The legitimacy of international organizations: 309 ...hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/16800/1/0600800301.pdf · 314SATO Somecomments ConcerningArticle39,日ThreattoPeace,=despiteitsclear,directallu-

ThelegltlmaCyOfSecurltyCouncilactivitiesunderChapterVIIoftheUNChartersincetheendoftheColdWar

TetsuoSato

Introduction

TheprovisionsrelatlngtOtheSecurityCouncilintheUnitedNationsCharterof2000donotlookmuchdifferenttothoseintheCharterof1945.Articles23and27wereamendedin1965toincreasethemember-

shipoftheSecurltyCouncilfromitsorlglnalllmemberstothepresent15,withacorrespondingchangefromseventoninevotesfortheadop-tionofresolutions･Nochangewasmadeinthe丘vePermanentMembers'vetopoweroversubstantivematters･1

However,thepracticeoftheSecurltyCouncil,particularlytheenforce一mentactivitiesbaseduponthepowersenjoyedbytheSecurityCouncilunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,havechangeddramaticallysincetheendoftheColdWar･2 Andwiththischange,aseriesofnewlegalproblemshaveappeared･KirglSSuccinctlysummarizedthecontroversialsituationoftheSecurltyCouncilasfollows:

Themostseriouslegalorquasi-legalissuessurroundingthepost-ColdWarSecurltyCouncilhavesofarbeenofthesortanobserverduringtheColdWarwouldhardlyhavedreamtcouldreachcentrestage･Theyhavehadmuchmoretodowiththepossibleabuseofpowerthanwithabdicationofit･TheCouncilhasinvokedChapterVIIwhenthethreattointernationalpeacewasnotself-evident,andhasforthemostpartomittedanyJuSti丘cationfor丘ndingsuchathreat･Ithas

309

310 SATO

invokedChapterⅥItoauthorisememberstatestousearmedforcetopreserveorrestorepeace,withoutrelyingonArticle42andwithoutanyArticle43agree一mentsirkPlace.Onthequasi-legislativefront,theCouncilhasestablishedwarcrimestribunals

andinCOnneCtionwiththemhasissueddirectivestomemberstatestocO-operate･Ithascreatedacompensationcommissiontodetemi eclaimsagainstanaggressorstate･Ithasempoweredthetribunalsandthecommissiontoapplynormsthatdonotnecessarilyreaectpre-existinginternationallaw･TheCouncilhasmadequasi-judicialdeterminationsthatgowellbeyondthose

inherentinitsexpressauthoritytodeterminethreatstothepeace,breachesofthepeaceandactsofaggression.IthasalsogonebeyonditsreadilyimpliedauthoritytointerpretandapplyrelevantCharterprovisionsortointerpretitsownresolu-tions･Ithasdonesodespiteitsownnonjudicialcharacter,andwithoutproceduralsafeguards･3

Theintendedpurposeofthischapteristhreefold.Itis,firstly,togive,aSapreliminaryobservationforthefollowmganalysis,anoverauideaofthepossiblepositiontobegiventotheSecurityCouncilin仙eUnitedNationsandintheinternationalcommunityasawhole;secondly,todemonstratethattheSecurityCouncilhassteppedintolegallygreyareasfromtheper-spectiveof血eUNCharter,whilemostofthecasescouldbelegauyjus-tified;and丘nally,toemphasizetheimportanceandroleoflegitimacylntheselegauygreyareas.

ChapterVIIoftheUNCharterandpracticeduringtheColdWarperiod

InterpretationoftheCharter

lntemationalorganizationsarefunctionalentitiesestablishedbystatesonthebasisofagreements(constituentinstruments).Sincethepurposes,functions,powersandcompetence,organizationalstructures,activities,andallotherimportantmattersofi山ernationalorganizationsare,inessence,providedintheirconstituentinstruments,anylegalanalysisoftheirstructuresandactivitiesshouldlogicauystartwithanalysesandinterpretationsofthoseconstituentinstruments.Infact,manyofthedis-

Anddisputesconcernlngtheirstructuresandactivities,whenLtheorgansofinternationalorganizationsorreferredtothellCourtofJustice,havebeenarguedonthelevelofinter-

pretationoftheirconstituentinstruments.Ontheotherhand,thei山er-pretationoflawalwaysleavessomeroomfordiscretion,andinvolves

THELEGITIMACYOFSECURITYCOUNCILACTIVITIES 311

avaluejudgementbytheinterpreterinselectlngOneOfseveralpossiblemeanlngSWithintheframeworkofthenormconcerned.Inthissense,the

matterofwhoistointerpretandapplyanormisdecisiveindeterminlng

itscontent･Treatiesaregenerallyinterpretedandappliedbythestates

partiesthemselves.Inthecaseofconstituentinstruments,theorgansof

internationalorganizationsalsointerpretand applythoseprovisions

relatedtotheiractivitiesasaninseparableprocessoftheiroperation･

ThereisnoprovisionconcernlngInterpretationintheCharteroftheUnitedNations.ToindicatetheconclusionofdiscussionsintheSam

FranciscoConference,thereexistsonlythefinalreportofCommittee

IV/2(LegalProblems)oftheConference,apartofwhichisasfollows:

InthecourseoftheoperationfromdaytodayofthevariousorgansoftheOrga-nisation,itlSinevltablethateachorganwillinterpretsuchpartsoftheCharterasareapplicabletoitsparticularfunctions･Thisprocessisinherentinthefunc-tionlngOfanybodywhichoperatesunderaninstrumentdeBningitsfunctionsandpowers.ItwillbemanifestedinthefunctionlngOfsuchabodyastheGeneralAssembly,theSecurltyCouncil,OrtheInternationalCourtofJustice.Accord-1ngly,ltisnotnecessarytoincludeintheCharteraprovisioneitherauthorislngOrapprovlngthenormaloperationofthisprlnCiple･Di銃cultiesmayconceivablyariseintheeventthatthereshouldbeadifference

ofopinionamongtheorgansoftheOrganisationconcerningthecorrectinterpre-tationofaprovisionoftheCharter.Thus,twoorgansmayconceivablyholdandmayexpressorevenactupondifFerentviews･Underunitaryformsofnationalgovernmentthefinaldeterminationofsuchaquestionmaybevestedinthehighestcourtorinsomeothernationalauthority.However,thenatureoftheOrganisationandofitsoperationwouldnotseemtobesuchastoinvitetheincluslOnintheCharterofanyprovisionofthisnature- Inbrief,theMembersortheorgansoftheOrganisationmighthaverecoursetovariousexpedientsinordertoobtainanapproprlateinterpretation-Itistobeunderstood.ofcourse,thatifaninterpretationmadebyanyorgan

oftheOrganisationorbyacommitteeofjuristsisnotgenerallyacceptableitwillbewithoutbindingforce･･･4

1tcanbeseenfrom thisreportthatthepossibilitywasclearlyrejected

thatanorgan(suchastheICJortheGeneralAssembly)oftheUnited

NationsbeglVenthepowertoauthoritativelyinterprettheChartereither

inwholeorpartially,itsinterpretationbindingalltheotherorgansand

allthememberstatesoftheUnitedNations･5 Asaconsequence,each

memberstatecouldquestionaninterpretationoftheChartermadeby

oneoftheorgansintakingaspecificmeasure･Insodoing,amember

statequestionswhetherthemeasureisinaccordancewiththeCharter,andthereforewhetheritislawful.6

312 SATO

WhatroledoestheUNChartergivetotheSecurityCouncil,particularlyunderChapterVIIoftheCharter?

TheUnitedNationswasconceivedbythefourgreatpowers-t九eSovietUnion,theUnitedKingdom,theUnitedStatesofAmerica,andChina-attheDumbartonOaksConferencein1944.ThegoalwasprlmarilytocreateanorganizationthatwouldserveasamechanismforposトSecondWorldWarhternationalsecurity･7TheDumbartonOaksplanwasre丘nedbyStalin,Churchill,andRooseveltatYaltainearly1945,andwasmouldedintotheCharteratSamFranciscolaterthatyear･8Article1oftheCharter,"ThePurposesoftheUnitedNations,"refers

inparagraph1totheeffortto"maintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity,andtothatend:totakeeffectivecollectivemeasuresforthepreventionandremovalofthreatstothepeace,andforthesuppressionofactsofaggressionorotherbreachesofthepeace."Article240fChapterV,"TheSecurityCouncil,"confersontheSecurityCouncilprimaryresponsibilityforthemaintenanceofintemationalpeaceandsecurity.ChapterVIIoftheCharterenablestheSecurityCounciltoadopteco-

nomicsanctionsandmi1itarymeasureswherethereisa"threattothepeace,breachofthepeaceoractofaggression,"therebyequlppmgitwi也 enforcementpowersindisputesorsituationsthatareparticularlysedous･9TobringChapterVIIintoplay,Article39StatesthatitiSfortheSecurityCounciltodeterminethatthenecessaryconditionsarepresent;thatis,thatoneofthethreesituationsaboveexists.Oncesuchadetermi一mationhasbeenmadeunderArticle39,itisopentotheSecurityCounciltomakerecommendations,OrtodecidewhatmeasuresshallbetakeninaccordancewithArticles41and42tomaintainorrestoreinternational

peaceandsecurity.Article41isprlmarilyconcernedwitheconomicsanc-tions.Article42isconcernedwithmilitarysanctions,andArticle43pro-videsformemberstatestoconcludeagreementswiththeUnitedNationsunderwhichtheirforceswinbeavailableforusewhenneeded.

Withtheseprovisions,theSecurityCouncilcouldbeconsideredasapnmarilyexecutiveorganequlppedwithpolicingpowerandthecapacitytousecoerciveforceintheformofmilitaryandnon-militarysanctions.

WhatroledidtheSecurityCouncilplayduringtheColdWayperiod?

Thelongperiodthatwegenerallyidentifyasthe"ColdWar"hasmeantanalmosttotalparalysisoftheSecurityCouncilintheexerciseofitsenforce-mentpowersunderChapterVII.TheCouncilhasbeencrippledbyitsideologicalpolarizationandtheabuseofthevetopowerofthePermanentMembers.Duringthisperiod,onlythreeenforcementactionshavebeen

THELEGITtMACYOFSECURITYCOUNCILACTIVITIES 313

takenunderChapterVII:theattackupontheRepublicofKorea,thesit-uationinSouthernRhodesia,andtheinternalsituationinSouthAfrica.10

TheattackupontheRepublicofKorea

TheSecurityCouncil,throughResolution82(1950),determinedthatthearmedattackbyNorthKoreaconstitutedabreachofthepeace,andcalledupontheNorthKoreanauthoritiestowithdrawtheirforcestothe38thparallel.ThroughResolutions83(1950)and84(1950),itrecom一mendedthatmemberstatesassistKoreainrepellingthearmedattack,

andthattheymakesuchassistanceavailabletoauni丘edcommandundertheUnitedStates,whichwasauthorizedtousetheUnitedNations且agandwasobligedonlytoreporttotheSecurityCounciLThecollectivemilitaryactionundertakenagalnStNorthKoreawasledbytheUnitedStateswithtroopscontributedby16states･TheSecurityCouncilhadnoauthorityovertheconductofmilitaryoperations･Assoonastherep-resentativeoftheSovietUnioncamebacktotheSecurityCouncil,itceasedtoplayanactiverole.TheGeneralAssembly,however,playedthisroleandbuttresseditspositionbyadoptlngtheHUnitingforPeaceHResolution.

ThesituationinSouthernRhodesia

AgainsttheunilateraldeclarationofindependencebytheauthoritiesofSouthernRhodesia,whichwasanon-self-governlngterritory,theSecurityCouncil,inResolution216(1965),declaredtheannulmentofthisdecla-rationofindependence.Furthermore,afterdeterminlngtheexistenceofathreattopeace,inResolution221(1966),it"call[ed]upon"theUnitedKingdom"topreventbytheuseofforceifnecessarythearrivalatBeira"

(Mozambique),whichiscoヮnectedtoRhodesiabypipeline,ofshipspresumablycarryingoildestlnedforRhodesia,and"empower[ed]"ittoarrestatankerconcerned.TheSecurltyCouncilalsoimposedeconomicandothersanctions,instages,underArticle41･

TheinternalsituationinSouthAfrica

TheSecurltyCouncilhadbeenbesetbyquestionsrelatedtotheracialpolicyofSouthAfricasince1963,andithadcondemnedtheapartheidpolicyseveraltimesandcalledforanarmsembargoinResolution181(1963).ItwasonlyinResolution418(1977)thattheSecurityCouncilactuallyImposedsuchaweaponsembargo･HeretheSecurltyCouncilfoundtheexistenceofathreattopeaceonlylnrelationtoSouthAfricaヮsacqulSltionofweaponsandmateriel,ratherthanintheapartheidpolicyitself.However,ltSeemsClearthattheSecurltyCouncilwasmotivatedbyconsiderationsconcernlngtheapartheidpolicy,whichwerealreadysufi-cientlyaggravatedatthattime･

314 SATO

Somecomments

ConcerningArticle39,日ThreattoPeace,=despiteitsclear,directallu-siontoanarmedcon瓜ict,theconceptofathreattopeaceevolvedinthepracticeoftheSecurityCounciltorefertosomethingbroaderthanthat･TheSecurityCouncilcouldbeconsideredtohaveincludedinthiscon-ceptsuchcasesasthedenialofself-determinationtotheblackmajorityinSouthernRhodesia,andthelarge-scale,systematicdenialofbasichumanrightsinSouthAfrica.

ConcerningArticle39,"Recom endations,"andArticle42,intheColdWarperiod,oneofthecrucialquestionswaswhethertheCouncilcouldtakemilitaryenforcementactionsunderArticle42intheabsenceoftheagreementsandtllemachineryprovidedforinArticles43-47･Theprev-alentoplmOnatthattimewasthatArticle42､wasnotapplicablewithoutspecialagreementstobeconcludedunderArticle43･l1Thus,theKoreanactionandpossiblytheactioncalledfor也theResolutiononSouthernRhodesiawereconsideredtohavebeentakenonthebasisofaHrecom-

mendationHby仙eSecurityCouncilunderArticle39･12Itistruethatthesewerescarcelythekindsof"recommendations"thatthedraftersoftheCharterhadinmhdwhentheyadoptedArticle39.At也etime,however,thisconceptofmilitarymeasureson仙ebasisofaCouncil"recommen-dation"wasacceptedbyagreatmajorityofmembers,withthemajorexceptionoftheSovietbloc･13TheactionsoftheSecurityCouncilin thetwocasesofKoreaand

Southem R血odesiawerenotexplicitlybaseduponrelevantarticlesoftheCharter.Tothatextent,theresolutionsmentionedaboveworkedasalegitimizingfactorfortheuseofforcebyrecommendingordelegatingforcibleactionstohdividualstatesforspeci丘edpurposes.Apartfromafewexamples,theruleoftheSecurityCouncilduringthe

ColdWarperiodwascharacterizedbyvirtualparalysis,deepdisagree-mentsandmistrustamongthePermanentMembers,andaninabilitytoprevent,manage,orredressthemanycon且ictswithwhichitwasfaced･14

SecurityCouncilactivitiesunderChapterVIIoftheUNChartersincetheendoftheColdWar

WhathavebeenthemainactivitiesoftheSecurityCouncilunderChapterVIIoftheUNChartersincetheendoftheColdWar?Aretheylegalinthesensethattheyareinconformitywithinternationallaw,andconstitu-tionalinthesensethattheyareinconformitywiththeCharter,whichistheconstitutionoftheUnitedNations?Someofthemainandparticularlycontroversialcaseswinbediscussedbelow.


Article39

Interferenc.eintointernalaHairsofmemberstatesbytheUJu'tedNationsonhumanltariangroundsinthecaseoftheKurds(Resolution688(1991)),ofSomalia,andothercases

ThenotionofHthreattothepeaceHisnow interpretedasincludingessentiallyInternalsituationsthatmightdegenerateintoaninterna-tionalconflict･TheSecurltyCouncilreferredto"therepressionofthelraqlCivilianpopulationinmanypartsofIraq,lnCludingmostrecentlylnKurdish-populatedareas,whichledtoamassivenowofrefugeestowardsandacrossinternationalfrontiersandtocross-borderincursionswhich

threateninternationalpeaceandsecurltyinthereglOn,=15andHthemag-nitudeofthehumantragedycausedbytheconflictinSomalia,furtherexacerbatedbytheobstaclesbeingcreatedtothedistributionofhuman-

itarianassistance,constitut[ing]athreattointernationalpeaPeandsecu-rlty･=16OneshouldalsoconsiderthecivilwarinLiberia,lnregardtowhichtheSecurltyCouncildetermined"thatthedeteriorationofthesit-

uation[inthisregion]constitute[d]athreattointern空 nalpeaceandsecurlty,particularlyinWestAfricaasawholeH;17theclVilwarandgeno-cideinRwanda,inregardtowhichtheSecurityCouncildeterminedHthat

themagnitudeofthehunTani.tariancrisis[inthisregion]constitTte[d]athreattopeaceandsecurltylnthereglOnH;18andthecoupagalnSttheelectedPresidentofHaiti.19Inthiscontext,allofthesecaseswereseen

inasimilarlightbytheSecurityCouncil･20ThisevolutionwasdefendedfromtheviewpolntOfthereal-lifedynam-

icsofethnicandsimilarconflictsasfollows:

Ethnicconflictblursthelinebetweendomesticandinternattonal,stateandnon-stateactors,aswellaslhafbetweenChapterVIandVII.EthnicconflicthasalsomadeamockeryofthedoctrinethatonlylnterStateCOn且ictcanbeaHthreattointerna-tionalpeaceandsecurity"(Article39).Con月ictsinwhichmorethanhalfamillionpeoplegetkilledandhundredsofthousandsofpeoplehavetofleeareathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurltylnahighlyinterdependentworld･TheSecurltyCouncilwasabsolutelyrighttodecideaccordinglylnthecaseofSomalia,Liberia,Angola,Rwanda,etc･21

TheAppealsChamberoftheInternationalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslaviaacknowledgedthisintheTadicCasebysaylng:

lE]venif〔anarmedconnictintheterritoryOftheFormerYugoslavia]werecon-sideredmerelyasanHinternalarmedconnict",ltWOuldstillconstituteaHthreattothepeaceHaccordingtothesettledpracticeoftheSecurltyCouncilandthecommonunderstandingoftheUnitedNationsmembershiplngeneraLIndeed,

316 SATO

thepracticeoftheSecurityCouncilisrichwithcasesofcivilwarorinternalstrifewhic血itclassi丘edasa"threattothepeace"anddealtwithunderChapterⅥⅠ,withtheencouragementorevenatthebehestoftheGeneralAssembly,suchastheCongocrisisatthebeginnmgofthe1960sand,morerecently,LiberiaandSomalia.Itcanthusbesaidthatthereisacommonunderstanding,manifestedbythe"subsequentpractice"ofthemembershipoftheUnitedNationsatlarge,thatthe"threattothepeace"ofArticle39mayinclude,asoneofitsspecies,internalarmedconaicts.22

TheLibyancase:Resolutions731(1992)and748(1992)

SecurityCouncilResolution731of21January1992,interalia,CalleduponLibyatoextraditetwosuspectsallegedlylinkedtothebombingofanAmericanairlineroverLockerbietoeithertheUnitedStatesorthe

UnitedKingdomfortrial･也 response,LibyabroughtanactionbeforetheInternationalCourtofJusticeandrequestedtheCourttoindicateprovisionalmeasurestopreventtheUnitedStatesfromtakingcoerciveactionsagalnStLibya,andtoensurethatnostepsweretakenthatwouldprejudiceLibya'srights.Threedaysafterthecloseoforalhearingsinthecase,theSecurityCounciladoptedResolution748asabindingdecisionrequiringLibyatoextraditethepersonsinquestionandimposlngSanc-tionsuponitshoulditfailtodosoby15Aprilofthatyear.

Graefrathcriticizedthisactionasfollows:

WithduerespecttothewisdomoftheSecurityCouncil,itseemstomeratherdoubtfulwhetherafailuretofullyrespondtolthe]UnitedStates'requeststosurrendersuspectstotheUmitedStatesortheUnitedKingdomandtopaycom-

pensationcanbeinterpreted,withinthemeanlngOfArticle390ftheCharter,asathreattointernationalpeace;especiallywhenithasnotbeenestablishedthatLibyaviolatedinternationallaw･23

Aseriousandcautiousconsiderationisreq血edonthematterofwhethertheSecurityCouncilcouldreasonablydeterminetheexistenceofathreatto血ternationalpeaceandsecuritythreeandahalfyearsafter也eLocker-biebombing,simplybecauseLibyahadnotsurrenderedthesuspects.

Article41

TheLibyancase:Resolutions731(1992)and748(1992)

Graefrathfurtherpointsoutthat"theSecurityCouncilbyResolution748(1992)transformedthetermsofsettlementrecommendedbyRe岳olu-tion731(1992)underChapterVIintoabindingdisputesettlementunderChapte.rVII,aprocedurethatisnotprovidedforintheCharter,‖24

cltlngthefollowingstatementbyG.Arangio-Ruiz:


AsstlPulatedunambiguouslylntheCharter,theSecurityCouncil'spowerscon-sistedofmakingnon-bindingrecommendations,underChapterVI,whichdealtwithdisputesettlement,andalsobindingdecisionsunderChapterVII,whichdealtwithmeasuresofcollectivesecurity･ThemainpolntWasthat,accordingtothedoctrinalview-whichdidnotappeartobeseriollSlychallengedeitherinthelegalliteratureorinpractice-theSecurityCouncilwouldnotbeempowered,whenactingunderChapterVII,toimposesettlementsunderChapterVIinsuchamannerastotransformitsrecommendatoryfunctionunderChapterVIintobindingsettlementsofdisputesorsituations･25

Thisisaratherdelicateandcontroversialpolnt,andwillbefurtherdealt

withlaterinthischapter･

Post-warsettlementintheGulfWar,includingthedestructionofIraq'schemicalandbiologicalweapons,andthedelimitationoftheboundarybetweenIraqandKuwait(Resolution687(1991))

Resolution687of3April1991providesfortheinviolabilityoftheinter一RationalboundarybetweenIraqandKuwait,thedemarcationofthatboundaryandtheestablishmentofaUNobserverunit(UNIKOM),the

destructionoflraq'schemical,biologlCal,andnuclearweaponsandlong-rangeballisticmissiles,andanundertakingbyIraqnottodevelopany

suchweaponsinthefuture.AspecialCommission(UNSCOM)andtheIAEAweretomonitorandverifylraq'scompliance･IraqwastoreturnKuwaitlpropertyandwasdeclaredliableforlossanddamageasaresult

ofitsunlawfulinvasionandoccupationofKuwait･A fundtopaycom-pensationwastobeestablished.SanctionsagalnStIraqweretobemain-taineduntilithadful丘11editsdisarmamentobligationsundertheresolu-

tion･Kuwaitiandthird-countrynationalsdetainedinIraqweretobe

repatriated･Finally,theSecurityCouncildeclared,Hupono抗cialnoti丘-

cationbylraqtotheSecretary-GeneralandtotheSecurityCouncilofitsacceptanceoftheprovisionsabove,aformalcease-fireiseffectivebe-

tweenIraqandKuwaitandtheMemberStatesc0-0peratlngWithKuwaitinaccordancewithResolution678(1991)."

Graefrathcriticizedthisinthefollowlngterms:

lA]sthedifferentstructuresofChapterVIandChapterVIIdemonstrate,theSecurityCouncilunderChapterVIIhasapoliclngfunctiononly-･Therefore,whenactlngunderChapterVIItheSecurityCouncilactionnor-

mallyieconfinedtostoplping]mi1itaryactivitiesoravert[ing]aspecificdangerforthemalntenanCeOfpeace,1nOrdertoallowthefunctionlngOfpeacefuldisputesettlementprocedurestosolvetheconnictwhichledtothebreachofthepeacel26

ToacceptthattheSecurityCouncilcouldimposeitsreparationschemeonlraqandothermemberStatesoftheUnitedNationswouldruncompletelyagalnStthe

systemoftheCharter.Itwouldnotonlyconfusepoliticalandjudicialpowersvestedintentionallyindifferentorgans,butalsoendowtheSecurityCouncilwithlegisla-tivepowerswhichStatesneverhavetransferredtoanyUnitedNationsorgan･27

318 SATO

EstablishmentofanInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsibleforSeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLaw(Resolution827(1993)andResolution955(1994))

TheSecurityCouncil,inResolution827(1993),establishedthe"Inter-nationalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsibleforSeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedintheTerritoryoftheFormerYugoslaviasince1991･‖28similarly,theSecurityCouncil,inResolution955(1994),establishedtheHInternationalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsibleforGenocideandOtherSeriousVio-lationsofInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedintheTerritoryofRwandaandRwandanCitizensResponsibleforGenocideandOtherSuchViolationsCommittedintheTerritoryofNeighbouringStates,between1January1994and31December1994･H29TheestablishmentofthesetribunalsbyresolutionsoftheSecurity

Councilgaverisetoreservationsandcriticism.ItwasarguedthattheauthoritytoestablishatribunaltotryofEencesbeingcomi ttedintheterritoryofanystatewasessentiallytobelefttothestate(S)withjuris-dictionovertheindividualsconcerned;thattheCharter,whenadopted,constitutedtreatyobligationsthatdidnotinCludetheestablishmentofacompulsorycriminaljurisdiction;andthatneitherhad也ememberstatesglVenSuchjurisdictiontotheUNthereafter.30However,theAppealsChamberoftheInternationalTribunalforthe

FormerYugoslaviaa抗rmeditslegalityintheTadicCase,saylng:

TheestablishmentoftheinternationalTribunalbytheSecurityCouncildoes

notsignify,however,thattheSecmityCouncilhasdelegatedtoitsPmeofitsfunctionsortheexerciseofsomeofitsownpowers.Nordoesitmean,lnreverse,thattheSecurityCouncilwasusurpingforitselfpartofajudicialfunctionwhichdoesnotbelongtoitbuttootherorgansoftheUnitedNationsaccordingtotheCharter･TheSecurityCouncilhasresortedtotheestabliSlmentofajudicialorganintheformofaninternationalcriminaltribunalasaninstrumentfol'theexerciseofitsownprincipalfunctionofmaintenanceofpeaceandsecurity,i.e.,asameasurecontributingtotherestorationandmaintenanceofpeaceintheformerYugoslavia･31

Article42

AuthorizationoftheuseofforcebymemberstatesintheGulfWar(Resolution678(1990))andothercases

TheSecurityCouncilresortedtoaformulaauthorizingorcallinguponmemberstatesgenerallytoactwiththeSecurityCouncil'sblesslngbutwithoutitscontrol.IntheGulfWar,itauthorized"MemberStatesco-


operatlngWiththeGovernmentofKuwait-･touseallnecessarymeans

toupholdandimplementresolution660(1990)andallsubseqTentrele-vantresolutionsandtorestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurltyinthearea･"32Indifferentcontextsofalesserscale,theSecurltyCouncilre-sortedtothisformulainsuchcasesasSomalia,33Bosnia-Herzegovina,34Rwanda,35andHaiti･36Thereoccurred,particularlylnrelationtoSecu-rityCouncilResolution678(1990),agreatdealofcontroversyovertheirlegality,constitutionality,andpossiblelegalgroundsITheargumentsagalnStthisformulacanbesummarizedasfollows:

lC]haracterisinga.nactionastakenunderArticle42ShoulddependonwhethertheCouncilgaveItselfthemeanstoexercISeCOntrOlanddirectionoverthemea-suresadopted･TheresolutioninquestioncontradictsthebasicpremisesofArticle42,forthetotallackofdirectionandcontrolbytheCouncilovertheactionsitauthorises･Thevaguenessofthedelegationofauthoritypl･OVidedbyparagraphZisstriking;thewidediscretionenjoyedbytheStatesconcernedastothe"necessarymeansHtouse,thelackofanyindicationaboutthecommandandc0-Ordinationofthemilitaryoperation,thevaguenessofthepurposeoftheauthorisation,andthelackofevenaclearreportingObLigationforthecoalitionStatesmakeDesertStormanoperationexternaltotheUnitedNations,astheformerSecretary-GeneralhimselfhastakenpalmstOunderlineonafewoccasions･37

ThemajorityOflegalscholars,however,althoughmoreorlessreluctantly,arereadytoacceptthisformulaasrealisticallypracticalandacceptable･Thispositionseemstobebaseduponseveralelements･38someprovi-sionsintheCharter,suchasArticles48and53,expresslyenvisagetlleCouncilauthorizlngactionbyothers.AstheSecretary-GeneralacknowLedged,theUnitedNationsisnotequlppedtotakecommandofamajormilitaryoperationinvolvingtheuseofforceagalnStanaggreSSOr･ToexcludethepossibilityofauthorizationwouldmeannopossibilityoftheUnitedNationstakingmilitaryenforcementactiononanysubstantialscale.Itisgenerallyconsideredas"unlikelythatinthenearfutureanyoperationofimportancewillbeconductedotherwisethanbymeansofaforcethatisauthorisedbytheSecurityCounciloristotallyoutsidetheUNsystem･=39

UnilateraltLSeOfforcefortheimplementafionofResolution687(1991)

TheUnitedNationsranintoseriousdi抗cultiesovertheimplementation

ofResolution687(1991)･Thisresolution.assumedIraqic?operation,andthemainproblemswiththeimplementatlOnOftheresolutlOnCameOutOfitsenforcementagalnStanunwillingIraq.Inthissense,onecouldsaythat

theSecurltyCouncilpaidforthedecisionofthecoalitionnottodestroySaddam Hussein'sreglmeunderthecoveroftheauthorizationtouse"allnecessarymeasures… torestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurlty･"

320 SATO

However,itisdoubtfulwhetheritwouldhavebeenpoliticallyfeasibleatthetimeoftheadoptionofResolution687toprovidefortheissueofenforcement.Thosecriticaloftheopen-endedauthorizationoftheuse

offorceinResolution.678(1990)WerenotlikelytoacceptageneralauthoritytouseforcetosecurecompliancewithResolution687･40Amongthevariousincidentsrelatedtolraq,themattersofdisarma一

mentandweaponsinspectionsareparticularlyrelevanttotheimplemen-tationofResolution687.IraqobstructedtheimplementationbydenylngaccesstotheIAEAandtheUNSCOMweaponsinspectors.TheSecurityCouncilunanimouslyadoptedResolution707(1991),inwhichitcon-demnedIraq'sseriousviolationofanumberofitsobligationsunderRes-olution687.1talsoadoptedResolution715(1991)tosupplementReso-lution687.Iraq,ontheotherhand,continueditsobstructionand五mallyinformedUNSCOMthattheUNweaponsinspectorswouldnolongerbeallowedtousetheirownaircraft.ThepresidentoftheSecurityCouncilissuedastatementinWhichitwasdeterminedthatIraqwasinmaterialbreachofResolution687anditsrelatedresolutions,andwarnedIraqoftheseriousconsequencesthatwouldflowfromsuchcontinueddefiance.Furthermore,theUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,andFrancestartedairstrikesonsitesinSOuthernlraq･41Thus,aquestionisposedastowhetherResolution687,thecease-fire

resolution,auowedtheunilateraluseofforcewithoutanyfurtherSecurltyCouncilresolutioninordertosecuretheimplementationofthecease-firereglme,evenintheabsenceofanyuseofforcebyIraq.TheSecurityCouncil,inParagraph1ofResolution687,a凪rmedall13priorresolu-tions,includingResolution678,"exceptasexpresslychangedbelowtoachievethegoalsofthisresolution,includingaformalcease-fire,"anddeclared,inParagraph33,thataformalcease-firewaseffectiveupono凪cialacceptancebyIraq.TheauthorizationtouseforceinResolution678isthereforenolongerinforce.Thus,onecommentatorconcluded:

IntheabsenceofexpressandfomalSecurityCouncilau血orisation也ecease-

firemustremaininforce.TheUKMimister'sargumentthat,"inthelightofIraq'scontinuedbreachesofSecurityCouncilResolution687andthusofthecease-firetens,andoftherepeatedwarningsgivenbytheSecurityCouncilandmembers

ofthecoalition･theirltheUSA]forceswereentitledtotakenecessaryandpro-portionateactioninOrdertoensurelraqlCOmpliancewiththosetens"isnotlegallyconvincing･42

∫Aseriesofcrisesensued,particularlyin1997and1998,concernmgtheimplementationofResolution687.TheUnitedStatesannouncedthatitwaspreparedtousemilitaryforceasalastresort.Secretary-GeneralKofiAnnanwenttoBaghdadinFebruary1998andannouncedanagreement


connrmlngfullcompliancebyIraqwithallrelevantresolutions,includingResolution687,TheSecurltyCouncilendorsedthisMemorandum ofUnderstandinginResolution1154(1998),adoptedunderChapterVII,inwhichtheSecurltyCouncilwarnedthat"anyviolationwouldhavetheseverestconsequencesforlraq･=43Hわwever,whiletheUnitedStatesas-sertedthatunilateralforcibleactioninresponsetoviolationsremainedpossible,a且umberofCouncilmembers,includingRussia,China,andFrance,Statedthatthisresolutioncouldnotberelieduponasautomati-callyauthorizlngtheuseofforceagalnStlraq･44TheSecurltyCouncil,

a.gain,adoptedResolution1205(1998),inwhichitcondemnedthedeci-sl0nbyIraqtoceasecooperationwiththeSpecialCommissionasafla-grantviolationofResolution687(1991)andotherrelevantresolutions,butdidnotauthorizetheuseofforceagalnStIraq･

Onemonthlater,however,whenlraqagalllrestrictedinspectionsbyUNSCOM,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStatescarriedoutmas-siveairstrikesagalnStIraqwithouttrylngtOaCqulreauthorizationtouseforce･ConcernlngthisseriesofairstrikesagalnStIraq,thefollowlngCOn-clusion,reachedbyKrisch,seemsreasonablyaccurate:

[N]eithertheinterpretationofResolution678(1990),687(1991),1154(1998)and1205(1998)norstatepracticesince1991giveindicationsforUnitedNationsauthorizationofthethreatoruseofforceinordertoenforcelraq'spost-warobligations- Thus,therelianceonUnitedNationsauthorityseemsmotivatedbythedesiretoenhancetheappearanceoflegitimacydesplteObviousillegality･45

TheSecurityCouncilsteppingintolegallygreyareas

ThebriefanalysュsaboveofthemainandcontroversialactivitiesoftheSecurltyCouncilunderChapterVHoftheUNChartersincetheendoftheColdWarimpliesthatsomeoftheactionsoftheSecurityCouncilmightbeambiguousintermsoftheirlegalityandconstitutionality･Twoimportantissueswillbeconsideredbelow･

WhethertheSecurltyCouncilhasthelegalpowertoimposeabindingdisputesettlementunderChapterVII

TheessenceoftheroleoftheSecurltyCouncilinmaintainlngInterna-tionalpeaceandsecurltyliesinitsabilitytoactquicklyanddecisive/lytopreventorpunishathreattoorbreachofthepeace,oranactofaggres-sion.SuchexecutiveactionandenforcementactivltyCOuldnotbeaccom-plishedifaccompanied,forexample,byrigorousandlengthyevidentiaryprocessesinvolvingcomplicatedproceduresforgatheringfactsandhear-1ngWitnesses,norifdelayedduetosomeform oflegalappealmecha-nism･46Thus,Kelsen,forexample,arguedthattheCouncilneednotact

322 SATO

inaccordancewithexistinginternationallawwhenitisactmgtomaintainorrestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurity･Hestated:

ThepurposeoftheenforcementactionunderArticle39isnot:tomaintainorrestorethelaw,buttomaintain,orrestorepeace,whichisnotnecessarilyidenti-calwiththelaw… [WhenitisactingunderChapterVII,]theSecurityCouncilwouldbeempoweredtoestablishjusticeifitconsideredtheexistinglawasnotsatisfactory,andhencetoenforceadecisionwhichitconsideredtobejustthoughnotinconformitywithexistinglaw･ThedecisionenforcedbytheSecurityCouncilmaycreatenewlawfortheconcretecase･47

Theargumentthatlegalrightsofstatesmaybeinfringeduponorsus-pendedbytheSecurityCouncilintheapplicationofcollectiveenforce一

mentmeasuresissupportedbytheCharterandthetravauxpreparatoiresoftheCharter,aswellasthepracticeoftheSecurityCouncil･48Article1(1)oftheCIlarterprovidesasfollows:

Articlel･ThepurposesoftheUnitedNationsare:1.Tomaintainintemationalpeaceandsecurity,andtothatend:totakeeffective

couectivemeasuresforthepreventionandremovalofthreatstotilepeace,andforthesuppressionofactsofaggressionorotherbreachesofthepeace,andtobringaboutbypeacefulmeansandinconformitywiththeprinciplesofjusticeandintemationallaw,adjustmentorsettlementofinternationaldisputesorsituationswhichmightleadtoabreachofthepeace･

Thisprovisiondividesthemeansformai山ainlnginternationalpeaceandsecurityhtocollectivemeasuresandpeacefulsettlement,anditisonlyin仙econtextofthelatterthattheSecurityCouncilissubjecttotheconstraintsofinternationallawandjustice･Furthermore,itcouldbecontendedthattheverynotionofenforcementmeasuresimpliesthattheCouncilhastheauthoritytoimplngeupon,restrict,orsuspendtherightsthatstatesarenormallyentitledtoexerciseunderbothcustomaryandconventionalinternationallaw.SuchauthorityfortheCouncilcouldbeimplicitinChapterVIIoftheCharter,speci丘callyArticles39,41,42,and48･49Thus,也epracticeoftheSecurityCouncilclearlydemonstratesthatatradeembargoimposedbyitcouldaffectrightstoengageincommerceaswellasrightsoffreemovementbyshipsonthehighseas.However,itisincorrecttocontendthattheSecurityCounciliscom-

pletelyunrestrainedbytheprlnCiplesofjusticeandinternationallawwhenitistakingcollectivemeasuresunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter･50Tothecontrary,itcouldreasonablybecontendedthatthefoundingstatesoftheUnitedNationsgavethisextraordinarypowertOtheSecurltyCouncilonlyontheconditionthatthescopeofthispowerwouldbelim-itedtoenforcementactivitiesnecessaryforthepurposesofmaintaining


internationalpeaceandsecurlty,excludingadjustmentorsettlementofinternationaldisputesorsituations,asisimpliedinthestructureofArticle

1(1)oftheUNCharter.Whatisunclearandunresolvediswhereandhowtheboundaryshouldbedrawnbetweenthetwo-thatis,enforce一血entactivitiesnecessaryforthepurposesofmaintainlnglnternational

peaceandsecurltyOntheonehand,andadjustmentorsettlementofinternationaldisputesontheother-andnotthefactthatsuchabound-

aryactuallyexists･Asregardsthisdichotomy,ithasbeensuggestedthat:

Itcouldwellbearguedthat… SecondarylevelactionsaftertheinitialresponsehasbeentakentorestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurltyShouldnotalsofallwithinthewidediscretionoftheCouncil,butshouldbetestedalsoagalnSttheprevailingprlnClplesofinternatlOnallaw･ThefurtheraSecurltyCouncilactionisfromitsprlmaryaCtivltyOfmaintainlngOrreStOrlngInternationalpeaceandsecurlty,themoreimportantitistol･eaSSertthekeyroleofinternationallaw･51

TheSecurltyCouncilresolutionsthatine任ectamounttoadetermina-tionorcharacterizationofalegalsituationareextensive･TheylllClude:thosethatassertthatparticularactsareillegalandnullandvoid;thosedemandinglnternational non-recognition;thoseimposingarmsembar-goes;thosedealingwithandrecognlZlngaSanauthorityanoustedreglme,ratherthanthereglmeinactualcontrol;thoseimposingPeaceCOnditions,definingandguaranteeingboundaries,anddeterminlngStatereSPOnSibillltylSSueS;andthoseestablishingInternationalcriminaltribunals･Althoughitmightbedi抗culttodrawaclearlinebetweenenforcementactivitiesandsettlementofinternationaldisputes,itmustbeemphasizedthatthefurtheraSecurltyCouncilactionisfrom itsenforcementactivltyformaintainlngOrreStOrlngInternationalpeaceandsecurlty,themorecon-siderationistobeglVentOtheprlnCiplesofjusticeandinternationallaw･

WhelhertheSecurityCouncilcoulddelegatetheuseofforcetomemberstates

WhileageneralanalystsOnthispolnthasalreadybeenmadeabove,thebasicideaunderlyingtheoplnionsofamaJOrltyOflegalscholarsonthispolntCOuldbesummarizedinthefollowlngterms:

Article42doesilOtitselftieSecurltyCouncilarmedactiontoArticle43anddoesnotnecessarllydependonastrongMilitaryStaffCommittee･Article42doescontemplatethatmemberstateswilltakearmedactiondeemednecessarybytheCouncil･Thus,OnecouldarguethatwhentheCouncilhasauthorisedtheuseofarmedforceunderchapterVIIwithoutspecifyingwhicharticleithasreliedon,thesourceofitsauthorityisArticle42.Theargumentisapragmaticone,treatlngtheCharterasaconstitutioncapableofgrowlngtOmeetChanglngCil'CumStanCeS･Bythesametoken,theCouncil'spowertoauthorisetheuseofarmedforceunder

324 SATO

chapterⅥImaybeseenasanimpliedpowerthatisnotliterallytiedtoArticle42,butisconsistentwiththepurposeofthatarticleandemanatesfromthefunc-tionalnecessitytomaketheCouncil'senforcementauthorityeffectivel52

Criticism,however,persists.Sarooshi,forexample,assertsthattheSecu-rityCouncildoesnotpossessthecompetencetodelegatetomemberstatesthepowertodecidethatathreatto,orbreachof,internationalpeaceandsecurityhaseitherstartedorceasedtoexist,forseveralreasons.Firstly,thatdecisionistheveryraisond'e'treofChapterVII,asanArticle39deteminationisthegatewaytoactionunderChapterVII･StateshavedelegatedthisauthoritytotheSecurityCouncilontheconditionthattheSecurityCouncilwouldbetheonlyentitytoexercisethispower･Secondly,theinstitutionalsafeguardofthevetoisattachedtotheCouncil'sdecision-makingprocesses.ThisensuresthatstatesexercisedelegatedChapterVIIpowersonlyinOrdertoachievetheobjectivesof也eUnitedNations,andnotsolelytofurthertheirownself-interestinaparticularsituation･Thirdly,Article53,0mreglOnalarrangementstocarryoutmilitaryen-forcementactioninordertomaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity,providesthatsuchactioncannotbecarriedout"WithouttheauthorisationoftheSecurityCouncil."Onecannotargue,Sarooshicontinues,thattheSecurityCouncilisallowedtodelegateitsArticle39powerofdetermi-nationtoindividualmemberstatesbutnottoreglOnalarrangements,sinceareglOnalarrangementis,afterall,onlyacollectionofUNmemberstates･InthecaseoftheGulfWar,Resolution678settwoobjectives:namely,toupholdandimplementResolution660(1990)andallsubse-quentrelevantresolutions,andtorestoreinternationalpeaceandsecu-rityinthearea.SarooshiconsidersthatthesecondobjectiveinVolvesdelegatingtomemberstatesthecompetencetodecidewheninternationalpeaceandsecurltyintheregionhavebeenrestored,andthatthepur-porteddelegationbytheCouncilofthisbroadpowertomemberstatesisthusunlawful.53

PersistentcriticismsseemtoindicateResolution678'sfragileconstitu-tionalityandthenecessityoflegitimacyinthisnewareaofenforcementpowerdelegation･Ithadalreadybeenpointedoutthatthismechanismmaybe:"Legal?Yes,technicauy.Butlegitimate?Aborderlineproposi-tionatbest.‖54

Legitimacyin血elightoftheUNCharterastheconstitutionoftheinternationalcom unity

Havingbrie且yanalysedsomeof血emaincasesofSecurityCouncilactiv-itiesunderChapterVHoftheUNChartersincetheendoftheColdWarin


thelightoftheirlegalityandconstitutionality,thischapterwillnowdis-cussthelegltimacy550ftheseandotheractivitiesoftheSecurityCounciLThisdiscussionwillbebaseduponthefollowlngtwobasicthemes:｡TllemoretheSecurltyCouncilstepsintolegallygreyareas,themorelegltlmaCylSrequiredforitsactivitiestobeeffectiveandacceptable･

.LegitimizationofSecurltyCouncilactivitiesinthelightoftheUNCharterastheconstitutionoftheinternationalcommunltyneedsahigherdegreeofsupportintermsofseparationofpowersandjudicialreviewwhichaimsatpreventlngabuseofandensurlngproperexerciseofpowers･AstheSecurltyCouncilhasmoreoccasionstoexerciseitsstrongpowers,itisnecessarytoexaminewhether,andifso,towhatextent,separationofpowersandjudicialreviewasfundamentalmech-anismsforpreventlngabuseofandensurlngproperexerciseofpowersincentralizednationalgovernlngSystemsCanbeappliedtotheUnitedNationssystem･56

TheUNCharterastheconstitutionoftheinternationalcommunity

TherehavebeentwostreamsofthoughtthatregardtheUNCharterasaconstitution･57OneregardsitastheconstitutionoftheUnitedNations･TheCharterastheconstituentinstrumentoftheUnitedNationscontains

theconstitutionde丘nedasthoseprovisionsthatprovideforthelegalfoundationandframeworkofaninternationalorganization.Thecoreoftheconstitutionalnatureofconstituentinstrumentsliesinthefactthat

constituentinstrumentsprovidethelegalfoundationsandframeworkforthestructuresandactivitiesofinternationalorganizationsonthebasisoftheirevolutionaryandteleologlCalinterpretationssothat,despltechanglnglnternationalrelations,internationalorganizationscancontinuetofunctione抗ciently,andeffectivelyperformtheirgivenPurposesandfunctions.Internationalorganizations.havebeencreatedbecausetheirpurposesandfunctionscannotbeacllievedbythecreationofsimplenormsofconductbymeansoftreaties,includingmultilaterallaw一makingtreaties･Theirpurposesandfunctionscanbeachievedonlybytheper一manentoperationoforganizationalentities.ThisimpliesthatconstituentinstrumentswillalwaysneedtobeadaptedtochanglngCircumstancesforthepurposesoftheefRcientfunctionlngandeffectiveactivitiesofinter-nationalorganizations･58Thisstreamofthoughtisfairlywellestablishedbythepracticeofstatesandinternationalorganizations･591twouldbepossibletoarguethat,baseduponthedoctrineoftheinterpretationofconstituentinstrumentsastheconstitutionsofinternationalorganiza-tions,most,ifnotall,oftheabove一mentionedactivitiesoftheSecurltyCouncilarelegal;thisisdemonstrated,forexample,bythediscussionconcerningthelegalityandconstitutionalityofResolution678(1990).60

326 SATO

The.OtherschoolregardstheCharterastheconstitutionoftheinter-nationalcoHmlunity.AftertheendoftheColdWar,manyauthorsbegantorefertothisidea.Itisanidea血atisclearlypromotedbytheimpres-siveactivitiesof也eSecurityCouncilinthe1990S.Opinionsvary,however,OnwhethertheChartercanberegardedasa"constitution"oftheinter-nationalcommunity61inasensecomparabletothefunctionofdomesticconstitutions.

Somearequitepositive.Tomuschat,forexample,takesthepositionthatithas"becomeobviousinrecentyearsthattheCharterisnothingelsethantheconstitutionoftheinternationalcommunity."Heelaboratesonthispointasfouows:

[T]oentertheUnitedNationsdi∬ersprofoundly丘･omacceptingatreatyoftheusualtype.AStatewhichbecomesamemberoftheworldorganisationconsentsnotjusttoaseriesofwell-definedandeasilyidenti五ableobligations,itagreestoachangedstatusunderinternationallaw...lT]heSecurityCouncilisauthorisedtoimposebindingobligationsoneverymemberStatewheneverissuesof"inter-nationalpeaceandsecurity"areatstake.Thisisanextremelybroadform山a.Nobodycanforeseewithanydegreeofprecisioninwhatsenseitwillbeinter-pretedbytheSecurityCouncil.,.WhoeverjoinstheUnitedNationsgivesblan-ketpowerstotheSecurityCouncil･62

Somearemorecautious.Dupuy,forexample,drawsattentionto"thesharpcontraststillexistingbetween,ontheonehand,仙eexlgenCiesofnormativeandorganicintegrationattachedtotheideaofconstitutionand,ontheotherhand,thepersistingdisseminationofpoweramongcompet一mgandformallyequalsoverelgnStates,Whichstillcharacterisestheinter-nationalsocietyinspiteoftheimportancenowtakenbytheactionofhundredsofinternationalorganisations･‖63Heconcludes:

TheinternationallegalorderremainsmorecharacterisedbythespreadingofsovereigntythanbytheoverallnormativeandorganicsubordinationofstatestoaninternationalpublicorderembodiedinthetextofaCharterthatwouldatthesametimeprovideacentralauthorityaimedatenforcingthe"constitutional"rulescharacterismg也atpublicorder.WhattheICJsaidin1949remainstrue:theUnitedNationsisnota"super-StateH･64

Otherobserversaremorecritical･Arangio-Ruiz,forexample,65isqultenegativeinassumingthatthedoctrineofimpliedpowersisapplicableasaninterpretivetooloftheCharterforthedeterminationofthepowersofthepoliticalorgansoftheUnitedNations,theSecurityCouncilinparticular;herejectsthisasbeingmoredangerousforthepreservationanddevelopmentoftheruleoflawinthe"organisedinternationalcom-munity,"Hestates:


[A]lthoughtheUNiswithoutdoubtanorganisation,havingitslegalstatuteintheCharter(andinthatsenseaconstitutionofitsown),theCharterisnot"thecon-stitution"or"aconstitution"ofthecommunltyOfthememberStatesorofthecommunltyOfallexistlngStates,letalonethecommunltyOfmankind･Inotherwords,theUNisnotanorganisationofthememberStatesthem selves,almostasiftheywereinsomemeasureabsorbedordissolvedinlt;norisit,despitetheboldliewithwhichthetextoftheUNCharterbegins-"WethePeoples"-anorga-nisationofthepeoplesofthememberStates,asaslnglepeople.ThememberStatesremain,undertheCharter,theseparate,independentpoliticalentitiestheywerebeforehand,intheirmutualrelations,aswellasinrelationtotheUN;andtheyremainalso-thisisofparamountimportance-subjecttogeneralinterna-tionallawandendowedwiththerightsderivingtherefrom･66

Thecontentionofeachschoolcontainssometruth;itisprobablywisest

totrytosynthesizethoseapproprlatepOlntS,aimlngatso血eCOnSistentdoctrine.Itcouldatleastbeconcludedthat:

TheconstitutionalsystemsetupfortheinternationalcommunityintheUnitedNationsCharterisofcoursefarfrombeingperfect･Ithasonlyalimitedcapacitytoenforcecompliancewithitsbasicrules.This,however,Shouldnotdetractourattentionfromthefactthatweliveinaninternationallegalsystemratherdiffer-entfromtheoneexistingbefore1945･67

TheSecurityCouncil:BetweenfairnessandeHectiveness

TheSecurityCouncilcanbeconceptuallylocatedonacontinuumbetweentwopoles:fairnessandeffectiveness.Whilethesetwoelementsarenot

inherentlycontradictory,theyseemtoexcludeeachothertosomeextentwithregardtotheSecurityCouncilinthedecentralizedpowerstructureoftheworldtoday･Franckde丘nesHlegltimacyHasitappliestotherulesapplicableamong

states･"Legitimacy,"hewrites,"isapropertyofaruleorrule一makinginstitutionwhichitselfexertsapulltowardcomplianceonthoseaddressednormativelybecausethoseaddressedbelievethattheruleorinstitution

hascomeintobeingandoperatesinaccordancewithgenerallyacceptedprlnCiplesofrightprocess･=68LegitlmaCy,hesays,canonlybeaccordedtorulesandinstitutions,ortoclaimsofrightandobligation,lnthecircum-stanceofanexistlngCOmmunlty･Itisonlybyreferencetoacommunlty'sevolvingstandardsofwhatconstitutesrightprocessthatitispossibletoassertmeanlngfullythatalaw,oranexecutiveorder,oracourt'sjudge-ment,oracitizen'sclaimonacompatriot,oragovernment'sclaimonacitizen,islegltimate･69FranckdevelopedhisanalysisfromtheviewpolntOffairness;heargues

thatfairness"isacompositeoftwoindependentvariables:1egltlmaCyand

328 SATO

distributivejustice･""Fairnessdiscourse,"hecontinues,"istheprocessbywhichthelaw,andthosewhomakelaw,seektointegratethesevariables,recognlSlngthetensionbetweenthecommunlty'sdesireforbothorder

(legitimacy)andchange(justice),aswellasthetensionsbetYeendifEerllngnotionsofwhatconstitutesgoodorderandgoodchangelnCOnCreteinstances･"70HavinganalysedfromthisviewpointthecollectivesecurityoftheUNSecurityCouncil,Franckpointsout:

[WiththeCharteroftileUnitedNations,]Weseeadramaticreturntojustwartheoryand,since也eendofthecoldwar,ofjustwarpractice.InfutureonemightreasonablyexpecttoseeUNpeacekeepingandpeace-enforcingcontingentslargelypre-empttherightjustlytoengageinwar.Allotherwarwinbeunjust･Thisenforcementmonopolymakesitextraordinarilyimportantthattheinstitutionalprocessbywhichthesystemresortstomi1itaryforceisnotmerelyformallylegit-

imatebutisseentobefair.Faimessinthiscontextmeans(1)thattheSecurityCouncilengagesinopenfairnessdiscourse-forexample,abouttreatinglikesalikeandaboutfaultandproportionality-beforemakingadecisiontodeployforce;(2)thatpowerwithintheSecurityCouncilitselfbeperceivedtobeallo-catedfairlyinaccordancewiththeequalrights,balancedagainsttheunequaldis-tributionofresponsibilityamongstatesforcarrylngOuttheCouncil'stasks;and(3)thatalldecisionstouseforceallocatecostsandbenefits(inlives,resources,andoutcomes)inamannerwhichdoesnotexacerbatethegapbetweenadvan-tagedanddisadvantagedstates･71

Effectiveness,ontheotherhand,derivesfromtherecognitionthat"itisnotatallself-evidentintoday'Sworldthat'fair'and'genuinelycollective'decision一makingbytheSecurityCouncilisasensibleapproachforglobalcon且ictmanagement･=72Realisticallyeffectivecollectivesecuritycomesfromtheconceptofrelatingresponsibilityforthemaintenanceofpeaceandsecuritytotheself-interestofthemajorpowers.TheLeagueofNations'collectivesecuritymechanismhadproveninadequateinthatitpurportedtoimposeresponsibilitiesonstatesthattheywereunwillingtoundertakeinpractice,becauseoftheseriousconsequencessuchrespon-sibilitiescouldhavefor也em.TheSecurityCouncilwasconstitutedsoastoreflectthespecialinterestsandresponsibilitiesofitsprlnCipalcon-tributors.Inthissense,therootsoftheSecurityCouncillielesshtheCounciloftheLeagueofNationsthaninthenineteenth-centuryConcertofEuropeanPowers･73Murphymakesthefollowmgpersuasivepointinthisregard:

ThemostrealisticmeansofachievingacrediblethreatoruseofpowerbytheUnitedNationsisthroughclosec0-Operationamongthenajormilitarypowersoftheworld･TI10SepowersmustbeconvincedtoleaveasidetheoptionofexercISmgunilateralactioninfavourofthecollectiveprocessthatforcesthemtotakeac-countofeachother'Sinterests.Todoso,thena]orpowersmustbepermittedto


bringintotheprocessthosematterstheyconsidervitaltotheirowninterestsandtopushforthosematterstobeaddressedinasatisfactorymanner･h doingso,eachpowerisforcedtotakeintoaccounttheconcernsoftheothermajorpowers,therebyminimislngthelikelihoodofanescalationofcon爪ict.Ontheotherhand,eachpowerwillonlybewillingtoparticIPateintheprocessifitiscapableofprotectlngItsOWnVitalinterestsfromcollectiveactionandofavoidingthecom一

mitmentofitsmilitaryforceswhenitsochooses･Forbothreasons,thesystemshouldnotasplretOtreatlngallthreatstothepeaceequallythroughautomaticandreliableresponses･74

Itseemsundeniablethatthiscontentionofeffectivenesscontainssome

importanttruths･However,ouranalystsOfSecurityCouncilactivities

underChapterVIIoftheUN ChartersincetheendoftheColdWardemonstratesthatthecontentionofeffectivenessneedstobemodifiedbytheconsiderationoffairness.75

Functionalseparationofpowersasafactorforlegitimization

TheAppealsChamberoftheInternationalTribunalfortheFormerYugo-

slavia,intheTadicCase,Setthecorrectstartlngpointfordiscussionon

thematterofseparationofpowers:

Itisclearthatthelegislative,executiveandjudicialdivisionofpowerswhichislargelyfollowedinmostmuniclpalsystemsdoesnotapplytotheinternationalsettingnor,morespecifically,tothesettlngOfaninternationalorganisationsuchastheUnitedNations･AmongtheprlnClpalorgansoftheUnitedNationsthedivisionsbetweenjudicial,executiveandlegislativefunctionsarenotclearcut･Regardingthejudicialfunction,theInternationalCourtofJusticeisclearlythe"principaljudicialorgan"(seeUnitedNationsCharter,art.92).Thereis,however,nolegislature,inthetechnicalsenseoftheterm,lntheUnitedNationssystemand,moregenerally,noParliamentintheworldcommunlty･Tllatistosay,thereexistsnocorporateorganformallyempoweredtoenactlawsdirectlybindingoninternationallegalsubjects･

ItisclearlyiTpossibletoclassifytheorg?nsoftheUnitedNationsintotheabove-discusseddivislOnSWhichexIStinthenatlOnallawofStates.Indeed‥.thecon-

stitutionalstructureoftheUnitedNationsdoesnotfollowthedivisionofpowersoftenfoundinnationalconstitutions.76

Thus,thequestionoflegalityandconstitutionalityofSecurityCouncil

activitiescannotbeapproachedonthebasisofanalogleSandpresump-

tionsbaseduponnationalgovernlngSystems,butonlybyinterpretlngthe

UnitedNations'constituentinstrument,theCharter,anditspractices･

However,thequestionoflegltimacyofSecurityCouncilactivitiescan

bebetteranalysedbyclassifyingwhethertheSecurityCouncilisactlng

inanexecutive,legislative,orjudicialcapaclty.Inanotherwords,itis

330 SATO

possibletoevaluatemoreaccuratelywhether,andifso,towhatextent,theSecurityCouncilisactlngproperlybyadoptingaframeofreferencebasedonthetypeofdecisionstheCouncilmakes･77Forexample,whentheSecurityCouncilstepsintothejudicial,ratherthanexecutive,func-tion,itispossibletousesuchframesofreferenceasindependencefrompoliticalin且uences,andrequirementsinherentinjudicialfunction(suchasdueprocess,publicationofjustifiedreasonlng,Principleofnemojudexinsuacausa,equalityoftheparties).WhentheSecurityCouncilstepsintothelegislativefunction,framesofreferencesuchasthequestionoftowhatextentaSecurityCouncilactionbelonglngtOthelegislativefunctionisnecessaryandusefulinachievingtheorlglnalpurposeofmaintalnlngorrestoringinternationalpeaceandsecurity,andsomerequlrementSinherentinthelegislativefunction(suchasconformitywithprinciplesofjusticeandinternationallaw,respectoffundamentalconsiderationofhumanity),canbeused.Wehavestartedfrom thebasicthemethatthemoretheSecurlty

Councilstepsintolegallygreyareas,themorelegitimacylSrequiredforitsactivitiestobeeffectiveandacceptable･InthelightofthislegitimacyofSecurityCouncilactivities,itisimportant,ifnotexpresslyprovidedintheCharteroftheUnitedNations,fortheSecurityCounciltoanalyticauyseparateexecutive,legislative,andjudicialfunctionstoavoidanundesiredmixtureoftwofunctions･SeparationofpowersinthecentralizednationalgovernlngSystemisfundamentallyorganizationalinthesenseofattrib-utingdifferentfunctionstodifferentorgans.Theseparationofpowersinthisorganizationalsenseis,aswaspointedoutaboveintheTadicCase,notadoptedhtheUnitedNations.However,theideaofanalyticallysep-aratingSecurityCouncilactivitiesintoexecutive,legislative,andjudicialfunctionstojudgetheirproprietyinthelightoftheframeofreferenceappropriateforeachfunctioncanbeconsideredafunctional,ifnotorga-nizational,separationofpowersinthelessstrictsenseoftheword.Thus,WecanconcludethatmoreattentionshouldbepaidtotherequlrementSofafunctionalseparationofpowersinevaluatingSecurityCouncilac-tivities･Fromthisviewpoint,WewillexaminesomeofthecontroversialSecurityCouncilactivitiesrelatedtoei也erjudicialorlegislativefunction.

Quasi-judicialpowers

Graefrathpointsoutthat:

TheSecurityCouncilremainsapoliticalorganthattakespoliticaldecisions.EveniftheCouncildecideslegaldisputesandexercises"quasiJudicialfunctions"itneitherappliesjlldicialmethodsnorreachesjudicialresults,anditsconclusionsneverattainthequalityofajudicialdecision,ItsdecisionsthereforecannotreplacerulingsoftheCourtormakethemsuperfluous.TheSecurityCouncilshouldleave


totheCourtwhatbelongstotheCourt･ItshouldnottakedecisionsinmattersthatarealreadybeforetheCourtorwhichshouldbedealtwithbytheCourt,unlessthereisathreattopeaceentailinganurgentneedforimmediateaction.78

However,itcouldbecontendedthattheSecurltyCouncilcanexerciseaquasl-judicialfunctionbyestablishingajudicialorgan.TheCourt,intheEffectofAwardsCase,foundthattheGeneralAssemblydidnotitself,undertheCharter,possessthejudicialfunctionexercisedbytheAdmin-istrativeTribunalthattheGeneralAssemblyhadestablished.However,itconsideredthattheGeneralAssemblypossessedthepowertoestablishtheAdministrativeTribunal,thispowerbeingImpliedfrom itscompe-tencetoregulatestaffrelations･TheCourtstated:

[T]heCharterdoesnotconferjudicialfunctionsontheGeneralAssembly-.ByestablishlngtheAdmlnistratlVeTribunal,theGeneralAssemblywasnotdelegat-1ngtheperformanceofitsownfunction:itwasexercislngapowerWhichithadundertheChartertoregulatestaffrelations･79

ThisuseofthepowertoestablishsubsidiaryorganstoperformfunctionsthattheprlnClpalorgancannotitselfexerciseisqulteimportantindeter一minlngthelegalityandconstitutionalityofrecentactivitiesbytheSecurltyCouncil･SeveralexamplesareglVenbelow･

TheInternlttionalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia

TheAppealsChamberoftheInternationalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslaviaacknowledged,intheTadicCase,tllattheCouncilpossessedthepowertoestablishtheWarCrimesTribunaltoexercisejudicialfunc-tions,impliedbyitsexpresspowersinArticle41,becauseitisameasurenecessaryfortheeffectiveexerciseofitspowerstomaintainorrestoreinternationalpeace･Prosecutionofpersonsresponsibleforseriousviolationsofinterna-

tionalhumanitarianlawcommittedintheterritoryoftheFormerYugo-

slaviaisqulnteSSentiallyajudicialmatter･Itneedstobeexercisednotthrougharbitrarypunishmentbyapoliticalol̀gan,butbyanindependentjudicialorgan,TheStatuteoftheTribunalincludedinSecurltyCouncilResolution827(1993)Clearlyindicatesthatthisjudicialfunctionisexer-cisedbyajudicial,althoughad-hoc,organ,inaccordancewithjudicialprocedures･

TheUnitedNationsCompensationComnu'ssion

AnotherexampleistheUnitedNationsCompensationCommissioncon-templatedinResolution687(1991),toevaluatelossessufferedasaresultoflraq'sinvasionofKuwaitandtoresolvedisputedclaimsaStOIraq'S

332 SATO

liabilityforthoselosses,andestablishedbyResolution692(1991)baseduponthereportbytheSecretary-General.TheCommission'sprmclpalbodyistheGoverningCouncil,whichiscomposedofrepresentativesofmecurrentmembersoftheSecurityCouncilatanyglVentime･TheGov-erningCouncilisthepolicy一makingorganandadministratoroftheUnitedNationsCompensationFundforpaymentofclaimsagainstIraq;assuch,ithasresponsibilityforestablishingguidelinesonmatterssuchastheadministrationand丘nanclngOftheCompensationFund,andtheproce-

durestobeappliedintheprocesslngOfclaims.TheGoverningCouncilisassistedbyanumberofcommissioners,whoareexpertsinfieldssuchasfinance,law,insurance,andenvironmentaldamageassessment,andactintheirpersonalcapacity.WhiletheCommissionissaidnottobeacourtoranarbitraltribunal,itperformsatleastaquasi-judicialfunctioninthesensethatitexaminesindividualclaims,veri丘estheirvalidity,evaluateslosses,andassessespayments.Giventhenatureofthisfunction,itises-sentialthatsomeelementsofdueprocessbebuiltintotheprocedllre,andthattheGoverningCouncilestablishtheguidelinesregarding也eclaimsprocedure.Panelsnormallycomposedofthreecommissionersimplementtheseguidelinesinrespectofclaimsthatarepresentedandresolutionofdisputedclaims･TheymaketheappropriaterecommβndationstotheGoverningCouncil,whichinturnmakes仇e丘naldetermination･WhiletheCommissioncouldbelegallybasedupontheimpliedpower

underChapterVIItoprovidejusticeandresolveoutstandingIssuesafteradevastatingarmedconflict,Kirgiscritiqueditsestablishmentasfollows:

Inoneimportantrespect,however,themechanismlacksessentialprocedtlralsafe一guards.ThewholeprocedureissupervisedbyaGoverningCouncil,whichcon-sistsoftherepresentativesoftheSecurityCouncil'smembersatanygiventime,actlngnotaSindependentindividuals,but也theirgovernmentalcapacities.TheGoverningCouncilestablishesrulesandinterpretationsforapplicationbythecomi ssioners(whodoactintheirpersonalcapacities)andservesastheappel-1atebodyforthereviewofdamageassessments.ThelegitlmaCyOfthismechanismisthusopentoquestion,notbecauseitwasunforeseenin19450rtheSecurltyCouncillackedtheimpliedpowertocreateacompensationcommissionafteranamedcon且ict,butbecausetheCouncilhedgedsomebasicprmciplesofproce-duralfairnesswhenitcreatedacom issionlackingindependencefrompoliticalinfluence.80

Inthelightoflegalityandconstitutionality,itispossibletoconcludethattheSecurityCouncilcanestablishtheCompensationCommissionforprocesslngtheclaimsagainstIraqunderChapterVII.FurtllermOre,itwouldnothavebeenrealisticandsuitabletoadoptatraditionalarbitralproceduretodealwiththeclaims,becausethehugenumberofclaimsand


thedifFerencesbetweenthemconstituteaninsurmountableobstacleto

theadoptionOfaclassicarbitralapproach･However,itisnotdesirablethattheGovernlngCouncilactlngaSapoliticalorganisengagedintheperformanceofjudicialfunctionstotheextentthatprocesslngtheclaimslagalnStlraqentailsthebasicallyjudicialtasksofexamlnlngindividual

claims,verifyingtheirvalidity,evaluatinglosses,andassessingp?yments･Itwillnotpossesssu銃CientlegitimacyconsideredagalnSttherequlrementSofafunctionalseparationofpowerswithaviewtopreventlngabuseofandensurlngproperexerciseofpowers･

TheUnitedNationsIraq-KuwaitBoundaryDemarcationCommission

ThedutyoftheSecurityCounciltorespecttheterritorialintegrltyOfstateswasanotherissueboundupinResolution687(1991).SincetheSecurityCouncilwassetuptomaintainthepoliticalindependenceofstatesandhasnoadjudicatorypowerstopermanentlyallocaterightsorimposethetermsofasettlementofadisputeorsituationonanystate,ltCOnSequentlyfollowsthatithasnorighttopermanentlyallocatetitletoterritory,OrtodetachortransfersoverelgntyOveraportionofastate'Sterritory,withouttheconsentofthatstate･81withrespecttothedemarcationofthelraq-KuwaitboundaryindicatedinResolution687,theSecretary-General,attherequestoftheSecurityCouncil,establishedtheUritedNationsIraq-KuwaitBoundaryDemarcationCommission.TheCommissionwascom-posedofonerepresentativeeachfromIraqandKuwaitandthreeinde-pendentexpertsappointedbytheSecretary-General,oneofwhomwouldserveaschairman･TheSecurityCouncil,actlngunderChapterVIIoftheCharter,unanimouslyadoptedResolution833,inwhichitendorsedtheCommission'sreportanda抗rmedthattheCommission'sdecisionsonthedemarcationoftheboundarywereanal.TheSecurityCouncilassertsthatthisoperationwasademarcationofanexistingboundaryandnotadelimitationofwhattheboundarywas;lnanotherwords,thattheCom一missionwasnotreallocatlngterritorybetweenIraqandKuwait,butwassimplycarrylngOutatechnicaltask･Inthelightoflegalityandconstitutionality,ltistruethatthereexisted

theAgreedMinutesof4October1963,SettingouttheinternationalboundarybetweenIraqandKuwait,andthatlraqacceptedResolution6871nwhichtheSecurityCouncildemandedthatIraqandKuwaitrespecttheinviolabilityoftheinternationalboundarybetweenthem･Inthissense,itseemshardlypossibletocritlquethelegalityandconstitutionalityoftheactionsthattheSecurltyCounciltook.However,itisalsotruethatthereexistedadisputebetweenIraqand

KuwaitonthevalidityoftheAgreedMinutes･Ⅰtwasalsopointedout,afteracarefulanalysis,that"tosaythattheCommissionwasmerely

334 SATO

e.ngagedinatechnicaldemarcationexerciseisa.cPnsiderablelover-slmpli丘cation1,evenifitisalsotruethattheCom sslOnWasnotreallo-catmgterritory･=82

Underthesecircumstances,whilethedeterminationofwheretheboundarylaybetweenIraqandKuwaitwasnecessaryfortherestorationandcontinuedmaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity,itcouldbecontendedthatthisshouldhavebeencarriedoutbyanindependentjudicialtribunaltobeestablishedundertheauthorityoftheCouncil.Also,theSecurityCouncil,asthemainguarantorofinternationalorder,hasinsuchcasesaresponsibilitytoensurethatjusticeisseentobedonebetweenthepartiesbyreferringthemattertotheInternationalCourtofJusticeorestablishingajudicialtribunal也atcandecidethematterthroughjudicialprocess.Concerningthismatter,Sarooshimakesthefo1-lowlngpOlnt:

Thepointisthatthechoiceofinstitutionalresponseisofcrucialimportancealsoindetermlnlngthelong-ten effectivjBneSSOftheCouncil'sactions･AtribunalWouldhaveprovidedtheapproprlatejudicialsafeguardstoensllrethatthearglトmentsofbothStateswerefullyheardandgivendueweightinasubsequentdecision.Thiswouldcontributesigni丘cantlyto也母perceptionbytheparties也atjusticewasinfactdonebetweenthem,aid,itisthussubmitted,asigni丘cantcon-tributionwouldbemadetothelegitimacyofanysubsequentenforcementactionbytheCouncilthatmaybenecessarytoenforcethedecisionofthetribunal･83

TheCharterconfersdifferentpowersuponUnitedNationsorgans,con-sistentwi也 thecompositionof血oseorgans.TheSecurityCounciliscomposedofthemostpowe血 lstates(atleastatthetimeofitsestab-lishment),andconsequentlymaintainstheinherentcapacitytocoercecompliancewithitsdecisions.FortheSecurityCouncil,however,theres-olutionofissuesoflawinadispositivemannerisnotconsistentwithitsroleasexecutiveenforcer,noristheSecurityCouncilequlppedwiththecompositionandprocesssuitablefortheexerciseofsuchpowers.TheSecurityCounc止,evenwhenactlngunderChapterVIIoftheCharter,isnotajudicialorgancapableofadopting丘naldecisionsontherightsofparties･Unlikethedecisionsofjudicialorgans,itsdecisionsarethereforenotentitledtoresjudicataeffect.84Inthesameway,whentheSecurltyCouncilmakeslegaldeterminations,itshouldnotincorporatepoliticalconsiderationsintoitsdecision-making.Consideringpoliticalfactorsisinapproprlatebecauselaw,unlikepolitics,isprlmarilybasedonconsider-ationsoffairnessandnormativeapplicationsofrules･85Thus,whentheSecurityCouncilstepsintothejudicial,ratherthanexecutive,function,itisimportanttoful丘lsuchrequlrementSaSindependencefrompoliticalinfluencesandrequirementsinherentinjudicialfunction(SllChasdue


process,publicationofjustifiedreasonlng,PrlnCipleofnemojudexinsuacd〟∫α,andequalityofparties).

Quasi-legislativepowers

WhethertheSecurltyCouncilhasquasi-legislativepowersdependsuponthedefinitionof"legislativepowers･''AnanrmativeconclusionmightfollowifwestartfromawidelyaccepteddefinitionoflegislativeauthorityintheUNsettlng;thatis,that"legislativeactshavethreeessentialchar-acteristics:thevareunilateralinform,theycreateormodifysomeelementoflegalnorm,andthelegalnorminquestionisgeneralinnature,thatis,directedtoindeterminateaddresseesandcapableofrepeatedapplicationintime･=86KirglS,fromthisviewpolnt,makesthefollowlngassessment:

UNCharterArticles41and42,buttressedbyArticles25and48,ClearlyauthorisetheSecurityCounciltotakelegislativeactioninthe[above]sense.Thus,economicsanctionsunderArticle41havebeenunilateralinform(adoptedbythefifteen-memberSecurityCouncilratherthanagreementofallUNmembers);theyhave

createdormodifiedlegalnorms(bindingrules);andtheyhavebeengeneral

innature(directedtoallm9mberstatesandsometimeseventonon一members,althoughArticle48(1)permltSthemtobedirectedmoreselectively).87

ItisdebatablewhetheronecanconsideraslegislativethenatureofthepowersexercisedunderChapterVII,particularlyArticle41,asKirgisdoes･Itwouldratherbeconsideredasconcreteexecution,asthesepowersarenormallyexercisedwithregardtoparticularcasesinthecontextofmaintainlngOrreStOrlnglnternationalpeaceandsecurlty･88However,manyofthenormsofconductembodiedin,forexample,Resolution661

(1990)adoptedunderArticle41aregeneralinnature,directedtoallmemberstatesasaddressees,althoughlimitedtotheirrelationshipwithIraqorKuwait･Suchconceptsaslegislationorexecutionarenotstrictlyde丘nedinthecontextofSecurityCouncilpowers,noraretheyglVenle-gallynormativeeffects.Thesepowerscan,therefore,simplybedescribedasquasi-1egislative･89ThedisarmlngOfIraq,oneofthemainobjectivesofResolution687

(1991),mightbedescribedasa.caseofquasi-legislation,notintheabovesense,butinthesenseofcreatlngnewObligationsforIraqthathadnotexistedpriortotheenactmentofthisresolution･90Forexample,althoughtheProtocolfortheProhibitionoftheUseinWarofAsphyxiatlng,PoisonousorOtherGases,andofBacteriologlCalMethodsofWarfareonlyrestrictsthe"use"ofsuchmaterials,Resolution687requiredthe"destruction"ofthoseweaponsandprohibitedIraqfromevenpossesslngthenecessaryagents･However,theSecurltyCouncil,inthepreambletoResolution687,laidoutevidencesupportlngltS丘ndingthatIraqcon-tinuedtobeathreattointernationalpeace;speci丘cally,Iraq'sproclivity

336 SATO

towardaggression,evidencedbyitsthreatstouseoutlawedweaponryanditspastinstancesofaggression.Thus,onecommentatorconcluded:"TheseincreasedobligationswerelogicalandreasonableextensionsoftheGenevaProtocol,especiauyglVenthelraqlprOpenSltytOuseandthreatentousetheseweapons･=91Theconclusionreachedintheabovesection,concernmgthematterof

whethertheSecurityCouncilhasthelegalpowertoimposeabindingdis-putesettlementunderChapterVII,W山applytotheseandothercases92ofquasi-legislation.Thatistosay,thefurtheraSecurityCouncilactiorL,anexerciseofquasillegislativepowers,isfromitsenforcementactivityformaintainlngOrreStOrlnginternationalpeaceandsecurity,themoreconsiderationistobegiventosuc血requlrementSaSCOnformitywithprh-

ciplesofjusticeandinternationallaw,andrespectofthefundamentalconsiderationofhumanity.Thisisinaccordancewiththeproperinter-pretationoftheUNCharter,particularlyChapterVII,aswellaswiththeexpectationoranxietythatmostofthememberstateshavewithregardtotheexerciseofquasi-legislativepowersbytheSecurityCouncil.

JudicialreviewbytheCourtasafactorforlegitimization

NeithertheUN CharternortheStatuteofthelntemationalCourtof

Justicedirectlyaddressesthequestionofjudicialreview.Thus,Graefrathpointsout:

ThefoundersoftheCharterdidnot丘nditnecessarytoexplicitlyformulateamandatefortheCourttoreviewthelegalityofGeneralAssemblyorSecurityCouncilresolutions.Theythoughtthatthesystemofthevetowouldsu凪ceasacheckandbalancedeviceagainsttheplenitudeoftheSecurityCouncil'spowers･Theywereoftheviewthatthedi丘erentpoliticalinterestsofseveralSuperpowerswouldpreventdecisionsoftheSecurityCoundlfromgongbeyondtheCharter,and也atthispoliticaldevicewouldensurethattheUNwasnotreducedtoatoolofonesuperpower･93

Similarly,theCourt,in theCertainExpensesCase,hadthefollowlngpolnttOmake:

InthelegalsystemsofStates,thereisoftensomeprocedurefordeterminingthevalidityofevenalegislativeorgovernmentalact,butnoanalogousprocedureistobefoundinthestructureoftheUnitedNations.ProposalsmadeduringthedraftingoftheChartertoplacetheultimateauthoritytointerprettheCharterintheInternationalCourtofJusticewerenotaccepted;theoplmOnWhichtheCourtishthecourseofrenderinglSanadvisoryopinion.As anticipatedin1945,there-fore,eachorganmust,inthe丘rstplaceatleast,determineitsown Jmisdiction･94


However,itnow seemsprobablethattheCourtcouldinterprettheCharterandjudgethelegalityofaSecurltyCouncilresolutionbothinadvisoryoplnionsandincontentiouscases.Firstly,theGeneralAssemblyandtheSecurltyCouncilhavecompetencetorequestanadvisoryoplniononanylegalquestion,whetherornotitariseswithinthescopeoftheiractivities.TheCourt,intheNamibiaCase,madethispointClearbystating:

Undoubtedly,theCourtdoesnotpossesspowersofjudicialrevieworappealinrespectofthedecisionstakenbytheUnitedNationsorgansconcerned･The

questionsofthevalidityorconformltyWiththeCharterofGeneralAssemblyresolution2145(XXⅠ)orofrelatedSecurityCouncilresolutionsdoesnotformthesubjectoftherequestforadvisoryoplnion.However,1ntheexerciseofitsjudicialfunctionandsinceobjectionshavebeenadvancedtheCourt,inthecourseofitsreasonlng,Willconsidertheseobjectionsbeforedeterminlnganylegalcon-sequencesarislngfromthoseresolutions･95

Secondly,lntheLockerbieCase,theCourtheldthat:"Whateverthesituationprevioustotheadoptionof[SecurityCouncilResolution748(1992)],therightsclaimedbyLibyaundertheMontrealConventioncannotnowberegardedasapproprlateforprotectionbytheindicationofprovisionalmeasures･"ThemaJOrltyOplnionthusreliedontheCouncilresolutionwithoutaddresslngthequestionofwhetheritmightbeultravires.However,severaljudgesclarifiedtheirbeliefthattherejectionofLibyaヮsapplicationforprovisionalmeasuresdidnotimplythattheCourtwasHabdicat[ing]HitsroleastheprincipaljudicialorganoftheUnitedNations.Anumberofjudges,furthermore,believedthattheCourtshouldconsiderwhethertheCouncil'sactionswerevalid.Onecommentatorcon-cludedasfollows:

Insum,theI,ibyadecisionmarkedthefirsttimeasignificantportionoftheWorldCourtintimateditcouldexerciseapowerofjudicialreviewincontentiouscases.Thisdevelopmentisimportantnotsimplybecauseacontentiouscasehasargu-ablygreaterprecedentialvaluethananadvisorycase;italsosuggeststhattheCourtdoesnotthinkjudicialreviewshouldbeexercisedonlywhenimplicitlyorexplicitlyendorsedbyaUNorganseekinganadvisoryoplnionontheeffectofthatHorgan'sactsH･96

However,thepresentmechanism ofjudgingthelegalityofSecurltyCouncilresolutions,eitherinadvisoryoplnionsorincontentiouscases,isverylimited.Inacontentiouscase,thematterdependsonwhethertwostatesacceptthejurisdictionoftheCourtinacasewheretheissuebetweenthemisessentiallyrelatedtothelegalityofaSecurityCouncilresolution･Thiscouldbeaveryrareincident.Asfortheadvisoryoplnion,neither

338 SATO

theGeneralAssemblynortheSecurityCouncilhasbeenactiveinutiliz-1ngthismechanism.

Ithasbeencorrectlypointedoutthatth9questionofjudicialreviewshouldnotbeapproachedfrom anall-or-nothingviewpoint,Sincethe

Courtisonlyoneofmany(de)legitimators.AlvarezhadthefollowingpolnttOmake:

[T]heWorldCourt'srighttocritiquetheCouncilshouldnotbepremisedonthepropositionthattheCourtisthe"onlyinstitution"capableofverifyingmelaw･AsthedraftersoftheCharterconceded,theusualtestforconstitutionalityis"generalacceptanceH,and,giventhepaucityofcasesthatreachtheCourtandthe

needforday-to-daydecisions,eachUNorganisusuallyinChargeof"verifyinglegality"andtypicallydoessowithoutincident.AsUSconstitutionalscholarshavenoted,institutionalpracticeshavehadasmuch(ormore)todowithcertainconstitutionaldevelopmentsintheUnitedStatesastheUSSupremeCourt･Giventhehugelacunaeincaselawanditshaphazardnature,itisunwarrantedtoassumethatconstitlltionaldevelopmentorinnovationnecessarilyreliesonajudicialim -

prlmaturOrthatthelegitimationofsuchdevelopmentsrequlreSaCOurt'sblessing･ThatnotionisparticularlyproblematicinthecontextoftheUnitedNationsandtheSecurityCouncil-wheretheCourt'sinvolvement,glVenitsjurisdictionallimits,isnecessarilyattenuatedwhenitcomestojudgingtheCouncil'sacts,wheresomechasmsinthelawoftheCharterarewiderthananygapsinUSconstitu-tionallaw,andwheremanyoftheconstitutionalinnovationsinpracticehavenotinvolvedtheCourt'sparticipation･97

ThiscurrentsituationleadstotheconclusionthatiftheSecurityCouncil

istobeeffectiveinthelongrun,itneedstodemonstratethatitisusingitspowersjudiciously.

Ontheotherhand,accordingtOBowett,thecurrentcaseforprovidhg

theCourtwithadirectpowerofjudicialreviewrestsonthreeconsidera-

tions･Firstly,inmostdemocraticsocieties,governmental(andsometimeslegisla如e)actsarereviewablebytheestablishedcourtssoastoensure

that也eyarevalidundertheconstitution;whyshouldthisnotbethecaseintheUnitedNations?Thesecondisthatwiththeterminationofthe

ColdWar,theSecurityCouncilcannowoperatewithoutpoliticalorlegal

controls･Andthethirdisthat,wheresuchorgansarenotplenaryorgans,thestatesnotrepresentedinthemneedsomemeanstoensurethatwhat

isdonein血eirnameisconstitutional･98Basedupontheseconsiderations,Bowettreachedthefollowmgconclusion:

ItmustbeconcededthattherearefewslgnSthat,atpresent,themembersoftheSecurityCouncilarepreparedtocontemplatejudicialreviewbytheCourt:theWestempowerswouldseethisasahindranceandneitherRussianorChinadisplay[S]anygreatcon丘denceintheCourt.Butinthelong-terminterestsoftheUNtheideaisworthpursulng･99


While,asnoted,theCourtisnotgiventhefull-fledgedinstitutionalpowerofjudicialreview,itcouldcertainlybeutilizedmoreextensivelylninterpretlngtheCharterandjudgingthelegalityandconstitutionalityofaSecurityCouncilresolution.Here,however,itiswisetokeeplnmindsomeofthedincultiesthattheCourtwouldhavetodealwith･Firstly,therearenoclearlegalstandardsglVentOtheCourt,forexample,astowhatconstitutesathreattothepeace,abreachofthepeace,oranactofaggression,orastowhetheracertainmeasureislikelyornecessarytomaintain orrestorethepeace.AlthoughtheCourtmaydecidethatameasurewouldbecontrarytonormsofjuscogensorfundamentalhumanrights,ltSpower,aSWasassertedbyJudgeLauterpachtintheBosniaGenocideConventionCase,wouldprobably"notembraceanyrightoftheCourttosubstituteitsdiscretionforthatoftheSecurltyCouncilindeterminlngtheexistenceofathreattothepeace,abreachofthepeace,Oranactofaggressionoreventhepoliticalstepstobetakenfollowlngsuchadetermination.=100

Secondly,activeutilizationoftheCourtinjudgingtheCouncil'SactionsmighthavesomenegativeinfluenceontheCourtitselfifadministeredcarelessly.Alvarezgavethefollowlngadmonition:

TotheextenttheWorldCourtbecomesmoresystematicallylnVOlvedinthepar-tisanstrugglesoftlleCouncil,itmaybe"politicized".‥increasedjudicialreviewmayblurthepresentdistinctionsbetweentheproperrolesforCourtandCouncil,politicsandlaw.WhiletheblumngOfthesedistinctionsmaynotposesoseriousalegitimacyproblemfordomesticlegalrules,whicharebackedbyeffectiveinsti-tutionalisedsanctions,theconsequencesforthelegltimacyofinternationallawmaybelnuChgraver,GiventhetenuouslegltimacyofICJjudges,turnlllgtllemintoumplreSOftheCouncil'spoliticalgamesistoorisky･101

Theseproblems,however,Wouldprobablynotconstituteinsurmount-ableobstaclesinpromotlngthelegltimacyofSecurltyCouncilactionsbyinvolvingtheCourttoareasonableextentwithpoliticalwisdom･1021tistruethatthereislittlepossibilityforthefull-fledgedinstitutionalpowerofjudicialreview,likethatfoundinnationalgovernlngSystems,tObebroughtintothelegalstructureoftheUl-itedNationsbyaformalamend-mentoftheCharter.However,theCourtcanjudgethelegalityandcon-stitutionalityofaSecurltyCouncill･eSOlutionwithinthepresent,althoughlimited,legalframeworkdescribedabove.Furthermore,thethreereasonsthatBowettpointsoutasgroundsforhisargumentdelegeferendaofintroducingthefull-月edgedinstitutionalpowerofjudicialreviewarealsopersuasiveasgroundsfortheargumentdelegelataofmoreactivelyinvolvingtheCourteitherinadvisoryoplnionsorincontentiouscases･Inthelightoftheseconsiderations,thefollowlngpOlnt,madebyFranck,iscertainlyJuStiGed:

340 SATO

Whileitwouldbefoolhardy-andentirelyImprobable-fortheCourttosubsti-tuteitsjudgmentofwhatconstitutesa"threattothepeace"andwhatmeasuresareappropriateinmeetingsuchathreat,somedegreeofcompetencetoreviewCouncildecisionsisessentialtomaintalmngthecon丘denceofallthestatesthathavefreelychosentodelegatespecifiCandlimitedpowerstoasupranationalorganwithrestrictedmembersllip･JudicialreviewforHgrossabuseofdiscretionHwouldenhancesigni丘CantlytheauthorityoftheCouncilbyassurlngmembersoftheUN-especiallythosenotontheCouncil-thatitsactionsremainaccountabletotheCharterandthemembership1103

ConclusionI

Aninterestingfactis血atforthepastseveralyears,internationallegalscholarshavereferredtotheconceptoflegiti血acynotonlyinthosearti-clesanalysingthelegitimacyoftheSecurityCouncil,butalsointhosediscussmgthelegalityandconstitutionalityofvariousactivitiesby也eSecurityCouncil.Ashasbeendemonstrated山地ischapter,theSecurityCouncilhasincreasmglysteppedintolegallygreyareasfromtheperspec-tiveoftheUNCharter.Increaslngreferencestotheconceptoflegitimacyinlegalliteraturewouldbeaclearindicationthatthelegalityorconsti-tutionalityofvariousactivitiesbytheSecurityCouncilisambiguousorfragileatbest.Morespeci丘cauy,theSecurityCouncilhasincreasinglybeenperform-

lngquaSirjudicialandquasi-legislativefunctionssincetheendoftheColdWartAswaspoi山edoutbytheAppealsChamberoftheInternationalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslaviahtheTadicCase,thereisnoorga-nizationalseparationofpowersintheUnitedNations･Thus,thelegalityorconstitutionalityofSecurityCouncilactivitiescanonlybejudgedinthelightoftherelevantprovisionsoftheCharteranditspractice･Aswasemphasizedinthisdapter,themoretheSecurityCouncilstepsintolegallygreyareas,themorelegitimacylSrequiredforitsactivitiestobeeffectiveandacceptable.Forthispurposetobeachieved,muchattentionshouldbepaidtotherequlrementSOfafunctionalseparationofpowers,even也OughthisisnotexplicitlydetailedhtheUNCharter.TheideaofanalyticauyseparatingSecurityCouncilactivitiesintoexecutive,legisla-tive,andjudicialfunctionstojudgetheirproprietyinthelightof仙eframeofreferenceappropriateforeachfunctioncanbeconsideredafunctional,ifnotorganizational,separationofpowersinthelessstrictsenseofthephrase.Itcouldcertainlybearguedthatthelegalrightsofstatesmaybeim-

plngeduponorsuspendedbytheSecurityCouncilintheapplicationofcollectiveenforcementmeasures.Itcouldfurthermorebecontendedthat

somequasijudicialandquasi-legislativepowersareglVentOtheSecurltyCouncilinitsenforcementactivitiesdeemednecessaryforthepurposes


ofmaintainlnglnternationalpeaceandsecurlty,althoughnotexplicitlyprovidedforintheUNCharter･However,OncetheSecurltyCouncilsteps

intotheselegallygreyareas,muchattentionmustbepaidtotherequlre一

mentsofafunctionalseparationofpowers･Onthispolnt,however,thepracticeoftheSecurltyCouncilhasnot

beenhighlycommendable･AlthoughtheSecurltyCouncilhasincreaslnglyadoptedresolutionsthatinelfectamounttoadeterminationorcharac-

terizationofalegalsituation,ithasnotpaidenoughattentiontotherequlrementSOfafunctionalseparationofpowers･Insuchcases,for

example,astheUnitedNationsCompensationCommissionandtheUnited

NationsIraq-KuwaitBoundaryDemarcationCommission,theSecurlty

Councildidnotsecurejudicialindependence,thusleadingtothefragilelegltimacyofthesecommissionsandtheSecurityCouncilitself･ItcouldbeconcludedthatthefurtheraSecurityCouncilactionisfromimmediate

collectiveenforcementmeasurestopreventathreattoorbreachofthe

peaceoranactofaggression,themorelegltimacylSrequired;hence,

moreattentionmustbepaidtotherequlrementSOfafunctionalsepara-tionofpowers.

Legitimacy,however,isanambiguousandbroadconcept･Itcouldbe

enhancednotonlybyful丘llingtherequlrementSOfafunctionalsepara-

tionofpowers,butalsobyrecoursetothejudicialreviewmechanism･

InthelegalframeworkoftheUnitedNations,theInternationalCourt

ofJusticeisnotglVenadirectpowerofjudicialreview,anditsrolein

judgingthelegalityandconstitutionalityofSecurltyCouncilresolutionsisquitelimited.However,thelegitimacyofSecurityCouncilactivitiescould

beenhancedbyactivelyprovidingrecoursetothejudicialreviewmech-

anism,especiallywhenthelegalityorconstitutionalityofsuchactivitiesis

notclear･Hereagaln,themoretheSecurityCouncilstepsintolegallygrey

areas,themorelegltimacylSrequired,hencethemoreactiverecourse,althoughwithinareasonablescope,tothejudicialreviewmechanism

shouldbeencouraged.

Notes

1.Kirgis,F.L.Jr,1995.日TheSecurityCouncil'sFirstFiftyYears･HAmericanJoLLrnalofInternationalLaw89:506.ThisISagoodarticleanalysingthedevelopmentoftheSecurityCounciloverthepast50years･

2.Itisnowclear,however,thatthenewerasincetheendoftheColdWarcanbedividedintotwoperiods.The firstisfromthelate1980sto1994,whentheSecurityCouncilbecamedramaticallyrevitalizedandexpandedltSaCtlVlties･ThesecondlSfrom1994onwards,whentheWesternPermanentMembersbecamecautiousfollowlngtheirexperienceslnSomallaandtheFormerYugoslavia･Furthermore,RussiaandChinaoftenopposedthosethreePermanentMembersandpreventedSecurityCouncilactiv-1tiesproposedbythem.

3.Kirgis,F.LJr,HTheSecurityCouncil'sFlrStFlftyYearsM(seenote1,above),537-538･

342 SATO

4･"ReportoftheRapporteurofComi tteeIV/2,asApprovedbytheComi ttee,"UNDoc･933IV/2/42(2),1945.UnitedNaiio耶 ConferenceonIntemationa10rganLsationDocumenls13:645.

5.See,fordetails,Sato,T.,1996.EvolvingConstitutionsofInternational0rganLsations･TheHague:KluwerLawInternational,1641181.

6･Conforti,B.,1996.TheLawandPrLZCticeoftheUnitedNations.TheHague:KluwerLawlntemationa1,16.

7lBenefitingfrontheLeagueofNations'experience,theUnitedNationsstrengtheneditspWposesineconomicandsocialareasaswell.

8･KirgiS,F.L.Jr,"neSecurityCouncil'sFirstFiftyYears"(seenote1,above),506-509･9.Merrills,J･G.,1998.1ntemationalDisputeSettlement(3rded.).Cam bridge:Cambridge

UniversityPress,245-249.10.Burci,G.L.,1993."TheMaintenanceofInternationalPeaceandSecuritybytheUnited

Nations:ActionsbyぬeSecurityCouncilundertheChapterVIIoftheCharter,Hb

ProspectsforReforToftheUnitedNadonsSystem,editedbytheItalian SocietyforlntematiomalOrgamsation.Padova:CEDAM,123,124-131.

ll.Seetheauthoritiescitedin Schachter,0.,1991."UmitedNations Lawin theGulfCon且ict."AmericanJoumaloflnteT･nationalLaw85:452,464,notes33and34.SeealsoKirgis,F.L.Jr,"TheSecurityCouncil'sFirstFiftyYears"(seenote1,above),506-509.

12･Bowett,D.W.,1964.UnitedNationsForcesIALegalStudyofUnitedNatz'oTWPractice･London:StevensandSons,34.

13.Goodrich,L.M"Hambro,E.,andSimons,A.P.,1969.TheCharteroftheUnitedNations(3rdandreviseded.).NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,3011

14･Burci,G.LJ'TheMaintenanceofInternationalPeace"(seenote,10,above),129･15･SCRes･688(1991)of5April1991.16.SCRes.794(1992)of3December1992.17.SCRes.788(1992)of19November1992.18.SCRes.929(1994)of22June1994.19.SCRest873(1993)of13October1993.20.Asforthepeacekeepingoperationsin thesecases,manywerewithin singlestates

wherecivilwarswereraglng,andsomeofthemwerewithouttheconsentofthegov-emment,ifindeedtherewasagovemment.Kirgiscorrectlypointsout(KirgiS,F.LJr,"TheSecurityCouncil'sFirstFiftyYears"(seenote1,above),535)比at:"Alegalpuristwouldhavetrouble丘ndingauthorityintheCharterforSecurityCouncilmea-suresofthissort,buttheintemationalcommumityhasnotobjectedtothemonlegalgrounds";andthatobjectionstotheseoperations"havebeenbasedinsteadonsuccess/failure,orcostlbenefit,grounds."

21･Ktihne,W"1995."TheUmitedNations,FragmentingStates,andtheNeedforEnlargedPeacekeeping,"hTomuschat,C.(ed.),TheUnitedNationsatAgeFiJb7IAL,egalPer-spective･TheHague:KluwerLawInternational,91,99.SeealsoOsterdahl,I.,1998･ThreattothePeace:TheInterpretationbytheSecu7･ityCouncilofArticle390ftheUNCharEer･Uppsala:IustusForlag.

22."TheProsecutorv.DuskoTadic,"CaseNo.IT-94-1lAR72,Decisionof2October

1995.1996,InternationalLegalMaterials35:32,43,Alvarez,however,criticizedthispointasfollows(Alvare2:,J.E.,1996."NurembergRevisited:TheTadicCase."Euro-peanJoul･nalofIntemationalLaw7:245,256):

Theappellatechamber'scursorytreatmentoftheCouncil'sdeterminationof"threattothepeace"isnotlikelytobecomfortingtonon-permanentmembersoftheCouncil.Atstakeinthiscaseisthelegallybindingnatureofaquasi-legislative/quasi-judicialaction

THELEGITIMACY OFSECURITY COUNCILACTIVITIES 343

bytheCouncil.Whileitmaybe"settledpractice" thattheCouncilhasindlCated,through priorquasilleglSlatlVe/quasi-Judicialdeterminations,that"internalarmedcon-

flicts"constitutesuchthreats,relianceonsuchhndingstodeterminethelegalityoftheparticular丘ndinginthiscaseisclrCUlarandunhelpful･

23･Graefrath,良,1993･LLLeavetotheCourtWhatBelongstotheCourt:TheLibyanCase･"

Europe?〟Journaloflnternat10nalLaw4:184,1991OnemightsaythatthethreattointernatlOnalpeaceandsecurltyfoundbytheSecurityCouncilwasLibyansupportforterrorismingeneral,notsimplythefailuretorespondtotherequestsforsurrender･However,judglngfromthepositionlatertakenbytheSecurityCouncil-1nparagraph160fResolution883(1993)andparagraph80fResolutlOn1192(1998)-thatthemeasuressetforthlnitspreviousresolutionsshouldbesuspendedimmediatelyifthetwoaccusedarrivedintheNetherlandsfortrial,itisreasonabletoassumethatthe

requesttosurrendersuspectswasthecorepolnt･24.Ibld.,196.

25.AranglOIRuiz,G.,1992,YearbookofInTernationalLawCommtsstonI:150.26･Graefrath,B.,1995."IraqiReparatlOnSandtheSecurityCouncilL"HeldelburgJournal

ofInternationalLaw55:1,12-13,27.Ibid.,26,

28.SCRes.827(1993)of25May1993.29.SCRes.955(1994)of8November1994.30,Rao,P.S..1995."TheUnltedNationsandlnternationalPeaceandSecurlty An

lndianPerspective,"inTomuschat,C.(ed.),TheUnitedNationsatAgeFIFy(seenote21,above),143,158-159･SeealsothestatementofAranglO-Ruiz,G.,1993･Yearbookoflllternal10nalIJaWCommiss10nI:16.

31."TheProsecutorv.DuskoTadic."CaseNo.IT-94-1-AR72,Decisionof2October1995

(seenote22,above),45.Kirgisalsostated(Kirgis.F,L Jr,"TheSecurityCouncil'sFirstFlftyYearsH(seenote1,above),522):H[Ⅰ]tisnotfarfetchedtofhldanimpliedpowertocreatewarcrimestribunalslftheconditionsforapplyingchapterVIIaremetandprlnCIPlesoffundamentaladjudicatoryfalmeSSarefollowed/ '

32･SCRes.678(1990)of29November1990.33.SCRes･794(1992)of3December1992･34.SCRes.816(1993)of31March1993andSCRes.836(1993)of4June1993.35.SCRes.929(1994)of22June1994.36.SCRes.940(1994)of31July1994.37.Burci,G.L.,"TheMaintenanceofInternationalPeace"(seenote10,above),134-135.

38･See,forexample,Greenwood,C･･1995･HTheUnitedNationsasGuarantoroflnter-nationalPeaceandSecurlty:Past,PresentandFuture-AUnitedKingdomview,"inTomuschat,C.(ed,),TheUnitedNationsatAgeFljbJ(seenote21,above),59,70.

39･Gaja,G･,1995･"UseofForceMadeorAuthorisedbytheUnltedNations,"inTomu-schat,C.(ed.).TheUnitedNationsatAgeFib (seenote21,above),39.43.SeealsoKilhne,W..TheUnitedNations(seenote21,above),1061

40･Gray,C.,1994."AftertheCease-fire:Iraq,theSecurltyCouncilandtheUseofForce."BritlShYearBookof177ternationalLaw65:135,1361137･

41･See,forthesepolntS,UnitedNations,1996･T/7eUnitedNationsandtheIraq-KuwatTConPict,19901996.NewYork:UnitedNations,79187.438,512513,516･

42.Gray,C.,=AftertheCease-firel'(seenote40,above),155.43.SCRes.1154(1998)ofユMarch1998.44･UNDoc,S/3858(1998),14,citedinWedgwood.R･,1998･"TheEnforcementofSecu-

rityCouncilResolution687:TheThreatofForceAgainstlraq'sWeaponsofMassDestruction."AmerlCanJournalofInternationalLaw92..724,728.

344 SATO

SeealsoLobel,J.andRatner,M.,1999."BypassingtheSecurityCouncil:Am biguousAuthorizationstoUseForce,Cease血esandtheIraqiInspectionRegime･"AmericanJoumalofIntemationalLaw93:124.

45,Krisch,N.,1999･"UnilateralEnforcementoftheCollectiveWill:Kosovo,Iraq,andtheSecmityCouncil･"MaxPlanckYearbookofUnitedNationsLaw3:59,731ItcouldbearguedthattheunilateralenforcementofSecurityCouncilresolutionsnotbysinglestatesbutbymultilateralreglOnalorganizationshasthemeritofachievingthecomm ongoodrecognizedbytheSecurityCouncil.However,ifitwerejustifiedinsuchaway,CouncilmemberswouldbemuchmorecautiousinadoptingtheoriginalSecurityCouncilresolutionsthatmightleadtounilateralenforcementinasimilarway.Afterall,thissimplyseemstotransfertheproblemfromthelevelofexpressauthorizationtothatofadoptionofresolutions,thusgolngintoaviciouscircle.Ibid.,93-94.

461Shaw,M･N.,1997･"TheSecurityCouncilandthehternationalCourtofJustice:JudicialDriftandJudicialFunction,"inMuuer,A.S.etal.(eds),TheInternationalCourtofJustice:ItsFutuT･eRoleaPerFlj&Year:S.TheHague:KluwerLawlntema-tional,219,225-6,

47.Kelsen,H.,1951･TheUnitedNationsIA CriticalAnalysisofiLsFundamentalPl'Oblems.NewYork:Stevens,294.

48.See,forexample,Gill,T.D.,1995."LegalandSomePoliticalLimitationsonthePoweroftheUNSecurityCounciltoExerciseItsEnforcementPowersunderChapterVIIoftheCharter."NetherlandsYearbookoflntemationalLaw26:33,64168;GoodrichL.M.etal.,TheCharteroftheUnitedNations(seenote13,above),27-28.

49.Ibid.,61-62.

50･Ibid･,72ff･SeealsoLamb,S･,1999."LegalLimitstoUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilPowers,"inGoodwin-Gill,G.S.andTalmon,S.(eds),TheRealityoflnternationalLaw.･EssaysinHonourofIonBrownlie.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,361;Zemanek,K-,1999･"IstheSecmityCounciltheSoleJudgeofItsOwnLegality?,"inYakpo,E･andBoum edra,T.(eds),EssaysinHonourOfJudgeMohammedBedjaou.TheHague:KluwerLawhternational,629;Akande,D"1997."TheInternationalCourtofJusticeandtheSecurityCouncil.AIsThereRoomforJudicialControlofDecisionsofthePoliticalOrgansoftheUnitedNations?"InternationalandComparativeLawQuarteT･ly46:309,319ff･;Gardam ,J･G･,1996."LegalRestraintsofSecurityCouncilMilitaryEnforcementAction･"MichiganJournalofIntemaEionalI,aw 17:285;Golland-Debbas,V"1994."SecurityCouncilEnforcementActionandIssuesofStateRespon-sibility."IntemationalandComparativeLawQuarterly43:55.

51･Shaw,N.M･,"TheSecurityCouncil"(seenote46,above),227.Hedescribedthisgra-dationfromtheimmediacyandseriousnessofthedangerasfollows(ibid.,234):

Thelessimmediateorseriousthedangerconstitutedbythepredeterminedthreattoorbreachofthepeace,themorelikelythatoneisconcemedwithpeacefuladjustmentorsettlementandthustheconsequentialapphcationofjusticeandinternationallaw･

ShawwasclearlyinspiredonthispointbyasimilardistinctionmadebyLauter-pacht(Lauterpacht,E.,1991.AspectsoftheAdministrationofInternationalJustice.Cambridge:GrotiusPublicationsLimited,44)asfollows:

Thougllitmaynotbepossibletodraw血elinewi血absoluteprecision,onemaysug一gestthatadistinctioncanbedrawnbetweenprescriptionsofconductthataredirectlyandimmediatelyrelatedtotheterminationoftheimpugnedconduct,suchascallingupontheaggressortowithdraw,authoriSingcollectiveforcibleresponseororderingtheinterruptlOnOftraderelationswithhim,andthose丘ndingsthat,though notrelated,

THELEGITIMACY OFSECURITY COUNCILACTIVITIES 345

haveageneralandlong-termlegalimpactthatgoesbeyondtheimmediateneedsofthesituation.intothiscategorywouldfalllegalhdingsthatcertainconductisHunlawfulHorlS"invalid"or"nullandvoid".

52･Kirgis,F.LJr,"TheSecurityCouncil'sFirstFiftyYears"(seenote1,above),521.SeealsoFrowein,J･A.,1994･"ReactlOnSbyNotDirectlyAffectedStatestoBreachesofPublicInternationalLaw."RecueildescoLLrS248:377.

53lSarooshi,D.,1999.TheUnitedNat10nSandtheDevelopmentofCollectiveSecurlty.'TheDelegaltlonbytheUNSecurtけCouncilofitsChapterVIIPowers･Oxford:C1arendonPress,33134,178-185.

54･Weston,B.H"1991."SecurityCouncllResolution678andPersianGulfDecisionMaking:PrecariousLegitimacy."AmericaFZJournalofInternationalLaw85:516,533･Westonpolntedoutfourproblemsinthislackoflegitimacy(ibid.,518):lntheindeter一minacyofthelegalauthorltyOfResolution678;lnthegreat-powerpressurediplomacythatmarkeditsadoptlOn;lnitswhollyunrestrictedcharacter;andintheCouncil'shastyretreatfromnon-violentsanctionlngalternativespermissibleunderit･SeealsoQuigley,∫.,1996.日TheP̀rivatization'ofSecurityCouncilEnforcement

Action:AThreattoMultilateralism."MichiganJournalofInternatl0nalLaw17:249･55.Theconceptoflegitimacywillnotbediscussedhere.SeeCaron,D.D･,1993.日The

LegltimacyofCollectiveAuthorityoftheSecurityCouncil."Ame7･L'canJournalofInternat10nalIJaW87:552.

56See,fordomesticanalogiesParticularlylnrelat10mtOinternationalorganizations,Suganami,IL,1989.TheDomesticAnalogyandWorldOrderProposals･Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

57･SeealsoSuy,E.,1995."TheConstltutiona】CharacterofConstituentTreatiesoflnternationalOrganisationsandtheHierarchyofNorms∴inBeyerlin,U･etal･(eds),LawBetwee77ChangeandPreservation.Commemoratit,eCollectionforRudolfBern-hardt.Berlln:Springer,267･

58･See,fordetalls,Sato,T,,EvolvingConstltutions(seenote5,above),229-230.59･TheinterpretativeframeworkpropertotheconstltuentinstrumentsofinternatlOnal

organizationsbasedupontheirevolutlOnaryandteleologlCalinterpretations,onwhichtheauthorelaboratedinhiswork(lbld.),nowseemstobewldelyacceptedindoctrines.See,forexample,Zemanek,K･,1997.日TheLegalFoundationoftheInternationalSystem:GeneralCourseonPubllCInternationalLaw."Recueildescours266:9,90-91;Zemanek,K,,"IstheSecurltyCounciltheSoleJudgeofitsownLegality?=(seenote50,above),632-634.

60･ReferencewasmadetotheconceptofHaconstitutionHinthlSCOnneCtionbymanylegalscholars;see,forexampleFranck,T･M･andPatel,F･,1991･"UNPoliticalActlOninLieuofWar:'TheOldOrderChangeth'."AmericanJournalofInternat10nalLaw85:63,66-67･SeealsothequotationfromKirgisinthetextcorrespondingtonote52,

above･ThelogicofthlS?rgumentWaslaterusedbyFranckasfollows(Franck･TIM･,1995.FairnessinInlernatl0nalL,awandInstitulL'ons,Oxford:ClarendonPress,299-300):

PeacekeepinglSPOpular】yattributedtoanImaginaryC̀hapter61/2'oftheCharter,areplacementfortheimmobilisedArticle43;buttheCharter,beingofthegenuscon-stitution,Shouldbereadascapableofregenerationandadaptation-Thus,whiletheframersmayhavemootedthecollectiveenforcementsystemonthe

assumptlOnthatstateswouldcommitforces,lnaccordancewithArticle43,tobeatthedisposaloftheCouncil.thisIntentionisnotchiselledintothetextlfArticle43cannotbeimplementedinpractice,thatdoesnotnecessarilyfrustratetheCharter'slargerpurpose･Acardinalpurpose,madeexplicitinArticle42,istoenabletheUNto

346 SATO

"takesuchactionbyair,sea,orlandforcesasmaybenecessarytorestorein terna-tionalpeaceandsecmity"deploying"air,seaorlandforcesofMembers"･Article42doesnotmentionArticle43,anditisthereforepossibletoconcludethatthelatterismerelyonewaytomakesuchforcesavailableandthattheCharterdoesnotprecludetheCouncildevislngOthermeanstoaccomplishthisparamountinstitutionalpurpose･

61.1tissaidthatthemajorityofwriterstodayseethespeci丘cmeaningOftheconceptofa"constitution"inthecombinationoftwoelements(Shlma,B.,1994･"FromBilaterausmtoCommunityInterestinInternationalLaw."Recueildescours250:260)･Ontheformalside,aconstitutionenJoyspriorityover"ordinary"rules;withregardtosubstance,itlaysdown thebasicrulesgovemngthelifeofacommunlty･

Dupuyclarifiedtwomean肇 softheterm HconstitutionHasfollows(Dupuy,P･,1997･HTheConstitutionalDimensionOftheCharteroftheUmitedNationsRevisited."Max

PlanckYeal･bookofUnitedNationsLaw1:1,3).Theconstitutioninthematerialorsubstantialsenseoftheterm is"tobeconsideredasasetoflegalprinciplesofpara-mountimportanceforeveryoneofthesubjectsbelonglngtOthesocialcommunityruledbyit.Itplacesallofthem(includingthedi#erentstate'sorgans)inasubordinatepositionandimpliesahierarchyofnoms,onthetopofwhicharethelegalpmciplesbelonglngtOthesaidconstitution."Theconstitutionintheorganicandinstitutionalsense"pointstothedesignationofpublicorgans,theseparationofpowersandthedifferentinstitutionswhichareendowedeachwithitsowncompetencies."Theanalysisinthischapterisrelatedtothissecondsense.

62.Tomuschat,C.,1993."ObhgationsAriSingforStatesWithoutorAgainstTheirWill."RecueildescouT:S241:249.Tomuschat'sanalysisisbaseduponthefollowingunder-standingofinternationallawandsociety(ibid.,2101211):

Oneshouldbearinmindthatanswers,evenifcorrectlyprovidedonagivenProblematsomepointintime,donotnecessarilyremainValidforever.Thefactisthattheco-hesivelegalbondstylngStatestooneanotherhaveconsiderablystrengthenedsincethecommgintoforceoftheUnitedNationsCharter.‥

GiventhedevelopmentstriggeredbytheUNCharter,todayacommunitymodelofinternationalsocietywouldseemtocomeclosertorealitythananytimebeforein

history.Accordingtothisinterpretation,Stateslive,asfromtheirbirth,withinalegalframeworkofalimi tednumberofbasicruleswhichdeterminestheirbasicrightsandobligationswithorwithouttheirwill,leavlngthem,however,su&cientroomforself-responsibleactionwitb血theopemlngSOfthatlegaledi丘ce.Onemayca11也isframe-work,fromwhicheveryStatereceivesitslegalentitlementtoberespectedasasover-eignentity,theconstitutionofi山emationalsocietyor,preferably,theconstitutionoftheinternationalCommunity,communitybeingaterm suitabletoindicateacloserunionthanbetweenmembersofasoci叫 .

SeealsothediscussionbyFassbenderinFassbender,B"1998.UNSecurityCouncilReformandtheRightofVetoIAConstitutionalPerspective.TheHague:KluwerLawlntemationa1.

63･Dupuy,P.,"TheConstitutionalDimension"(seenote61,above),2.64･Ibid･,30.Dupuy,however,isalsopositiveinacknowledgingthecontributionbythe

UnitedNations,ashestatesasfonows(ibid.,30-31):

Thatbeingsaid,theassertion也atthecreationoftheUnitedNationshasi山rodllCed

aradicalchange山地estructureofinternationallaw,whichwasmadebyaseriesofauthOrsincludingFriedman,Lachs,Schachter,VirallyorR.J.Dupuyhaslikewiseprovedtobetrueoverthelastfiftyyears.

THE LEGITIMACY OFSECURITY COUNCILACTIVITIES 347

65.InadditiontoArangioIRuiz,Herdegenmadeasimllarcontentionasfollows(Herdegen,M.J.,1994."The'Constitut10nalization'oftheUNSecurltySystem."Vande7'bllTJournal

ofTransnationalI,aw27:135,150):

[T]lleCOnStitutiona】perceptionisofdoubtfulheuristicvalue.TheunderlyinganalogyrisksblumngfundamentaldlfEerencesbetweenthenatureoftheUNsystemandclassic

issuesoftheseparatlOnOfpowersinatrulyconstltutionalcontexLTherelSnOSOlidbasisfortheseanalogleSfrom whlChanypersuasiveconcluslOnSmaybedrawn･Instructuraldenslty,theUnitedNationsCharterlSStlllfarfromaclosedsystemofcom-

petenciesinwhichtheapplicationofconstitutionalconceptsreallymakessense･InlightoftheactualdistributionoffunctlOnSbetweentheGelleralAssemblyandthe

SecurltyCouncilandtheICJ,thelnVOCatlOnOfaHseparationofpowersH1Smerelyaformofspeech･

66･ArangioIRuiz,G"19971"The'FederalAnalogy'andUNCharterInterpretation:ACritlCalIssue."EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw8:1,1617.SeealsoArangio-Ruiz,G.,1996."TheEstablishmentofthelnternatlOnalCriminalTribunalforthe

FormerTerrltOryOfYugoslaviaandtheDoctrineofImpliedPowersoftheUnitedNations,"inLattanzl,F.andSciso,E.(eds),From theAdHocInternationalPe17al

TrlbunalsToaPermaltentCourt.Napo】i:EditorialeScientifica,311WhileltwouldnotbewisetoacceptthewholeargumentofArangio-RulZ,SOmeOfhispolntSareWe】】worthquotlngaSadmonltlOnS:

[T]herealtestastowhetherthefederalanalogythesisholdswithrespecttotheUNisthedegree,ifany,towhichtheCharteraffectsthelegalstructureoftherelationsOf

thememberStateswitheachother･TheproblemlSWhethertheruleslaiddownintheCharterandtheorgansoperatlnglnimplementatlOnthereofmodlfytoanyde一

greethekindofegalitarlan,essentiallyhorlZOntalrelationsexIStlngamongStatesundergeneralinternatlOnallaw andordlnarytreatyrules.ItlS,lnOtherwords,a

questionofdeterminingWhether-andpossiblytowhatextent theCharterbringsaboutany"verticallSation"intherelationsofthememberStatesinterSeandwith

theUNthatmayjustifythefederalanalogiesassumedbytheconstltut10naltheories･(Ibid.,5.)

As farasInternationallegalscholarsareconcerned,Ifindtwotendenciesdangerous

ThefirstlSthetendencyto]ustlfylnlawanythingthathappensintheUNbyassumingtooeasilyeitherthemodlficationorabrogationofCharterrulesbytacitagreementorthroughtheformat10nOfcustomaryrules;ruleswhlCh,ifneedbe,Wouldchange

whentheUNpracticecharlgeSdirection.IwouldfeelmoreconfidentaboutthefutureoftheUNlf,everysooften.oneweretofindthattherehadbeennomodificationofthelaw,thatthearticleoftheCharterhadnotdisappeared,butthatithadsuffered,purelyandsimply,abreach;andlikewise,thatnocustomaryrulehadcomeIntobeingorvanished.

Thesecondtendency[isrelatedto]comblnlngtheprivilegedcondltlOnOfcertainstatesintheSecurityCouncllwlththeconditionofstrengththeywouldalsoenjoylegally

･･･undergeneraLInternationallawitself.Thesestateswouldapparentlyoperate,"TLTluniversi".bothonbehalfoftheinternationalcommunityasawhole,andonbehalfoftheUN.Thefabricofinternationallaw ..wouldthusattainaconslderabledegreeof‥"vertlCallSation"oflnteTnationa1lawinsideandoutsidetheUN.‥

Onewonderswhatencouragementtoresistabusecanevercome,tothegovern一mentsofthesmallorweakstates,fromtheoriesaccordingtowhlChtheStrongWOuld

348 SATO

haveacquiredthelegalpowersofaworlddirectoratewithoutbeingsubjecttoalltheobligationsofcommonmembers,andwithoutsubmittingtoanydutytoaccountfortheiractionstothestatesinrelationtowhichtheywouldexercise,through theCouncil,a11egedlylegislativeandadjudicatoryfunctionsnotcontemplatedinanyprovisionoftbeCharter.(Ibid.,25-26.)

Thecrucialpolntisthatitisveryhardtoconceiveasanormaldevelopmentofthe"orgamism"CreatedbytheCharterthefactthattheSecurityCounc止turnitselfproprl0motu,andwithoutadequatecontrolbytheentiremembership,fromthegendal'methatthefoundersaregenerallyconsideredtohavecreated,intothesupremelegislative,jtldicialandexeclltiveorganofasllpeトStateJtseemsreasonabletoassumethat,hadthefoundersenvisagedthepossibilityofsuchadramaticdevelopment,theywouldhaveprovidedforadequateguarantees.(Ibid.,28.)

67･Frowein,∫.A,,HReactionsH(seenote52,above),358.AgainsttheattitudetakenbyWeilthattheinternationallegalordershouldstolbeseenasmainlybasedonthewillofthestatesasexpressedinbilateralandmultilateraltreaties,Froweinstated(ibid.,365)that:"Withpublicinternationallawdevelopingintomuchmorethanalawofbilateralandmultilateraltreatyrelationshipsthethresholdtoaconstitutionalstructurehaslongbeemcrossed.‖

68･Franck,T･M.,1990.ThePowerofI,egitimacyAmongNationsINewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,24･Franckpointsoutfourcriteriaoflegitimacy(ibid･,chapters4111,andFranck,T･M.,Fairness(seenote60,above),30146):determinacy,symbolicvali-dation,coherence,andadherence.

Againsttheseanalyses,Williamscritiquedlegi山nacyinthesetermsasaconservativeprJnCiple,reaectingtheconservatismofthestates-systemicvalueoforder.Hepointedout(Williams,J.,1998.Legitz'macyinIntemationalRelationsandtheRLseandFallofYugoslavia.London.･MacmillanandNewYork:St.Martin'sPress,12113):

Hiscriteriastresstheneedtobeintouchwiththepast,tovalidateactionsandactorsagamstexpectationsandexistingpractice.Thereforethenormativevisionofwhatoughttoberestsontheperfectionofwhatalreadyis,themoreeffectiveoperationofintemationalsocietyratherthanitstransfomationintosomethingnewbuiltondiqer-entprmCiples･

69･Franck,T.M.,Fairness(seenote60,above),26.70.Ibid.,25-26.71.Ibid.,313-314.

721Murphy,S.D.,1994."TheSecurityCouncil,Legitimacy,andtheConceptofCollec-tiveSecurityAftertheColdWar."ColumbiaJoumalofTransnah-onalLaw32:201,258,

73･Ibid･,256-257.Similarly,GoodriChstatedasfollows(Goodrich,L M.,1974.TheUnitedNationsinaChangingWorld.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,21):

[T】hedraftersof也eChartercameto血econclusionthataformoforganisation也atfollowedthegenerallinesoftheLeaguesystem,butincorporatedtheconcertprinciple仇atpeacecouldonlybemaintainedsolonga§血emajorpowersbadanhterestandwerewillingtocol0perateinmaintainlngit,hadatleastachanceofsuccess.

74･Ibid･,260･FromthisvleWPOlnt,themethodofauthorizingstatestouseforcetore-spondtothreatstopeaceandsecuritylSconsideredwellsuitedtotheconceptofmaJor


powersactingbyconsensus.Murphydevelopsthispointasfollows(ibid･,261-262):

Whensuchsituationsarise,OneOrmorePOWerSWillbethemotivatlngforceinsecuringSecurityCouncilauthorlSationfortheaction,andshouldbeexpectedtocarrythepr1-maryburdenthroughtheuseofitsmilitaryforces･Imposit10nOfthisburdenmakesitmorelikelythatenforcementactlOnWillonlybetakenwhenthereisarealcommitment

byoneormoremajorpowers,Whichisanessentlalelementtothesuccessoftheaction･Forsimilarreasons,theprocessofprovidlngfairlyopen-endedauthorisationtothese

nationalforcesisapproprlate-･inmostcases,ltlSSimplynotfeasiblefortheSecurltyCounciltoattempttoimposeextenslVeCOnStraintsontheactionsofthosestatesconducト1mgtheenforcementaction… Suchconstraintsultimatelycanbehighlycounterproduc-tivetotheconductoftheenforcementaction…TheSecurityCouncilmusttakeseriously

anyauthorlSationfortheuseofforceinlightoftheinevltablyseriousconsequences

thatwillresult;atthesametime,theremustbeadegreeoffaithandtrustintheactionsoftheenforcingStatestOadheretothebasicgoalsestablishedbytheSecurityCouncil･

75･Caronmadeasimilarpolnt(Caron,D･D･,1993･"TheLegitimacyoftheCollectiveAuthorityoftheSecurityCouncll."AmerlCanJoumalofInternatl0nalLJaW87:552,566-567):

NowthattheCouncilisacting,legltlmaCyarguablyisessentialtoensurlngitslong-term

effectiveness.ButjustasitseemswrongtogaineだectlVeneSSattoogreatanexpensetOlegltlmaCy,SOdoesitnotmakesensetoincreaselegitimacyattheexpenseofaslgniaIcantlossineffectiveness.

76."TheProsecutorv.DuskoTadlC,"CaseNo.IT-94-トAR72,Decisionof2October1995

(seenote22,above),46-47.

77･Harper,K,1994･"DoestheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncllHavetheCompetencetoActasCourtandLegislature?"NewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLJaWandPolitics27:103,156.

78.Graefrath,B.,=LeavetotheCourtH(seenote23,above),204･InthisconnectlOn,Harperreferredtoseveralpoints(Harper,K･,"DoestheUnitedNationsSecurity

CouncilHavetheCompetence"(seenote77,above),137-140)･Firstly,a.courtlSgen-erallypresumedtohaveproceduralsafeguardsfordueprocess･Secondly,ltlSrequlredtoexplainitsholdingsonlegalandfactualissuesinpublishedoplnions･Thlrdly,iftheCouncllistoactlnajudlClalcapaclty,itmustnotallowitsmemberstoadjudlCatemattersinwhichitsmembersareinterestedparties･

Similarly,Kirgisstated(Kirgis,F.L.Jr,"TheSecurityCouncil'sFITStFiftyYears"

(see.note1,above),532):HTheCouncilhasnorulesofprocedureforfalradjudicativehearlngS,norCOulditreasonablybeexpectedtoadoptorfollowanysuchrules･M

79･1954ICJRep･,61･80,KirglS,F.L Jr,HTheSecurityCouncillsFirstFiftyYears"(seenote1,above),525･See

alsoKlrgis,FLJr,1995.HClaimsSettlementandtheUnitedNatlOnSLegalStructure,"inLillich.R.B.(ed･),TheUnitedNationsCompensat10nCommissEOn･NewYork:TransnationalPubllShers,103.

Itissaid,however,thattheGovemlngCoul-CilhassofaralwaysapprovedwithoutanychangetherecommendatlOnSOfthePanelsofCommissioners･DiRattalma,M･andTreves,T･(eds),1999.TheUnitedNationsCompensatTOnCommLys10n:AHandbook･TheHague:KluwerLawInternational,3537.

81.Gill,T.D.,"LegalandSomePoliticalLimitations"(seenote48,above),85ff･82･Mendelson,M.H･andHulton,SC･,1993･"TheIraq-KuwaitBoundary.HBrltishYear

350 SATO

BookofIntemaiionaZL,aw64:135,193.WithregardtothepositionoftheSecurityCouncilmentionedabove,MendelsonandHultonpointedoutasfollows(ibid･,192):

Technically,thismayhavebeencorrect,butsubstantivelytherewasmoretoit･Inthe firstplace".thiswasnotademarcationexerciseintheusualsenseofthe

tem･TheCommissionwasnotmerelymarkingoutonthegroundaboundarywhichhadalreadybeendefinedwith someprecisioninatreaty.SofarasconcernedtheboundaryintheKhowrAbdAllah,therewasnotreatydefinitionatall;and,asforthelandboundary,thetreatydefinitionwassovagueastorequireconsiderableelab-oration(touseaneutralterm).

83･Sarooshi,D.,1996･"TheLegalFrameworkGoverningUnitedNationsSubsidiaryOr-gans."BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw67:413,471-472･Harper,K･,"DoestheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilHavetheCompetence"(seenote77,above),146-147･

84.Martenczuk,B.,1999."TheSecurityCouncil,theInternationalCourtandJudicialReview:WhatLessonsfromLockerbie?"EuropeanJournalofIntemationalLaw10:517,533･

85.Harper,K.,"DoestheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilHavetheCompetence"(seenote77,above),137,141.Simma,particularlyconcemingtheFormerYugoslaviaandRwandatribunalsandsanctionsreglmeS,madeasimilarpolnt.WhilesuchSecurityCouncillaw-makingorregulatorymeasuresappearjusti丘ed,andshouldbedeemedlegaliftheyhmitthemselvestospecificcasesofparticularlyhllgedimensions-theunderlyingconsiderationbeingthatinternationalpeaceandsecurityCanOnlybere-StoredifthefactorsthatledtotheArticle39situationsareredressedasthoroughlyaspossible-hepointedoutasfollows(Simma,B.,HFromBilateralismtoCommunitylnterest"(seenote61,above),277):

However,insuchinstances,theCouncilshouldbeheldtoconformtogeneralpnnci-plesoflawandelementaryconsiderationsofhumanity.ThustheYugoslaviaandRwandaTribunalsmustcertainlyberegardedasobligedtoaccorddueprocessoflaw,fairtrial,andtorespecttherightsoftheaccused(asprovidedintheirstatutes)ISimilarly,sanctionsreglmeSukethatembodiedinresolution6870nIraqmustremainproportionatetothebreachesofthelawthusconcerned.

86･Yemin,E.,1969.LegislativePowersintheUm'tedNationsandSpecialLsedAgencies.Leyden:AIW.Sijthoff,6.

87･KirgiS,F･LJr,"TheSecmityCouncil'sFirstFiftyYears"(seenote1,above),520･88.See,forexample,Skubiszewski,K.,1965166."EnactmentofLawbyInternational

0rganizations.〟BritishYearBookofInternadonalLaw41:198,202.89･Similarly,deBrichambautstated(deBrichambaut,M,P.,2000."TheRoleofthe

UnitedNationsSecurityCounci]inthehtemationalLegalSystem,"inByers,M･(ed.),TheRoleofLawinInternadonalPoliticsIEssaysinIntemationalRelationsandZnter-nan'onaLLaw･Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,269,275):HAlthoughtheSecurityCouncildoesnothavethepowertocreatelaw,itdoeshavethepowertocreaterightsandobligationsforthememberStatesoftheUnitedNations."

90.Roberts,LD.,1993."UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution687andItsAfter-

math:TheImplicationsforDomesticAuthorityandtheNeedforLegitimacy･"NewYorkUniversityJoumaLofInternationalLawandPolitics25:593,597-610:seealsoHarper,K･,"DoestheUnitedNationsSecllrityCouncilHavetheCompetence"(seenote77,above),127-128.

91.Ibid.,155.

92lEstablishmentofsubsidiaryorganscouldsometimesinVolvequasi-1egislativefunctions


insuchcasesasthelnternatlOnalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavla,andforRwanda,aswellastheUnitedNationsCompensationCommisslOn･Concernlngtheformer,it

waspointedout(Klrgis,F.LJr,"TlleSecurltyCouncil'sFlrStFlftyYears"(seenote1,

above),522):"TheseStatutesarelegislativeh"atureeventhough eachStatuteappliestoonlyoneexistingsituation:eachisdirectedtoIndeterminateaddressees(individuals)andmaybeappliedrepeatedlyuntilalljustlClablecaseshavebeentrled･HseealsoKirgis'discussionwlthregardtotheproblemsofapplicablelawandproceduralprovi-sionsconcerningthetribunals,aswe]lasthedirectivestoapplytheforcemaJeuredefenceconcernlngResolution687,1bid･,523525･However,concemlngthesetribu-nals,Kirgisacknowledgedtheirlegality(ibid.,523):

Tobesure,theframersoftheCharterdonotseemtohavecontemplatedtheuseofArticle291mthisfashlOn.Nevertheless,theobjectionseemslegalisticbecausetheArtlCle

39conditionsaremet,theTribunal'sdecis10nmakersareindependentofpolltical

control,andtheadjudicativeprocedureappearstobeessentiallyfalr･

93･Graefrath,B/'LeavetotheCourt"(seenote23,above),203.Herdegenstatedslmilarlyasfollows(Herdegen,M.JJ'The'ConstitutlOnallZationloftheUNSecurltySysteml'

(seenote65,above),150):

UndertheCharter,theprlmarySafeguardagalnStanunbalanceddynamismdoesnotliewithjudicialcontrol,butratherwithapoliticalcheck-theveto..AThiselement.andnotdynamicinterventionbytheICJ,lSthemalnguardlanOftheSecurityCouncll'sabstent10nfromirratlOnalltyandabuseofpowers･

94･1962ICJRep-168･

95･1971ICJRep,4596,Watson,G-良.,1993,"Constltutionalism,JudicialReview,andtheWorldCourt."

Ha7･VardInternationalLawJouT･nal34:1,27.

97･AIvarez,JE.,1996･HJudgingtheSecurityCouncll.日AmericanJoLuJna/oflnternationalLaw90:1,91Herdegenmadeasimilarpolnt(Herdegen,M･JL,"The'Constitut10naliza-tion'oftheUNSecuritySystem"(seenote65above),151):

ContrastedwlththecomprehensivepowersoftheEuropeanCourt,theICJ'sinterven-tlOnlntheadmlnlStrationoftheCharterandtheoccasionsforlttOpronounceuponthe

effectofSecurityCouncilresolutionsdependonratherhazardousandincldentalele-ments:apropercasebroughtbytheproperpartiesunderpropersubmissiontothe

Hague･BecausetheInternationalCourtofJusticepossessesnopowerofannulment,theimpactofitsreasonlngregardingtheIllegalityofaSecurityCouncilresolutlOnwilloftenbelefttospeculativeguesslngJnaddition,theICJ'sdecisionscannotclaimblndingeffectergoomnes.

98-Bowett,D･W.,1996."TheCourt'SRoleinRelationtoInternationalOrganisations,"in

Lowe,V･andFitzmaurice,ML(eds),FiftyYearsoftheInternat10nalCourtofJustlCe:Essayst'nHonourofSirRobertJe7ZnlngS･Cambridge:CambridgeUnlVerSityPress,181,190-191.

Seealsothevariousdiscuss10nSbyBedJaouiinBedJaOui,M･,1994･TheNewWorldOrderandtheSecurityCouncz'l:TestlngtheL･egaltlyofitsActs･Dordrecht:MarinusNijhofE.

99･Ibid･LauterpachtlSalsoposltiveand,lnthecontextofHrecourseagainstquaSl-judicialdecisionsofpoliticalorgansofinternationalorganlSations,"stated(Lauterpacht,E･,

352 SATO

AspecLs(seenote51,above),113-114):

Inwhatdirectionthencanwemovetoreduceoreliminatetheproblemoferroneous

orimproperinstitutionalquasi-judicialactivity?Theanswerwouldappeartolieinthedirectionofjudicialreview;ineffect,inthedirectionofsomekindofappeaLItshouldbeopentoaStateorentityprejudicedbyaSecurityCouncilresolutiontoinsistonthesubmissionof也edisputedquestionsoflawtoanintematiomaltribunaL

SeealSotherelevantdiscussionbythepresentauthor(Sato,T･,EvolvingConstitutionsof/nternational0rgan由ations(seenote5,above),177-178),

100･1993ICJRepり439;IntemationalLawReports95:159.SeealsothediscussiononthispointbyAkande,D.,"TheInternationalCourtofJusticeandtheSecmityCouncil"(seenote50,above),325-342.

101.AIvarez,J.E･,"JudgingtheSecurityCouncil"(seenote97,above),37.An otherprob1

1em㌣agpointedoutbyGreenwoodasfollows(Greenwood,C･･1999･"TheImpactofDecislOnSandResolutionsoftheSecurityCouncilonthehtematiomalCourtofJus-tice,"inHeere,W.P.(ed.),IntemationalLawandtheHague'S750thAnnivelTary.TheHague:T.MIC･AsseI.Press,81,85186):

TheassertionofageneralisedpowerofjudicialreviewofSecurityCouncilresolutionsanddecisionscouldhaveadestabihsingeffectontheworkingsofChapterVIIoftheCharter,ifadecisiontakenbytheSecurityCollnCil,forexample,toimposeeconomicsanctions,Couldbechallenged,perhapsmanyyearsafteritwastaken･ThatwouldinduceanelementofuncertaintywhichcouldhanghkeaswordofDamoclesovereverysanctionsreglmeOnWhich也eCouncilmightdecide.

102･Onthismatter,Bowettcontinuedasfollows(Bowett,D.W.,"TheCourt'sRole"(seenote98,above),191):

TheobjectionthatthiswouldinvitetheCotlrttOquestiontheCouncil'spoliticaljudge-ment,ordiscretion,isnotcompelling.Mostlegalsystemshaveatraditionofjudicialabstentionfrom"politicalquestions,"anditshouldnotbeexpectedthattheCourtwouldattempttosubstituteitspoliticaljudgementforthatoftheSecurityCollnCil･

103.Franck,T.M.,1995."TheUnitedNationsasGuarantorofhternationalPeaceand

Security:Past,PresentandFuture,"inTomuschat,C.(ed.),TheUnitedNationsatAgeFiJb,(seenote21,above),37.SeealsoSimma,Bリ"FromBilateralismtoCommllnityInterest"(seenote61,above),282;Malanczuk.P.,1999."ReconsideringtheRelation-shipBetweentheICJandtheSecurityCouncil,HinHeere,W.P･(ed･),InternationalLaw(Seenote101,above),87,98-99.

*Theauthorwouldliketonote,withgratitude,thegenerouscontributiongiventOhisresearchbytheMtuataScienceFoundationin1998.

Documents

The legitimacy of international organizations: 309 ...hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/16800/1/0600800301.pdf · 314SATO Somecomments ConcerningArticle39,日ThreattoPeace,=despiteitsclear,directallu-