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could not be excluded. Antenatal care would.however, gave large numbers of babies. and they hadevery reason to believe that by tackling the question,.f antenatal care a material difference to the rate ofmaternity mortality and stillbirths could be made.lu reply to a. question. Mr. Evers said fie would trustno case entirely tu a midwife. No woman should beallowed to go and pick a midwife. She should have togo and pick a, doctor and a midwife, and the doctorshould then pass the patient as suitable and lit tohave labour carried through by the midwife. Ante-natal care should not be entrusted to a midwife.

THE LIMITATION OF EXPERT EVIDENCE.

(BY A LEGAL CORRESPONDENT.)

Ix the course of a long case which is now beforehim in the Chancery Division, Mr. Justice Tomlinhas had something to say in relation to the callingof expert witnesses. He pointed out that there arecary few aspects of life to-day which escape the cun-ning eye of science, so that in may cases it is opento the parties to introduce a string of experts. liewent on to say that. if a litigant was left free to callall the evidence possible, it placed a weapon in thehands of persons of large resources. He thereforeenunciated a rule, which he proposed to follow inthe case before him. that only two experts shouldbe called unless there were special circumstances

justifying a party in asking’ that more should beheard. In the present instance—an inquiry into thecause of the flooding of certain mines in !South Wales—the plaintiffs’ case had taken 2H days, and their twoexperts had been so fully heard that the issues hadbecome plain. Any rule limiting the amount of

expert evidence would be of considerable importanceto the medical profession. In the first place, nomember of the profession wants to go to court asa witness more often than he can help. Apart fromthe time he spends in preparing and giving hisevidence, he is often compelled to make a long’journey to a distant court only to find that the casehas been adjourned. In the class of action in whichthe medica] profession has but too good a reason totake an interest—namely, the action for malpraxis—to support a charge of negligence the plaintiff willof necessity rely upon the evidence of practitionersdrawn (if possible) from the front of the profession ;tu refute the charge, the defendant will endeavourto procure the best evidence he can. Those whohave the conduct of such litigation know well itscost—indeed the knowledge is made common bysubscription lists in the medical journals. Any rule,then, which would limit the number of mere expertwitnesses on either side would necessarily diminishthe expense, and the length of the hearing of auaction for negligence. It would be so far to the good.But if such a rule endangered the rights of litigantsno consideration of convenience or expense willjustify it.

’

Some people, of course. may take the view that toplace any limitation upon the right to call expertsis to unduly restrict the privileges of a litigant. Butit is conceived that when the true meaning of " expertevidence" and the proper functions of an expert.witness are appreciated, no hardship can occur. Asthe learned judge took care to point out,. a trueand accurate knowledge of science and scientific

principles may be essential for those who have to

apply the law to the facts of particular cases: and

although a learned judge may know something ofmedicine, he cannot hope to do justice unless he isassisted by those who have made it a lifelong study.But there is all the difference in the world betweena mere witness and an " expert " witness. The oneis called to prove the existence or non-existence ofcertain facts ; the other is there to express an opinionas to what will or is most likely to happen, given acertain set of facts. His opinion (if lie is a doctor)may not be shared by another practitioner of equal

standing in his profession ; but it will be for thecourt to decide which opinion to adopt in determiningthe issue in the case. In these circumstances it ismanifest that an expert must base his opinion uponreasons which lie can explain to the judge, and he isthe best expert who can best explain himself to onewho may have but au inkling of scientific knowledge.Some examples may be interesting.

1t was held in an old case (H. v. Wright (1821), R. & R.456) that a witness having medical qualiticaitons may beasked whether such and such appearances, proved ty otherwitnesses, are, in his judgment, symptoms of insanity.But a doubt was expressed as. to whether such a witness canbe asked whether from other testimony given, the act withwhich the prisoner iv charged is in his opinion an act ofinsanit y, that being the very point to be decided by the jury.

It was held in a recent case that the evidence of a medicalman was admissible as to the materiality of facts not disclosedin an action on a policy of life assurance (Yorke v. TorkshireInsurance Co., [1918] 1 K.B. 662).The evidence of experts, however, does not stand much

chance if mere theory is opposed to fact. So in a caseheard in 1961 (Brock v. Kelloch, 30 L. J. Ch. 198), the questionwas whether a child was or was not born alive. The evidencein the affirmative of the accoucheur, who attended themother in her continetuent, and who was a person of com-petent skill and integrity was taken to outweigh the contraryopinions of numerous medical men of eminence who weresubsequently consulted upon the facts stated.

Viewing the position of an " expert ’’ from thisstandpoint, it will be seen that the intention is toplace a, limit, not upon the amount off evidence, butupon the amonut of "

opinion" which is to bevoiced upon the scientific result or effect of thatevidence. As the rule is to apply equally to plaintiffand defendant there is no reason to apprehend thatit will be attended with any serious consequences tothe administration of justice. One thing is certain :it will tend to diminish the costs of litigation.

INTERNATIONAL OPHTHALMOLOGICALCONFERENCE.

EARLY in October last, following on a resolutionpassed at the general meeting of English-speakingophthalmologists in July, 1925, a small committeeconvened by Mr. E. Treacher Collins sent out a

general notice to ophthalmological societies andophthalmologists in all parts of the world, asking themto nominate two delegates from each country to conferon the question or the re-establishment of Internationalcongresses and on other matters of Internationalophthalmological interest. The response to thatnotice has been widespread, and already all theprincipal countries of the world have indicated theirapproval of the project, and for the most part have named their delegates.

Arrangements have been made provisionally forthe committee to meet at The Hague or Tuesday,July 12th, on the invitation of the NetherlandsOphthalmological Society. Mr. Treacher Collins willattend as convener of the conference.The delegates nominated are:—Argentine : Prof. Dr.

Enrique H. Demaria and Prof. Dr. Ra&uacute;l Arga&ntilde;araz.Austria: Dr. Adalbert 1’nchs and Prof. Dr. Josef Meller.Belgium: Dr. Henri Coppez and Dr. Leon Weekers.Bulgaria: Prof. Dr. <’. Pascheff and Dr. Slavoff. China :Dr. T. P. Lee. Czecho-Slovakia: Dr. A. Elschnig and Prof.Lese. Denmark: Dr. K. K. K. Lund"gaard and Dr. Chr.F. Bentzen. Finland: Prof. V. Gr&ouml;nholm and Dr. Y. G.Lindberg. France: Dr. Morax and Dr. Terrien. Germany :Ilerrn Prof. Dr. Axenfeld and Herrn Prof. Dr. Wessely.Great Britain: Sir J. Herbert Parsons and Mr. Leslie Paton.irolland : Prof. Dr. G. P. Hocnat and Prof. Dr..F. van derIfoeve. Hungary: Prof. Emile de Gr&oacute;sz and Prof. L. deBlaskovich. Japan : Prof. S. Tshihara and Prof. Oguchi.Norway: Prof. Dr. Hagen and Dr. Mauing. Roumania:Dr. (’. Pandelescu and Dr. N. R&aacute;svan, Spain : Dr. M.Marquez and Dr. F. Poyales, Sweden: Prof. Fritz Askand Prof. Albin Dal&eacute;n. Switzerland: Prof. J. Gonin and1)r. Ernst Pfl&uuml;ger. United States: Dr. G. E. de Schweinitzand Dr. Arnold Knapp.The following countries have intimated their

intention of taking part, but have not yet nominatedtheir delegates : Cuba, Italy, Poland, Yugo-Slavia.