.2% -66.9% 33.6% N/A
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 33,740 15.8% 21.3% 28.5% 16.2% 14.2% -18.0% 4.9% -15.7% -15.1% 11.7% 6.5
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 39,975 4.8% 38.4% 54.0% 22.7% 21.7% -38.6% 4.2% -41.9% -70.5% 25.8% 4.6
Edison-New Brunswick, NJ 26,054 8.8% 12.7% 11.9% -0.4% 0.3% -27.5% 9.6% 2.4% -1.9% 15.6% 15.5
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 48,601 10.0% 36.6% 39.6% 13.2% 12.7% -44.2% 14.2% -25.2% -33.9% 42.8% 11.9
NOTE: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions. †April Data ** Negative Equity Data through Q1 2013
8© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
STATE SUMMARy APRIL 2013
State
Total Sales 12-month
sum
Total Sales yOy
12-month sum
Distressed Sales Share
(sales 12-month sum)
Distressed Sales Share (sales
12-month sum) A year Ago
SFC HPI yoy
SFCxD HPI yoy
HPI Percent Change
from Peak90 Days +
DQ Pct
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies
yoy Chg
Percent Change Stock
of Foreclosures from Peak
Negative Equity
Share**
Months' Supply Distressed
Homes (total sales
12-month avg.)
Alabama 36,522 -5.1% 18.7% 14.8% -1.6% 3.7% -19.6% 5.2% -10.5% -26.2% 17.4% 8.9
Alaska 10,814 5.6% 11.4% 12.0% 6.0% 7.4% -0.7% 1.9% -17.6% -32.2% 6.1% 1.7
Arizona 137,261 -5.4% 27.0% 42.0% 17.3% 15.3% -36.0% 3.7% -42.9% -74.5% 31.3% 3.2
Arkansas 36,925 -12.3% 9.0% 8.3% 1.8% 3.0% -2.1% 5.5% 0.1% -0.2% 10.2% 5.1
California 487,843 6.4% 32.2% 45.0% 19.4% 18.3% -29.0% 4.1% -38.7% -66.7% 21.3% 5.2
Colorado 108,090 17.4% 20.9% 28.7% 10.7% 10.5% -1.3% 2.7% -32.0% -56.4% 14.2% 2.6
Connecticut 37,707 11.5% 19.7% 18.8% 3.3% 6.1% -24.8% 7.3% -4.7% -11.9% 15.8% 10.8
Delaware 9,141 -9.3% 21.0% 20.3% 1.2% 0.7% -20.5% 6.6% -4.2% -15.5% 18.7% 13.3
District of Columbia 7,586 11.3% 0.6% 9.8% 9.4% 9.0% 0.0% 5.4% -6.9% -28.1% 9.7% 7.9
Florida 445,780 8.5% 29.2% 31.3% 10.5% 12.3% -40.4% 14.0% -23.5% -32.7% 38.1% 10.6
Georgia 125,753 12.7% 27.7% 31.4% 14.5% 11.8% -19.2% 5.9% -24.9% -35.2% 30.5% 7.9
Hawaii 16,569 3.0% 13.2% 19.6% 17.0% 13.3% -11.8% 5.9% -14.1% -15.5% 7.5% 7.0
Idaho 35,888 8.5% 18.1% 28.5% 13.2% 16.4% -25.2% 4.1% -20.2% -34.4% 16.4% 3.1
Illinois 151,347 18.0% 30.5% 28.1% 1.4% 7.0% -31.7% 7.9% -17.9% -27.9% 29.2% 11.1
Indiana 111,519 6.5% 20.2% 18.7% 2.1% 4.6% -12.4% 5.5% -17.2% -30.1% 11.6% 4.9
Iowa 43,490 -8.3% 9.8% 9.4% 1.7% 2.1% -2.8% 3.5% -13.5% -24.3% 9.9% 3.3
Kansas 33,579 11.7% 16.3% 16.5% 6.0% 8.4% -7.1% 3.7% -15.0% -30.0% 9.1% 4.1
Kentucky 44,489 -1.5% 16.3% 13.7% 1.1% 2.8% -7.8% 4.9% -14.4% -30.4% 10.3% 5.6
Louisiana 49,916 -10.3% 15.1% 13.9% 3.3% 4.4% -3.7% 5.4% -11.4% -28.8% 15.9% 5.6
Maine 14,042 27.6% 9.7% 9.8% 5.2% 6.1% -16.6% 7.0% -4.0% -4.8% 9.2% 8.6
Maryland 72,927 8.2% 21.5% 24.2% 4.1% 7.0% -27.2% 7.7% -7.4% -22.5% 22.6% 12.4
Massachusetts 89,741 12.0% 9.0% 13.1% 8.6% 8.1% -17.2% 5.1% -10.2% -23.1% 15.0% 5.8
Michigan 163,774 6.2% 36.7% 35.3% 7.6% 10.2% -36.1% 4.5% -27.4% -61.4% 32.0% 4.2
Minnesota 68,191 1.7% 17.2% 21.1% 6.0% 6.4% -23.0% 3.2% -25.8% -56.4% 17.5% 4.8
Mississippi 7,277 -12.8% 20.0% 12.6% -1.7% 5.3% -13.1% 6.5% -13.5% -32.5% 22.3% 24.2
Missouri 88,777 8.0% 25.1% 25.5% 3.1% 7.1% -19.3% 3.7% -19.9% -37.5% 15.3% 3.8
Montana 14,596 9.7% 14.2% 15.7% 6.2% 8.2% -12.5% 2.3% -22.1% -48.9% 5.6% 2.4
Nebraska 28,240 -8.1% 8.8% 9.9% 5.0% 4.6% -0.2% 2.4% -14.1% -35.0% 11.1% 2.2
Nevada 66,289 -11.5% 41.8% 55.1% 24.5% 22.6% -47.3% 10.0% -25.1% -56.8% 45.4% 7.8
New Hampshire 18,710 14.3% 23.9% 25.1% 5.4% 6.4% -19.1% 3.9% -15.6% -35.6% 21.3% 4.6
New Jersey 85,120 8.3% 14.9% 14.6% 3.4% 4.2% -26.4% 11.4% 0.1% -1.9% 19.0% 19.0
New Mexico 23,415 4.4% 17.5% 18.2% 1.8% 6.6% -20.5% 5.3% -11.8% -18.3% 13.3% 6.6
New york 151,096 -1.0% 6.4% 6.3% 8.2% 8.5% -8.0% 8.3% 0.7% -5.7% 7.7% 12.2
North Carolina 124,307 10.4% 16.0% 15.0% 5.2% 7.3% -7.9% 4.8% -17.2% -28.4% 12.2% 6.1
North Dakota 14,093 3.4% 3.8% 3.8% 8.9% 7.9% 0.0% 1.3% -18.7% -24.6% 5.9% 0.6
Ohio 155,717 7.8% 24.0% 26.4% 2.8% 6.3% -17.6% 6.1% -16.0% -28.7% 26.3% 6.5
Oklahoma 66,700 -0.7% 10.8% 10.4% 3.1% 3.2% -0.6% 4.9% -9.4% -11.7% 7.8% 3.2
Oregon 58,198 14.4% 21.7% 28.1% 15.5% 13.6% -19.8% 5.1% -13.5% -13.4% 14.8% 6.1
Pennsylvania 142,267 6.9% 13.1% 12.6% 2.8% 4.8% -11.7% 5.8% -2.8% -15.1% 10.3% 6.9
Rhode Island 12,161 3.7% 21.7% 24.3% 2.4% 3.8% -34.7% 7.1% -8.1% -13.5% 25.8% 8.9
South Carolina 68,449 10.3% 22.3% 22.4% 8.6% 8.5% -11.8% 5.5% -17.0% -25.9% 15.9% 5.9
South Dakota N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.7% 5.6% 0.0% 2.2% -11.9% -31.3% N/A N/A
Tennessee 112,260 8.1% 21.1% 20.5% 5.0% 7.3% -8.7% 5.0% -18.9% -41.2% 15.2% 3.9
Texas 436,354 6.3% 16.2% 16.4% 8.0% 9.8% -2.0% 3.6% -21.1% -28.6% 7.2% 2.8
Utah 50,053 1.5% 17.3% 26.0% 12.0% 12.9% -19.5% 3.9% -21.8% -40.6% 13.9% 3.8
Vermont N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.4% 7.6% -3.0% 4.0% -4.3% -9.0% N/A N/A
Virginia 95,036 -2.1% 21.0% 23.7% 7.0% 7.7% -18.0% 3.4% -15.8% -48.0% 17.0% 5.4
Washington 96,288 14.5% 20.0% 26.0% 13.2% 13.9% -19.6% 5.8% -14.5% -8.8% 14.7% 8.0
West Virginia N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.8% 9.0% -27.8% 3.4% -13.3% -34.5% N/A N/A
Wisconsin 77,880 9.6% 15.6% 15.9% 4.4% 5.8% -14.8% 3.6% -20.9% -41.4% 16.3% 4.2
Wyoming 7,636 20.5% 11.8% 13.7% 11.9% 12.1% 0.0% 1.9% -19.9% -53.8% 7.4% 2.1
NOTE: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions. †April Data ** Negative Equity Data through Q1 2013
9© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
Home Prices ► Home prices nationwide, including distressed sales, increased 12.1 percent in April 2013 compared to April 2012. This change represents the biggest increase since February 2006 and the 14th consecutive monthly increase in home prices nationally. Similarly, excluding distressed sales, home prices increased on a year-over-year basis by 11.9 percent in April 2013 compared to April 2012. Including distressed sales, 12 states showed double-digit home price appreciation in April 2013, with eight of the 12 states averaging higher year-over-year growth than the nation as a whole. The five states with the highest year-over-year growth are all located in the Western U.S.
► As of the end of the first quarter of 2013, there were 9.7 million properties in the U.S. (or 19.8 percent of all properties with a mortgage) in negative equity. There are 850,000 fewer properties in negative equity compared with the fourth quarter of 2012. Nevada continues to lead the nation in the highest share of properties in negative equity, but Nevada also leads the nation in largest improvements in negative equity. The negative equity share in Nevada is now 45.4 percent, which is 6.9 percentage points lower than the fourth quarter of 2012, 15.8 percentage points lower than the first quarter of 2012, and 27.3 percent points lower than the peak in negative equity in the first quarter of 2010.
yoy HPI GROWTH FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATES Min, Max, Current since Jan 1976
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
NV
CA
AZ HI
OR
GA ID
WA UT
WY
CO FL
DC
ND
MA SC
NY
TX MI
VT
VA
MT
KS
AK
MN
Current
2.58x3.65 5pt gothamPrices: yoy hpi growth for 25 lowest rate states apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
HPI By PRICE SEGMENT Indexed to Jan 2011
95
100
105
110
115
120
Jan
-11
Feb
-11
Mar
-11
Ap
r-11
May
-11
Jun
-11
Jul-
11A
ug-1
1S
ep-1
1O
ct-1
1N
ov-
11D
ec-1
1Ja
n-1
2F
eb-1
2M
ar-1
2A
pr-
12M
ay-1
2Ju
n-1
2Ju
l-12
Aug
-12
Sep
-12
Oct
-12
No
v-12
Dec
-12
Jan
-13
Feb
-13
Mar
-13
Ap
r-13
Price 0-75% of Median Price 75-100% of MedianPrice 100-125% of Median Price > 125% of Median
2.64x3.27 5pt gothamPrices: hpi by price segment apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
HOME PRICE INDExPct Change from year Ago Pct Change from Month Ago
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
All Transactions Excluding Distressed All Transactions - Right Axis
2.77x3.66 5pt gotham bookPrices: home price index apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
PRICE TO INCOME RATIO Indexed to Jan 1976
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
Jan
-76
Ap
r-77
Jul-
78
Oct
-79
Jan
-81
Ap
r-8
2
Jul-
83
Oct
-84
Jan
-86
Ap
r-8
7
Jul-
88
Oct
-89
Jan
-91
Ap
r-9
2
Jul-
93
Oct
-94
Jan
-96
Ap
r-9
7
Jul-
98
Oct
-99
Jan
-01
Ap
r-0
2
Jul-
03
Oct
-04
Jan
-06
Ap
r-0
7
Jul-
08
Oct
-09
Jan
-11
Ap
r-12
Price/Income Ratio
2.66x3.52Prices: price to income ratio apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic, BEA April 2013
DISTRESSED SALES DISCOUNT
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
REO Price Discount Short Sale Price Discount - Right Axis
2.72x3.56Prices: distressed sales discount apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
10© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
Mortgage Performance ► At the end of April 2013, there were fewer than 2.3 million mortgages, or 5.9 percent, in serious delinquency—SDQ, defined as 90 days past due or more, including those in foreclosure or the real estate owned (REO). This marks the first time since March 2009 that the SDQ rate fell below the 6 percent threshold. On a year-over-year basis, the number of mortgages in SDQ decreased by 19 percent. The number of homes in serious delinquency is down 36 percent from its peak in January 2010.
► The inventory of foreclosed homes continues to decline—there were 1.1 million homes in some stage of foreclosure as of April 2013. While a high level of homes is still at some stage of foreclosure, the stock of foreclosed homes decreased 24 percent year over year in April. In April, there were 52,000 completed foreclosures, representing a year-over-year decrease of 16 percent. The national annualized sum of completed foreclosures has declined for 17 consecutive months.
CONFORMING PRIME SERIOUS DELINQUENCy RATEBy Origination year
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
3 m
on
ths
6 m
ont
hs
9 m
ont
hs
12 m
ont
hs
15 m
ont
hs
18 m
on
ths
21 m
ont
hs
24 m
ont
hs
27 m
ont
hs
30 m
ont
hs
33 m
on
ths
36 m
ont
hs
39 m
ont
hs
42
mo
nths
45
mo
nths
48
mo
nths
51 m
ont
hs
54 m
ont
hs
57 m
ont
hs
60
mo
nths
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
2.97x3.45Performance: conforming prime serious del rate mar 2013
Source: CoreLogic March 2012
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
JUMBO PRIME SERIOUS DELINQUENCy RATEBy Origination year
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
3 m
on
ths
6 m
ont
hs
9 m
ont
hs
12 m
ont
hs
15 m
ont
hs
18 m
on
ths
21 m
ont
hs
24 m
ont
hs
27 m
ont
hs
30 m
ont
hs
33 m
on
ths
36 m
ont
hs
39 m
ont
hs
42
mo
nths
45
mo
nths
48
mo
nths
51 m
ont
hs
54 m
ont
hs
57 m
ont
hs
60
mo
nths
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
3.1x3.44Performance: jumbo prime serious del rate mar 2013
Source: CoreLogic March 2012
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
SERIOUS DELINQUENCIES FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATESMin, Max, Current since Jan 2000
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%F
L
NJ
NV
NY IL
MD CT RI
ME
DE
MS
OH
GA HI
PA
WA IN SC
AR
LA
DC
NM AL
MA
OR
Current
2.5x3.57Performance: serious del for 25 highest rate states apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
OVERALL MORTGAGE PERFORMANCE
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
0.9%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
90+ Days DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct - Right Axis
2.53x3.42Performance: overall mortgage performance apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
PRE-FORECLOSURE FILINGS AND COMPLETED FORECLOSURESIn Thousands (3mma) In Thousands
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
Completed Foreclosures Pre-Foreclosure Filings - Right Axis
2.69x3.45Performance: pre foreclosure filings and completed
foreclosures apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
11© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 6
Home Sales ► Total home sales increased by 3 percent year over year in April 2013, despite new home sales being down 14 percent from a year ago. Sales of previously owned homes grew at a healthy 12 percent year-over-year pace, illustrating strong momentum into the summer months.
► Nationwide, distressed sales accounted for 20 percent of all homes sales in April 2013. The share of distressed sales is the lowest since August 2008. REO sales (a component of distressed sales) experienced a 32 percent year-over-year decrease from April 2012. REO sales account for about half of all distressed sales in April 2013. Nationally, the short sales price discount was 26 percent while the REO price discount remained at 46 percent.
HOME SALES SHARE By PRICE TIERAs a Percentage of Total Sales
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Jan
-00
Jul-
00
Jan
-01
Jul-
01
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
0-100K 100K-200K 200K+
2.54x3.42Sales: home sales vol by price tier apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
NEW HOME SALES TRENDSIn Thousands In Thousands
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
Jan
-02
Jun
-02
No
v-0
2
Ap
r-0
3
Sep
-03
Feb
-04
Jul-
04
Dec
-04
May
-05
Oct
-05
Mar
-06
Aug
-06
Jan
-07
Jun
-07
No
v-0
7
Ap
r-0
8
Sep
-08
Feb
-09
Jul-
09
Dec
-09
May
-10
Oct
-10
Mar
-11
Aug
-11
Jan
-12
Jun
-12
No
v-12
Ap
r-13
Median Price Volume - Right Axis
2.75x3.51Sales: new home sales trends apr 2013
Feb
-12
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
DISTRESSED SALE SHARE FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATESMin, Max, Current
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%M
I IL DE
NH FL
MO
CA
MS
OH
TN CT
SC
GA AL
MD RI
VA
AZ
WA IN KY
NM
CO WI
OR
Current
2.39x3.48Sales: distressed sale share for 25 highest rate states apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
DISTRESSED SALES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
Short Sales Share REO Sales Share
2.62x3.64Sales: distressed sales as % of total sales apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
SALES By SALE TyPEAnnualized In Millions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
Existing Home New Home REO Short
2.65x3.51Sales: sales by sale type apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
corelogic.com
© 2013 CoreLogic, Inc. All rights reserved.
CoreLogic, the CoreLogic logo, HPI, CORELOGIC HPI and CASE-SHILLER INDExES are trademarks of CoreLogic, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. All other trademarks are the property of their respective holders.
17-MKTPLSEQTR-0613-00
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Variable DefinitionTotal Sales The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month.
Total Sales 12-month sum The total number of all home-sale transactions for the last 12 months.
Total Sales yoy Change 12-month sum
Percentage increase or decrease in current 12 months of total sales over the prior 12 months of total sales
New Home Sales The total number of newly constructed residential housing units sold during the month.
New Home Sales Median Price The median price for newly constructed residential housing units during the month.
Existing Home Sales The number of previously constucted homes that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. DOES NOT INCLUDE REO AND SHORT SALES.
REO Sales Number of bank owned properties that were sold to an unaffiliated third party.
REO Sales Share The number of REO Sales in a given month divided by total sales.
REO Price Discount The average price of a REO divided by the average price of an existing-home sale.
REO Pct The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.
Short Sales The number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan.
Short Sales Share The number of Short Sales in a given month divided by total sales.
Short Sale Price Discount The average price of a Short Sale divided by the average price of an existing-home sale.
Short Sale Pct The count of loans in Short Sale as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the month.
Distressed Sales Share The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (REO or short sale).
Distressed Sales Share (sales 12-month sum)
The sum of the REO Sales 12-month sum and the Short Sales 12-month sum divided by the total sales 12-month sum.
HPI MoM Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a month ago.
HPI yoy Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a year ago.
HPI MoM Excluding Distressed Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago.
HPI yoy Excluding Distressed Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago.
HPI Percent Change from Peak Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series from the respective peak value in the index.
90 Days + DQ Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO.
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies yoy Chg Percent change year-over-year of the number of 90+ day delinquencies in the current month.
Foreclosure Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period.
Percent Change Stock of Foreclosures from Peak
Percent increase or decrease in the number of foreclosures from the respective peak number of foreclosures.
Pre-foreclosure Filings The number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NOD).
Completed ForeclosuresA completed foreclosure occurs when a property is auctioned and results in either the purchase of the home at auction or the property is taken by the lender as part of their Real Estate Owned (REO) inventory.
Negative Equity ShareThe percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record.
Negative EquityThe number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the difference between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, the property is considered to be in a negative equity position. We estimate current UPB value, not origination value.
Months' Supply of Distressed Homes (total sales 12-month avg)
The months it would take to sell off all homes currently in distress of 90 days delinquency or greater based on the current sales pace.
Price/Income Ratio CoreLogic HPI divided by Nominal Personal Income provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and indexed to January 1976.
Conforming Prime Serious Delinquency Rate
The rate serious delinquency mortgages which are within the legislated purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The conforming limits are legislated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
Jumbo Prime Serious Delinquency Rate
The rate serious delinquency mortgages which are larger than the legislated purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The conforming limits are legislated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
Source: CoreLogicThe data provided is for use only by the primary recipient or the primary recipient's publication or broadcast. This data may not be re-sold, republished or licensed to any other source, including publications and sources owned by the primary recipient's parent company without prior written permission from CoreLogic. Any CoreLogic data used for publication or broadcast, in whole or in part, must be sourced as coming from CoreLogic, a data and analytics company. For use with broadcast or web content, the citation must directly accompany first reference of the data. If the data is illustrated with maps, charts, graphs or other visual elements, the CoreLogic logo must be included on screen or website. For questions, analysis or interpretation of the data, contact CoreLogic at [email protected]. Data provided may not be modified without the prior written permission of CoreLogic. Do not use the data in any unlawful manner. This data is compiled from public records, contributory databases and proprietary analytics, and its accuracy is dependent upon these sources.
FOR MORE INFORMATION PLEASE CALL 415-536-3500The MarketPulse is a newsletter published by CoreLogic, Inc. ("CoreLogic"). This information is made available for informational purposes only and is not intended to provide specific commercial, financial or investment advice. CoreLogic disclaims all express or implied representations, warranties and guaranties, including implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title, or non-infringement. Neither CoreLogic nor its licensors make any representations, warranties or guaranties as to the quality, reliability, suitability, truth, accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the information contained in this newsletter. CoreLogic shall not be held responsible for any errors, inaccuracies, omissions or losses resulting directly or indirectly from your reliance on the information contained in this newsletter.
This newsletter contains links to third-party websites that are not controlled by CoreLogic. CoreLogic is not responsible for the content of third-party websites. The use of a third-party website and its content is governed by the terms and conditions set forth on the third-party’s site and CoreLogic assumes no responsibility for your use of or activities on the site.
