THE MALAWI CIVIL SOCIETY AND COMMUNITIES … · NPO Non-Profit Organisation ... • Conflictof Interest (COI) e.g. how grant implementers (SRs) who are also CCM members manage COI

The Anglophone Africa Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report and Scorecard Initiative

THE MALAWI CIVIL SOCIETYAND COMMUNITIES

CCM SHADOW REPORT

Authors:

Ali Mwachande (MANERERA+)

Safari Mbewe (MANERERA+)

2

“Africa’s story has been written by others; we need to own our problems and solutions and write our story”.- President of Rwanda, Paul

Kagame, 2013.*

*Every one of the Country Reports were done using Participatory Action Research: the research was developed, conducted, analysed and written by in-country national civil

society activists.

The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report

3

Table of Contents

Abbreviations .....................................................................................................................................................................4

Problem Statement ...........................................................................................................................................................5

About the research ............................................................................................................................................................7

Expected Outcomes ...........................................................................................................................................................7

Methodology ......................................................................................................................................................................8

Analysis .............................................................................................................................................................................10

CCM Performance ............................................................................................................................................................10

EPA Tool & Process ..........................................................................................................................................................16

PIP Tool and Process .......................................................................................................................................................16

CCM Scorecard & Shadow Report Tool & Process .......................................................................................................16

Findings .............................................................................................................................................................................18

Finding 1: CSO CCM member election not transparent nor accountable ................................................................18

Finding 2: CCM struggles with some duties and requires regulatory support .........................................................18

Finding 3: CCM secretariat has weak communications with stakeholders...............................................................18

Recommendations ...........................................................................................................................................................19

Notes .................................................................................................................................................................................20

Contact Details .................................................................................................................................................................22

4

Abbreviations

AAI AIDS Accountability InternationalCCM Country Co-ordinating MechanismCoI/CI ConflictofInterestCG Community groupCSO Civil Society OrganisationCS Civil SocietyEANNASO EasternAfricaNationalNetworksofAIDSServiceOrganisationsEPA EligibilityPerformanceAssessmentFBO Faith-Based OrganisationFGD Focus Group DiscussionWSW WomenwhohaveSexwithWomenGF/GFATM GlobalFundforAIDS,TuberculosisandMalariaHIV HumanImmunodeficiencyVirusIDU Injecting drug usersINGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisationKAP KeyAffectedPopulationsKP Key PopulationsMDR TB Multi-Drug-ResistantTuberculosisMSM MenwhohavesexwithmenNFM NewfundingmodelNCM NationalCoordinatingMechanismNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationNPO Non-ProfitOrganisationOIG OfficeoftheInspector-GeneralPAM PeopleAffectedbyMalariaPATB PeopleAffectedbyTuberculosisPIP PerformanceImprovementPlanPLWD PeopleLivingwiththeDiseasesofHIV,TBandmalariaPLWHIV PeopleLivingwithHIVPR Primary RecipientRFA RequestforApplicationSR Subsidiary RecipientSSR Sub-Subsidiary RecipientSW SexWorkersTB Tuberculosis


5

EffectiveCountryCoordinatingMechanisms(CCMs)areavitalpartoftheGlobalFundarchitectureatcountrylevel.

CCMsareresponsible forsubmittingrequests for fundingandforprovidingoversiteduring implementation.With

theintroductionoftheGlobalFund’sNewFundingModel(NFM)inMarch2014,CCMsplayanevenmoreimportant

centralrole,convenestakeholderstoengagemeaningfullyininclusivecountrydialogue,agreeonfundingsplit,and

participateinthedevelopmentofNationalStrategicPlan(NSP)discussionsforthethreediseasesatcountrylevel.

Withtheenhancedresponsibility,theNFMalsointroducedmorerigorousCCMassessmentprocesses.Previously,

CCMssubmittedaself-assessmentattachedtotheirproposal.Now,CCMself-assessmentsarefacilitatedbyconducted

byanexternalconsultant–either the InternationalHIV/AIDSAllianceorGrantManagementSolutions forandon

behalfoftheCCMHub.Further,CCMsarealsomandatedtohaveaperformanceimprovementplantoaccompany

theirassessment,ensuringthatareasofweaknessareaddressedinanopenandtransparentmanner.

DespitetheimportanceofCCMsinGlobalFunddecision-makingatcountry level,studieshaveflaggedissueswith

CCMmembershipbalance,poorrepresentationandlimitedconstituencyfeedback.1,2Further,therecentauditreport

fromtheOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral(OIG)foundseveralpersistentshortcomingswithCCMperformance:

• 10%ofthe50countriesrevieweddidnothavetherequiredoversightcommittee;

• Morethanhalfofthecountriesdidnothavespecificinformationonroles,timelines,andbudgetsintheiroversight

plans,ortheyhadoversightplansthatwereoutdated;

• 62%oftheCCMswerenon-compliantwiththerequirementofseekingfeedbackfromnonCCMmembersand

frompeoplelivingwithand/oraffectedwiththedisease;

• Morethanhalfofthe45CCMsthathaveoversightbodiesdidnotadequatelydiscusschallengeswiththePRsto

identifyproblemsandexploresolutions;

• 58%oftheCCMshadnotsharedoversightreportswithcountrystakeholdersandtheGlobalFundSecretariatin

theprevioussixmonths;and

• 26%didnotsharetheoversightreportswithrelevantstakeholdersinatimelymannerthatcouldhaveensured

well-timedremedialaction.

InlightoftheOIGCCMAudit,andtheenhancedroleofCCMsincountryleveldiseasegovernanceintheFunding

Model,thereisaneedforawiderangeofstakeholderstobeempoweredtodemandimprovedCCMperformance.

WhilethemovetohaveanexternalconsultanttofacilitatetheCCMEligibility&PerformanceAssessments(EPA)and

thedevelopmentofPerformanceImprovementPlans(PIPs)toguidethesubsequentstrengtheningoftheCCMisan

improvement,thefactthattheseEPAsandPIPsarenotpublicisanobstacletoaccountability.

Problem Statement

1 Oberth,G. (2012).Who isReallyAffecting theGlobalFundDecisionMakingProcess?:ACommunityConsultationReport.AIDSAccountabilityInternational.CapeTown,SouthAfrica.Onlineathttp://aidsaccountability.org/?page_id=80942 Tucker,P.(2012).WhoisreallyaffectingtheGlobalFunddecisionmakingprocesses?AQuantitativeAnalysisofCountryCoordinatingMechanisms(CCMs).AIDSAccountabilityInternational.CapeTown,SouthAfrica.Onlineathttp://aidsaccountability.org/?page_id=8094

6

VestedstakeholdersandcommunitiesmustbeabletouseCCMassessmentsandimprovementplansasaccountability

mechanismstodemandbetterperformance.

AddedtothisisthatfactthatcurrentlyCCMAssessment&PerformanceImprovementPlanslackquestionsthatspeak

toqualityofperformancesuchasmeaningfulengagement,useofdocumentationandinformation,etc.

CivilsocietyneedstobefurtherengagedwiththeCCMAssessment&PerformanceImprovementPlansinorderto

holdstakeholdersaccountable.Similarly, thesesamecivilsocietywatchdogsandaffectedcommunitiesmusthave

thetools,knowledgeandinformationtheyneedtobeabletomeasuretheperformanceoftheCCMmembersthat

representthemandtoholdCCMsaccountable.

Problem Statement


7

About the research

Long term goalMoreaccountableCCMs.

Medium term objectiveIncreased transparency around

CCMperformanceandimprovementplans.

Theprojectcomprisesoftwotypesofresearch:

The Country CCM Shadow Reports

ThesereportsdrilldownintoissuesatcountrylevelandassessCCMperformancefromtheperspectivesofbothCCM

membersaswellastheperspectiveofotherstakeholderssuchasprincipalrecipientsandsubrecipients.Thereport

isbasedontheGFATMCCMAuditProgressAssessmentToolbutalsoincludevariousotherquestionsthatareseen

tobelackingintheexistingauditsbyGeneva.Thereasonwhytheresearchisconsideredashadowreportingexercise

isthatmethodologicallyandintermsofcontentwearehopingtobuildandimproveonthemethodsbeingusedby

Genevaatthistime.Shadowreportsareusedtosupplementand/orprovidealternativeinformationtothatwhich

wassubmittedintheoriginalreports. Inthiswork,ouraimisthesame:tosupplementand/orprovidealternative

informationtothatfoundintheoriginalCCMaudits.

TheCivilSocietyCCMScorecardandCountryCCMShadowReportswillnotduplicate theGlobalFundsupported

EligibilityandPerformanceAssessments(EPAs).ThisisbecausewhilstEPAsareconsultantfacilitatedself-assessments

ofCCMsthatarelargelydrivenbytheGlobalFundtofacilitateaccountabilityusingatopdownapproach;theCivil

SocietyCCMScorecardandCountryCCMShadowReportswillbeundertakenbycivilsocietyincountry,usingabottom

upapproach.Inaddition,theCivilSocietyCCMScorecardandCountryCCMShadowReportssoughttointerviewboth

CCMmembersaswellas implementingpartners (principal recipients (PRs)andsub-recipients (SRs))who interact

withCCMs.TheresearchfortheCivilSocietyScorecardandtheCountryCCMShadowReportswasfacilitatedbycivil

societyresidentincountrysotheexercisecouldbothempowercivilsocietyandsustainthecultureofdemanding

accountabilityfromCCMsincountryandbereplicatedacrossothergrantimplementers.

The Civil Society CCM Scorecard

Acomparativeanalysisthatrankstheparticipatingcountriesagainsteachotherintermsoftheirperformance.Using

theAAIScorecardmethodology,datafromtheCountryCCMShadowReportsisanalyzedandcountriesaregraded

ontheirperformance,asameanstouncoverbestandworstpractice,whoisahead,whoisfallingbehind,andother

similaritiesanddifferencesthatmightmakeforgoodentrypointsforadvocacy.

Focus Countries

Ninecountriesparticipatedintheresearch:Ghana,Kenya,Malawi,Nigeria,Rwanda,Swaziland,Tanzania,Ugandaand

Zambia.

Expected Outcomes

Short term aimEmpoweredcivilsocietyand

communitygroupswhocandoeffectiveshadowreporting.

8

Thetechnicalteam(AAIandEANNASO)developedaquestionnairebasedontheGlobalFundEligibilityandPerformance

Assessments(EPAs)questionnaire(calledtheProgressAssessmentTool).AAIalmostexclusivelyusesParticipatory

Actionresearch(PAR) forfieldresearch,abestpractice inwhichcommunityandcountrycivilsocietypartnersco-

developedthemethodology,researchtools,conductedtheresearchandwrotethefinalreportsandanalysis.

Localcivilsociety,whodonotsitontheCCManddonotreceiveGlobalFundmoney,wereidentifiedtodoconduct

theresearchatcountrylevel,includingdatacollectionandanalysis.Weselected3localwatchdogsineachofthe9

countriesforatotalof27localwatchdogstobetrained,mentoredandsupportedtodotheresearch.Thetraining

alsoequippedcivilsocietywithskillstoenablethemtoengagewiththeCCMSecretariattoplanandschedulethe

interviewsandFGDs.Civilsocietyconductedinterviewstocollectdatausingamixofquestionnaireinterviewsand

focusedgroupdiscussions(FGD).ComprehensivequestionnaireswithopenendedquestionsandFGDguideswere

providedtocivilsociety;theseallowedforprobinganddiscussionswhilstcollectingdata.

First,thecoregroupofrespondentsfromtheCCMfortheinterviewandfocusgroupdiscussionsweredrawnfroma

crosssectionofCCMmembersrepresentingtherespectivegovernments,faithbased,civilsociety,privatesector,key

populations,peopleaffectedbythediseases,thebilateralandmulti-lateralpartnersandtheCCMsecretariat.Civil

societyconductingtheresearchwereexpectedtoundertakeaminimumofeightfacetofaceinterviewsandconduct

onefocusgroupdiscussionofnotlessthansixCCMmembers.

These interviewsandaFGDcollectively includedallofthefollowingsectors:government, faithbased,civilsociety,

privatesector,keypopulations,peopleaffectedbythediseases,thebilateralandmulti-lateralpartnersandtheCCM

secretariat.

Secondly,civilsocietyalsoconductedaFGDof10-12nonCCMmembersmainlydrawnfromimplementinggovernment

andcivilsocietyPRsandSRs.ThesecondFGDenabledtheresearchtogettheperspectivesofnonCCMmembers

whohaveinteractedwiththeCCM.Keyareasofdiscussionincluded:

• HowtheyhavebenefittedfromtheoversightfunctionoftheCCM;

• How,whenandtheoutcomesoftheoversightfieldvisit;

• IftheoversightreportsandoutcomesareformallysharedandpublishedthroughtheCCMwebsite

• WhetherwomenandKPsareadequatelyrepresentedontheCCM;

• Ifcivilsocietymemberswereelected/selectedinanopenandtransparentmanner;

• AnunderstandingofthelevelofmeaningfulparticipationofKPsinCCMleadership;

• AnunderstandingofthelevelofmeaningfulparticipationofKPsinformalandadhoccommittees;

• ThemethodsofsolicitingKPinputandthenthisfeedbacktothelargerconstituency;

• Conflictof Interest (COI)e.g.howgrant implementers (SRs)whoarealsoCCMmembersmanageCOI inCCM

meetingsetc.

Methodology


9

Oneaimwastobuildthecapacityofthelocalcivilsocietywatchdogstoengagewithavarietyofdifferentresearch

techniquesanddatagatheringmodalities,sothefollowingwillcontributetothisobjective:

• CivilsocietyreceivedtrainingonFGDsattheworkshop;

• Civilsocietycompletedhardcopiesofthequestionnairesatcountrylevelandthenalsocapturedthedataonline

intoasurveymonkey.

• Civilsocietydevelopedtheirown2-3pageanalysisofeachofthe2FGDs,talkingaboutkeyfindings(estimate5-8

findings)andrecommendingstrategicentrypointsforadvocacy(estimate3-5)

• In addition to this, civil societywrote their own 5-8 page analysis of all of the data as they understood and

interpreteditandsubmittedthistothetechnicalteam.Thisanalysisformedthebasisofalloftheresearchthey

conducted,andinformedthetechnicalteam’sanalysisofthedata.

Sub-grantsweremadetoeachofthelocalwatchdogstosupporttheirimplementationoftheshadowreporting.The

contentfromthecountrydatacollectors,onceenteredintothesurveymonkeytool,wasanalysedbyAAI,presented

toEANNASOandcountryteamsatameetinginKigali,RwandainFebruary2017,andfeedbackfromthismeetingand

fromemailcorrespondencefromcountryteamswasincludedtodevelopthefinalreports.

10

CCM PerformanceAllCCMsarerequiredtomeetthefollowingsixrequirementstobeeligibleforGlobalFundfinancing:

1. Atransparentandinclusiveconceptnotedevelopmentprocess;

2. AnopenandtransparentPrincipalRecipientselectionprocess;

3. Oversightplanningandimplementation;

4. MembershipofaffectedcommunitiesontheCCM;

5. Processesfornon-governmentCCMmemberselection;and

6. ManagementofconflictofinterestonCCMs.

Belowisahighlightoftheresearchfindingsaspertheaboveeligibilityrequirements:

1. Transparent and inclusive concept note development.

Basedonthetoolsthatweusedduringthescorecardprocesstherewerenoquestionsthatdirectly linkedtothe

issuesofthedevelopmentoftheconceptnoteprocessandthePrincipalRecipientselectionprocessin-country.So

allmembersnevertouchedonthoseissuesalthoughmembers,moreespeciallytheNon-CCMmembers,wantedthis

issuebetalkedaboutaswell,butwewererestrictedfromgoingoverboard.

Fromthefindings,allmembersfromaffectedcommunitiesarewellrepresentedontheCCMandtheyattendthe

CCMmeetingsallthetime,whilesomearealsoindifferentcommitteesliketheOversightCommittee,butthereare

nopropermechanismstoremovenon-performingCCMmembersfromtheCCMapartfromwaitinguntiltheendof

theirterm.

GenderhasbeenmainstreamedintheCCMgovernancedocumentssuchastheconstitution,by-laws,andoversight

guidelinesandtherepresentation isgenderbalanced. Itwasfoundthatthishashelpedtomainstreamgender in

conceptnotesandotherprogrammingplanningatCCMlevel.AslongastheCCMrepresentationisgenderbalanced,

thereisnoneedtoconsiderhavingagenderexpertontheCCM.

TheperformanceofGFATMwasratedtobegood,butmostCCMmemberswerenotawareoftheexistenceandthe

functionsoftheCCMHub.However,concernswereraisedintermsofarrangingmissionsonveryshortnotice,that

thetimesofmeetingsareconstrainedandnotallrelevantissuesarediscussed,andalsodelayregardingtheprovision

offeedbackonissuesthathavebeenreferredtotheGFATM.

TheGFATMshouldcommunicatetheirmissionsingoodtime,haveadequatetimefordiscussionstoensureallthe

relevantissuesarediscussed,andalsoimproveonprovidingfeedbackonissuesthathavebeenreferredtothem.

Analysis


11

2. An Open and Transparent PR Selection process

FromtheFDGsandfacetoface interviews,CSOsmembersrecommendedthattheselectionofthePRshouldbe

transparentbyadvertisingthePRselectioninnewspapersandontheradio,andthisshouldincludeaclearselection

criteria.TheFindingsarethatcurrentlythesearenotsufficientlydone.

TheCCMallowsobserverstoattendtheCCMmeetingsbutnotspeak.Itwashoweverfoundthatmostlytheobservers

arefromthegovernmentsideanddevelopmentpartnersbutnotnecessarilyfromcivilsociety.Civilsocietyactors

shouldbeencouragedtoparticipateinCCMmeetingsasobservers.

ThereisgoodandpropercommunicationinsidetheCCM.However,itwasnotedthatcommunicationfromtheCCM

secretariattothemembersinmosttimesisdelayed.

The communication between the CCM and other stakeholders is almost non-existent as evidenced by a lack of

informationformoststakeholdersontheCCM’soperations.CommunicationfromtheCCMSecretariattomembersis

oftendelayed–andthereisnocommunicationbetweentheCCMSecretariatandthestakeholders.

“Let’s advertise the selection of PR in newspapers.”

ThereisaneedforwrittencommunicationfromCCMSecretariattoitsmembersandthisshouldbetimely.TheCCM

Secretariatshouldimproveitscommunicationwithstakeholdersthroughradioannouncements;newspaperadverts

sothatthestakeholdersandthepublicshouldbeawareoftheCCM’soperations.

3. Oversight Planning and Implementation

18%

25%

9%

13%

64%

40%

50%

13%

27%

14%

17%

38%

88%

36%

60%

50%

38%

27%

71%

67%

50%

9%

14%

17%

13%

25%

9%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

QuesGon:Oversight:Howwouldyouratetheperformanceoftheoversightbody?

Totallyunacceptablequality Unacceptablequality Acceptablequality Goodquality Perfectquality Idon'tknow

Question: Oversight: How would you rate the performance of the oversight body?

100%

90%

90%

86%

100%

73%

100%

100%

88%

0%

10%

10%

14%

27%

13%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

1.AFendmeeGngs?

Yes No Idon'tknow

88%

100%

70%

75%

50%

45%

67%

100%

50%

13%

30%

13%

38%

55%

33%

50%

13%

13%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

2.Speak&beheard?

Yes No Idon'tknow

TheCCMisfulfillingitsoversightroleandisinclusiveasmembersofthecivilsocietyarealsopartoftheOversight

Committee.TheOversightCommitteehasitsownmeetingswhereitreceivesreportsfromPRsandprovidesitsreport

attheCCMmeetinganditalsoconductssitevisitsinordertogetfirst-handinformation.

Generally, the CCM allows observers to attend the CCM meetings but not speak. Considering that civil society

organisationsaresupposedtobekeymembersoftheOversightCommittee,themembershipisverycompromised

duetothefactthattherewasnotransparencyintermsofhowsomecivilsocietyrepresentativesfoundtheirway

ontotheCCM.Thiswasalsopartlybecausesomecivilsocietyconstituenciesarenotproperlyorganisedanditwas

verydifficulttohaveatransparentwayofidentifyingsomeoftherepresentatives,assuchtheperformanceofthe

oversightbodywasfoundtobeofacceptablequality.AmongalltheCSOsintheCCM,it’sonlythePLHIVconstituency

thathasaclearprocessforselectionofthememberthathastogoandrepresentthem,butfortherest,theselection

processisnotclearuptonow:howwastheselectiondone,andhowdidtheybecomemembers;somedidnotknow

theproceduresofselection.

Allthecivilsocietyconstituenciesshouldbeproperlyorganisedandconstituted.Thereshouldbeaverytransparent

andaccountablewayofidentifyingcivilsocietyrepresentativesappointedtotheCCM.TheCCMSecretariatshould

ensurethereisproperdocumentationintermsofhowcivilsocietyrepresentativeswereidentified,includingfollowing

upwithindividualconstituenciesinordertoverifytheprocess.

“Certain assignments are done independently though other remain questionable.”

“We should look at the expenditures, but (key affected populations (KAP) and people living with the

diseases (PLWD)) both are represented in the (oversight) Committee (,) to make sure that their

sector are benefiting from the intervention.”

Analysis

ATTENDANCE DOES NOT EQUAL BEING12

TheGhanaCivilSocietyandCommunitiesCCMShadowReport

88%

100%

60%

67%

50%

27%

86%

100%

88%

13%

40%

17%

38%

73%

14%

13%

17%

13%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

3.ParFcipatemeaningfully?

Yes No Idon'tknow

63%

100

50%

57%

50%

18%

50%

92%

25%

13%

40%

14%

38%

73%

50%

75%

25%

10%

29%

13%

9%

8%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

4.Influencedecisions?

Yes No Idon'tknow

4. Membership of affected communities in the CCM

CommonlyKAPsandPLWDsareable toattendCCMmeetingsbutdonotparticipatemeaningfully,donotspeak

andbeheard,andthereforearenotabletoinfluencedecisions.Thereisamajorconcernregardingthecivilsociety

constituenciesintermsofthembeingproperlyconstituted,transparencyandaccountabilitywiththeselectionofthe

CSOrepresentatives,andthisthereforecompromisestheirabilitytospeakandbeheardandinfluencedecisions.

Thecivilsocietyconstituenciesshouldbeproperlyconstitutedanddefined,andtheselectionoftheirrepresentatives

shouldbetransparentandaccountableinordertoselecttherepresentativeswiththeabilityandcapacitytospeak

andbeheardandinfluencedecisions.

“Most of the time CCM is dominated by donor community and Government and ill represented of CSOs.”

“The composition is there and quality of member should be improved.”

“Some constituencies of the KPs such as MSM have been missing in CCM undertakings.”

“Some constituencies of PLWD are themselves not very organized such as the TB constituency

and the Malaria constituency but this is being worked out.”

5. Process for non-government CCM member selection

Saveforonlyoneconstituencyofcivilsociety,PLWHIV,thereisliterallynoconstituencyconsultationbythecivilsociety

representatives.Thereisnopropermechanismandsupporttoenablecivilsocietyrepresentativestoconsulttheir

constituencies.Thiswasalsoattributedtothefactthatinsomecasestheconstituenciesarenotproperlydefined.

Evenwhereconstituenciesareproperlydefined,meetingsdon’ttakeplacetoagreeonrepresentativestotheCCM,or

feedbacktothemembership:thisisattributedtoalackoffundsforthemeetings,ortoalackofscheduledmeetings

todeterminesuchissues.

ABLE TO INFLUENCE DECISION MAKING 13

14

TheCCMSecretariatshouldprovideresourcesandsupportforconstituencyconsultations.TheCCMSecretariatshould

developaclearpolicyonconstituencyconsultation.Constituenciesshouldimproviseaccountabilitymechanismsto

agreeonmembershipandfeedback.

“In some constituencies such as PLHIV the process was transparent while in some constituencies

such as TB, KPs, NGO the selection was not transparent.”

OwingtotheconstrainedcapacityoftheCCMsecretariat,somenewCSOrepresentativeshavenotbeenorientedto

theCCM.TheothermajorkeyfindingwasthatsomeAlternateDelegatesfromtheCSOrepresentativeshavenotyet

beencontactedbytheCCMsecretariatandthereforearenotawareoftheirselectiontobeAlternateDelegatestothe

CCM.ThecapacityoftheCCMSecretariatshouldbestrengthenedintermsofhumanresources.

AlltheCSOrepresentativestotheCCMshouldbeproperlyorientedontheirrole.AlltheCSOAlternateDelegatesto

theCCMshouldbecontactedandbeinformedabouttheirselectiontotheCCMasAlternateDelegates.

6. Management on Conflict of Interests on CCMs

Theconflictofinterestpolicyisavailableandbeforethestartofeachmeeting,membersarerequiredtodeclaretheir

conflictofinterestonanyitemoftheagenda.Thereisaclearmechanismofmanagingtheconflictofinterestthatall

membersareadheringtomaketheprocesstransparentandaccountable.

Analysis

18%

13%

43%

18%

14,29

38%

36%

100%

14%

14%

9%

17%

50%

50%

27%

86%

43%

55%

57%

50%

38%

36%

14%

33%

13%

14%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

CSOQuality:WhatisthequalityofcivilsocietysectorrepresentaSon?

Totallyunacceptablequality Unacceptablequality Acceptablequality Goodquality Perfectquality Idon'tknow


15

10%

70%

20%

13%

64%

27%

13%

20%

20%

63%

9%

20%

60%

60%

27%

40%

45%

75%

25%

20%

13%

10%

10%

25%

18%

75%

40%

9%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

QuesGon:ArethereanyconflictsofinterestintheCCM?

AlltheGme VeryoRen SomeGmes/Occasionally Seldom Never Idon'tknow

16

Fromtheface-to-faceandfocusgroupdiscussionforCCMsmembersitshowedclearlythatallmembersigntheCOI

beforeanymeetingsstartandsomemembershavebeenforceto leavethemembershiptoCCMbecauseof the

COI.DeclaringconflictsofinterestwasfoundtobeastandingagendaitemforalltheCCMmeetings.Thepracticeof

declaringaconflictofinterestbeforethestartofanyCCMmeetingshouldbecontinuedandencouraged.

EPA Tool & ProcessThegeneral feelingwas that theassessmentsofCCMsdonotmeasure thequalityof theCCM’sworkbut rather

whethersomethingisdone,andnothowwellitisdone.Itwasfoundthatthequalityofhowwellsomethingwasdone

wasnotverymuchemphasised.Theassessmentsshouldfocusonqualityissuesandnotjustwhethersomethingis

done.AftertheEPA,feedbackshouldbegiventotheCCMmembersandNon-CCMmembers.

PIP Tool and ProcessThe Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) addresses the CCMperformance gap. It was found that while the PIP

addressestheCCMperformancegaps,notmuchintermsofimplementationisdonetoensuretheidentifiedgaps

areactuallyaddressed.AllthegapsidentifiedduringthePIPshouldbeaddressedasamatterofurgencyassome

gapskeeponrecurringinseveralPIPs.

CCM Scorecard & Shadow Report Tool & Process

Strengths

ThemeetingwithbothCCMandNon-CCMmembersweregood.

HoldingtheFDGsandface-to-faceinterviewsenrichedtheprocess,becauseduringtheFDGs,membersmightcome

withgoodpointsthattheyforgotduringface-to-faceinterviews.

Weaknesses

Toomanyquestionswereoverlapping,sothereisaneedtostreamlinethequestions.Thereporttemplatedidnot

tallywiththeformatofthequestionnaire.Therewerealotofadditionalrequirementswhichwewerenotinformedof

duringthetraininge.g:thevalidationofthereportwiththeCCM’sSurveyMonkeywasnotproperlyexplained.

TheCCMdoesnotinformNon-CCMmembersofwhenandwheremeetingswilltakeplace.Moststakeholdersandthe

generalpublicarenotawareofwhenandwhereCCMmeetingswillbetakingplace.

TheCCMSecretariatshouldpublicisetheentitysothatthegeneralpublicisawareofitsexistenceandfunctions.The

CCMSecretariatshouldmakethepublicawareofitsmeetingsthroughradioannouncementsandnewspaperadverts.

Analysis


17

43%

63%

90%

100%

100%

90%

50%

83%

100%

57%

38%

10%

10%

50%

17%

13%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

CantheexisHngEPAbeimprovedon?

Yes No

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Ghana

Kenya

Malawi

Nigeria

Rwanda

Swaziland

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

DoesyourcountryPerformanceImprovementPlan(PIP)addresstheCCM'sperformancegaps?

Yes No Idon'tknow

OverallthereisgoodandpropercommunicationinsidetheCCM.Howeveritwasnotedthatcommunicationfromthe

CCMsecretariattothemembersinmostcasesisdelayed.ThecommunicationbetweentheCCMandotherstakeholders

is almost non- existent as evidencedby the lack of information formost stakeholders on theCCM’s operations.

CommunicationfromtheCCMSecretariat tomembers isoftendelayed.There isnocommunicationbetweenthe

CCMSecretariatandthestakeholders.WrittencommunicationfromtheCCMSecretariattoitsmembersshouldbe

timely.TheCCMSecretariatshouldimproveitscommunicationwithstakeholdersthroughradioannouncementsand

newspaperadvertssothatthestakeholdersandthegeneralpublicshouldbeawareoftheCCM’soperations.

18

Findings

Finding 1: CSO CCM member election not transparent nor accountableCivilsocietyorganisationsarenotproperlyconstituted,andlacktransparencyandaccountabilityintheirprocessesof

selectingrepresentativestotheCCM.Thiscompromisestheirabilitytospeakandbeheardandinfluencedecisions.

SomeCSOconstituenciesarenotproperlydefinedandconstituted.SomenewCSOrepresentativeshavenotbeen

orientedtotheCCM,whilesomeAlternateDelegateshavenotevenbeeninformedoftheirselection.

Finding 2: CCM struggles with some duties and requires regulatory supportWhileCCMLeadershipworkshardandabidesbyCOI,PIPandEPAprocesses,itwasfoundthattherearenoclear

guidelinesandmechanismsthatcanbeusedtoremovenon-performingCCMmembers.CCMleadership isoften

rushedandtime-constrainedbecauseofotherduties,andthereisalackofqualitycontrolregardingCCMoperations,

andaconsistentfailuretoaddressgapsidentifiedbythePIP.

Finding 3: CCM secretariat has weak communications with stakeholdersTheCCMSecretariatisslowtocommunicatewithCCMmembers,andhaszerocommunicationswithotherstakeholders

andconstituencies.ThisrendersitinvisibletomanyKAPsandCSOs.

Generally,thequalityofcivilsocietysectorrepresentationispoorduetolackofproperlydefinedCSOconstituencies

aswellastoalackoftransparencyandaccountabilityinselectingtheCSOrepresentatives.Civilsocietyconstituencies

should be properly defined and constituted, the selection of CSO representatives at the CCM should be very

transparentandaccountable,newCCMmembersshouldbeproperlyoriented,CSOrepresentativesattheCCMshould

besupportedwithresourcestoenableconstituencyconsultation,meetingsoftheCCMshouldbewellpublicisedand

thecapacityofboththeCCMSecretariatandCSOrepresentativesshouldbestrengthened.

MembersoftheCCMweresatisfiedwiththeperformanceoftheCCMLeadership.Butwhiletheperformanceofthe

CCMLeadershipwasfoundtobesatisfactory,sometimesCCMbusinessisrushedowingtothefactthattheCCM

Leadership isoftenextremelybusywith theirotherduties.CCMbusinessshouldbegivenadequate timeso that

deliberationsarenotrushedthrough.


19

Recommendations

TheCCMSecretariatshouldpublicisetheentitysothatthegeneralpublicisawareofitsexistence,itsmeetingsand

operationsthroughradioannouncementsandnewspaperadverts,andcivilsocietyactorsshouldbeencouragedto

participateinCCMmeetingsasobservers.

Thecivilsocietyconstituenciesshouldbeproperlyconstitutedanddefined,theselectionofitsrepresentativesshould

betransparentandaccountableinordertoselecttherepresentativeswiththeabilityandcapacitytospeakandbe

heardandinfluencedecisions.

ThecapacityoftheCCMSecretariatshouldbestrengthenedintermsofhumanresources:alltheCSOrepresentatives

to theCCM shouldbeproperly orientedon their roles; and theCSOAlternateDelegates to theCCM shouldbe

informedabouttheirselectiontotheCCM.

Properguidelinesandmechanismsshouldbedevelopedtofacilitatetheremovalonnon-performingCCMmembers

evenbeforetheendoftheirterm

CCMbusinessshouldbegivenadequatetimesothatdeliberationsarenotrushedthrough.

TheGFATMshouldcommunicatetheirmissionsingoodtime,haveadequatetimefordiscussionstoensureallthe

relevantissuesarediscussedandalsoimproveonprovidingfeedbackonissuesthathavebeenreferredtothem.

EPAandPIPassessmentsshouldfocusonquality issuesandnotjustonwhetherornotsomethingisdone–and

gapsidentifiedmustbeaddressedandnotjustallowedtorolloveruntilthenextassessment.AftertheEPAandPIP,

feedbackshouldbegiventotheCCMmembersandNon-CCMmembers.

20

Notes


21

22

Contact Details

Ali Mwachande (MANERERA+): [email protected]

Safari Mbewe (MANERERA+):[email protected]

Olive Mumba (EANNASO):[email protected]

Phillipa Tucker(AIDSAccountabilityInternational):[email protected]


23

Documents

THE MALAWI CIVIL SOCIETY AND COMMUNITIES … · NPO Non-Profit Organisation ... • Conflictof Interest (COI) e.g. how grant implementers (SRs) who are also CCM members manage COI