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SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the 2oth of JANUARY, 1948

Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 22 JANUARY, 1948

The War Office,January, 1948.

OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST, FROM I7TH OCTOBER 1940 TO 27™DECEMBER 1941

The following Despatch was submitted to theBritish Chiefs of Staff on 2&lh May, 1942,by AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR ROBERT-BgOOKE-POPHAM, G.C.V.O., K.C.B.,C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Commander-in-Chief in the Far East.

I.—FORMATION OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,FAR EAST.

1. This despatch, covers the period from thedate of my appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Far East, the iyth October, 1940, to thedate on -which I handed over to Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, the 27th December,1941.

My original staff consisted of seven, exclusiveof my personal assistant. Of these seven, theChief .of Staff, Majpr-General Dewing, theSenior Royal Adr Force Staff Officer, Group-Captain Darvall, as well as any personal assis-tant, travelled out with me.

The Naval Liaison Officer, Captain Back,met me on my arrival at Singapore, and theArmy G.S.O.i, Colonel Fawcett, met me inBurma.

Before leaving England I saw the Chief ofthe Imperial General .Staff, Chief of the AirStaff and Major-General Ismay individually,but did not meet the Chiefs of Staff collectivelyat one of their meetings.

2. I left London on Sunday, the 27thOctober, and started 'by air from Plymouth onthe 28th October. I spent two clear days inCairo, three in Delhi and three in Rangoon,arriving at Singapore on Thursday,' the 14 thNovember. General Headquarters', Far East,started to operate on .Monday, ; the ' i8thNovember, 1940.

During the journey I was able to ses theworking of the Headquarters of both the Armyand Air Force in Cairo, and to consult with the.

Commander-in-Chief, Sir Archibald Wavell,on the methods of operating has headquarters,and especially why he found such a big expan-sion from his original staff necessary.

At Delhi I stayed with the Viceroy, and estab-lished contact with the Commander-in-Chief,the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and theirrespective staffs, and with certain civil officials.

At Rangoon I stayed with the Governor,Sir Archibald Cochrane, and reached agree-ment over the constitutional problems raised bythe appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, FarEast. I met the General Officer Commanding,Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sir K.McLeod, visited various establishments, includ-ing the oil refinery at Syriam, and establishedcontact with many of the civil officials.

Instructions and General Policy.3. My Directive is given in Appendix A.On my arrival in Singapore it was agreed

that, should I become a casualty, the Com-mander-in-Chief, China Station, should takemy place until my successor was appointed.

With reference to paragraph 2 of mj~Directive, the meaning of the term " operationalcontrol " was explained as being higher direc-tion and control as distinct from detailed opera-tional control.

fii addition to this Directive, I had two mainguides for action: first, that if was the policyof 'His Majesty's Government to avoid warwith Japan, and, secondly, that, uiitil a fleetwas available; our policy 'in the Far East shouldbe to rely primarily on .ajrjpower'in conjunctionwith such naval forces "as could be made avail-able. The first was confirmed during 1941 inmany telegrams, e.g., in March, " Avoidanceof war with Japan is basis of Far East policyand provocation must be rigidly avoided,"and again in September, " Our policy in the

536 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948

Far East is still to avoid war with Japan."The second was. laid down by the Chiefs ofStaff in August, 1940.

4. It was pointed out to me that the require-ments of Home Defence, the Battle of theAtlantic, and the Middle East, must take pre-cedence over those of the Far East; at a laterdate Russia also took precedence, and, at onetime, Iraq and Iran. Realising this, it wasobviously our duty to be content with the essen-tial minimum, to consider what we could dowithout rather than what we would like to have,

. and to imake the fullest use of local resources.But we always regarded the strength of 336

•aeroplanes as an irreducible minimum. {Seepara. 79 below.} In January, 1941, we werecautioned against over-estimate of the Japaneseforces.

I was also informed that the defence organi-sation in Malaya was apparently not workingsmoothly or efficiently, and that this wouldnecessitate early investigation and action.

5. To carry out the directions outlined above,it was evident that the following steps werenecessary: —

•(a) To avoid any action that might bedeemed provocative by Japan, but at thesame time to try and convince her that ourstrength was too great to be challenged suc-cessfully;

(6) To strengthen our defences in the FarEast, and especially to build up our air forces,not only by obtaining new aircraft but alsoby making all preparations to ensure mutualreinforcement in the Far East area;

(c) To ensure effective co-operation inMalaya, not only between the Royal Navy,the Army and the Air Force but also betweenthem and the civil services;

(d) To stiffen the Chinese so that thevcould contain the maximum Japanese effort(see paras. 70 and 71 below); and

(e) To establish as close co-operation aspossible with the Dutch and Americans, aswell as with Australia and New Zealand, themain object being to ensure that, should anattack be made on any part of the Far Eastarea, all the nations concerned would simul-taneously enter the war against Japan, thusavoiding the risk of defeat in detail, as hadhappened in Europe.6. A very brief study of the area comprised

in the Far East Command shows that thedefence of the whole area is essentially onesingle problem. Burma, Siain, Indo-China,Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies,Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand,all inter-connect and operations or preparationsin any one of these areas affect all the others.In view of the above, I regarded it as one ofmy principal duties to make personal contactsin these places. During 1941 I visited Australia,twice, in February and October, Manila threetimes and the Netherlands East Indies fivetimes. I also visited Hong Kong in December,1940, and April, 1941; and Burma in June andSeptember, 1941.

Another point that stands out is that theproblem is (fundamentally a naval one, andthat, although the Army and Air Force in com-bination may defend areas of land and repelan enemy, his definite defeat cannot be broughtabout unless control of sea communications isobtained. This control will necessitate airsuperiority.

The Far East is usually examined on a small-scale map, so people are rather apt to get a .false idea of distances. From Singapore toAlor Star at the North End of Malaya is a gooddeal further than from London to Aberdeen.Rangoon to Singapore direct by air is abouti,iop miles; Singapore to Hong Kong, viaManila, ds 2,000 miles, about the distance fromGibraltar to Alexandria; and from Singaporeto Melbourne about 4,100, which is only slightlyless than the distance from London to Aden,via Malta and Cairo.

Size of General Headquarters Staff.7. Although it was obvious that Singapore

was a key 'position, and -therefore that tbfdefence of Malaya was of the greatest impor-tance, it was evident that, apart from my Direc-tive, the size of -my Staff rendered it quiteimpossible to exercise any form of direct opera-tional control, except in the widest sense. Itherefore decided that, although the fact ofmy headquarters happening to be situated atSingapore would naturally involve my dealingwith more details in Malaya than elsewhere,the Commands of Hong Kong, Malaya andBurma must be regarded as of equal status.Each General Officer Commanding would haveto control the operations in his own area, and1

the initiative of the Air Officer Commanding,Far East, must not be cramped; the operationalcontrol of my headquarters would be limitedmainly to the movement. of reinforcements,principally air, within my command and to theissue of directives.

The staff of General Headquarters, Far East,was very small for the work it had to carry-out, and immediately on its formation inSingapore it was found necessary to add threeduty officers of junior rank in order to ensurekeeping a twenty-four-hour watch in the office.Requests for an increase in staff at GeneralHeadquarters were made on more than oneoccasion, and finally it was agreed by theChiefs of Staff, in August, 1941, that the total'establishment should be raised to the;following:—

Commander-in^Ghief: i.Chief of Staff: i.Staff Officer, ist Grade: Navy i; Army 2^

R.A.F. 2.Staff Officer, 2nd Grade: Navy i; Army 3;

R.A.F. 3.Staff Officer, 3rd Grade: Navy i.

Total, 15.In addition to this, there were:—

Personal Assistant: i.Cipher Officers: 2.Signal Officer: i.Chief Clerk: i.

Making a total in all of 20. This establish-ment was not completed by the time war broke-out.

The result of the smallness of the Staff was-that individuals were overworked, and this,in conjunction with the Malayan climate, ledto sickness. The most serious case was that,of my Chief of Staff, Major-General Dewing,who went into (hospital on the 8th April, and1

remained there until he started for England inMay. General 'Playfair arrived to take his*place on the 2ist June, but for a period ofsome ten and a half weeks I was without a.Chief of Staff.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948 537

This sickness was largely attributed by themedical authorities to the effects of overwork.In addition, Wing-Commander Yarde had tobe sent away sick, other officers were in hos-pital for shorter periods, and when war withJapan broke out Colonel Scott, who had takenColonel Fawcett's place as the Army G.S.O.&,was in- India on sick leave, having been seiitthere from hospital.Intelligence.

8. For intelligence I relied almost entirelyon the Far Eastern Combined Bureau, knownfor short as! F.E.C.B. This consisted ofbranches of Naval, Army and Air Force in-telligence, and was under the administrativecontrol of the Admiralty, the officer in chargeof the Naval Section acting as head of theBureau. At the date of the formation of anyheadquarters, F.E.C.B. was somewhat un-balanced in that attention was mostly concen-trated on Naval intelligence, while Army andAir intelligence took a minor place, the latterespecially being quite inadequate. This, how-•ever, was steadily corrected, and I considerthat F.E.C.B. fulfilled its functions and showedthat a combined intelligence staff of the threeServices is a workable proposition. Wihat wasneeded, however, was a real chief of F.E.C.B.,and not merely one whose main duty was actingas head of his own 'branch. The difficulty wasin finding a really suitable individual, and thiswe had not succeeded in doing at the time warwith Japan broke out.Attachments to General Headquarters Staff.

g. A branch of the Ministry of EconomicWarfare known as the O.M. Section, was startedon the arrival of Mr. Killery at Singapore inMay, 1941. He and his staff were keen andcapable, but they had no experience and verylittle knowledge of how to set about theirwork. Further, as in the case of intelligence,this is work that requires a great deal of pre-paration-., In consequence of this, but throughno fault of 'Mr. Killery or his staff, the O.M.activities really never got functioning properlyby the time that war with Japan broke out.There was also a curious reluctance on the partof many people to have anything to do withthese activities, or to help on the work. Thiswas particularly noticeable in the case of in-tended activities in Siam.

10. Colonel Warren arrived in Singaporeearly in 1941 to assist in starting IndependentCompanies. The obvious disadvantage ofthese Companies is that they form a drain oninfantry units, which were already depleted ofmany of their best non-commissioned officersand officers owing to the expansion and de-mands of other organisations.. As a result, itwas finally decided to limit these IndependentCompanies to two—one for Burma and one forMalaya.II.—FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEFENCE OF

MALAYA AND BORNEO.11. Air Vice-Marshal Pulford became Air

Officer Commanding, Far East, vice Air Vice-Marshal Babington on the 26th April, 1941,and Lieutenant-General Percival took over theduties of General Officer Commanding, Malaya,from Lieutenant-General Bond on the i6th May,1941.

The strength of the Army and of the AirForce in Malaya in November, 1940, is givenin Appendices D and I respectively.

A 2

In Malaya, as in Burma and Hong Kongvthere was a 'War Committee, which sat under.the Governor.

The main reason for the defence of Malayawas to preserve the facilities of the NavalBase at Singapore. The port and rubber andtin production were also important, but on a.different plane from the Naval Base. It was,,of course, not sufficient to have a close defence-of the area round the Naval Base itself. Itwas of great importance to keep enemy aircraftas far away from the Base as possible, onaccount of the danger of bombing; this meantextending the defence right up to the Northern;end of Malaya-.. It may be noted that this wasnot dependent upon the policy of defending.Malaya by means of air power. Had thepolicy been to defend Malaya by means of Armyforces, the dispositions" might have been;different, but it would still have been essential

. to hold the greater part of Malaya in orderto deny aerodromes or their possible sites to-the enemy. Singapore Island was to be pro-visioned for 180 days.Communications.

12. The main roads in Malaya are weir-metalled, and the railways are single-trackmetre-gauge. Down the centre of Malaya runsa range of hills rising to some 7,000 feet, andthere are no east-to-west communications northof latitude 4, i.e., about the latitude of Kuantan,The central (backbone of hills dies away soonafter crossing the frontier with Siam, and goodlateral communications were available in theneighbourhood of Singora, where, also, therewere suitable sites for aerodromes. Generallyspeaking, communications in the west are goodand on the east poor.

The defence of the east coast was simplified!by the lack of communications, since it was.only necessary to hold those places from whichroads ran into the interior.. This meant thatthe key points to hold were Mersing andKuantan. Kota Bharu in Kelantan was heldbecause of the aerodrome at that place and twoothers a few miles further south, these beingnecessary in order to enable us to strike, withaircraft, as far as possible into the Gulf ofSiam and into Indo China. (See para. 5.2:below.)

The only existing land communication1,between Kelantan and the rest of Malaya is therailway, there being no through road.

.Attempts were made to use the railway formotor transport, tout as the rails were spiked'and no chairs were available the damagecaused to tyres, was so excessive that the pro-ject was given up as impracticable; This meantthat communications with any force at 'KotaBharu were precarious, since everything had to-move ;by the single line of railway, which iitmany parts was highly vulnerable to bombing..I laid down that the road policy in Kelantaoi-should -be not to develop any road on or nearthe coast, but as soon as practicable to con-struct an internal road running north and south,following more or less the line of the railway.

The only communication overland withKuantan was a single road, also very vulner-able in places to air bombing.Co-operation between the services and with the1

civil authorities.13. For some time before November, 1940,

the relations between the Army and the AirForce were not happy; there was some jealousy


between them, co-operation left a great deal tobe desired, and it was some months 'before thiscould 'be considered satisfactory. Every opera-tion should have been looked upon as a com-bined operation of 'two, or very often the three,services; for a long time there was a tendencyfor one of the services to work out a plan onits own and then see how one or both the otherservices could come in.

A great step in advance was made by gettingthe headquarters of the Army and Air Force onthe same site. This entailed a good deal ofbuilding, but before war started there was asingle combined Operations Room functioningand the whole of the Army General Staff werelocated on the same site as Royal Air ForceHeadquarters. A naval section joined theOperations Room at the start of the war asplanned previously.

14. The local tradition of inter-servicejealousy had some effect for the first few monthson the working of General Headquarters. Per-sonal relations with Army Headquarters weregood, but my staff had to ibe scrupulously care-ful in dealing with matters that touched on theprovince of the General Officer Commanding.

Co-operation (between the Navy and AirForce was good, and it continually improvedbetween the Navy and the Army, for instance,on such matters as getting advice from navalofficers as to the probable sites of landings fromthe naval point of view.

15. Relations between the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, and myself were closeand friendly throughout. Our offices wereadjoining after the move of my headquartersto the Naval Base and I had luncheon with himin his house nearly every day.

Relations between the commanders in Malayaand the Governor were good. I always foundthe Governor ready to help, and our personalrelations were very friendly.

As regards the Colonial Service generally,our relations in most cases were satisfactory,and much help was received0 from manyDepartments, especially the Survey and theGovernment Posts and Telegraphs. But,partly owing to the complicated system of gov-ernment, delays sometimes occurred and oncertain matters it was difficult to get full andaccurate information. I feel it would be ofgreat value to the Colonial Service if its officerscould attend some college on the lines of theMilitary Staff Colleges at some time in theircareer.

There was an interchange of liaison officerswith the Dutch, first Navy and Air and laterArmy as well. Observers from the AmericanArmy and Navy were also posted to Singapore.

Borneo.16. Unless we obtained command of the sea,

it was impossible to defend British Borneo as awhole with the forces available. But throughcommunications in the island were practicallynon-existent; consequently, any defence couldbe limited to holding the important points. Theonly place which it was decided to hold wasKuching, the reason for this being not only thatthere was an aerodrome at that place, but thatits occupation by the enemy might give accessto the aerodromes in Dutch Borneo at theNorth-Western end of the island, these aero-dromes being only some 350 miles from Singa-pore, i.e., much nearer than any in South Indo-China.

I informed the Governor of North Borneo thathis territory could not be defended, and thatthe volunteers and police at his disposal were tobe utilised for purposes of internal security.No attempt was made to defend Labuan,though it was a cable and wireless station.

The State of Brunei was of some importanceowing to the oilfield at Seria in the South,which, in addition to Miri, supplied crude oilto the refineries at Lutong in Sarawak. Althoughone company of the 2nd/i5th Punjab Regi-ment less one platoon to Kuching, had beenmoved to Lutong in December, 1940, and two6-inch guns had been mounted there, it wasfinally decided that it was useless to attempt todefend the refinery or either of the oilfields.Consequently, a partial denial scheme wascarried out before war broke out, whereby theoil output was reduced by some 70 per cent.,and only a small number of items were left tocomplete the denial scheme when war brokeout. According to reports, the work wascompleted satisfactorily.

The 2nd/i5th Punjab Regiment, less the onecompany referred to above, left Singapore for.Kuching on the loth and nth May, 1941. Stepswere also taken to develop local forces, i.e.,volunteers and a body of native troops knownas the Sarawak Rangers.

III.—FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEFENCE OFBURMA.

Authorities.17. Sir Reginald Dorman Smith replaced the

Hon. Sir Archibald Cochrane as Governor ofBurma on the 6th May, 1941, and Lieut.-General Hutton took over the duties of GeneralOfficer Commanding from Lieut.-GeneralMcLeod at midnight the 28th-29th December,1941.

The War Committee in Burma includedBurmese Ministers as well as the two BritishCounsellors and the General Officer Command-ing. The Governor was President and thePremier of Burma Vice-President.

Sir R. Dorman Smith established a militaryliaison officer on his personal staff. There wereobvious advantages in this, and it would doubt-less have worked well had the facts and figuresalways been obtained from the responsibleauthorities. As it was, information was some-times sought through other channels, with theresult that at times inaccurate or incompleteinformation was 'given to the Governor, leadingto misunderstandings.Communications.

18. The main factor affecting the defence ofBurma was that of communications. The totallength of frontier facing Japanese-occupied terri-tory in December, 1941, was nearly 800 miles.There were good roads, as well as railways,running north and south up the valleys of theSittang and Irrawaddy. Roads in theTenasserim Peninsula were ibad.

Working north from the southern end of theTenasserim Peninsula, there were onlymountain tracks leading eastwards from Siamuntil reaching the road from Raheng throughMesod towards Moulmein, which crossed theBurma frontier at Myawadi. Even this roadwas not continuous, and there was a sectionof fifty miles reported to be not much betterthan a pack track. From the Japanese pointof view, it had 4he disadvantages that weshould be able to operate from close to ourrailhead at Martaban, and that, so long as we


held command of the sea, advance beyondMoulmein by the Japanese would be open toa British flank attack.

Continuing north, there were again onlytracks until reaching the road leading from theBangkok-Chieng Mai railway,' through ChiengRai and thence via Kentung to Taunggyi. Onthe Siamese side of the frontier this road wasgood; on our side it was fair-weather only forpart of the way.

There were only tracks leading from Burmainto Northern Indo-China, and these involvedthe crossing of the River Mekong. Into Chinaitself there was a fair track from Kentung toPuerhfu, and, secondly, the main road fromLashio to Kunming. A road from Bhamo joinedthe latter near the frontier.

Westwards, a start had been made on a roadcommunication with India, but this was by nomeans complete when war broke out.

Landing grounds had been established in theTenasserim Peninsula with the object of facili-tating the movement of aircraft between Burmaand Malaya; the main ones were at Tavoy,Mergui and Victoria Point. The last was veryisolated, and it was realised that it probablycould not be held for long if war with Japanbroke out.

19. It was estimated that the total forcewhich the Japanese could bring against Burma,using land communications only, would beabout two divisions, of which one divisionwould be on the road running* through Chie'ngRai. The Chiefs of Staff considered in January1941 that, although four enemy divisions couldbe maintained at railhead on the Bangkok-Chieng Mai railway, it was unlikely that evenone division could be maintained on the Burmaside of the frontier, owing to the limited roadcommunications. The situation would, how-ever, be completely altered should the Japaneseget control of sea communications in the Bay ofBengal. In that case, their capture of Mergui,and possibly Tavoy, would only be a questionof time. They would be able to outflank ourpositions at Moulmein, and our line of com-munication thence with Rangoon; and, shouldSingapore fall or be invested, would be able tobring by sea against Burma a force muchgreater than two divisions.

20. Turning to the Chieng Rai line ofadvance, owing to the indifferent road on ourside of the frontier and the shortage of Mechani-cal Transport, it was impracticable to maintaina big force east of the Salween. The policy,

. therefore, was to fight delaying actions as farforward as possible, and to make the Salweenthe main line of defence.

Owing to the. heavy growth of trees alongthe Japanese lines of advance, conditions werenot generally favourable for air reconnaissance.On the other hand, there were certain opendefiles against which air bombing wouldprobably have been very effective, and it washoped that sufficient air force would be avail-able to deter the Japanese advance to a greatextent. For this purpose aerodromes wereconstructed with the object of being able to con-centrate either on Central or South Burma, andagainst either the Mesod road or the ChiengRai road.

Demolitions were prepared along the enemylines of advance, especially on the Chieng Rairoad.

Engineering Programme,21. There was a great shortage of engineers,

both civil and military. In planning the engi-neering programme, priority was given first toaerodrome construction and accommodation forthe Royal Air Force; secondly, to road con-struction for strategical and tactical purposes,including ferries; and then accommodation fortroops and stores, including ammunition.

In the time available there was no opportu-nity to complete elaborate concrete defence lines;all that could be done was to construct fielddefences on the probable lines of approach.There were limitations even to this: first, thedifficulty of working and the prevalence ofmalaria in the rainy season; secondly, the num-ber of troops available; and thirdly, the lack ofMechanical Transport, until the Autumn of1941, which severely limited the number of men•that could be maintained near, and east of,the Salween River.

Strength of Forces.22. The composition of the military forces in

Burma when war broke out is shown in Appen-dix G, and the situation regarding Anti-Aircraftguns in Appendix F.

As will be seen, the organisation was some-what complicated from the desire to make everypossible use of local resources. Originally, theBurma Frontier Force had been independentof the General Officer Commanding in peace,and only came under him in time of war: HisExcellency Sir Reginald Dorman Smith decidedto put the Burma Frontier Force under theGeneral Officer Commanding's control in peaceas well, thus simplifying the organisation. Thechange was effected on the loth November,1941.

The -Independent Company was abolishedbefore war with Japan broke out, the Britishportion being used mainly for additional squadsfor Chinese guerillas, and the Burmese return-ing to their original units.

23. In the Singapore Ccnference of October1940 it was recommended that ,as regards theArmy, the force immediately required for thedefence of Burma was as follows: —

5 infantry brigades and two additionalbattalions;

1 field regiment and i battery;2 mountain batteries;i anti-tank battery;i-heavy A.A. regiment (24 guns);i light A.A. battery, non-mobile d6 guns);i light A.A. battery, mobile; and1 company light tanks.

This • was exclusive of the Burma FrontierForce and of the Territorial and Auxiliaryforces allotted to internal security duties. Itwas also staled that an additional requirementfor the long-term problem was: one Division,less certain units, which made the fightingportion of this Division as follows: —

2 infantry brigades, each 'of 3 battalions;i reconnaissance unit;i field regiment (24 guns);i medium re^jment (16 guns);i light A.A. regiment (48 guns);i anti-tank battery; andi machine gun battalion.

In their comments of January 1941, on theConference, the Chiefs of Staff stated that theyconsidered both the threat of attack, and thedemands for land forces, had been overstated.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948going to face this, they would be much morelikely to start attacking Singapore than Burma.Admittedly, we were working on probabilitiesand not certainties, but, in view of the weaknessof our air forces, it was essential to concentratethe maximum effort and not try to be equallystrong in two places.

540

Comparing the Conference recommendationswith the total Army strength available in Burmain December 1941 (see Appendix G), andomitting the Burma Frontier Force and theTerritorial and Auxiliary forces, the shortageswere approximately—

3 field batteries;i anti-tank battery; andi company light tanks

out of the immediate requirements, and thewhole of the additional requirement.

Apart from this, up to the outbreak of the•war with Japan, Burma remained short of: —

Rifles;Mechanical transport vehicles;Officers for the General Officer Command-

ing's staff and services; andMedical personnel.

24. A Burma Royal Naval Volunteer Reserveunder the command of Commander K. S. Lyle,R.N., had been raised in 1940. It had two orthree patrol boats operating off the TenasserimPeninsula, and was also responsible for mine-sweeping the Rangoon approaches and forexamination services. There were several othercraft building at Rangoon, but these had beenhelp up mainly owing to the delay in obtainingengines and fittings from England. The forcewas under the Commander-in-Chief, China, foroperations, and under the Governor of Burmafor administration. It was not under theGeneral Officer Commanding, though co-opera-tion was very satisfactory.

25. In November 1940, air strength inBurma was practically non-existent. TheSingapore Conference had recommended thefollowing: —

1 general reconnaissance squadron;2 bomber squadrons; andi fighter squadron.

No. 60 Squadron, equipped with Blenheimbombers, arrived from India in February 1941;in August 1941, one flight was reorganised asa fighter flight and equipped with BrewsterBuffaloes. Later, a complete Buffalo squadron,No. 67, was sent from Malaya in November1941, and the whole of No. 60 Squadron re-verted to bombers. There was a BurmaVolunteer Air Unit, but this had not got furtherthan a small training organisation. Thismerely gave Burma two squadrons, whichwas admittedly very weak, and, actually, whenwar broke out, most of the Blenheim squadron,No. 60, was in Malaya for bombing practice.

On the other hand, the American VolunteerGroup of the International Air Force startedto train in Burma in August 1941, and there wasan understanding, amounting practically to anagreement, with General Chiang Kai-shek that,if Burma was attacked, part, or the whole, ofthis American Volunteer Group would bedetailed for the defence of Burma. Actually,two of the American Volunteer Groupsquadrons were sent to Kunming when war withJapan ibroke out, and one to Mingaladon, nearRangoon.

It was my opinion that the defence of Burmadepended largely upon holding Malaya, andthat the defence of the latter must havepriority. I also considered it unlikely that theJapanese would attack Burma solely in orderto cut the Burma Road to China. They knewthat this must involve war with Great Britain,and in all probability with the Dutch andperhaps also the United States. If they, were

The American Volunteer Group.26. The American Volunteer Group consisted

of three single-seater fighter squadrons whichwere equipped with Tomahawks up to the timeI handed over command.

Doubtless the United States will not forgetthe help that was freely given to the AmericanVolunteer Group by the Burma Governmentand by the Royal Air Force. They were giventhe sole use of the Royal Air Force aerodromeat Toungoo, allowed to use Mingaladon aero-drome, near Rangoon, for testing Tomahawksafter erection, and were offered the use of furtheraerodromes if required. Permission fromLondon was given on the 22nd August, 1941,for the American Volunteer Group to carry outoperational training in Burma, and they weregiven assistance in many other directions.

On the 3ist October, 1941, the BritishAmbassador, Chungking, represented to theForeign Office that the situation in China wasvery serious. We were asked what we could doto help, and suggested that we might form aBritish fighter squadron with volunteers fromthe Royal Air Force to form part of the Inter-national Air Force, and possibly a bombersquadron as well. It was pointed out that thisproposal would mean a reduction in our owneffective fighting and bombing strength. Thesuggestion was approved by the Chiefs of Staff,provided I was satisfied they would be able tooperate effectively as part of the InternationalAir Force and that I could accept the detach-ment from the Malaya defences. Thesesquadrons would have been largely dependenton the American Volunteer Grouporganisation for their maintaintence. Pendinga detailed examination of the maintenancearrangements in China, volunteers for thesesquadrons were not called for and actually theywere never formed, but many preliminary stepswere taken, including the movement of vehicles,spares and bombs. A telegram to the Britishliaison mission in Washington, and a personaltelegram from me to General MacArthur inManila, resulted in a very fair stock of sparesbeing received by the American Volunteer Groupbefore war broke out. But for this, it is verydoubtful if they could have gone on working formore than two or three weeks.

I found that the pilots of. the AmericanVolunteer Group were not satisfied with theirTomahawks when I visited them in September1941. This was largely corrected before war brokeout, partly Iby giving details of the successes ofthe Tomahawks in the Middle East, and partly•by a test carried out between a Buffalo and aTomahawk, which showed the latter to be con-siderably superior in speed, climb and inmanoeuvrability over some 10,000 feet.Aircraft Warning System.

27. There was an air observation corps underGeneral Officer Commanding, organised in fivegroups, each under an ex-inspector of police,the observers being local Burmans and Anglo-Burmans. This Observer Corps did good work,and, according to later reports, warnings ofthe attacks on Rangoon were received in time


for the fighters to take off and get up. AnR.D.F. set at Moulmein was just starting to•operate in December 1941.

With regard to A.R.P., the original policyin Rangoon had been evacuation. Sir ReginaldDorman Smith decided to change this, andto construct air raid shelters. There had .beenno time to complete these shelters before warbroke out.

Political Factors.28. The internal situation in Burma gave

rise to much anxiety, and it was realised thatin time of war it might become necessary toreinforce the police with military units. Therewere doubtless many reasons for this potentialunrest, but two were particularly evident. Thefirst was the influence of the Buddhist priest-hood, especially from Mandalay. In Burmaitself, the priesthood was numerous andpowerful; it had been brought largely underthe influence of the anti-British political party,and. consequently preached the doctrine ofBurma for the Burmese and complete indepen-dence. Many efforts were being made to ocounteract this, and were partially successful. "Apparently, in the Shan States, the native rulershad kept a tighter control over the Buddhistpriests than we did in Burma proper, and hadlimited their numbers.

The second reason was the anti-Indian feeling.The Indians in Burma were much more cleverthan the Burmese in business transactions, and,amongst other things, lent money out on mort-gage, with the result that they owned a largeproportion—about one-half—of the best agri-cultural land in Burma. We were looked uponto some extent as protectors of the Indians, andconsequently attracted to ourselves part of thehatred that was felt by the Burmese for theIndians over this land problem.

Transfer of Command to Commander-in-Chief,India.29. On the I2th December a telegram was

received from the Chiefs of Staff stating that thedefence of Burma was to be transferred fromCommander-in-Chief, Far East, to Commander-in-Chief, India, including all relations withChina. The transfer was effected as from 0630hours on the I5th December, 1941.

IV.—FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEFENCE OFHONG KONG.

Authorities.30. In November 1940, General Norton was

Acting Governor of Hong Kong. Sir GeoffreyNorthcote resumed his post as Governor on the oI3th March, 1941, and handed over to hissuccessor, Sir Mark Young, on the lothSeptember, 1941. Major General Maltby tookover the duties of General Officer Commandingfrom Major-General Grasett on the igth July,1941.

General Policy.31. Hong Kong was regarded officially as an

undesirable 'military commitment, or else as anoutpost to be held as long as possible. It must,however, be considered in relation to the wholedefence of the Far East, especially China andthe Philippines. The withdrawal of our troopsirom Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai in thesummer of 1941 after the collapse of Francewas recognised by General Chiang Kai-shek andthe Chinese as being an inevitable and wisemove, but the Chinese interest in the defence of

Hong Kong grew as their war developed andtheir difficulties increased. Hong Kong was

' very valuable to China as a port of access andhad they not been convinced of our determina-tion to stand and fight for its defence, and beentaken into our confidence and given opportu-nities to inspect the defences and discuss plansfor defence, the effect on their war effort wouldin all probability have been serious. A with-drawal of the troops in Hong Kong coincidingwith the closing of the 'Burma Road might havehad a marked effect on Chinese determinationto fight on. Our policy for the defence of HongKong, therefore, in all probability played animportant part at a critical period in China'swar effort.

As regards the Philippines, according to infor-mation available in Singapore, it was doubtful,at any rate up to the middle of 1941, whetherthe Americans intended to defend the islands,or whether they did not. It is therefore possible,that had we demilitarised Hong Kong, orannounced our intention of not defending it,the Americans might have adopted a similarpolicy with regard to the Philippines. In thiscase, they -might have ceased to take direct in-terest in the Far East, and confined themselvesto the Eastern half of the Pacific. Should thissupposition be correct, then the attempteddefence of Hong Kong was justified for thisreason alone, even though it did ultimately leadto the loss of six battalions and other troops.

Strength of Defences.32. The strength of the Hong Kong garrison

is given in Appendix H. The official period forwhich Hong Kong was to be provisioned, ibothin military stores and food reserves, was 130days.

The main defence of Hong Kong was on theIsland. Whilst the enemy were to be delayedas long as possible in any advance over theleased territory on the mainland, the troops hadorders to retire if attacked in force, as theywere required for the defence of the Islanditself. The Gin Drinkers line was naturally astrong one, and much work had .been done onit, -but it would have required two divisionsor more to hold properly.

Two Canadian battalions arrived in HongKong on the i6th November, 1941. This extraforce was of greater value than the figures wouldindicate. Whilst there were only four batta-lions in Hong Kong, only one could be sparedfor the Gin Drinkers line, which practicallymeant merely a thin outpost line. As this batta-lion was also essential for the defence of HongKong Island, it would not have been able toput up any resistance, but would have had toretire before the advance of even a weak force,since heavy casualties would prejudice thedefence of the Island, and could not >be faced.With the arrival of these two Canadian batta-lions, three could be put into the Gin Drinkersline, and a far stronger resistance could -be putup, not merely because of the increasedstrength, but because casualties would notcripple the subsequent defence of Hong KongIsland. Even a few days' delay in the occu-pation of the mainland by the enemy was ofgreat value, enabling steps to -be completedwhich it was impracticable to take before theoutbreak of war, for instance, the movementof the fishing fleet and waterborne populationout of Hong Kong waters.


33. A great deal of work had been done inpreparing the island for defence, and the con-struction and concealment of pill-boxes and ob-stacles showed much originality and initiative.Preparations were also made for offensive opera-tions against islands near Hong Kong, shouldthe Japanese seize them, and for " left-behind "parties on the mainland. Every advantagewas taken of any local resources available fordefence.

34. There were two Walrus amphibians andfour Vildebeeste aeroplanes at Hong Kong,located at Kai Tak aerodrome on the mainland.The former might have been of some value forreconnaissance; in war it had been intended tooperate them from Aberdeen Harbour, on theSouth side of Hong Kong Island, but this wasapparently found impracticable. The latterwould have had to remain at Kai Tak since nopossible site for an aerodrome could be foundon the Island "itself. It was realised that theseaeroplanes could not last for long in time of war,and that the Kai Tak aerodrome would, in fact,be quite unusable unless the Gin Drinkers linecould be held.

.Civil Population Factors.35. One of the main problems in the defence

of Hong Kong was the large Chinese popula-tion. This had nearly doubled during the threeyears previous to December 1941, owing to theinflux from China. The population in April1941 was—

Hong Kong 709,006Kowloon 581,000Water population 154,000

Total 1,444,000This is exclusive of the population of what isknown as the New Territories on the mainland.

The great increase above the normal popula-tion led to many problems, e.g., civil hospitalaccommodation and medical staff, police con-trol, supply of water, food and firewood. Inaddition, this increase, combined with the con-stant movement taking place between the Islandand the mainland, rendered it very difficult tokeep complete control of the Chinese, and madeit easy for the Japanese to acquire information.

36. The reservoirs on Hong Kong Island werepartly filled by rain water and partly by asupply from the mainland. It was, of course,realised that this latter supply might be cut,calculations showed that the rain, added to thecapacity of the reservoirs, was normally suffi-cient to meet the essential requirements of HongKong Island, so long as the whole Islandremained in our hands. If there was a dry0

spell during the winter, the supply might havebeen short in February and March, and theremight not have been sufficient to supply waterto deal with outbreaks of fire. Although fireengines could draw on sea water, the higherlevels of the town of Victoria could not bereached in one lift. This difficulty was largelyovercome, however, by the installation of ser-vice' tanks at medium levels, which it was in-tended to keep filled with sea water by separatepumps.

37. As regards food, rice was a constantanxiety, since most of it had to be importedfrom Siam or Burma. In addition, what wasknown as the rice supplement was a problem,since fish would not be available in case ofwar, and storage of alternatives over a period

of months was difficult. In December 1941 thestocks of food were not much short of thatrequired for the period laid down, i.e., 130days. The local supply of firewood was in-sufficent, and some was being imported fromNorth Borneo.

38. The A.R.P. organisation in Hong Kongwas good, and some 12,000 A.R.P. workers ofone sort or another had been enrolled beforewar broke out. In addition, tunnels were madeinto the granite hills behind the town of Vic-toria; these provided admirable shelters whichshould have been proof against any type ofbomb. The limitation here was the number ofpneumatic drills that could be obtained toenable the necessary blasting to be carried out.It was a slow process but by the time war brokeout there was shelter accommodation in thetunnels, concrete splinter-proof shelters andstrengthened houses for about 300,000.Provision was made for the movement of thebalance to hutments outside the town.

39. Most of the European women and childrenhad been moved away from Hong Kong byJuly 1941, the total leaving being approxi-mately i,680 women and children belonging tothe Navy, Army or Air Force, and 1,824 civi-lian. This left about 918 European women andgirls in Hong Kong. Of these, 595 were nursesand medical staff, 60 held key duties in A.R.P.and the majority of the remaining 263 wereemployed in clerical and other duties. TheGovernor's order for the movement of womenand children away from Hong Kong had beendisputed, but was upheld in a test case in thecourts.

V.—PROBLEMS AND WORK OF GENERALHEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST.

Site of General Headquarters.

40. General Headquarters started to functionat 0800 hours on Monday, the i8th November.The order issued to the three General OfficersCommanding and the Air Officer Commandingoutlining their relations to General Head-quarters is given in Appendix B.

One of the first problems I had to decide wasthe site of my Headquarters. The Army Head-quarters was at Fort Canning and the AirForce Headquarters was in newly-built hut-ments about five miles away. The Governorand other civil authorities were in Singaporetown. The Naval Commander-in-Chief had hisHeadquarters at the Naval Base, which wassome 35 minutes by road from Singapore. Itwas important for my Headquarters to keep in

, touch with all these. I hoped at one time thatthe Commander-in-Chief, China, would moveto Singapore, but he felt very strongly that hehad to remain in the Naval Base, where theF.E.C.B. was also located. A compromisemight .have been possible but would have en-tailed dividing F.E.C.B. After much considera-tion, I decided that the dominant factors wereto ensure close touch with the Commander-in-Chief, China, and to keep the F.E.C.B. intact.Accordingly, my Headquarters moved to theNaval Base in January, 1941, but I continuedto reside in Singapore, which enabled me tohave interviews with the General Officer Com-manding, Air Officer Commanding and theGovernor, either before I went to the office oron my return. This was not a perfect solu-tion, but it was Ihe best one in all the circum-stances.


Another factor which influenced me in com-ing to this decision was the danger of my Head-quarters becoming intimately involved in thedefence of Malaya if I remained at Singapore,to the neglect of the wider problems of the de-fence of the Far East.

Relations with Commander-in-Chief, China• Station.

41. From about June 1941 onwards an intel-ligence conference was held at'ten o'clock everymorning, and was attended^by the Commander-in-Chief, China, and myself, and our seniorstaff officers. Generally speaking, the divisionof responsibilities was clear, and in other casesthey were divided up without any difficulty.The Commander-in-Chief, China, had beendealing with Free French problems, and con-tinued to do so after my Headquarters wasformed. As our relations with French Indo-China were largely concerned with economicsand shipping, he dealt with most of the prob-lems of that country, whilst my Headquartersdealt mainly with Siam. He also agreed totake over responsibility for control of the Pressand continued to do so up to the beginning ofDecember, when Sir Tom Phillips arrived andI took over this responsibility.

Other questions, such as food supplies, we[dealt with together. In this case also shippingwas largely involved, and as the Commander-in-Chief, China, had a representative on theFood Committee, he generally represented ourcombined views at meetings of the War Com-mittee.

The Commander-in-Chief, China, took overfrom me the control of the Miri oil denialscheme. This was found more convenient sincethe problems of oil supply were more closelyconnected with the Navy than with the Armyor Air Force, and the evacuation of bothmaterial and personnel from Miri was essen-tially a Naval matter.

Agreement was reached in regard to surfacesea patrols near the coast, and it was decided

.that the Naval authorities would be responsiblefor patrolling in the open sea and the Armywould be responsible for similar work on therivers. One or two estuaries were dealt withas special cases, but generally came under theNaval authorities.Conferences at Singapore.

42. Many conferences were held .in Singa-pore both before and after the formation ofGeneral Headquarters, Far East. These wereas follows: —

(a) The Franco-British Conference held inJune 1939. ihe report of tnis comerence con-tained some useful observations on thegeneral problems, but the basic assumptionof active French collaboration from Indo-China vanished with. the;.collapse of France.

(6) The Singapore Conference of October,1940, with which should be included theTactical Appreciation dated the i6th October,1940, prepared by the Commander-in-Chief,China Station, the General Officer Command-ing, Malaya, and the Air Officer Command-ing, Far East. (See paras. 79 and 90 below.)

(c) The conversations with the Dutch inDecember 1940, the principal object beingto obtain information and agreement on cer-tain matters raised in Appendix A of the Re-port of the Singapore Conference.

(d) The Conference between British, Dutchand Australian representatives, with United

Slates observers in attendance, held in Singa-pore in February 1941, resulting, in what isknown as the A.D.A. agreement. Thisagreement included plans for mutual rein-forcements, principally of air forces and sub-marines. (See para. 44 below.)

(e) The Conference between the Ameri-cans, Dutch and British, including Australiaand New Zealand, together with representa-tives of India and the East Indies Station.This was held at Singapore in April 1941,and resulted in what is known as the A.D.B.agreement. (See para. 45 below.) It was fol-lowed by a snorter agreement between theBritish and the Dutch, which dealt almostentirely with Naval matters, and was reallya modification of the agreement reached inA.D.A., bringing the latter into line withA.D.B. It .was known as B.D.

(/) Arising out'of A.D.B., a detailed planfor naval and air operations, known asPlenaps was drawn up..No political commitment was involved by

these agreements, and A.D.A. and A.D.B. re-mained subject to ratification by the respectiveGovernments.

43. In the case of the conference leading tothe A.D.A. and A.D.B. agreements, I felt thatthe representation was somewhat unbalanced.In the former, the Naval representation of theDominions was weak since the Chief of theNaval Staff in Australia, Admiral Colvin, wasunable to come, and New Zealand was repre-sented by Australia. In the A.D.B. Conference,the Naval representation was strong but thatof the Dominion Army and Air Force was com-paratively weak. Further, in A.D.B. theUnited States representatives were somewhatjunior, and there was no representative of thePacific Fleet, but only of the Asiatic.

'44. In A.D.A. the necessity for collectiveaction was emphasised, it being pointed outthat Japanese aggression against any one coun-try would be of vital importance to the others.Agreement was reached on the particularactions by Japan which would necessitate theNaval and Military authorities concerned ad-vising their respective Governments to takeactive military counter-action. A suggestionwas made that Commanders-in-Chief on thespot might be allowed to take measures in suchcircumstances without prior reference toLondon.

The principle of mutual reinforcement wasagreed, the Dutch undertaking to provide sub-marines for operation in the South China Sea,as well as one Fighter and three bombersquadrons to reinforce Malaya; whilst it wasestimated that four Bomber squadrons wouldbe available from Malaya to reinforce theNetherlands East Indies. Australia was pre-pared to assist by the provision of Army units,and of an air striking force at Darwin to rein-force Ambon and Koepang. The necessaryadministrative arrangements to prepare for theseland and air reinforcements were to be under-taken at once, and progress reports were to berendered monthly to G.H.Q., Far East. Theprinciples on which sea communications wouldbe defended were outlined, and emphasis waslaid on the importance of making the passage ofthe Northern line of the Dutch possessions asdifficult as possible for the Japanese.

The A.D.A. report was approved generallyby the Chiefs of Staff, the main exception beingthat there could be no prior definition of an act

544 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY,. 1948

of war and automatic reaction without referenceto London.

45. In the A.D.B. report it was stressed thatthe Atlantic and Europe were the decisivetheatres of war, so that the forces employed inother theatres must be reduced to a minimum.Our main strategy in the Far East for the timemust, therefore, be defensive, but it was re-commended that preparations should be madefor air operations against Japanese-occupiedterritory and against Japan herself, both fromChina and from Luzon.

The necessity for collective action was re-affirmed as well as the particular actions byJapan which would necessitate the Commandersconcerned advising their respective Govern-ments to take active military counter-action.The importance of Luzon, especially from theoffensive point of view, was emphasised, anda recommendation made that its defence shouldbe strengthened. It was suggested in thisconnection that Hong Kong might be of valueas a subsidiary base. It was also recommendedthat the British and U.S.A. should support theChinese Army, especially with finance andequipment, should assist the guerilla opera-tions in China, and organise subversive activityin Japan and Japanese-occupied territories.

It was recommended that the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, should exercisestrategical direction over all Naval forces, ex-cluding those employed solely on local defenceor operating under Commander-in-Chief, UnitedStates Asiatic Fleet. Similarly, it was recom-mended that the Commander-in-Chief, FarEast, should exercise strategical direction of theair forces in the Far East. The areas of res-ponsibility were denned. The 'basis of a planfor Naval and air co-operation, both as regardsreinforcements and reconnaissance, was laiddown. This included the movement of surfacevessels of the United States Asiatic Fleet fromManila to Singapore if the former were attacked,and the despatch of two or more Dutch sub-marines to the South China Sea, all operatingunder the Commander-in-Chief, China.

For purposes of planning, the iair forcesavailable for mutual reinforcement were assumedto be: —

c From Malaya: 4 bomber squadrons;From Netherlands East Indies: 3 bomber

and i fighter squadrons;From Philippines: all available, but in case

of evacuation only; andFrom Australia: 2 bomber squadrons for

the Ambon-Timor Area.In telegraphic comments by the Commanders-

in-Chief, Far East and China, two points werespecially stressed: first, the great importanceto the defence of the Far East of offensive opera-tions by the United States Pacific Fleet, a pointthat was deliberately omitted from the report;and, secondly, the importance of strengtheningthe defences of Luzon.

The A.DJB. report was, with one or twoexceptions, approved -by the Chiefs of Staff inLondon. The exceptions were that, whilst theywould welcome any strengthening of the Philip-pines which could be effected otherwise thanat the expense of the United States effort in t!heAtlantic, they were not prepared to press thepoint in the United States: and that Hong Kongwas unlikely to be of much value as anadvanced base for operations iby United Statessubmarines and naval aircraft against theJapanese sea communications.

But, although signed by the representativesof the United States, the report was objected toin Washington, mainly on the ground that cer-tain political matters had been introduced. Anamended A.D.B. agreement, known asA.D.B. 2, was therefore drawn up in Londonin August 1941, leaving all the main featuresof A.D.B. practically unchanged, but puttingthe political matters into an appendix. This,however, did not entirely satisfy the UnitedStates authorities in Washington, and eventu-ally it was decided that a further conferenceshould be held in the Far East to draw up amodified A.D.B. This information was con-veyed to me on the 25th November, 1941, butwas received too late for any action to be takenbefore war started.

In spite of this, A.D.B. and Plenaps re-mained the basis on .which we were able towork before, and immediately after, the out-break of war with Japan, both with the Nether-lands East Indies and, to a lesser degree, withthe Philippines. (But see para, in below.)

Information from London.46. I found on arrival in the Far East that

there was considerable ignorance of modern warconditions, both in the Army and the Air Force.This could not, of course, be made good entirelyby documents; personal experience was essential.

For some months after the formation of myGeneral Headquarters there seemed to be con-siderable delay in getting information fromEngland with regard to the lessons of recentoperations and developments in tactical ideas,both as regards the Army and the Air Force,though A.R.P. pamphlets seemed to arriveregularly soon after issue. The situation im-proved about July, 1941, but we were alwaysuncertain whether we were being kept up todate. This feeling of being neglected wasnaturally, intensified by the distance of Londonfrom Singapore, and the whole position in thisrespect would have been greatly improved ifvisits by liaison officers from the War Office andAir Ministry had (been made from time to time.This was actually started in .the case of the WarOffice, and the first liaison officer arrived inSingapore in November, 1941. I believe it wasintended to do the same in the case of the AirMinistry. It would have been a great helphad this been done twelve months earlier.

Training.47. As regards training, steps were taken to

ensure that troops were thoroughly acquaintedwith the nature of the country in which theywould have to operate. This was simple in thecase of Hong Kong, where units knew exactlythe ground over which they were going to fight.It was more difficult in the case of Malaya, asthe nature of the country varied considerably,but here special attention was paid to move-ments through jungle and the acquisition ofjungle lore, and many units reached a highstage of proficiency in this. The Volunteers inMalaya were called up for training duringFebruary and March 1941.

Apart from minor Staff Exercises, two werecarried out under General Headquarters: thefirst in December, 1940, to test out communi-cations and co-operation between the Army andthe Royal Air Force; and the second, a moreambitious one, in March, 1941, to test out allthe stages of a change-over from peace to warfor the civil authorities as well as for the threeServices. This brought out many useful lessons.


A very successful exercise based on this secondone was held in Burma in July, 1941, and HongKong carried out two or three on similar lines.

Defensive Preparations.48. The question of the best method of

defending the important sectors of the EastCoast of Malaya gave rise to much discussion.One school of thought argued that, as therewere insufficient numbers to defend any greatlength of beach, the enemy would be able toland outside the defended portion, thus out-flanking the defender£\and possibly cutting themoff. The best ca^se^7*?ction was, therefore, tofight on a prepared position in rear where theroad.leading into the interior could be defended.This school also argued that attempts to holdthe beaches would result in a purely lineardefence with insufficient troops in hand forcounter-attack.

The view of General Headquarters, Far East,was that it was essential to hold the beaches,because it was during the period of landingthat the enemy would be most vulnerable, andif the beaches were given up he would be fight-ing on equality with us. Again, it was duringthis process of landing that outmost effectiveoo-operation between the Army and Air, andpossibly the Navy as well, could be effected.Admittedly there was a danger of having apurely linear defence, but this was primarilya question of adjustment between the forcesretained in reserve and those detailed for hold-ing the beaches themselves.

Another point was that of all-round defence.It was difficult with the forces available to haveunits in a group of perimeter'posts and at thesame time to protect an adequate length.ofbeach. .Further, the defenders must be pre-pared to hold on for a period to be reckonedby weeks raliher than by days, even if sur-rounded by the enemy and out off. There wasbut little object in this unless adequate reserveswere available in rear to attack the enemy andrestore the situation. The 22nd AustralianBrigade at Mersing found a satisfactory solutionto the problem in that they Jhad perimeter•defences for units,71 mutually supporting eachother and primarily defending the beaches.But in their case -the 27th Australian Brigadewas available in Johore for counter-attack ona large scale. The problem was more difficultat Kuantan and Kota Bharu for the reasonsindicated above. (See para. 12.)

Although it was my policy to allow theGeneral Officers-in-Command as much freedomas possible, I found it necessary in the case ofMalaya to issue orders that the first line of ourdefence was to be the beaches. Previously, ex-cept on Singapore Island and Penang, beacheswere going to be occupied only by watchingposts, and the first lines of defence were sitedinland. This change involved a considerableamount of work and preparation of obstaclesand defence posts at Mersing, Kuantan andKota Bharu.

It was found at' one period that the work ofpreparing positions and putting up obstacles wastaking up so much time that the training of thetroops was being hampered and, in addition, thewire generally required renewing after about six.months. Also, I was always on guard .against.too much reliance upon water obstacles, barbedwire and pill-boxes, in case this should lead toa Maginot Line complex to the detriment of the•offensive spirit. Consequently, a division of

available hours was, drawn up, allowing a pro-portion for training.1, a proportion for renewals,and the balance for "new work. As far as prac-ticable, troops consiructed the actual defencesin which they would normally fight. New workscarried out included ;not only defensive prepara-tions,- but facilities for making counter-attacks,e.g., preparation of hidden paths fit for BrenCarriers.

Looking back in the light of what actuallyhappened, it is easy to point out that a lot ofthe preparation was wasted, and that the energyso taken up should have been expended else-where; for instance, a great deal of time wasspent on the Mersing area, which was neverheavily attacked. Mersing, however, was a veryimportant place, and, had the Japanese estab-lished themselves here instead of at Kota Bharu,they would have been at once within a short dis-tance of Singapore; and it is possible that, hadthese defences been less strong, they might haveattacked the Mersing area at an early stage inthe operations. I feel, however, that stepsshould have been taken before war broke outto strengthen the defences on the Northern andNorth-Western sides of Singapore Island.

49. We also had to be prepared for the possi-bility of a break-through in the Mersing area,which would have isolated Southern andNorthern Malaya from Singapore, and this con-sideration affected the siting of depots for storesand ammunition. Therefore, preparations weremade to enable a force to be supplied, if neces-sary, by a line of communication runningthrough Kuala Lumpur to Penang, so that theywould be able to operate quite independently ofSingapore.

Another possibility that had to be consideredwas that of a sudden descent without warning ona part of Singapore Island with the object eitherof destroying some important place, such as themain wireless station, or of establishing a foot-ing, awaiting subsequent reinforcements. Thispossibility was met by having a portion of theSingapore garrison ready to come into actionand move at very short notice.

Operation "Matador."50. The importance of the Southern end of the

Kra Isthmus, especially the neighbourhood ofSingora, has already been referred to (seeparagraph 12 above]. The possibility of anadvance into this Isthmus, in order to hold aposition North of Haad Yai Junction, was con-sidered soon after the formation of GeneralHeadquarters, Far East. Detailed plans forcarrying out this operation were prepared, andthe code word " Matador" was eventuallygiven to it. It was from the start realised thatthe essential feature of this operation was fore-stalling the Japanese on a position near Sin-gora; see, for instance my telegram to theChiefs of Staff through the War Office, in whichit is stated: " The success of this plan woulddepend on rapidity of execution in order to fore-stall the Japanese on the Songhla line "; alsomy telegram from which the following is an ex-tract: " I wish to emphasise the fact that theforestalling of the Japanese in Singora area isessential to the success of ' Matador.' "

This necessitated at least twenty-four hours'. start before the Japanese landed, and rapid

movement of our force once the order was given.It was realised all along that, if these conditionscould not be fulfilled, then the Matador opera-tion would be impracticable. The psychological


value of offensive movement at the start of thewar and the possibility of thereby upsetting theJapanese plans were fully realised, but had tobe weighed against the fact that we should beleaving prepared ground with which the troopswere familiar, and that, unless we forestalled theenemy, the fighting would be in the nature ofan encounter battle, quite possibly againstsuperior numbers. Further, the attitude of theSiamese was uncertain, and questions of secrecyprecluded any attempt to get prior agreementfrom Bangkok. Orders were issued that, shouldMatador be ordered, any opposition from theSiamese was to be overcome at once, but wecould never be certain in advance how muchdelay might be caused to our movements byobstacles, destruction of bridges or active re-sistance. A margin of time was necessary.

A total of thirty officers, two or three at atime, were sent over as visitors to the area inplain clothes in order to collect information,especially on the topography of the country, andto have some individuals familiar with it.

The preparations were completed beforethe Autumn of 1941 as far as could be fore-seen, including maps, arrangements for the dis-tribution of rice to the population, the collec-tion of a quantity of Siamese money, and writ-ing, ready for translation and printing,pamphlets of three varieties to suit the differentattitudes which migHt be adopted by theSiamese Government. For reasons of secrecy,knowledge of the plans was confined to a mini-mum number of individuals, and for the samereason certain stepls could (not be taken anadvance. For instance, it was considereddangerous to translate or print the pamphletsbefore the operation was ordered.

51. Up to the 5th December, Matador was notto be carried out without reference to the WarCabinet, but on that date a telegram was sentto the effect that I could -order it without refer-ence to London in either of the following contin-gencies : —

(a) If I had information that the Japaneseexpedition was advancing with the apparentintention of landing on the Kra Isthmus; or

(b) If the Japanese violated any other partof Thailand (Siam).A few days earlier it had been impressed on

me that carrying out Matador if the Japaneseintended to make a landing in Southern Siamwould almost certainly mean war with Japan,and hi view of this I considered it my duty tobe scrupulously careful in acting on the tele-gram of the 5th December.

Aerodrome Policy.52. The number and location of .aerodromes in

Malaya was based on the principle of relyingmainly on air power for defence. This alsoapplied, though in a somewhat smaller degreeto Burma.

It meant, first having a sufficient number ofaerodromes to make use of the mobility of air-craft for concentrating a large proportion of oursquadrons in any given area; and, secondly,choosing sites as far forward as practicable soas to enable us to reach out the maximum dis-tance both for reconnaissance and for offen-sive operations. This was particularly import-ant in the case of attacks on Japanese convoysin order to ensure having sufficient time to carryout more than one attack before they reachedour coast.

The total number of aerodromes prepared was.based on the figure of 336 Initial Equipmentaircraft, and since this figure was. never reached.we had in some areas more .aerodromes than,we were able to use, the surplus being a liabilityrather than an asset. The forecasts of develop-ment of our air strength were admittedly uncer-tain, but in view of the long time taken to con-struct an aerodrome in Malaya we could notafford to wait until we knew definitely that moreaircraft were coming. The Army dispositionswere largely influenced by the necessity forprotecting Royal Air Force aerodromes. Asevents turned out, owing to the weakness ofthe Royal Air Force at the time war started,the defence of Malaya devolved largely uponthe Army, which meant that sites for aero-dromes were not always the most suitable foroperations as they were actually carried out.But it was impossible to have foreseen this, sinceno one could have known in advance when theJapanese would start the war.

In the autumn of 1941, orders were issuedthat four of the aerodromes in Malaya and twoin Burma were to be extended so as to be suit-able for the operation of heavy bombers up tothe Boeing Fortress type. This meant runwaysof 2,000 yards with a surface sufficiently strongto bear the weight of tfeese aircraft fully loaded.

Sufficient attention was not always given to-the tactical siting of aerodromes from the pointof view of their defence. There was rather atendency at one time to site them solely withreference to their suitability for flying opera-tions; and in one or two cases they were locatedtoo near the coast where they were a definitedanger so long as the Japanese had commandof the sea. This, however, was corrected, andir was laid down that no aerodrome was to beselected or planned except in conjunction withthe staff officer of the Army organisation con-cerned, a principle also applied to the siting of•buildings and aircraft pens. The buildings onsome of the original aerodromes in Malaya hadbeen laid out entirely on a peace basis, forthey were not dispersed and were in straightlines; this was noticeably the case at Alor Star..

53. We learned a lesson from the Dutch asregards the siting of aerodromes. In Borneo,.the communications of which were undeveloped,they worked on the principle of locating aero-dromes 25 to 50 miles from the coast in junglecountry with only one line of access, generallya road, but sometimes a river.. This, of course,,considerably simplified the problem of defenceagainst overland attacks. It was practicableonly to a limited extent in Malaya, but it waslaid down that any future aerodromes requiredin Sarawak and other parts of British Borneo-would be sited on this principle.

Aircraft Warning System.54. There was no air observation system in

Malaya when I arrived, and its organisation en-tailed a large amount of work. The respon-sibility was at first placed upon the G.O.C.and was later transferred to the A.O.C. SomeR.D.F. sets were received during 1941, andbefore war brake out an air observation system,was working well as regards Southern' Malayaand Singapore; it was not good up North,.partly owing to the lack of depth from thefrontier and partly because we had not suffi-cient R.D.F. sets to install any in the North..Communications were difficult the whole time-


as we were short generally of signalling equip-ment, especially material for the constructionof land lines; but the Government Post andTelegraph Service was most helpful, and war•es:perience proved that so long as the Japanesewere kept out of Southern Malaya, Singaporecould always rely on half-an hour's warning of•hostile aircraft. This was, of course, reducedafter the Japanese advance had forced us to

k leave certain R.D.F. stations *

Other Matters that Required Action.55-.. Some special camouflage officers having

been sent out from England in the late summerof 1941, a Camouflage Committee was set upin Malaya and camouflage classes formed inMalaya for the Far East. Priority in camou-flage work was given to the Naval Base andaerodromes, but work was also being donefor civilian establishments which were impor-tant to the war effort. All this involved aperiod of years rather than months and wasby no means complete when war broke out.

The formation of Army Labour Units inMalaya was a matter that was delayed forvarious reasons. Finally, however, it was de-cided to recruit Chinese in Hong Kong, whichhad the- advantage not only of getting labour,but also of reducing the Chinese population ofHong Kong, but, unfortunately, the projectwas not executed before war broke out.

Arrangements were made for successive varia-tions in the route to be followed by civil air-craft between Australia and India in the eventof war with Japan.

56. In December, 1940, there was a seriousdeficiency in ammunition, especially for the4.5 and 3.7 A.A. guns, and in reserves forordnance stores which were only sufficient for90 days instead of 180. Anti-tank weaponsand mines, 3-inch mortars and ammunition werealso short.

Aircraft bombs at this time were also quiteinsufficient to allow for the expected expansion,and up to the autumn, of 1941, .5 ammunitionfor the Buffaloes was difficult to obtain inadequate quantity.

By December, 1941, some of these deficien-cies had been made good. (See paragraph 92below.}

57. Although the Government Post and Tele-graph Service was responsible for the communi-cations on the mainland of Malaya, the lineson Singapore Island were mainly in the handsof a private company known as O.T.E.C. Thiscaused some difficulties, e.g., as regards main-tenance of stocks of spares. But it was de-cided that the situation in 1941 was not suitablefor making the big changes that would havebeen involved had the Government taken overthis company.

58. I found the Malayan War Committee was•not on a satisfactory basis; though the pro-ceedings were recorded in the relevant files,there were no formal minutes, so it was oftendifficult at a meeting to find out quickly whathad been decided previously or who was respon-sible for taking action. This was corrected,a new Secretary for Defence was appointed,and three civilians were brought into the Wai-Committee with' good results. The Commander-in-Chief, China, and I were not members ofthis War Committee, but had a permanent in-vitation from the Governor to attend meetings.

Press Relations.59. It was realised in the Spring of 1941

that some organisation to deal with the Presswould be necessary when war broke out, and,further, that it would be important before warduring .periods of strained relations with Japan.As a. result of a conference attended by allconcerned, an organisation was worked outand brought into operation in the middle ofMay, 1941. The essential feature of it was thatthe Press relations of all three Services weregrouped under one head. As has been statedabove (in paragraph 41), Commander-m-Chief,China, agreed to be responsible for Press re-lations, and a Commander, R.N., who wascalled up from the 'Reserve, was put at thehead of the Services Press Bureau. I was, andstill am, of the opinion that this organisationwas workable. Unfortunately, there were somediscordant personalities, and, finally, after warbroke out, a somewhat different organisationwas adopted, with Sir George Sansom at thehead.

I always found the Press ready to help whenthey were asked (see, for instance, paragraphno below] and on many occasions we gotgood value from them. On the other hand,some representatives, of the Press of othercountries were difficult and required very tact-ful handling; and we were undoubtedly ham-pered in the Far East through lack of officersexperienced in dealing with the Press.

Complaints reached the Ministry of Infor-mation in London that Press correspondentswere not being properly treated; in my replyto one that was passed on to Singapore I stated:" Should be most grateful for any assistanceyou can give to assure that we get out hereofficers who have knowledge of the work andcan be trusted to work loyally as a team andnot for their own individual benefit." I feelthat in this matter we should have had morehelp from England, principally in the way oLsuitable and experienced personnel from thebeginning.

I was reluctant to give Press interviews, butthe importance of doing so from time to timewas frequently intimated to me. There wasone stock question I was -frequently asked:" Was I satisfied with the strength of the de-fences of Malaya or the Far East generally? "I always gave the same reply, that I wasnever going to be satisfied because defensivepreparations could always be improved, and,so far as I could, I was not going to allowany of my subordinates to be satisfied either.

60. One of the steps taken to discourage theJapanese from starting war was to emphasisethe growing strength of our defences in Malaya.(See paragraph 5 (a] above.} The Chiefs ofStaff stated .in May, 1941, that they saw noobjection to this policy and we were aided bydirections from the Ministry of Information inLondon to their representative in Singapore.The method adopted did not consist merelyin extensive advertising of any reinforcements;sometimes when these were obvious they weregiven only a small notice in the papers orbroadcast. On the other hand, when reinforce-ments of Royal Air Force personnel arrived theywere merely referred to as Royal Air Force andno mention was made of the fact that no aero-planes were with them. It is doubtful if theeffect was great, but it was probably ,notnegligible.


In interviews with Press correspondents whomI could trust, I made no secret of the fact thatthe shortage of aeroplanes claused me greatanxiety, but warned them that they were on noaccount to mention it in their papers. Asimilar attitude was adopted with regard totanks, of which we had none when war "trokeout.

Meeting with British Far East Representatives.61. At the end of September 1941, Sir Earle

Page from Australia, the British Ambassador inChungking Sir A. Clark Kerr, and the BritishMinister in Bangkok Sir J. Crosby, were all inSingapore. The opportunity was taken to havea combined meeting together with Mr. -DuffCooper and the Governor of Malaya in orderthat the two Commanders-in-Chief mightdiscuss with them all the situation in the FarEast. A report was sent to the Chiefs ofStaff.

The meeting agreed generally with the viewsexpressed by the Commander-in-Chief, China,and myself, that Japan's principal asset in theFar East was her foothold in Indo-China, whichmight be developed as a springboard from whichto attack Malaya. Further, that Japan mustbe anxious to avoid war in the South for thenext few months so the time was opportune forbringing pressure to bear on her to withdrawfrom Indo-China.

The meeting emphasised that, in the absenceof a British fleet based at Singapore, there waslittle doubt that Japan could strike at herselected moment and stressed the propagandavalue of even one or two battleships at Singa-pore. Various steps were recommended,including the following: —

The issue of a co-ordinated announcementby the British, United States and DutchGovernments that they had a combined planfor action in the event of a Japanese moveagainst any of their interests in the FarEast;

Urging the United States to reinforce thePhilippines, especially with submarines andair forces;

Development of our aid to, and plans foroperations in, China; and

Liaison with Russian forces in the FarEast.

VI.—CIVIL DEFENCE PROBLEMS IN MALAYA.Food and Water.

62. On my arrival in Singapore I found alarge number of Civil Defence matters requiringattention. As regards food supplies, a six-months' supply for the whole population, aswell as for the Navy, Army and Air Force,had been laid down as the minimum require-ment. Rice was a constant source of anxiety.The yield of rice in Malaya was insufficientfor the whole population, and so some had to beimported mainly from Burma, and this again wasnaturally dependent on shipping. As soon asthe year's crop was gathered, stocks wereplentiful, but the consumption was large andrequired constant watching. There was diffi-culty over the storage of rice for more thansix months, but this had been solved by theintroduction of the method of mixing a smallproportion of lime with the rice, which, so faras tests went, preserved it for two years with-out deterioration. There was also the problemof the distribution of rice, some of the Statesproducing an excess of their own requirements.

The custom had been to store this surplus ortthe spot, and at one time there was some 50,000tons of rice stored as far North as Alor Star..By the time war broke out, however, distribu-tion was satisfactory.

On two occasions, the War Committeedecided that a scheme of food rationing intime of war must be prepared. Committeeswere formed to tarry this out, but on bothoccasions reported that the difficulties were so»great that food rationing was impracticable;and, on one occasion, that if it was necessaryfrom the military point of view, it was up tothe military to prepare a scheme. The positionwas certainly complicated, but I did not believethat the difficulties were insurmountable.

The main source of supply for the waterreservoirs on Singapore Island was from themainland of Johore. It was realised that thismight be cut, and the matter was investigatedon my arrival. The result of this investigation,showed that the rainfall was sufficient, withcertain additional water mains, to supplyenough water to meet the requirements of thewhole of the anticipated population of theisland, except that water-borne sanitation-would have to be stopped. The necessary steps-were taken. A sea-water fire service alreadyexisted for part of Singapore City.

Air Raid Precautions.63. A.R.P. in Singapore had started, and

before war broke out I was satisfied that theorganisation, as regards fire precautions, demo-lition squads, rescue parties and first aid, wasgood. Up to the time I handed over com-mand, A.R.P. functioned well, with oneexception. (See para. 99 below.) Up-country,progress was somewhat slower.

Black-out in Malaya was difficult. Owing to>the construction of most of the houses, completeblack-out meant shutting off most of the ventila-tion, which was extremely disagreeable in-Malayan climate. Consequently, when black-out'was enforced it meant most people livingeither in darkness or in physical discomfort.In consequence, a system was introduced ofhaving a " brown-out," a black-out beingfenforced as soon as warning was received ofthe actual approach of hostile aircraft. Thebrown-out allowed a certain amount of light,sufficient with care to read by without closing-up the room. In my opinion, this workedsatisfactorily.

64. The provision of air raid shelters in-Singapore was insufficient for the total popu-lation, but the construction of these was not a\simple matter. The water-level was near thesurface, so that in most places the digging oftrenches was not only useless, but dangerousbecause they soon became filled with water and"formed breeding places for mosquitoes. Manyof the streets were narrow, and there was littleroom for the building of shelters. Quite apartfrom the blocking of traffic, the medical authori-ties definitely advised against the building ofshelters in streets, on the ground that the circu-lation of air would thereby be stopped, thusleading to epidemics.

On the other hand, many of the streets ofSingapore had footpaths covered over by thefirst floors of the buildings, which were sup-ported by pillars from the outside. Provided'the houses were of fairly solid construction,filling up the spaces between the pillars withstone or bricks afforded a good type of air-raid


shelter. Where none could be constructed, thepolicy was to provide accommodation in openspaces outside the town, where it was expectedthat the population would move as soon asbombing started. Compulsory evacuation wasnot enforced.

Denial Schemes and Evacuation.65. A denial scheme was prepared early in

1941 for the event of an invasion of Malaya,and necessary instructions issued. This schemewas directed principally to the destruction orremoval of everything that might facilitate themovement of invading forces. It included suchthings as the removal of food stocks, or theirdispersal amongst the villages, the destructionof any form of repair workshop, as well asthe demolition of bridges and the removal ordestruction of all forms of vehicle or boat. Theplan did not envisage a complete " scorchedearth " policy. (See para. 119 below.) Forinstance, hi the case of tin mines it was onlylaid down that essential parts of the machineryof dredges were to be removed and broughtaway. A plan for the denial of British-ownedtin mines in the Kra Isthmus was also workedout by the O.M. Section of the Ministry ofEconomic Warfare, including arrangements withCommander-in-Chief, China, for the evacuationof British personnel by sea after the denialscheme had been carried out.

66. Originally, civil officials were ordered toremain at their posts in the event of invasion.This, however, was modified in December 1941,enabling those who were suitable, physically tindotherwise, for service witn military units to bewithdrawn, so that they could be used fordefence. This also applied to a proportion ofthe civil medical staff.

67. The problem of British families in Singa-pore and Malaya generally was somewhatinvolved. In the case of the Navy, familieswere permitted for those stationed ashore, i.e.,officers in the light cruisers were1 not allowed tobring their families out to Singapore. In theArmy and Air Force, families were allowed inthose units which were considered to be thepermanent garrison in Singapore, which in prac-tice meant the units existing before September1939. Units which arrived since that date werecounted as reinforcements, and families werenot allowed in their case. This gave rise toanomalies, because some of the units, e.g.,Headquarters, Malaya Command, and theRoyal Air Force Depot at Se'letar, had expan-ded very considerably since September 1939,although they were still counted as part of thepermanent garrison. In the case of the familiesof civil officials and civilians there were norestrictions. Apart from 50 W.R.N.S. at theNaval Wireless Station and a number of nurses,many women were employed in the differentservices for clerical, cipher and other duties,including intelligence work in F.E.C.B. Hadall these been sent away, it would have meanta large increase in the number of men absorbed.As it was, we were short of women to fill suit-abte posts and thus relieve men_ for the fightingunits.

On the other hand, the presence- of largenumbers of women and children led, in Janu-ary 1942, to hurried evacuation, with conse-quent loss of personal belongings and dis-comfort, and, later, to casualties. (See para.121 below.)

•Service and Civilian Communities.68. Relations between the Services and

civilian communities were better up-countrythan in Singapore.

The view held in the Colonial Office was thatrubber* and tin output was of greater importancethan the training of the local forces; for instance,a telegram, dated the 3ist December, 1940, tothe Governor, states: " The ultimate criterionfor exemption should be not what the1 GeneralOfficer Commanding considers practicable, butwhat you consider essential to maintain thenecessary production and efficient labourmanagement.".

Attitude of Non-British Population.69. With regard to the other races in Malaya,,

the most numerous were the Chinese. Many ofthem had no particular roots in.Malaya. Therewas difficulty in filling the Chinese companiesof the Volunteers up to establishment, nor couldwe get a sufficient number of Chinese motordrivers. This may have been partly the fault,of the British, and there was not sufficient con-tact between the British and the leading men ofthe Chinese community. My experience of theChinese under air bombing was that they werecalm, and with no tendency to panic.

There were several thousand Indian labourersin Malaya," mostly Tamils, who worked on therubber estates. So long as they were kept freefrom agitators, these Tamils were a law-abiding,community.

Some probable fifth columnists were markeddown at Kuala Lumpur and rounded up. at thestart of the war, but there was very little -fifthcolumn work or treachery. There was no diffi-culty in recruiting for the two battalions of theMalay Regiment, and young Malays who hadbeen specially trained in technical schoolsworked well in the aircraft maintenance unit onSingapore Island, and were not unduly worriedby bombing.

VII.—NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES.China.

70. The late Major-General Dennys wasappointed Military Attache in Chungking shortlyafter my arrival in Singapore, with the inten-tion that, when war with Japan broke out, he-would become Head of the British MilitaryMission with the Chinese, this being known as.204 Mission. Chiefly owing to his work,seconded by Wing-Commander Warburton and',backed by the Ambassador, Sir A. Clark Ken*,.our relations with the Chinese were very satis-factory, and considerable progress was made inplans for co-operation, and, .to some degree,in their execution.

Co-operation as regards air consisted mainlyin the preparation of aerodrome sites and thedispatch to China of stocks of aviation petrol'and, finally, bombs, all for British squadrons-which it was hoped to send up later. (See-Para. 26 above.) The aerodrome sites were-in three groups: the first in'the area northand west of Kunming, the object of which waslargely to protect the Burma Road; the second,an area north of Hong Kong, from which it was-hoped to assist in the defence of that placerand the third, an area further east, from whichit was hoped that one day it might be possible-to deliver air attacks on Japan. It was onlyin the first group that these preparations could'be called complete when war 'broke out. Trans-port was one of the main difficulties, and it:


was nol until the i^th. November, 1941, thatpermission was given to send up bombs. Thepetrol and bombs were consigned to theChinese, who took charge of them.

71. The second form of assistance to Chinawas with their guerillas. It was agreed thatfifteen special Chinese guerilla companies shouldbe formed initially, and that each should havea squad of fifteen British and Indian personnelattached to it. These squads would be speciallytrained in the use of explosives and hi carryingout demolitions, and would be kept suppliedby us with the necessary material. It wasproposed eventually to double the number ofguerilla companies, and consequently of thesquads. These squads went through a thoroughtraining in Burma, including living under theconditions they would experience when operat-ing with the Chinese guerillas.

72. The whole organisation for the supplyto the aerodromes and to the guerilla squadswas based on Bftrma. It was known first asChi Base and later as Tulip. Lieutenant^ColonelMcFeat was in charge; his own headquarterswere at Rangoon, the training of guerilla squadswas carried out at Maymyo, and stores of allsorts were sent up to Lashio and to Bhamo.A mechanical transport organisation for for-warding stores and supplies was in progress,but by no means complete in vehicles 'by the7th December. Signalling and medical facili-ties were deficient for most of the guerillasquads. Tulip was directly under my head-quarters till war with Japan broke out, whenit was transferred, as planned, to GeneralOfficer Commanding, Burma.

73. On their part, the Chinese promised notonly to help in the defence of Burma with theAmerican Volunteer Group (see para. 25above), but also to send troops to Burma ifrequired, and to threaten the Japanese northernflank should they advance against Burma viaChieng Rai. They also promised to help in thedefence of Hong Kong by an advance towardsCanton.

They kept their promises.74. A Chinese Military Mission visited Burma

and Singapore in April and May, 1941,. andvarious Chinese officers also paid visits indi-vidually, including General Mow, of the ChineseAir Force, who was in Singapore from the igthto the 25th June, 1941, and stayed in myhouse. Certain members of my staff visitedChungking.

Siam and Indo-China.75. The dominating factor influencing the

actions of the Siamese authorities was fear.Our attitude towards the Siamese was governedby the desire to keep on as friendly terms aspossible, and to encourage them to resist anyencroachment by Japan. The latter was some-what difficult because it was quite impracticablefor us to take any effective military action toprevent Japanese penetration of Siam. Further,as the Siamese quite rightly pointed out, theywere very short of equipment, especially air-craft and anti-aircraft, tank-and anti-tank, sothat, if they could not get help from us or theUnited States, there was little they could do butto comply with Japanese demands. Definiteproposals were made in October, 1941, forgiving the Siamese a few weapons, but nothingwas actually sent.

It was suggested in March, 1941, that weshould adopt a strong line with the Siamese.It is, however, at least doubtful whether, ifwe had done so, the Siamese would have beenwilling or able to render any effective aid whenthe Japanese attacked their country. As eventsturned out, in spite of statements by theSiamese Prime Minister, the resistance offeredby the Siamese for us lasted only a few hoursat Battambang on the frontier east of Bangkok-,whereas British troops advancing into SouthernSiam were opposed by the Siamese after theJapanese had landed.

76. At the time of my arrival in Singapore,the Japanese had troops in Tongking, at thenorthern end of Indo-China. This in itselfwas no direct threat to Burma or Malaya. Tosome extent it was a threat to the Chinesesection of the road from Burma to China, butthere seemed some reason to believe that theoriginal purpose for which these troops weresent there was to extricate Japanese forces inKwangsi, who were malaria-ridden and in adifficult position.- 77. In the latter part of 1940, SiameseMinisters, possibly encouraged by the Japanese,had stimulated their country to demand thereturn to Siam of certain areas that had beentaken by the French some years before. Thiseventually led to a mild form of hostilitiesbetween the two countries concerned.Endeavours were made at Singapore by thfGovernor, Comm'andeor-in-Chief, China, andmyself to bring about a settlement withoutposing as official mediators, but these en-deavours were unsuccessful. By the end ofJanuary, 1941, the Japanese had been recog-nised as the mediators, and thus scored a diplo-matic success.

78. We had concluded an economic agree-ment with the Vichy French authorities in Indo-China, and they professed themselves anxiousto develop friendly relations. In spite of thisan agreement between them and the Japanesewas announced on the 24th July, 1941. Itsterms allowed the Japanese to maintain forcesin the South of Indo-China. A Japanese con-voy began to arrive at Saigon on the 26th,and by the end of July the Japanese were wellestablished in that town. More important still,this movement gave the Japanese completecontrol of Camranh Harbour, and they quickivstarted to make or improve aerodromes to theSouth and West of Saigon. As was expected,the Japanese did not limit themselves for longto the terms of the agreement, and the Frenchauthorities made practically no effort to opposeeither the original terms or the successive en-croachments. The effect of this expansion onthe defence of the Far East is indicated below(paras. 93 et seq.).

VIII.—DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH AIRFORCES IN THE FAR EAST.

General Position.79. In their paper of the I5th August, 1940,

the Chiefs of Staff estimated the air strengthnecessary for the Far East as 336 first-line a'ir-craft, to which, of course, had to be addedreserves.

In the Singapore Conference of October,1940, the final strength of the Royal Air Forcerecommended for the Far East was 582 air-craft, an increase of sixteen over that givenin the appreciation dated the i6th October,


1940 (see para. 42 (b) above). The Chiefsof Staff agreed that 582 aircraft was an ideal,but considered that 336 should give a very fairdegree of security. The figure of 566 aircraftgiven in the appreciation was stated 'by theAir Ministry to be far beyond the bounds ofpractical possibility in the light of total re-sources and vital requirements in activetheatres at home and in the Middle East.

The strength of the Air Forces in Malaya inNovember, 1940, is as shown in Appendix I,

0 that in Hong Kong and Ceylon was negligible.Of the total of 88 first-line aircraft, only 48,i.e., the Blenheims and Hudsons, could becounted as modern, and the former sufferedfrom lack of range. The Vildebeestes whichwe had at the beginning of .the war with Japanwere considered by the Chiefs of 'Staff inAugust, 1940, as having -become an obsoletetype.

The replacement for the Vildebeeste was tobe the Beaufort. Manufacture of these hadstarted in Australia and we were to get 'thefirst 90. Much of the raw material and cer-tain complete parts of these aeroplanes hadto come from England and from the UnitedStates, and there was considerable delay insupplying many of the items. The urgencyof the matter was represented several timesfrom Australia, and particularly at the begin-ning of August, when the Prime Minister ofAustralia sent a special telegram to theAustralian High Commissioner in London. Inspite, however, of every effort on the part ofAustralia, ;Vildebeesltes were (still in use inDecember, 1941 (see para. 86 below).

The flying boats were not only obsolete, butbadly in need of complete overhaul, and theWirraways could only be considered as train-ing aircraft.

But the -great weaknesses were the absenceof any fighters and the small size of the re-serves. This latter even necessitated restric-tions on the numlber of flying hours insquadrons towards the end of 1940, and thefirst months of 1941. The importance ofremedying these weaknesses was emphasisedvery shortly after my arrival at Singapore,and the aircraft situation was elaborated in atelegram three months later. In this latter tele-gram I estimated that, at the end of 1941, weshould be • able to reckon, as an absolutemaximum; on a total of only 215 aircraft, in-cluding anticipated reinforcements of 39Dutch aircraft, or 176 exclusive of the Dutch.

80. The general deficiencies in aircraft were.also emphasised in many other telegrams.

The following are extracts:—'' This means bluntly that at present not

only is our ability to attack shipping deplor-ably weak, but we have not the staying-power to sustain even what we could nowdo. As our air effort dwindles (as it wouldif war came now) so will the enemy's chanceof landing increase ";

and:—" Nor do I know whether troops or air-

craft will be the easier to provide but I haveno doubt what our first requirement here is.We want to increase our 'hitting poweragainst ships, and our capacity to go onhitting."The need for more aircraft for the attack of

shipping had also been emphasised in aprevious te]egram of the 23rd July, 1941.

81. The Chiefs of Staff fully appreciated myanxiety about the smallness of the air forcesat my disposal, but pointed out that they hadhad to face .disappointments; in production,had to reinforce the Middle East still furtherto -meet the probable scale of attack in theSpring, and that the necessity for supportingRussia was likely to impose a further strainon British and American resources. Further,that in these circumstances it was clear thatneither could the target programme for the FarEast be completed, nor, indeed, could anysubstantial reinforcements be sent before theend of 1941.

82. This Chiefs of Staff's figure of 336 firstline aircraft referred to in para. 79 above, wasbased on the assumption that Borneo wouldbe defended, but took no account of the de-fence of Burma. Whilst the latter was agreater commitment than the former, Iaccepted the figure of 336 as the target atwhich to aim in view of two telegrams from.the Chiefs of Staff, in both of which the figureof 336 was confirmed.

Fighters.83. Single-seater fighter aircraft, known as

the Brewster Buffalo, began to arrive in Singa-pore in cases frem the United States in Febru-ary, 1941, and permission was given by theAir Ministry to form two squadrons in the firstinstance. These .were (formed mainly -withpilots taken from existing squadrons, whohad a good deal of flying experience, and sogot up to the operational standard muchquicker than the two new squadrons formedlater; though not up to establishment, the firsttwo squadrons would (have been able to fightby the middle of April, 1941. A total of 167Buffaloes in all were received in Singapore,and on the 30th May, 1941, permission wasgiven by the Air Ministry to form two furtherfighter squadrons.

These new squadrons took a long time tobecome operationally efficient. The majorityof the pilots (had to be brought from Australiaand New Zealand. They all came straightfrom the Flying Training Schools, and somefrom New Zealand had never flown anythingbeyond a Hart, iand had no experience ofretractable undercarriages, variable-pitch pro-pellors, or flaps. Under these conditions ittook over four, months from the time that thepilots arrived in Malaya before the squadronscould be considered fit for operations; in fact,they had not been passed as fit when war withJapan broke out. It would have helped agreat deal if we could have formed a properoperational training unit in Malaya, but I wasinformed that neither personnel nor aircraftcould be spared for the (purpose, and that allthe training of pilots would have to be donein the squadrons. As this would haveseriously hindered the operational training ofsquadrons, the nucleus of an O.T.U. wasformed from our own resources.

After the formation of the third and fourthBuffalo squadrons had been started, it wasfound that the re-equipment of the R.A.A.F.Wirraway Squadron was going to be delayedindefinitely, and I was requested by Australiato take any possible steps I could to ensurethat this Australian squadron was re-equippedwith some form of more modern machine thanthe Wirraway. The only possible course ofaction was to re-equip it with Buffaloes. This


was sanctioned by the Air Ministry and carriedout, tout five squadrons 'were definitely toomany for the total number of Buffaloes avail-able, and overstrained the reserves. •<

84. The Buffalo proved disappointing, at anyrate when up against the Japanese Zeroifighter.This was due partly to technical reas'ons andpartly to incomplete training of pilots. Withregard to the former the performance of theBuffaloes at heights of 10,000 feet and overwere relatively poor. (See Appendix " L "}.Whilst it had been realised that the Buffalolacked speed, it had been hoped that, with goodwarning system and the comparatively smallarea of important objectives, e.g., the NavalBase, it would 'be able to reach the height neces-sary before the arrival of enemy aircraft, andthat its better armament would enable oursquadrons to give a good account of themselves.Whether deliberately or not, the Japaneseappear to have sacrificed armour and armamentin their Zero fighters in order to save weight,thereby obtaining the advantage of rate ofclimb and manoeuvrability at (heights. In thecase of these two particular types, the technicaladvantage certainly lay with the Japanese.Attempts were made to improve the perform-ance of the Buffalo by substituting .303 for the.5. In addition some trouble was experiencedwith the valve gear of the Cyclone engine in theBuffalo, and with the interrupter gear of thetwo fuselage guns. The Buffalo was unsuitablefor night flying owing to the exhaust flames,flame dampers would have been essential fornight flying but were not available. Actuallythis was not serious as I had laid down that theBuffalo was to be used for day work only, andthat, by night, reliance was to be placed onthe A.A. guns assisted by Blenheim fighters.

Pilots have been referred to in paragraph 83above. What the R.A.F. lacked in Malaya wasa good proportion of pilots with practical warexperience. Apart from forming a leaven whenoperations started, they could have taught thenew pilots those niceties of manoeuvre and aim-ing which just make the difference between miss-ing the enemy and bringing him down, the typeof training that can only be given as a result ofexperience. Again all the Buffalo squadronswere formed in Malaya and there was nosquadron with practical war experience to seta standard, and it is possible that in somerespects ours was not sufficiently high formodern conditions.

85. Apart from the fighter squadron inBurma, we had in Malaya in December, 1941,a total of four Buffalo squadrons, one Dutchfighter squadron, which arrived on the gthDecember, and one Blenheim squadron, the lastprincipally for night fighting. This total wasconsidered adequate both by the Chiefs of Staffand by my own General Headquarters, butresults showed that more fighter squadrons wererequired, largely because the scope of a fighter'sduties has widened. One Buffalo squadron wasspecially trained for Army co-operation, and wereally wanted two. I had also agreed with theCommander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, that onesquadron, which ought to have been a Buffalo,should be trained in the duties of fighter pro-tection for ships. Fighter squadrons are alsothe most efficient type with which to attackenemy aerodromes. To carry out these func-tions at all adequately, as well as the normalduties of a fighter, at least seven fighter

squadrons were needed in Malaya alone, with-out allowing for night fighters.

Long-Range Bombers.86. The need for long-range bombers had

been constantly pressed from the time I was firstappointed Commander-in-Chief, Far East. Atthat time I had merely felt that they would bewanted without having any concrete proposals,but as the Japanese advanced into SouthernIndo-China, the object for which they would beused became clear and definite. The targetswhich we wished to reach in Southern Indo-China were just within reach of Blenheim IV'sfrom the Northern end of Malaya, and of Hud-sons, but we had too few of the former and thelatter were required for overseas reconnaissance.

Six Beauforts were flown from Australia afew days before the war started, but as theseaircraft were not operational, and as the crewsrequired considerable operational training intheir use, the Air Officer Commanding, with myconcurrence, sent all bar one, which was re-tained in the hope of using it for photographicwork, back to Australia in order that they mightcontinue their training under suitable conditions.

Other Requirements.87. Other requirements which were realised

too late were special aircraft for photographicreconnaissance and transport aircraft for facili-tating the rapid movement of squadrons. Photo-graphic aircraft were first asked for in August,1941, after the visit of a special photographicofficer. The Dutch were ready to help us in thesecond requirement, but once war had startedwere making full use of their transport aircraftfor their own purposes, and we felt the lack of,having a few of our own available at very shortnotice.

It was also suggested at one time that aballoon barrage would be valuable for the pro-tection of Singapore, especially the Naval Base.Experiments, however, proved that the climateand meteorology of Malaya were quite unsuit-able for the use of kite balloons.

88. The strength and location of the RoyalAir Force in the Far East on the 7th Decem-ber, 1941, are given in Appendix J and a sum-mary of serviceable aircraft in Malaya ondifferent dates in December in Appendix K.

Our most serious deficiency at that time wasin reserves, partly of pilots, but principally air-craft. It was not only a stock of reserve aero-planes we wanted, but also a continuous flow ofnew aircraft to replace wastage, for aeroplanesmust be regarded as expendable material, andthere must be a regular, continuous channelof supply. Without these it was impossible to-keep the squadrons up to their first-line estab-lishment. Apart from the material weakness,failure to keep up what is commonly known as" a full breakfast table " always has an adverseeffect on squadrons' morale.

89. There were several civil flying clubs inMalaya, and the Air Officer Commanding hadorganised for these an Auxiliary Air Force,which did useful work in communication andassistance to the Army in certain aspects oftraining.

IX.—ARMY STRENGTH AND REQUIREMENTS,MALAYA.

90. In the appreciation of the situation drawnup by the Commanders in Malaya previous tothe Singapore Defence Conference of October,


1940, an estimate was made of the total armedforces required on the supposition that 582 air-craft would be available for the defence of theFar East. The estimate was as follows: —

26 infantry battalions, including 3 forBorneo.

5 field regiments.3 light tank companies.

In'-addition anti-tank units, troops for localdefence of aerodromes, volunteer units and an-cillary troops. This figure of 26 battalions wasagreed to by the Chiefs of Staff in January,1941.

On his arrival, General Percival . wentthoroughly into the question of the strength ofthe Army and, in August, 1941, sent his esti-mate of the strength required, which he sum-marised as: —'

48 Infantry Battalions.4 Indian Reconnaissance Units.9 Forward Artillery Regiments.4 Light A.A. Regiments.2 Tank Regiments.3 Anti-Tank Regiments.2 Mountain Artillery Regiments.12 Field Companies;.

This was based on my forecast of the strengthwhich our Air Forces would reach by December,1941, namely 186 first-line aircraft as against theaccepted figure of 336. I was asked for obser-vations and my general conclusion was that nodrastic reduction in General Percival's estimatewas acceptable until the strength of the RoyalAir Force was materially increased not only innumbers but in quality of aircraft and in re-serves of air crews and aircraft. Also thatbefore General Percival's new target wasreached in Malaya, the question of increasingforces in other areas of my command, especiallyBurma, would have to be considered. TheChiefs of Staff commented: " We accept esti-mate by General Officer Commanding, Malaya,as reasonable figure for land forces required inpresent circumstances. Nevertheless, this tar-get cannot be fulfilled in foreseeable future."

91. In December, ' 1941, while the actualstrength of the Royal Air Force (see Appendix/) approached very closely to my forecast, theArmy strength (see Appendix E) fell far shortof the figure which it had been agreed was re-quired to compensate for the deficiency in air-craft. The main deficiencies were: —

17 Battalions;4 Light A.A. Regiments; and2 Tank Regiments.

The strength in A.A. weapons in the Far Easton the yth December, 1941, is given in AppendixF.

92. The fact that we were entirely withouttanks in Malaya was a serious handicap to anyoffensive land operations, whether on a smallor a large scale. There were also very fewarmoured cars. Many efforts were made toobtain both tanks and armoured cars from vari-ous sources. On the I4th August the WarOffice offered forty light tanks from the MiddleEast. These tanks were at the time being em-ployed for aerodrome defence, and they wereoffered to the Far East on the condition thatthey would be employed in an operational role,and that we could man them from local re-sources. Some delay occurred at Singapore infinding the best method of meeting the latter

Ba

condition. Eventually Australia agreed to pro-vide the necessary men and to train them up toa-^reasonable standard in Australia, this trainingto be completed by the ist January, 1942. Onthe I3th November, 1941, 'however, MiddleEast reported to the War Office that they couldnot provide forty tanks for the Far East exceptat the expense of operational requirements.After war had broken out, War Office orderedMiddle East to send fifty light tanks to India „their subsequent destination to be decided later..

With regard to armoured cars, a model ofan armoured vehicle mounted on an Americanchassis was obtained from the Dutch and sixwere 'made in Singapore, chiefly at the NavalBase; drawings were also made and sent toBurma. No more, however, could be madeowing to a shortage of boiler plate, which wasiused for the armouring. By the 24th Novem-ber, 1941, a total of 84 Marmon-Harringtottarmoured cars had been shipped from South.Africa for Singapore. Some of these arrived:a few days -before war broke out, and the-drivers had not become accustomed to thenrbefore they had to go to the front.

The number of anti-tank weapons had im-proved considerably by the time war brokeout, but there was still a shortage of the 0.5anti-tank rifle in infantry units.

The lack of mobile A.A. weapons was serious,especially in view of the shortage of fighters.A constant anxiety to the General Officer Com-manding, also, was the continual drain on theArmy for men to protect aerodromes. Indian:State troops were brought over to assist, but itwould have been a great help if we had had:more armoured cars or even tanks of an obso-lete pattern for this duty. This would have en-••abled us to have a mobile defence and to-substitute mechanical vehicles for a large pro-portion of the men required. The reserve ofsmall-arms ammunition was well below the:authorised figure. In November, 1941, GeneralHeadquarters informed the War Office that,with releases, in sight, we should be short ofour authorised holding of 150 million roundsby 57 million on the ist January, 1942. Aus-tralia, who were already sending us 3 millionrounds per month, agreed to increase this to8 million.

X.—EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WAR.The Problem of Japanese Intentions.

93. As the Japanese spread South into Cam-bodia and Cochin China, the potential dangerto Burma, Malaya, the South China Sea, andeven the Philippines, increased; this danger hadbeen realised from the start, and was referredto in a telegram in December, 1940. But itwas difficult to judge whether this movementsignified definite plans for an offensive againstus in the near future, whether it was merelythe acquisition of a strategic asset to be usedin negotiation, or whether it was the first steptowards occupation of Siam. This applied evento the construction of aerodromes, of whichwe were kept fairly well informed; what wewere particularly on the look-out for was anyindication of movements of long-distancebombers, or of the Zero-type fighters fitted withdetachable petrol tanks. These, of course,,could be concentrated on the aerodromes atshort notice.

94. Another difficulty in getting any long;warning of the Japanese intention was due to'the restriction on exports to, and imports from,


Japan. So long as Japanese merchant shippingwas being employed on its normal work,F.E.C.B. could keep track of every vessel, andshould it be found that an unusual numberwas being kept in home ports for no goodreason, it would indicate the possibility, or evenprobability, that the Japanese were 'refittingthese ships as transports prior to an overseasexpedition. The effect of the embargo, how-ever, was to drive all Japanese shipping offthe seas for purely economic reasons, and oncein Japanese ports they could be altered asrequired without our being any the wiser. Thisapplied especially to the fast vessels, i.e., roundabout 18 knots.

In spite of the preparations going on inSouthern Indo-China there were some indica-tions—at any rate up to the end of November—that the Japanese did not intend immediatehostilities. The first was a general one, namely,that if the Japanese intended to attack Malaya,they would have been more likely to have doneso in 1940, when our forces were far weakerthan they were at the end of 1941. Then thewinter months, December to February, were lessfavourable for an expedition against the Eastcoast of Malaya and the Kra Isthmus than otherperiods of the year owing to the North-Eastmonsoon. (See also para. 134 below.) Finally,there was the visit of Kurusu to Washington.It seems now probable that Kurusu, though pos-sibly innocent himself, was sent to Washingtonwith the deliberate object of misleading theUnited States and ourselves as to the Japaneseintentions, and keeping us quiet until theirown preparations had been finally completed.But at the time it seemed to us in Singaporethat this was a genuine attempt on the partof the Japanese to get relaxation of the restric-tions that had been imposed, and possibly todrive a wedge between Britain and the UnitedStates. I believe the same view was held inEngland.

95. In the latter part of November informa-tion accumulated to show that the Japanesewere probably intending an offensive at anearly date. Four Mogami class cruisers with afew destroyers had been despatched from theJapanese Combined Fleet to the South ChinaSea. Two squadrons of long-range Zero fightersarrived in South Indo-China. The number ofaircraft in Indo-China rose from a total of 74at the end of October to 245 at the end ofNovember. The 5th Japanese Division, whichwas highly trained in landing operations, wasreported by the Chinese to have moved to SouthIndo-China. There were large movements ofmotor landing craft from Central China, thoughthere was no definite information as to wherethey had gone. In addition, a telegram wasreceived from the War Office to the effect thatthe United States Army commanders in the FarEast had -been informed from Washington thatthe Kurusu negotiations might break down atany time and offensive operations be startedby Japan against Siam, the Netherlands EastIndies or the Philippines; up to the receipt ofthis telegram we had remained completely inthe dark on this matter except for Press reports.

Aeroplanes, almost certainly Japanese, occa-sionally flew over parts of Malaya in the latterpart of November and early December, in allprobability carrying out photographic recon-naissance, but owing to the speed and height al

which they operated we were never able tomake contact and obtain definite identification.

In view of the continued Japanese develop-ments in Southern Indo-China, which gavethem the facilities needed to attack Malaya, pre-cautionary steps • were taken on the 22ndNovember, and orders were issued for vulner-able points to :be guarded, and on the istDecember the Volunteers were mobilised. Cer-tain movements of air forces were carried out,and reconnaissances over the China Sea wereinstituted.

During this time we felt great need of air-craft capable of doing high-altitude photo-graphic reconnaissance. This applied not onlyto the aerodromes in Southern Indo^China, butparticularly to Camranh Harbour, on whichwe got no information whatever. We had noaircraft suitable for the purpose' since, thougha Catalina could have flown the distance, ithad neither the speed nor the necessary ceiling.It seemed highly undesirable to aggravate astrained situation by sending over an aeroplanewhich would in all probability have been inter-cepted and definitely identified as British. Iasked General MacArthur to carry out a photo-graphic reconnaissance from Manila with oneof his Boeing Fortresses, which had the neces-sary speed and ceiling, but he replied thatorders from Washington prevented him fromcarrying out my request.

96. Near the opposite end of the prospectivetheatre of operations, the island of Timor wasimportant as being a definite .link in the aircommunications between Australia and theNetherlands East Indies. Its occupation -by .theJapanese would also be a serious threat to Aus-tralia. The importance of Timor was noted inthe A.D.A. agreement, and it was referred to inA.D.B. Roughly half the island was Dutchterritory and half Portuguese; it was the latterhalf which gave no small anxiety. The Japanesehad a consulate in Dilli, the capital of Portu-guese Timor, and by November, 1941, hadreceived permission to run a regular flying-boatservice to Dilli, and were gradually getting aneconomic hold on Portuguese Timor. InNovember, 1941, a small nucleus of Australiantroops was sent to Koepang in Dutch Timor,where there was an aerodrome and a flying-boatbase. On the I2th December one infantrybattalion, one independent company and a fewcoast defence troops reached Koepang fromAustralia. A combined Australian and Dutchforce occupied Dilli in the middle of December,1941. About the 7th December, in accordancewith the A.D.A. and A.D.B. agreements, twoflights of Hudsons of the Royal Australian AirForce moved to Ambon hi the Netherlands EastIndies. These were followed later by an in-fantry battalion.

Order of the Day.97. The Commander-in-Chief, China, and I

had agreed as far back as May, 1941, that itwas desirable to prepare an Order of the Daybefore the war broke out, so that it could reachBurma and Hong Kong in time to be translatedinto the different languages jspoken toy thetroops in the Far East and be ready for issueon the first day of war. Drafting this Orderpresented difficulty because it had to appealto men of varying races and religions, e.g.,British sailors and Burmese troops. The mainobject that I had in view when preparing itwas to make an effective appeal to the Indian

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON- GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948 555

troops, as I considered it would be necessaryto stimulate them rather than the British.Through information that has reached me sub-sequent to the outbreak of war I believe ithad the effect it was meant to. The order isgiven in Appendix M-..

Approach of the First Enemy Expedition.98. About 1400 hours on the 6th December

I received information that an air reconnais-sance had sighted two Japanese convoysescorted by warships about 80 miles East-South-East of Pulo Obi, an island off the South-ern point of Indo-China, steaming West. Oneconvoy consisted of 22 io,ooo-ton merchantvessels escorted by one battleship, probably theKongoo, five cruisers and seven destroyers; theother of 21 merchant ships escorted by twocruisers and ten destroyers. Further West, oneJapanese cruiser and three io,ooo-ton merchantships had been sighted steering North-West.I consulted with Admiral Sir Geoffrey Laytonand Admiral Palliser, Sir Tom Phillips' Chiefof Staff, and we concluded that the probabilitywas that the convoy would not continue itscourse due West, which would have brought iton to the Kra Isthmus, but that it would followthe first four vessels and round Cambodia Point.It was pointed out that there was a goodanchorage on the West Coast of Indo-China atKoh Tron, which they might be making foras the next step towards Siam.

•Bearing in mind the policy of avoiding warwith Japan if possible—a policy which had beenreaffirmed by the Chiefs of Staff as recentlyas the ^gth November—and the situation in theUnited States with the Kurusu talks still goingon in Washington, I decided that I would notbe justified in ordering " Matador " on thisinformation, but orders were issued to bring allforces to the first, i.e., the highest, degree ofreadiness. I also impressed upon the Air OfficerCommanding the urgent necessity for maintain-ing contact with the convoy, a point which hehad already realised.

The location of these forces by Hudsons ofNo.. I Royal Australian Air Force Squadron,based on Kota Bharu, was a particularly goodpiece of work in view of their being at thelimit of their patrolling range, over 300 milesfrom the Malayan Coast. This same factor ofdistance, however, made it impossible for themto remain in contact until relieved, but aCatalina Flying-boat was despatched to shadowthe convoy during the night. The Air OfficerCommanding also ordered a reconnaissance byHudsons starting early on the 7th December,fanning out from Kota Bharu on to the lastknown bearings of the convoy. No signal wasreceived from the Catalina, and, from infor-mation received later, it is almost certain it wasshot down. A second Catalina failed to makecontact with the convoy. On the morning ofthe 7th December, visibility East and North-East from Kota Bharu was good. The recon-naissance found no ships in the area betweenKota Bharu and the Southern end of Indo-China, thus confirming the supposition tihat theconvoy had rounded Cambodia Point, and hadfollowed the four leading ships North-North-West into the Gulf of Siam. In this Gulf thevisibility was very bad and no positive infor-mation was received from this area until theevening, when a report was received that aHudson had seen, through low clouds, three

small Japanese ships which were then passingSingora and heading south. This informationreached me about 2100 hours. I met GeneralPercival and we proceeded together to theNaval Base; I decided not to order" Matador "; the main reason being that atleast 24 hours start was required before theanticipated time of a Japanese landing andthis was most unlikely to be available, shouldthe 3 ships seen turn out to be part of aJapanese expedition. Further, the conditions,for reconnaissance were bad, on the information;then available there could be no certainty thatthe Japanese were about to open hostilities, andon more than one occasion the British Ministerto Thailand had stressed the serious conse-quences that would ensue should we be the first'to break Thai neutrality. (See also paragraph51 above.)

It is pertinent to record that, until theJapanese had committed some definite act ofhostility against the United States, the Dutch .or ourselves, permission had not been given toattack a Japanese expedition at sea.

XL—THE START OF HOSTILITIES.The Opening Day.

99. Clear evidence that the Japanese had,in fact, taken the plunge into hostilities wassoon forthcoming when, at 0130 hours on Mon-day, the 8th December, the Japanese startedto land from about ten ships at Kota Bharu.I received this news at about 0200 hours inmy office at the Naval Base, Singapore, andthe necessary steps were at once taken to puteverything on a war footing, including theinternment of Japanese. Later on, reportswere received that the Japanese were landinglarge forces at Singora and Patani in the South-ern part of the Kra Isthmus.

At 0300 hours on the 8th December Singaporewas attacked by Japanese bombers, which, inall probability, came from Southern Indo-China. In one case, at any rate, they cameover in a formation of nine at a height of be-tween 12,000 .and 14,000 feet, without droppingany bombs, apparently with the object of draw-ing the searchlights and A.A. guns away from,a few other aircraft which, flying at 4,000 to5,000 feet, attacked objectives on SingaporeIsland, mainly aerodromes, with practically noresults. An attack was also made on the Easternpart of Singapore Harbour, possibly in mistakefor the aerodrome at Kallang; this attack causeda number of casualties, killing about sixty,mostly Chinese.

The observation system worked 'satisfac-torily, and thirty minutes' warning of theapproach of Japanese aircraft was received atmy headquarters. For some reason that Inever ascertained, the Headquarters of theA.R.P. organisation had not been manned, andit was only a few minutes before bombs weredropping on Singapore that contact was madeby Fighter Group Headquarters and the sirenssounded giving the warning for black-out. Inmy opinion, the absence of black-out had butlittle effect, since there was a bright full moon,and the coastline and most of Singapore musthave shown up very clearly.

Apart from this failure in Civil A.R.P., there -was no tactical surprise, since as has beenstated above, the troops were all in readiness,and the black-out was carried out at all Naval*Army and Air Force establishments..

556 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON' GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948

100. In the morning of the 8tli Decemberthe weather was clear over the land and closeto the coast, but out to sea there were cloudsdown to 500 feet. No. i Squadron, RoyalAustralian Air Force, at Kota Bharu, aided "bythe Vildebeestes of Nos.. 36 and 100 Squadrons,carried out a vigorous offensive against theJapanese vessels and landing craft. Reportsshowed that these attacks had a considerablemeasure of success, many landing craft in theKota Bharu River being sunk, and a ship re-ported to have contained tanks being sent tothe bottom.

No. 62 Squadron from Alor Star also wentout to attack the same target, but, owing prob-ably to being ordered too far from the coast,failed to locate the enemy ships near KotaBharu and proceeded to the neighbourhood olPatani on the Kra Isthmus. Here it was metby a greatly superior force of Japanese Zerofighters, and though Japanese ships werelocated there and bombs dropped on them, theattack was probably ineffective.

On the Western side in Kedah reconnaissanceforces of the nth Division crossed the Siamfrontier in the afternoon of the 8th Decemberand made contact with the enemy, who werealready employing 10 A.F.Vs. After inflictingcasualties, our forces withdrew in the afternoon,demolishing bridges on their way to the frontier.Further South a force known as Krohcol alsocrossed the frontier beyond Kroh in order totake up a position on the Siamese side of theborder as originally planned. Both these forcesmet with some opposition from the Siamese.

Meanwhile, in spite of resistance on thebeaches and further back, the enemy -had madeprogress at Kota Bharu, until by 1600 hoursthe aerodrome was so threatened by Japanesetroops that our aircraft had to leave and fly toKuantan.

101. A feature'of the opening day of hostili-ties was the enemy air attack upon our Northernaerodromes. Gong Kedah, Machang, Penang,Butterworth, Alor Star and Sungei Patani aero-dromes were all attacked, the total scale of«nemy effort for the day being estimated atsome 150 aircraft, of which probably 65 percent, were fighters. Of these attacks, the mostdamaging were against Alor Star and SungeiPatani, several aircraft on the ground beingrendered unserviceable in both cases and mostbuildings at Sungei Patani destroyed. Bothaerodromes were henceforth unable to operateand had to be vacated.

The attack on Alor Star was made by a for-mation of 27 twin-engine bombers of the Armytype 97, and started about twenty minutes afterthe return of No. 62 Squadron from their attackat Patani and whilst the aircraft were refuelling.The Japanese attacked from a height of about13,000 feet and used pattern bombing, thebombs being partly high-explosive, mostlyabout 150 lb., and partly incendiary. Theattack was very effective; some ten of our Blen-heims were put out of action, four being com-pletely written off. The fuel dump and somebuildings were set on fire, and, as the watersupply was put out of action, the fires werenot extinguished till dusk. Casualties weresmall, only seven men being killed. Alor Starwas defended by four 3-inch 2o-cwt. guns, butthey failed to bring down any Japanese air-craft, possibly owing to the height at which theywere flying.

qth-iith December.102. Broadly speaking, assaults on our aero-

dromes, coupled with fresh landings in Siameseterritory, continued to be the main feature ofthe Japanese operations for the first two daysof the war. The enemy was greatly helped inthem by the prompt use to which he putSiamese aerodromes, our reconnaissances on the9th and loth December revealing concentrationsof some sixty aircraft at Singora and eighty toa hundred aircraft at Don Muang, Bangkok.On the gth December eleven Blenheims attackedSingora aerodrome, but they were met by agreatly superior force of enemy fighters andfive of our aircraft were brought down; theresults of our bombing were not observed. Air-craft of No. 62 Squadron, which had movedback to Butterworth at dawn on the gthDecember, were also ordered to attack Singora,starting at 1700 hours the same day. Butter-worth was attacked by Japanese aircraft justas ours were about to take .off, and, althoughBuffaloes were up, considerable damage wascaused, with the result that only one Blenheimleft. The pilot, Flight-Lieutenant Scarf, reachedand attacked Singora, but was badly wounded;he flew his aeroplane back, landed at AlorStar and died a few minutes later.

On the gth December our aircraft were forcedto vacate Kuantan owing to enemy bombing,though it was still used for refuelling. Alreadyby this date it was clear that the success ofthe enemy's attack on our Northern aerodromeswould considerably handicap our own air action,and that this in turn would unfavourably pre-judice our fortunes in the fighting on land. Inter-ference with Singora landings was made diffi-cult, once our Northern aerodromes had suc-cumbed, by our lack of bombers of adequaterange. In a telegram to London from GeneralHeadquarters a warning was given that it wasunlikely we should find it practicable to main-tain the existing air effort for more than twoor three weeks.

Dutch air reinforcements arrived in SingaporeIsland on the gth; they consisted of three squad-rons of Glenn Martin bombers, total 22 aircraft,and one squadron of nine Buffalo fighters. Itwas found necessary to send eight of thebombers back to the Netherlands East Indiesto complete the training of their crews in nightflying.

103. The 8th Brigade, defending KotaBharu, was pressed back on the gth, demoli-tion being carried out before the aerodromewas evacuated. By the end of the day it wasforced back to a line in Kelantan runningPeringot-Mulong. The enemy was employinginfiltration tactics and working round the flanksof our forces wherever possible. The 8thBrigade had put up a stout resistance roundKota Bharu, and its commander, BrigadierKey, was faced with a difficult problem in de-ciding when retreat would become necessary.(See para. 138 below.} The decision havingbeen made, the Brigade was disengaged skil-fully.

Japanese Army reinforcements meanwhilearrived on a considerable scale. A large force,consisting of transports escorted by a battle-ship, three cruisers and eleven destroyers, wassighted by our aircraft between Kota Bharuand the Penhentain Islands on the gth Decem-ber. North of Kuantan the Japanese landedin small numbers at Beserah during the night


9th-ioth December. These were driven off,and by 0845 on the loth December all wasquiet there. The general situation in regard toJapanese landings was thus that all successfullandings took place North of the Malaya-Siamfrontier, except that at Kota Bharu, which,as already stated in para. 12 above, had noroad communications to Southern Malaya, anddepended for reinforcements from the South onthe railway alone.

By the loth December it was evident that theenemy's primary object was the establishmentof air superiority in Northern Malaya, whilst atthe same time he was testing our defences ona wide front. It was estimated that the Japanesewere now employing about 30 Zero-type fightersfrom Patani and about 70 aircraft, mainly Zerofighters, from Singora. All but about 50 ofthe Japanese bombers previously based inSouthern Indo-China had presumably beenmoved to Siam.

A complication of the situation which gavesome anxiety at this date was that our effortsmight be impeded by lack of support, or evenactively hostile measures, among nativeelements. Native .labour tended to disappearfor days after bombing, and non-British rail-way employees, including engine-drivers, de-serted temporarily on a large scale; the Armywas able to replace the drivers to some extent.

i104. By the nth December the 8th Brigade,

in Kelantan, retiring along the road which meetsthe railway at Kuala Krai, was in a position

. covering Machang. In Kedah a new threat wasopening in the form of enemy infiltration fromSiam, especially in the Chaglun area. This ad-vance into Kedah, coupled with the heavy airattacks on Penang, indicated that the Japanesemain attack would be down the road communi-cations of Western Malaya. Advanced troopsof the nth Indian Division were in positionSouth, of a line Chaglun-Kodiang, while Krohcolsought to hold off the enemy in this more cen-tral region. Some of the demolitions that hadbeen prepared in Northern Kedah failed to beeffective; this was not due to any failure toact in time, but to some technical fault either inthe fuses or explosives. All our serviceable air-craft had now been withdrawn from NorthernMalaya. It was estimated that by the nth.December the Japanese were employing inMalaya at least two divisions, supported by250-300 aircraft.

H.M.S. Prince of Wales and Repulse.105. H.M.S. Prince of Wales and Repulse

arrived at Singapore on Tuesday, the 2ndDecember, 1941, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips hav-ing arrived by air two days before. He andI -had no opportunity for full consultation overthe situation before war broke out, partlybecause he was taking over from Sir GeoffreyLayton as Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet,and partly because he visited Manila by air tomeet Admiral Hart.

H.M.S. Repulse left to pay a visit to PortDarwin on the 5th December, and it was agreedshe should proceed for the first 48 hours at com-paratively slow speed: She was recalled as soonas the air reconnaissance report. of the 6thDecember was received, and arrived back inSingapore on the 7th December. The navalforces at Singapore on the 7th December aregiven in Appendix C.

106. Admiral Phillips decided to take actionwith his two capital ships. So far as my Head-quarters was concerned he was put into directtouch with the Air Officer Commanding withregard to the air co-operation required, andasked for three things:—

(a) Reconnaissance 100 miles to north ofthe force from daylight, Tuesday, the gthDecember;

(b} Reconnaissance to Singora and beyondten miles from the coast starting^ at first lighton the loth December; and

' (c) Fighter protection off Singora at day-light on the zoth December.The Air Officer Commanding gave tentative

replies that he could provide (a), hoped to beable to provide (b), but could not provide (&).It was decided that he should go thoroughlyinto the problems involved and give definitereplies to the Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet,Rear-Admiral Palliser, who was remaining.behind. Air Officer Commanding later con-firmed his tentative replies and this informationwas sent on by signal to Commander-in-Chief,Eastern Fleet, in the evening of the- 8thDecember. The doubt about (b) was due to thefact that the reconnaissance would have to -beprovided by Blenheim IV's based on Kuantanaerodrome, and it was uncertain whether thiswould be out of action or not. Actually, iboththe reconnaissances were carried out, thoughone of the Blenheims doing (b) had wirelesstroubles. .

The reason why (c} could not be providedwas mainly'that the northern aerodromes wereeither untenable or else had been badlydamaged 'by 'bombing; this meant that thefighters would have to operate from aerodromesat considerable distance from Singora, and,owing to the short endurance of the Buffalo,they would have .been alble to remain only avery short tune over that area before havingto return to refuel. The Dutch fighter squadronhad not arrived by the 8th; it was uncertainwhether it would (be available by the loth andthus there was a shortage of fighter aircraft.These factors meant that a Short patrol mightpossibly have been provided at intervals atSingpra, but that it was impossible to 'guaranteecontinuous fighter protection.

107. The Prince of Wales and Repulse,accompanied by four destroyers, left Singaporein the afternoon of Monday, the 8th December.Early on the loth December a signal was madeto Singapore indicating that tihe ships wouldreturn earlier than originally planned. Exceptfor this, no communication was received andtheu: position remained unknown until, shortlyafter twelve noon on Wednesday, the lothDecember, a signal was received from Repulsethat she was being bombed in a position about60 miles East-South-East of Kuantan. On re-ceipt of the message a fighter squadron was atonce despatched and reached the position ofthe ships in commendably quick time, but onlyto see the Prince of Wales go down. No enemyaircraft were spotted. Fighter cover, thoughonly a weak one, was provided for thedestroyers that picked up the crews from thesunken ships.

108. I had been asked by 'Rear-AdmiralPalliser to give an indication of the strength ofthe air force that the Japanese might bringagainst these two ships from Indo-China, andgave an estimate of between 50 and 60 bombers.


which might be expected to arrive five noursafter the ships had been first located by recon-naissance. Whether this information was everreceived by the Commander-in-Chief, EasternFleet, I do not. know.

109. The ships were attacked toy high-levelbombers and torpedo bombers, the latter beingby far the more effective. It is possible that thehigh-level bombers were used with the objectof attracting any of our fighters that mighthave been with the ships away from the tor-pedo bombers. The Japanese would probablyhave expected that such fighters would be flyinghigh, and that they would naturally attack high-level (bombers in the first instance, thus givingsufficient time for the torpedo bombers to get intheir attack before our fighters could get downto them. Admittedly, this is conjecture, but itis on similar lines to the •bombing attack carriedout on Singapore Island early on the 8thDecember. It also indicates the value of thedive bomber as a third alternative method ofattacking ships, thereby giving greater facilitiesfor surprise.

no. The (psychological effect on Malaya ofthe loss of these two ships was somewhat miti-gated by the fact that shortly after they arrivedI had summoned a Press conference, and talkedto those present on the. following lines:—

" The arrival of the two capital ships inno way reduced the need for continuance ofevery effort being made to improve the de-fences of Malaya and Singapore; indeed, itenhanced the importance of this effort. War-ships must not foe tied down to their base;they must ibe free to operate to the full limitof their range of action and know that theycan still return to a safe base when necessary.These ships would be of value to the Far Eastas a whole, but must not (be regarded in anysense as part of the local defences of Malayaand Singapore. Further, in the same way asthese ships had arrived from distant stations,so, if the situation changed and they becameneeded elsewhere, we had to be prepared forthem to be ordered away."Based on this, the local papers 'published good

leading articles, bringing out the particularpoints I made. In addition, Mr. Duff Cooper,at niy request, gave an excellent broadcast onthe evening of loth December, pointing out thatthe loss of these ships must not lead to despond-ency, but merely to a determination to fight allthe harder and so avenge their loss.

Japanese Command of the Sea.in. From the point of view of the defence

of the Far East as a whole, what was moreserious was the Japanese attack on the UnitedStates Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour. Inappreciations of the situation we had alwaysrelied on the deterrent effect of the existence ofthis Fleet, even if the United States were notin the war from the start. It was expected thatthis deterrent would prevent the Japanese fromallotting more than a limited number of war-ships for escort duties, which fact would limitthe number of convoys sent into the SouthChina Sea, and that it would also stop themfrom sending an expedition round the East sideof the Philippines towards the Netherlands EastIndies, especially the Eastern islands.

An indirect result of the Pearl Harbouiattack was to prevent the surface ships of theAsiatic Fleet from Manila co-operating with

British and Dutch ships in the Java and SouthChina Seas in accordance with the A.D.B.agreement. This Asiatic Fleet was, ;by ordersfrom Washington, limited to operations betweenSourabaya and Port Darwin.

As a final result, the command of the seaacquired by the Japanese was greater than wehad ever anticipated. We were, in fact, fightingunder conditions of which the British Empirehad very little previous experience.

Penang.H2. Penang Island was of no small import-

ance for three reasons: —(a) Very fair port facilities.(b) Stocks of ammunition and stores.(c) The point of departure of two Over-

seas cables.It was decided that the true defence of Penang

was on the mainland and that, should the forcesin Kedah be driven south, direct defence oiPenang would be of no value. Tihis enabledmost of the garrison of Penang to be releasedto reinforce the mainland. One of the greatweaknesses of Penang lay in the fact that therewere no A.A. guns, which was entirely due toshortage of weapons. It had foeen laid downthat the Naval Base, Royal Air Force aero-dromes, Singapore Harbour and KualaLumpur, had to have priority above Penang,and there were not enough to go round.

There was no analogy between Penang andTobruk.. Even had the garrison of Penang heldout for some weeks, it would have been entirelyisolated both by land and by sea, and couldnot have carried out any'attacks against theJapanese line of communications exceptpossibly an odd spasmodic raid. Any troopsthat might have been utilised for a garrisonunder these conditions would have been morevaluable elsewhere.

113. The first attack on Penang was at iioohours on the 8th December, when the aero-drome was bombed by Japanese aircraft, theeffect generally being small. At 1000 hours thenth December, Georgetown was bombed andheavy casualties caused among the native popu-lation; these were due not so much to any in-adequacy of A.R.P. as to the fact that thenative population turned out into the streetsto watch the sight, presumably under the im-pression that another attack was about to bemade on the aerodrome. As a result nearlythe whole native population left the town andthe labour problem became acute. Next daythe military authorities had to take over manycivil duties, including burial of the dead, andthe naval authorities had to work the ferriesbetween the Island and the mainland.

114. In view of the situation in Kedah, itwas decided to move women and children, otherthan Malays and Chinese, from Penang on theI3th December. This was intended to applyto Indians as well as Europeans, but owing tosome misunderstanding the Sikh Police werenot given the opportunity to send their womenand children away, and in the end only theEuropeans left, the total numbers being about520.

At 2030 hours, the I5th December, orderswere received by the Military Commander atPenang to destroy all military stores, etc., thatcould not be moved and to come away withthe remainder of the garrison and Britishcivilians. About half a dozen British residents

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948 559were left as they did not wish to move. Thenative Volunteers were given the option ofmoving, but most of them decided to remainwith their families in Penang; the British per-sonnel of the Volunteers were brought away.

The coast artillery denial scheme was carriedout and all 6-inch guns destrc^ed. Approvedarmament was withdrawn and most first-linetransport. Electrical machinery and the oilfuelling system of the Eastern Smelting Com-pany were smashed, the river house, telephoneexchange, cable and wireless station and aero-dromes destroyed. The Singapore-Colomboand the Singapore-Madras cables were, how-ever, connected by binding screws and leftworking in the hope that the Japanese mightnot discover them—a hope that proved vain.A reserve of food was opened for the civilpopulation, which had suffered some 600 killedand 1,100 wounded in air raids during the lastweek.

The destruction of material was incomplete,the most notable example being certain vesselsthat were left intact. Efforts were made bythe naval authorities to immobilise these bylaying mines in the Southern Channel, theNorthern already having been mined by theJapanese. Presumably this was not effectivefor long.

XII. THE RETREAT FROM NORTHERN MALAYA.

I2th-i8th December.115. By the I2th December enemy pressure

on the Kedah front was becoming very severe-.The Kroh forces were being forced backwardsover the frontier, while our right in NorthernKedah was also driven back, necessitating the6th Indian Infantry Brigade withdrawing onthe left to conform-and hold a line River Bukit(north of Alor Star) to Penang. Penang wasthe subject of daily air attacks at this period.Two days of heavy" fighting then saw our forcespushed back twenty miles south of Alor Star,the nth Division taking up a position in theGurun area. Some of the infantry units inthis division reported losses up to 50 per cent.,but this included missing, many of whom re-joined later.

The immediate preoccupation on our part atthis moment was to co-ordinate the movementof the nth Division with that of Krohcol. Un-less this was done there was serious danger ofthe Japanese cutting off one of the two forces.Krohcol was now back in Kedah just east ofBaling and under the command of the I2thIndian Infantry Brigade, which had been sentup from the south as reinforcements. But onthe i6th December the enemy drove in betweenthe Kroh forces and the nth Division, andcounter-attacks by two- battalions of the 28thIndian Brigade proved unavailing to restore.contact. It was now that the lack of adequatereserves to relieve troops who had been fightingcontinuously for a week began to be felt. Theenemy were pressing home their attacks in spiteof heavy losses. Troops from. Penang weresent up as reinforcements, while the 6th andI5th Indian Infantry Brigades had been soweakened in the fighting that they were orderedto re-form into one composite Brigade.

.The Japanese were inow employing KotaBharu aerodrome, reconnaissance revealingsome forty of their fighters on the ground. Toattack Kota GBharu, Singora and Patani aero-dromes with the object of reducing the scale

of Japanese air effort was part of our generalair policy at this period, but our bomber effortwas painfully limited by our lack of aircraft.Apart from deficiency of adequate A.A..weapons, the defence of our aerodromes washandicapped 'by lack of adequate warning inthe North. (See para. 54 above.) Theseformed two causes of our heavy losses of air-craft on the .ground. The retention of our mainfighter strength for the defence of Singapore(see para. 142 below) was a contributory causeand also reacted directly on our bombing effort,since it was impracticable to provide fighterescorts.

Two Buffaloes had been specially fitted forphotographic reconnaissance. To allow, ofextra petrol being carried, and at the sametime to reduce weight, all guns were taken out.Even then the Buffaloes were inferior in per-formance to the Japanese Zero fighters. Thepilots of these specially fitted aircraft carriedout useful work under very difficult conditions.'

From the start of hostilities the Dutch sub-marines -had been very active.. On the I2thDecember one of them reported sinking fourenemy troopships at Patani Roads.

ri6. The difficulty of combating theJapanese attacks on our aerodromes resulted onthe i6th and i7th December in the evacuationand demolition of Butterworth, Taiping andKuantan aerodromes, and our aircraft wereforced further South. Ipoh, too, was now beingbombed, and the aerodrome petrol dump washit.

On land, the enemy, having advanced inKelantan (as far as the Sungei Nal) and inKedah, was now also attacking detachments ofour troops in Perak round about the Grik area.The 3rd Indian Corps was accordingly autho-rised to withdraw behind the line of the .PerakRiver to protect the communications of ourforces North of Kuala Kangsar.' The nthIndian Division began withdrawing from theline of the River Muda Southwards behindRiver Krian, linking up with the 28th IndianInfantry Brigade and protected all the timeon the right flank by the I2th Indian InfantryBrigade. During this period the Argyll andSutherland Highlanders made counter-attackswith gallantry and skill. This withdrawal wascarried out successfully, the enemy being re-pulsed with loss at his first attempt to cross theriver..

Inter-Allied Conference, i.8th December.117. On the i8th December a conference of

inter-Allied representatives took place at Singa-pore, in accordance with proposals made byPresident Roosevelt. Owing to the time factor,China was not represented. Results of theconference were telegraphed to England. Themain conclusions were as follows:—

(a) The importance of Singapore to thewar in the Far East, and to the world war,.could not be exaggerated;

(6) The immediate plan was to dispose ourcombined forces then available in the FarEast so as to—

(i) Keep the enemy as far North inMalaya as possible and hold him in thePhilippines; and

(ii) Prevent the enemy acquiring terri-tory, and particularly aerodromes, whichwould threaten the arrival of reinforce-ments;


(c) Our urgent and immediate need wasfor reinforcements, which must be on a scalenot only to meet the present scale of attack,but also that likely to be put in the fieldagainst us;

(d) It was recommended that the UnitedStates convoy at present directed to Brisbaneshould proceed to Sourabaya, where aircraftwould be assembled and flown on to destina-tion;

(e) It was desirable that the Chinese shouldbe asked to maintain the maximum pressureon the Japanese in order to contain as manydivisions as possible, and subsequently toprovide bases for long-distance bombingattacks on Japan.Finally the conference considered that the

situation, though serious, need not give riseto undue pessimism provided the necessaryreinforcements were supplied in the availabletime, but time was the essential feature.

Reinforcements.118. From the 8th December, 1941, onwards

many requests for reinforcements had beenmade from General Headquarters, Far East.The time factor meant that reinforcements had'to come from the Middle East, India and con-voys already at sea rather than from the -UnitedKingdom. Complicated quadrangular refer-ences between 'Malaya, India, the Middle Eastand London were hence entailed, but Com-mander-in-Chief, India, was most helpful inappreciating the need for diversion to Malayaof forces originally intended for his own com-mand. A sub-committee of the Inter-AlliedConference, having considered all the previousrequests for reinforcements, agreed on the fol-lowing immediate requirements for Malaya tostabilise the situation:—

Air—4 Fighter Squadrons;4 Bomber Squadrons;i Photographic Flight?i Transport Flight; andReserves at 100 per cent, for fighters and

50 per cent, for bombers, plus aircraft tocomplete existing squadrons and their re-serves.Land—

i Brigade Group;1 Division;Reinforcements for gth and nth Divisions;3 Light A.A. Regiments;2 Heavy A.A. Regiments;i Anti-Tank Regiment;50 Light tanks;350 Anti-tank rifles;Bofors ammunition; and500 Tommy guns and ammunition;Further large forces would be required

later hi view of probable Japanese reinforce-ments.

By the 27th December the following had beendefinitely promised:—

Air—51 Hurricanes. (One fighter squadron ex

convoy W.S. 12.Z with 18 additional pilots);24 Blenheims. (One squadron from Middle

East) ;52 'Hudsons (from United Kingdom);While measures were in hand aiming at

the release of a further 3 fighter squadronsfrom the Middle East, and for 80 4-enginedUnited States bombers.

ex Convoy W.S. I2.Z.

Land—2 Infantry Brigade Groups"}Reinforcements for gth- >-ex India.

nth Divisions85th Anti-Tank'

Regiment complete6th Heavy A.A.

Regiment (16 guns)32nd Light A.A.

Regiment (24 guns)Light tank squadron (17 Light tanks

and reserves) ex India;53rd Infantry Brigade (i8th Division),

guns and transport of which were to followafter arrival of personnel;

i Machine Gun Battalion and reinforce-ments for the A.I.F. Brigades ex Australia;

Provision of further tanks was under dis-cussion, while 'General Headquarters, FarEast, was also pressing strongly for the com-plete i<8th Division.Five 'Blenheims from the Middle East and

four Hudsons from Australia arrived inSingapore on the 23rd December, 1941.

igth-2$th December.119. In accordance with instructions from

London, a scorched earth policy was orderedat this period instead of the denial schemereferred to in para. 65 above.

The general situation on land by the I9th-2ist December was that our troops were tryingto keep the enemy West of the River Perak,while at the same time preventing him advan-cing further South than the River Krian. Tothis end the nth Indian Division, which itwas considered essential to maintain as afighting formation, was holding a line along theRiver Kuran with the 28th Indian InfantryBrigade, and also protecting Kuala Kangsarwith the i2th Indian Infantry Brigade, a de-tachment of which was also further North alongthe Grik road. The Division as a whole wassuffering from exhaustion, damaged feet andloss of equipment. The 6th and I5th IndianInfantry Brigades were now re-formed at Ipohas the composite I5th Infantry Brigade, whilea composite battalion of the 2nd/i6th and3rd/i6th from these two Brigades was in CorpsReserve. The Kelantan forces, 8th IndianInfantry Brigade, gih Indian Division, hadsuffered about a hundred casualties in eachbattalion, and were now along the railway atManik Orai. Of elements not thus far engagedin the main operations, the 22nd Indian Infan-try Brigade (9th Indian Division) was atKuantan, while the Australian 22nd and 27thBrigades were responsible for Johore, andthe ist and 2nd Malay Infantry Brigades forSingapore Fortress. None of these last fourBrigades could be despatched North to relievethe hardl-pressed nth Indian Division, iforthe reasons given below. (See para. 138 below.)

120. Heavy enemy.air attack was now fallingon Ipoh aerodrome, and our own fighters weredriven further South to Kuala Lumpur(Selangor). Attacks on our road and railcommunications were becoming an increasingfeature of the Japanese air operations. Recon-naissance revealed that the enemy was nowmaking use of Sungei Patani aerodrome, wherethirty fighters were discovered. Our aircraftwere making night and dawn attacks on enemy

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948

aerodromes, and were very valuable for recon-naissance; reconnaissances were regularly -beingmade—

(a) 350 miles N.N.E. of Singapore;(b) along the East coast of Malaya;

• (c) over the Rhio Archipelago; and(d) 10 the Miri and Kuching areas—from

Sinkawang;in addition to those over the fighting area.

'By'the 2ist-22nd December Kuala Lumpurwas coming in for heavy air attack, thoughlittle damage was at first inflicted. Againstan attack by Ju. 87*5 on the 2ist Decemberthe Buffaloes were more successful, causing theJapanese bombers to break formation in dis-order, but to deal with the Zero fighters it wasapparent that only the speedy arrival ofHurricane reinforcements, while we still heldsufficient air bases, could turn the tide..

The land situation in the next few days (2ist-23rd December) witnessed further advances bythe enemy in all areas. Pressure along the Grikroad was heavy, in spite of severe losses inflictedduring a successful clash on the night of theI9th-20th December.

The Japanese floated troops down .the PerakRiver by night, and on the 22nd December the12th Indian Infantry Brigade was forced backSouth of Kuala Kangsar. The . 28th IndianInfantry Brigade was also pressed in the samedirection, small detachments only being leftNorth of Kuala Kangsar and West of -the PerakRiver. Bridges were destroyed as the troopsretired. While this was taking place on thePerak front, the Kelantan withdrawal was alsocontinuing, the 8th Indian Infantry Brigaderetiring South of Kuala Krai along the railroad.A problem similar to that of Krohcol and thenth Division referred to above (see para. 115)now arose in regard to 8th Indian InfantryBrigade and the main body of III Corps inPerak, and, to a lesser degree, in regard to theforce at Kuantan and the 8th Indian InfantryBrigade, lit was therefore decided to withdrawthis 8th Brigade much further South into'Central Malaya, and it took-up completely newpositions in the Kuala Lipis-Raub area. Asmall party known as " Macforce " was leftwith an armoured train at Dabong to withdrawdown the railway, demolishing it as they went.The Kuantan force was ordered to prepare towithdraw Westwards at short notice. On the23rd December all our fighters on the mainlandwere withdrawn to Singapore, Kuala Lumpurand Port Swettenham being kept as advancedlanding grounds. The enemy was also occupy-ing various points down the East coast ofMalaya, and had proceeded from Kuala Treng-ganu to Dungun. By the 25th December itwould be true to say that something like one-half of Malaya had passed from our control.

121. With the object of maintaining themorale of the civil population of Malaya I helda meeting on the 22nd December, attended bymembers of the Legislative Council, leading menof the different communities and thePress, the total number being about 120.The main points I stressed were that theavailable strength had proved inadequate; wehad to remember that the aircraft, A.A. gunsand tanks that might have come to Malaya werenot being wasted, but were being used withgreat effect in Libya«and Russia; that there wasevery reason for confidence that, now the re-quirements of the Far East had become press-

ing, those 'responsible were taking steps to en-sure the despatch of adequate reinforcements ofmen and material; and that it was up to every-one to ensure that no effort was spared to holdup the enemy until the necessary forces arrived.

On the 22nd December, a telegram was sentto Mr. Duff Cooper to the effect that uselessmouths were to be evacuated from Singaporewithout racial discrimination and on a voluntarybasis so far as the general population were con-cerned.

The total number of British women andchildren evacuated from Malaya from the begin-ning of the war with Japan to the 3ist Janu-ary, 1942, was as follows: —

7,174 European;2,305 Indian; and1,250 Chinese.

According to a Japanese report, the number ofBritish women and children left in Singapore atthe time of capitulation was about 200.

XIII.—THE ATTACK ON, AND FALL OF, HONGKONG.

122. On the 8th December, at 0800 hours,hostilities began with the launching of aJapanese air attack on Kowloon. Frontier de-molitions were accordingly blown and ourtroops withdrew according to plan as theJapanese crossed the frontier on a broad frontduring the course of the morning. It was esti-mated that the enemy were employing a forceof one division, with the possibility of increasingthis to two divisions with the troops then in thearea.

There was no,, enemy action from the air orsea during the night of the Sth-gth December,but heavy pressure was exerted against our for-ward troops along the Taipo Road. During theday of the gth December these troops were com-pelled to withdraw within the Gin Drinkers' line

'in consequence of their left flank being turned.Enemy air attacks during the day, directedmainly against the south coast of the island,did little damage. Leaflets, too, were dropped.The day closed unfortunately, since the ShingMun Redoubt, held by The Royal Scots, wassuddenly captured at 2300 hours—an unex-pected blow in view of the difficulty of approachover such country at night. It was consideredthat local fifth columnists must have guided theJapanese in this attack. One company ofWinnipeg Grenadiers was now despatched to re-inforce the Kowloon Brigade.

It was soon found necessary, in view of enemypressure, to readjust the line south-west of theJubilee Reservoir, where the enemy was makingprogress, and to vacate Kai Tak aerodrome,after the two remaining aircraft had been de-molished. During the morning of the nthDecember, however, after the two left Com-panies (Royal Scots) at Kowloon had beendriven in, and reserves {including WinnipegGrenadiers) had failed to effect more than a tem-porary halt, it was decided to withdraw fromthe (mainland, with the exception of Devil'sPeak. This withdrawal was successfully carriedout, beginning at dusk on vhe nth, and includedhowitzers, mechanical transport and armouredcars. Some interference by Kowloon Chinesefifth columnists was experienced. Stonecutter'sIsland, which had been heavily bombarded andhad suffered damage to the military barracks,was also evacuated during the night of the nth-I2th. Hong Kong Island itself was now also the


subject of bombardment, both from the air andby artillery, the main target being the navaldockyard.

123. During the night the I2th-i3th Decem-ber, troops were withdrawn from Devil's Peak,our last post on the mainland. Coast defenceguns were now used landwards for counter-battery work against the Japanese. It was notedthat the evacuation of Kowloon had consider-ably disturbed the morale of the Hong Kongcivil population, and defeatist elements came tothe fore. It became necessary to organise ricedistribution. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief demanded the surrender of Hong Kong,which was refused.

During the I4th December the Japanese shell-ing of the island increased in severity, andseveral of our gunposts were hit, as a result ofwhich some Chinese gunners deserted. Theenemy was now enjoying the use of Devil'sPeak as an observation post. On the same dayAberdeen was bombed from high-level, and thegenerating station was hit, though not put out ofaction. Considerable trouble was still being ex-perienced with the civil population, the policewere unable to prevent robbery by armed gangsin the A.R.P. tunnels, and rice distribution wasa difficulty. Propaganda was accordingly cir-culated about the proximity of a Chinese ad-vance to relieve Hong Kong; the ChungkingGovernment's representative was most helpfulin maintaining order.

During the night of the I4th-i5th December,the Japanese continued their systematic shell-ing, and gathered together a collection of smallcraft in Kowloon Bay. The Thracian enteredthe Bay and sank two river steamers, whilea special agent succeeded in blowing up a thirdship. The Thracian, however, in view ofdamage, had to be beached and dismantled.thefollowing day.

On the r6th December, Aberdeen was heavilybombed, eight times in all, with resulting loss ofone Motor Torpedo Boat and damage to thedock. Most of our Auxiliary Patrolling Vesselswere now useless in view of desertion by Chinesecrews. The enemy landed parties on LammaIsland, and started concentrations of troops onthe mainland at Customs Pass and WaterlooRoad, but these were dispersed by our artillery.During the night of the i6th-i7th mortar firedamaged some of our machine guns along thewater-front.

On the i7th December, Hong Kong Islandwas twice raided by fourteen Army lightbombers, coinciding with heavy bombardmentby artillery. After this raid the Japanese againcame across with proposals of surrender, whichwere rejected.

124. The night of the lyth-iSth was veryquiet, but on the i8th decisive events took place.The North face of the Island was subjected tocontinuous artillery, mortar and dive-bombingattack, some of our infantry defence posts beingstruck three or four times. Hospitals were badlyhit and much damage was done to water mains,roads, cables and signal communications, alsorice stores. Stanley and Murray Barracks werebombed in two raids by nine and six bombers,roughly 100 bombs being dropped—the largestnumber to that date. Much of the transport ofthe 2nd Battalion Royal Scots was destroyed,and C Battery Plotting Room O was demolishedby a direct hit. The civil Government centre

was also dive-bombed. It was following this in-tense activity that, after dusk, the Japaneseeffected landings at Quarry Bay and at Lyemunin the north-eastern 'corner of the island.

The following day the Japanese infiltratedover the hill to the Wong Nei Cheong andTytam Gaps with pack artillery and mortars.Our artillery from the Collinson and D'Aguilarareas (east and south-east of the Island) weresuccessfully withdrawn to Stanley (south of theIsland), but were compelled to destroy theirheavy guns and equipment. Our line ran nowfrom Stanley Mound northwards, Stanley Mounditself being held by one battalion of Canadians,two companies of Indian infantry and some mis-cellaneous artillery and machine guns.

During the afternoon of the igth a counter-attack was attempted, with the help of motortorpedo boats, to regain possession of MountParker and Mount Butler, but broke downthrough heavy enemy shelling, failure of inter-communications and the exhaustion of ourtroops. Our motor torpedo boats were success-ful in destroying landing craft in Kowloon Bay,but two were lost in the operations.

125. On the 20th our line was still roughlyNorth from Stanley Mound. A communiqu&was again issued to inspire civilian morale with,belief in near relief by Chinese forces. By the2ist the enemy was attacking strongly acrossMount Nicholson through Middle Gap, and ourtroops were suffering greatly from exhaustion,the wet and cold of the night-time, and isola-tion from food and ammunition stores. Counter-attacks on the enemy rear by the RoyalRifles of Canada came to nought, and WinnipegGrenadiers were also unsuccessful in an effortto retake Wong Nei Cheong Gap. The enemystill paid attention from the air to the Dockyardarea, and practically all Naval personnel werenow ashore and took their place in the landfighting. Japanese naval forces blockading theIsland consisted of two cruisers, two destroyersand two torpedo boats.

It was during the 2ist that the " Resist to theend " message from the Prime Minister was re-ceived, followed by instructions from the Ad-miralty to wreck all oil installations andstorages.

The 22nd December witnessed a fresh enemylanding on the north-east coast of the Island.Part of our force was now cut off in Stanley,while Various remnants were still holding outin isolated positions. The Japanese were nowvirtually surrounding Victoria, where a greatdeal of damage had been inflicted by bombingand shelling. Oil installations were destroyed,,but it was found impossible to do so at Lai ChiKok, since a large hospital would have beenendangered. A telegram was received from theAdmiralty giving the full text of Mr. Churchill'smessage, but also leaving to the Governor thediscretion of surrender when resistance couldno longer be usefully continued.

126. By the 23rd December the principal re-servoirs were in the hands of the enemy, andthe connections of those that remained underour control were damaged through shell-fire.Great efforts were made to effect repairs, but,in the absence of any substantial success in thisdirection, only one day's supply of water re-mained to the beleaguered city. Food stores,,too, were greatly depleted. Our troops had be-come more or less exhausted, though RoyalMarines managed to recapture ground on Mount


•Cameron (protecting the South of Victoria),which had been heavily bombarded by theJapanese, and the Middlesex Regiment beat offan attack on Leighton Hill. The enemy, how-•ever, penetrated through the A.R.P. tunnels.and street fighting began at Wanchai. The con-duct of the civil population, which had thus far.suffered some 4,000 casualties (1,000 killed),was, however, good and had become increas-ingly so since, the first depression after the.evacuation of the mainland.

On the same day the forces isolated in theSouth of the Island made an effort to counter-attack towards Stanley Mound, but to no avail.

On the 24th December the Royal Scots, fol-lowing heavy enemy attacks, were driven offthe top of Mount Cameron, and Leighton Hillwas captured after bombardment. The posi-tion in the South of the Island was unchanged.

On the 25th December, in the early hours ofthe morning, street fighting took place as the•enemy fought his way towards the centre of thetown, but another Japanese demand for sur-render was refused. Two hours later, how-ever, the Governor was advised by the Militaryand Naval commanders that further effectiveresistance could not be made, and, after carry-ing out a series of demolitions, our forces wereordered to lay down their arms. The Chinesekept their word and had endeavoured to assistthe defence of Hong Kong by advancing onCanton, but their force was not strong enoughto produce any serious effect on the Japanese.

XIV.—OPERATIONS IN BURMA AND SARAWAK.Burma.

127. A fresh field of operations opened inBurma on the gth December, when a landingwas reported at Prachuabkhirikun, a clearthreat to Mergui and the Tenasserim Peninsula.

On the nth December, Tavoy was bombed.A further enemy landing at Chumporn (Siam)gave access to the southernmost tip of Burma,and an advance on Victoria Point threatened.In the next two or three days the Japaneseadvance materialised and coincided with raidson Mergui by about fifty aircraft, propagandaleaflets being dropped as well as bombs. Aneffort was made to cut off the Japanese advancesouthwards by crossing the Siam frontier todemolish the railway a few miles south ofPrachuabkhirikun, but the strength of the op-position and the heavy rains proved too greatfor the success of this expedition. The situa-tion was still in an undeveloped stage, but witha clear threat to Southern Burma, when on theI5th December Burma reverted to the provinceof the Commander-in-Chief, India. (See para.29 above.}

Sarawak.128. The general problem of the defence of

'Borneo was indicated in para. 16 above. The•oil denial scheme was put into operation at theoutbreak of war and completed by the nthDecember. The landing ground at Miri was alsodemolished and the forces at Lutong evacuatedby sea to> Kuching in H.M.S. Lipis.

The Company of 2/15 Punjab Regiment re-joined the rest of its Battalion, which formedthe regular garrison of Kuching and the remain-ing individuals—from the 2nd Loyals and S.S.Police—were 'brought on to Singapore.

Considerable anxiety and uneasiness was feltby the authorities in Kuching owing to the ab-sence of Naval and Air Forces. It was pointed

out to them, however, that many places inEngland had stood up to 'bombing without anydirect defence, and that they would be expectedto do the same. It was evident, however, thatthe morale of the population of Kuching wasin a bad way. This, in my opinion, was partlydue to the fact that the ruler, Rajah Brooke,.was absent—actually in Australia. He had agreat deal of influence with the natives, andin view of the situation he should have returnedto his country immediately on the outbreak ofwar, if not before. As it was, the SarawakRangers proved quite unreliable, and the 2/15Punjab Regiment were left to carry out thedefence by themselves.

The complete control of the South China Seaexercised by the Japanese reduced the problemof the capture of Kuching to a mere calculationof the strength necessary to overcome the resist-ance that they would probably meet. Theyappear to have attacked it with the equivalentof one Brigade Group.

129. Japanese naval forces were not long inappearing in strength before Miri. By the i6thDecember, some ten warships had been sightedin company with a tanker off Miri and Lutong,and these ships became the object of our attacks.On the I7th December, 6 Glenn Martins and 5Buffaloes of the Netherlands East Indies Ah*Force delivered an attack from Sinkawang, butscored neither hits nor near misses. The sameday, Dutch bombers from Samiuwkoa locatedand attacked this force, a Dutch navy Dornierscoring a direct hit on a destroyer. Encountersbetween Dutch Buffaloes and the Navy Zerofighters revealed the clear superiority of theJapanese aircraft. Reports of a Japanese land-ing at Lutong and Baram Point were received,and on the i8th December renewed attacks onenemy shipping in this area were made, with-out success, by a mixed force. . Eight GlennMartins from Sinkawang had to return withoutdelivering their attack owing to the badweather. The following day 6 Netherlands EastIndies Glen Martins claimed a hit on a cruiserand .some near misses. The igth December,however, was also marked by Japanese airattacks, Kuching aerodrome and town beingbombed by about 15 heavy bombers and oneseaplane. Civilians suffered approximately 100casualties, while the main material damage wasthe destruction of the Borneo Company BenzineStores. The air war was also carried to DutchTerritory by a heavy attack on Pontianak,much of the city 'being destroyed.

An expedition clearly aimed at Kuching wasthen sighted on the 23rd December, and 5Blenheim IVs, attacking this on the 24thDecember, scored one hit on a transport andsome near misses. Air support from Sinkawangwas no longer possible in view of the damageto the aerodrome from a Japanese attack, andthe Dutch aircraft were withdrawn to Palem-bang.

The 2/15 Punjab Regiment carried outdemolitions on the aerodromes, held- up theJapanese for a time, and eventually moved inaccordance with orders, along a jungle path,to join up with the Dutch, though this necessi-tated abandoning practically the whole of theirequipment.

It was noteworthy that Malay labour atKuching disappeared as the course of. opera-tions approached the area.

According to later reports, some 800 of the2/15 Punjab Regiment joined the Dutch and


were still fighting with them at the end ofJanuary, 1942.

XV.—SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS.Changes in Commands.

130. A large number of changes took placeshortly before or shortly after the war withJapan started. These were as follows:—

(a) Admiral Sir Tom Phillips replacedAdmiral Sir Geoffrey Layton on the 6thDecember.

(6) On the loth December, after Sir TomPhillips had gone down with the Prince ofWales, Sir Geoffrey Layton—who was thenactually on 'board his ship about to start forAustralia on his way home—resumedcommand.

(c) On the 6th November I was informedthat " owing to recent developments in theFar East, it had been decided that the dutiesof Commander-in-Chief should be entrustedto an Army officer with up-to-date experi-ence." My successor was to be Lieutenant-Generai Paget. This prospective changebecame generally known in the Army and AirForce in Malaya by the end of November.

(d) On the sgth November a signal wasreceived from Whitehall to the effect thatGeneral Pownall had been substituted forGeneral Paget.

(e) On the I5th December the responsi-bility of the defence of Burma was transferredfrom the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, toCommander-in-Chief, India.

(/) On the agth December General. McLeodwas replaced by General Hutton as GeneralOfficer Commanding, Burma.

(g) On the loth December Mr. Duff Cooperwas appointed as Cabinet representative inthe Far East, and instructions were receivedby him that a War Council was to be formedunder his leadership.These changes may have been inevitable, and

it could not, of course, have been foreseen thatthey would coincide so closely with the start ofthe war, but they did add to the difficulties ofthe situation.War Council.

131. The composition of the War Council,the formation of -which was started on the lothDecember, was as follows:—

Mr. Duff Cooper, Chairman;H.E. the Governor of Malaya;C.-in-C., Far East;C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet;G.O.C. Malaya;A.O.C., Far East;and later, Sir George Sansom, as being

responsible for Propaganda and Press control.The Wax Council did useful work in several

directions, but as it was not formed until afterthe war began there had been no time to workout its correct functions. Actually, the com-position led to its dealing rather too much withthe details of what was happening in Malaya,whilst it would have been more useful if it hadconcentrated on the wider problems.

On the i6th December a Civil Defence Com-mittee was set up to review and deal with allmeasures affecting the defence of Singaporeother than those of a purely military character.Its composition was: —

Mr. Duff Cooper, Chairman;Fortress Commander;Inspector-General of Police; andOne civilian.

Intelligence.132. Turning to intelligence, perhaps the

most serious error was one involving the broad-est aspect, namely, the intention of the Japan-ese Government. From the tactical point ofview in Malaya there was no surprise, but fromthe" wider point of view there was. Whilst inGeneral Headquarters we always realised thepossibility of the extreme military party inJapan forcing their country into war, we didnot believe, till the end of November, thatJapan might 4>e actually on the verge of startingwar. (See paras. 61 and 94 above.}

As indicated in paragraph 75 above, therewas also some error regarding the intentions ofthe Siamese Government.

133. As regards the more local intelligence,the forces that the Japanese would have at thebeginning for an attack on Malaya were esti-mated with a fair degree of accuracy, but therewas an under-estimate of the power of theJapanese to attack several places simultane-ously. Before the war it was considered thatthe Japanese might attack in force either thePhilippines (with or without Hong Kong), orMalaya or the Netherlands East Indies. It wasnot anticipated that they would attack in forceboth the Philippines and Malaya simultane-ously; still less that they would also attack PearlHarbour. So far as I could gather from tele-grams, this opinion was also held in England,at any rate up to the last few days before warstarted, though I believe the Embassy in Tokioheld a more correct view of the Japanese powerto attack several places simultaneously.

134. There was also an under-estimate of theefficiency of the Japanese Army and Air Force,particularly in the following points:—

(a) Their disregard of weather conditions,especially their ability to land on beachesin bad weather. Also they appear to havebeen but little hampered by the flooded stateof the country in the Southern end of the KraIsthmus;

(6) Their mobility. This was due to severalcauses. The Japanese Army seemed gener-ally to depend less on mechanism than oursand to be content with a smaller proportion ofartillery. The men needed only simple foodand were able to live largely on the countryand apparently required nothing in the wayof comforts. In some cases they used lighterweapons including a mortar that was lighterthan our 2-inch mortar. As a result theJapanese Army was able to operate with lessmechanical transport than ours and so wasless dependent upon roads. The whole organi-sation could be kept less complicated thanours and more flexible;

(c) The individual initiative of the Japan-ese soldier;

(d) The performance of the naval single-seater fighter known as the Zero type. Thishad a detachable petrol tank under the fuse-lage and the Japanese got much value fromthe long range thus given to it. In spite ofthis complication, its speed and manoeuvra-bility at heights of 10,000 feet and over wereremarkably good; and

(e) The rapidity with which repairs werecarried out, in particular of bridges and aero-dromes. This last affected the strength of theJapanese air force in the Singora area at theSouth end of the Kra Isthmus in the earlydays of the war.


These under-estimates were not attributablesolely to errors on the part of F.E.C.B., butalso to those of other bodies, including my ownGeneral Headquarters.

Japanese Army Tactics and Training.135. With regard to tactics, in general the

Japanese endeavoured to infiltrate or outflank.They made use of certain novelties such as:—

(a) A type of light infantry screen actingin advance of their main body. The menwere very lightly clad, had but littleequipment and were armed with a light auto-matic weapon, the calibre of which was some-thing under 0.3; they carried only about fortyrounds of ammunition and a few handgrenades. These light infantry parties usedto work individually, would get round to theTear of our advance troops, and resorted tosuch expedients as climbing trees from whichto fire their automatic or throw hand gren-ades. Our men frequently mistook .theselight troops for Malays or Chinese, but it isdoubtful if the Japanese soldiers were de-liberately disguised as Malayan natives;

(&) The use of noise, including Chinesecrackers and strange cries at night; thesetricks, though laughable when one knewabout them, had a certain amount of moraleffect, especially on young Indian troops atthe commencement of the campaign; and

(c) Inflatable rubber belts to enable mento cross creeks and small rivers.To combat these tactics the General Officer

Commanding, Malaya, stressed the import-ance of discipline and steadiness, the necessityfor alertness and cunning on the part of theindividual, and that the way to defeat theenemy was to attack or counter-attack him onevery possible occasion. " Essentially war ofmovement and attack, and too much diggingcreates defence complex."

136. An anti-white campaign had started inJapan in 1936, and it was evident that for longbefore the commencement of the war the spiritof hatred of Europeans, particularly the British,had constantly been inculcated into the Japan-ese soldiers. They appear to have been taughtthat the killing of Europeans by any methodwas a patriotic action.

It is possible that had we adopted the samecourse some men might have fought harder atthe start, but it is difficult to inculcate the spiritof hatred into the Englishman. This is partlydue to his peculiar faculty of seeing a jest inthe most depressing circumstances, and partlyto the fact that hatred is ultimately based onfear, which is not a natural characteristic ofour race.

Factors affecting Morale of our Forces.137. The majority of the Indian regiments

laboured under some disability on account ofthe inexperience of most of their British officers.As a rule, there would tie two or three seniorofficers, with fifteen or more years' experience,then a gap until we came to officers who hadjoined after September, 1939. Somewhere abouthalf these officers had experience in India andcould talk the language, but having only fromone to two and a half years' service they didnot carry the weight which more experiencedofficers would have done.

•In both British and Indian units there wasonly a small leaven of war-experienced officers

and men, and it was under these conditions thatyoung soldiers had to meet the first shock ofthe Japanese attack..?138. A factor which had some effect on morale

generally was that, strategically, we were on thedefensive; everyone knew that it was to our in-terests to avoid war with Japan, which meantthat the initiative and especially choice ofmoment for opening hostiHties rested with them.

As stated above, the 'Matador plan providedfor a tactical offensive, provided- adequatewarning could be obtained. As events turnedout, the execution of Matador was impractic-able, and later events confirmed that the deci-sion not to carry out this operation was correct.

Then, owing to the comparative weakness ofour forces in Malaya we could neither affordheavy losses oip North nor send up there morethan limited reinforcements, because of thenecessity for retaining a force to defendSouthern Johore and in the last resort theisland of Singapore itself. This was not theresult of a sort of fortress-complex, but becausethe essential factor was preservation of therepair and other facilities in the Naval Base.The opinion held in London on this point wasmade perfectly clear in the latter part ofDecember when the Chiefs of Staff telegraphed:" 'His Majesty's Government agree yourconception that vital issue is to ensure securityof Singapore Naval • Base. They emphasisethat no other consideration -must compete withthis."

Holding Northern Malaya was not an end initself; it was with reference to the Naval Basethat Northern Malaya acquired its importance.This meant that Commanders in the North hadto bear in mind the possibility of withdrawal inthe face of superior forces, .their action—at anyrate until Johore was reached—being mainly adelaying one to gain time for the arrival of re-inforcements from overseas. This applied par-ticularly to the Kelantan area, and to a lesserextent, to Kuantan, since hi both cases (asstated in para. 12 above) the line of communi-cation was a single one and vulnerable to airbombing.

139. It is easy to talk of the lack of an offen-sive spirit and of a " retreat complex," butunder the conditions described above with-drawals from the North were necessary; andthe adverse effect induced by having to carryout a continuous retreat over some hundreds ofmiles starting from the early days of the cam-paign must be attributed to the general situa-tion rather than to any fault in the originalmorale of the troops themselves.

It is possible however, that the need foroffensive action even during a retreat had notbeen so stressed during the training of officersand men as to become a second nature. Forinstance, there appeared to be a tendency touse reserves for supporting a weak portion ofa defensive position rather than retaining .themat all costs for bringing about a counter-attack.Again, up to the time I handed over command,there was a tendency to use the IndependentCompany in Malaya as a reinforcement andnot to carry out the functions for which it wasspecially intended. Further, officers and menmust be taught that occasions will arise whensome parties have got to hold on to the lastman, even though the main body of the forcemay be moving back.


Royal Air Force problems.140. With regard to the Air Force, reference

has already .been made in paras. 79 and 88above to the obsolescence of our Vildebeesteaircraft and to the effect of lack of reserves.Apart from this, the necessity for rapid evacua-tion of the Northern aerodromes had someeffect on the ground personnel, many of whomwere young and inexperienced. There were in-sufficient rifles or Thompson guns to equipall Air Force personnel, but they must be pre-pared to fight, and, if necessary, sacrifice them-selves in the same way as the infantry; andfurther, must spare no effort to ensure that allmaterial than can possibly be moved isdespatched, or in the last resort destroyed, toprevent its being of value to the enemy.

141. The Royal Air Force suffered from lackof staff. It was not so much that more officerswere required at headquarters as that suffi-cient should have been available to formanother Group Headquarters. A Fighter Head-quarters had been formed and operated well,but the rest of the operations had to foe carriedout direct by Royal Air Force Headquarters,with the result that practically all the head-quarters air staff officers had to be employedin the operations room, and, including theAir Officer Commanding, were fully occupiedin working out details of bombing and recon-naissance, leaving no one to plan and thinkahead. This condition would have been im-proved had it been possible to form anothergroup to operate the bombing squadrons, or,possibly, naval co-operation and overseasreconnaissance as well as all bombing.

142. As aerodromes in Northern Malayabecame untenable there was a danger of thosein the South becoming too few to allow ofadequate dispersal of the Royal Air ForceSquadrons. The possibility of this had alsobeen foreseen some months before war brokeout and it had been decided in such an eventu-ality to move the bombing squadrons to Dutchaerodromes in Sumatra, retaining most of thefighter squadrons on Singapore Island. Up tothe time that war broke out this remainedlittle more than a project owing to the RoyalAir Force staff being fully occupied with otherwork. At the end of December, however, theplans were well advanced, not only for themove of these squadrons but also for thepossible establishment of an erecting depot inJava.

143. The need for preserving an adequateforce for the protection of the Naval Base(see pam. 138 above) applied especially to theRoyal Air Force. This accounts for the com-parative weakness of the fighter strength inNorthern Malaya at the start of the war andfor fighter escorts not being available for ourbombers. From the last week in Decemberair protection for reinforcement convoysabsorbed most of our fighter strength.

Defence and Denial of Aerodromes.144. As indicated in para. 103 above, the

primary object of the Japanese appears to havebeen to get command of the air, principally bythe attack on our aerodromes by aircraft, orby their capture. The weakness of our aero-drome defence is referred to in para. 115 above.In regard to A.A. weapons, as a result of theexperiences in Crete, I laid down that thedefence of aerodromes was to take precedence

over everything else except the A.A. defenceof the Naval Base.. It was decided that the fullscale of the defence would be eight heavy andeight light A.A. guns; this was altered afterwar broke out to four heavy and twelve light,a scale that was hardly every approached.

145. When our aerodromes had to be aban-doned, steps were naturally taken to renderthem useless to the enemy, particularly toyexplosives in runways and other parts of thelanding area. The effect of this action wasgenerally of disappointingly short duration. TheJapanese were certainly quick in carrying outrepairs, but, even allowing for that, the re-sults of many of the demolitions as carried outseem hardly to have repaid the energy ex-pended and the adverse moral effect on troopsof hearing explosions behind them. A systemof delay-action mines would probably havebeen effective provided they could have beenproperly concealed; preparations would havebeen necessary for this at the time the aero-dromes were constructed. A heavy tractordrawing some form of deep plough or scarifierand working in between craters would havebeen a very useful addition; it could not havegone on working to the last moment, unlessii: was intended to abandon the tractor, sincethese could only move very slowly and werelikely to block roads if left to the last.

At aerodromes located in wet or low-lyingareas, mines should be located with referenceto the drainage system with the object of dis-locating it and so putting the aerodrome outof action for a long period. Aerodromes in ourpossession were occasionally rendered unser-viceable for about twenty-four hours byJapanese bombing of. runways; this would havebeen much more effective had delay-actionbombs been used.

Left-Behind Parties.146. An attempt was made to organise left-

behind parties in Northern Malaya with theobject of obtaining information and carryingout sabotage of all sorts in the enemy's rear.This duty was entrusted to the O.M. Sectionof the Ministry of Economic Warfare under Mr.Killery. It was, however, started too late andthere was no time to organise it thoroughly.This was in no way the fault of the O.M.,but was due to the factors mentioned in para.9 above.

Question of a Military Governor.147. The appointment of a Military Governor

might have been desirable for Singapore Islandduring the later stages, but I was of the opinionthat such an appointment for the whole ofMalaya at the start of the war was not a prac-ticable proposition. The mam reason was thatthe organisation of the Colony, with the Fede-rated and the Unfederated States, was verycomplicated and that it was not a practicalproposition for anyone to take it over at shortnotice. It would have been found far morepracticable for Hong Kong.

Australia's Assistance.148. The Australian Government fully

realised the importance of Singapore to thedefence of the Far East and especially toAustralia and did everything in their power tohelp. In November, 1940, there were threesquadrons of the Royal Australian Air Force


in Malaya. In December, 1940, the AustralianWar Minister visited Singapore. Largely as aresult of his representations, the AustralianGovernment despatched the 22nd Brigade,Australian Imperial Forces, to Singapore inFebruary. The 27th Brigade followed later,and arrived on the 20th August. Besides thesevaluable reinforcements, Australia suppliedofficers for the Royal Air Force Volunteer Re-serve for administrative work on aerodromes,men for two reserve mechanical transport unitsin the spring of 1941 and for the forty tankswhich we had hoped to get from the MiddleEast. The situation regarding Beaufort aircrafthas been mentioned in para. 79 above, andsmall arms ammunition in para. 92. In addi-tion to this, Australia also supplied many itemsof signalling equipment and special radio setsfor coast defence guns-,. After the war startedfour Hudsons from Australia reached Singaporeon the 23rd December and Army reinforcementswere promised. (See para. 118 above.)

567

The Dutch.149. The Dutch in the Netherlands East

Indies faithfully executed their share of theagreements and, indeed, went beyond them,and co-operated wholeheartedly with us in'every way. They sent three bomber squadronsand one fighter squadron in the early daysof the war in Malaya, although, owing to tech-nical troubles they were having at the timewith their engines, the bomber squadrons con-sisted of only six aircraft, the whole three,therefore, being equivalent to little more thanone British bomber squadron. Their sub-marines operated with great gallantry in theGulf of Siam. They also gave me three of theirreserve flying boats to make good our losses,and sent over a guerilla band to NorthernMalaya to operate in the Japanese rear.

At a later stage in the operations I believethey were somewhat critical of the amount ofassistance we were able to send to the Nether-lands East Indies, and of the length of timebefore it arrived; should this give rise to anyacrimony in the future, I hope that the promptand whole-hearted assistance they rendered tous will not be forgotten.

Work of General Headquarters.150-.. In Malaya the operations of my own

Headquarters were limited to the issue of certaindirectives to the General Officer Commandingand Air Officer Commanding. These laid downsuch matters as the withdrawal from Kelantanand Kuantan, and priority of tasks for theRoyal Air Force. Apart from that, the mainwork was to secure the proper co-ordination ofair operations with the Dutch and Australians.

A great deal of the time of my small staffwas taken up at the beginning toy the draftingof Sitreps telegrams and communique's, as wellas preparing appreciations demanded fromEngland. One of the problems regarding thetwo former was the fact that they had to besent to Australia as well as to England; theirtiming was, therefore, a matter of fine adjust-ment, since it was necessary to ensure, forinstance, that a communique should not beprinted in Australian newspapers before theSitreps telegrams arrived in England. Eventu-ally, it was found simpler to hand over most ofthis work to the combined Army and Air Forceoperations room, in so far as Malaya itself was

C

concerned, and General Headquarters Sitrepscommuniques were confined to the situation asa whole.

Although my General Headquarters operatedat the Naval Base at the beginning of thewar, it was found that, after the loss of thePrince of Wales and Repulse and the formationof the War Council, it was more convenientfor my Headquarters to be located near theCombined Operations Room. Preparations hadbeen made for this some months before, andthe necessary accommodation was available.The move was carried out about the I5thDecember*

151. After the transfer of the defence ofBurma to Commander-in-Chief, India, and thefall of Hong Kong, it was felt that the locationof General Headquarters should no longer bein Malaya, since to keep it there would notonly hamper its own work but cramp theinitiative of the General Officer Commandingand Air Officer Commanding and make theorganisation in Singapore too 'top-heavy. Itwas decided before I left that the correct loca-tion of General Headquarters would be inJava, preferably near Bandoeng, and steps werealready in hand to effect this move. Thepossibility of a move away from Singapore be-coming necessary had been foreseen manymonths before.

• 152. The results of the campaign in the FarEast naturally gave rise to some speculationas to the advisability of forming what may becalled Strategic Headquarters, devoid of allresponsibility for direct operational control oradministration. Commander-in-chief, -MiddleEast, at the time I passed through Cairo inNovember, 1940, stated that, in his opinion,such a General Headquarters was impractic-able. My view is that, under special conditionssuch as existed in the Far East, a strategicGeneral Headquarters was a workable proposi-tion,'- provided its limitations are fully recog-nized.

In para. 5 above were indicated the measureswhich it was expected to achieve iby thecreation of a General Headquarters, Far East.We failed to convince the Japanese that ourstrength was too great to ibe challenged withsuccess; the limitation of the forces, especiallyaircraft, that could be sent to the Far Eastwas imposed by prior requirements elsewhere.

Co-operation in Malaya and co-ordination ofeffort with neighbouring countries, includingplans for mutual reinforcement, were, achieved.

Farewell Order.153. I handed over Command of the Far East

to Lt.-jGeneral Sir Henry Pownall on the 27thDecember, 1941, and left Singapore, in accord-ance with instructions, on the 3ist December.

I end with my farewell order which was pub-lished on the 28th December, 1941.

To ALL RANKS OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE,MALAYA.

On relinquishing the Far East Command 1send to you all in the Army and Air Force inMalaya a message of farewell, of admiration forthe way you have faced danger, fatigue andhardship, and of all good wishes for 1942.

I know my successor well, and I turn overthe command to good hands.


Remember that upon the issue of this wardepends the welfare of the whole world, includ-ing our own families. Their eyes are uponyou. Do your Duty unflinchingly, knowingthat the resources of the Empire and of ourAllies are behind you, confident that, howeverhard the struggle now, our cause will triumphin the end.

R. BROOKE-POPHAM,Air Chief Marshal.

APPENDICES

A.—Directive to the Commander-in-Chief,Far East

B.—Instructions issued to General OfficersCommanding and Air OfficerCommanding, Far East

C.—His Majesty's Ships based at Singaporeand Hong Kong, December 7, 1941

D.—Summary of Army Strength, Malaya,November, 1940

E.—Order of Battle, Malaya, December 7,1941, and Summary

F.—Anti-Aircraft Position, December, 7,1941

G.—Order of Battle, Burma, December 7,1941, and Summary

H.—Order of Battle, Hong Kong, Decem-ber 8, 1941

I.—Strength of Air Force in Malaya,November, 1940

J.—Strength and Dispositions of the RoyalAir Force, December 7, 1941

K. Summary of Operationally Serviceable""" I.E. Aircraft in Malaya-.L.—Performance of the Buffalo Single-

SeaterM.—Order of the Day issued December 8,

1941 \

APPENDIX A.

DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,FAR EAST.

1. You are appointed Commander-in-Chief,Far East.

2. You will be responsible to the Chiefs ofStaff for the operational control and generaldirection of training of all British land and airforces in Malaya,* Burma and Hong Kong, andfor the co-ordination of plans for the defence ofthese territories.

You will also be responsible for the opera-tional control and general direction of trainingof British Air Forces in Ceylon and of thegeneral reconnaissance Squadrons of the RoyalAir Force which it is proposed to station in theIndian Ocean and Bay of Bengal for oceanreconnaissance in those areas.

3. For these purposes, the following will beunder your command:—

General Officer Commanding, Malaya.General Officer Commanding, Burma.General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong.Air Officer Commanding, Far East.

*Including the Straits Settlements, the Federatedand Unfederated Malay States, Brunei, Sarawak andNorth Borneo.

4. It is intended that you should deal,primarily with matters of major military policyand strategy. It is not the intention that youshould assume administrative or financialresponsibilities or the normal day-to-day func-tions at present exercised by the General OfficersCommanding and Air Officer Commanding.

These Officers will continue to correspond asat present with the War Office, Air Ministry,Colonial Office and Burma Office, on all matterson which they have hitherto dealt with thesedepartments, to the fullest extent possible con-sistent with the exercise of your Command;keeping you informed as and when you wish.

5. Your staff will consist of the followingonly, and no expansion of this staff is contem-plated:—

A Chief of Staff (an army officer of therank of Major-Genera.1),

A Senior Royal Air Force Staff Officer,A Naval Liaison Officer,An Army Officer of the -rank of General

Staff Officer, ist Grade,An officer from each Service of the equiva-

lent rank of General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade,together with the necessary clerical and cypherstaff.

6. You will, where appropriate, consult andco-operate with the Commander-in-Chief,China, the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies,and the Commander-in-Chief in India. Youwill also communicate direct with the DefenceDepartments of the Governments of theCommonwealth of Australia and New Zealandon all routine matters of interest to them, -buton matters of major policy you will communi-cate to these Dominion Governments throughthe appropriate Service Department of HisMajesty's Government.

7. You will keep the Governor of the StraitsSettlements and High Commissioner for theMalay States, the Governor of Burma and theGovernor of Hong Kong closely and constantlyinformed and will consult them as appropriate.

8. The General and Air Officers mentioned inparagraph 3 above remain, subject to yourgeneral direction and supervision, in touchwith the Governor of the Straits Settlementsand High Commissioner for the Malay States,the Governor of Burma and the Governor ofHong Kong. In the case of Burma you willensure that the constitutional relations betweenthe Governor and the General Officer Com-manding are not affected. This is of particularimportance with regard to any movement oftroops which might affect internal security.

9. You will, where appropriate, maintaintouch with His Majesty's, (representatives inJapan, China, the United States of Americaand Thailand, and with His Majesty's Consuls-General in the Netherlands East Indies andIndo-China. The maintenance of touch withHis Majesty's representatives and Consuls-General in these countries will rest with youexclusively and not with the General and AirOfficers referred to in paragraph 3.

10. The Far East Combined IntelligenceBureau, in addition to keeping you informed ofcurrent intelligence, will be charged with theduty of collecting such special intelligence asyou may require. The Bureau will remainunder the control of the Admiralty.


ii. You will normally communicate as neces-sary with the Chiefs of Staff, the Air Ministrybeing used -as a channel of communication fortelegrams, and letters • being addressed to theSecretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee; but youhave the right to correspond direct with anindividual Chief of Staff on matters particularlyaffecting his Service.

APPENDIX B.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO GENERAL OFFICERSCOMMANDING AND AIR OFFICER COMMAND-ING, FAR EAST.

Headquarters of 'Commander-inrChief, FarEast, will open at Singapore at 0800 hours onthe i8th November.

(2) A prime function of staff of Commander-in-Chief, Far 'East, will be to prepare, in con-junction with Staff of Commander-in-Chief,China, all joint plans that may be requiredeither by Chiefs of Staff organisation in Londonor -by strategic situation in Far East. . TheAuthority for such plans will be either Chiefsof Staffs in London or two Commanders-in-Chief.

(3) There will be no alteration in channelsby which you correspond War Office, AirMinistry, Colonial Office or Burma Office onany matters other than questions of pjplicyaffecting strategy or operations. On these ques-tions of policy you will correspond direct withthis Headquarters, sending copies of your com-munications to appropriate Governor. Similarly,all communications from Commander-in-Chief,Far East, to you on these questions will berepeated to appropriate Governor.

On other questions you will repeat to Com-mander-in-Chief, Far East, such of your com-munications to War Office, &c., as you judgeof-sufficient importance.

(4) You will ensure that intimate touch nowexisting between yourself and Governor in yourcommand is maintained.

(5) You will submit to Commander-in-Chiefcopies of your most recent appreciations andplans which are now in operation and will keephim fully informed of any changes in situationby signal if of immediate importance, other-wise by periodical liaison letter.

(6) You will submit location statement show-ing present location of all forces within yourcommand. You will subsequently report majorchanges in location as they occur.

(7) The Commander-in-Chief requires to bekept informed of general administrative * con-ditions of forces under your command, includ-ing position in respect of reserves of essentialcommodities. Any major administrative 'diffi-culties which you may now be experiencing,or which arise subsequently, will be reportedat once, in order that both extent to whichthey may affect operations .or policy may beaccurately gauged, and that representationsmay be made direct by him to higher authority,if such a course appears to be required.

(8) You will submit short report of presentstate of training of units under your commandand your programme of training for comingmonths. Further instructions will be issuedon method by which Commander-in-Chief is tobe kept informed of progress of training.

(9) Chiefs of Staff have-made Commander-in-Chief, Far East, responsible for maintainingtouch with His Majesty's representatives inJapan, China and Thailand, and with HisMajesty's Consuls-General in Netherlands EastIndies and Indo-China. Your direct touch withHis Majesty's representatives or Consuls-General in these countries should therefore berestricted to matters immediately affecting yourcommands.

APPENDIX C.

H.M. SHIPS BASED AT SINGAPORE AND HONGKONG ON 7TH DECEMBER, 1941.

Singapore—Capital Ships—

Prince of Wales.Repulse.

Cruisers— '•Danae.Dragon.Durban.

Destroyers—Jupiter.Electra.Encounter.Express.Tenedos.Thanet.Scout.Stronghold.

Ships from other Stations refitting at Singapore.Cruiser—

Mauritius (E.I. Station).

Destroyers—Isis (Mediterranean Station).H.M.A.S. Vampire (Australian Station).H.M.A.S. Vendetta (Australian Station).

Submarine—Rover (Mediterranean Station).

Hong Kong—Destroyer—

Thracian.

This list does not include auxiliary minesweepers,patrol vessels and small craft.

APPENDIX D!SUMMARY OF ARMY STRENGTH, MALAYA,

NOVEMBER, 1940.Infantry—

17 Battalions, viz.—British 6 (including I M.G.

Battalion).Indian 10Malay. ... . ... r

Mobile Artillery—i Mountain Regiment, R.A.

APPENDIX E.

MALAYA COMMAND.Order of Battle — December 7, 1941.

H.Q., MALAYA COMMAND.

Singapore Fortress 3 Indiai

i Malaya Inf. Bde. 2 Malaya Inf. Bde.2 Loyals i Manchester (M.G.)i Malay Regt. 2 Gordons

2/17 Dogras

Coast and A.A. Defences7 Coast Regt., R.A.9 Coast Regt., R.A.16 Defence Regt., R.A.35 Fortress Coy., R.E.41 Fortress Coy., R.E.3 A.A. Regt., R.A.I Hy. A.A. Regt. (H.K.S.R.A.) . I

(less one bty.) • H.Q., L. of C.2 Hy; A.A. Regt. (H.K.S.R.A.) H.Q.; F.M.S.V

(less one bty.)3 Lt. A.A. Regt.H.K.S.R.A.i A.A. Regt., LA.5 S/L Regt., R.A.

* The Australian Unit

Corps A.I.F. Malaya* O.C. Troops Sarawak O.C., R.A.2/10 Fd. Regt. and Brunei Christmas Is.2/15 Fd. Regt. 2/15 Punjab Regt. 6-in. gun)4 A/T Regt. R.A. Det.

(less one bty.) (two 6-in. guns)2/10 Fd. Coy.2/12 Fd. Coy.2/6 Fd. Park Coy.

22 A.I.F. Bde. 27 A.I.F. Bde.2/18 Bn. 2/26 Bn.2/19 Bn. 2/29 Bn.2/20 Bn. 2/30 Bn.

1 1Area Penang Fortress 9 Indian Div.F. ii Coast Regt. 5 Fd. Regt.

36 Fortress Coy. 88 Fd. Regt.5/14 Punjab One Bty. 80 A/Tk. Regt.

42 Fd. Park Coy.

8 Ind. Inf. Bde. 22 Ind. Inf. Bde.

Det., 12 Ind. Inf. Bde.(one 122 Fd. Regt.

15 Fd. Coy. S. & M.2 A. & S.H.5/2 Punjab4/19 Hyderabad

ii Indian Div.3 Cav. (less one sqn.)137 Fd. Regt.155 Fd. Regt.80 A. Tk. Regt. (less one bty.)23 Fd. Coy.43 Fd. Park Coy.

21 Mtn. Bty. One Sec. 21 Mtn. Bty. | |(less one section) 22 Fd. Coy. S. & M. 6 Ind. Inf. Bde. 15 Ind. Inf. Bde. 28 Ind. Inf. Bde.

19 Fd. Coy. S. & M. 5/11 Sikhs 22 Mtn. Regt. 3 Fd. Coy. S. & M. 2/1 Gurkhas2/10 Baluch 2/18 R. Garhwal Rif. (less 21 Mtn. Bty.) i Leicesters 2X2 Gurkhas2/12 F.F. Regt. 17 Fd. Coy. S. & M. 2/9 Jat 2/9 Gurkhas3/17 Dogras 2 Surreys 1/14 Punjabi F.F. Regt. 1/8 Punjab 3/16 Punjab

27i6 Punjabs of the A.I.F. Malaya shown here formed part of the 8th Australian Division.

570 SU

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Summary of Strength of Army in Malaya, December 7, 1941.

(Royal Engineers, Mechanical Transport, Signals and Ancillary Units not included.)

Infantry Battalions—BritishIndianAustralianMalay

TotalVolunteer Battalions .Johore Military ForcesIndian State Forces

Artillery—Field RegimentsMountain RegimentsAnti-Tank RegimentsAnti-Tank Batteries

6 (including i M.G. Btn.).186

10i5

7 (5 of 24 guns; 2 of 16 guns).1 (24 guns).2 (i of 48 guns; i of 36 guns).2 (i of 8 Breda guns; i of 6 2-pounders).

Total Strength—Regulars—

British 19,391Australian 15,279IndianAsiatic

Volunteers—BritishIndianAsiatic

Total

Total

37,1914,482

2,430727

7.395

Grand Total

76,343

10,552

86,895

APPENDIX F.

FAR EAST.

Anti-Aircraft Position, December 7, 1941.

Malaya —HeavyLight

3-in. Naval

Burma —HeavyLight

Hong Kong —HeavyLight3-in. Naval

ApprovedScale.

176100 (plus

144 field force)Nil

2468

3230Nil

Holdings.

7078

24

} (a)

1422

En route.

1228

Nil

88

48

Allocated butnot shipped.

£}»

(a) Of these 4 heavy and 8 light had only just reached Rangoon and had not been installed.(6) A proportion was to be allocated to Burma by Commau'der-in-Chief, Far East.


APPENDIX G.

BURMA.

Order of Battle at Commencement of Hostilities.

(i) ist Burma Division—consisting of—

Maymyo Brigade

Teriasserim Brigade

I3th Indian Infantry Brigade

(2) Rangoon Brigade

(3) i6th Indian Infantry Brigade

(4) Burma Frontier Force

(5) Garrison Companies

(6) Burma Rifles (Territorials)

(7) Burma Auxiliary Force

(8) Burma Rifles

(9) Field Company

(10) Armed Police •

2nd K.O.Y.L.I.ist Burma Rifles.6th Burma Rifles.7th Burma Rifles.i2th Mountain Battery.56th Field Company (S. and M.).

2nd Burma Rifles.4th Burma Rifles.5th Burma Rifles.8th Burma Rifles.2nd Mountain Battery.Sec. Field Company.

5th/ist Punjab.2nd/7th Rajputs.ist/i8th R. Garh Rifles.23rd Mountain Battery.5th Field Battery R.A., B.A.F.

ist Gloucesters.3rd Burma Rifles.Coast Defence Battery.

ist/gth Jat.4th/i2th F.F. Regiment.ist/7th Gurkha Regiment.5th Mountain Battery.Headquarters, 27th Mountain Regiment.5oth Field Company (S. and M.).

Bhama Battalion.Chin Hills Battalion.Myitkyina Battalion.Northern Shan States Battalion.Southern Shan States Battalion.Kokine Battalion.Reserve Battalion.

ist Garrison Company.2nd Garrison Company.3rd Garrison Company.4th Garrison Company.5th Garrison Company.

nth Burma Rifles.i2th Burma Rifles.I3th Southern Shan States

Battalion Burma Rifles.I4th Burma Rifles (forming).

Rangoon Battalion.Upper Burma Battalion.Burma Railways Battalion.Tenasserim Battalion,i A.A. Regiment (forming). .

gth and loth Battalions (forming).Six Anti-Tank Troops.One Field Battery.

Forming.

Three Battalions.


SUMMARY OF STRENGTH OF ARMY IN BURMA, DECEMBER 7, 1941.

Infantry—British 2 battalions.Indian 6 battalions.Burma Rifles (Regulars) 8 battalions (4 of these just formed).Burma Rifles (Territorials) 4 battalions.Garrison Company 5 battalions.Burma Auxiliary Force 4 battalions.Burma Frontier Force 6 battalions,

i reserve battalion.Artillery—

Indian Mountain Batteries . . . . . . 3Burma Auxiliary Force i field battery, i8-pounders.Five mobile detachments Burma Frontier Force.

APPENDIX H.

HONG KONG.

Order of Battle at Outbreak of War.

At the outbreak of hostilities on the 8th December, 1941, the garrison comprised :—

Hong Kong Infantry Brigade— Arrived.ist Battalion Middlesex Regiment (M.G.) August, 1937.ist Battalion The Winnipeg Grenadiers November, 1941.ist Battalion The Royal Rifles of Canada November, 1941.

Kowloon Infantry Brigade— '2nd Battalion The Royal Scots January, 1938.2nd I4th Punjab Regiment November, 1940.5th 7th Rajputana Rifles June, 1937.

Headquarters Fortress, R.E.—' i E. and M. Company.i Field Company (3 British, i Chinese section).i Bomb Disposal section. ' l

i Medium Regiment, H.K.S.R.A.8th Coast Regiment, R.A.I2th Coast Regiment, R.A. °5th A.A. Regiment, R.A.Ancillary Units.Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps (strength about 2,000).A Chinese machine-gun battalion was in process of being formed, but had not progressed

beyond the cadre stage.

Appropriate strengths of all personnel mobilised at the 8th December, 1941, were :—British ... .'. ... ... 3,652Canadian 1,982Indian 2,254Local Colonial 2,428Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps 2,000Auxiliary Defence Units 2,112Nursing Detachment 136

Total 14,564

APPENDIX I.

STRENGTH OF AIR FORCE IN MALAYA.

November, 1940.Bombers : 2 squadrons Blenheim I—24 aircraft.Reconnaissance : 2 squadrons Hudsons (R.A.A.F.)—24 aircraft.Torpedo Bombers : 2 squadrons Vildebeestes—24 aircraft.General Purpose.:. i squadron Wirraways (R.A.A.F.)—12 aircraft.Flying Boats : i squadron Singapores—4 aircraft.

X Total: 88 first-line aircraft.


APPENDIX J.

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE R.A.F., DECEMBER 7, 1941.

Malaya.Strength in

Aerodrome. Squadron No. Type. Aircraft.AlorStar 62 Blenheim I (B) nSungei Patani 21 Buffalo 12

(R.A.A.F.)Sungei Patani 27 Blenheim I (F) 12Kota Bharu i Hudson 12

(R.A.A.F.)Kota Bharu 36 Vildebeeste 6Gong Kedah 100 Vildebeeste 6Kuantan 60 (a) Blenheim I (B) 8Kuantan 8 Hudson 8

(R.A.A.F.)Kuantan 36 Vildebeeste 6Tengah 34 Blenheim IV 16Kallang 243 and 488 - Buffalo 32Sembawang 8 Hudson 4

(R.A.A.F.)Sembawang 453 Buffalo 16Seletar . ... .. 100 Vildebeeste 6Seletar 205 Catalina 3

; 158(a) No. 60 Squadron had arived from Burma for Bombing practice, and was retained in Malaya on the start

of the war with Japan. About the middle of December the personnel were sent back to Burma by sea, theaeroplanes being retained in Malaya to replace wastage in other squadrons.

There were two maintenance units, No. 151 at Seletar and No. 153 at Kuala Lumpur.Reserve Aircraft.

Blenheim I and IV 15Buffalo 52 (6)Hudson 7Vildebeeste 12Catalina 2

Total 88(6) Of these, 21 were temporarily out of action owing to trouble with the engine valve gear on a new mark

of engine.

Burma.Strength in

Aerodrome. Squadron No. Type. Aircraft.Mingaladon 60 Blenheim I (B) 4Mingaladon 67 Buffalo 16

Reserve Aircraft.Blenheim I NilBuffalo 16

Of the total of 32 Buffaloes in Burma, 24 were temporarily out of action owing to trouble withthe engine valve gear on a new mark of engine.

Ceylon.Catalina 2

Total in Far East.Initial Equipment 180Reserves 104

Total :. ... 284

Of these aircraft, the Vildebeestes were obsolete, and if these are deducted the figures become :—Initial Equipment -" 156Reserves 92

Total 248


** Requirements as laid down by the Chiefs of Staff were 336 Initial'Equipment. Reservesfor these on the basis of 50 per cent, for flying-boats and 100 per cent, for all other aircraft shouldhave amounted to 327, a total of 663.

Omitting the Vildebeestes, the total deficiency in aircraft was 415.The Dutch sent over a total of 22 bombers and 9 fighters. If these are included, the net

deficiency becomes 384.The figure of 100 per cent, for reserves of land-based aircraft was laid down in an Air Ministry

telegram of the 23rd February, 1941.

APPENDIX K.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONALLY SERVICEABLE I.E. AIRCRAFT IN MALAYA.Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec.

7. 12. 17. 19. 22. 24.Bombers (including Torpedo Bombers)... 59 . 45 59 58 49 61Fighters 72 53 58 53 45 50Reconnaissance 24 7 12 n 12 13Flying Boats 3 3 4 4 3 3

Total 158 108 133 126 109 127The above figures do not include Dutch aircraft in N. Sumatra or in Borneo, which were

stationed North of the Equator and thus came under the command of the Air Officer Commanding,Far East, under the terms of the A.D.B. Agreement. Nor do the figures include ImmediateReserves with Squadrons, Reserves in the Maintenance Units nor Aircraft in the AA.C.U.

APPENDIX L.

PERFORMANCE OF THE BUFFALO SINGLE SEATER.A report on the tests of a Buffalo was sent in from the A. & A.E.E., Boscombe Down, dated

the 3rd July, 1941. Comparison of this with the official intelligence figures of the Japanese Navalfighter, Zero type, showed that the Buffalo was much inferior at heights of 10,000 feet, and over,viz.:—

Zero Fighter. Buffalo.Rate of climb to 13,000 feet 4-3 minutes 6-1 minutesSpeed at 10,000 feet 315 270 (Approx.)

At 20,000 feet the performance, as indicated by the official figures, is more nearly equal,i.e. :—

Zero Fighter. Buffalo.Speed at 20,000 feet 295 292

Actual experience in Malaya, however, showed that this speed of 292 for the Buffalo couldnot be obtained. Whether this was due to the aeroplane, to the climate or to the pilots I cannotsay.

APPENDIX M.

MALAYA.

Order of the Day issued December 8, 1941.

Japan's action to-day gives the signal for the Empire Naval; Army and Air Forces, and thoseof their Allies, to go into action with a common aim and common ideals.

We are ready. We have had plenty of warning and our preparations are made and tested.We do not forget at this moment the years of patience and forbearance in which we have borne,with dignity and discipline, the petty insults and insolences inflicted on us by the Japanese in theFar East. .We know that those things were only done because Japan thought she could takeadvantage of pur supposed weakness. Now, when Japan herself has decided to put the matterto a sterner test,'she will find out that she has made a grievous mistake.

We are confident. Our defences are strong and our weapons efficient. Whatever our race,and whether we are now in our native land or have come thousands of miles, we have one aimand one only. It is to defend these shores, to destroy such of our enemies as may set foot on oursoil, and then, finally, to cripple the power of the enemy to endanger our ideals, our possessionsand our peace.


What of the enemy ? We see before us a Japan drained for years by the exhausting claimsof her wanton onslaught on China. We see a Japan whose trade and industry have been so dislocatedby these years of reckless adventure that, in a mood of desperation, her Government has flungher into war under the delusion that, by stabbing a friendly nation in the back, she can gain herend. Let her look at Italy and what has happened since that nation tried a similar base action.

Let us all remember that we here in the Far East form part of the great campaign for thepreservation in the world of truth and justice and freedom; confidence, resolution, enterpriseand devotion to the cause must and will inspire every one of us in the fighting services, while fromthe civilian population, Malay, Chinese, Indian, or Burmese, we expect that patience, enduranceand serenity which is the great virtue of the East and which will go far to assist the fighting mento gain final and complete victory.

R. BROOKE-POPHAM, Air Chief Marshal,Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

G. LAYTON, Vice-Admiral,Commander-in-Chief, China.

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