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The Limits of Institutional Design
Francis Fukuyama
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Presidential/PM v. Electoral Systems
Plurality PR
Presidential
Parliamentary Westminster
US, Philippines Latin America
Continental Europe
Participation v. speed of decision-making (Buchanan and Tullock)
Percentage of population required to make decision
Exp
ecte
d D
ecis
ion
Cos
ts
Types of veto gates
• Electoral system– PR/plurality, district size, thresholds, timing
• Party discipline– Open v. closed list PR, campaign finance
• Bicameralism
• Federalism and decentralization
• Independent Judiciaries
System Rankings
• Classic Westminster
• Parliamentary/PR with strong parties
• Premier-presidential
• Presidential with plurality voting
• Parliamentary with fragmented parties
• Presidential with fragmented parties
British Election Results, 2001
party pop vote % pop vote seats % seatsLabour 10,724,953 42.0 412 62.5Conservatives 8,355,193 32.7 166 25.2Lib Democrats 4,814,321 18.8 52 7.9other 1,662,542 6.5 29 4.4
total 25,557,009 100.0 659 100.0
Successful Institutional Reform
• Electoral systems– Chile 1988, Japan 1994, Italy 1994, New
Zealand 1996, Thailand 1997
• Federalism– Brazil, Fiscal Responsibility Law (2000)
Conclusions
• No such thing as an optimal political system• Institutions come in complex, interdependent
packages• Good institutions heavily dependent on local
context and traditions• Need to invest in local knowledge of institutions• Leadership matters• Formal institutions matter less than many think