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THEMADHYAMAKACONTRIBUTIONTOSKEPTICISMGeorgesDreyfusWilliamsCollege

andJayLGarfieldSmithCollege

HarvardDivinitySchoolCentralUniversityofTibetanStudies

UniversityofMelbourne

Introduction

SkepticismisoftenseenasaspecificallyWesterndevelopment.Inthisessay,we

willshowthatthisethnocentricattitudeisseriouslymistaken.Skepticismwasaliveand

wellinancientIndiaaswell.Infact,itisquitepossiblethatPyrrhoofElisdevelopedhis

skepticisminconversationwithphilosophersinIndia,andhencethatitisthatcountrythat

shouldbecreditedasthefountainheadoftheskepticaltradition,anditssourcemay

perhapsbeintheearlyBuddhistideasthatgaverisetoMadhyamaka.Thesayings

attributedtoPyrrhobyDiogenesLaertiusareredolentofPrajñāparamitālanguage,andat

leastraisethispossibility.1Inthisessay,wearguenotsimplythatskepticismispartofthe

Indiantradition,butthatMadhyamakaskepticismoffersimportantresourcesfor

interpretingskepticismandforbringingitintomeaningfuldialoguewithother

philosophicalpositions.

TheMadhyamakaschoolwasfoundedbyNāgārjuna,anIndianphilosopher(c2ndC

CE)whosemasterwork,theMulamādhyamikakārikā(FundamentalVersesontheMiddle

Way,henceforthMMK),revolutionizedIndianBuddhistphilosophy.Itscentralclaimisthat

allphenomenaareempty(śunya),thatis,lacksvabhāva.Thistermhasbeentranslatedinto

Englishinanumberofways:own-being,essence,inherentexistence,intrinsicnature,true

nature,realexistence,substance,thing-in-itself,etc.Althoughsomeofuspreferintrinsic

nature,therangeofoptionsindicatesitscomplexsemanticrange.ThecentralMadhyamaka

insightisthatallthingslackintrinsicnature:nothinghasanessentialcharacteristicin

virtueofwhichitiswhatitis;nothingexistsindependentlyofamanifoldofcausalrelations

1SeeC.Beckwith(2015),McEvilly(2012),Kuzminsky(2008)andGarfield(1990).

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andpart-wholerelations;nothinghasanykindofrealitythatdoesnotinsomewaydepend

onconventions.

Thisisbothanontologicalandanepistemologicalclaim.Ontologically,itisthe

claimthatnothinghasintrinsicnature;epistemologicallyitmeansthatwhenweanalyse

phenomenatodeterminewhattheyare,wefindnothing;wecomeupempty.Thislackof

findabilityconcernsthewaythingsare(or,rather,howtheyarenot)butalsoinvolvesour

waysofunderstandingtheworld.Thisepistemicsenseisallthemoreimportantgiventhat

itsrefutationisnotmeanttobejustatheoreticalenterprisebuttoentailacognitive

transformationofthewaysweconceiveofandexperienceourselvesandtheworld,aswe

willseelater.

Nāgārjunaarguesthatitnothinghassvabhāva.Thatis,everythingisemptyof

intrinsicnature.Butwhataboutthelackofsvabhāvaitself,thefactthatphenomenadon’t

haveatruenature?Isthislackoftruenaturetheirtruenature?Isthishowthingsarein

reality,namelythattheylackanytruenature?Andifthisisso,isn’tthistheirtruenature?

Indeed,theΑṣtahaśrika-prajñāparammīta-sūtrasaysthat“allthingshaveonenature—that

is,nonature.”Thisisobviouslyparadoxical.Thisparadox(whichGarfieldandPriest

(2003)call“Nāgārjuna’sParadox”isneitheraccidentaltoNāgārjuna’sphilosophynor

unnoticedintheMadhyamakatradition—ancientandmodern.

Therearemanyresponsestothisparadox,reflectingavarietyofinterpretive

choicesmadebycommentatorsandthecomplexityandambiguitiesofNāgārjuna’scorpus.

Somecommentatorschoosetoembracethemoreparadoxicalandradicallyskeptical

passagesinNāgārjuna’sworks,particularlytheonesconcerningthesislessnessandthe

repudiationofallviews.Othersattempttodefusetheparadoxesandtofindconsistent

readings.Thisistruebothofcanonicalandcontemporarycommentators.(See,

Tsongkhapa(2006),Garfield(2015),GarfieldandPriest(2010),DeguchiGarfieldand

Priest(2008;2013).

Tsongkhapa(1357-1419)presentsanimportantcanonicalnon-skeptical

interpretationofNāgārjuna.Hearguesthattheassertionthatthingslackintrinsicnatureis

meantsimplytounderminethetendencytoreifyrealityandtopresentapositivetheoryof

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thenatureofthings,viz.,thattheylackintrinsicexistence;thattheyexistaselementsinthe

webofinterconnectedcausesandeffects.(Tsongkhapa2002&2006).Onthis

understanding,theclaimthatemptinessistheultimatetruthisnotmerelytherefusalto

acceptanyintrinsicnature;itisalsotheassertionthatthingsexistinaparticularway.

(Whetheritispossibletoevadeparadoxthiswayisanothermatter,oneaddressedby

DeguchiGarfieldandPriest(2003)andbyGarfieldandPriest(2003)).Thisinterpretation

hastobetakenseriously,for,whileNāgārjuna—atleastaccordingtohisinterpreterswho

followCandarakīrti—usesreductioargumentstodemonstratethathisopponents’

positionsareincoherentbytheirownlights,thisdoesnotprecludehisarguingforhisown

position,namely,thatthingslacksvabhāva.

Ontheotherhand,onamoreskepticalinterpretation,wemightthinkthatthis

realizationcanneverbecashedoutasadefinitiveunderstandingofhowthingsreallyare.

Whenwelookforhowthingsare,wealwayscomeupempty.Wecanneverreachtheir

truenature.Allwhatwecandoistousevariousformulationsthatwillhelpusto

relinquishtheinstinctivecommitmenttotheideathattheremustbeawaythatthings

reallyare,andthisisthefreedomfromviewsrecommendedbytheearlycanon(Majjhima

Nikāya,Sutta72).ThismaybewhatNāgārjunameanswhenhesaysthatemptinessisthe

rejectionofallviews,andthatoneforwhomemptinessbecomesaviewisincurable.(MMK

Xiii.8)Candrakīrtiputsthispointnicelyinhiscommentary,whenhecomparessomeone

accordingtowhomemptinessisthefinalnatureofthingstosomeonewho,whentoldthat

ashopkeeperhasnothingtosell,askstobuysomeofthatnothing.(Prasannapadā83b,

quotedinTsongkhapa2006,p.299)

Whenviewedinthisperspective,webelievethatMadhyamakaisbestunderstood

assimilartoPyrrhonianskepticismratherthanmodernepistemologicalskepticismof

Descartes.(SeeGarfield1990andCowherds2005,chs6and7forasustaineddefenseof

thisposition.)HereweexplorethewaysinwhichtheMadhyamakadoctrineofthetwo

truthscanprovideresourcesforrespondingtosomechallengesthatskepticismfaces.We

thenaskwhichofthetwoprincipalinterpretationsofMadhyamaka—Prāsaṅgikaand

Svātantrika—providesthebestresourcesfortheexplanationoftheutilityofpractical

knowledgewithintheskepticalperspective.Wehopethatthisexplorationgives

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philosophersinterestedinskepticismareasontolookbeyondGreeceandtoopentheir

eyestotheresourcesprovidedbyMadhyamakafortheskepticaltradition.

Havingnotedthattherearenon-skepticalreadingsofNāgārjuna’sMadhyamaka,we

nowsetthemasidetoexplorewhatwecanlearnfromreadingNāgārjunaasaskeptic.But

weadvisethereadertokeepinmindthatthisisonlyonlyonestrandofMadhyamaka

interpretation.Ontheotherhanditisaveryimportantone,probablyeventhemainone

followedbythemajorityoftraditionalIndianandTibetancommentators,andsoour

attentiontoitisjustified,notonlybyitsphilosophicalimportance,butalsobyits

prominenceintheBuddhisttradition.

1.MadhyamakaandSkepticism

Manycontemporaryphilosophersunderstandbyskepticismthemodernskepticism

introducedbyDescartes:theviewthatweshouldrefusetoassenttoanyclaimofwhichwe

cannotbecertain,andwherecertaintyentailstheeliminationofallpossibilityoferror.This

isverydifferentfromanyformofclassicalskepticism,whetherAcademicorPyrrhonian.It

isbothmorelimitedinitsscope,andmoremethodologicalandtheoretical;Pyrrhonian

skepticismisuniversalinitsreach,andhasprofoundimplicationsforhowweunderstand

ourcognitiverelationtotheworld,includingtoourselves.

Pyrrhonianskepticismhasaverydistinctivestructure,includingbothanegative

andapositivephase.Pyrrhonianskepticismalwayssituatesitselfasakindofmiddlepath

inasubstantivephilosophicaldebate,butamiddlepathofaveryparticularkind,

essentiallyinvolvingthedialecticaldeviceofepochē.Theskeptic,whensheencountersa

debatebetweentwodogmaticextremes—areificationistandanihilistposition—identifies

thesharedpresuppositionatthecoreofthedebate,andrejectsit,suspendingtheentire

debateassenseless.Thissuspensiondoesnotconsistinsaying“maybethissideisright;

maybethatside”;nordoesitinvolvetakingsomekindofcompromiseposition.Instead,it

rejectsbothpositionsnotasfalse,butassenseless,andtheentiredebateasmeaningless,to

besuspended.

Forexample,onemightimagineadebateregardingtheexistenceoftheexternal

world.Thereificationistarguesthatourwaysoftalkingabouttheexternalworld

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(includingtheassertionoftheexistenceoftheobjectsofperception)arejustifiedbecause

wehavedirectperceptualevidencethatitexists;thenihilistarguesthatnoneofour

evidenceisdirectandallweperceiveareoursensations,andsoourdiscourseaboutthe

externalworldisentirelyunjustified.ThePyrrhonianskepticarguesthatnoneofthis

makesanysense.Shearguesthatdespitethefactthatthereificationistandthenihilist

appeartodisagreecompletely,theyagreeabouttheonlythingthatmatters—thatour

conventionsarejustifiedif,andonlyif,wehavedirectaccesstoanindependentexternal

world.Instead,inamovethatGarfield(1990)hascalledthe“skepticalinversion,”the

skepticarguesthatnothingindependentofourconventionscouldeverjustifythose

conventions,andthatourconventionsthemselvesconstitutetheexternalworldforus;that

thereisnobedrockthatcouldgroundourepistemic,oranyotherpractices.

ThisistightlyboundupwithwhatSextusEmpiricuscalled“theproblemofthe

criterion.”Hearguedthatanyattempttogroundconventioninanindependentreality—

anysearchforepistemicfoundations,foundersontheimpossibilityofsecuringacriterion

forvalidity:ifacriterionisneeded,thenacriterionisneededforthevalidationofthe

criterion,leadingtoacircleortoaregress.

Skepticismsofarseemsentirelynegative,tobethepositionthatwecanneverhave

justificationforwhatwesay,whatwedo,orhowweleadourlives;thatnothingwesayhas

anyground.ThepositivesideofskepticismemergesfromwhatSextuscalled“thefourfold

prescription.”Sextusurgedthattheskepticleadslifeinaccordancewithournatural

instincts;thewaythingsappeartooursenses;thecustomsofourculture;andthe

instructionoftheartsandcrafts.

Holdingtoappearances,then,welivewithoutbeliefsbutinaccordancewiththeordinaryregimenoflife,sincewecannotbewhollyinactive.Andthisordinaryregimenoflifeseemstobefourfold:oneparthastodowiththeguidanceofnature,anotherwiththecompulsionsofthepathé,anotherwiththehandingdownoflawsandcustoms,andafourthwiththeinstructioninartsandcrafts.Nature’sguidanceisthatbywhichwearenaturallycapableofsensationandthought;compulsionofthepathéisthatbywhichhungerdrivesustofoodandthirstmakesusdrink;thehandingdownofcustomsandlawsisthatbywhichweacceptthatpietyintheconductoflifeisgoodandimpietybad;andinstructioninarts

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andcraftsisthatbywhichwearenotinactiveinwhicheverweacquire.Andwesayallthesethingswithoutbelief(I:23-24).

Thesefourdeterminantsofpracticegiveusallofthejustificationweeverneedor

couldeverhaveforourordinarypractices,includingmoralandscientificdiscourse.The

skepticthinkswegowrongnotwhenwetalk,notwhenweassenttothings,butrather

whenwethinkthatthattalkorassentisgroundedoutsideofhumanconvention.(See

Mates1996,Hallie1985,Garfield1990formoredetailonthestructureofPyrrhonian

skepticism.)

ThereisonelastpointweshouldmakeabouttheclassicalGreekskepticaltradition

beforewereturntoMadhyamaka,andthatisthedistinctionbetweenAcademicand

Pyrrhonianskepticism.ThesewerethetwoskepticalschoolsactiveintheHellenistic

period,andSextus,forgoodreason,defendsthePyrrhonianapproach.Thedifferenceis

this.TheAcademicskeptictakestheargumentsforskepticismitselftobecompelling,and

henceforskepticismtobeclearlywarrantedasanepistemologicalposition.Thismight

appeartobeasradicalasonecouldgetintherefutationofdogmatism.Butitisnot,andit

isanunstablestoppingpoint.ThePyrrhoniangoesonestepfarther,applyingskeptical

argumentsreflexivelytoskepticismitself,andarguingthatskepticalcritiqueandpractice

itselfcanneverbeanymorethanonemorecustom.Ifitdoesbecomemorethanthis,it

becomesonemoredogma.SextususesthemetaphorofalaxativeinOutlinesof

Pyrrhonism:ifthelaxativedoesnotpurgeitselfaswellasthematerialinthebowel,it

becomesonemoredisease.Interestingly,Candrakīrtiquotesexactlythesamemetaphorin

hiscommentaryonxiii.8ofMūlamadhyamakakārikā.Thepassageisdrawnoriginallyfrom

theKaśyapa-parivarta-sūtra.(SeeTsongkhapa2006,p.300.)

WearenotthefirsttolinkMadhyamakaandGreekskepticism.B.K.Matilal,for

example,understandsNāgārjunaasofferingaskepticalargumentagainsthisHindurealist

adversariesandtheirepistemology(Matilal1986:46-68).Matilalarguesthatskeptical

argumentrestsontheproblemofthecriterion.Ourepistemicpracticesarebasedon

criteriarespondingtostandardsofproof.Wedonotjusthaveimpressionsaboutreality

butholdtheseimpressionstobetrueinrelationtosomecriteria,whichinturncanbe

assessedinrelationtosomestandardsofproof.Butthesecriteriabothdemand

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justificationandcannotbejustifiedindependently;theyhenceshouldberejectedbythe

rationalperson.

IntheIndiancontext,MatilalfindssuchepistemologicalskepticisminNāgārjuna’s

Vigrahavyāvartanī,asustainedcritiqueoftheHindurealist(theNyāya)epistemology

accordingtowhichourepistemicpracticesrequirethesupportofwarrantingepistemic

instruments(pramāṇa).2ForNāgārjuna,thisisimpossiblesinceiteitherbegsthequestion

(presupposingtheverystandardsthatitseekstoestablish)oritleadstoanunacceptable

infiniteregressinwhicheveryappealtosomestandardpresupposesanotherstandardof

justification.ThisispreciselySextus’critiqueofthecriterion.Matilalunderstands

Nāgārjunatoconcludethatitisincoherenttorequireeveryepistemicepisodetobe

supportedbysomewell-establishedmeansofreliablecognition.Weshoulddispensefrom

thisrequirementandrealizethatwedonothavehardcriteriatodistinguishveridicalfrom

non-veridicalcognitions.Nāgārjuna,onthisview,isaskepticalcoherentist.

Nāgārjuna’srefutationraisesanimmediateobjectionfromhisrealistopponent

(Matilal1986,64).Iftherearenowell-establishedmeanstodistinguishreliablefrom

unreliablecognitions,whatisthentheepistemicstatusofthisrefutation?Isititself

reliable?Ifitis,itshouldbesupportedbysomewell-establishedmeansofreliable

cognitioninflagrantcontradictiontotheskepticalthesis.Ifitisnotreliable,whyshould

wegiveitanycredence?Againstthisaccusationthathisrefutationisself-stultifying,

Nāgārjunagivesthisfamousanswer:

IfIhadanyposition,Itherebywouldbeatfault.ButsinceIhavenoposition,Iamnotatfaultatall.3

2Pramāṇaisoftentranslatedas“validcognition,”“epistemicwarrant,”“epistemicinstrument,”“meansofreliablecognition”orsimplyas“reliablecognition.”Wewillusetheterm“epistemicinstrument”whenreferringtopramāṇaasameansofacquiringknowledge,and“epistemicwarrant”totranslatethetermwhenitreferstoavalidatororknowlege.Thesetranslationshavetheadvantageofavoidingjargonwhileatthesametimecapturingthereliabilistviewofknowledge,orrather,itsroughIndianequivalentpramāṇa,thatBuddhistthinkersshare.ForatranslationofNāgārjuna’swork,seeBattacharya(1978,1986).ForadiscussionoftheNyāyaepistemology,seeMatilal(1971)&(1985).SeealsoCowherds(2005)andGarfield(2015).3Någårjuna,VV29quotedbyPatshab(2006):49.Forathoroughexaminationofthisstatement,see.D.Ruegg(2000).AsimilarpointismadeinYSV50-51.SeeScherrer-Schaub(1991):294-296.

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Atfirstssight,thisparadoxicalanswercanseemaglibwayforNāgārjunatogetout

ofatrickysituation.Thisisinfacthowmanyauthors,traditionalandmodern,have

understoodthisstatement,whichtheyseeasanillustrationofthesophistry(vitanda)that

theyseeasbeingattheheartofhisphilosophy(Robinson1972&Hayes1994).Butthis

dismissalmissesthekeypointmadebyNāgārjuna,forthisispreciselywhereNāgārjunais

clearlyalignedneitherwithmodernnorwithAcademic,butwithPyrrhonianskepticism.

NāgārjunaisnotjustquestioningtheNyāyaclaimsinrelationtowell-establishedstandards

ofproof;heisreflexivelyapplyingtheskepticalargumenttohisownposition,affirming

thatthereisnoconvention-independentArchimedeanepistemicfulcrum,andthathe

claimsnoneforhimself.

Nāgārjuna,thatis,rejectstheveryideaofappealingtoindependentstandardsof

prooftoestablishanything,includingthat.(SeeGarfield1996,2010)Accordingto

Nāgārjuna,Mādhyamikasarenotinthebusinessofdefendingtruepositionsaboutthe

natureofreality.Thisiswhyhesays(MMKXXII:11)

Wedonotassert“Empty.”Nordoweassert“Non-empty.”Weneitherassertbothnorneither.Theyareassertedonlyforthepurposeofdesignation.

Inthispassage,Nāgārjunaisexplicitabouthisskepticism.This“thesislessness,”i.e.,

ofcompletesuspensionofassertionwasalsoclaimedbyPyrrhoinhisremarks,“Iassert

nothing”(I:192-194)“Ihavenoposition”(I:197).

Nāgārjuna’smethodis,however,differentfromthatofPyrrhonism,whichseeksto

reachasuspensionofbeliefbyoutliningtheargumentsforandagainstathesis.The

Madhyamakamethoddoesnotusethismethodofequipollence,butinsteadapplies

reductioargumentstoeachdogmaticposition.Hence,insomeways,itsargumentform

goesfurthertheGreekmethodofequipollence,andwecouldsaythattheMadhyamaka

reductiomethodisagreatcontributiontotheskepticaltradition.Despitethese

differences,itisclearthatPyrrhonianskepticismandMadhyamikadobelongtothesame

skepticalfamily.

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2.MadhyamakaandtheTwoTruths

IfitistruethattheMādhyamikaskepticaimstorejectallviews(anyoneforwhom

emptinessbecomesaviewisincurable;IprostratetoGautama,thebestofallteachers,who

taughtthesupremeDharmathatleadstotherelinquishingofallviews…)andnotjust

questionthereliabilityofourknowledge,shouldn’tsherejectallviews,eventhose

concerningtransactionalreality,andevenherown?Thisobjectioniswell-knownandhas

beenraisedagainstPyrrhonismanditsfounder,PyrrhoofElis.Thisobjectionraisesan

importantquestion:cantheskeptics’commitmenttothesuspensionofbeliefsavoid

includingthatofbeliefsconcerningeverydaylife?OurthesisisthattheMadhyamaka

schemaofthetwotruthscanexplainhowtheskepticcanrespondtothischallenge.

ThetwotruthsschemeisarticulatedindifferentwaysinthehistoryofBuddhist

philosophy,butitplaysadistinctiveandcentralroleinMadhyamaka.(SeeSiderits1980,

1981,Garfield1995,2015)Nāgārjuna,forinstancesassertsthat

TheBuddha’steachingoftheDharmaIsbasedontwotruths:Atruthofworldlyconvention,Andanultimatetruth.(xxiv.8)

Candrakīrtri,inglossingthisverse,emphasizesthatthetwotruthsreflecttwo

naturesthateveryentityhas—aconventionalnatureasadependentlyoriginated,

perceptibleobjectandultimatenatureasempty.[Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya253a]But

thesetwonatures—althoughtheyaretwonaturesofanobject,aredefinedwithrespectto

theperspectivesofthesubjecttowhomthoseobjectsappear.Conventionaltruthis

constitutedbyourordinaryperceptualandconceptualprocesses,andbyourlinguistic

conventions.Itisthewaythingsareaccordingtoourordinaryexperienceandasconfirmed

byourconventionalinvestigativetechniques,includingscience.Buteventotheextentthat

wegetitrightontheseterms,conventionaltruthisdeceptive:thethingsthatare

conventionalrealappeartousasthoughtheyhaveagreater,adeeperrealitythanthat—

theyappearasconvention-independentrealities.

Infact,however,theyareemptyofthatkindofexistence,andthisistheirultimate

truth.Thisishowtheywouldappeartoanawakenedconsciousness.Formthisstandpoint,

theyhavenoindependentnature;nothingcanbesaidaboutthemexceptthattheyare

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emptyofanyintrinsicnature,evenofthatemptiness.(SeeGarfield1995,2015,Garfield

andPriest2003.)Thesetwostandpointsenableadistinctionbetweentwosortsof

statements,thosethataretrueconventionallyandthosethatareultimatelytrue.This

distinctioninturnenablesadistinctionbetweentwolevelsofreality:ultimatetruth(the

objectsthatmakeultimatelytruestatementstrue)andconventionaltruth(theobjectsthat

makeconventionallytruestatementsconventionallytrue).

ItmayseemoddinEnglishtocallpotsandpansconventionaltruthsasweareused

tolimittheapplicationoftheconceptoftruthtotruthbearers,entitiessuchas

propositions,statements,sentences,thoughts,etc.TheIndiantraditiondoesnotsharethis

restrictionanduseliberallytheideaoftruth(satya)asreferringtobothstatementandthe

objectsofthestatement.TheSanskritsatmeansrealasmuchasitmeanstrue.So,wecan

thinkofitaspickingupthemeaningoftrueasitoccursinphraseslikeatruefriend,ortrue

coinoftherealm.Itmeanstobenondeceptive(andindeedfalsityisglossedbyNāgārjunain

MMKxiii.2intermsofdeceptiveness).Wecanthusseethecommonuseoftrueasapplying

onlytosentencesorbeliefsasderivativefromthemorebasicuseoftrueascognatewith

trust:thingsaretruetotheextentthatwecantrustthem;totheextentthattheydonot

deceiveus.Ifweunderstandthetermthisway,thereisnothingoddabouttranslatingsatya

astrue.Truesentencesliketruewaterarenon-deceptive;falsesentenceslikethefalse

waterinamiragearedeceptive.

IntheAbhidharma,thedistinctionbetweenthetwotruthsismereological.

Compositephenomenaareconventionaltruths,whereastheirultimatepartless

componentsareultimatetruths.Thisconceptionofthetwotruthsdifferentiatetwoclasses

ofphenomena:thosethathaveacertainamountofsubstantialreality(dravyasat)and

thosethatexistonlyasdesignations(prajñāptisat)orconstructionsonthebasisofreally

existentelements.

TheMadhyamakadoctrineofthetwotruthsisrelatedtothatoftheAbhidharmabut

doesnotinvolveatwo-tierontology.ThedecisivepassageoftheMMKisfoundinthe

XXIVthchapter.NāgārjunarespondstohisAbhidharmaopponent,whoarguesthatifall

thingslacktrueexistenceandeverythingisonlyconventionallyreal,wecannotmake

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ethicaldistinctionsbetweentheobstaclesthatneetobeabandonedandthevirtuesthat

needtobedeveloped.Againstthischargeofrelativism,Nāgārjunarespondsthatthe

opponenthasfailedtounderstandthescopeoftheMadhyamakaapproach.The

thoroughlydeconstructiveapproachadvocatedbyNāgārjunaconcernsonlyontological

notionssuchascausality,movement,fournobletruths,dependent-arising,etc.Itisan

inquiryintohowthingsreallyareanddoesnotaffectsthepragmaticconceptsthatweuse

indailylife.Thoseareconventionalortransactionaltruths,thatis,theyareonly

conventionallyortransactionallyreal.Theydon’thaveanyrealexistenceoutsideoftheir

beingusedinthepracticeswithoutwhichlifeinthisworldwouldbeimpossible.

Buteventhoughthismightappeartobeareaffirmationofthetwo-tieredapproach

tothetwotruthscharacteristicoftheAbhidharma,afewverseslaterNāgārjunapullsthe

rugoutfromunderthatreadingbyaffirmingtheontologicalidentityofthetwotruths:

“Whateverisdependentoriginationweexplaintobeemptiness.That,beingadependent

designationisitselfthemiddleway.”(xxiv.18)AsTsongkhpaputsit,thetwotruthsare

intensionallydistinct,butextensionallyidentical.UltimatetruthonNāgārjuna’sview

consistsnotinintrinsicallyrealpartlessmomentaryparticlesbutinemptiness(śunayatā),

thatis,theabsenceofanyintrinsicreality.Thislackoftruenatureistheultimatetruth,not

inthesensethatitissomekindofsuper-reality,butinthesensethatitiswhatthe

ontologicalanalysiscomesupagainstultimately:nothing.Hence,ultimatetruthshould

notbehypostatizedintoarealentity,forthelackoftruenatureitselflacksitselfanytrue

nature.Emptinessitselfisempty.Statementsabouttheemptinessofthingsshouldnotbe

understoodasrevealingtheirtruenature,but,rather,asstatementsthattheyhaveno

naturetoberevealed.(SeeGarfield2014)

Manyhavenotedthatthisisparadoxical:emptinessistheultimatenatureofthings

anditistheabsenceofanynature.(GarfieldandPriest).Indiancommentatorswrestled

withthisparadox.Bhāvivekaarguesthatsuchastatementshouldbeunderstood

rhetorically.Itislikesomebodywishingtopreventnoisesaying“quiet”.(Katsura&

Siderits,248)Thisisaperformativeutterancethatismeanttointerveneinpracticeand

thisishowMadhyamakastatementsaboutemptinessbeingtheultimatetruthhavetobe

understood.Theyarenotdescriptionsofhowthingsare,nordotheyrefertosomekindof

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mysticalabsolute(asitmaybeforaschoollikeVedānta)orarockbottombasisofreality,

asitisfortheAbhidharma.Candrakīrti,ontheotherhand,isamorePyrrhoniangesture,

usesthesimilesoftheshopkeeperwithemptyshelvesandthelaxativetoarguethatwe

shouldunderstandtheseassertionsreflexively,asapplyingtothemselvesaswellas

anythingelse,followingthePyrrhonianmodelofskepticaldiscourse.

Thenotionofconventionaltruthcanbemuchmorecomplexthanthatofthe

ultimatetruth.(SeeCowherds2005,2010).Candrakīrtidevotesagreatdealofhis

philosophicalefforttoexplicatingthisidea.Thisishowheexplainsthetwotruths:

Allthingsbeartwonaturesthroughcorrectandfalseviews.Theobject(viṣaya)ofthosewhoseecorrectlyissaidtobe“reality”(tattva)andtheobjectsofthosewhoseefalseissaidtobe“conventionalexistence”(saṃvṛtisatya).(fromMadhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya253a,quotedatCowherds205,p.9)

ForMādhyamikas,theconventionalnatureofobjectsdoesnotconsistjustoftheir

beingtheobjectsoftheconventions(agreementsinpractice)weengageinforthesakeof

convenience,astheyareunderstoodbytheAbhidharma.Theirbeingconventionalalso

entailsthattheyaretheobjectsconstructedbythedistortionscreatedbytheignorance

afflictingsentientbeings.Contrarytowhatthenaïverealistbelieves,wedonotseethe

worldasitis;weengageinaconstantconstructionoftherealitiesweencounter.Indoing

so,wesuperimpose(samāropa)intrinsicidentityinsteadofseeingtheworldasawebof

inter-relations.4Thus,conventionalrealitiesaretobethoughtnotjustastheentitieswe

engagewithinpracticaltransactions,theyarealsotheentitiesthatweconstructusingour

innateperceptualandcognitiveapparatus,modulatedbyourculturallyacquiredconcepts

anddispositions,andmistakenlytakentobeobjectsperceiveddirectly,justastheyare

independentlyoftheirmodeofapprehension.

Candrakīrticapturesthiscomplexitywhenhedistinguishesthreemeaningsofthe

termsaṃvṛti.Thetermcanmeandependentarising(pratityasamutpāda)inthesenseof

4TillemansclaimsthatMādhyamikassimplypostulatethatbeingsreifyrealitywithoutofferinganyproof(Tillemans,33).WhetherornotclassicalIndianBuddhistargumentsfortheomnipresenceofreificationarecompelling,however,contemporarycognitivescienceprovidesampleevidencetofillthegaps.

13

mutualdependenceincludingcausal,mereological,andimputationaldependence..Itcan

alsorefertoexistenceinvirtueoftheordinarymundaneconventions(lokavyavahāra)in

whichweengageindailylife,ormoresimply,ordinariness.Thesemeaningsitshareswith

theEnglishwordconventional,giveortakeabit.Butsamvṛticanalsomeanconcealment,

indicatingthefactthatourhabitsofreificationandoftakingwhatweperceivetobegiven

directlytousthroughtransparentperceptualprocessesconcealtherealwayinwhichthey

exist.(Cowherds2005,13;Garfield2015)

Webeganthissectionbysuggestingthatthedoctrineofthetwotruthscansolvea

problemforskepticism:howcantheskepticrespondtothechallengethatherskepticismis

cripplinginthatitpreventsherfromformulatingaconstructiveaccountoftheordinary

worldthatsupportsthedistinctionsnecessarytoordinarylife?Canthedoctrineofthetwo

truthsprovidesuchaprincipledway?Inparticular,doesthedoctrineallowsfora

sufficientlyrobustaccountofconventionaltruthtogroundtherationalityundergirding

ordinarylife?Itistothatquestionthatwenowturn,andwewillexamineitthrougha

doxographicrubricintroducedbyTibetanphilosopherstosystematizecommentarial

debatesinIndiaregardingtheproperunderstandingofMadhyamaka:thedistinction

betweenrangrgyud(Svātantrika/proponentsofindependentarguments)andthal‘gyur

(Prāsaṅgika/wieldersofreductioarguments).

3.SvātantrikaandPrāsaṅgika

Adifferenceamongcommentatorsemergedduringadisputeontheinterpretation

ofNāgārjuna’sMMK.Bhāvivekaarguedthatanearliercommentarywrittenby

Buddhapālitawasafailedcommentaryinthatitdidnotglossargumentspresentedinthe

textasautonomous(svatantra),thatis,probativearguments(prayoga)establishingthe

emptinessofallphenomena.CandrakīrtirespondedbydefendingBuddhapālita,arguing

thatMādhyamikasshouldnotprovideprobativearguments,andcriticizingBhāvivekafor

doingso.Thisessayisnottheplacetoexplorethisextremelycomplexissue.(SeeDreyfus

andMcClintockfordetails.)Hereweemphasizethatthisdifferencealsoconcernswhether

aMādhyamikacanclaimtohavenoviewwhileformulatinganaccountofconventional

truththatrespondstothechallengefacedbytheskeptic.

14

Bhāvivekatakesamoderateapproach,arguingthattheclaimtopositionlessness

cannotbetakenatfacevalue,thatweneedsomewaytomodify,or,atleast,reducethe

scopeoftheapparentlyparadoxicalclaimsoastomakeMadhyamakasafeforphilosophical

discourse.Andhedoessobyappealingtoastrongdistinctionbetweentheultimateand

conventional.Candrakīrtidisagreesvehementlywiththisstrategyandarguesforamore

radicalstancethattakesNāgārjuna’sstatementofthesislessnessmuchmoreliterally.

Tibetancommentatorsseethisdebateasdefiningtwolinesofinterpretationof

Nāgārjuna.FollowingTsongkhapa,theyarguethatthisdifferencedoesnotconcernjustthe

waysinwhichMādhyamikasdeployargumentstoestablishemptinessbuthasalso

importantimplicationsforhowtounderstandthetwotruths.Hence,theyseethis

differenceasseparatingtwosub-schoolsofMadhyamaka:thosewhofollowBhāviveka

accepttheuseofautonomousargumentsinestablishingemptinesstheycallSvātantrikas;

thosewhofollowCandrakīrti’srejectionofthistypeofargumentandwhoofferonly

reductioarguments(prāsaṅga)theycallPrāsaṅgikas.(Nonetheless,althoughtheyagreeon

theimportanceofthisdistinction,Tibetancommentatorsdisagreeonhowtounderstand

thescopeofthisdifferencebetweenSvātantrikasandPrāsaṅgikas(Dreyfus2003).)

Tsongkhapaarguesthatthisdifferenceconcernsnotjustthewaytounderstand

conventionaltruthbutalsohowtounderstandultimatetruth.Hearguesthatthe

SvātantrikaoffersaninferiorinterpretationofMadhyamakawhichdoesnotgofarenough

initsdeconstructionofoursenseofwhatitmeansforsomethingtobereal.Weshould

note,however,thatTsongkhapa’sinterpretationofthePrāsaṅgikaviewraisesimportant

questionsforsomeofhisothercommitments,andinparticularhisendorsementofthe

rationalanalysisoftheultimate(Dreyfus2003).Hence,Tillemansisquiterightincalling

himan“atypicalPrāsaṅgika”.(Tillemans2016,5)Non-GelukthinkerssuchasMipham,

havenoticedthisambiguityandhaverejectedTsongkhapa‘sinterpretationofthe

difference.Fortheseinterpretersthereisnodifferenceintheviewofemptinessbetween

SvātantrikasandPrāsaṅgikas.Thedifferenceonlyconcernsthewayweshouldapproach

thisviewandtheimplicationsthatthishasasfarashowweunderstandwhatitmeansfor

somethingtobeconventionallyreal.

15

AccordingtoSvātantrikas,Mādhyamikasmustdrawaprincipleddistinction

betweenultimateandconventionaltruths.Withoutsuchdistinction,theyargue,

Nāgārjuna’sdialecticdescendsintoanincoherentpositioninwhicheverythingcanbe

equallynegatedoraffirmed,whatTillemanshascalled“thedismalslough”ofrelativism.

(Cowherds2005)Toavoidthisdanger,SvātantrikasrecommendthatNāgārjuna’s

positionlessnessbeunderstoodasconcerningonlytheultimate.Mādhyamikas,theyagree,

shouldnotholdanypositionabouthowthingsareinreality,sinceanyattempttohold

Madhyamakastatementsabouttheultimateisboundtoreifyphenomenabyattributing

themapositiveornegativeintrinsicnature.Therefore,theyargue,thebestthat

Mādhyamikascandoistomakestatementsthatapproximatetheultimatewithoutever

claimingtograspitfully.

This,then,iswhatSvātantrikastakeMadhyamakaargumentstobeallabout:using

theconventionaltobringopponentstoprovisionalconclusionsthatwillleadthemto

understandtheultimate.Thisconceptualunderstandingisnot,however,afullyaccurate

realizationoftheultimatebutmerelyanunderstandingoftheultimatethroughconcepts.

Hence,inasmuchasitistakentobetheultimate,theobjectofrealizationcanbeonlythe

represented,orcategorized,ultimate(rnamgrangspa’idondam).Theactual—non-

represented,non-categorized—ultimate(rnamgrangsmayinpa’idondam)isbeyondthe

reachoflanguageandthought,whichimplicatethedualitiesthataretobetranscendedat

theultimatelevel(Eckel1987,71-75).

TheseSvātantrikaargumentsarebasedontheassumptionthatwhilewecannot

findanyultimateintrinsicnature,wecanstillmakeconventionaldistinctions.Ifweanalyze

thingsastheyaretakenconventionally,wewillfind,inourconventions,enoughresources

todelineatesetsofnecessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheiridentities;ifweaskabout

thenatureofourconventions,wewillfindatsomepointdefiniterulesthatdetermineour

practices.Philosophicalanalysesoftheconventionalworld,onthisview,yieldsresults,

albeitprovisionalones.Thereare,forexample,principleddistinctionsthatcanbemade

betweenwhatisconventionallyrealandwhatiscompletelyimaginedandhencehasno

realitywhatsoever(Eckel1987,75-80).

16

AsMādhyamikas,Svātantrikasdenythatanyofwhatthisconventionalphilosophical

analysisyieldssurvivesultimateanalysis.Thecriteriathatwefindinourconventional

analyses,theyconcede,donotapplytoanythingindependentlyofourpracticesand

schemata;instead,theyareusefulonlywithinthecontextofthesepractices.Forinstance,

whenwesaythatthingsareproducedindependenceofcausesandconditions,wearenot

attemptingtocapturehowthingsreallyare,butmerelydescribehowtheyappeartous.We

arethekindofbeingswhocanonlyorganizeourexperiencesthroughaschemasuchas

causality.Hence,wearejustifiedinclaimingthatthingsareproducedconditionally,but

onlyconventionally,thatis,withinthecontextofourownpracticesandschemata.

PrāsaṅgikasvigorouslyrejectthisSvātantrikapositionasareintroductionthrough

thebackdoorofthenotionoftherealintrinsicnaturethatNāgārjunathrewoutofthefront

door.AccordingtothePrāsaṅgikainterpretation,Madhyamakaisincompatiblewithany

commitmenttotheexistenceofindependenttruthmakersforourassertions.Svātantrikas,

theyargue,eventhoughtheytakethetruthmakerstheyposittobemerelyconventionally

existent,insistthatourordinaryconventionspresumethattheseentitieshavethenatures

thattheydoindependentlyofourconventions,andsoconstituteanindependentstandard

oftruthorfalsity.

ThisisthesenseinwhichPrāsaṅgikaschargeSvātantrikaswithpositingintrinsic

natureconventionally,evenifnotultimately.Prāsaṅgikas,ontheotherhand,arguethat

thisamountstothepresuppositionthattheobjectsofsomestatementsconstitute

standardsfortruthandso,atleastconventionally,haveintrinsic,notrelationalor

dependent,identities.Theyclaimthatthisapparentrationalreconstructionordinary

practiceascribestoordinarypeopleametaphysicalcommitmentneitherrequirednor

presentinoureverydayconventions.(CompareWittgenstein’scritiqueoftheideathatour

useofwordspresupposesthatwehavenecessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheircorrect

applicationinmind.)Thisradicalpositionraisesdeepquestionsaboutconventionaltruth.

WhataretheimplicationsofthePrāsaṅgikaembraceofNāgārjuna’sthesislessnessfor

understandingtheconventional?Shouldn’tonebeabletomakedistinctionswithinthe

realmofconventionaltransactionalrealitybetweentrueandfalsestatements?Shouldn’t

weabletosaythattheaffirmationthattheearthisflatissimplyfalse?

17

Itisherethatinterpretationsdiverge.PatsabNyimadrak,the11thcenturyTibetan

translatorofCandrakīrtiandtheintroducerofhisideasinTibet(Dreyfus2003),rejectsthe

veryideaoftruthintheconventionalrealm.HearguesthattheroleofMadhyamaka

argumentsisnottoestablishtruth—orevenfalsity—butrathersimplytodebunkthenaive

viewthatthingsexistthewaytheyappeartous.TheMadhyamakarefutationoftherealist

is,fromthisperspective,notintendedtoprovidesomehighertruth,buttogetusoutofthe

gameofascribingtruthandfalsity,andtodosowithoutcommittingourselvestoany

standpoint,positiveornegative,onthegroundsthatanycommitmenttotruthandfalsity

aspolarsemanticoppositesleadsustocontradiction.Thus,accordingtoPatsab,eventhe

claimthatallphenomenaareemptyisnotaconclusion,evenonederivedfromthe

contradictionsentailedbytheiropponents’viewsthatthingsarenon-empty.

OnPatsab’sview,itismerelyarhetoricalstance,akindofsloganusefulinshowing

opponentsthewaytogetoutofthecontradictionsentailedbytheirowncommitments;the

Mādhyamikadoesn’tevenactuallysaythathehasnoposition,andevenhisprofessionsto

accordwithmundaneconventionaretobedistrusted.Patsabclaimsthatthedoctrineof

thetwotruthsismerelyawaytotakeintoaccountthewaysoftheworldandshouldnot

thoughttohaveanyconstructivephilosophicalvalue.Madhyamakashouldaimfora

completesuspensionoftruthandfalsityandusesconventionsonlyasawaytoleadbeings

outoftheirmiseries.ThisviewisechoedbytheSakyascholarTaktshangLotsawainhis

critiqueofTsongkhapa’suseofreasoningtoinvestigateultimaterealityandof

Tsongkhapa’scommitmenttostandardsoftruthwithinconventionalreality.(SeeGarfield

inpress.)

ButPatsabseemstogetCandrakīrtiwrong(asdoesTaktshang).Candrakīrtidoes

claimthatnoassertionsarepossibleregardingtheintrinsicnatureofthings.Buthedoes

notgoasfarasPatsab:heishappytodistinguishtruthfromfalsitywithinconventional

reality,andinglossingtruthasnondeceptiveness,hearguesthatconventionalphenomena

maydeceiveusregardingtheirultimatenaturewithoutdeceivingusregardingtheir

conventionalnature.(Cowherds2015)Moreimportantly,hedefendsthismethodology

extensivelyandcriticizesBhāvivekaforadvocatingadifferentargumentativemethodology,

theuseofautonomousreasonings(PP12-38)onthegroundsthatBhāviveka’s

18

methodologyreintroducesintrinsicnatureconventionally,andsoseeksastandardoftruth

andfalsitymorerobustthanmereconvention.Hence,hisclaimsandargumentshavetobe

understoodasbeingsomethingmorethanmereslogansorconcessionstotheworld,as

Patsabunderstandthem.

Moreover,Candrakīrtiendorsestheuseofconventionalepistemicinstruments,and

thenormativestatusofconventionalepistemicwarrants.HefaultstheBuddhist

epistemologists,particularlyDignāga,forofferinganoverlypareddownepistemologyand

arguesthatinthesemattersweshouldfollowcommonsenseratherthanarevisionist

epistemologicalprogram.Inthisperspective—onethatechoesSextus’fourfold

prescription—epistemicpracticesarenottoberejected;theyaresimplytobeunderstood

descriptivelyasthewaysweinfactleadourepistemiclives;asconventionstobefollowed,

becausethatishowhumanlifeworks.Onthisview,epistemologyandontologyaremore

anthropologicalthantranscendentalpursuits,revealingourconventionsregardingwhat

wetaketoberealandwhatcountsaswarrant,notanyindependentstandardthatgrounds

orfailstogroundthoseconventions.Hence,CandrakīrtiisquitehappytoaccepttheNyāya

epistemologyasreflectingthewaysinwhichweusetheconceptofknowledgeindailylife.

(SeeCowherds2015andSiderits1980and1981)

Svātantrikasaredistinctivelyunhappywiththisminimalistepistemology.Whileas

Mādhyamikas,theydonotarguethatMadhyamakareasoningscancaptureultimatereality

andprovideatruedepictionofhowthingsreallyare,theydoseektoreininthe

paradoxicalnatureofMadhyamakasoastoresolve,oratleast,attenuatethefundamental

tensionthatisattheheartofthistradition.Theywanttomakesenseofadoctrinethat

claimstoshowthatitmakesnosensetotalkabouthowthingsreallyarepreciselywhile

preservingrobustwaystomaketransactionaldistinctions.AccordingtotheSvātantrikas,

thetensioncanberelievedbyarguingthatMadhyamakareasoningsdonotaimat

providingatruedescriptionofrealitybutasprovidingthemostjustifiablewayofthinking

aboutreality,theonethatisleastmisleadingandmostlikelytofosterahealthyattitude

towardpracticewhilepreservingthepossibilityofprovidingprincipleddistinctions

informingsuchpractice.

19

4.Prasaṅgika,SvātantrikaandSkepticismTheSvātantrikapositionseeksaplaceforconstructivephilosophy,andworriesthat

Prāsaṅgikahaseliminatedanysuchspace.Itdevelopsthisconstructivepositionby

providingarobustdistinctionbetweenthewaysinwhichskepticismoperatesregarding

theultimatetruthandhowitoperatesinthedomainofpracticallife,theconventionaltruth

ortransactionaldomainofobjectsofpracticalinquiry.

IntheIndiancontext,thisrequiresarobustaccountofepistemicwarrantinthe

conventionalrealm.PatsabrejectsthispossibilityentirelybutCandrakīrtidoesnot.The

issuehereconcernswhetheranaccountofconventionaltruthandconventionalepistemic

warrantthatismerelyanthropologicalcanhavesufficientbitetoconstituteandtoexplain

genuinenormativeforce.ForPatsab,noepistemicpracticescansurvivethedeconstructive

Madhyamakaanalysisandhenceitmakesnosensetoattempttodistinguishwarranted

fromunwarrantedepistemicpractices,evenattheconventionallevel.Suchdistinctionis

merelyaconcessiontotheworldwhichtheBuddhistsshouldnotpaytoomuchattention

to.Instead,theyshouldrelyontheonlyvalidsourceofguidance,thewordsofthe

Buddha.CandrakīrtiislessextremeinthatheishappytoaccepttheNyāyacatalog

ofpramāṇasasadescriptionofordinaryepistemicpractices,butherejectstheideathat

this,oranysetofepistemicpracticeshasanythingbeyondcustomtorecommendit.So,he

argues,knowledgeissimplyopinionvalidatedbytheepistemicpracticesacceptedbythe

world.ButaccordingtoSvātantrikas,thisconventionalismdegeneratesintoarelativism

accordingtowhichconventionaltruthiswhatevertheworldaccepts.(SeeCowherds2005,

c.9).Ifthisistobeanadequateepistemology,itmustprovideaprincipledaccountofhow

pragmaticdistinctionscanbepreservedandexplainedthatgoesbeyondmerelysaying

“thisiswhatwedo.”Andindeed,Candrakīrtidoesnotdoso.

Aswenotedabove,Candrakīrti’spositionresemblesthatSextusEmpiricus’account

foundintheFourfoldPrescriptionpresentedinOutlines(hencethekinshiptoskeptical

positionsintheWestadoptedbyHumeandWittgenstein).Sextusaskshowtheskepticisto

livehisskepticism,andrepliesthattheskepticfollowshisappetites,appearances,thelaws

andcustomsofhisculture,andtheinstructionsofthearts.Sextus’deepinsightisthatallof

thisispractice,andnoneofitinvolvescommitmenttodeepthesesaboutthenatureof

20

things.(SeeespeciallyI:18.)Thefourfoldprescription,aswehavenoted,isthepositive

sideofPyrrhonianskepticism,anditisimportanttoSextusthatitispossibletofollowthis

prescriptionwithoutfallingintodogmatism,withoutmakingassertions,intherelevant

sense;withouttakingpositions,intherelevantsense.

Buthowisthispossible?ManyfindSextus’ownaccounttooweaktoprovidea

philosophicallysatisfyinganswertothechallengefacingskepticism.Wearenottoldhow

orwhythisprescriptionistooperate,orwhatitsbenefitsare.Wearealsonottoldhowthe

listismade.Isitexhaustive?Onwhichbasisisitmade?Thisispartofthemotivationfor

the17thand18thcenturyattemptsofBacon,Mandeville,Humeandotherstodefendthe

normativeforceofcustom,astrategywhichremainscontroversial.(SeeGarfield20xx).Can

theSvātantrikaapproachdobetterandprovideamoreprincipledaccountofconventional

truth?The8thcenturyphilosopherJñānagarbhaarguesthatMādhyamikascanmeetthe

challengethatitfacesbymakingadistinctionbetweencorrect(satya)andincorrect

(mithyā)conventionaltruths.Hesays:

Amerething(vastu-mātra),whichisnottobeconfusedwithanythingthatisimaginedandarisesdependently,isnotknownascorrectrelative[truth].(Eckel1987,75).

AccordingtoJñānagarbha,thedistinctionthatcansaveMadhyamakafrom

descendingintorelativismistobefoundonthebasicBuddhistdoctrineofdependent

arising(pratityasamutpāda).Whatweneedtodistinguisharetheappearancesthatare

illusoryaccordingtotheworld(likemirages,theobjectsofdreams,etc.)fromtheonesthat

arecorrect(liketheappearancesoftheheatproducedbyfire).Thoseappearancesare

producedindependenceoncausesandconditions,andhencecanbeestablishedas

conventionallyreal.Inthisway,theMādhyamikacanclaimtohaveprovidedaprincipled

waytopreservetheintegrityoftheobjectsthatourpracticespresupposewithoutreifying

themintohypostatizedentities.

ThiswayofarguingforMadhyamakastartsbytakingtheideaofconventionaltruth

veryseriously.Itisnotjustthewaydeludedbeingsconceiveofreality(asPatsabthinks)

or,even,akindofconcessionthattheskepticmakestoparticipateintheconversation

accordingtotheconventionsoftheworld(asCandrakīrtimaythink),butanarticulationof

21

thepresuppositionsofourpractice.Obviously,suchanarticulationdoesnotaimtoprovide

adescriptionperimpossibleofhowthingsreallyarebutjustofhowweassumethemtobe

whenweengagetheminourpractices.Hence,thisarticulationismerelyconventionaland

istobesetasidewhenweattempttothinkhowthingsreallyare.

Nonetheless,suchastrategymuststartfromtheprovisionalknowledgethatwe

haveoftheworldasassumedbyourpractices.Theworldweexperiencedoesnotexist

outsideofourinterestsandconventions,butisalsonotcompletelydeterminedbythese

considerations.Ourassumptionsaboutrealityarealsolargelydeterminedbyour

embodiedcondition.Weseetheworldofexperienceincertainwaysnotjustbecauseofour

interestsandconventionsbutalsobecauseofthekindoftheperceptualapparatusthatwe

have.Itappearstousthatourexperiencesandtheobjectsoftheworldareproducedin

dependenceoncomplexcausalnexes.Whetherornotoriginationisnotbuiltinthefabric

oftheuniverse,itiscertainlyaubiquitousfeatureoftheworldappearance.Thisiswhy

Jñānagarbhaasserts:[T]hisiswhy[theBuddha’s]teachingisbasedonappearances.”

(Eckel1987,89)Andevenifdependenceoncausalityismerelyofthedomainof

appearance,wearenotfreejusttodispensefromitandestablishedsetsofconventionthat

wouldnegatecausaldependence.

Hence,ourembodiedandtheperceptualapparatusthatthisentailssignificantly

constrainthekindofconventionsthatwecancomeup,andthusoffersabasisfora

principledaccountofconventionaltruthbasedontheconceptofdependentarising,

understoodnotasanontologicalconceptbutasprovidinganaccountofthefundamental

perceptualconstraintsofourexperienceandtheobjectsthattheyyield.

Thisissonotbecausetheobjectsgiveninperceptionexistinrealityjustasthey

appear,butbecausetheyreflectourmostfundamentalmodesofinteractionwiththe

world.ItisonthisbasisthatMādhyamikascanthenproceedtoshowtheirfundamental

pointthatitmakesnosensetothinkofrealityinabstractionofourmodesofinteraction

withtheworld,asifwecouldtaketheviewfromnowhere.Thisconclusionmaynotstrictly

correspondtorealitybutisthebestway,themostusefulandleastdeceptive,wayof

thinkingaboutreality.

22

Onceweadoptthishealthyskepticismtowardanyattempttocharacterizehow

thingsreallyareinabstractionfromourinteractionswiththem,wecometorealizethatall

whatwehavearewhatisprovidedbyourinteractionswiththeworld.OnthisSvātantrika

view,thisiswhatconventionalrealityisabout,andweneedtorealizethatthisisallthat

wehave.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatouraccountofthislevelofrealityisarbitrary.

Therearewaysinwhichourexperiencesaresignificantlyconstrainedbyourembodiment

andbytheworld.

TheSvātantrikapositionsuggeststhatwemaybewisetostartfromthis

conventionalbasistoshowhowwearejustifiedtogofromtheretothefundamental

Madhyamakainsight.Thissuggestionalsoprovidesaresponsetothechallengefacing

skepticism.Althoughinquiriesintohowthingsexistaretobesuspendedastheyleadto

unsolvablecontradictions,theinvestigationsintohowthingsarewithinthecontextofhow

thingsappeartousaretobewelcomed.Itmaybeimpossibletoestablishahardline

dividingwhichkindofinquiryisallowableandwhichisnot,buttherelianceondependent

arisingdoesprovideaguidelinesufficientlyrobusttorespondtothechallengefacing

skepticism.

Inquiriesbasedoncausality(andinamoderncontextonprobability)canbetaken

asprovidingtheprovisionalbedrocksonwhichtobaseourconventionaldistinctions.Ina

moderncontext,thismeansthatwecantakethewell-establishedscientificfindingsas

basestoestablishthekindofdistinctionsthatweneedtosurviveonthisplanet.Hence,we

donotneedtofearthatskepticismmayunderminetherelianceoncausalorprobabilistic

regularitiesestablishedbyscienceaslongasweunderstandthatalthoughthosearenot

arbitrarytheyarealsonothowthingsareinrealitysincetheyareofthedomainofthe

appearances.

Inthisway,Nāgārjuna’sinsightthatitisimpossibletomakesenseofhowthingsare

inrealityispreservedandmadecompatiblewithamoreconstructiveapproachto

knowledgeingeneralandphilosophyinparticular.ThePrāsaṅgikaprojectofgrounding

everythinginconventionmaybepossible;butthisrequiresanaccountofconvention

sufficientlyrobusttoinducethegenuinenormativitypresupposedbyideassuchastruth

23

andknowledge.Alternatively,theSvātantrikaproject,withitscommitmenttoconventional

intrinsicnaturesmaybeabetterarticulationoftheskepticalprogram,Insettingoutthis

dilemma,theMadhyamakatraditionenrichesourunderstandingofskepticism.And

whicheverway,onegoes,theMadhyamakatraditionindicatesawayofresolvingskeptical

problemsnotanticipatedinWesternskepticalthought.Thesearecontributionsthat

Westernphilosophersinterestedinskepticismshouldtakeseriously.

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