The Lind Mission to Mexico

The Lind Mission to MexicoAuthor(s): Kenneth J. GriebSource: Caribbean Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Jan., 1968), pp. 25-43Published by: Institute of Caribbean Studies, UPR, Rio Piedras CampusStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25612031 .

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CARIBBEAN STUDIES / VOL. 7, NO. 4 25

THE LIND MISSION TO MEXICO

Kenneth J. Grieb *

From the moment he assumed office in March, 1913, Woodrow Wilson opposed the government of General Victoriano Huerta, hence

reversing the more moderate Taft policy that would have led to an eventual de facto recognition of the Mexican dictator. Wilson viewed the situation in moral terms. With a strong religious feeling and sense of self-righteousness, Wilson based his Mexican policy solely on his desire to spread democracy. He would accept nothing less than the removal of his Mexican counterpart, for Wilson assumed that Huerta's ouster would bring democracy to Mexico. Therefore, the American President exerted all his energies to force Huerta from

power. Yet while refusing to recognize the Huerta government, the American President did not at first support the Constitutionalist revolu tionaries who opposed the general. Wilson's aspirations and Mexi can realities made strange bedfellows.

As the stubborn Mexican general clung to office throughout the summer of 1913, President Wilson decided to "mediate" the Mexican

dispute by offering a plan to transfer it from the battlefield to the ballot box in true democratic fashion. Stating that the government of the United States "does not feel at liberty any longer to stand

inactively by," the President proposed his good offices. He outlined a "satisfactory settlement" that would require an armistice, a pledge of an early election, Huerta's promise not to be a candidate, and agreement by all parties to accept the election results. Wilson promis ed to recognize a government chosen under these conditions.1

Since the President's proposal dealt with domestic problems and thus constituted intervention in the internal affairs of Mexico, it had no chance of success. A government could not consent to an armistice with rebels, for this would imply recognition of their belligerency. The United States would have rejected any such proposal during its own Civil War. Further, Wilson assumed that the only opposition to an armistice came from the Huerta government, which he regard ed as the source of all Mexican problems. In this he erred, for the Constitutionalists also refused to accept an armistice, preferring to seek complete military victory. The demand that Huerta promise not to be a candidate was also shortsighted and unnecessary. Na tional integrity would not allow a Mexican leader to be chosen by a

* Assistant Professor of History, Wisconsin State University, Oshkosh. i Woodrow Wilson, address to Congress, August 27, 1913, United States State

Department Papers, National Archives, RG 59, 812.00/8614A. Hereafter, State De partment papers from the 812.00 file will be cited by slash number only.



26 I. ARTICLES

United States president In addition, the Mexican Constitution for bade consecutive terms, and this prevented a provisional president from entering the election. Instead of asking a guarantee that Huer ta would not be a candidate, and thus providing the general with a chance to reject foreign interference in Mexican internal affairs, Wilson could have stated that he was sure Huerta would respect the limitation of the Mexican Constitution ? a phraseology the Me xican President could not have easily rejected.

The American President should have known his "mediation" plan was doomed at the outset. A similar proposal by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in July, 1913, ostensibly "leaked" and

newspapers printed all details. The Washington Post noted that both sides in Mexico would reject it, while Henry Lane Wilson, the United States Ambassador in Mexico, reported that Huerta would certainly refuse mediation. Although the President paid no attention to an ambassador he mistrusted or an anti-administration newspaper, he should have listened to Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison and Senator Augustus O. Bacon, Chairman of the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations, who reached the same conclusion. But even if the President disregarded this advice, he certainly could have seen that his plan would fail when both Huerta and revolutionary leader Venus tiano Carranza publicly announced on July 30 that they would reject any mediation proposal. Carranza's agents in Washington had in fact issued a similar statement several days earlier.2

Confident that his proposal advanced Mexican interests, Wilson felt certain that anyone who studied the plan would perceive its

altruism. It apparently never occurred to him that Huerta might not

agree that his own elimination as president served the best interests of Mexico. Wilson did not regard his action as intervention ? was

he not merely pointing out the only fair solution? Wilson's insistence that Huerta not be a candidate somewhat contradicted his belief that

the majority of the Mexican people backed Carranza, for if this were

true Huerta could not hope to win a fair election. If the government controlled the election its candidate, whether Huerta or someone else, would be certain of victory. In either event, Huerta's candidacy was

irrelevant.

2 Bryan's suggestions are Bryan to Wilson, undated (received July 20, 1913), Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Library of Congress, and William B. Hale to Ben G. Davis (chief clerk of the State Department), July 17/23629; while the newspaper is New York World, July 24, 1:1. The indications of rejection are Washington Post, July 25, 6:1; New

York World (quoting Henry Lane Wilson), July 27, 1:1; Garrison to Wilson, July 24, Wilson Papers; Washington Post, July 25, 2 : 1 (quoting Senator Bacon); Hale to Davis,

July 28/23633; New York Times, July 25, 1 : 6, and July 26, 3 : 7 (quoting Carranza's agent in Washington); and New York World, July 30, 1:1, referring to the statements

by Huerta and Carranza.




To compound the situation, the man Wilson selected to deliver his

plan to Huerta was the ex-Governor of Minnesota, John Lind. Lind was a Swede who came to America as a youth. A tall, gaunt, hard

looking man, he had the blue eyes and sandy hair of the Norsemen of old. When excited he emphasized his worlds by tapping his right hand on the stump of his left wrist, all that remained after an acciden tal shotgun blast forced amputation of his left hand. Assuredly, he was a man of controversy. He could inspire devotion among his

supporters, and hatred among those he opposed, and he reciprocated these feelings. Lind had served in Congress as a Silver Republican, won election as Governor of Minnesota on the Fusion ticket in 1898, and later returned to Congress as a Democrat.3 A close friend and

supporter of William Jennings Bryan, he backed Woodrow Wilson for the presidency in 1912. Bryan therefore recommended him for the mission to Mexico.

While Lind had attained distinction in politics, he was unqualified for a diplomatic mission to Mexico. He himself admitted that he had "Only the general knowledge that an American would have about Me xico." His only previous contact with Mexican matters was a tele gram to Bryan advising the recall of Henry Lane Wilson, based on information he received from an ex-army officer, anld upon his own unfavorable opinion of the ambassador's brother, whom Lind had known in Congress. Lind had no diplomatic exjperienee and could not

speak Spanish. Nor did he adhere to the Catholic faith, which would have given him some connection with Catholic Mexico, however tenuous. He was as a matter of fact rather anti-Catholic in outlook. He later

proposed that the United States take an option on the Cathedral in Mexico City, which he considered a suitable site for a new embassy. His religious beliefs defy classification. One of the few governors of Minnesota ever to issue a Thanksgiving Day proclamation that made no mention of God, he was a member of an agnostic society, a student of Christian Science, and a devotee of a spiritualist magazine. Since he disliked minority groups, especially Irish Catholics, this estranged him from Charge Nelson O'Shaughnessy in Mexico City, the man who had first hand information. 4

3 George M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1935), 4-16, 27-117, 133-53, and 177-97 passim; and Edith O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York, 1916), 2-3.

4 Stephenson, John Lind, 127-9 Lind's statement on his lack of preparation and

knowledge of Mexico is 66 Congress, 2 session, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Mexican Affairs (Washington, 1920), testimony of John Lind, April 27, 1920, 2317-8; and Lind's telegram regarding the Ambassador is Lind to Bryan, March 16, 1913, United States State Department Papers, National Archives, RG 59, 123.W691/126. Lind's proposal on the Cathedral is Lind to Bryan, December 18, 1913/10256. Bryan replied pluntly: "Do not understand your reference to option on the Cathedral," December 19/10256. Lind contended that he had been joking, Lind to

Bryan, December 19, 1913, Papers of John Lind, Minnesota Historical Society, Saint Paul.



28 I. ARTICLES

The President and Secretary of State who placed their confidence in Lind considered these handicaps as advantages. In their view he had no prejudices about Mexico based on former contacts, and had no connection with State Department personnel whose ideas differed from those of the President. Wilson wanted someone he could trust, and Lind's friendship with Bryan assured his loyalty. In addition, Lind's anti-imperialist and anti-big business views, so prevalent among

progressives, guaranteed that he would not advocate a return to the

policies of Henry Lane Wilson. The Minnesotan's approach to the

problems also fitted the President's specifications, for like Wilson, Lind viewed things on a moral plane, and never doubted the self

righteousness of America's cause. Accordingly, the President could count on him to agree with the instructions and to carry them out with the same fervor the president felt in this crusade for democracy in Mexico.

Lind had no specific preparation before his mission. Secretly,

Bryan summoned him to Washington "for consultation about an

important matter" on July 28 ? the same day Henry Lane Wilson, who had been recalled for "consultations" conferred with the President

in Washington. Lind had no idea that his summons concerned Mexico

until he arrived in the capital. He received no written instructions

beyond the President's proposal; his only directions were to secure

Huerta's concurrence. Lind's knowledge of Mexico, aside from a talk

with Wilson and Bryan, came from William Bayard Hale, another

Wilsonian "special agent" who met him at Veracruz.5 With no chance

to study the Mexican situation, and with no diplomatic background or

thorough briefing, Linld naturally could form opinions on it only from

the moralistic outlook of Hale and Wilson.

Having decided on a course of amateur diplomacy, the Wilson

administration launched the Lind mission with singular ineptness. The President did not consult the charge or the embassy staff in

preparing his proposal. Neither the Mexican government nor the

embassy received any notice of Lind's mission, learning of it from

Bryan's press statement of August 4 announcing acceptance of

Ambassador Wilson's resignation and Lind's departure for Mexico.

Bryan informed the embassy of Lind's imminent arrival the day after

5 Bryan to Lind, July 28, 1913, and July 29, Lind Papers; and Bryan to Wilson, July 31, Correspondence of Secretary of State Bryan with President Wilson, 1913-1915,

National Archives, I, 106. The ambassador was recalled July 15, 1913, Bryan to

H. L. Wilson, United States State Department Papers, National Archives, RG 84, Post

Records (hereafter cited as PR and city) PR Mexico City, 1913, XXIII, CI. 800. Lind told the Fall committee that he had never heard of Hale until he met him in Veracruz, as

neither the President nor the Secretary of State told him about the other agent in their

briefings, 66 Congress, 2 session, United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

Investigation of Mexican Affairs, testimony of John Lind, April 27, 1920, 2323-4.




the staff read the news in the papers. There were no advance arrangements for Lind's trip, and only when he arrived in New Orleans and discovered there were no boats leaving for Mexico for several days did Bryan arrange transport for him aboard a warship.6

Throughout this initial phase, Wilson's failure to notify the Mexican government of the full particulars created an atmosphere of fear. Bryan's message to the embassy on August 5 merely stated that Lind was on a "peace mission," and he refused to provide details when O'Shaughnessy requested them. The Mexican government quite naturally viewed Lind's arrival as the precursor of armed intervention. Manuel Garza Aldape, the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, in formed the charge on August 6 that, "if Mr. Lind... does not properly establish his official character, or if he is not the bearer of the

recognition of this government by yours, his sojourn in this Republic will not be pleasing," while Huerta toljd a reporter that he would

"absolutely ignore" Lind if these conditions were not met.7

John Lind stepped into an atmosphere of uncertainty when he sailed into Veracruz on the morning of August 9 aboard the battleship

New Hampshire. The warship anchored outside the breakwater

alongside the Louisiana, as these battleships were too large to enter the harbor. Standing on the deck of the New Hampshire as it fired a twenty-one gun salute to Mexico, Lind got his first glimpse of Mexico. Beyond the ancient fortress of San Juan de Ulua spread the modern harbor of the country's largest port. The waterfront had a touch of his old homeland, as the concrete port installations had a facing of Scandinavian granite. Lind could see the multi-colored buildings of the city, reaching toward the majestic mountains. Prior to setting foot on. Mexican soil, he transfered to the Louisiana to confer with Hale who had come from the capital to meet him. Lind landed at 5:00 P.M. and encountered his first Mexicans ?

twenty policemen sent to "protect" him. Although he was a special envoy, there were no representatives of the Mexican government to greet him. He spent the night in the American consulate and traveled to Mexico City the next day.8

Even though he had the technical title of "adviser to the embassy" Lind was in actuality a de facto ambassador. He could not formally

6 New York Times, August 5, 1913, 1 : 1; New York World, August 5, 1 : 1; and Bryan to Lind, August, 5, Lind Papers. 7 Bryfcn to O'Shaughnessy, August 5, 1916/8661; O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, August 5/8241; Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, August 6/8241; Garza Aldape to O'Shaughnessy, August 6, PR Mexico City, 1913, XXIII, CI. 800; O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, August 7/8573, and August 8/8274; El Imparcial (Mexico City), August 6, 1:4, and August 7, 1 : 3-4; and New York World, August 8, 1 : 1.

8 El Pais (Mexico City), August 10, 1913, 1 : 3-4, and New York Times, August 10, II, 1 : 8.



30 I. ARTICLES

have this title as the naming of a new ambassador would constitute

recognition of the Huerta government, but he came with all the

plenary powers of an ambassador and was paid an ambassador's

salary. Bryan had in fact previously offered Lind the post of minister to Sweden, which was more in keeping with his background. But now

in Mexico, the American Embassy was "completely at Governor Lind's

disposal." The State Department also communicated directly with

Lind, and Bryan wrote much of this extensive correspondence in his own hand.9

On August 8, three days after the press reported the Lind mission, and one day before Lind's arrival in Veracruz, Bryan informed all nations represented in Mexico that the United States would soon

make a proposal for restoring peace in Mexico: "The contents of his communication will be made known to you when it is ready," he

stated, and went on to say: "In the meantime it is respectfully suggested that your government consider the propriety of asking its representative in Mexico to confer with Huerta and advise him of its

view with regard to the propriety and necessity of giving very serious

consideration to any suggestions this government may make and the

situation which might arise if these good offices be rejected." Wilson

was in this manner asking twenty-one nations to commit themselves

to support his proposal before anyone learned its content. When

several governments requested details, the Secretary of State replied: "the President's views will be given to the public as soon as any

change in policy is made," implying that other governments could

read about it in the newspapers. He acted as if his previous note

had not asked endorsement of this policy. "The object of our note," he said "was to suggest that foreign governments should advise

serious consideration of the policy." 10 This ignored the fact that such

advice would imply support. President Wilson hesitated momentarily after Lind arrived in

Mexico, and on August 11 Bryan informed Lind that the President would await his opinion before acting. Wilson may have wavered in

the face of harsh criticism by Senator William A. Smith, chairman

of a Committee on Foreign Relations subcommittee investigating

Mexico, who charged that an extensive rebel lobby in Washington was influencing administration policy. Wilson had previously in

formeid Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall that he was "very much

afraid of even seeming to play into the hands of some of our

9 Bryan to Lind, August 5, 1914, Lind Papers, stating: "You may prepare your accounts on this basis; the salary of an ambassador is $17,500 a year." Wilson to Lind,

June 11, 1913, Lind Papers, for the offer of the post of Minister to Sweden; O'Shaugh

nessy to Bryan, August 10, 1913/8287; and Bryan to Lind, August 10/8274A. 10 Bryan to twenty-one nations, August 8, 1913/8284A; New York Times, August 6,

1 : 8, and Bryan to American embassy in Germany, August 12/8285.




Republican friends in the Senate who are trying to make the situation impossible." After one day's consideration, Wilson instructed Lind to

proceed with his mission.11 Huerta was ready to have his minister of foreign relations deal

with Lind, for his earlier statements to the contrary were intended for home consumption and had achieved their purpose. Huerta's

prestige immediately skyrocketed due to his defiance of the United States, and he received numerous messages of congratulations and

support. Even some Liberal Deputies backed his stand. Huerta could

easily save face by contending that Lind established his "official character" by presenting a letter stating:

To whom it may concern:

This will introduce the Honorable John Lind, who goes to Mexico at my

request and as my personal representative, to act as adviser to the American

Embassy in the City of Mexico. I bespeak for him the same consideration

that would, in other circumstances, be accorded a regularly accredited repre sentative of the Government of the United States.

(signed) Woodrow Wilson President of the United States.

The task of meeting Lind fell to Federico Gamboa, the new Minister of Foreign Relations. Gamboa was a career diplomat and returned from the Mexican legation in Belgium to become head of the Foreign ministry. Gamboa and Lind both traveled to Mexico at the same time, like two men involveid in an odyssey that carried them toward an inevitable rendezvous.12

Lind visited Gamboa briefly August 12, and presented Wilson's proposal secretly the very next day. On August 15, Lind met Gamboa again and informed him that rejection of the President's plan would

probably result in ending the arms embargo, granting belligerent rights to the revolutionaries, and armed intervention. Lind did not wish to negotiate but wanted the note to be an ultimatum. Bryan however, refused as he felt lengthy consideration would allow foreign goverments to apply pressure for eventual compliance.13

11 Bryan to Lind, August 11, 1913/8278, and August 12/10638A; Washington Post, August 6, 1 : 1; New York Times, August 10, II, 2 : 2; and Wilson to Marshall, August 4, Wilson Papers.

12 El Imparcial, August 9, 1913, 2 : 6-7, and 5 : 4-5; El Pais, August 8, 1 : 2-3, and 2 : 3-5; Washington Post, August 8, 1 : 6-7; and E. G. Church to William Canada (U.S. Consul, Veracruz). August 9, PR Veracruz, 331, CI. 8. The Wilson letter is dated August, 4, Lind Papers. Gamboa landed at Veracruz two days before Lind, and took the oath of office on the very day he met the American envoy, El Imparcial,

August, 7, 1913, 1 : 1-2; and Mexican Herald (Mexico City), August 12 1 : 3. 13 Lind to Bryan, August 12, 1913/8314; New York Times, August 13, 1 : 1; Bryan

to Lind, August 13, Lind Papers; Lind to Bryan, undated (August 15), Lind Papers;"



32 I. ARTICLES

On August 16, Gamboa replied in a scathing note referring derisi

vely to Lind as "Mr. Confidential Agent" and pointing out legal fallacies of the American proposition. Noting that the United States and Mexico were not at war, he expressed surprise that Lind was on a peace mission. Citing the "strange and unwarranted character" of

the proposals, he explained that: "Mexico cannot for one moment take into consideration the four conditions which His Excellency Mr. Wil son has been pleased to propose... Bandits, Mr. Confidential Agent, are not admitted to armistice." He added that such an armistice would "ipso facto recognize their belligerency." As for a pledge of

early elections the minister concluded, "our laws already provide such

guarantees." 14

This Mexican reply caught President Wilson by surprise ?for he

had not considered rejection, despite the numerous indications to this

effect. Consequently, Lind's instructions did not cover this eventual

ity, and only after presenting the note Aid he request directions for

this "unlikely" possibility. There was clearly a lack of planning, and

in the face of this rejection the United States hesitated, searching for

another course. Despite the ominous warnings that accompanied the

proposal no action followed. Lind remained in Mexico City to con

tinue pressing his demands. Bryan informed Lind that he was sure

the Mexican government would wish to reopen talks "as soon as the

Mexican people have had time to consider the notes." This was more

wishful thinking as Bryan was completely ignorant of the prevailing Mexican spirit and sentiment. When the Huerta regime published the exchange of notes after the negotiations closed, the Mexican peo

ple rallied arounld Huerta as the defender of the nation against Yan

kee interference, and the popularity of the government rose to new

heights.15 This was an unexpected twist to Wilson's concept of self

determination. Other nations did not press Huerta as Wilson had hoped. Lind

had implied that the entire world agreed with the American plan, but

this was far from the case. Only concerted European pressure could have changed Huerta's reply, but the major powers had extended di

plomatic recognition to Huerta and accordingly did not support the

president's plan. European diplomats desired stability and while the

British minister in Mexico did advise consideration of Wilson's plan,

Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, August 15/10638B; New York Times, August 16, 1 : 1; Lind to Bryan, August 13/8334; Bryan to Wilson, August 14/8334; and Bryan to Lind, August 14/8334.

14 Gamboa to Lind, August 16, 1913/8614A. 15 Lind to Bryan, August 13, 1913/8334; Bryan to Lind, August 28/8593; El Pais,

August 29, 1 : 1-3; El Imparcial, August 28, 1 : 3-5, 2 : 5-7, 3 : 1-3, 5 : 1-7, and 8 : 4, and August 29, 1 : 5-7 and 3 : 5; New York Times, August 28, 1 : 5; and Nemesio Garcia Naranjo, Memorias de Nemesio Garcia Naranjo (Monterrey, Mexico, 1956-62),

VII, 96.




his note made it obvious that his government did not support the

proposal. Only the smaller European states which had no large scale interest in Mexico backed the plan, and many of the Latin American states also added their support. But O'Shaughnessy informed Bryan that even those nations that advised acceptance of the Wilson proposal did so only in a perfunctory manner, as all European diplomats in

Mexico opposed this move.16 Mexican troop movements and long conferences of White House

advisers caused American newspapers to proclaim that the two nations were approaching a war footing. The United States Military Attache in Mexico, Captain William Burnside, believed the Lind proposals

would "probably cause war" if rejected. Gamboa offered to resign and go to Washington unofficially to discuss the plan with Wilson and

Bryan, but Lind considered this an attempt to delay concessions. Wilson therefore stated that he would receive Gamboa only if he ac

cepted the plan as a basis for discussion. Publication of Lind's notes in the United States increased the storm of protests. The New York Times stated that proper preparation would have prevented presen tation of an unacceptable proposal, adding that there would be no prob lems if Wilson had recognized Huerta, and asked who Huerta could surrender to in view of the lack of unity among the revolutionaries.17

Despite the initial rebuff Lind resubmitted the President's plan on

August 25, stating that if Mexico accepted it President Wilson would inform American bankers that he would "look with favor" upon a loan to the Huerta regime. Lind made this statement on his own, without

consulting Washington, and the mention of a loan introduced a new

complication into the talks. He contended that the desperate financial condition of the government made a loan offer a strong inducement, and added that he feared the government would collapse under the financial strain before it could carry out the President's plan. He therefore considered a loan offer essential.18 But the mention of

money in such a delicate situation smacked of bribery, and gave the Huerta government a chance to assume an air of shocked indignation in its second rejection of the Yankee proposal. In attempting to gain

Mexican acceptance of the president's plan, Lind had unwittingly played into Huerta's hands. The lack of diplomatic expertise on

Lind's part was slowly becoming apparent.

16 Sir Cecil Spring-Rice (British Ambassador in Washington) to Bryan, August 11,

1913, Wilson Papers; and O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, August 21/8501, and August 27/8693. 17 New York World, August 19, 1913, 3 : 6-7; Washington Post, August 19, 1 : 1-4;

Burnside to Garrison, August 25, 1913. United States War Department Records, office of the Adjutant General, National Archives, RG 94, AG 2059431A: Lind to Bryan, August 21/10642; Bryan to Lind, August 22/10642; and New York Times, August 21, 1:1, August 23, 6 : 2-3, and August 22, 3 : 4-5, and 8 : 2.

18 Lind to Gamboa and Lind to Bryan, August 25, 1913/24650. Bryan supported Lind's loan offer, Bryan to Wilson, undated (apparently August 27), Wilson Papers.

3



34 I. ARTICLES

The next day Gamboa again rejected the proposal, but the Wilson administration professed to see concessions in the wording of this second Mexican rebuff. In his note, Gamboa referred: to the clause in the Mexican Constitution that prevented a provisional president from being a candidate to succeed himself. Wilson, Bryan, and Lind

interpreted this statement of the obvious as a concession. Prematurely, Lind proclaimed his mission a success, telling the Secretary of State, "every point contended for in the last note is accepted in fact though not in form." Bryan cabled "Hearty congratulations," adding: "Huerta's announcement that he will not be a candidate is the only thing necessary to the restoration of peace." A few days later Bryan congratulated Lind on the "elimination of Huerta." 19 But his analy sis of the Mexican problem proved faulty, for the mere removal of

Huerta would have solved little even if it was achieved. In reality Huerta was far from eliminated ? indeed, the clumsy

efforts of Wilson and Lind had provided Huerta with several oppor tunities to increase his popularity with the Mexican masses, and the

crafty Mexican President promptly seized them all. The loan offer

by Lind was merely the last of a series of blunders. Thus President Wilson much to his own consternation, in seeking to oust Huerta, had

inadvertantly strenghtened his adversary's position.

On August 27, Wilson addressed Congress, relating his proposals to Huerta, announcing a total arms embargo, and proclaiming a policy of "watchful waiting." Most of Congress supported his actions, but reaction abroad was quite different. The London Times commented that Wilson did not throw any "new light" on the Mexican problem, and called for American recognition of Huerta. The Mexican presi dent professed to be pleased with the arms embargo, noting that he was unable to purchase arms in the United States anyway.20

John Lind had fulfilled his original mission by delivering the Pres ident's proposals, but Wilson instructed him to remain in Veracruz and report developments. Lind had left the capital without awaiting instructions after delivering the proposals to Gamboa the second time, hoping that his departure would frighten the Mexican government into making concessions. He planned to remain in Veracruz a few

days before returning to the United States, in case Gamboa asked him to return to the capital to resume negotiations. At this point Wilson

19 Gamboa to Lind, August 26, 1913/9069; Lind to Bryan, August 27, Wilson Papers; and Bryan to Lind, August 27/8593, and August 31/8635A. Lind felt that the important thing was that "our record is made," regardless of the Mexican response, Lind to Bryan,

August 25/24650. 20 Wilson's address was sent to all governments represented in Mexico, August 27,

1913/8614A; New York Times, August 28, 1 : 8; London Times, August 28, as quoted in Walter H. Page (U.S. Ambassador in London) to Bryan, August 29/8715; and

O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, August 25/8548.




decided to keep Linjd in Veracruz. 21 Accordingly, the Lind mission

was now lengthened from a brief errand into a seven month stay, and Lind became Wilson's major adviser on Mexico. These develop ments did not please Lind. He had come to Mexico prepared to stay only a few days, and had already spent more time in Mexico than he had anticipated. Throughout the torrid Veracruz summer he longed for the cool Minnesota lakes.

Watchful waiting dismayed Lind. He was a man of straight forward action who did not favor a waiting policy. The special agent, unacquainted with diplomacy, frequently complained that he did not like "to waste time as I am doing" waiting for the Mexican government to yield. Perhaps his desire to leave Mexico as soon as possible prompted him to press for a quick solution. On August 28 he sent

Bryan a long analysis of the Mexican problem with an extraordinary notation which read: "You will appreciate that I have had compara tively little time to become acquainted with the full scope of his [the President's] plans. I am sure he has a plan. It is absolutely essen tial that there shouljd be one." In the same letter he said he had "seen enough of the conditions" in Mexico and "learned enough of the Latin character," even though his contact with Mexican problems was as brief as his acquaintance with Wilson's plans. Stating that Mexicans appreciated only power and authority, he compared Mexi can politics to "the Irish of our cities in the matter of the distribu tion of offices." Hence to Lind, Huerta was analagous to an Irish political boss. Recognizing that the President's proposal was imprac tical since no one voluntarily surrenders power, Lind advocated using American power to support the revolutionaries. Here was the first of a long series of messages Lind sent urging this course. He advo cated ending the arms embargo, on the ground that Huerta could buy arms in Europe, anld' demanded action even if it meant armed intervention. His impatience increased in proportion to the length of his stay in Mexico. He took it upon himself to send Hale back to Washington to advocate his proposals, for the two "special agents" were amateur diplomats who expected results far too quickly.

22

The "President's personal representative" continued reporting from Veracruz. Lind resided in the Hotel Terminal until his wife return ed to the United States on November 1. The Terminal was near the

21 Lind to Bryan, August 20, 1913, Lind Papers; Lind to Bryan, August 25/24650; and Bryan to Lind, August 25, Lind Papers. 22 Lind to Bryan, September 16, 1913/8880, and August 28/10487. The two "special agents" had become mutual admirers, and sent glowing accounts of each other, Hale to Bryan, August 20, Wilson Papers; and Lind to Bryan, August 28/10487. Lind sent Hale home without consulting Bryan informing the Secretary of State that if he wished Hale to return to Mexico, he could reach him at Havana, where his boat

would stop, Lind to Bryan, August 28, Lind Papers.



36 I. ARTICLES

waterfront and Lind could catch the Gulf breeze that provided the only relief on the torrid summer days. He haid plenty of time to see the city despite his alleged duties of "observing" Mexico and "watching" events. Veracruz was a city of contrasts with modern

buildings standing beside edifices built by the Viceroys. Every afternoon about 5 o'clock he walked through the narrow cobblestone streets ? a tall, light haired figure wearing a grey felt hat and grey

suit, contrasting with the short, dark Mexicans in their sombreros.

Certainly anyone who wished to "aid" his observations by staging a

demonstration for his benefit could easily find him. On November 1

he moved to the American consulate, occupying a small, dark room

which opened on a shabby courtyard at the rear of the building. 23

In reality, Lind's observations were more like those of a tourist than

those of a diplomat. Though Lind had at first refused to meet with ordinary citizens,

on the ground that he was "wholly ignorant of Mexican political issues," his role had changed to that of an observer with the rejection of the President's proposals. Since he spoke no Spanish, it was

therefore American acquaintances who sent him regular reports and

served as his principal sources. Two of these confidants were Loring Olmstead and George Hackley, both pro-Carranza. Olmstead manag ed the British Club in Mexico City and reported on British activities. Louis D'Antin, first clerk and legal counsel of the embassy, secretly

reported developments in the capital, and related actions of the charge whom he hated. Sloan W. Emery, manager of an experimental ha

cienda owned by the University of Minnesota, and J. J. Slade Jr., a

businessman, both Huertistas, sent Lind their views. As most Amer

icans residing in Mexico favored Huerta, they disliked Lind for his

pro-Carranza prejudices. Sidney Conger, an Evangelical minister,

summed up the colony's feelings: "When I first met Mr. Lind I

thought he was after the facts. Later on I sort of got the impression that the facts were after him and that he was not anxious to meet

them." Lind reciprocated these ill feelings, regarding the American

colony as a "thankless lot."24 Huerta was thoroughly aggravated by Lind's presence, and

attempted to circumvent him by sending his own "personal and confi

dential agent," Manuel Zamacona, to Washington on September 1.

Lind believed this was a ruse to gain time, while O'Shaughnessy felt

23 Stephenson, John Lind, 224-5; O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, 2-3; and

Washington Post, February 27, 1914, 3:2. _ ^ 24 Lind to O'Shaughnessy, August 13, 1913, PR Mexico City, 1913, XXIII, CI. 800,

for Lind's refusal to meet Mexican private citizens; Lind to Bryan, November 17/9784,

and December 17/10239; Stephenson, John Lind, 230-2; and 66 Congress, 2 session,

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Mexican Affairs,

Testimony of Sidney Conger, February 27, 1920, 1743.




that Huerta really desireld an agreement. Bryan informed the Mexi can government that Wilson would not receive Zamacona, and preferred to conduct negotiations through Lind. Huerta, however, had little desire to negotiate with Lind, and became very angry at every men tion his name.25 The very presence of Lind in Mexico increased the

impasse. The arrival of a new British Minister in Mexico City enraged

Lind, for Sir Lionel Garden presented his credentials to Huerta on Oc tober 11, one day after Huerta had forcibly dismissed Congress. Lind, who was strongly anti-British, saw a plot, and concluded that British oil interests planned the Huerta coup to coincide with the minister's arrival. He angrily condemned Carden as the tool of British oil interests. When Carden told Lind that he believed Huerta must remain President, Lind was even more aroused, and contended that

only British support enabled Huerta to continue in office. Lind had no evidence to support his charges, but remained convinced that the British were seeking to frustrate American policy in Mexico.26 The differences between British and American policy were due to the

varying interests and outlooks of the two nations, not to any plot. The British government desired some semblance of stability in Me xico to provide protection for British property and subjects. These

thoroughly realistic goals naturally conflicted with the American idealistic desire to teach the Mexicans democracy. Thus Britain was content to accept Huerta while the United States insisted upon his removal.

Negotiations came to a halt while all parties awaited the outcome of the October 26 Mexican elections. The United States had stated that it could not accept the results of the vote due to the dismissal of Congress, but still awaited the outcome before taking further action. 27

Lind predicted that Huerta would publicly announce his candidacy, but he underestimated the subtlety of the Mexican president. Taking a devious route, Huerta assembled the diplomatic corps on October 23 and read them a statement that "he had reason to fear that some of his friends would propose him as a candidate." He added that in the event that any votes were cast for him he would declare them "null and void," and that if he received a majority he would annul

25 O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, September 1, 1913/8648, and September 7/8735; Lind to Bryan, September 4/8671, and September 5/10500; Bryan to Lind, September 8/24260a; Bryan to Lind, September 15, Lind Papers; and O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's

Wife, 54. 26 For Huerta's decree dissolving Congress, Diario Oficial, CXXVIII, 36, 452-3,

October 11, 1913; for information on his coup, Mexican Herald, October 10, 1:6-7, 2:5-6, and October 11, 1:6-7; for Lind's views of the British role, Lind to Bryan, October 8/9127, October 15/9218, October 25/9401, and October 23/9355. 27 Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, October 13, 1913/9180A.



38 I. ARTICLES

the election.28 Ostensibly, this complied with Wilson's request that he withdraw from the race.

Huerta's assurance did calm American fears. Bryan elatedly told Lind that "this would seem to dispose of Huerta's candidacy." The Americans failed to realize that Huerta's statement received little

publicity in Mexico. This one declaration would hardly discourage those who wished to vote for him, especially in view of the extensive effort on his behalf by government officials. His statement was

merely a clever ploy to impress the Americans. For the government had already instructed many regional officials to be sure that Huerta

triumphed at the polls.29 And every vote Huerta received increased

the chance that no legal candidate would obtain a majority. The

Mexican president planned to use the election to secure a legal excuse

to continue in office. His scheme emerged in reports that the army would go to the polls

? and naturally the soldiers would vote for

General Huerta. When Felix Diaz, a leading candidate for the presidency, returned

to Mexico from a mission to Japan, the government prevented him

from campaigning. Secret police arrested his staff and watched his

house, making him a virtual prisoner. Diaz moved to the Hotel Ale

man, which was only twenty feet from the back window of the Ame

rican consulate, escorted by Lind amd United States Consul William

Canada, who arranged to meet him "accidently" in front of his house.

Lind backed Diaz for president, and had even arranged a communica

tions code with the manager of the Diaz campaign, an action that

was clearly interference in Mexican internal affairs. But Wilson and

Bryan, who regarded Diaz favorably, now seemingly preferred the Ca

tholic Party candidate, former Minister of Foreign Relations Federico

Gamboa.30 The support of Diaz contrasted strangely with Ameri

can opposition to Huerta, for Diaz had played a key role in the revolt

that installed Huerta in power. American idealism was becoming more and more confused and confounded by the harsh realities of

Mexican politics. 28 Lind to Bryan, October 20, 1913/9285; and O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, October

23/9344. 29 Bryan to Lind, October 24, 1913/9344; Reports of government instructions to

Jefe PolUicos in the provinces to secure a vote favorable to Huerta came from United

States Consuls Wilber Gracey (Progresso), October 13/9186, Will Davis (Guadalajara), undated (received October 22)/9328, and William Canada (Veracruz), October 24/9405; while Lind reported similar information to Bryan on October 21/9302, October 23/9343, and October 26/9406. A copy of the orders to Jefe PolUicos appears in the Lind Papers, and it seems to be authentic.

30 El Pais, October 18, 1913, 1:7; New York Times, October 23, 1:3, and October 24,

4:3-4; and New York World, October 22, 4:1. Lind's report on the code with the

Diaz manager is Lind to Bryan, October 12, Lind Papers. Immediately after the election

Diaz crawled across the roof of his hotel to the American consulate seeking asylum. He was later placed aboard a United States warship in the harbor. William Canada

(Veracruz) to Bryan, October 27, 1913/9418, and Lind to Bryan, October 28/9440.




The government controlled the elections effectively, and the offi cial returns showed a large majority for Huerta. The new Congress

was composed entirely of Huertistas anjd Catholic Party men.

Having rejected the election before it occurred, Wilson instructed

O'Shaughnessy to demand Huerta's resignation again and to warn him that if he refused to retire Wilson would "insist upon the terms of an ultimatum, the rejection of which would render it necessary for him to propose very serious practical measures to the Congress of the United States."31

Three days after O'Shaughnessy presented this new American demand for Huerta's retirement, Wilson instructed Lind to return to Mexico City to receive the Mexican reply. Lind demanded that Huer ta dismiss the newly elected Congress before resigning, while Huerta

replied that if he did, there would be no one to present his resigna tion to. Minister of Foreign Relations Querido Moheno, ignoring the American notes, informed all diplomatic missions on November 9 that

Congress would convene to declare the presidential election null and

void, and that Huerta would continue in office until a new election. Lind ended negotiations and returned to Veracruz without awaiting instructions, stating that he would return only after the Congress was dissolved. Before leaving Mexico City, Lind instructed O'Shaughnessy not to consider any proposals from Huerta until he dismissed the Con gress. The special envoy even asked Bryan to send the charge ins tructions on who should be left in charge of American interests if the embassy was closed.32 Clearly Lind felt that the United States should break relations with the Huerta regime to show its displeasure with the elections.

After another American attempt to secure European support proved fruitless, Lind and Bryan continued to press Huerta, temporarily stressing nullification of the congressional elections. Manuel Garza Aldape, minister of gobernacion, explained to O'Shaughnessy that Con gress must convene to annul the presidential elections, but offered to have it dissolved after this act. Bryan maintained that even one ses sion of the Congress would imply that its election was legal. A few days after this conversation with O'Shaughnessy, Garza Aldape resign ed from the cabinet, and the charge reported that this occurred because he had urged Huerta to accept the American demands. Lind did not subscribe to this theory, and suspected that Garza Aldape's resigna

31 For the election results, O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, November 3, 1913/9512, and New York Times, November 3, 3:5-6; for Wilson's note, Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, November 1/11443A.

32 Bryan to Lind, November 5, 1913/9568; Lind to Bryan, November 11/9675, and November 12/9677; Bryan to Lind, November 12/9677; Querido Moheno to all diplomatic missions, and O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, November 9/9638; O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, November 12/9680; and Lind to Bryan, November 13/9704.



40 I. ARTICLES

tion was an attempt to trick the United States into backing him as Huerta's successor. His conclusion was erroneous, however, for in

reality Huerta had suspected that Garza Aldape hoped to succeed him if he acceded to the American demands, and had exiled the minister.33

The Mexican Congress convened on November 20, despite Ameri can objections. Acting on Bryan's instructions, the American charge did not attend the inaugural session, although all other diplomatic representatives in Mexico did ? Once again demonstrating that the American president had suceeded only in isolating himself, not Huerta.34

The new Mexican rebuff annoyed Lind, and he sent Bryan another series of recommendations urging American support for Carranza. In a lengthy memorandum on November 15 he concluded that the wealthy, the army, and the church caused all of Mexico's problems. Speaking like a midwestern progressive opposing the "special interests" on behalf of "the people", he wrote passionately: "We could defeat but we could

neither humble nor humiliate them. This can only be done by their own people, their own blood ? the people of the North... To make a

dog feel that he is really a cur he must be whipped by another dog and preferably by a cur. Consequently let this housecleaning be done

by home talent." Lind urged American aid to enable rebel leader

Francisco Villa to do this "housecleaning." He had never met Villa, but described him as "the highest type of physical, moral and mental

efficiency that the conditions and the environment could reasonably be expected to produce." Lind stressed that the United States must

support the Constitutionalists fully or intervene militarily, and again

urged lifting the arms embargo. He insisted that the revolutionaries needed American arms to counter Huerta's purchases in Europe.

Nearly all his dispatches in December and January urged recognition of the belligerency of the Carrancistas. Lind practiced his recom

mendation, giving aid to the revolutionists by means of forwarding a pleidge of support from the Tetzuitlas Indians to Carranza. Despite the fact that this was overt intervention in Mexican internal affairs,

Bryan approved Lind's action.35

Sailing to Pass Christian, Mississippi to meet Wilson briefly on January 2, 1914, Lind reiterated his recommendations, and shortly thereafter Wilson lifted the arms embargo. While the President in

33 O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, November 13, 1913/9705; Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, November 14/9705; O'Shaughnessy to Bryan, November 15/9757, and November 16

19151 \ Lind to Bryan, November 16 9762; Miguel Alessio Robles, Historia politica de la Revolucion (Mexico City, 1938), 110, and El Imparcial, November 16, 1:5-7,

and November 17, 1:6-7. 34 Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, November 12, 1913/9648; and O'Shaughnessy to Bryan,

November 18/9813, and November 20/9848. 35 Lind to Bryan, November 15, 1913/9760, December 5/10077, December 14

/10185, January 7, 1914/10462, January 14/10537, and January 26, Lind Papers.




formed Bryan that he "got nothing new" from Lind at their meeting, he did feel the talks provided "a splendid opportunity to see things... nearer at hand." The President was considering action, and Lind's influence may have born fruit when on February 1, 1914, Wilson ended the arms embargo, thus terminating the period of watchful

waiting. Large shipments of arms immediately crossed the border to the revolutionists.36 Lind had always advocated stronger measures, and now this harder line was adopted.

Lifting the arms embargo did not bring an immediate change in the situation, so Lind therefore advocated more drastic American action. Acting as an "armchair strategist" constantly criticising the slow pace of the revolutionary forces, Lind began hatching interven tion schemes to speed the rebel advance. In January, 1914 he propos ed that the United States military attache plan a rebel attack on the federal gunboats at Tampico, and even badgered the military attache into writing a report on how to aid the revolutionaries. Lind sug gested that the United States Navy seize the Mexican Gulf ports to cut revenues and railroad fuel, assuming that these cities would surrender upon the appearance of a small American force. When the Mexican gunboat Zaragoza sailed to New Orleans, he proposed that the United States aid the Carrancistas in capturing it on the

Mississippi River. He even asked Bryan for authority to have Ame rican marines seize Mexico City, believing only two companies neces sary. He explained that he had arranged to get these troops to the

capital "secretly" ? via the main railroad.37 Thus Lind audaciously

suggested an American military coup to overthrow a government that the United States opposed because it came to power by this very

method. Lind was exasperated with the Mexican situation and frequently

requested his recall. Throughout his stay in Mexico, Lind complained that he was getting "a little restless" and felt he was "doing nothing." Bryan finally agreed to Lind's return on March 9, 1914, though his departure was delayed. At last the "President's personal represent

36 New York Times, December 31, 1913, 1:1, January 3, 1914, 2:1, and January 4, II, 2:2; Wilson to Bryan, January 6, 1914, Papers of William Jennings Bryan, Library' of Congress; and New York World, January 4, I, 1:1. Colonel Edward M. House had also discussed the possibility of lifting the arms embargo with the President, Diary of Colonel Edward M. House, Papers of Colonel Edward M. House Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, December 23, 1913, and January 21, 1914.

37 Lind to Bryan, January 7, 1914/10462, January 15/1065272, January 14/10537, February 3/10777, February 6/10818, March 8/11098, and March 23/27482. Burnside's report, written to "satisfy Governor Lind," is Burnside to AGWAR, January 31, 1914,

United States War Department Records, War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence File, National Archives, RG 165, 5761-914. The reports of the military attache were made available to the author by special permission of the Director of the Army and Air Corps Branch of the National Archives, Victor Gondos Jr., and were not available to researchers until the present study.



42 I. ARTICLES

ative" left Mexico April 6, seven months after he arrived. He came with little knowledge of Mexico and returned as the chief Wilsonian adviser on Mexican affairs. Lind looked haggard and drawn when he returned to Washington, and told reporters that he was "certainly glad" when told to return.38

Lind was the instrument of Wilson's first action in Mexico, and his recall confirmed the failure of American policy. Despite his efforts Huerta still remained in power. The reason was that the pre sident's proposal was impractical. But Lind had accurately represented the President's ideas, for like Wilson he was an idealist who thought only in terms of spreading democracy. In this sense, he shared Wilson's error. But since this was the President's view, there was a need for someone with a similar outlook to represent him in Mexico. It was

Lind's lack knowledge about Mexico that caused him to misjudge the situation, and again the problem lay with Wilson's decision as to the

type of envoy he desired. The President preferred somone who was

sympathetic to his views rather than a person acquainted with Mexico, and once selected, Lind could only carry out his mission to the best of his ability. He was a well intentioned, amateur diplomat, anid could not be expected to acquire professional diplomatic knowhow. Indeed, the President preferred a non-professional envoy, which anticipates the New Diplomacy of Wilson in the aftermath of World War One.

After the failure of his initial mission to get Huerta to resign, Lind had considerable influence upon Wilson. The President had read his

dispatches daily, and much of Wilson's policy during this period was

based on Lind's recomendations. The President considered Lind's letters "most instructive" and felt they furnished him with "much food for

thought."39 After some initial misjudgements, Lind gained a better

knowledge of Mexico with time, and his analyses improved. He did

perceive that Huerta could be ousted only by some form of American

military intervention or by American support of Huerta's strongest opponents, something Wilson and Bryan took a while to recognize. But

Lind proved too zealous in advocating these courses, proposing i 11

advisdd schemes out of his impatience rather than careful calculation.

Lind saw only one side of the Mexican picture, however, for he had

gone to Mexico convinced that Huerta was the incarnation of evil.

Consequently, Lind spent his time seeking to prove these preconceived

charges rather than impartially investigating the facts. Accordingly, he associated with pro-revolutionaries, drawing his information only

38 Lind to Bryan, March 29, 1914/11327, and March 23/27482; Bryan to Lind, March 31/11327; and New York Times, April 3, 2:2, and April 14, 3:5.

39 Wilson to Bryan, October 6, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; and Bryan to Lind, March 31, 1914/11327. Even while Lind was in Mexico, Bryan had suggested that Wilson appoint him to the Joint Boundary Commission (with Canada) when he returned, Bryan to Wilson, September 18, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence.




from one side. Surely this would not produce a balanced view. He had not come to Mexico to seek the best solution possible. He had come to seek the best way to oust Huerta, for that was the only solution Wilson would accept. Thus when Lind told the President

what he wanted to hear Wilson followed his dispatches avidly. While Lind failed to evaluate the entire situation and while his

advice perpetuated a policy based on questionable grounds, it is doubtful if more realistic advice would have changed American policy.

Wilson had decided on his stand before sending Lind, and was seeking only ways to implement it. The President selected Lind as a man whose idealism would bring the kind of reports he desired, and he was not disappointed. Certainly Lind's actions pleased the President, and the failure of the mission stemmed from Wilson's policy.

The most significant aspect of the Lind mission was not its abortive

attempt to get Huerta to resign, but that Lind's reports brought the

Washington government to a more realistic view of the steps needed to implement its policy. While the wisdom of the seizure of Veracruz and the open support of the revolutionaries is debatable, they were the

only possible ways to force Huerta from power. Since the Wilson administration haJd already decided that it could accept nothing less than Huerta's ouster, such action was inevitable. It was Lind who focused attention to these measures as the only way to attain realiza tion of the implications of Wilson's policy. This was Lind's contri bution.



Documents

The Lind Mission to Mexico