The Installation Safety Case -Identifies and assesses hazards, defines how risks are managed, and documents and demonstrates the basis of safety

Major accidents are:

• deathorseriouspersonalinjuryduetofire,explosionordangeroussubstancerelease

• majordamagetostructureorplant,orlossofstabilityoftheinstallationincludingwell‘blowout’,lossofcontainmentorwellcontrol

• helicopter/shipcollisionwiththeinstallation

• failureofdivingoperations’lifesupportsystems,detachmentofadivingbellortrappingofadiver

• anyothereventinvolvingdeathorseriouspersonalinjuryto5ormorepeople

StudiesarecarriedouttofullyunderstandwhatcangowrongandhowwecandesignandoperatetopreventandmitigatetheeffectsofMAHs

Safetyassessmentsestablishpotentialextentofhazardsandassesswaysofmanagingtherisk.Theseinclude:

• detailedriskassessment• fireandexplosion riskanalysis• droppedobject

assessment• shipcollision• evacuationescapeand

rescueanalysis

OperatorsmustdemonstratetotheHealthandSafetyExecutive(HSE)thattheirinstallationmeetsacceptablelevelsofsafety.Todothis,eachinstallationmustsubmita‘safetycase’totheHSEwhichmustthenbeacceptedbytheHSE.Thesafetycasedescribes:• theinstallation• majoraccidenthazards

andrisks• howtheserisksare

managed

Becauseeachinstallationisdifferentandtechnologiesadvance,eachinstallationhasitsownsafetycasewhichisregularlyupdated.

SafetycriticalelementsaretheessentialplantandequipmentwhichperformfunctionstopreventorlimittheeffectsofaMAH.ThefailureofSCEscouldcauseorcontributetoamajoraccident.

TheroleofSCEsisto:• prevent• detect• control• mitigate• rescue• recover

ExamplesofSCEsare:• hydrocarbon

containment• ignitionprevention• firedetection• firefighting• temporaryrefuge• lifeboats• installationstructure

EachSCEmustattainaperformancestandard(PS)whichoutlinesminimumlevelsof:• functionalperformance

(whattheSCEmustdo)• availabilityofSCE• reliableoperation• howtheSCEsurvives

intheeventofafireorexplosion

AssuranceisthecheckingofSCEsbythoseworkersontheinstallationassignedtomaintainingortestingthoseSCEs.Thischecking,knownaspreventativemaintenanceroutines(PMR)istoassureusthatthesafetysystemsarefunctional.ThesePMRsincludecheckssuchas:• closureandleakoff

testingofemergencyshutdownvalves

• checksongasheads• temporaryrefugeintegrity• delugetesting• inspectionofpassivefire

protection(PFP)• inspectionofstructures

Written Scheme of Examination (WSE) -Sets requirements for plant & equipment performance and Assures and Verifies they achieve this

STEP 1Major Accident Hazards (MAH) are identified

STEP 2Safety Assessmentsare made

STEP 3The Safety Case document is created

List of Safety Critical Elements (SCEs)

STEP 4Performance Standards (PS)

STEP 5Assurance Scheme

STEP 6

3

Verification Scheme and Independent Competent Person (ICP)

STEP 7

33

Verificationisaback-uptotheassurancescheme.Itrequiresanindependentcompetentperson(ICP)[alsoknownastheindependentverificationbody(IVB)]tocheckthattheSCEsarepresentandfunctional.TheICPchecksthattheSCEsarefunctioningaccordingtothePSrequirements.IfthePShasnotbeenmet,remedialactionsrecommended(RAR)aremadetothedutyholder.Thedutyholdermusttakeactiontorepair/replacetheSCEwherenecessary.

VerificationbyICPmayinvolve:• witnesstesting• inspection• auditingandreviewingrecords• interviewingoffshore

personnel

What do you need to know?The Major Accident Hazard

Management Process

coverback

Introduction

Thisleafletisaimedatalloffshoreworkerstohelp them understand what major accidentshazards (MAH) are, and recognise whatactivitiesaredoneonadailybasisbyyourselvesandcolleaguestohelppreventthesehazardsbecoming actual accidents onboard yourinstallation.

It is recognised that the offshore oil industryisahazardousone,andthishasbeenshownbydisastersinthepast.However,afterreadingthisleaflet,youshouldunderstandthatlessonshave been learned from such incidents, andthatcertainsystemsareinplacetohelppreventthemfromhappeningagain.

The prime trigger for the introduction ofmajor accident hazard management controlswas the Piper Alpha accident in July 1988.This may seem historical and irrelevant intoday’s industry, because it happened duringadifferentgenerationofoffshoreworkers,butits legacy lives on. Piper Alpha is as relevanttoday as it was in 1988 when 167 men losttheirlives.LordCullenledtheinquiryintothedisaster and his report recommended thatoperators must put in place certain controlsto stop such an event from ever happeningagain. Two of the recommendations are‘majoraccidenthazardmanagement’,andtheintroduction of the ‘safety case’ regime andthesearecentralfeaturesofthisleaflet.

This leaflet should give you all the information you need to answer the following questions:

1. Doyouknowwhatasafetycaseis,andwhatiscontainedwithinit?

2. Doyouknowwheretogetacopyofthesafetycaseatyourplaceofwork?

3. DoyouknowwhataMAHisandcouldyougiveanexample?

4. CanyounamethreeSCEs?5. WhydoyoucarryoutPMRs(preventative

maintenanceroutines)offshore?6. Howdoweensureallsafetycritical

elementsoffshorearereadyforuseiftheyarerequired?

7. DoyouknowwhattheabbreviationsICPandRARstandfor,andwhattheymeanwithregardstokeepingyousafewhilstoffshore?

This document is one of a series of Assurance & Verification publications by Step Change in Safety. Others include: • seniormanagementsummaryflier

• guidancedocumentprovidingbasicoutlineofAssuranceandVerificationrequirements

• practitioner’sguideprovidingdetailedadviceandcommonpracticeonAssuranceandVerification

Thesedocumentscanbefoundat:www.stepchangeinsafety.net

✓

An

swer

s to

qu

esti

on

s

1.

Ad

ocum

ent

that

de

scrib

est

he

inst

alla

tion,

the

maj

or

acci

dent

haz

ards

(MA

H)

and

the

syst

ems

in

plac

eto

sto

pth

em

ajor

ac

cide

nts

occu

rrin

g.

Itis

the

‘prim

esa

fety

in

stru

ctio

nm

anua

l’fo

rth

ein

stal

latio

n.2.

Yo

urs

afet

yre

pres

enta

tive

and

OIM

w

illh

ave

copi

eso

fth

ein

stal

latio

n’s

safe

tyc

ase.

It

isa

vaila

ble

for

read

ing

onr

eque

st.

3.

AM

AH

isa

‘maj

or

acci

dent

haz

ard’

.Thi

sis

an

even

tth

ath

as

the

pote

ntia

lto

kill

or

serio

usly

inju

re5

or

mor

epe

ople

.Exa

mpl

es

are:

•Fi

rea

nde

xplo

sion

ev

ents

•Sh

ipc

ollis

ion

with

th

ein

stal

latio

n•

Stru

ctur

alf

ailu

re

due

tow

eath

ero

rde

sign

/con

stru

ctio

nfa

ult

4.

Hyd

roca

rbon

pi

pew

ork,

pre

ssur

eve

ssel

s,fi

rea

ndg

as

dete

ctio

n,in

stal

latio

nst

ruct

ure,

em

erge

ncy

com

mun

icat

ions

,etc

5.

Toe

nsur

eSC

Esp

erfo

rm

asin

tend

edt

oav

oid/

stop

maj

ora

ccid

ents

.

6.

Insp

ectio

n,m

aint

enan

ce

and

assu

ranc

eby

pla

tfor

ms

taff

an

dve

rifica

tion

by

inde

pend

ent

com

pete

nt

pers

on(I

CP)

.7.

IC

P=

inde

pend

ent

com

pete

ntp

erso

n;

RAR

=r

emed

iala

ctio

nre

com

men

ded.

An

ICP

verifi

est

hat

SCEs

are

pr

esen

tan

dsu

itabl

e.

RARs

are

mad

eby

th

eIC

Pto

ens

ure

any

faul

tsin

the

SC

Esa

re

addr

esse

d.

Alexander Kiellandsemi-subcapsized

123 killed

1980 2012

0 killed

The Major Accident Hazard Timeline

INTERNATIONAL

1988

167 killed

Piper Alphaplatformexplosion

UK

1989

0 killed

Cormorant Alphaexplosiononplatform

UK

1991

Sleipnerstructuralfailureandtotallossofinstallation

0 killed

INTERNATIONAL

2005

Mumbai Highvesselcollidedwithplatform

22 killed

INTERNATIONAL

2006

0 killed

Roughplatformfire

UK

2010

0 killed

Erskineplatformfire

UK

2010

Deep Water Horizondrillingrigexplosion

11 killed

INTERNATIONAL

Elginplatformgasleak

UK