The Legacy of Peace: Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years After the Dayton Peace Accords

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The Legacy of PeaceBosnia and herzegovina 20 years afTer The dayTon Peace accords

ediTors amer KaPeTanović JudiTh iLLerhues

tHe Legacy of Peace

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after tHe dayton Peace accords

sarajevo, 2015.

Title: naslijeđe mira Bosna i Hercegovina 20 godina poslije dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma

original title: naslijeđe mira - Bosna i Hercegovina 20 godina poslije dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma

authors: srećko Latal, nerzuk Ćurak, Đorđe vuković, goran Marković, SvetlanaCenić,ŽarkoPapić,MarkoRadovanović,JasminMujanović Hoda dedić, adnan Ćerimagić

editors: amer Kapetanović JudithIllerhues

Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES) Kupreška 20 71 000 sarajevo Bosnia and Herzegovina Tel.:+387(0)33722-010 E-mail:[email protected] www.fes.ba

Responsible: JudithIllerhues

Proofread: Šejla Hasanović

DTP: filip andronik

Print: Amosgraf

circulation: 150 copies

CIP-Katalogizacijaupublikaciji

NacionalnaiuniverzitetskabibliotekaBosne i Hercegovine, sarajevo 341.382(497.6)”1995/2015”(082)323(497.6)(082) TheLEGACYofpeace:BosniaandHerzegovina20yearsaftertheDaytonPeaceAccords/[authorsSrećkoLatal...[etal.].-Sarajevo:Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,2015.-260str.:graf.prikazi ; 25 cm Prijevoddjela:Naslijeđemira.-Shortbiographiesoftheauthorslistedintheorderofpublicationoftheessays:str.245-249.-Bibliografija:str.250-258iuztekst. ISBN978-9958-884-46-71. Latal, srećkocoBiss.BH-id 22533382

Attitudes,opinionsandconclusionsexpressedinthispublicationdonotnecessarilyexpressattitudesoftheFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.TheFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftungdoesnotvouchfortheaccuracyofthedatastatedinthispublication.CommercialuseofallmediapublishedbytheFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES)isnotpermittedwithoutthewrittenconsentoftheFES.

sarajevo, 2015.

The Legacy of PeaceBosnia and herzegovina 20 years afTer The dayTon Peace accords

ediTors amer KaPeTanović JudiTh iLLerhues

4

conTenTs

JudithIllerhuesforeword .............................................................................. 7

amer Kapetanović introduction ...................................................................... 11

srećko Latal agreeMent in its LaByrintH .............................................. 19

nerzuk Ćurak study of return of tHe state .......................................... 43

Đorđe vuković fate of tHe state in tHe cHaracter of tHe PeoPLe ........ 65

goran Marković reorganizing wHat’s PossiBLe ......................................... 89

svetlana cenić tHe BosnianHerzegovinian PatH .................................... 121

5

Marko radovanović Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Quantitative easing ......... 143

ŽarkoPapićconsensus on tHe coMMon good ............................... 161

JasminMujanovićfroM tHe BottoM uP, forward ...................................... 183

Hoda dedić tHe aritHMetic of Bad assuMPtions ............................. 201

adnan Ćerimagić tHe iMaginary worLd of coMPetencies ...................... 223

Shortbiographiesoftheauthors ............................................... 245

Bibliography ............................................................................... 250

Abbrevations ............................................................................. 259

7

foreword

Judith illerhues

TheDaytonPeaceAccordsfrom1995broughtanendtothewar inBosniaandHerzegovina.Twentyyears later it is therightmomentnotonlytosumupachievements,butalsoto

reflectonthechallengesBosniaandHerzegovinafacestoday.Thecountryisinaseverecrisis,wherethestatusquohasbeenprevailingforalmostadecadewithlittleprogressinimplementingimportantreforms.Thislackofprogressisexpressedinanincreasingpoliticalandeconomicinstabilityandsocialinequality.

Extensiveresearchhasbeenundertakentoexaminetheunderly-ingcausesofthestalemate.Somescholarsidentifytheconstitutionalnorm,whichderived from theDaytonPeaceAccords,asamainhindrancetoreforms. It is truethattheDaytonregimeallowsforastrong influenceofvetopower in thedecision-makingprocess,which isnot favorable for implementingcomprehensive reforms.Butunfortunately, thisargument is toooftenused to justify theprevailingabsenceofreformsinthecountryandthemaintainanceofthestatusquo.Sinceacomprehensivereformoftheconstitutionseemsunlikelyatthispoint,thequestionarises:towhatextentdothecurrentpoliticalandsocialchallengesoccurasaconsequenceoftheDaytonconstitution?Andmoreprecisely:whatcanbedone

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Judith Illerhues

toachievefurtherprogressinpoliticalandsocialreformsaswellasinEU-integrationinthescopeoftheDaytoncontext?

Thecomplexityof thesequestionsand theneed forabetterunderstandingandaconstructivewayforwardforthecountrymo-tivatedtheFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES)inBosniaandHerzegovinatopreparethispublicationtogetherwithnationalintellectualsandresearchers.Asapoliticalfoundation,‘thinktank’andplatformforpoliticaldialogue,itisthecoretaskoftheFESinBosniaandHerze-govinatocontributetoanalyzingsociopoliticalchallenges,develop-ingrecommendationsforpolicyapproachesandengagingwithourpartners in a constructive and open dialogue to discuss solutions.

Thispublicationistheresultofajointeffortbyateamofintel-lectualsfromvariousdisciplines.Eachauthorreflectedonthetopicfromhisorherownperspectiveandscientificbackgroundwiththeobjectiveofspecifyingreformneedstoaddressthecurrentdilemma.TheyallstartedfromanalysisofthecurrentsituationinBosniaandHerzegovinaandthenhighlightedthequestionofwhatkindofre-formsandactionsareneededtostrengthenpoliticalandeconomicstability,socialequalityandEU-integrationinasustainablemanner.

Thepublication’sobjectiveisnottoreachconsensusonasingleproposedwayforwardforthecountry.Onthecontrary,theideaistoassembledifferent–sometimescontradictory-viewsandtodebateonamenuofoptionsforBosniaandHerzegovinatoimprovetoday’ssituationbasedonanalysisofastate-of-the-artdebate.

9Foreword

Ouraimistoreflectthemultifacetedpublicdiscourseandofferaplatformforopendiscussionandexchangeofideas.Theapproachesandviewspresentedintheessaysmaydiffersignificantly,andtheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheeditors’opinion.Butwebelievethatapluralistic–andthusdemocratic-societyisbasedupontheopendiscussionofdifferentopinions,varyingfrommoreconservativetomoreprogressiveapproaches.

WewouldespeciallyliketothankMr.AmerKapetanovicforhisexcellentcontributionstotheeditingofthevolumeaswellasalltheauthorsfortheirvaluableresearch,thinkingandwriting.Wehopethattheirthoughts,ideasandinsightsprovidereaderswithabetterunderstandingofthecurrentsituationinBosniaandHerzegovina.Theirjointeffortsareanencouragementforallofusnottobeover-whelmedbythecomplexityofthesituation,butrathertocontem-platetheopportunitiesandrealisticscenariosforimprovements20yearsafterthesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAccords.

11

inTroducTion

amer Kapetanović

Thispublication is theresultof intensive jointeffortsbytheGermanFriedrichEbertFoundation(FES)OfficeinSarajevoandagroupoflocal intellectualsfromBosniaandHerzegovina,

includingauthors, publicists andprofessors.Althoughpublishedontheoccasionofthe20thanniversaryoftheGeneralFrameworkAgreement for Peace in Bosnia andHerzegovina, known as theDaytonPeaceAgreement (DPA), theaimof thepublication isnottocelebratethisjubileeandwriteforthisoccasionbuttousetwodecadesofpracticalexperiencewiththeDPAinordertodrawsomerelevantconclusions.Thispublicationshouldbeobservedasakindofintrospectionoflocalintelligence,whichmaynotbegreaterthatthe internationalone,butwhich ismostcertainlyadaptedtothenecessityof life inBiHas it is.TheauthorsandtheFESachievedagreementonsuchanapproach immediatelywithoutanyfurtheradoduetothefactthat,interalia,thereisnotmuchthathasnotbeensaidorwrittenaboutthisAgreementandanyreiterationwouldactuallybelikewritinginthesand.Therefore,wedecidedtofocusonthe issuesthatseemed insufficientlyanalysed,suchashowtocreateamorefunctionalstatewithintheDaytonlimitationswithoutnecessarilyintroducingDaytonIIorsubstantialamendmentstotheAnnexIVtotheAgreement.Ourintentionis,therefore,toexamine

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Amer Kapetanović

if thenon-functionalityof thepolitical systems inBiHwithin theDaytonframeworkispreconditionedbytheconstitutionalnorm,itsabsenceorwhetheritisaresultofmany-years-longabuse,contor-tionoforevendistancingfromtheDaytonAgreementassuch.Howmuchhas thissituationbeen instigatedbyclientelistpolitical (un)culture, ignorantofthecommongoodandwhichdoesnotknowhow(ordoesnotwant)tofightforitbutwhichputsforwardsomebetterparticularisms,“purer” ideasandderivedpoliticalsystems?Theeventsunfoldingat thetimewhenourauthorswerealreadyworkingontheiressaysclearedupanydoubtsastowhetherourcourseofenquirywascorrect.AnewreferendumadventureinRSandaratherunspecific,dividedandmildreactionbytheinternati-onalcommunityeventwentyyearsintotheimplementationoftheAgreementmadeusdoubtifwecorrectlyreadtheusermanualfortheDaytonPeaceAgreementandinstructionsonprecautionaryme-asures.Ortheproblemmaybethattherewasnomanualandthattheinternationaladministratorswrotesuchamanualinfragments,assuitedtothepoliticalmomentorreality.

Anequally importantquestiondiscussedbythispublication iswhetheraninternationalagreement,regardlessofhowambitiousitis,should,couldorhastostipulatetothelastdetailhowapost-war,transitionalstateshouldfunctionorshould itonlycreateabroadframeworkleavingenoughroomtodefinesocialandpoliticalrela-tionsinawaythattheyshouldbeinamultiethniccountry?

Therearemorequestionsposedthananswersoffered,aswearewellawarehowdifficult itcanbetofindsimpleformulas for

13Introduction

theBiH“mal-union”.However,wehavetriedtoanswersomereallyimportantquestions,offerpossiblesolutionsandalsoshattersomeillusionsthathavekeptusinthedarkalltheseyears.

Wecanonlyleaveittoourreaderstojudgeifwehavesucceededinthat.

Inordertohaveourconceptbetterunderstood,itisnecessarytoexplainthestructureofthispublicationforthepurposeofbetterunderstandingitsintegralparts.Acurseorablessingofimportanttopicsisthattheyallowanumberofanalysesfromamyriadofper-spectives,eachwithitsownjustificationsandreasons.Wedecidedtoorganisethispublicationintothreechaptersandtenessays.Thefirstessaybytheanalystandjournalist,SrećkoLatal,isnotincludedinanyofthechaptersbutshouldserveasacommondenominatorforallthreechaptersandasareminderofhowtheDPAwascreatedandwhichtransformationsitunderwentinthemeantime.Latalcarriedoutthisdemandingtaskcombiningthechronologyofthedevelop-mentoftwoagreements(astheWashingtonagreementisofgreatrelevancefortheDaytonone)andanalysingsubstantialomissionswhich leadtotoday’ssituation inwhichweseemtohaveseveraldayton agreements and several parallel political realities.

InthefirstchapterbroadlydealingwiththeconstitutionalandpoliticalheritageoftheDPA,Dr.NerzukĆurak,professorattheFac-ultyofPoliticalSciencesoftheUniversityofSarajevo,analyseswhoandwhat“stole”thestatefromtheagreementandexaminesthepossiblewaystoreturnitintotheoverallsocialandpoliticalcontext,


notonlythroughpoliticalwillbutalsothroughtheruleof law.Akeyrequirementfor that is thechangeofpoliticalculture,whichpromptedDrĐorđeVuković,professorat theFacultyofPoliticalSciencesinBanjaLukatoanalysethepossibilityof“constitutionalpatriotism”astheonlywaytoreturnthestatetothepeoplesandcitizensthroughtheruleoflaw.Developmentofthesentimentthat“weareallBiH”,accordingtoVuković,requiresethnicemancipa-tion(fullrealisationofethnicidentities)withoutsuppressionofcivicprinciplesandwithoutforcingpatriotismandrespectforthecoatofarms,flag,anthemandfootballnationalteam.Itshouldbegiventime,asitisdifficulttoforceanemotion.DrGoranMarković,profes-sorofconstitutionallaw,triestogiveanorganisationalformtowhatisanalysedbyĆurakandVuković.Toputitdifferently,DrMarkovićinaverypragmaticmannerexaminestheterritorialorganisationofthecountry,asoneofthemostdifficultissuesoftheDPA,byanalysingallthreedominantoptions:maintainingatwo-entitystructure,in-troductionofathirdentityandregionalisationofBiHinlinewiththeprincipleofeconomicallysustainablelocalself-government.Eachofthesemodelsisanalysedagainstthepoliticalrealityastheaxiom,i.e.itsrelevanceismeasuredthroughitsacceptabilityorunacceptabilityingivencircumstances.HecametotheconclusionthatBiHhastobereorganisedinordertobemorecost-efficient,functionalandtherebymoresuccessfulinourattemptstoreturnittothepeople.How?Thisyoushouldreadinhisessayentitled“ReorganisingWhat’sPossible”.Thesethreeauthors,althoughtheyhaddifferenttopics,instructionanddynamicsofwriting,almostwithoneaccordconcludethefol-lowing-BiHcanfunctionbetterintheexistingconstitutionalframe-workunder threeconditions:departurefrompoliticalclientelism,

15Introduction

acceptanceandemancipationofethnicidentitiesassmallpiecesinalargermosaic,andterritorialorganisationwithinthelimitsoftheacceptableandmostfunctional.Inaword,truereconciliationanduncompromisingmeritocracyineverything.

Thesecondchapterfocusesonthesocio-economicheritageoftheDPA,an issue thatunjustifiablyhasbeenneglectedall theseyearsbytheartificially-createdstoriesaboutseparation,unitarisa-tion,majorisation,federalisation,etc.Whilepoliticianswereengagedinspreadingfear,thequalityofthecitizens’ lifehasdeteriorated.Workersareputonholdatworkdue to temporary lay-offs, thestateisonhold,abetterlifeorlifeitselfisonhold…ThischapteropenswithaninterestinganalysisbytherenownedeconomicanalystSvetlanaCenić,whoexamineshowpoliticalinstabilityunderminestheeconomicbasisforallofus,therebyundermininganyremnantsofhopeforthepossibilityofahealthystateforourdescendants.Theessay,written inacolumnist’sstyle,strikinglyshowshowweinBiHcanallsucceedtogetherorfailtogether.Therearenobetterentities,cantons,orcitieswhichwillbeeconomicallyself-sufficient.Cenićdoesnotavoid thequestionofwhether thisconstitutionalframeworkallows foreconomic recovery.She thinks itdoes,butundertheconditionthatlocalauthoritiesstopstimulatingreformsandthat internationalmentorsstop imposingsolutionswhichareinnowayrelatedtotheBiHreality.TheissuesonlyoutlinedinthefirstessayarefurtherelaboratedbyMarkoRadovanović,anexpertformacro-economicpolicyandBiHdiplomatandDrŽarkoPapić,formerSFRYdiplomatandrenownedexpert forsocialpolicyandinclusion.Bothof them, inan interestingmanner,dealwith the


issueofwhetherandhowmuchawelfarestate,asasocialconceptfocusedonthe individualandnotonthemarket, iscontradictorytothereformmeasuresBiHpromisedtoimplement,andhowmuchtheDPA isanobstacle toachievingthatobjective.Theycometothesameconclusion:notonlyisitpossible,butitisalsonecessary.Theybothcall for reindustrialisationandquantitativeeasing, i.e.smartmanagementofmonetarysovereigntyandinflation,inordertoreleasemoneyforwell-designeddevelopmentalprojects.Achiev-ingthisrequireschangesofacertainnumberoflaws,butitisnotnecessary tochangetheDaytonPeaceAgreement.However, it isnecessarytoachieveconsensusonthecommongood,whichwouldimplythatpoliticaleliteswillnotabusethemonetarysovereigntytomakeupforbudgetdeficitsto“buy”fakesocialpeaceandactually“oiltheclientelistmachinery”.

Thelast(third)chapterdealswiththepossibilityofEuropeanisa-tionoftheDaytoncontext.Inorderforthattohappen,itisnecessarytoEuropeanisepolitics inBiH.JasminMujanović,aPhDcandidateatYorkUniversityinTorontoandactiveintellectualadvocatingforpoliticalemancipationinBiH,believesthatitishardtoexpectthatpoliticaleliteswill“euromancipate”(read:endtheexistingpractices)bythemselves.Inhisessay,whichopensthethirdchapter,heseescivicawakeningasawayout.Thebottom-uppressure,combinedwiththestrictEuropeanstandardisationcriteriaimposedfromtheoutside,simplyreducesthemanoeuvrespaceforcontinuationoftheself-sustainedpoliticswhichhaveforgottentoservetheindividual.Heparticularlyfocusesonthemodelsof internalbottom-uppres-sureandanalyses the ‘Februarydemonstrations’asan important

17Introduction

turningpoint.Startingfromthispremise,DrHodaDedićandAdnanĆerimagić,bothexpertsforEUissueswithdiplomaticexperienceanduniversityspecialisations,intheiressaysindicatewhatBiHhastoandshoulddoinordertomovetowardsEuro-standardisation.Inheres-say‘ArithmeticofBadAssumptions’,DrDedićpresentsacompara-tiveanalysisofcorrelationsoftheEUconditionalityandreadinessofcandidatecountriestoconductreforms.ShebelievesthatwithitsnewapproachtowardsBiH,theEUmanagedtocreatebalanceintheconditionality,toseparatedifficultfromeasyissuesandtofocusoneconomicreforms.Thereisonlyone“little”requirementtobefulfilled–thecoordinationmechanism.Thisisdealtwithintheessayentitled ‘ImaginaryWorldofCompetencies’byAdnanĆerimagić,whoexplainshowmuchtheabsenceofajointworkbymunicipali-ties,cantons,entitiesandstate in theEUharmonisationactivitieshascostBiHmillionsindeniedpre-accessionassistance.Heputsthispoliticisedissueintothetechnicalcontextwhereitbelongs.AlllevelshavetobeharmonisedwiththeEUacquiswhichisalwaysbetterandlesscostlyifundertakeninacoordinatedfashionandnotindividu-ally.This issueisnotrelatedtoanyconflict,divisionortransferofcompetencies,butitfocusesonasimplerworkingcommunicationwiththeEU.FearthatthisfamouscoordinationmechanismwouldfurthercentraliseordecentralisecompetenciesandtherebyindirectlychangetheDPA,accordingtoĆerimagić,isjustanotherattempttoblockEUprocessesinthecountrywhereover70%ofthepopulationsupportstheEUcourse.

Inthecourseofthepreparationandorganisationofthispublica-tion,greatassistancewasprovidedbytheFESBiHassociates:Merima


EjubovićandNerminKujović.Thispublicationwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithout theHeadof theFESBiHOffice, Judith Illerheus,primarilythankstoherunderstandingofthecomplexityofthistopic.MichaelWeichert,amainstayoftheFESyears-longengagementinBiH,wasalsotheretoprovideassistance.Onbehalfofallofthemandoftheauthors,IwishtoallBosniansandHerzegoviniansinthecountryandabroadahappy20thanniversaryoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement,with thehope that in thenextdecadewewillhaveenoughwisdomtorecognisethechallenges, thecouragetofacethemandthewill-powertopersevere.

19

agreemenT in iTs LaByrinTh

srećko Latal

20

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: The search for peace or (just) the end of the war?

This introductory essay examines the circumstances under which the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) was reached and the transformations it has undergone over the years. It explains how and why it normatively and perceptually changed, which ultimately resulted in the simultaneous existence of several Dayton Agreements. Depending on which political milieu is either acting upon or aga-inst the Agreement, Srećko Latal, an accomplished analyst and journalist of renowned news agencies at the time of the signing of the Agreement, depicts the course and wayward paths of the pre-Dayton, Dayton and post-Dayton times in a manner only direct participants or active observers and contempo-raries could do. However, he avoids merely presenting the chronology of the peace agreement, which is the main focus of this essay, and goes further to point out some substantial failures due to which the debate about the Dayton Agreement is still, 20 years later, focused on negation-affirmation of the state-hood of BiH, rather than discussing its better functionality. One of such failures, according to Latal, is that the international community never made the effort to have the Dayton Agreement officially adopted by the state and entity parlia-ments in BiH, a fact which is used by Milorad Dodik, President of RS, as one of the arguments to negate the existing legal framework in BiH. The BiH society enters its 20th year of peace with at least three visions of BiH, four perceptions on what possibilities the Agreement offers, and a devastated economic and social basis. We have come to understand that none of the actors can achieve anything on their own, nor can the international community, as the imposing of solutions is no longer an option, nor can the political elites, as the low level of political culture diminishes any possibility of achieving compromise at the domestic level – compromise is seen as a sign of weakness! Latal sees a long-term partnership between the international community and the authorities in the country in order to enhance the economic basis as a possible way out. That could mean an attempt to define a common denominator for the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21Agreement in its labyrinth

The Chronology of the (Dis)Agreement

Astestifiedbyanumberofthosewhoparticipatedinprepa-rationandorganisationofnegotiationsthatresulted intheDaytonAgreement,theturningpointsthatledtothedecision

oftheUnitedStatestoinitiatethesenegotiationswerethefalloftheUNprotectionzoneinSrebrenicaon11July1995andtheensuinggenocideofover8000Bosniaks,thedeathofthreeAmericanofficials,RobertFrasure,JosephKruzelandNelsonDrewon19August1995,whodiedtryingtoenterbesiegedSarajevoandintheend,thesecondmassacreattheSarajevomarket“Markale”on28August1995,whenseveralmortarshellskilled45andwounded75citizensofSarajevo.

Accordingtothewitnessestothisprocess,themandatebywhichthethenUSPresidentWilliamJeffersonClintonenabledthechiefnegotiator,thediplomatRichardHolbrooke,tomaketacticaldeci-sions“ashewentalong”andwithouttheapprovalbytheAmeri-canadministration,wascrucialtothesuccessofthesenegotiations.MotivatedbytheincreasingnumberofciviliancasualtiesinBiHandequippedwithauniquemandate,Holbrookeandhisteamlaunchedoneofthemostintensive“shuttle”negotiationsinhistorythatin-cludedhundredsofmeetingsandthousandsofhoursonflightsbe-tweenSarajevo,Belgrade,Zagreb,Berlin,Moscow,Brussels,Rome,Paris, London,Washingtonandothercentersofpower.AnothercrucialelementinthisprocesswastheNATOaircampaigntarget-ingartillerypositionsandcommunicationcentersof theBosnian

22 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Srećko Latal

SerbarmyaftertheirleadersrejectedtheUNandNATOrequeststowithdrawtheirartilleryfromaroundSarajevo.

Theairstrikes,whichbeganon30Augustandlasteduntil20September1995,togetherwiththemilitaryoperationsbythere-establishedcoalitionoftheBiHArmy,theCroatianDefenceCouncil(HVO)andtheCroatianArmy(HV)soonresulted inapowershiftandchangeoftheterritorialcontrolwithinBiH.Foralmostthewholedurationofthewar,BosnianSerbmilitaryforceshadcontrolover70%oftheterritoryofBiH,butbytheendofSeptember2015,ter-ritorialcontrolbyBosnianSerbsononesideandtheFederationofBosniaksandCroatsontheotherwasalmostequal,whichprovedtobeoneofthemostimportantfactorsinachievingtheagreement.Preparationsforpeacenegotiationstookplaceamidcontinuousmili-tarycampaignsandincreasinglyhightensionduetofrictionbetweentheBosniakandCroatmilitaryunitsand,ontheotherhand,becauseofthepossibilityofdirectinvolvementofSerbiaintheconflictiftheBosnianSerbmilitaryunitsweretoloseBanjaLukaorthecorridorinthevicinityofBrcko.

BeingpressuredbyNATOstrikes,economicsanctionsandAmeri-candiplomacy,SerbianPresident,SlobodanMiloseviconbehalfofthemilitaryforcesofBosnianSerbs,signedtheceasefireagreementinBelgradeon04October1995.TheChairoftheBiHPresidency,AlijaIzetbegovicsignedthesameagreementinSarajevoon05Oc-tober1995,whichinadditiontocessationofhostilitiesmeanttheendofthesiegeofSarajevoandthebeginningoffinalpreparationsforpeacenegotiations.RichardHolbrookeandhis teamcarefully


preparedallcrucialaspectsofthenegotiations,fromlocationandarrangementofaccommodationofthedelegationstoorganisationof regularvisitsandphonecallsbyAmericanandotherWesternofficialswhoexertedcontinuousdiplomaticpressureonthedelega-tionsofBiH,CroatiaandSerbia.

Thenegotiations,heldat theWright-PattersonAirForceBaseoutsideDayton,Ohio,wereofficiallyopenedon01November1995.Facedwithnumerouscrisescausedbydivergentpositionsandten-sionsbothwithinandamongthethreedelegations,thenegotiationswereonthevergeoffailure.Holbrookeandhisteamwerealreadyconsideringending thenegotiationswhenacompromise for themostproblematicissuewasreached–thefinaldivisionoftheterri-toryaccordingtowhichBosnianSerbsreceived49%,Bosniaks30%andBosnianCroats21%oftheterritoryofBiH.ThePeaceAgree-mentwasinitialledinDaytonon21NovemberandofficiallysignedinParison14December1995.1

Inaddition,oneof thekey issueswas thecontrolof thecor-ridoroutsideBrcko,whichinaccordancewiththeagreementwas

1 TheDaytonAgreementcomprises12annexes:Annex1-A:MilitaryAspectsofthePeaceSettlement;Annex1-B:AgreementonRegionalStabilization;Annex2: agreement on inter-entity Boundary Line, annex 3: agreement on elections; Annex4:ConstitutionofBosnia andHerzegovina;Annex5:AgreementonArbitration; Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights; Annex 7: Agreementon Refugees and Displaced Persons; Annex 8: Agreement on CommissiontoPreserveNationalMonuments;Annex9:AgreementonEstablishmentofBosniaandHerzegovinaPublicCorporations;Annex10:AgreementonCivilianimplementation; and annex 11: agreement on international Police force.


supposedtoberesolvedata laterstagethroughinternationalar-bitration.Manybelievethatthisproblemwhichhadtoberesolvedoutside theDaytonAgreementandwhich resulted in theestab-lishmentofBrčkoDistrictisoneofthebestexamplesofpost-warreintegration.

TwodecadesaftertheDaytonAgreementwassigned,thereisanincreasingdivergenceofopinionastohowmuchthisdocumentprevented2andhowmuchitcontributedtotheproblemsthatarosein later years.3Someoftheforeignofficialswhowere involvedinthepreparationand/or implementationof theDaytonAgreementemphasise that thisdocumentwasacompromisewhichdidnotsatisfyanyofthepartiesinvolved. 4However,therootsofthesub-sequentderogationoftheDaytonAgreementcanbefoundintheveryessenceofsuchasolution.Namely,thecompromiseincludedmechanismsthatwouldprotectCroatsandSerbsinBiHfrombeingoverruledbyaBosniakmajority,butapartof thosemechanisms,particularlythosepertainingtoBosnianCroats,wereremovedovertime.On theother hand, Bosniaksweregivenmechanisms and

2 “Themainobjectiveof theDaytonAccordwas toend thewar. Lookingatthingsfromthisperspective, it iseasytofindmistakes,but inthecourseoftheprocessofitsimplementationwedidwhatthecircumstancesatthelocalandinternationalscenepermittedatthattime”,saysahigh-rankingAmericandiplomat.

3 “TheDaytonAccord ended thewar,which is excellent, but it also createdconditionsforalltheproblemswearefacingtoday”,saysaBiHofficial.

4 “Bosniakswantedastateandtheygotit.Serbswantedarepublicandtheygotit.Croatswantedcantonsandtheygotthem”,saysoneofthem.


guaranteesthatshouldhaveprovidedforreturnofrefugeeswhichwouldrestorethemulti-ethniccharacterofBiH.Inspiteofthefactthatthereturnofrefugeeswastheoreticallyandlegallypossible,ithasnotbeenentirelyimplementedduetounresolvedsecurity,po-liticalandeconomicissuesandduetotheindolenceofpoliticians.A largenumberofrefugeesanddisplacedpersonsstayed intheirnewresidenceseitherinBiHorabroad.Today,itisconsideredthattheprocessofthereturnofrefugeesiscompletedandthatsomeofthosepersonsmayreturntotheirpre-warhomeswhentheyretirebutthattheirchildrenandgrandchildrenarelostforBiHforever.5

Fromthebeginningofnegotiationstothefirstyearsofimple-mentationof theDaytonAgreement, internationalofficialswereclearthatDayton’sBiHisalegalsuccessortotheRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovinaandthatRepublikaSrpskaandHerzeg-Bosnaareconsidered“rebelmovements”,which-asdefactoentities-hadtobeinvolved,butcouldnothavebeenrecognisedasstatesbytheinternationalcommunity.Therefore,HolbrookeandhisteaminsistedthatthedelegationsofBosnianSerbsandCroatswererepresentedbythePresidentsofSerbiaandCroatiainthenegotiations.Twentyyearslater,theseprovisionsareusedasthefirstlineofdefenceofBosniaandHerzegovinafromthefrequentthreatsofseparationofRepublikaSrpskacomingfromtheRSPresidentMiloradDodik.The

5 “ReturnofrefugeeswasinthefocusofDaytonwhenitwasdesigned.Hadthereturnbeenreallyimplementedandpeoplereturnedtotheirhomes,RSwouldhave been a different environment. Thatwas themain premise ofDayton,whichunfortunatelywasnotrealised.WecannotblameSerbsonly,CroatandBosniakleadersalsosharetheresponsibility”,claimsaninternationalofficial.


legal fact that today’sBiHwasnotcreatedbyunificationof twostatesbutthroughthechangeoftheinternalstructureoftheRepub-licofBiHrepresentsthebasisforlegalprotectionofBiHfromunilat-eralattemptsaimedatchangingitsstructureorborders.However,over theperiodof twentyyearsof implementationof theDaytonAgreement,boththisdocumentanditsimplementationmechanismschangedtosuchadegreethattheyagainenabledunilateralthreatstotheexistenceofBiH.


The Evolution of the Dayton Accord – April in Butmir at Sejdić and Finci’s

AlltheweaknessesandambiguitiesoftheDaytonAgreementsurfacedalreadyinthefirstmonthsofitsimplementation.Thefirstbigturninimplementationofthemilitaryaspects

oftheagreementwasachangeinthemandateoftheNATOPeaceCorpsinBiHinmid-1997,whentheStabilisationForces,SFOR,star-tedactively searching forandarrestingpersons indicted forwarcrimesbythe InternationalTribunal forWarCrimes intheformerYugoslaviaintheHague.Arrestingwarcrimesuspectshelped,toagreatdegree,toremovesomeofthemostradicalofficialsfromthepolitical, military and police structures. However, even two years later nosignificantresultswereachievedintermsofthecivilianaspectsofimplementation,andtheinternationalcommunitydecidedtoaccele-ratetheprogress.AttheconferenceinBonn,GermanyinDecember1997,thePeaceImplementationCouncil,whichsupervisestheworkoftheHighRepresentativeforBosniaandHerzegovina,decidedtoacceptawiderinterpretationoftheDaytonAgreementgivingtheHighRepresentativepowers to imposedecisions in thesituationswhenlocalleaderscannotreachanagreement,butalsotosanctionandifnecessarytoremovefrompositionthoseofficialswhoblockimplementationoftheAgreement.


Onlysixdayslater,on16December1997,theHighRepresenta-tiveCarlosWestendorpusedthesepowersforthefirsttimetoim-poseastronglycontestedLawonCitizenshipofBiH.Thiswasonlythefirstinaseriesofdecisionsthatfollowed.On04March1998,thefirstremovalofalocalofficialwasdonewhenthemayorofStolac,PeroRagužwasremovedfromoffice.Theseandmanyotherdeci-sionsmeantanewphaseintheevolutionoftheDaytonAgreementandengagementoftheinternationalcommunityinBiH.

Althoughtheinternationalcommunityfrequentlyblamedlead-ersinBiHforselectiveimplementationoftheDaytonAgreement,itdidthesame.SomeoftheprovisionsoftheAgreementthatwereneglectedby the international communityas it considered themtobeless important,now15-20years laterhaveseriousnegativeconsequencesforBiH.

Lookingfromtoday’sperspective,oneofthekeyoversightswasthefailureoftheinternationalcommunitytoensurethattheDaytonAgreementbeofficiallyadoptedbythestateandentityparliamentsin BiH.6Failingtodothat,BiHisstrandedwiththeso-calledoctroyedconstitution,which,20yearslater,isusedbythePresidentofRS,Milo-radDodik,asoneofthelegalbasesfornegationoftheexistinglegalframeworkinBiH.NegatingthehistoriccontinuityofBiH,DodikclaimsthatBosnianSerbshavetherighttoseparatefromBiHinareferendum.Ontheotherside,referringtothehistoriccontinuityofBiH,someof

6 “NeitherentitynorstateparliamentadoptedtheDaytonConstitution.Fromtoday’sperspective,itissomethingweshouldhavedone,butatthetimewehadother,moreimportantpriorities”,claimsaninternationalofficial.


theBosniakleadersclaimthatputtinganendtotheDaytonAgree-mentwouldmeanareturntothelegalsystemoftheRepublicofBiH.

Inasimilarmanner, theOfficeof theHighRepresentative re-frainedfromimplementationofalargerpartofAnnex9,AgreementonEstablishmentofBosniaandHerzegovinaPublicCorporations,whichwasconsideredtobefartoodemandingandwouldnotyieldsufficientbenefit.Dueto their income,ability to initiateprojects,largenumberofemployeesandoverallinfluenceonthelocalcom-munity,publicenterprisesoverthelast20yearshavebecomeoneofthemainmechanismsinthedivisionofthecountryandkeepingthecorruptedgovernmentsinpower.

Ontheotherhand,thedeterminationandengagementofthein-ternationalcommunityhascontributedtotheevolutionoftheoriginalDaytonwhich,forabriefperiodoftime,significantlyimprovedthefunctioningofgovernmentsatalladministrative levels,somethingwhichwasachievedboththroughtheactivitiesofthegovernmentsandparliamentsinBiHandthroughimposedsolutionsbytheHighRepresentative.Awiderangeofreformswereinitiatedthatconsider-ablychangedboththeDaytonAgreementandBiHitself.Bothentitiesagreedtoabolishentityarmiesandsecretservicesandestablishedjointarmedforcesandseveralsecurityagencies.TheCouncilofMin-istersofBiHgrewfromtwotonineministries.Inadditiontothecom-moncurrency,BiHintroducedacommonVATsystem.OneofthemostsignificantchangesoftheDaytonAgreementtookplaceinApril2002whentheHighRepresentative imposedamendmentstotheentityconstitutionsintroducingtheterm“constituentpeoples”.Aimedto


equalisetherightsofallthreeethnicgroupsovertheentireterritoryofBiH,thisdecisionhadfar-reachingconsequencesfortheFederationofBiHandtheentirecountry,asitremovedoneofthemechanismsforprotectionofCroatpolitical interests intheConstitutionoftheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina.

Upuntil2003,veryfewpeoplebelievedthatBiHwascapableofmovingforwardonitsown.Therefore,theOfficeofHighRepre-sentativelaunchedaresoluteactiontoreformandcentralisepoliceforces.Thisinitiative,whichdividedtheinternationalcommunity,wasunanimouslyrejectedbyboththegovernmentandtheoppositioninRepublikaSrpska.Simultaneously,theAmericanadministration,whichsinceitssigningwasthemainguarantoroftheimplementationoftheDaytonAgreement,was lookingforan“exitstrategy”fromBiHinordertobeabletodedicateitselftothegrowingcrisesintheMiddleEastandAfghanistan.ThebasisofsuchastrategyshouldhavebeenreformsoftheBiHConstitutioninitiatedbytheUSin2004.7

Theso-called“Aprilpackage” 8of theconstitutional reforms,althoughdisputedoveritspurposefulness,wasatthetimegenerally

7 “After the failureof theprocessesof returnof refugeesandpolice reform,emphasis was placed on constitutional reforms in order to change thestateof affairs through largermeasures.However, by criticizing theDaytonConstitution,we gave the local leaders room to question the substance ofDayton”,saysaninternationalofficial.

8 The April package included the reforms whereby the tripartite Presidencyshould have been replaced by an indirectly elected president with limitedpowers,withalargerpartoftheexecutivefunctionsbeingtransferredtothestateprimeminister.TheHouseofPeopleswouldhavebeenabolishedand


acceptedbythemajorityoftherulingpartiesandthepublicinBiH.However,inApril2006,itwasrejectedbytwovotesofrepresenta-tivesoftwominorpartieswhichuseditfortheirpromotionbeforethegeneralelectioninOctoberthesameyear.TheAprilpackagewasauniqueandpossiblyforalongtimethelastopportunitytoupgradetheDaytonAgreementbytherulingpoliticalelites.

Afteritsfailure,theso-called“Butmirpackage”9ofconstitutionalreformsinOctober2009andnegotiationsonconstitutionalreformsin2012concerningtheSejdić-Finci10 judgementshowedthat the

its functions transferred to the House of Representatives. These proposals,observed from the perspective of the situation in BiH in mid-2015 seemhardly attainable,while in 2006,many political parties thought of themasonlycosmeticchanges,whichonlyindicatesthedegreeofdeteriorationoftheinstitutionsandmechanismsinBiHinthisperiod.

9 TheUSandEUoffereda revised versionof the“April package” throughaseriesofhigh-levelmeetingswith the leadersofpoliticalparties inOctober2009.Theseamendments,knownasthe“Butmirpackage”,namedaftertheSarajevoairportwherethemeetingswereheld,werebasedonthesolutionsfrom the “April package”, taking into account subsequent comments bythe Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. However, from the verybeginningof thenegotiations, itwasclear that thepoliticalsituation inBiHhaddeterioratedtosuchadegreecomparedto2006andthatthepositionsandrequestsofthemajorityofpoliticalpartieshadradicalisedsomuchthattherewasnoreadinesstoachievethiskindofcompromise.Itwasalsoobviousthatasectionofthetextoftheproposalwasdraftedinhasteandsomeofthesolutionswerenotsufficientlyelaborated.Thiscontributedtothefailureofthisproposalwhichneverevenenteredtheparliamentaryprocedure.

10 SejdićandFinciv.BosniaandHerzegovinaisacourtcasebeforetheEuropeanCourt of Human Rights tried in the period from 2006 to 2009 based ontwoseparateapplicationsbyDervoSejdićandJakobFinciversusBosniaandHerzegovinawho,asmembersofminoritycommunities,werenotabletostand


politicalpositionsareevenfurtherapartandthatthere isnottheslightestchancethatagreementonfurtherconstitutional reformswouldbeachieved.Followingtheelectionsin2006,thediscourseandpoliticalpositionsinallofBiHwerefurtherradicalised.MiloradDodikandHarisSilajdžić,thetwopoliticalopponentsatthetime,pursuedstrongnationalistpositions in theirelectoral campaigns,whichsoonspreadtoalargepartofthepoliticalscene.

Inspiteofthefailureofthe“Aprilpackage”andradicalisa-tionofthepoliticalsituationinBiH,in2006,theAmericanadmin-istrationtransferredthemainresponsibility for implementationofthepeaceagreementinBiHtotheEU,whichalmostovernight“pro-moted”BiHfromacountryoffrozenconflictanddeepstructuralchangesintoaprospectivecandidateforEUmembership.ThethenHighRepresentativeforBiH,ChristianSchwarz-SchillingcametoBiHwiththemandatetodeclaretheDaytonAgreementimplementedandtoclosetheOfficeoftheHighRepresentative.

ConcernedbythecontinuousradicalisationofMiloradDodik,intheendof2006,Schwarz-Schillingproposedasetofsanctions

forelectiontothePresidencyofBosniaandHerzegovinaandHouseofPeoplesof Bosnia andHerzegovina. TheCourt, on 22December 2009, delivered ajudgement in favourofSejdićandFinci,orderingBiH institutions toamenddiscriminatoryprovisionsintheBiHConstitution.TheEUusedthisjudgementto exert new pressure on BiH leaders requesting adequate constitutionalreforms.Negotiationswithregardtothismatterwereheldforoverayearin2012and2013.However,itwasclearfromtheverybeginningthattheleadersoftherulingpoliticalpartiesonlystalledtheprocessandthattherewasnotanywillingnesswhatsoevertoachievecompromise.


againstDodikandhispoliticalpartyandsubmittedittothePeaceIm-plementationCouncilforconsideration.Severaldayslater,AmericandiplomatsinformedSchwarz-Schillingthattheywouldnotsupporttheproposedsanctions,asKosovowasexpectedtosoondeclareitsindependenceandtheUSdidnotwanttodealwithtwocrisesintheBalkansatthesametime.Eversince2008,EuropeanofficialshavebeentryingtoresolvethedeepeningcrisisinBiHthroughthetech-nicalprocessofEUaccession.However,eventhelatestinitiativebyBritishandGermandiplomatsinthesecondhalfof2014hasfailedsofartostopthecontinuousderogationofDaytonandtoreturnBiHleaderstothecourseofreformsandpotentialEUmembership.

Indolenceof the internationalcommunityencouragednotonlyDodikbutalsosomeotherBiHpoliticianswhostartedradicalis-ingtheirpositions.SomeofthepoliticalleadersofBosnianCroats,forthefirsttimeafteradeterminedactionoftheinternationalcom-munityagainsttheattempttore-establishHerzeg-Bosna in2001,promotedthisinitiativeinthecampaignforthegeneralelectionin2010.Subsequently,thisideaattractedincreasingsupportbycertainpoliticalmilieusinneighbouringCroatia,evenafterCroatiabecamethe28thEUmemberinJuly2013.SuchradicalisedpositionsoftheleadersofBosnianCroatswerethelaststrawfortheEUofficialswhounsuccessfullytriedin2012/2013tonegotiatereformsconcerningtheSejdić-Fincicase. 11

11 Inthecourseofalmostayearofnegotiations,EuropeanrequestspertainingtoBiHConstitutionreformswerereducedtoarequestforthesimplestpossiblesolution for theelectionofPresidencymembersandnumberofMPs in theHouse of Peoples. Not even a complete trivialisation of this reform led to


Ontheotherhand,theconstantradicalisationofDodik’sposi-tionsin2011resultedinhisinitiativetoholdareferendumtoques-tion theauthorityof theHighRepresentativeandBiHCourtandOfficeoftheProsecutor.Thistime,thecurrentHighRepresentativeinBiH,ValentinInzko,hadtheapprovaloftheUSandEuropeanad-ministrationsforasetofsanctionsagainstDodik.ThiswasexpectedandDodikhadcounter-measures,which includedthewithdrawalofallrepresentativesofRSfromBiHjointinstitutions.OpenpoliticalconflictbetweenDodikandtheinternationalcommunitywaspre-ventedatthelastmomentwhentheHighRepresentativeoftheEUforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicy,CatherineAshtoncametoBiHandagreedacompromisewithDodik–puttingthereferenduminitiativeonholdandinitiatingtheso-calledStructuredDialogueonJudiciaryReforminBiH.

EscalationofthecrisisinBiHcontinuedoverthenextfouryearsinspiteofEUeffortstostopitandguidelocalleaderstowardtheeconomicandsocialreformswhichwouldenableBiHtocontinuetheprocessofEuropean integration. InJuly2015,Dodikofficially

compromise.Themainreasonisthatthisissuewasalmostentirely“kidnapped”byBosnianCroatleaderswhotriedtousethisreformfortheestablishmentofaseparateCroatentitywithinBiH.Intheend,EuropeanandUSdiplomatsjointlypreparedanewsolutionbasedontheAmericanpresidencyelectionsthoughelectoral votes,whichwas designed to accommodate Croats as it basicallyguaranteedelectionoftherepresentativeoftheCroatDemocraticParty(HDZ)inthePresidency.ThissolutionwasacceptedbytherepresentativesofBosniaksandBosnianSerbs,but itwasrejectedwithoutanyfurtherconsiderationbythepresidentofHDZ,DraganČović,whichinpracticemeanttheendofthisEuropean Initiative. The EU never officially said that the HDZwas the onlypoliticalpartythatrejectedtheofferedsolution.


submittedaproposaltotheRSNationalAssemblytore-launchthereferendum initiativeso that the referendumcould takeplace inSeptember.ThisproposalwasacceptedbytheRSNationalAssem-bly.Bosniakssubmittedamotionfortheprotectionofvitalnationalinterests,anditwillbedecidedbytheConstitutionalCourtofRSandifnecessarytheBiHConstitutionalCourt. 12

12 “WepermittedDodiktocreateanalternativeDaytonAgreementbecauseweexpected the international communitywould succeed in the adoption of anewconstitution.Today,thatalternativeDaytonexists,whiletheconstitutionalreformwasabandoned”,saysoneinternationalofficial.


Dayton(s) Today – Three in One

Afterall thesenumeroussteps forwardandback, it seemsthatDaytonhasreturnedtoitsbeginnings.13Intheabsen-ceofanauthoritative internationalarbitrator,all localac-

torshaveagainestablishedtheirownrulesof thegame insistingonthoseaspectsof theDaytonAgreementwhichsuit themandignoringallothers.Eachoftheopposingsidesstandsbyitsradicalpositions,referringtotheirDaytonagreements.MiloradDodikto-dayacceptsonlytheoriginalDaytonfromDecember1995,whichdoesnotstipulateauthoritiesof theHighRepresentative,buthemaysoonquestionthattoo.LeadersofBosnianCroatswantatanycosttoreturntothesituationfromtheperiodpriorto2002,whentheamendmentstotheentityconstitutionswereimposed.Bosniakleadershipstilldreamsofacentralisedcountrywithavotingsystembasedontheprinciple“onemanonevote”,whichtheythinkthattheinternationalcommunitypromisedthemalongtimeago.TheHighRepresentative,whohas interpretedDaytonambiguitiesandshortcomingsforyearsandguaranteestheimplementationofthis

13 Noneoftheinternationalofficials, includingseniorstaffoftheOfficeoftheHighRepresentative,wasabletoassessthecurrentlevelofimplementationoftheDaytonAgreement,eitherasapercentageor inanyotherway.Theyallagreethatsomeelementsofthisdocumenthavebeenneglectedoverthepast20yearsbutalso that in someother segments, theDaytonAgreementhassignificantlydepartedfromtheinitialconcepts.Nevertheless,thisprogresswasstoppedandtheseaspectswentbackwardsalmosttothestartingpositions.Therefore many are of the opinion that the Dayton Agreement, withoutstrongerengagementoftheinternationalcommunity,isblockedorruined.


Agreement,stillclaimsthatonlytheHighRepresentativecanjudgewhichDaytonistherealoneandwhichisnot,butitseemsthathehaslostmuchofhisinfluence.

AlthoughthecriticismbyinternationalofficialsismostfrequentlyfocusedonradicalisationoftheauthoritiesinRS,otherrulingstruc-turesonotheradministrative levelsarenotfreeofblameeither.14 Oneof the indicatorsprovingthis fact is the listofa totalof80violationsoftheBiHConstitutionalCourtJudgementsintheperiodfrom2005-2013,indicatingthatthesejudgementswereviolatedbytheinstitutionsatthestatelevel,inbothentitiesandatthecantonaland municipal level.

TheOfficeoftheHighRepresentativecan,toacertaindegree,beblamedforthissituation,asoverthepasttwentyyearsitoftenexperimentedorundertookactivitieswithoutanyqualitycontrolandplayedvariousgameswithlocalactors.Inaddition,responsibilitycanbesoughtintherestoftheinternationalcommunitywhichcreatedtoday’sBiHas it is,withall itsambiguitiesandcontradictionsandleftitforgettingallthepainfulandexpensivelessonsitlearnedafterthefallofYugoslavia.However,thelargestresponsibilityliesintheBiHsocietyitself,whichbeingdivided,impoverishedandirrespon-siblecannotfindanexitfromthisDaytonlabyrinthandkeepsgoingaroundincirclesinflictingevermoredamagetoitself.

14 “Wearewitnessingratherconcerningtrends,strengtheningoftheinfluenceofradicalIslamamongBosniakleaders,rebirthoftheideaofestablishmentofathirdentityamongCroatpoliticiansandfurtherradicalisationconcerningtheseparationofRepublikaSrpska”,saysoneforeigndiplomat.


New Approach

ThecomplexityofthecrisisinBiH,particularlyinthecontextoftheworseningregionalandglobalsituation,impliesthattherearenosimplesolutionstothissituation.Apartofthe

internationalcommunityandlocalactorshavesofarfocusedontheshortcomingsoftheBiHConstitutionandnumerousrequestsforitsreform,neglectingthehistoricalcontextoftheDaytonAgreementand the fact that its deterioration is not somuch the result ofits shortcomingsbutofaconsciousdecisionof the internationalcommunitytorejectitsownresponsibilityforimplementationofthisagreement,althoughitwasitsmainelement.NumerousattemptstopursueconstitutionalreformsoverthepastseveralyearshaveclearlyshownthatthereisnotevenaminimumofpoliticalwillingnesstodoitandthatthereisnotevenonegenerallyacceptablecommonvisionofthefutureofBiH,whichisquintessentialforanysubstantialconstitutionalreform.ThereisnodoubtthatthereisaneedforaseriousreformoftheBiHConstitution,butinthecurrentsituation,anyfurthercriticismoftheConstitutioncanonlystrengthenradicalideasclaimingthatthisBiHisnotsustainableandthatithastofallapartandbedivided.

Ontheonehand,itisclearthatthesuccessfulimplementationoftheDaytonAgreementdependsontheactiveengagementoftheinternationalcommunityandthatthelocalsocietyhasneverbeenreadytoentirelytakeovertheautonomousgovernanceofthestate.Furtherinsistingonatotalownershipoftheprocesses,inasituation


whereallthreeethnic-politicalblocksplaybydifferentrulesandhavedifferentvisionsofthecountry’spast,presentandfuture,threatenstofurtherleadtodestabilisationorevenabreak-upofthecountry,whichwouldalmost certainly result innewethnic conflicts. Thisleadstotheconclusionthat,withoutstrongerandmoreconcreteinternationalengagement, itcannotbeexpectedthat thefurtherescalationofthecrisiswillbestoppedorthattherewillbeagradualstabilisationofthesituationinBiH.

Ontheotherhand,itisobviousthatanyactiveengagementoftheinternationalcommunitynotaccompaniedbygenuineinvolve-mentofthelocalactorscouldcausenewcomplicationsandprob-lems,whileearlierproblemswouldbeonly resolved temporarily,i.e.while the internationalcommunity iswillingtoguaranteethefunctioningofthelocalinstitutionswithitsauthority.TheauthorityoftheinternationalcommunityinBiHhasbeensignificantlydimin-ishedoverthepastnineyears,anditisimprobableitwillbeentirelyregainedwithoutsignificantstrengtheningofmilitary,security,diplo-maticandfinancialresources,whichisunlikelytohappenconsider-ingthattheworldpowersareengagedinmuchlargerglobalcrises.

Inconclusion,althoughstrengthenedengagementoftheinter-nationalcommunityinBiHisnecessary,thisshouldnotandcannotmeana return to imposed solutionsanddismissed localofficialsbyWesterndiplomats.Instead,theinternationalcommunityshouldpursueadifferentapproachcombiningthebestaspectsfromboththeactiveandpassiveperiodofinternationalengagement.Insteadofshort-termandshort-livedtacticalsolutions,thiswouldrequirea


strategicandlong-termapproach,basedonlocalownershipofre-formsandfocused,atthebeginning,onstrengtheningofeconomicandsocialbasesinBiH.However,itwouldalsohavetoincludelong-termmechanismsfortheprotectionoftheDaytonAgreementbytheinternationalcommunityuntiltheBiHsocietyismatureenoughandreadytochooseitsownuniqueroadtoexitthislabyrinth.

41

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONSTiTuTiONAl AND POliTiCAl lEgACy OF THE DAyTON AgrEEmENT

43

sTudy of reTurn of The sTaTe

nerzuk ćurak

44

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: Who stole the state from the Agreement?

This essay, like a cinematic flashback, takes us back into the past in one short

sequence in order to clarify the zero-point of “disappearance” of the state from

the peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and relate it to today’s context

of the utter absence of the state from social and political reality. Nerzuk Ćurak,

PhD, a professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, uses that silver

thread to point out the wrong premises of different political approaches which

are now trying to right a wrong by endeavoring to “bring the state back” into

the Dayton Agreement by the use of force. He rather, and rightfully so, focu-

ses on the importance of returning the state to Bosnians and Herzegovinians,

Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, and ‘others’, as well as to entities, cantons and muni-

cipalities. Dr. Ćurak clearly identifies how the pragmatic mind of the negotiation

process has temporarily pushed the state into the background, which ethnic

elites, encouraged by new constellations, obviously misunderstood for a conve-

nient chance to completely remove the state – abolish, terminate or euthanize

it, or on the other hand to force it and establish it as a platform for incinerating

entities… Both sides are wrong! This essay, 20 years after the signing of the

Dayton Peace Agreement, proposes the return of the state to Bosnia and

Herzegovina, not through the rule of people, but with the assistance of the

rule of law. Constitutional patriotism is also seen in this essay as an acceptable

model which can be strengthened by the EU with its soft power of transition and

the integration process. May we be helped to reach the unavoidable moment

of general conclusion - we all are Bosnia and Herzegovina! Everything else, as

the author points out, is in between!

45Study of return of the state

genesis of the Dayton equidistance

TheDaytonAgreementstoppedorganizedviolenceinBosniaandHerzegovina.That isthemost importantattributionofthiscontradictory international treaty.Heraldingpeace, the

saidAgreement,onthatalreadydistantNovember21,1995,roseaboveallthepreviousattemptsoftheinternationalcommunitytoforestallorrathertoendthewar.Cutileiro’smediation,theVance-Owenplan,theOwen-Stoltenbergplan,theWashingtonAgreementand theContactGroupplandidnotbringpeace toBosnia andHerzegovina,onthecontrary theyonly inspirednewcyclesofvi-olence.Thecauseofthisutterfailureofthepeacemediatorswasmorethanevident.TheUnitedStatesofAmericaapproachedtheBosnian-Herzegovinianissueinanirresponsibleandconformistway,adaptingtheirowndiplomaticstandardstothoseofothers.

ItwasonlywhentheytooktheleadingroleintheBosniancrisis,subordinatingotherBalkanpoliciestotheirownandrationalizingthepowerandimportanceofLondon,Paris,BerlinandMoscowintheBosnianconflict,thatmediationinpeacenegotiationsbetweenthewarringpartiestookamoreseriousturnandwastransformedfroman irresponsible internationalpromenade intoaseriousandresponsibleUSforeignpolicyinstrument.

Withaseriesofdiplomaticmaneuvers,skillfullyusingthecar-rot and stick (reward and punishment) negotiation technique,

46 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Nerzuk Ćurak

Washingtonbroughtthewarlordstothenegotiatingtable,convinc-ingitsalliesthattheUnitedStatescanandwillendthewarinBosniaandHerzegovinawiththeresponsibleassistanceoftheinternationalcommunity.WherethesluggishEuropeandiplomacyfailed,theag-gressive foreignpolicyof theplanet’s leadingpowerat the timesucceeded.ThepeaceagreementforBosniaandHerzegovinawasagreatforeignpolicysuccessoftheClintonadministrationwherewiththeWhiteHousehumiliatedotherplayersininternationalpolitics,convincingthemthattheUnitedStateswastheonlycontemporaryworldpowerwhichwieldsglobalstrength.

That this was so was confirmed by Milošević, Tuđman andIzetbegović,thewarleadersofthecountriesinconflict,who,eventhoughreluctantly,ambivalentlyandwithmixedfeelingsoftriumphanddefeat,wereforcedtosigntheirnamesontotheDaytondocu-ments.Uponthatcertificationofthetreaty,thearchitectoftheDay-tonPeaceAgreement,Clinton’senvoyforspecialdiplomaticopera-tions,RichardHolbrookecouldproudlyaskthePresidentoftheUSAtoannouncetheendofthewarinBosniaandHerzegovinaandthebeginningofalongpostconflictreconstructionofthecountry,forwhoselong-termsurvivalinhistorytheworld’sleadingsuperpowerwasreadytopledgeitssupremacistauthority.

Twentyyearsafter,thankstothatauthorityamongotherthings,BosniaandHerzegovinahasnotslippedoutofhistory,eventhoughitsinternaldesignderivedfromtheDaytonAgreementhasallowedforthegenerationofnarrativeswhichcompeteintheirrationalam-bitiontopermanentlypreventoneauthenticcountryfromexisting.


Nevertheless,inspiteoftheoverwhelmingintensityofpolitical,intel-ligenceandintellectualdenialofBosniaandHerzegovinabytheSer-bian,CroatianandBosniakpoliticalelites,BosniaandHerzegovinahas survived thanks to theDaytonAgreement,even though theConstitutionfromtheAgreementhasgivenlifetothegenerationoftheideathatthecountrywillnotsurvive.

ThisprimarilyreferstotheirritatinghandicapoftheConstitutionannexedtotheDaytonAgreement, reflected incontinuouspossi-bilitiesofdifferentinterpretationsthereof,withoutanywishoftheparticipantsintheprocesstoraisethedifferentinterpretationstoahigher levelofconsensualawarenessofstate-building.Ratherac-centuatedcasualnessininterpretationoftheConstitutionisaconse-quenceoftheAmericanpragmaticapproach,whichcountedonthestatetobebuiltundercontinuedUSpressure,whichshouldhave,regardlessoflooseconstitutionalnorms,resultedinstrengtheningofthestate;whyitdidnotweshallreadintheargumentsbelow.

Unfortunately, altered geopolitical circumstances, particularlyafterSeptember11,2001andtheterroristattackagainsttheUSA,have reducedAmerican interest inBosniaandHerzegovina,con-sequentlytheprocessof“stealingthestate”fromtheAgreementcouldstartwithoutanyhindrancewithinDayton’sdualarchitecture,which includesperverting theentities intoquasi statesand theirradical“statization”withtheclearobjectiveoftheprivilegedethnicelitestomakedualityofthestatethefinal,permanentandundeni-ablemaximumofstatehoodinBosniaandHerzegovina.Thatwouldnotbeaproblemiftheobjectiveofsuchpoliticalreasoningwere


thebuildingofastate(becauseastatecanbeconstitutedasahori-zontal,andnotjustaverticalplane,ifbuildingalawfulcommunityis therealobjective), ratherthan itsprevention,whichcausesthecitizensofBosniaandHerzegovinatosufferenormousdamage,astheyareleftatthemercyoftheegotismofpoliticalleaderswhosenineteenth-centuryunderstandingof thestatepreventspeople inBosniaandHerzegovinafromhavingastateattheirservice,apro-fessionalmediatorwithlife.


Affirmation, emancipation, reformation

Itwastheprocessofde-AmericanizationoftheAmericanBosniaandHerzegovinawhich,byreducingtheverysignificantpowerofWashington,hasgivenstrengthtosecessionistandunitaristideasofownershipofBosniaandHerzegovina,andtheclashofthosetwoideashassentthestateitselfintolimbo,abayouinwhichitisimpo-ssibletoaccomplishanythingimportantwhichshallnotbeannulledbytheghastlyworkoftheentitiesonthedestructionoftheirownstate. It is theparadoxofparadoxes.AlthoughthecontemporaryBosniaandHerzegovinaisaradicalexpressionofthepoweroftheentities,whichistosaytheinstitutionalnormativityofBosniaandHerzegovinaisrepresentedatthestatelevelasthewilloftheenti-ties,inactualpoliticalactivitiesthatsamestateisbeingdestroyedbythesamepeoplewhocreateditasitis.Itistragicthatthestatewhich isanexpressionof thewillof theentities is interpreted, intheethnickey,asanon-entitystate,asastateonitsown,asathirdvirtualentityinwhichactualentitiesarenotrepresentedatall.Suchapoliticalapproach,which,unfortunately,wentunopposedevenbythosewhosemandatewastosavetheDaytonstate(OHR),generatedapoliticalactivitypracticewhichenabledentitiestostealthestatefor themselvesbelievingthat theDaytonBosniaandHerzegovinaassuchisastateownedbytheentities,andnotaserviceforciti-zens.AccordingtotheHabermasversionofconstitutionalpatriotism,suchastateshouldinsteadconstituteareasonablepoliticalcommu-nitydevoidofethnicandentitypurposessincesuchpurposeshave


alreadybeenhonoredbytheinstitutionaldesignofthestatewhichfavorsethnicandentitydivision.

However,intheBosnian-Herzegovinianpoliticalgalimatias,itisimportanttonote,inreferencetooutsideplayerswhichhaveinflu-enceonthestate-building,thattheUSA,usingmultilateralinstru-mentsofinternationalaction,hasmanagedduringtheirtwenty-yearengagement inBosniaandHerzegovina todisseminate theirwillforthesurvivalandbuildingofaminimaliststate(butstillastate)inBosniaandHerzegovina,thereforeitisnoticeabletodaythatthewholewesternizedinternationalcommunity(notjusttheUSA),asthehegemonoftheAgreement,hasstood,withitsentirethreaten-ing,softandcleverpower,behindBosniaandHerzegovinaasastatewhichhastofindthestrengthtoemancipateitselfandarisefromthemudofunderstandingtheDaytonAgreementasanegationofthestateintotheattitudewhichseesDaytonasapossiblepointofaffirmationofbuildingaself-sustainablepoliticalcommunity.

Atendencywhichisnoticeableintheyearmarkingthetwenty-yearstatusofnewBosniaandHerzegovina,sponsoredby,forBosniaandHerzegovina,themostimportantinternationalplayers(EUandUSA),isthenthattempttobuildastateinBosniaandHerzegovi-nathroughsynchronizedstrategiesofstrengtheningthestability,marketliberalization,institutionalreformsandfurtherdevelopmentofcivilsocietywithabackgroundideaofdevelopingaprocess inwhichitwillnotbeimpossibletotransformthepoliticaldesignofthestatethroughconsensusofall relevantplayersbecause itwillbedemandednotonlybythemajorityofcitizenswantingto join


thetrans-Atlanticcommunityofstates,butbecausetheinstitutionaltransformationwillbedemandedbylifeitself,whichwill,withthesupportofdevelopmentofthedemocraticpoliticalculture,provoketheovercomingofartificialandirrationalinstitutionalarrangements.

Thisaforementionedopinion,whichcountsonanabsolutelycer-tainEuro-AtlanticfutureofBosniaandHerzegovina,isnotaresultofmysubjectivistbeliefthatitshallbeso,butitisratheranexpressionofobjectifiedsubjectivityonwhichfuturestudiesarebasedasadis-ciplinewhichresearchesthefuturethroughthequestionsoffuturedevelopmentsinthefieldsofpolitics,society,economics,technology,culture,ecologyandpopulation.Anticipationof thefuturepoliti-cal,political-geographic,economicandsocialmodelofBosniaandHerzegovinaisgeneratedfromunderstandingofthemodelofthefuture,aswellasfromtheawarenessthatwithoutincorporationoftheactivationandreformprincipleintothestructureoftheDaytonstate,theDaytonstatehasnofuture,butonlyabadpastwhichcon-stantlyrepeatsitself.ItisbecauseofthisthatthisinitialvisittothefutureshouldbeunderstoodasarequesttotheopinionmakerstocreatedescriptionsofthefuturesocietyinBosniaandHerzegovina,andthestateinwhichthatsocietywillexist,withtheaimofimprov-ing political and social planning and decision making.

Incorporationof theprincipleof the future intoourpresent,defacto,bringsthestatebackintotheAgreement,togetherwiththefollowingquestion:towhatextentisitpossible,intheexistinglimitingconditionsofaffirmationoftheDayton-createdBosniaandHerzegovinaasagenuinestatecapableofmakingdecisions,totake


advantageofthepotentialsexistingwithintheAgreementitselfandtobringthestatebackintotheAgreementfollowingtheideathatdivisionintotwoentitiesisonlyaformofinternalorganizationofthestate,andnotanegationofthestate,inotherwords,thattheentity-dividedBosniaandHerzegovinaisanintroductionintothefu-tureofthestate,andnotanintroductionintothenegationthereof.Therefore,letustrytoofferargumentswhichbringthestatebackintotheAgreement.


The integrating formula: we, ourselves (cantons, entities, ethnic groups, citizens) are Bosnia and Herzegovina

The (post)Daytonstate“celebrates”thisyear (2015) itsfirsttwentyyears.Oneofthekeyissuesraisedtothethinkingpe-opleinthecountry,region,Europe,andtheworld,is–have

thoseyearsbeeneatenbylocusts,i.e.arethosesimplyyearsinwhichthestatehasbeeneatenaway,powerlessbeforethepoweroftheinternalquasi-statesubjects?Inordertoofferapartoftheanswertothisquestion,it is importanttodiscerntheconstitutionalplaceintermsofterminologywhichblocksthegenuinebuildingofthestate.That is,arewesettingupadifferencebetweentheDaytonandthepost-DaytonBosniaandHerzegovina.Thisisnotarhetoricalquestion,orjustarhetoricalquestion.Theanswertothisdifference,ifitexists,andweshalltrytoprovethatitdoes,providesthenatureofanewBosnian-Herzegovinianparadigm.

What,actually,isthepointofthedilemmabeingraised?

Intermsofappearance, ineverydayspeech,politicalandjour-nalisticdiscourse,therearenoimportantdistinctionsbetweentheDaytonandthepost-DaytondefinitionofanyformofrealityintherecentBosniaandHerzegovina.TheDaytonrealitywasshapedbythegeopoliticsofthewar,whilethepost-Daytonrealitywasshaped


bythegeopoliticsofthepeaceprocess.TheDaytonmodelofun-derstatingBosniaandHerzegovinawasanout-of-warmodel,de-rivedfromthewar,asseenfromtheperspectiveofwar,conditionedby theoutcomeof thewar,and itprecedes thepost-warmodel,asseenfromtheperspectiveoftheupcomingpeaceprocess.Thepostwar(post-Dayton)model,unlimitedbyanydurationperiod,hasgraduallyfreeditselffromthewarasitsoriginalcause,theout-of-warmodelisdefinedbythewar,trappedinitsfinaloutcome.Thisdifference in termsof terminologyandconcepts isattemptingtointerestalltheparticipantsinthepoliticalgamesinBosniaandHer-zegovinatoadoptawin-winunderstandingofthepolitics,sothatthepost-Daytonnarrativecouldbecomeoneofintegration,andnotofdisintegration,andsothatrulingpoliticalstructurescouldfinallyproduceoneparticularconsensuswhichreconcilestheideaofthepost-dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina as a more permanent category withtheideaofbuildingagenuinestate.That,initsmostgeneralsense,isaguidelineforthePeaceAgreement,ormoreimportantlyfortheConstitutioncreatedbythesaidagreement,toembraceBos-nia and Herzegovina as a state, and not as an empty concept under theauspicesoftheentities.

Operationalizationofsuchanattitudewouldincludenewread-ingsof the internationalengagement,withrecommendationsforthatengagement tobe radicallypassivizedandpassively radical-ized. radical passivation would include a long-term moratorium on changingthestructureof thepost-Daytonstate,whichstrength-ensthepoliticalplayersresistingcentralizationandunitarization.Atthesametime,the internationalcommunityopenstheprocessof


passiveradicalization, i.e. itcreatesconditionswithintheexistingpost-Daytonframeworkofalong-termgeneralpoliticalimmobilitytoacceleratetheprocesseswhichwillturnthepost-Daytonstruc-tureintoastatewhichgoesbeyonditsdefinitionofbeingasimplemechanical sumof twoentities.That is just thewin-winstrategyweneed,as itwasformulatedbyoneof the leadingtheoristsofstrategy,AndreBeaufre,thesparkofgeniusandthatstepwasoftentaken.However,geniusismostoftenonlylongpatience.Divineornot,strategymustbeaccessibletothinking,reasoning…Ibelievethattheessenceofthestrategyisinanabstractgame,whichreliesonslowness,commonsenseandcunningmind inordertofindamodusvivendiforbuildingthestate.

Metaphoricallyandsymbolically,ifwetranslatethisrequestintothelogicofbuildingsocialtrustasthemostimportantelementofthemissingcohesivesocialcapital,thatwouldmeanthatwhencitizenslivingintheRepublikaSrpskasay‘state’,theydonottalkabouttheentity,butaboutthestate,andwhencitizenslivingintheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovinasay‘state’,theydonottalkaboutthestatewithoutany,orwiththree,entities,butaboutthestatewhichis,whichby itsmereexistencemakesus recognizeandacknowl-edgeitasComradeLeninusedtosay.AndtocontinueinthespiritofLenin,whattodo,then,howtomakeonestepforwardwithoutmakingittwostepsbackward?

DetectingthecausesofwhythestatehasbeendrawnoutofthePeaceAgreementcanhelp.Thefirstlevelofdetectionincludesreal-izationthatthestate,aswealreadynotedabove,hasbeen“stolen”


bytheAmericanpragmaticmind,convincedthatapoliticalcommu-nitycanbebuiltonanyplatformofpeace,ifsuchbuildingisstimu-latedbyWashingtonwithitscomprehensiveauthority.Initsinitialsensethatistrue,ifthesaidauthority,regardlessofdifferentgeopo-liticalchangesandcircumstances,remainsloyaltoitsoriginalintent,whichisalong-termsupportofstate-buildingusingthestrategiesofselectivemultilateralism,pragmaticinternationalismandbilateralalliancewithBosniaandHerzegovina.However,alteredgeopoliticalcircumstanceshavediminishedtheinterestoftheUSinBosniaandHerzegovinatothelevelofsecuritymanagement,actuallyupuntilthepreviousyear,sothestate-buildingcollapsed.Intheplacewherethesecuritydilemma isstronger thanthedevelopmentone–thestate,defacto,sufferstheconsequencesofitstrappedstatus,i.e.theformofexistenceofthestateinthePeaceAgreementissuchthatwetalkabouttheabsenceofthestatethroughitspresenceandthepresenceofthestatethroughitsabsence.Forexample,letustakealookattheArmedForcesofBosniaandHerzegovina.Theyareatypicalexampleofabsenceofthestatethrough itspresence.TheArmedForcesdonotreflecttheparticularpresenceofthestate,butratheritsabsence,althoughtheyareastateorganizationparexcel-lence.UnliketheArmedForces,thepolicestructuresareatomized,wecanalmosttalkaboutasortofanarchicsynthesisofhierarchicalinstitutionsinwhichtheabsenceofstateprevails,butthestateis,unwillingly,presentthroughitsabsence,whichisparticularlyvisibleinemergencysituations.SuchaformofexistenceofthestatemakesthePeaceAgreement,ininterpretation,olderthanthepoliticalcom-munityitself,whichis,ontheonehand,amarginalizedabsurdity,and,ontheother,atriumphoftheAmericanpragmaticmindwhich


spreadoutontotheinternationalcommunity,demandingfromthedomesticplayers that theybuilda statewhichdoesnot toleraterestorationofpre-Daytonnarratives,as theyareawasteof time,and,atthesametime,itstilltreatsthepost-DaytonnarrativesasacontinuationofthelonghistoricexistenceofBosniaandHerzegovinaandnotasazero-pointofstate-building.


instructions for interpretation of state

ThemicroanalysisaboveimpliesUSloyaltytoitsmostsucce-ssfulpost-ColdWarinternationalproject(therehasbeennorenewalofviolencewhichisthekeycriterionforevaluating

success)but,havinginmindtheaprioriirrelevancyofBosniaandHerzegovinaonthegeopoliticalmapof theworld, theUS loyaltytoBosniaandHerzegovinaasof2001hasbeenmoreofavalue(silentstimulationtobuildingastate inwhichdifferencesarenotanobstacletoacommonpointofview),securityandeconomicna-ture,andlessofaforcingandimposingnature,whichhassloweddownthebuildingofthepost-DaytonBosniaandHerzegovinaasacommunity, running as a us propelled engine. However, it is an en-couragingpieceofnewsthattheUSA,eventhoughtheyabandonedBosniaandHerzegovinatotheEuropeanUnion,andtoasomewhatlesserextenttoTurkeyandRussia,isonceagainpresentwithanewenergyof loyaltytostate-building,whichwasemphaticallyexpre-ssedbytheUSAmbassadortoBosnia,MaureenE.Cormack,inherspeechduringherIndependenceDayreceptiononJuly1thisyearinSarajevo:“WeseehereinBosniaandHerzegovinahowthisjourney,onethathasdefinedAmerica’shistory,isnotoursalone.MadelineAlbrightsaidtwodecadesagohereinSarajevo,thatBosniansandHerzegovinians,andAmericans,arepeoplesoftwocountriesunited,“bytheconvictionthatallraces,creeds,andethnicoriginscanlivetogetherproductively,freely,andinpeace.”Indeed,thatiswhoweareatourbest-peoplesoftwocountries,madeupofmany,who


honorandcherishourhistoryanddiversetraditionsbutwhorefusetobeboundbythem.Workingtogetherwithinadiversesociety,dec-laringindependencefromtheburdensofthepast,ensuringthatthewordsdemocracyandopportunitymeansomethingforallcitizens:thesearedifficultchallenges.Butinsomanyrespects,theyareourcommonchallenges.”TheseindeedareencouragingwordsinwhichwecanreadaconvictionthatAmericashallnottireandgiveuponBosniaandHerzegovinaasacommunityofallitsethnicitiesandpe-ople,whichinturnwillencouragepoliticalplayersinthecountytostopwiththeirirrationalsecessionistpolitics,butalsowithirrationalunitaristpolitics,whichis,althoughlessvisible,stillpresentinthepoliticalandculturalmilieuofthecountryasanintellectualpoison.

ThesecondlevelofargumentationconcernstheimpotenceofthestatetoturntoitsadvantagethemostnegativefeatureoftheDaytonAgreement,andthatisthealreadymentionedpossibilityofdifferentinterpretationoftheAgreementanditsAnnexes,whichinmymindisacolossaloversightwhichallowsethnicplayersconstantrepetitionofpre-DaytonnarrativesastheDaytonones.ConsequentlyasthesecondsubjectofstealingthestatefromtheAgreement,wehave interpretationsof itspoliticaland legalnormsaswellas in-terpreterswho,throughlegislative,executiveandjudicialauthoritystructures,togetherwitheducationandmediasupport,havegener-atedtheconvictionabouttheDaytonAgreementthatitissomethingwhichisnotpermanentlybinding.

This irritatingsimplificationof the international treatycreatesastate inwhichprevail lawlessness, false legalizationofpolitical


power,constantaccusationsamongthepoliticalplayerswithallofthembeingconvincedthatthelawisontheirside,etc.ThatisthecrucialprocesswhichhasresultedintheretreatofthestatetothemarginsofthePeaceAgreementandtheConstitution.Inordertostopthispractice,theOHR,astheguardianofthestateinthepost-Daytonperiod,onthewingsoftheWesternpoliticalpower,should,usingtheforemost legalminds,offerauthentic interpretationnotonlyofindividualprovisionsoftheAgreementwhentheybecomeanissuebecauseofanti-Daytonactivitiesofthepoliticalplayers,butalsoacomprehensiveusermanualforinterpretingtheDaytonPeaceAgreementanditsConstitution,whichwouldcreateconditionsforreductionofdifferentinterpretationsofthePeaceAgreementinthefieldofpolitics.Forexample,whydoesn’ttheOHRofferabindinginterpretationoftheconstitutionalpreambleonthecontinuityofthestateanditsholidays?ShouldtheDayton-createdstatecelebratetheholidaysofthepreviousBosniaandHerzegovinaupuntiltheDaytonBosniaandHerzegovinapassesitsownlawonholidays?Thoseinfavorofintegrationwouldsayyes,thoseagainstwouldsayno.Thegoalofthisproposalistosendtotheaddressesofpoliticalsubjectsarequesttoimplementtheconstitutionalnorm,regardlessofwhatthatnormlookslike.

Consequently,thisapproachshouldencompassallthecontentsoftheDaytonAccordsinordertoprotectthestructureofthestateandtoreducedifferent interpretationsof thesame legalnormtoaminimum.This,inturn,wouldstrengthenthepost-Daytonstatewhichwouldfinallybeprotectedbya clear legal interpretation,whichwouldimplythatwithinthedevelopmentoftheconstitutional


politicalculture,conditionsarebeingcreatedformercilessposition-ingoftheConstitutionalCourtofBosniaandHerzegovinaastheindisputableinstancewhichcanbuildasubsumingcapacityfortheinstrumentsofactionoftheinternationalcommunity,ortheCourtitselfcouldbecomethesubsuminginstitutionfortheOHR.

TheaforementionedpossibilityofdifferentinterpretationsoftheConstitutionandthedecisionsoftheConstitutionalCourtofBosniaandHerzegovinaistheimportantfactorwhichpreventstheinstitu-tionsof the internationalcommunity fromwithdrawing fromthecountry,astheConstitutionalCourtisfarfromreachingthatdeci-sion-makingleveloftheOHR,which,eventhoughitrarelyimposesanydecision,stillhasthatpowerbehinditsstatus.ThisisthepowerwhichenablestheOHRtocreateconditionsforasingleinterpreta-tionoftheconstitutionalnorms,whichmeansthattheOHRhastherighttoprotecttheDaytonConstitution,butnotadhoc,insteaditshouldbedoneinadvanceandcomprehensively,followingtheideasofMauriceJolywhoascribesthefollowingthoughttoMachiavelli:“Andwherehaveyoueverseenthataconstitution,trulyworthyofthename,trulydurable,hasbeentheresultofpopulardeliberations?Aconstitutionmustcomefully formedfromtheheadofasinglepersonoritismerelyaworkcondemnedtonothingness.Withouthomogeneity,without the liaisonof itsparties,withoutpracticalforce,itwouldnecessarilycarrytheimprintsofalltheweaknessesoftheviewsthatpresidedoveritsdrafting.Onceagain:aconstitu-tioncanonlybetheworkofasingleperson;neverhavethingsbeendoneotherwise;Icancallaswitnessesallofthefoundersofempire...Solon,Lycurgus,Charlemagne,FredericII,PetertheGreat.”Ifthis


approachismissingfromtheOHR’sactions,thentheconditionshavetobecreatedfortheConstitutionalCourtofBosniaandHerzegovinatohavesuchanapproach(tobeonesinglehead)withoutanypos-sibilityofpoliticalrelativization,ignorance,andthelike.

ThethirdlevelofargumentationconcernstheEuropeanUnionasthesecondsegmentofthepro-WesterninternationalcommunityinBosniaandHerzegovinawithakeyquestion:hastheEuropeantake-overoftheAmericanproject,withoutsignificantinterventionintheproject,eventhoughtheprojectitself(theDaytonAccords)defiestheEuropeanpoliticallogic,setbacktheprocessofEuropeanizationoftheDayton-createdBosniaandHerzegovina?Theperennialinsis-tenceof theEUonthenormative-institutional-technicalapproachattheexpenseofbuildingapoliticallystablestatehasdegradedthepositionofthestate,somuchsothatthebroaddemocraticdiscus-sionontechnicalandnormativeaspectsofEuropeanizationofthecountryhasemergedasanopponentofthestate.

Ididnotexpectthatanalytictoolswouldleadmetoanicheofparadoxes:throughtheEU’sapproach,democracyhasbeentrans-formedintoaresourceagainststate-building.However,thegeo-po-liticalcircumstancesofthecontemporaryworld,althoughessentiallynegative,astheyproduceviolenceindifferentpartsoftheworld,haveinfluencedthechangeoftheEuropeanparadigmtowardsBos-niaandHerzegovina,sothatthroughnewapproachessuchastheGermaninitiative,theEUsendsamessagethatthepoliticalcriterionisbecoming,20yearsafter theDaytonAgreement,equally ifnotmoreimportantthanthenormativecriterion,whichwillonlyserve


tostrengthenthedemocraticpotentialsofBosniaandHerzegovinaasastatewhich,realizingthatitisastate,andnotthatitislikeastateexpandsitsfieldforauthenticmanifestationofdemocracy.

However,astheswordofDamoclesabovealltheseopportunitieswhichappearbeforethislittleBalkanfledgling,therestandsaret-rogradevectorofanachronous,rotten,irresponsible,incompetent,parochial,corrupt,aristocraticquasieliteswhoperceivethechanceoftheirexistenceandsurvivalinblockingthedevelopmentofadem-ocraticpoliticalculturethroughorganizedethnicdeviation,withtheaimofpermanentlyreproducingirresponsiblegovernmentwhichisontheothersideofbelongingtothebeltofdevelopedtransatlanticdemocraticandworkingcultures.ItisexactlybecauseofthefactthattheDaytonPeaceAgreementanditsconstitutioncreatedthepos-sibilityofastrongdestructiveimpactoftheworstpoliticalstructuresontheconstitutionalnorm,thatwehavetocreateconditions,aboutwhichIhavetriedtodebateinthistext,toreplacetheruleofpeoplewiththeruleoflawasanabstractimpersonalprinciple,asthatisthebestwaytopreventproductionoffalse,cronyist,familial,andquasi-aristocraticandIdonotknowwhatotherreductioniststatesinwhichethnicbackgroundwillbetheonlycompetenceimportantforsocialpromotion.Historyisoverflowingwithgraveyardsofcountrieswhichweregovernedbytheprincipleoftheruleofpeople,buthis-toryisalsofulloftheexamplesofcountrieswhichareamongthemostsuccessfulbecausetheyaregovernedbytheruleoflaw.

Twentyyearsafterconstitutionof thepeacetreaty forBosniaandHerzegovina, Iamanopti-pessimist. Ibuildmyoptimismon


lifesignswhichdirectusincontrovertiblytothepathofbuildingthestatewhichdemonstratesitsvitalityevenwhenallofitsparametersarefailing.Thatisenoughforasmartpersontobuildacommunityforthemselvesandothers.Ifeelpessimisticbecauseofinadequatedecisionmakerswho refuse toemancipate themselvesand theirvoters,persuadingthemthattheprimalbelongingtoatribeismoreimportantthanciviccivility,freedomandjustice.

Betweenthosewhohavefaithandthosewhodonotthereareagnostics.Betweenoptimistsandpessimists thereareopti-pessi-mists.Thatisarationalchoice20yearsafterDayton.Inbetween.

65

faTe of The sTaTe in The characTer of The PeoPLe

Đorđe vuković

66

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: How to restore Trust in Democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Is the chronic instability of the Dayton political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina

anchored in a major identification drama, wherein for two decades collective

consciousnesses and their democratically elected political elites, instead of

competing with one another to advance things for the public benefit, effecti-

vely engage in a merciless struggle to overthrow the existing Dayton order, so

that each can build a “better one” for itself ? To what extent is this permanent

crisis actually helping create a climate of general distrust towards other peo-

ples, fellow citizens, the system itself, and politicians…? Perhaps the biggest

problem is the latent dimension of the potential for conflict, present in the

collective consciousnesses, political mentalities, and authoritarian attributes of

the political culture. Of course, this happens elsewhere, but not always at the

expense of the core democratization! There can be no core democratization

in Bosnia and Herzegovina without a change in the political culture on both

sides – not only among the politicians and government officials, but also in

the non-governmental sector, in the media and among the citizens! Dr. Đorđe

Vuković, assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Banja Luka

and a publicist, proposes a two-phase solution.

67Fate of the state in the character of the people

Emancipation of “murderous identities”

Twodecadesaftertheendofwar,whichdoesnotceasetopro-vokevarious,almostinsurmountabledisputesoveritscausesandcharacter,butmanagestoevokesharedconsciousness

of itsbeingthemostfrighteningandmosttragic inter-nationalityconflictinEuropesinceWorldWarII,BosniaandHerzegovinastillseekstoachievepoliticalstability, internal legitimacy,andbalanceandharmonybetweenandamongethniccommunities,andtobuildandstrengthencivilsocietyanddemocraticpoliticalculture.

EventhoughitspoliticalrepresentativesrepeatedlydeclarethatsocialrecoveryanddemocraticprospectcanonlybeachievedwithstrongsupportbymajorpowersandmembershipintheEuropeanUnion,BosniaandHerzegovinaisstillburdenednotonlywithgal-lopingpoverty,adevastatedandruinedeconomy,andhighlevelsofcrimeandcorruption,butalsowithdeepinter-ethnicantagonismsanddistrust,utterlyopposinginterpretationsofsharedhistory,andevenbycontroversialandmutuallyexclusiveviews regarding themodelof internalorganizationandtheconstitutional frameworkbasedon theDaytonPeaceAgreement.Thisagreementhasputanendto thekillings,but theconflictshavecontinuedbyothermeans,andarestillongoing,withchanges in their intensityanddynamics. Theyaremanifested ineachpolitical and social crisis,duringelectoralcampaigns,inpoliticaldebates,inmediareportsoncurrentsocial issuesandprocesses,andsoon.Holidays,symbols,

68 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Đorđe Vuković

andpublicceremoniesthatheightenmattersofstate,regional,orreligious importancehabituallybecomepretextsfortheflaringupofconflictsbetweennationalities.Thelatentdimensionofthepo-tential forconflict isembedded in thecollectiveconsciousnesses,politicalmentalities,authoritativecharacterofthepoliticalculture,formalandinformalmodalitiesofsocialization,widespreadandos-sifiedprejudicesandstereotypes,andeveninthenatureofnationalidentitiesasarticulatedatpresentandtheir inter-connectedness.ImperfectionsoftheDaytonAgreement,constitutionalambiguities,voidsandcontradictions,and,aboveall,adistinctlylowlevel,ifnotcompleteabsenceofthepotentialfordemocracy,notonlyonthepartofthepoliticalelites,butalsoinlargesegmentsofthepopula-tion,renderBosniaandHerzegovinafertileforinter-ethnicintoler-ance,verbalandphysicalviolence,andcontinuingpoliticalinstability.Fortwentyyears,thispotentialforconflicthasgreatlybenefitedthepoliticalelites,whoperpetuate,superchargeandmanipulate it inordertorotateand/orstayinpower,whilethepeoplesandcitizensalikesinkintoeverdeeperagonyanddespair.Scientific,intellectual,andculturalcommunitiesnotonlyfailtoscrutinizetheunderlyingcausesofthissituationandwarnoftheirdisruptiveanddevastatingconsequences,butalsosignificantlycontributetothedeepeningandflaringupofintra-nationalandespeciallyofinter-ethnicconflicts.

Thequestionnowarisesastohowtochangethissituationandovercome theconflicts;howtobuildandstrengthendemocraticinstitutionsandprocedureswhilesimultaneouslyachievinganap-propriatedegreeofpoliticalunityandcohesion,whichwouldensurestableandprosperouslifetothecitizensandpeoplesinBosniaand


Herzegovina,and,ultimately,theiraccessiontothegreatcommunityof theEuropeannations.Whilemanyseekanswers to theseandsimilarquestionsinexhausting,oftenfutilediscussionsofthedailypoliticsonunconditionalabolitionoruncriticalcarvingoftheDaytonAgreementinstone, it isquiteclearthatcoresolutionsareintheso-calledsoftwarecontent,firstofall,inacreativeandresponsibleendeavor to make mutual relations civilized and cultivated and to taketraditionalcollectiveidentitiesasunavoidableandundeniablesocialfacts,thatgetmodernizedandmergedintoasingle,or,betteryet, sharedBosnian-Herzegovinianpoliticalandcultural standard,whichwouldbeembracedasasuperstructureoverparticularself-interpretationsandself-identificationsofnationalcommunitiesandwouldbebasedonmutualrecognition,respect,andaffirmation.Ashared identityofBosniaandHerzegovinadoesnotexist,and itscitizensandpeoplesarefacingadilemmaofwhethertheywantandareabletobuildit,inthetimetocomeandwiththeexistinglevelofpoliticalcultureandthecurrentethnic-nationalandreligiousidenti-fiers.Thesurvivingidentitiesareburdenedbytragichistoricalexperi-ences, distorted and neglected cultural modalities, ideological com-promises,andchallengesofdailypolitics.Theyhavestrongandgravepotentialformanifestingthemselvesas“murderousidentities”1 and

1 French-LibyanwriterAminMaalouf refers to“murderous identities”,wherethe identityofaperson is reduced toa singlebelonging, thusencouragingpeopletoengageinbiased,intolerant,commandeering,andsometimesevensuicidalbehavior, turningtheminto“murderersorsupporters thereof”. (Formoredetails,seeMaalouf’sbook“IntheNameofIdentity”(Ubilačkiidentiteti),Belgrade,Paideia,2003)


“narcissismofminordifferences”2. In this socialandculturalen-vironment, it iseasytomanipulatewithwartraumas, thefearofunitarization(mostpronouncedinmostoftheSerbsandtheCroats)or fearofdissolutionof the state (mostpronouncedamong theBosniaks),fearoflosingnationalandculturalidentity(pronouncedinallthreeconstituentpeoples),etc.Ultimately,asaresultofthisstateofcollectiveconsciousness,politicscomesdowntoazero-sumgame,withnoroomforcompromise,becauseanyconcessionwhat-soevertoanyonesideisseenasadefeatoftheother,happinessofonegroupmeansunhappinessof theother,whileconfrontingone’sownpast,acceptingresponsibilityanddivergingfromwartimegoalsaredeemedastreachery,andsoon.Forthisreason,insteadofcontinuingtobroadenthedifferencesanddivisionsontheissuesoffundamentalconstitutionalreforms,itwouldbemuchbettertoiniti-atetheprocessesoftruedialogue,enlightenment,cultivationandenrichmentofthesocialenvironment,whilereckoninginadecisiveanduncompromisingmannerwithprimitivenationalism,chauvinism,authoritarianism,andutterunconcern.This is thetaskputbeforethepoliticalplayers,butitisalsoputbeforeculturalandintellectualcommunities,educationassociations,schoolsanduniversities,non-governmental organizations, and every single individual.

2 This term of Sigmund Freud is very often used when describing identitydramas in the territoryof the formerYugoslavia, inparticular inBosniaandHerzegovina.InhisworkGroupPsychologyandtheAnalysisoftheEgo,Freudarguesthatcohesionofagroupincreasesifitcomesacrossanopposinggroupthatissufficientlysimilarordifferenttocementinternalboundariesasexternalhatred.Groupsthataredifficulttotellapartinsertviolenceinordertocreateidentityboundariesandoveremphasizetheirdifferences.


Authoritarian Heritage as Obstacle to Building of Democratic institutions

A long time ago, the American political scientist GabrielAlmond,announcingthecomingpoliticalandsocialproce-ssesinEasternEurope,forewarnedthatthemainproblem

wouldbeinadequatepoliticalculture.Thiswaslaterconfirmedbytheresultsofresearch3carriedoutbytheEuropeanInstitutefromSussexinthecountriesfacingaccessiontotheEuropeanUnioninthe late20th and early 21stcentury.ResearchersMaryKaldorandIvanVejvodahavepointedoutthatthemajor internalobstacletothebuildingofdemocraticinstitutions,rules,andproceduresistheabsenceofdemocraticpoliticalculture,andthat,whenitcomestoinfluenceofexternalfactors,atthisparticularlysensitivestagetheaccentisonthewillingnessoftheWesttohelpthemresistregre-ssingtototalitarianism,authoritarianism,andpopulism,whicharestillsignificantlypresentinthesesocieties.

3 The researchwas conducted in10countriesofCentral andEasternEurope(Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria,Latvia,Lithuania,andEstonia).Theexpertsstudiedthepositionandfunctioningof political institutions in countries that have, after the fall of socialism,demonstratedclearpoliticalwillfordemocratizationandEuropeanintegration,intheperiodbetween1989and2000.AllofthemarenowmembersoftheEuropeanUnion. (Formoredetails, see:MaryKaldor, IvanVejvoda,“Past intheEast,FutureintheWest:DemocratizationinCentralandEasternEurope”(Prošlost na Istoku, budućnost na Zapadu: demokratizacija u Centralnoj iIstočnojEvropi),Zavodzaudžbenikeinastavnasredstva,Belgrade,2001).


Discerningbetweenformal(pertainingtoinstitutionsandproce-duresofdemocracy)andsubstantial(politicalequality,separationofpowers,andpoliticalcultureofdemocraticparticipation)democracy,KaldorandVejvodahavefoundthatforalltencountries,whichwerecandidatesforaccessiontotheEuropeanUnion,itcanbesaidthattoasignificantextenttheydomeetthecriterion4offormaldemocracy,buttherearemanyweaknesseswhenitcomestothemarkersofsub-stantialdemocracy.Thisprimarilypertainstoinsufficientlydevelopedjudiciaryandinadequatelawenforcement,politicizedandclientelis-ticadministration,stronggovernmentinfluenceonthemassmedia,andevenracismandxenophobia,whichanchorpopulism,andsenseofpersonalandcollectiveinsecurity.Theresearchersconcludethattheabsenceofdemocraticculture inEasternEuropeancountriesisadirectconsequenceofthelackofactivecitizenryasacounter-balanceforthesaidtendencies.Eventhoughthesecountrieshavenumerousnon-governmentalorganizations,theirroleisquiteweak.Theconsequencesoftheirtotalitarianpoliticalhistoryarealowlevelofpoliticalengagement,mistrustinpoliticiansandbureaucrats,andpoliticalpartieswhichlackstrongactivemembership.

Many research scientists from the territoryof the formerYu-goslavia (IvanŠiber,ZagorkaGolubović,VladimirVujčić,Vladimir

4 Theresearchersfocusedonasetof“minimumproceduralconditions”definedbyAmericanpoliticalscientistRobertDahlinhisbook“DilemmasofPluralistDemocracy”, thesebeing the followingcharacteristics:1) inclusive suffrage,2) ruleof law,3) separationofpowers,4) electedofficials,5) freeand fairelections,6)freedomofexpressionandalternativesourcesofinformation,7)associationalautonomy,and8)civiliancontrolovernationalsecurity.


Pavićević,VojislavStanovčić,NenadKecmanović,andothers)havefoundstrongelementsofpaternalrelations,aconservativeroleofpolitics,mythological euphoria and religious exclusiveness to befundamentalattributesofthepoliticalcultureprevailingintheter-ritoryofBosniaandHerzegovinaand its immediatesurroundings.Commontothepeoplewhohavefordecades lived inthesharedstateareinflatedtraditionalformsofethnicconsciousness,petrifiedsocialstructureandalowlevelofsocialmobility,authoritarianrela-tionsinpolitics, intheworkandfamilyenvironment,etc.PoliticalanthropologistZagorkaGolubovićpointsoutthattheauthoritarianregime5isanchoredintheauthoritariancharacterofthesocietyandauthoritarianmentality,whichischaracterizedbytraditionalism,con-servatism,conformism,prejudices,andstereotypes,soitdoesnotbreedpersonsreadytostandupfortheirrights.WithoutacultureofdemocracyinBosniaandHerzegovina,thecitizenscannotplayanactualparticipatoryrole,andthesystemisdoomedtoundergole-gitimacycrises.Thefunctionofthecivilsocietyistomobilizepeopletodefendtheirpersonal,political,andsocialrights,guidedbythevaluesoffreedom,equality,justice,tolerance,solidarity,etc.

5 Inher2004Article“AuthoritarianHeritageandObstaclestoDevelopmentofCivilSocietyandDemocraticPoliticalCulture”(Autoritarnonasljeđeipreprekezarazvojcivilnogdruštvaidemokratskepolitičkekulture),ZagorkaGolubovićarguesthatpopulismandnationalismconstitutethereferenceframeworkforan authoritarian order, inwhich charismatic leadersmanipulate themassesandproclaimethnicandnationalinterestsasgeneralsocietalinterests.“Suchsociety is closed and hostile towards differences, to be able to defend itsnarrowethnicornationalidentitybeforeanallegedthreatofpenetrationofotherculturesandtheirvalues”(Golubović,p.233).


Inorder toexaminetransitionalprocesses in theBalkans,nu-meroushistoricaldeterminantsandcomplexdynamicsof the linkbetweenboostednationalismanddemocraticambitionsmustbetakenintoconsideration.Inhisbook“ReflectionsontheRevolutioninEurope”(1990),sociologistRalfDahrendorfexplainstheprocessesoverthelastdecadeofthe20thcenturybythetheoryofdemocraticrevolution (swiftandradical transformation).Heuses this term inreferencetotheeventsinBerlin,Prague,andBucharest,emphasiz-ing,however,thatthepluralistrevolutionof1989hasnotgivenbirthtoanysubstantialnewideas,butratheritconstituteddismissalofhardexistential realityandreaffirmationofold ideals.Dahrendorfarguesthatthesocialpowersofthecitizenryareessentialforprog-ress,asisfreedomofchoice,asbothrequireentrepreneurialinitia-tiveand innovative spirit.Havingobserved thedecadenceof theoldpolitics,thecollapseofcommunism,anddepletionofthesocialdemocracy,Dahrendorfbelievessocial reformshavethreephases.Thefirstphasecomprisesconstitutionalchangesandconstitutionalorganization;thisperiodtakesapproximatelysixmonthsandcon-stitutesthetimeforthejuriststoact.Thepointistofindbalancebetweentheprincipleofseparationofpowersandtheabilityoftheexecutiveauthoritiestoeffectivelydotheirjob.Thesecondphaseen-compassespoliticalandeconomicreformsanditlastsapproximatelysixyears.Thisisataskforthepoliticians.Inthefinal,thirdphase,wherepreconditionsforfreedomarecreated,thecivilsocietyplaystheleadingrole.Withoutthecitizensplayingtheirrole,juristsandpoliticianscannotdomuch.Citizenrymustbebuilt,withcivilian,political,andsocialrightsbecomingtheverycoreofthesocialandpoliticalcommunity.Mediamustbefreeandpluralist,partiesmust


befundedfairlyandbe independentof thestate, lawsandtaxesshouldencouragethefundingofcharitablefoundationsandvari-oussolidaritymodels,whiletheuniversitiesandculturalinstitutionsshouldact independently fromstatefunding.Oneof thechronicpoliticalabsurdities inBosniaandHerzegovina is thebelief thatacivil identity contradicts and excludes national ones.

Hence,stateinstitutions,thepoliticalcommunity,andcivilsocietyareequallyresponsiblefortheadvancementofdemocracy.Themostimportantimpulseforthedemocraticculturecomesfromthecivilso-ciety;atthesametime,theexistenceofdemocraticpoliticalcultureisoneofthekeyprerequisitsforitsdevelopment.Thepoliticalculturedependsonthelevelofgeneralcultureofthecitizens,therespectforindividualsandguaranteeingofindividualandcollectiverights,thewillingnesstodefendfreedomofthoughtandthespiritofcriticalreasoning,toaffirmuniversalvalues,andalsotopracticeindividualandcollectiveresponsibility.Furthermore, it isvery importantthatthereareclearproceduresfordemission,revocationofgovernment,andlimitedterminoffice.Althoughitsoundsdiscouraging,buildingacivicsociety,accordingtoDahrendorf,takesatleastsixdecades.Unfortunately, thefirst twowerenotagoodstart inBosniaandHerzegovina!Itsinhabitantshaveaparticularlylowlevelofthecivilculture,there isanapparentabsenceofpoliticalcompetencyandanundevelopedinstinctforprotectionofconstitutionalorderandlaws,whilethereiswidespreadmistrustinthedemocraticprinciplesandprocedures,ignoranceabouttheirownroleandtheresponsibil-itytheyhaveinthepoliticalsystemandpoliticalprocesses,andanunwillingnesstopermanentlyandactivelyparticipateinpoliticallife.


Anentirehorizonofdiverse, freeandauthenticpoliticalopinionsandpositionsisessentiallylacking.Itallcomesdowntoethnic/na-tionalideologies,withoccasionalemergenceofmodestandratherinconsistentpseudo-citizenconcepts.The involvement inpoliticsbasicallycomesdowntovoting,withoutrecognizableengagementintheshaping,implementing,andcontrollingofpublicpolicyandinparticularrequestsforaccountabilityofthosewhofailtodeliverontheirpromisesandprograms.Pressureonmedia,abuseofoffice,andomnipresentcrimeandcorruptiontakeplacewithoutrealcivilresistance,withtheprevalenceoffanaticalpartylines,ontheonehand,andapoliticism,politicalabstinence,andapathy,whichonlytooeasilyturnintovandalismandviolence,ontheother.Corruptioninthepoliticalelitesishardtoeradicate,thisisduetotheinabilitytoformatruly independent judiciary,responsiblemedia,andfreeandcriticalpublicopinion,failedreformsofpublicadministrationandmodernizationof institutions,andevenwidespread lethargy,asmentionedearlier.Inthisatmosphere,itishardtohearandevenhardertounderstandthosewhotrytoaffirmideasofconstitutionalpatriotism,emotionsofloyalty,respectforlaw,developmentofde-mocracy,andbuildingofastatewhereindifferentcultures,religions,andpoliticalorientationsconstituteanadvantageandwealth.Pos-ingaserious threat is thepresenceandpromotionby themediaofprejudicesandstereotypes,discrimination,hatredspeech,anduncriticalspreadingofmessages.InBosniaandHerzegovina,peoplerarelychoosetheirwordscarefullyandrarelyaretheyheldaccount-ableforthosewords!Withoutcriminalandmoralsanctionsinplace,therearefrequentgraveslandersandaccusationsattheexpenseofotherpeoples.Everywhereyoucanfindconfirmationsforthebasic


attributesofanundemocraticsociety,onethatlackstolerancefordifferentopinions,suppressesfreedomofexpression,suffocatesthepoliticalautonomyofindividuals,celebratesauthoritarianismanden-couragessubordination,strengthensfundamentalistreligiousbeliefs,broadenspoliticalconflict,etc.


identity Drama and Dimensions of Political Culture

ForabroaderandfullerreviewoftheproblemsburdeningtheprocessofdemocratizationoftheBosnian-Herzegoviniansoci-etyandaggravatingtheeffortstowardsstabilizationofitspo-

liticalsystem,ofgreatvalueistheworkofHarvardprofessorSidneyVerba,oneoftheleadingauthoritiesinthefieldofstudyofpoliticalcultureanditsimpactsonademocraticsociety.Asfarbackas1965,hestressedtheimportanceoffourcorequestionsofthepoliticalcul-ture:1.Nationalidentity,2.Identificationwithone’sfellowcitizens,3.Attitudetowardsgovernmentaloutputs(results),and4.Typeofgovernment(politicaldecisionmakingprocess).

Theissueof“national identity”isthemost importantpoliticalbeliefpeoplehave,and it constitutes thebasis for theirpoliticalidentity.AccordingtoVerba,nationalidentityisthedegreetowhichanindividualbelievesinhisbelongingtohisstateanditssymbols(flag,hymn,etc.),andinpoliticalintegrationthatenablessuccessfulfunctioningofthestate.Atthesametime,thecoreissueistheso-called“identificationwithone’sfellowcitizens”,i.e.awarenessofconnectednesswithotherpeopleofthesamepoliticalcommunityandtheirsharedculture.Democraticpoliticalculturedirectlydependsonwhetherpeoplehavefaithintheirfellowcitizensaspoliticalac-tors.Thisfaithiscrucialtohorizontalintegrationanditreflectsongovernmentstability,decisionmakingprocessesandmethods,coali-tionforming,etc.Itisaproductofthehistoricalheritage,butalsoof


theprocessofsocializationandcurrentpoliticalexperience.Ontheotherhand,politicaldistrust leadstocynicismamongthegeneralpublic,andtheirholdingontoandspreadingofstereotypesandprejudices. for two decades now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to nationalnarrow-mindednessandpoliticalshortsightedness,accord-ingtoSarajevopublicistIvanLovrenović6, inter-nationality divisions getcarvedinstone,andpoliticaltensionsbecomepartofdailylife.Fearofcompromiseparalyzespoliticalleadersofnationalcommu-nities,whodonotdareproclaimgivingupontheirwartimegoals,asthatwouldsetthemoutforpoliticaldoom,withaccusationsofhavingbetrayed theirownpeople, the fallenvictims,etc.This iswhytheymostlyoptforthezero-sumpolicy.Verticalidentificationisaprobleminmanycountries,butexplicitlyinthosewherecentralpoliticalsymbolsareinemotionalconflictwithethnicandregionalconcepts.This issuehasbeenpresent inBosniaandHerzegovinasincethefirstdayofitsexistenceasanindependentstate,whilethedayton agreement or any new constitutional arrangement cannot initselfcreatethesenseofpoliticalidentityandidentificationwiththestatesymbols.ThecurrentflagofBosniaandHerzegovinawasimposedbythethenHighRepresentativeoftheinternationalcom-munity,CarlosWestendorp,in1998,afterpoliticalrepresentativesoftheconstituentpeoplesfailedtoagreeamongthemselvesonitsappearance;soonafterwardsBosniaandHerzegovinagotitscoatofarms,andinmid1999,thestatehymnwasadopted.Andyet,inoveroneandahalfdecades,thecitizensofBosniaandHerzegovinahave

6 Lovrenović Ivan, JergovićMiljenko,Bosnia andHerzegovina, „The FutureofUnfinishedWar”(„BosnaiHercegovina,budućnostnedovršnograta“),Zagreb,NoviLiber,2010.(co-publisherforBosniaandHerzegovina:Synopsis,Sarajevo)


notdevelopedtheexpectedfeelingsforthesesymbols.Thereasonsforthisshouldnotbesoughtinthemannertheycameintobeing,butrather intheabsenceofsincerepoliticalwillandreadinesstoaffirmthemassharedvaluesandsymbolsofthestate,acceptedbyitscitizensandpeoples.Instead,openand/orconcealedambitionstochangetheconstitutionalconcept,fromunitariantosecession-ist aspirations, internal pre-compositions, new regionalization, calls forabolishmentoftheentitiesandcallstoreferendaonseparation,andevencontinuousmutualdisputeshave ledtoethnic/nationalandreligioussymbolshavingadominant,evenexclusiveroleinthecollectiveidentifications,whiletheneedtobuildandcultivatetheso-called constitutional patriotism gets ignored and discarded. certainly, thereisabroadrangeofhistorical,cultural,social,andpoliticalex-planationsastowhyitishardtoreachconsentonsharedsymbolsinastatethat,accordingtomanyauthors,lacksinternallegitimacy.Asenseofbelonging toastate regardscognitive,affective,andevaluativeorientationsofindividuals,itisbuiltonknowledge,andonemotionalandvaluejudgments,andregardlessofthequalityofsuchviews,theymustbeacknowledgedaspoliticalfacts.Resultsofvariousprofessionalstudies7 inBosniaandHerzegovinashowthat

7 This is a series of studies over the courseof 2010and2011: focusgroupsof students at the universities of Sarajevo, Banja Luka andMostar, surveysconducted inanumberoftowns inRepublikaSrpskaandtheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina, respondentswere studentsoffinalgradesofhighschoolanduniversitystudents.Formoredetails,see:MajstorovićD.,TurjačaninV. (Eds.) (2011),UndertheWingoftheNation.EthnicandNational IdentityinYoungPeopleinBosniaandHerzegovina(Uokriljunacije.EtničkiidržavniidentitetkodmladihuBiH),BanjaLuka:Centarzakulturuisocijalnipopravak.SimilarresearchwasconductedbytheagencyPrismResearchfortheEuropeanUnioninMay2013(usingthemethodofinterviewandrandomselectionon


belongingtothestateismostlydemonstratedbytheBosniaks,whilebelongingtotheentitiesisfeltstrongestamongtheSerbs.BelongingtoreligionisthemostimportanttotheCroats,ethnicitytotheSerbs,whileallthreeconstituentpeoplesequallyrefrainfromidentificationwiththebroader,Europeanframework,andtheyalsodismiss thepossibilityofexistenceoftheso-calledmultiplenationalidentity(todevelop,ontopoftheirrespectiveBosniak/Serb/Croatidentity,alsoa“Bosnian-Herzegovinian”nationalidentity).

TwopoliticalscientistsfromSarajevo,whohavecontinuedtheirscientificworkoutsideofBosniaandHerzegovina,MirjanaKasapovićinZagrebandNenadKecmanovićinBelgrade,haveconcludedthatindeedtheattributesofthepoliticalcultureofnationalcommuni-tiesintheformerYugoslaviahavecontributedtoitsdissolutionandtocivilwarandconstituteoneofthefundamentalreasonsfortheBosnian-Herzegoviniansocietybeingdividedandthestateregimebeingunstable.KasapovićarguesthatforcenturiesSerbs,Bosniaks/Muslims,andCroatshaveneverjointly,permanentlyandmassivelyadvocatedasharedstate,andtheyonlysubsistedthankstoauthori-tarianregimes (theOttomanEmpire, theAustro-HungarianMon-archy,and theKingdomofYugoslavia, later theSocialist FederalRepublicofYugoslavia).KecmanovićarguesthatthecurrentstateunionofBosniaandHerzegovinahasnotactuallybeencreatedby

thesampleof1500personsovertheageof18acrossBosniaandHerzegovina).ItshowsthatthelargestnumberofyoungpeopleinBosniaandHerzegovinatakesmostprideintheirreligiousidentity(90.6percent),andonlythenintheirnationalandcivilidentity,whilemostrespondentsolderthan30takeprideintheirethnicidentity(92.7percent).


thewillofitscitizens,itisnotaresultofinternalacknowledgmentofthoselivingtherein,anditlacksabasicconsensusofitsconstitu-entpeoples.Sincedayone,theindependenceofBosniaandHerze-govinaisagroundforconflictsbetweencentripetalandcentrifugalorientations,fromambitionstoestablishcontrolovertheentireter-ritory,centralizethegovernmentinthestateandenablethedomi-nanceofonepeople8, tothethreatsofholdingareferendumforseparationofoneentityfromBosniaandHerzegovina,toinsistenceongreaterautonomyofcantons,creationofathirdentity,orevennew regionalization.

Hence,thethreelargestpeoplesinBosniaandHerzegovinadis-puteovertheformofthestateregime,whileundergoinganiden-titydrama.Religiousbelongingandnationalismasanexpressionofethno-culturalandpre-politicalunificationofmembersofonecommunityconstitutethefoundationfortheshapingofacollectiveidentityofthepoliticalcommunity(statizationofthenation).Ifdur-ingtheentirelastcentury,despitetheenthusiasmoflocalpeoples,whohadmanagedto liberatethemselvesfirstfromtheOttoman,

8 Even though there are fierce political and academic disputes on this thesissincethestartoftheconflictinBosniaandHerzegovina,whoseepilogueisnotonthehorizon,thesaidpositionflashesmoreor lessopenly inmanypublicappearances of the Bosniak representatives. This was very obvious duringthe pre-census campaign in 2013 (President of the Bosniakmovement andcoordinatoroftheCoalition“TheImportanceofBeingBosniak”SejfudinTokićpromotedthisstandinaseriesofpublicaddresses,wherehewasopenlyorimplicitlysupportedbyrepresentativesofthepolitical,academic,andculturalelite),andhashadevenmoreradicalappearancesinthecourseof2015,whenhe referred toBosniaandHerzegovinaas the“Bosniakstate”, telling thosewhofeltotherwisetomoveout.


and then fromtheAustro-Hungarianoccupation, fromNaziandfascistaggressorsduringtheWorldWarII,andevenoverhalfacen-turyofanauthoritarianregime,atheistandcommunistpropaganda,andcontrolledsocialization,theYugoslavnationalidentityfailedtodevelop,itisclearwhyforthelasttwodecadesthepoliticalidentityofthe“BosniansandHerzegovinians”hasfailedtoevolve.Insup-portofthisassertion,itisworthnotingthataccordingtotheprewarcensus(1991),therewere4.4millionpeoplelivinginBosniaandHer-zegovina,ofwhich43.5percentdeclaredthemselvesasMuslims(asof1993,asBosniaks),31.2percentasSerbs,17.4percentasCroats,whilemerely5.5percentofthepopulationregardedthemselvesasYugoslavs,and2.4percentas“Others” (Jews,Roma,Ukrainians,etc.).Upon thedissolutionofYugoslavia,Yugoslavshavedisap-peared.BosniaandHerzegovinahasbeencreatedwithoutBosniansandHerzegovinians.Theidentitydramaplaysaveryimportantroleinthestabilityofeachstate.Itisonlyifandwhenitisresolvedthattheissueastohowthatstateshouldbeorganizedcanbeaddressed.AfamouswriterMiroslavKrležapredictedfourdecadesagothatitwouldtakemuchmorethoughtfulandorganizedeffortsforallthecomponentsofthenationalitymesstobeshapedprogressively inthecollectiveconsciousness,withtheprincipleofnationalequality.Acommon“we”asaunifiedidentitycannotbecreatedinBosniaandHerzegovinaintheatmosphereofethnic,national,ideological,andculturalantagonisms,onadeclarativepoliticalviewofallegedjointaccessiontotheEuropeanUnionorbyrhetoricallyadvocatingtheequalityofthecitizensbeforethelawandaffirmationofhumanandethnicrights.Nationalandpoliticalidentityisformedwithinastate; inlightoftheabsenceofinternalconsensusonBosniaand


Herzegovina,suchidentityisobviouslyhardtocomeby.IfweacceptHabermas’sconceptof“constitutionalpatriotism”9 and civil loyalty totheconstitutionalorderasthebasisfortheiridentificationwiththestate,wecomeacrossanobvioussplitinnationalandpoliticalorientations.Thus,denialoftheDaytonstructureofthenationstateandtotallyopenandquiteobviousambitiontochangeitisincreas-inglyrootingitselfintheBosniakcorpus,whileprotectivenessoftheConstitution,notbecauseofasenseofloyaltytothesharedstate,butratherasaguaranteeforthepreservationofRepublikaSrpskaisdevelopingintheSerbcommunity.Croatrepresentativesoftendis-playacontradictingviewontheconstitutionalorder,fromextensiveloyaltytosomeprovisions,torenouncingandinsistingonchangestootherlegalprovisions.Atthesametime,whileaportionofBosniakpoliticiansshield themselvesbehind thecivilorderofBosniaandHerzegovinaandhighlightthethesisofthe“BosniansandHerze-govinians” (which they fullycompromised in thecampaign“TheImportanceofBeingBosniak”inthecourseof2013),theSerbsandtheCroatsdonotacceptstateborderswiththeir“parentstates”,butconsiderthemascutsbetweentheirnationalandpoliticalidentities.

9 The idea, developed by famous German philosopher Jürgen Habermas in1968,isbasedonopencommunicationspace,apublicsphereinwhichcitizensreasonfreely,whichbenefitstheirreciprocity,solidarity,andmutualrecognition.Publicreassessmentofthepastencouragespromotionofuniversalvaluesanddevelopmentofdemocraticconsciousness.Theprincipleofcitizenryintegratesthepoliticalcommunityandpatriotismbasedoncivilloyaltytotheconstitutionguaranteeingfreedomsandrights,anditdoesnotemphasizecultural-historicaland ethnic matters, which is particularly important for multicultural andmultiethnicsocieties.Theconceptofconstitutionalpatriotism,asasubstitutefor“compromisednational identity”hasbeenacceptedbymostprominentgerman and international intellectuals.


Verbareferstothethirddimensionofdemocraticpoliticalcul-tureas“governmentaloutputs”;itpertainstothetrustinthemeth-odsofpoliticalprocessesofthestateorgovernment.Peoplebelievethatthestate(government),throughtheirpoliticalprocessesandresults,willsomehowimpactthequalityoftheirlife.Ifpeopledonotbelieveintheeffectsofthestateordonotobservethem,thisspeaksof theirpolitical culture,andof the typeofgovernment.Theseexpectationshavevaluecriteria.Peopleexpectnotonlyposi-tiveimpactsfromthestate,butalsoforthoseimpactstobemoreor less just, forthestatetotakecareofthesocialsecurityof in-dividuals,etc.Theyexpectfreedom,equality,andjusticefromthestateauthorities.Ifthegovernmentbelievespeopledonotexpectanythingfromitandtheyaremeresubjects,thenitwilltreattheirneedsinanirresponsibleandauthoritarianmanner.Verbatiesthefourthdimensionofthedemocraticculturetotheprocessesofpo-liticaldecisionmakingandruling.Thisregardsthetrustofpeopleinthemannerinwhichthegovernmentmakesdecisions,inwhichitshouldmakedecisions,andhowitisdone.InBosniaandHerze-govina,thereareevermorewidespreadbeliefsthatpeopleenterpoliticsfortheirownprivatebenefit(theirownpersonalinterest),thatthecivilservicecomesdowntojobsecurityandabuseofoffice.Insteadofworkinginparliaments,dealsanddecisionsaremadeinhotelsorcafés,betweenleaderswhomakeagreementstheythem-selvesdonotbelieveinandwhichtheysignwithoutothermembersoftheirpartyknowingaboutorsupportingthem.Theinterestsofthepublicandthepeoplearesubordinatedtosmallergroups.Withsuchexpectationsandnotionsaboutthegovernance,ademocraticprospectseemsunattainable.


Symbolic Political gestures and Core meritocracy

After all theaforementioned,wegoback to thequestionofhowtoachievethedegreeofpoliticalunityandmutualrelationsthatcultivatesandencouragescivilvirtues,which

advancesthedevelopmentofdemocraticproceduresandpoliticalcultureandconciliatesandmergestheexistingcollectiveidentitiesintoasharedBosnian-Herzegovinian identity.Thebuildingofde-mocraticpoliticalcultureandaffirmationofsharedpoliticalidentityinBosniaandHerzegovinaarekeypre-requisitesforitsprosperousfuture, internal stability, long-termsurvival,andvitalityof itsciti-zensandpeoples.The identitycrisisandcollectivememoriesarethecausesofmostof itscurrentproblems, itstraumaticpastandchaoticchallengesinthefuture.StatestabilityisbasednotonlyontheConstitutionandlaws,butalsoonunwrittenrules,habits,and“thelawsoftheheart”,mutualrespectandtrustofpeople,volun-tarism,andloyaltytocommoninterestsandvalues.Thecharacterofpeopledeterminesthecharacterofthestate,thefateofthenation.WhathasbeenascertainedbyPlato,Montesquieu,Rousseau,andothersstillappliestoday.InsteadoftiresomeemptyphrasesabouttheDaytonAgreementbeingthebiggestculpritandthecauseofconflictsformanyyearsandanobstacletoconciliationandprogress,itisimperativetounderstandtheopposite:theDaytonAgreementisaconsequenceofthenatureoftheinter-ethnicrelationsinBosniaandHerzegovina,thesurvivingnationalidentities,andtheattribu-tesofthepoliticalculture.BosniaandHerzegovinaisnotunstable


becauseofitsconstitutionalimperfectionorexpensiveandcomplexapparatus,butbecauseofburdensomepoliticaltradition,civilandpoliticalincompetence,lackofculturalenlightenment,aswellasanauthoritarianandnon-democraticmentality.

It is futileand impossible tobuilda common identityon therenouncingoftheBosniak,Serb,andCroatidentity,orevenwith-outa sincereaffirmationofcitizenry. It is imperative tocultivateandbringtheexistingidentitiestogetherinordertostartshapingamultiple,multi-layeredBosnian-Herzegovinianidentity,attheheartofwhicharemutualrecognitionandrespect,diversityoftheunityandtheunityofdiversity,equalityofpeoplesandreligions,andalsothestrongandpronouncedroleofcitizens,humanrights,andfree-doms.Traumaticexperiencesfromthepastandtheiractualizationandabusebythedailypoliticsconstitutethemostseriousobstacletotheprocessofconciliationandaconstantthreatofescalationofnewconflicts. Insteadofhopelessly turningback,countingdeadcompatriotsandputtingtheblameontheopposingside,itisexcep-tionallyimportanttocultivatethecultureofrememberingthepastwarsasatimeofcollectivecasualtiesandcommontragedy.Suchanendeavorrequirestwophases.

Thefirst,short-termphase,servestodemonstratethepoliticalwill,tomakeaseriesofgoodanddaringsymbolicgestures,suchasjointbowingtothevictimsonallsides,toappearinthepublicin fullagreementonclearcondemnationofany formsofhatredspeech,callstoretribution,disrespectforconstitutionalfoundations,personalandcollectivevalues,etc.,toencouragejointcelebration


ofstate,entity,andreligiousholidays,culturalandsportingevents,andtostressuniversalprinciplesandvalues,whereinaspecialroleisplayedbythemassmedia.Publicadministrationmustnotremainadenationalizedsphere,bootyinthedealsofpoliticalpartiesandclans.Civil serviceshouldbefullyservingthepublic interestsandsubjected tomercilessde-clientelization;notonly shouldcitizensgetclosertooneanother,butalsoitisnecessarytopromote(politi-cal)friendshipbetweenthecitizensandthestate10,bydevisingandpreparingadistinctlong-termstrategicplan.Thefirstoneisthetaskfor thepoliticalelites, thesecondoneforuniversities,academia,culturalandartisticsocieties,freelanceintellectuals,associationsofwriters and journalists, trade unions and veteran organizations, non-governmentalsector,andinparticularfortheyoungergeneration.Competency, responsibilityand innovationmust taketheplaceofwhathasoverthelasttwodecadesbeenfloodedbypureamateur-ism, utter unconcern and demagoguery.

10 This notion was introduced by German political scientist and philosopherDolf Sternberger in 1963, in a ceremonial speech on the occasion of thehundredth anniversary of SPD, titled “Friendship towards the State”. Theidea of friendship of citizenswas developed already byAristotle and Kant,emphasizingtheimportanceofreciprocity,solidarity,unity,benevolence,etc.,andthetermusedbySternbergercomesfromSchiller.EventheprofessorofpoliticalsciencesattheUniversityofMunich,HenningOttmannwritesaboutfriendshipofcitizens(see:Ottmann,H.,“FriendshipofCitizens” inPolitičkamisaono.3,2010,pp.80-90).

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reorganizing whaT’s PossiBLe

goran marković

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Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: Problem mapping, map Solving

It is imperative for Bosnia and Herzegovina to undergo political/territorial reor-ganization. This should make the existing political/territorial organization more rational; however, as this essay will show, it would not be possible if the ethnic criterion is fully abandoned, as the society is strongly divided by this very cri-terion. Dr. Goran Marković, professor of constitutional law, believes that ethnic divisions in the society will not be overcome by forcing reorganization of the sta-te, but, on the contrary, by developing direct democracy, by introducing a form of economic democracy, and by strengthening the principle of constituency of peoples at sub-state levels. He believes there is no constitutional ground for a third entity or for regionalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, just as there is no political consensus at present on such a territorial reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dr. Marković believes that legitimate requests by the Croat people may be achieved without the third entity, and that reorganization on the principle of regions as political/economic units would require a change in the constitutional concept from the federal to unitary, for which, in his opinion, there is no political consensus at present. A way out of the vicious circle of welded positions (the Serbs are in favor of a two-entity solution, the Croats of a three-entity one, while the Bosniaks advocate regionalization), according to Marković, is not to touch the existing two-entity organization, but rather to start a political/territorial ratio-nalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Federation by significantly reducing the number of cantons. The advantage of this is that a solution to the problem would depend on the ability to reach consensus by two, rather than by three national political elites. Another advantage of this solution is that the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not stipulate the political/terri-torial organization in great detail. It does not even provide for a precise number of cantons, which is prescribed by a separate law. The disadvantage is that a reduction in the number of cantons cannot be done by mere amendments to the law, but rather it requires a redistribution of power between the Federation and the cantons, which in fact involves rather serious amendments to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

91Reorganizing what’s possible

Some Thoughts regarding Changes...

Thepolitical/territorialorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovinais prescribed by Article I.3 of the Constitution, reading:“BosniaandHerzegovinashallconsistof twoEntities: the

FederationofBosniaandHerzegovinaandRepublikaSrpska.”AstheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinadoesnotspecificallyprohibit thepossibilityofestablishingotherpoliticaland territo-rialunits, it isnot impossible, inprinciple, to imagineadifferentpolitical/territorialorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovina.Inpo-litical life, there isoftenmentionoftheestablishmentofathird,“Croat”entity.TheConstitutiondoesnotprohibitmakingchangesin thisoranyotherway.Politicalelitesoftendiscuss (lackof) ju-stification forchanges to thepoliticalandterritorialorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovina.Fromthis,discussionsdonot revolvearoundwhethertheConstitutionpermitschangestothepolitical/territorialorganization,butratheraroundthreeissues:Arechangesto thepolitical/territorialorganization justified?; If justified,howshouldtheybecarriedout?;andWhatshouldbethenatureofthechangesmade?.Thepoliticalelites,dependingonwhichconstituentpeopletheyrepresent,havetakenthreedifferentpositionsontheissue.Accordingtooneview,theconstitutionalstatusquoshouldbepreserved,i.e.thecurrenttwo-entitypoliticalandterritorialor-ganization.Inanotherview,thestateshouldbedividedintothreeentities.Accordingtothethirdview,insteadoftheentities,thestateshouldbedividedintoacertainnumberofregions.Myopinionon

92 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Goran Marković

whetherchangestothepolitical/territorialorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovinaarewarrantedwillbepresentedattheendofthispaper,afterwehaveexaminedall thequestions that shouldbeansweredbeforehand.


...and Nature of Changes to Territorial Organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina

InordertochangethepoliticalandterritorialorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovina,itwouldbenecessarytoamendtheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina,oreventopassanewconstitution.Itwouldalldependonwhatthescopeandnatureofthechangeswouldbe.ArticleXoftheConstitutionprescribestheprocedureforconstitutionalamendments.AdecisiontoamendtheConstitutionismadebytheParliamentaryAssemblyofBosniaandHerzegovina.Thisimpliestheapplicationoftheinstrumentofentityvoting,andpotentially,incaseofadisputeinvolvingathreattoavitalnationalinterest,theinstrumentforprotectionofvitalnationalinterests.EventhoughtheConstitutiondoesnotexplicitly so require,adecisionofthisimportanceessentiallyrequiresaconsensusbythenationalpolitical elites.

Anothermodalityofchangewouldimplytheholdingofanewpeaceconference,which isadvocatedby theBosniakandCroatpoliticalelites.Yet, thisoutcome issurelynotpossible,asthere isnoagreementamongtheinternationalplayerstoholdsuchacon-ference.Even if itwereheld, itwouldmean impositionofanewconstitution,thesecondpromulgatedconstitutioninarow,whichwouldnotresonatewellhereorintheregion.Thissolution,whichispurelypolitical,wouldmeantotalabolitionoftheconstitutional


systemofBosniaandHerzegovinaand,consequently,abreakintheconstitutionalcontinuity.Itwouldnotbeanexpressionofcompro-miseandconsensusofthenationalpoliticalelites,soitcouldnotbedeemedasjust,orevensustainable.

ChangestotheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinacouldnotbefinalizedbyamendingArticleI.3.Theestablishmentofnewpolitical/territorialunitswouldcertainlyrequireconstitutionaldefini-tionoftheirrightsandobligations.Ifachangeinthepolitical/territo-rialorganizationwouldmeanmereestablishmentofthethirdentity,onwhichtheCroatpoliticaleliteinsist,constitutionalamendmentswouldnotnecessarilyberadical.Theywouldhavetoencompasspar-ticipationofthethirdentityinthegovernmentatthestatelevel,butsuchparticipationwouldbebasedonthesameprinciplesonwhichthetwoentitiescurrentlypartakeintheworkoftheinstitutionsofBosnia and Herzegovina.

Theestablishmentof thethirdentitywouldrequiresolvingofadifficult issueregardingtheterritorialdemarcationbetweentheentities.ItisnotclearwhethertheCroatpoliticalelitewouldacceptasolutionwherethethirdentitywouldconsistonlyofcantonsorportionsthereofinthecurrentFederation,orwhetheritwouldalsocomprisecertainmunicipalitiesfromtheterritoryoftheRepublikaSrpska.EvenifthethirdentitywereestablishedbydividingtheFeder-ationintotwoentities,theissueoftheterritorialdemarcationwouldbehardtosolve.For,besidesthecantonswithclearBosniakandclearCroatmajority,therearecantonsinwhichBosniaksandCroatsarebothrepresentedbysignificantpercentages in thepopulation


structure.Itwouldbehardtoreachacompromiseontheterritorialdemarcationinthosecantons.

Ifachangeinthepolitical/territorialorganizationwouldmeanregionalizationofBosniaandHerzegovina, itwouldbenecessarytopassanewconstitution,asinthiscasethefederalregimewouldbereplacedbyaunitaryone.Inthatcase,theentirestateorganiza-tionwouldbebasedonentirelydifferentprinciples,andthestatebodieswouldhaveadifferentstructure,composition,andelectionanddecision-makingprocedures,giventhattheregionswouldhaveanentirelydifferentlegalnature(primarily,asmallerdegreeofau-tonomy)fromthecurrententities. Inorderforanewconstitutiontobepassed,agreementbythenationalpoliticaleliteswouldberequired.Thatwouldnotbepossibletoachieve,asitiswellknownthatthenationalpoliticaleliteshaveopposingpositionsontheissueofthepolitical/territorialorganizationofthestate.Moreover,onlyone(Bosniak)politicalelitestandsfortheregionalization,whiletheothertwostandopposed.


Two-Entity Status Quo

Theprincipalargumentagainstsuchpoliticalandterritorialor-ganizationisthatitisanexpressionofthewar,and,assuch,not legitimate.Thesecondargument isthat itrepresentsan

expressionofnationaldivisionsanddominanceofindividualnationsovercertainportionsofthestateterritory.Inorderfortheconstituentpeoplestobeequalandinorderforthestatetobecivic,itisnecessarytoovercomethetwo-entityorganization.Whentheissueoflegitimacyisraised,thestartingpoint iswhobelievesthepoliticalandconsti-tutionalsolutionathandtobelegitimate.FromthepointofviewofnotonlyBosniakandCroatpoliticalelites,butalsooftheirpeoples,thetwo-entityorganizationisnotlegitimate.However,itislegitimatefromthestandpointoftheSerbpeopleanditspoliticalelite.GiventhattheBosnian-Herzegoviniansocietyisdividedonthis,theissueoflegitimacycannotbeviewedmerelyfromtheperspectiveofpoliticalopinionofthemajorityofcitizensasasetofabstractindividuals,butalsofromtheaspectoftheconstituentpeoplesascollectivepoliticalunits.Asthesocietyisnotmerelyasetofcitizens,butalsoacommu-nityoftheconstituentpeoples,infundamentalpoliticalandconstituti-onalmattersitisimperativetohaveconsensusamongtheconstituentpeoples.Assuchconsensusisabsent,theissueoflegitimacyofthetwo-entityorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovinaremainsunsolved.Fromtheconstitutionalaspect,thismeansmaintainingthestatusquo.

Anotherargumentpertainstothedominationofindividualpeo-ples.Dominationoftheconstituentpeoplesintheentitiesiscontrary


to theprincipleofconstituencyofpeoples,which, following theDecisionbytheConstitutionalCourtofBosniaandHerzegovina1, assumestheparticipationofthethreepeoples inthegovernmentbodiesnotonlyatthestatelevel,butalsoatsub-statelevels.Iftheconstitutionsallowforeffectiveparticipationofrepresentativesofthethreepeoplesintheentitygovernments,theissueofthetwo-entity regimeofBosniaandHerzegovina isno longer inthefore-ground.For,throughtheapplicationoftheprincipleofconstituencyofpeoples,theentitieshavebecomemultiethnicfederalunits,whichcanalsobeseenintheirconstitutionalprovisions.2

Thefirstandbasic reasonspeaking in favorof thetwo-entitystateorganizationisitsfoundationintheconstitution.Inordertochange it,amendmentswouldberequiredtotheConstitutionorevenadoptionofanewconstitution,whichisnotdo-able.Ontheotherhand,thetwo-entitystateorganizationshouldbeviewedinadifferentlightafterthesaidDecisionbytheConstitutionalCourtofBosniaandHerzegovinahasbeenrendered.Itistruethatpriortothisdecisionitcouldhavebeenarguedthattherewasdominanceofoneortwopeoples intheentities;however,aftertheissuanceofthedecision,suchdominancehasweakenedtotheextentthatitenablestheuseoftheinstrumentofvitalnationalinterestprotection.Thisdoesnotmeantotalabsenceofanydominance,givenextensive

1 See:Decisionby theConstitutionalCourtofBosniaandHerzegovina in theCaseno.U5/98.

2 Amendments LXVI and LXVII to the Constitution of the Republika Srpska;AmendmentsXXVIIandXXVIIItotheConstitutionoftheFederationofBosniaand Herzegovina.


disproportioninthenumbersof individualpeoples intheentities.Secondly,evenifagreementbyrepresentativesofthethreepeopleswereachievedtovacatethetwo-entityorganization(whichisnotdo-able),thereisnoagreementonwhatitshouldbereplacedby.Itisnotpossible(orevenmeaningful)tochangetheexistingpoliticalandterritorialorganizationwithoutprioragreementastowhat itshouldbereplacedby.Thirdly,theabolishingoftheexistingpoliti-cal/territorialorganizationwouldbeillegitimatefromtheaspectofone(Serb)constituentpeople’s interest.Surely, itcouldbearguedthatthepolitical/territorialsetupofBosniaandHerzegovinamustbeviewedfromtheaspectoftheinterestsofallconstituentpeoples.Inprinciple,thisistrue.However,thequestioniswhatiftheinterestsofthethreepeoplesarenotonlydifferent,butalsoopposingonthisissue.Thenitisutterlyimpossibletoresolvetheissueoflegitimacyoftheexistingoranyotherpolitical/territorialorganization.Theprob-lemremainsunresolvedforthetimebeing.


Problem Not Solved by Third Entity

Thisoption isadvocatedbytheCroatpoliticalelite. It startsfromthepremisethattheBosniaksandtheSerbshave“theirown”entities,whichiswhytheCroatsshouldgetanentity

oftheirown.Intheiropinion,thiswouldbeawayfortheCroatstofinallyachievefullequality.Theissueofequalityisherebytiedtothepolitical/territorialorganizationofthestate,undertheprincipleof“threepeoples–threeentities”.

The Declaration “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Our Homeland”,whichwasadoptedbytheCroatNationalAssembly(HNS)attheir6th session,3heldon28February2015,readsthatthestateofBos-niaandHerzegovinahasfailedtofulfilltheaspirationsoftheCroatpeople,citingthefollowingassomeofthemostimportantreasonsforit:legalization,theDaytonregime,injusticesinflictedbythewarandpersecutionofthepopulation,irrationalterritorialorganization,denialoftherightoftheCroatpeopletoberepresentedbyitslegiti-materepresentatives,andinabilitytodevelopnationalandculturalidentityoftheCroatpeople.

Ascanbeseen,rectificationofalargepartoftheseobjectionsdoesnotrequireterritorialreorganizationofthestate.Itwouldbe

3 Declaration of the 6th session of the HNS, http://hnsbih.org/deklaracija-6-zasjedanja-hns-a/,27.6.2015.


necessarytoadoptamendmentstotheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinawhichwouldprovide foradifferentorganizationofindividualinstitutions,ortoamendcertainlaws.ParticipantsintheAssembly themselvesadmit tothis,citingconstitutionaland legalprovisionsthatneedtobeamendedwithintheexistingconstitutionalsystem.

However, theyalsopointout that it isnecessary tocarryoutterritorial reorganization,whichshouldserveseveralpurposes:1)rationalterritorialorganization,2)creationofasymmetricalfederalstate,3)equal respect for theconstituentpeoples,byconsistentimplementationoftheprincipleofconstituencyofpeoplescitedinthePreambleoftheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina.

Achievingmostofthesegoalsdoesnotrequireterritorialreor-ganizationof thestate,but itdoes requiremakingamendmentstotheConstitution.Equalrespectfortheconstituentpeoplesmaybeachievedbyamendingcertainconstitutionalprovisions,primarilythosepertainingtotheelectionprocedurefortheMembersofthePresidencyofBosniaandHerzegovinaandtheprocedureforvitalnational interest protection. a more rational territorial organization mayalsobeachievedbyradicalreductioninthenumberofcantonsin theFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina.Asymmetrical fed-eralstatemaybeprovidedthroughadifferentlegalsolutiontotheprincipleofconstituencyofpeoplesintheentities.ItistruethattheprincipleofconstituencyofpeoplesisnotexercisedintheentitiesinthemanneridenticaltowhathasbeenprovidedundertheConstitu-tionofBosniaandHerzegovina.Therespectiveentityconstitutions


couldactuallyprovideforbetterexerciseof thisprinciple, sothattheentitieswouldbe closer tohaving thenatureofmultiethnicfederalunits.Ifthisweretohappen,thesymmetryoftheBosnian-Herzegovinian federalismwouldbealmost fullyachieved,as therightsoftheconstituentpeopleswouldbeidenticalorverysimilarinbothentitiestotherightstheyhaveatthestatelevel.Whenspeak-ingabouttheirrightsinthiscontext,werefertothewaysinwhichtheyparticipateintheformingandworkofthestategovernment,i.e. to institutional solutions.

TheCroatNationalAssemblybelievesthattheestablishmentofasymmetricalfederalstateshouldbeachievedatanewinternationalconference,wherebyBosniaandHerzegovinawouldgetanewcon-stitution.ThisproposalwasmadebecausetheAssemblyunderstandsthat it isnotpossible toachieveconsensus in the institutionsofBosniaandHerzegovinaaboutthepassingofanewconstitution.Still,itremainsunclearhowsuchaconsensuscouldbeachievedatanewinternationalconferenceifitcannotbedoneintheinstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovina.ThereisnoanswertothisquestionortothequestionofwhetheritwouldbeacceptabletotheAssemblyparticipantsifaconstitutionwereadoptedatthisnewinternationalconferencewithouttheagreementofpoliticalrepresentativesofoneor even two constituent peoples.

TheissueoftheCroatthirdentitycanonlybediscussedtenta-tively,giventhattheprincipleofconstituencyofpeopleswouldhavetobeexercisedtherein,i.e.it,too,wouldhavetobedefinedasamul-tiethnicfederalunit.Hence,eventhoughtheentitiesaremultiethnic


federalunitsintheconstitutionalcontext,itisnotbychancethattheCroatpoliticaleliteadvocatestheestablishmentofthethirdentity,wheretheCroatswouldconstitutethemajorityofthepopulation.Al-thoughallthepeopleswouldbeconstituentinthisentityaswell,anditwouldformallynotbetheCroatentity,itwouldbesoinessence,as theCroatpoliticalelitewoulddominate inthe institutionsanddecision-makingprocesses.Thiswouldbepossiblefortworeasons.Thefirstreasonisthenationalstructureofthepopulation,wheretheCroatswouldbedominant.Thesecondreasonisinadequacyofthemechanismfortheprotectionofvitalnationalinterestsintheentities.

AsthereareportionsoftheterritoryofBosniaandHerzegovinawheretheCroatsconstituteamajority,theCroatpoliticalelitebelievesthata“Croatentity” iswarranted. Inthisentity,theCroatswouldindependentlymakedecisionsontheissuesthatare,undertheCon-stitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina,withintheresponsibilityoftheentities.Inotherwords,theCroatswouldgetthesamerightsthattheSerbshave,andbasicallythateventheBosniakshave,astheCroatpoliticalelitebelievesthattheCroatsarenotequalintheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina.Furthermore,thecitizensofthisentitywouldelecttheirownrepresentativestotheinstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovina,whichwouldguaranteethemastatusofequality,whichispresentlynotthecase,inparticularwithregardtotheproblemthathashappenedtwicealreadyinrelationtotheselectionoftheCroatMemberofthePresidencyofBosniaandHerzegovina.

Inthisway,theCroatnationalissueinBosniaandHerzegovinaessentiallycomesdowntoaterritorialquestion.TheCroatpolitical


elitebelievesthatitwillbesolvedifandwhenanentitywillhavebeencreatedwhereintheCroatswillconstitutethemajorityandbeabletoindependentlymakedecisionsontheissuesthatareintheresponsibilityofthisentity(andofotherentities).

Thisargument,however,cannotbedeemedasjustified.Thees-tablishmentofathirdentitydoesnotinitselfsolvetheCroatissueinBosniaandHerzegovina,asitisalsoimportantwhatrightstheCroatshaveintheinstitutionsoftheBosniaandHerzegovinastate.Ifthecompositionofandthedecision-makingprocessintheinstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovinaarenotchanged,therewillstillbeproblemswiththedecisionmaking,asitcanhappenthatthemajorityofCroatrepresentativesinaninstitutionareagainstadecision,butitstillgetsadopted.Inotherwords,itisnecessaryforchangestobemadetothedecision-makingprocedureinindividualstateinstitutions.

Insistenceontheformingofathirdentityisconditionedbytheaspiration toencirclea territorywhereentitygovernmentbodieswouldexercisetheresponsibilitiesoftheentityprovidedforundertheconstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina.Given that thecon-sociationaldemocracyattheentitylevelisunfinished,itmeansthattheexercisingoftheseresponsibilitiesforthemostpartwillbeunderthecontrolofonepoliticalelite.Theothertwopoliticaleliteswillbeabletousethemechanismsfortheprotectionofvitalnationalinterests,butitisnotcertaintowhatextenttheywouldsucceedinit(asitdependsontheconcretebalanceofpoliticalpowers).Thepointoftheideaofthethirdentityisforthethreenationalpoliticalelitestoterritorializetheirownpoliticalandsocialpower,andfor


theinstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovinatoserveassomesortofadiplomaticconferencearenafornegotiationsandcompromises.

WhatisstandinginthewayofsuchanoutcomeistheConstitu-tionofBosniaandHerzegovina.Formallyandlegallyitbelongstothecategoryoffirmconstitutions,whichmaybeamendedinapro-ceduremorecomplexthanthelegislativeprocedure.Specifically,toamendtheConstitution,itisnecessarytohaveatwo-thirdsmajorityofthosepresentandvotingintheHouseofRepresentatives,aswellastheconsentbytheHouseofPeoples,whichisgiveninaregularlegislativeprocedure.Furthermore,whenamendingtheConstitu-tionoradoptinganewone,theissueofprotectionofvitalnationalinterestsmayberaised.Thismeansthatinpractice,toamendtheConstitution,thereisaneedtoachieveconsensusamongthena-tional political elites.

Thesecondproblemwiththissolutionisthatitdoesnotresolveanimportantproblem,whichistheinadequacyofthemechanismsforachievingfullequalityoftheconstituentpeoples.TheCroatpo-liticaleliteclaimsthatitisnotfullyequaleitherintheFederationoratthestatelevel.Theestablishmentofathirdentitydoesnotsolvetheseproblems.Onthecontrary,itwouldleadtoasituationwherethispoliticalelite,representingthelargestconstituentpeople,woulddominate in thenewentity. Inotherwords, theexistingmecha-nismsofdominationorlessthanfullequalitywouldprevail;itwouldonlybethateachpoliticalelitewouldgetaterritoryoverwhichtodominate.


Thethirdissuethatcomesupistheterritorialdemarcation.ItisnoteasytoidentifywhichmunicipalitiesintheFederationwouldbepartofsuchanewentity.Itwouldbeparticularlysensitivetodeter-minethefateofMostar.AdifficultproblemisalsoconstitutedbythetwocantonsinwhichbothBosniaksandCroatshaverelevantrep-resentationinthenationalstructureofthepopulation.Inadividedsociety,inwhichbothpoliticalelitesputtheirclaimto“historical”or“national”territories,oropposethenationaldivisionoftheter-ritory,theissueofentitydemarcationcanbeconsideredafirst-ratepoliticalproblem.


regionalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Regionalization4,advocatedbytheBosniakpoliticalelite,im-pliestwobasicchanges:inthetypeofthestateregimeandinthepolitical-territorialorganization.Inordertogoahead

withregionalization,thestateneedstonolongerbeorganizedfe-derally,butasaunitarystate5,withbothentitiesbeing replacedbymultiethnicregions.Forsuchreorganization,itwouldbenece-ssarytoadoptanewconstitution,asitimpliesaradicallydifferent

4 “Hence,wecandefinereorganizationasaprocessofthecreationofanewlevelintheverticalgovernmentalsetup,butthisnewlevelmaybeincorporatedintothesystemoflocalself-governance.ThisisthecasewithCroatia,CzechRepublic,Poland,oritmayenjoyastatusborderingonthestatusoffederalunits, which is the case with Spain”. – Bojan Bojanić, Regionalization and Regional State. Constitutional Aspects (Regionalizacija i regionalna država Ustavnopravni aspekti), Facultyof Lawof theUniversityof Prishtina,withatemporaryseatinKosovskaMitrovica,KosovskaMitrovica2013,94.

5 Opinionsdivergewhenitcomestothelegalnatureofaregionalstate.Someauthors point out that the regional state is tertium genus, a form of statethatisbetweentheunitaryandfederalstate,whichmeansthattheclassicaldivisionofthestateregimetypesintounitaryandfederalneedstobemodified,acknowledgingregionalstateasthethird,specificoption.–MiodragJovičić,L’Etat regional.Centredepromotiond’étudesjurisdiques,Belgrade–InstitutdufederalismFribourg,Belgrade2003,10.Ibid:MarijanaPajvančić,Constitutional Law (Ustavno pravo),FacultyofLawoftheUniversityofNoviSad,NoviSad2014,303.Otherauthors,however,stillrecognizeonlythedivisionofthestateregimetypesintounitaryandfederalstate,believingthattheregionalstateisaformofterritorialdecentralization,whichiscalledterritorialautonomy.–RatkoMarković, Constitutional Law (Ustavno pravo),FacultyofLawoftheUniversityofBelgrade,Belgrade2014,361,435-444.


constitutionalsetup.Thebasicproblemwiththisoptionisthesameaswiththeproposalforathree-entitysetup:theabsenceofconsen-susonjustificationforsuchapolitical/territorialorganizationandtheinabilitytoadoptanewconstitution.Theproblemisevenbigger,asthethree-entityorganizationwouldbesupportedbytwonationalpoliticalelites,whileregionalizationisadvocatedonlybyoneelite.

Proponentsof the ideaof regionalizationbelieve itsbasicad-vantagetobethatitenablesdivisionofthestateintofour,five,orsevenmultiethnicregions.Whenidentifyingtheareasoftheregions,theethniccriterionshouldbedisregarded,whiletakingintoconsid-erationothercriteria,suchasnatural/geographical,economic,andtrafficcriteria.Thiswoulddiminishtheimportanceofethnicdivisionsandconsequencesofthewar.Itisbelievedthatthecurrentpolitical/territorialdivisionisartificial,because,asaconsequenceofthewar,itfailstotakeintoaccountothercriteria6.ItisalsoemphasizedthatBosniaandHerzegovinahasnoexperiencewithfederalism,buthasmanycenturiesofexperiencewithregionalization7.Itisofparticular

6 “The constitutional model of the political/territorial organization is not inharmonywiththeregional/geographicstructureofBosniaandHerzegovina.Thedemarcation lines are aproductofpolitical compromisemade inorderto end the war. They have legally ensured the dissolution of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian physiognomy systems, geo-unities, geo-complexes, self-sustainablenodal-functioningregions,sub-regions,andareas,andtransformedthem into unsustainable and expensive functioning units.” – Edin Šarčević,Projection of B-H Constitution (Projekcija Ustava BiH), centar za javno pravo, Sarajevo2012,6.

7 ElmirSadiković,“Federalization:SolutionforBosniaandHerzegovina,orStepTowards ItsDisintegration?” (Federalizacija: rješenje zaBosnu iHercegovinuili korak ka njenoj dezintegraciji?), Tačno.net, http://tacno.net/novosti/doc-


importancethattheregionalizationeliminatestheethniccriterionindeterminationofthepolitical/territorialorganization,whichcriterionisbelievedtothreatentheveryexistenceofthestateandtobeaconsequenceofthewar.

Theseargumentsareworthanalyzing.Whenitcomestopriorexperiencewithfederalismandregionalization, it isworthnotingthatBosniaandHerzegovinahasneither.Justasithadneverbeenorganizedasafederalstateuntil1995,neitherwasiteveraregionalstate.Sometimesregionalizationisdefinedinverybroadterms,sothat it includesalmostall formsofpolitical/territorialorganizationexistinginthisareasincethe10thcentury.Suchargumentscannotbetakenseriously.Firstofall,BosniaandHerzegovinahasonlyexistedasamodernstatesince1995.TheMedievalBosnianstatecannotbetakenasaraw-model,asitwasnotamodern,butratherafeudalstate.Later,withthearrivaloftheTurksandtheAustro-Hungarians,BosniaandHerzegovinabecameanadministrativearea,organized,untilthelate19thcentury,aspartofapre-modernstate.Afterwards,BosniaandHerzegovinawasapartofYugoslavia,andonlyin1943diditbecomeaseparatestateunit.

ThenotionofregionalizationreferstothesetupofBosniaandHerzegovina as a regional state. regionalization implies division ofthestateintopolitical/territorialunitswhoseresponsibilitiesaredefinedbythestateconstitution,whichhavetheirownlegislative

dr-elmir-sadikovic-federalizacija-rjesenje-za-bosnu-i-hercegovinu-ili-korak-ka-njenoj-dezintegraciji/,24.6.2015.


andexecutivegovernmentbodies(insomeregionalstates,suchasSpain,regionsalsohavetheirownjudiciary).Thisdoesnotregardtheregionsaseconomic,butratheraspolitical/territorialunits.Re-gionalizationclearlyimpliesseparationofpowersbetweenthestategovernmentandtheregionscomprisedtherein.

Whenanalyzingtheideaofregionalization,attentionshouldalsobepaidtohistoricalandpoliticalcircumstances,aswellasthenatureofthesociety.Reasonsforthecreationoffederalstatesareanalyzedindetailinconstitutionallawtheory.8Historicalandethnicreasonsconstitutesomeofthebasicreasons.Historicalcircumstancessur-roundingthecreationofafederalstateareveryimportantfordeter-minationofthetypeofitsstateregime.InBosniaandHerzegovina,thereasonsthathaveledinDaytontotheadoptionoftheconstitu-tionwehavetodayarewellknown.Itisworthnotingthattheystillpersist.Ontheotherhand,themultiethnicnatureofthesocietyisnotinitselfsufficientreasontohaveafederalstate.However,ifweaddtothemulti-ethnicitythefactthatthesocietyisdeeplydivided,anddividedexactly(althoughnotexclusively)alongethniclines,itisclearwhyregionalizationisnotpossible.Itwouldbecontrarytothenatureofthesocietyandthedominantsocialconflicts.SomeauthorsbelievethatregionalizationofBosniaandHerzegovinaconformstotheterritorial-administrative-politicaltraditionofthecountry.9 How-

8 RatkoMarković,373–377.

9 See: Elmir Sadiković, “Regionalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Pre-requisite for Integration into European Union” (Regionalizacija Bosne iHercegovinekaopretpostavkaintegracijeuEvropskuuniju),Yearbook of the Faculty of Political Sciences,Sarajevo2006,152.


ever,evenifweleaveasidetheissueofwhetherandtowhatextentsuchatraditionhaseverbeenestablished(astheregionalizationinthesocialistBosniaandHerzegovina,for instance,hadadifferentnature fromthecurrentconceptof regionalizationadvocatedbycertainauthorsandpoliticalelites), thefact remains that thewarandpost-wareventshave,tosaythe least,brought intoquestionthepossibilityofrelyingonthistradition.

TheBosnian-Herzegoviniansocietybecamenationallydividedin1990,andafterthewar,ithasexhibitedallthemarkersofaseg-mentedsociety,withinthemeaninggiventosuchsocieties intheworksofArendLijphart.10Political/territorialorganizationofastatemustbeharmonizedwiththenatureofthesociety.Andithastobeharmonizedwithitnotbecausesomeonewantsitto,butsimplybecauseitcouldnotbefunctioningotherwise,withoutcontinuingand deep political crises.

Twonationalpoliticaleliteswanttohavepolitical/territorialunitsthatwouldbeshapedprimarilybytheethniccriterion.Oneofthepoliticalelites(theSerbone)hasalreadyachievedthisandwantsthisachievementtoprevail;theother(theCroat)politicalelitewantstoachievethesamegoal.Inthissituation,itcannotbeexpectedthat

10 See: Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Modeli demokratije), Službenilist–CID, Belgrade–Podgorica 2003; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (Demokracija u globalnim društvima),Globus–Školskaknjiga,Zagreb1992; Arend Lijphart, “Consensus andConsociational Democracy, Cultural,Structural, Functional, and Rational-Choice Explanations”, Scandinavian Political Studies,Vol.21,2/1998;ArendLijphart,“ConstitutionalDesign forDividedSocieties”,Journal of Democracy,Vol.15,2/2004.


theconstitutionalordershouldberadicallychangedinawaythatwouldsatisfythegoalsofonlythethird(Bosniak)politicalelite.

Aparticularproblemwiththisoption,evenifitwereachievable,wouldbetoembedtheprincipleofconstituencyofpeoplesintheconstitution.Asthesociety ismultinationalanddivided,constitu-entpeopleswouldaspiretoachievetheirequalityinthestateandregional institutions.However,advocatesoftheregionalizationofthestatedonothaveaunifiedpositiononwhetherandhowtheconstituencyofpeoplesshouldbeguaranteed.Thisisbestseenbyexaminationofprogramdocumentsofthepoliticalpartiesthatad-vocateregionalization,thesebeingtheSocialDemocraticParty(SDP),PartyofDemocraticAction(SDA),andPartyforBosniaandHerze-govina(SBiH).11WhileSDPbelievesthatpoliticalinstitutionsshouldbeorganizedinawaythattheconstituentpeoplesarenotonlyrep-resented,butalsoinapositiontoprotecttheirvitalinterests,12 sBiH advocatestheestablishmentofa“clear”politicalregimeofliberalormajoritydemocracy,wherethecitizens,butnottheconstituent

11 Positions of the national political parties on this issue have been analyzedin detail in: Goran Marković, “Bosnian-Herzegovinian Federalism”(Bosanskohercegovački federalizam), Službeni glasnik–University Press,Belgrade–Sarajevo2012,389–406.

12 ThispartybelievesthattheParliamentofBosniaandHerzegovinashouldbeatwo-houseparliament,withtheprotectionofvitalinterestsbeingexercisedintheHouseofRegions.Vitalinterestswouldbedefinedinasimilarwayastheyarenowdefinedbytheentities’constitutions.–Proposal of Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Articles 40, 45, 48, http://www.ustavnareforma.ba/files/articles/20101015/187/bs. %20SDP_%20BiH_Ustav_RBiH,%2001.%2003.%202009. pdf,25.6.2015.


peoples,wouldbethepoliticalsubjects.13Ifeventhe“regionalists”donotagreeonhowtoensureequalityoftheconstituentpeoples,thisdiminishesthenumberofthosewhowouldvoteinfavorofa“regionalist”constitutionintheParliamentaryAssembly.

Anotherissuerelatedtotheideaofregionalizationisthedivisionofresponsibilitiesbetweenthestateandtheregions.Althoughitispossibletohavedeviationsinpractice,thereisaruleintheorythatfederalunitsinafederalstatehavebiggerresponsibilitiesthantheregionsinaregionalstate.Sincefederalunitsperformallthefunc-tionsof thestategovernmentandhavetheirown legal systems,whichtheyadministerindependently,providedthatitisharmonizedwiththefederallaws,itislogicalthatsuchquasi-statepolitical/ter-ritorialunitshavealargerdegreeofindependencethantheregionsinaregionalstate,whichismerelyamodifiedformofaunitarystate.

Despitethetransferof responsibilities,whichhas ledtoasig-nificantincreaseintheresponsibilitiesofBosniaandHerzegovina,theentitiesstillhavesignificantresponsibilities.Territorialreorgani-zationintermsoftheestablishmentofregionswouldsurelyimplyincreasedresponsibilitiesofthecentralgovernment.Advocatesof

13 InthedocumentDraft Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,thispartyhasformulatedtheideathattheParliamentshouldbecomposedoftheHouseofRepresentativesandtheSenate,whichwouldberepresentativeoftheregions.Theywould send equal number of representatives to the Senate; however,theDraft Constitution doesnotprescribetherulesforparityorproportionalrepresentationoftheconstituentpeoples,ortheprocedureforprotectionofvital national interests.


theregionalizationthemselvesemphasizethis.14BearinginmindthatthereisnoagreementonthetransferofresponsibilitiesinfederalBosniaandHerzegovina,whichwould,bytheirscopeandnature,besignificantlysmallerthanwhatisproposedbytheadvocatesofregionalization, it isnot tobeexpected thata consensuswouldbeachievedonsubstantialtransferofresponsibilitiestothestate.RegionalizationofBosniaandHerzegovinawouldcertainly implycentralizationofthestategovernment,althoughthisstilldoesnotmean,andcannotmean, that thestatewouldbeorganizedasacentralist state.

14 “It isnecessarytoexpandconstitutionalresponsibilitiesoftheinstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovina, inordertoenabletheunityof itseconomic, legal,andpolitical system, such as the customs system, labor relations and socialsecurity,laborlawandpensionsystem,defenseandsecurity,education,culture,financialandbankingsystem,etc.For,bydefiningverynarrowresponsibilitiesof the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as exclusive responsibilities and byleavingverybroadresponsibilitieswiththeentities,theConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinahastherebyhelpedstrengthenthestatehoodoftheentitiesattheexpenseofBosniaandHerzegovina.Theabolitionoftheentitiesandcantonswould definitely lead to essential changes in the responsibilities ofthe bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” – Program of SDP BiH, http://sdp.ba/datoteke/uploads/dokumenti/PROGRAM_SDP_BiH.pdf, 25.6.2015. In thedocumentProposalofConstitutionoftheRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovina,which has been adopted by the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia andHerzegovina, Articles 36 and 37 enumerate the exclusive responsibilities oftheRepublicandofregionalcommunities.TheresponsibilitiesoftheRepublicaresignificantlylargerthantheresponsibilitiestheinstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovinahaveundertheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina.Asimilarsolution isproposedby theworkinggroupofForumofTuzlaCitizens.See:DraftConstitutionoftheRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovina,Arts89and92.http://www.fcjp.ba/templates/ja_avian_ii_d/images/green/Forum%20gradja-na%20Tuzla.pdf, 25.6.2015.


Changing the Washington regime to Preserve the Dayton regime

GiventheabsenceofconsensusregardingamendmentstotheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina,asolutiontotheproblemcanonlybesoughtwithintheframeworkof

theexistingconstitutionalorder.ItisnotclearhowArticleI.3,stipula-tingthetwo-entityorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovina,couldbeamended,letaloneotherconstitutionalprovisions,whichprescribethecompositionandtheprocedurefortheelectionofanddecisionmaking in political institutions.

Thequestion iswhatcouldbeacompromiseandpossibleso-lution. Inmyopinion, the two-entityorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovinacannotbechanged,henceasolutionthatwouldbebasedon itsabolitionshouldnotevenbeconsidered.Within thetwo-entityorganizationofBosniaandHerzegovina,itispossibletoconsiderchangeintheterritorialorganizationoftheFederation.Thissolutionispossibleforanumberofreasons.First,theConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinagivestheentitiesalmostunlimitedrighttoself-organization,whichisconditionedonlybytherespectforcertainbasicprinciplesof theconstitutionalorder (suchas, forexample,theprincipleoftheruleoflaw,protectionofhumanrightsorfreeanddemocraticelections).However,theseprinciplesdonotdirectlyaffectthepolitical/territorialorganizationoftheentities.Therefore,


thesolutionshouldbesoughtintheamendmentoftheConstitutionoftheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina.

Asolutionthatisbasedonamendmentstothisconstitutionhasbothadvantagesanddisadvantages.Anadvantageisthatasolutiontotheproblemdependsontheabilitytoachieveconsensusbytwo,ratherthanthreenationalpoliticalelites.Althoughitisnotalwaysso,inprincipleitiseasiertoachieveagreementinsuchasituation.AnotheradvantageofthissolutionisthattheConstitutionoftheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovinadoesnotprescribeindetailthepolitical/territorialorganization.Itdoesnotevengiveaprecisenumberofcantons,whichisstipulatedbyaseparatelaw.

Thisdoesnotmeanthatthepolitical/territorialorganizationoftheFederationcanbeestablishedbysimplemodificationtoaFed-erationlawthatwouldreducethenumberofcantons.This istheweaknessofthisproposal.However,suchasolutionwouldleadtothecreationofasimplerandcheaperstateapparatus,whilethecon-stitutionalstatusofthecantonwouldbeunchanged.However,giventhattheresponsibilitiesoftheFederationarenotfew,thiswouldnotcontributetothesolvingoftheessentialquestiondiscussedhere.Inordertohavearealchange,itisnecessarynotonlytoreducethenumberofcantons,butalsoforthecantonstogetmorerespon-sibilities,whichwouldapproximate themtothestatusofcurrententities.Thismeansthat,byamendingtheFederationconstitution,asignificantportionoftheresponsibilitiesshouldbetransferredfromtheFederationtothecantons.Inthisway,thecantonswouldgetlargerterritory,theywouldbeeconomicallymoresustainable,their


operationwouldmakemoresense,andtheywouldhaveagreaterdegreeofautonomy,whichwouldapproximatethemtothedegreeofautonomyenjoyedbytheentities.ThetransferofresponsibilitieswouldbecarriedoutbytransferringtheexclusiveresponsibilitiesoftheFederationontocantonsastheirexclusiveresponsibility,ortherewouldbesharedresponsibilityoftheFederationandthecantons.

Inmyopinion,theFederationshouldhavetwocantons–onewithamajorityBosniakpopulationandtheotherwithamajorityCroatpopulation.Mostar,acityofgreatpoliticalrelevance,whereasignificantnumberofbothCroatsandBosniakslive,shouldhavethestatusofadistrict,asitwouldnotbepossibletodecidewhichcanton itwouldbelongto.Asthecantonswouldhavemorere-sponsibilities than theydounder thecurrent constitution, theirconstitutional statuswouldbeclose to thestatusof thecurrententities.Thiswouldcreateapolitical/territorialunitthatwould,byterritorialexpansion,numberof inhabitants,economic strength,andresponsibilities,besignificantlylargerthanthecurrentindividu-allyobservedcantonswithaCroatmajority,andthemajorityofthepopulationwouldbeCroat.ThiswouldbetheCroatquasi-entity.Of course, itwouldnot send its representatives to thegovern-mentbodiesofBosniaandHerzegovina,norwouldithavealltheresponsibilitiesofanentity,butitwould,ontheotherhand,haveallthefunctionsofthestategovernment, itwouldhaveitsownlegalsystem,institutionalsystemandfinancialautonomy.ItwouldhaveitsrepresentativesintheinstitutionsoftheFederation,andthroughthemitwouldelectrepresentativestotheinstitutionsofBosnia and Herzegovina.


Certainly,thechangescouldnotpertainsolelytopolitical-terri-torialreorganization.TheywouldhavetoencompasstheprocedurefortheelectionofanddecisionmakinginindividualinstitutionsoftheFederationofBosniaandHerzegovina.Thisregards,primarily,theinstitutionofthePresidentoftheFederation,aswellasthecomposi-tionanddecision-makingprocedureoftheGovernment.Changestothisportionoftheconstitutionarenecessaryinordertoachievefullequalityoftheconstituentpeoples.Withoutthesechanges,political/territorialreorganizationwouldnotbeenough,asitwouldfailtoprovideallthenecessarymechanismsfortheprotectionofinterestsoftheconstituentpeoplesintheinstitutionsoftheFederation,whichwouldstillhaveresponsibilitiesincertainmatters.

Wecannotelaborateonthesequestions ingreatdetail inthispaper.Wecanonlynameseveralparticularlysensitiveones.Thefirstquestionistheprocedurefortheelectionofpresidentandvice-pres-identoftheFederation,whichisdefinedinthe2002constitutionalamendmentsinawaythatdoesnotalwaysensuretheelectionoflegitimaterepresentativesofindividualpeoples.15Thesecondques-tionisthecompositionoftheFederationgovernment,whichcouldcomprisedelegates,asisthecasewiththeGovernmentoftheRe-publikaSrpska.Thismeansthat theGovernmentwouldcomprise

15 Amendment XLII prescribes that the candidates for president and vice-presidentsoftheFederationmaybenominatedbyonethirdofthedelegatesofeachcaucusoftheconstituentpeoples.Ifthehousesdonotagreeonthelistofthenomineesforthepresidentandvice-presidents,adecisionmaybemadebyonlyonehouse.ThereisapossibilityhereforthisdecisiontobemadebytheHouseofRepresentatives,byoutvotingonnationalgrounds.


onlythosedelegatesthatwerepreviouslyelectedtotheParliament.SuchasolutionwouldpreventnominationtotheGovernmentofministerswhoaremembersofminorCroatparties,whodonotenjoythesupportof theelectorate,butwereelectedtotheParliamentwithminimumsupportbythevoters.Thiswouldresolvetheprob-lemof“illegitimate”Croatministers,suchasthesituationthattookplaceinthelastconvocationoftheParliament,whenaminorCroatPartyofRights(HNS)enteredtheGovernment.Thethirdquestionregardstheprocedurefortheprotectionofvitalnationalinterests,whichshouldbeprescribedinamannerthatlegitimaterepresenta-tivesofeachpeoplecanpreventthetakingofadecisiontheydeemdetrimentaltotheirvitalnationalinterests.

119

CHAPTER TWO

THE ECONOmiC AND SOCiAl lEgACy OF THE DAyTON PEACE AgrEEmENT

121

The Bosnian-herzegovinian PaTh

svetlana cenić

122

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: How to Jump Start the Economy?

Has the combination of physical reconstruction, deregulation, privatization,

and macroeconomic stabilization over the past two decades been a proper

and adequate recipe for the economic transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

It appears not and, surely, it lacks one major dimension – transformation of

ownership that would be based on meritocracy, rule of law, and zero tolerance

for corruption. Has this consequently led to giving support to economic reforms

only in principle and rhetorically, merely to the extent they fit into the political

ethnic/national agendas? According to Svetlana Cenić, a renowned economist

(both theoretician and practitioner), author and publicist, this permanent politi-

cal instability is the underlying cause of a serious economic decline, which can

be expressed as billions of dollars worth of losses in gross national product.

Whose interests, then, are served by creating such instability? The answer to

this question may help answer the main question explored by this essay: Is it

possible to achieve economic progress under this constitutional framework? Ms.

Cenić believes it is, provided that it is a brand new, Bosnian-Herzegovinian path!

123The Bosnian-Herzegovinian path

Poor Statistics between Two Agreements1

TwodecadesintotheDaytonAgreement,theStabilizationandAssociationAgreement–SAAhasfinallycomeintoforce(1June2015)2.Thiswouldnotbesostrange if this temporal

correlation,orperhapsdiscrepancy,didnotcalltomindtheperiodrightafterthewar,wheninternationalorganizations,throughtheirprojectsandconsultants,andwiththesupportandcooperationofnationalauthorities,wereintroducingdemocracy,privatization,andajudiciarysystem,reformingpublicadministrationandbasicallybuil-dingcapacity.Howsuccessfulweretheseprojects?ThedataindicatethatBosniaandHerzegovina (BiH)hasnotyetcaughtupwith itspre-wargrossdomesticproduct(GDP),thatthestandardoflivinghasbeendroppingforthelastsevenyears,andthattheSAAhascomeintoforceasmuchaseightyearsafterbeingsigned!

Today,BiHisfurther indebtthanever, ithasarecordnumberofunemployed,itistheonlycountryintheworldwith“temporary

1 The data used in the text result from various researches conducted by theauthor.Theaccuracyofdataisasoleresponsibilityoftheauthor.

2 The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) is an instrumentproviding formal mechanisms and harmonized criteria that enable theEU to work with BiH on approximation of its standards to those of theEuropean Union. BiH started the SAA negotiations on 25 November2005, initialed the agreement on 4 December 2007, and signed it on 16July2008.TheratificationintheEUwasfinalizedon21April2015,anditcameintoforceon1June2015.

124 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Svetlana Cenić

layoffs”3,ithaspoorworldrankingwithregardtocorruptionandinvestmentintoscience(researchanddevelopment)4, it is a country withagreatmanyprivateandstateuniversities,butthenumberofpersonswithauniversityeducationdoesnotexceedtenpercent,whiletheilliteracyratedoes.TheabsolutepovertyrateinBiH,de-notingcitizenswithamonthlyincomeunderBAM205,wasaround14percentin2014,encompassingaround538,000inhabitants,ren-deringitthelargestintheregion,whilethepercentageofrelativepovertyis18.5.Ontheotherhand,thereare512millionaires,i.e.personswithanaveragebalanceinthebankofonemillionconvert-iblemarks(511,000Euros)ormore,currentlylivinginBiH.Accordingtothereportby“WealthX”,thereare85multimillionaireslivinginBiH,rankingitthethirtiethcountryintheworld,whilethewealthofitsmillionairesisassessedatUSD9billion.

3 The term temporary layoff is ageneral reference to employees in collapsedcompanies (operating with losses and undergoing or having undergonetransformationofownership),whosesalariesarenotpaid,noraretaxesandcontributionsonsalaries.Suchemployeesawaitresolution,theykeepgettingpromises,theycannotregisterasunemployed,becauseonthepapertheyareemployed,norcantheyreceivesocialaid,orevenlookfornewjobsbecausetheirbreaksinservicearenotbridgedandcontributionsnotpaid.

4 TherearenoreliabledataonhowmuchfundsareallocatedtoresearchanddevelopmentinBiH,butitiswellknownthatthepercentageisbasicallyintherangeofastatisticalerror,althoughthepercentagesomewherebetween0.07and0.08percentoftheGDPisoften(ab)used.Forcomparison,thedocumentEurope2020promotesthegoalofspendingthreepercentofGDPonR&D.Developed countries in theworld spend evenmore, so, for example, Israelspends 4.21 percent, Korea 4.15 percent, Japan 3.49 percent, Taiwan andChina 3.12 percent, Finland 3.32 percent, Sweden 3.30 percent, Denmark3.06percent,etc.


Theabsolutepoverty rate in this (2015)andnextyearmightincreaseevenfurther,givenourfinancialsituation,withthecautionthatthenumberofpeoplelivinginsqualormayexceed670,000ofthetotalof3.7millioninhabitants(accordingtopreliminaryresultsoftheOctober2014Census).

The current B-H economy is still a transitional, quasi-marketeconomy, lacking strategic planning, modern administration, and closercooperationwithscientific research institutions,andbeinghighlydependentonpolitics.Positivecasesdoexist(companiesinthemunicipalitiesofTešanj, gradačac, gračanica, teslić, goražde),butprivateentrepreneurstendtoevadethepolitical“radar”,whichisactuallyevenpossibleintheFederationofBiH(FBiH),havingsev-eralcentersofpower,while it isalmostunattainable inRepublikaSrpska(RS),wherealldecisionsaremadeatoneplace.


Ethnic Annexation of Public Corporations...

Fortwentyyearsnow,theDaytonPeaceAgreement, inparti-cularthepartwiththeConstitutionofBiH,servesforouruse,abuseandexcuse.TheBosnian-HerzegovinianConstitutionis

astructuralpartofanotherlegaldocument,whileitsbrevity,expertsinconstitutionallawassert,isindicativeofitsnormativedeficit.Nottomentionthatthisveryimportantdocumentincludesreferencestootherdocuments,morespecifically,to15internationaldocumentsonprotectionofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms,renderingitsomewhatconfusing,andhardforaregularcitizentocomprehend.Thisleadstofrequentmanipulationwithaccusationsthat,forinstan-ce,theBosniaksidewantsaunitaryBiH,eventhoughsuchathingwouldbeimpossibleinacountrywithatwo-houseparliament,aswouldbesecession,orformationofnewadministrative/politicalunits.

Thebêtenoireofpotentialtransferofresponsibilitiestothestate-levelinstitutions,evenwithoutactualreductioninthepowersoflow-er-levelauthorities(theEntities),purelyasamatterofoneaddressandcoordination,hasbeenpresent inthepoliticalrhetoricoftheSerbrepresentatives,eventhoughgivingconsenttoanagreementontransferofresponsibilitiesshouldbehandledthroughtherespec-tiveentity’sregulations,whichisnotstipulatedbytheConstitutionofBiH.TheConstitutiondoesnotpermittransferfromthestatetotheentitylevel,asthisisnotthepurposeofArticleIII/5.a),i.e.,astatere-sponsibilitymaynotbetransferredtotheentitiesbyanyagreement.


However,indealingwiththeissueofformingtheministryofagri-cultureandruraldevelopment(andsettingupaseparatepaymentagencytoensuretransparency)atthestatelevelortheCouncilofMinistersforthepurposeofusingIPA2fundsandasacoordinationmechanism,itisclearthatatechnicalproblembecomesapoliticalone,andeven the2014Resolutionof theEuropeanParliament,seekingthatBiHimmediatelyestablishaministryofagriculture, isbeingignored.IstheDaytonAgreementbeingusedasanexcuse,orisitsimplybeingabused?Byfailingtohaveoneaddress(underoneroof),byfailingtoformIPARD5structures,BiHhasalreadylostfinancialresourcesfromtheIPAfunds,whilefinancialresourcesarepracticallyfrozenforthenextthreeyears,fortheveryreasonofhav-ingignoredEUrequirements.

TheConstitutionparticularlycoverseconomic rightsandfree-doms.Article I/4guaranteesthefreedomofmovementofgoods,services,capital,andpersonsthroughouttheterritoryofthestate.Theterm“state” isa referencetopublicauthoritiesatall levels:fromthecentral,rooftopgovernmenttomunicipalgovernment,sothequestionarisesastowhetherprivate,naturalandlegalentitiesareobligedtoabidebyArticleI/4,asallfreedomshaveonethingincommon–theyconstituteanobligationonthepartofthestate.

5 IPARDisapre-accessionprogramoftheEuropeanUnionfortheperiodfrom2007 to 2013. It is a constituent part of IPA (Instrument of Pre-accessionAssistance), its component of “Rural Development”. Themain goal of theIPARDprogram ispromotionof theagricultural sectorby strengthening thecompetitivenessofagriculturalproducts.


TheDaytonPeaceAgreementhasnotbeenratifiedbythePar-liament.Whenmentioningthis, inparticularAnnex4,whethertostressthe“spiritoftheDaytonAgreement”ortoopposechanges,itshouldbenotedthattherearecertainprovisionsthathaveneverbeenmet,suchas,forexample,Annex9:AgreementonEstablish-mentofBosniaandHerzegovinaPublicCorporations.ArticleIreadsthataCommissiononPublicCorporationsshallbeestablished,Ar-ticleIIthataBosniaandHerzegovinaTransportationCorporationistobeestablished,andthat“withinthirtydaysafterthisAgreemententers intoforce, thePartiesshallagreeonsumsofmoneytobecontributedtotheTransportationCorporationforitsinitialoperatingbudget”.UnderArticleIII,theParties(theEntitiesoftheFederationofBiHandtheRS)maydecideto“useestablishmentoftheTrans-portationCorporationasamodel for theestablishmentofotherjointpubliccorporations,suchasfortheoperationofutility,energy,postal,andcommunicationfacilities”.InBiHtoday,therearenojointpubliccorporations,butrathertwoentitypublicrailroadcompanies,threeelectricitydistributioncompanies,twopublicpostalcorpora-tions,twopubliccorporationsforhighways,etc.Everyonehascre-atedtheirowncorporations,whicharemostlyethnicallystaffed,whilepoliticalelitescontrol“theirown”spaceanddonotallowformeritocracytotakecareofthepublicgood.

Whilethisconstitutionalrighttocreatejointpubliccompaniesforthebenefitofthegeneralpublichasbeencompletelyworndownandoutinclientelisticzeal,theotherone,therighttocreatespe-cial relationshipswithneighboringstates,hasbeentrivializedun-dercorruptpolitics,andassuch,formanyyearshasbeenusedto


needlesslychannelnegativeenergyforallthreesides.ArticleIII/2.aoftheConstitutionofBiHguaranteestheentitiestherighttoalsoestablish“specialparallelrelationshipswithneighboringstates”,al-thoughtheresponsibilityforforeignaffairs,inclusiveofcontractualrelationswithneighboringstates,lieswiththestate(ArticleIII/1.a).Itseemsthateventually,reallifehasinvalidatedtheneedforspecialandparallel lives (beyondethno-cultural issuesand identity),hav-ingdonesointhefieldofexacteconomics.RepublikaSrpskahastheAgreementonSpecialandParallelRelationshipwithSerbia,butwhenlookingatthelevelofforeigntradeexchange,itsimportfromSerbiaistwicethefigureoftheexporttoSerbia(2013datafromtheChamberofCommerceofRepublikaSrpska:theimportfromSerbiaBAM765,443,000,andtheexportBAM414,504,000),while it istheotherwayaroundwithCroatia:theexportisBAM322,387,000andtheimportBAM189,404,000.Ifclientelisminthefirstexampleandnationalisminthesecondonewereprevented,currentstatisticsandfactswouldhavebeenmuchmorefavorable.


... and Twenty years of Attempted Economic reforms

FromthesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAgreementtodate,theprevailingpositionofthe internationalcommunityhasbeenthatbuildingofastablemarketeconomyupontheruinsofwar

canbeachievedbyacombinationofphysicalreconstruction,dere-gulation,privatization,andmacroeconomicstabilization.Dependingonthelocalambientandparticularities,eachofthesecomponentscanplayaroleineconomicreconstructionandtransformation,butevenifcombinedandtakentogether,theyconstituteanincompleteandinadequateanswertothereformchallenges.Noneofthesestra-tegies,forinstance,isfocusedonorganizedcrimeandcorruption,asthebiggestchallengesofapost-conflictsociety.

Verypoorlydevisedprivatizationandliberalizationhavebenefitedthosewithgoodpoliticalconnections,pronetocorruption.Further-more,theconventionalreformapproachhasnotsufficientlyfocusedonthesocialdimensionandtheconnectionbetweenpeacebuildingandemployment,aswellassocialwelfare,notonlyofthepopulationaffectedbywartraumas,butalsoofdemobilizedsoldiersandreturn-ees.Finally,althoughthereisbroadconsensusthat“liberalpoliticalandeconomicprinciplesofferthemostpromisingmodelforthereorgani-zationofwar-shatteredstates”(Paris,R.2001,“Echoesofthe‘Mis-sionCivilisatrice’:PeacekeepinginthePost-ColdWarEra”,103),theinternationalcommunityhasfailedtomastertheskilloftransformationofwar-devastatedstatesintodemocratic,stablemarketeconomies.


Insistenceonprivatizationisarguedfordepolitizationoftheecon-omyandcreationofthebasisforeconomicrecoveryandgrowth.Whenitcomestothepost-DaytonBiH,neitherofthesegoalshasbeenachieved.Whatwasseenbyinternationaladvisorsasapolitical-swiftandcleantransferofassetsfromthestateintoprivatehands-hasbecomeacorruptplaygroundforapowerstruggle,alongethniclines,whichhasneitherstimulatedeconomicgrowth,norpromotedintra-ethnicconciliation.Ithaslongbecomecleartoalltheplayersthatsuchtransformationofownershipshouldnothavebeendonewithoutfirsthavingestablishedtheruleoflaw.

Complex ties betweenpolitics and economy in variouspost-conflictsituations indicate,ascouldbeexpected, that theeffortstowardseconomicreformcannotbetakenoutsideofthebroaderpoliticalcontext, justas it is imperativetocarefullyweighthe im-pactsofpoliticaldecisionsontheeconomy.Thepost-DaytonBosniaisaparticularlydifficultcase,becausethreetransitionshavebeentakingplacesimultaneously,butwithavaryingdegreeofintensity.Withsignificantinternationalassistance,Bosniahasbeenundertak-inguncertaintransitionprocesses,facingnumerouspoliticalblock-ades,headingnotonlytowardsdemocracyandcapitalism,butalsotowardstheconsolidationofthestate.

At themomentofaffixingsignaturesonto theDaytonPeaceAgreement,GDPpercapitahad fallenbelowUSD500,which isapproximately20percentof thepre-warfigure,whileunemploy-mentwasataround80-90percent,andthesamepercentageofthepopulationwasdependantoninternationalhumanitarianaid.The


WorldBankhasestimatedthevalueofdestroyedinfrastructureataroundUSD25-30billion,withtheadditionalburdenbeingthedebtinheritedfromtheformerstate.TheDaytonConstitutionprovidesfortheestablishmentoftheCentralBank,withacurrencyboardinplaceforthefirstsixyears.TwodecadesintotheDaytonAgreementthecurrencyboardisstilleffective.Unfortunately,withdysfunctionalpoliticalelitesandcontinuousprovocationofconflictmerelytowindailypoliticalpoints,thingscouldnothavebeendoneotherwise,inordertoavoidpotentialabuseoftheCentralBankorthecurrencyexchangerateeverytimethemoneyrunsout;and,becauseofnothavinganexchange-rateregime, importhasmostlystayedcheap(conditionallyspeaking),exportexpensive,whileweproducegoodsthatcanhardlycompeteinqualitywithforeigngoods.

Inits1996Report,theWorldBankrecommendsthattheB-Hgov-ernmentshouldputprimaryfocusontheestablishmentofalegal,regulatory,andinstitutionalframeworktoenablethefunctioningofthefreemarket,aswellasontheprovisionofgoodsandservices,suchasdefense,publicorder,basiceducation,andhealthcare6. in otherwords,sincetheverystart,B-Hauthoritieswereseenaschiefpartnersintheeconomictransitionprocesses,whichmeantbreakingupwiththepast,andthepostwarperiodmarkingafreshstartofaneweconomicorder,inpartnershipwithresponsibleanddedicatedpoliticalelites.But,inthecaseofBiH,thesewerethesamewartimepoliticalelites,withthesameproblems.Themainorderofbusinessin

6 World Bank (1996), Bosnia and Herzegovina: Toward Economic Recovery,WashingtonDC;WorldBank.


thepost-Daytonerawasmulti-ethnicityvs.apartheid,unityvs.divi-sions,andconsolidationoftheirownpoliticalpower,whichbasicallymeantnochangefromthepre-Daytonperiod.AnditisinthislightthattheattitudeofB-Hpolitical leaderstowardseconomictransi-tionshouldbeviewed:theysupportedeconomicreformsinprincipleandrhetorically,whileinpracticeitsprogressandspeeddependedonbroaderpoliticalgoalsof individual leadingparties,and itwassubjugatedtothecomplexityofvariousnationalpoliciesinthestate.Thishasinevitablycreatedacomplicatedrelationshipbetweentheinternationalandnationalauthorities.Inanutshell,theinternationalstrategy for transition towardsmarketeconomy focusedon twoelements:aninternationallyfinancedphaseofinfrastructurerecon-structiontothepre-warlevelandreformpoliciesaimedatcreationofafavorableclimateforprivateentrepreneurship.Inotherwords,theinternationalaidforthereconstructionwastobereplacedbyprivateinvestmentsaskeydrivingforcesbehindeconomicreconstruction.Thisstrategyhasencounteredtwochallenges:thecooperationandwillingnessoftheB-Hgovernmenttocreateconditionsthatwouldstrengthenprivatesector,nomatterhowincompetentorunwillingB-Hpoliticalelitestrulyare,andrelianceontheprivatesector,asthedrivingforcebehindtheeconomictransition,acceptingthefactthatforthetimetocome,BiHwillnothavetheefficientinstitutionsandpoliticalstabilitynecessarytoattractprivateinvestments.


Political instability - Economic regression

Lookingat thepostwareconomic indicators, it isexactly theparallelbetweenpoliticalstabilityandgrowthinGDPthatisinteresting.Withaverymodestbaseafterthewar,GDPhas

seengrowthtoalesserorsmallerextent;intheperiodfrom1999to2006,thesmallestgrowthintherealGDPgrowthratewasseenin2003,asaresultofthe2002GeneralElections,withtheformingofgovernmentandimplementingofconstitutionalreformsintheRS.Theprocessoftheconstitutionoflegislativeandexecutiveautho-ritiesintheFederationofBiHaftertheresultsoftheOctober2012elections took a very long time, due to indecisiveness among parlia-mentarypartiesastowhowillformacoalitionwithwhom,whichwasonly reinforcedbysomerepresentativesof the internationalcommunity,who,afterhavingaratherpassivestandduringthepre-electionperiod,triedtoinfluencetheformationandpersonal/partycompositionofthenewgovernment,onlytoabandontheidealater.Ofcourse,muchtimehadbeenwasted.TheprocessofconstitutionandformationoftheCouncilofMinisterstookalmostfourmonthsandlotsoftimewaswastedonconstitutingandtakingmeasuresfromwithintheresponsibilitiesofthestate.

Allofthishashadanimpactonboththeeconomyandeconomicindicators;somethingsimilarwasrepeatedafterthe2006Electionsand,inparticular,afterthe2010GeneralElections.


Ind

icat

ors

19

99

2000

20

01

2002

20

03

2004

20

05

2006

NominalGDP(bnEUR)

4.9

5.5

5.9

6.5

6.9

8.5

9.3

10.5

GDPperCapita(EUR)

1,385

1,449

1,561

1,713

1,794

2,219

2,417

2,731

RealGDPGrowthRate(%)

10.0

5.5

4.5

5.5

3.0

6.0

6.7

7.1

IncreaseinIndustrialProduction(%)1.6

8.8

12.2

9.2

4.8

9.0

10.0

11.0

AverageMonthlyNetPay(EUR)

188

190

209

228

247

258

275

300

AnnualInflationRate(%)

-0.9

4.8

3.1

0.4

0.6

0.4

2.1

6.1

UnemploymentRate(%)

39.3

39.7

40.3

40.9

42.0

43.2

31.1

30.0

TotalAmountofFDI(mnEUR)

166

159

133

282

338

534

421

556

FDIShareinGDP(%)

3.4

2.9

2.3

4.3

4.9

6.2

4.5

5.2

Source:CentralBankofBiH,AgencyforStatisticsofBiH,FIPA


Andsince2006:

RealGDPGrowthRate,AgencyforStatisticsofBiH

Thecampaignsinthe2006GeneralElectionsweremonopolizedbyconstitutionalamendments,withthepoliticalpartiespositioningthemselvesintwogroups:thefirstgroupcomprisedthepoliticalpar-tiesofSDA,SDS,HDZBiH,SDP,andSNSD,defendingthepackageofagreedconstitutionalamendments,eitherasmerelythefirststageorasamaximumconcession,whilethesecondgroupconsistedofthepoliticalpartiesofSBiHandHDZ1990,advocatingmoreradicalconsti-tutionalamendments.ThefearinducedinthemajorityoftheBosniakpeoplewasthefearofdividingthestateandofthesecessionistinten-tionsoftheotherpeoples;thefearinthemajorityoftheSerbpeoplewasthatofabolitionorsignificantreductionintheresponsibilitiesoftheRS,whileinthemajorityoftheCroatpeopleitwasthefearof

7,0

6,0

5,0

4,0

3,0

2,0

1,0

0,0

-1,0

-2,0

-3,0

-4,0

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


ethnicinequalityandvulnerability.OnceagainthedominanttopicwastheannouncedpossibilityforhavingareferendumintheRS.In2006,theValueAddedTax(VAT)wasintroduced,revenuesroseaboveallexpectations,sonobodywasseriouslyaddressingeconomicissues,ex-ceptformakinglotsofpromises.Thesamewastruefortheyearafter,andthesaleofTelekomRStoneighboringSerbiabroughtrevenuestoRepublikaSrpskainthevalueofalmostonebudget,sonoonegaveanythoughttowhatunrealisticpromisesandallocationsmeantinthelongrun.Theadministrationwasgrowinginbothentities,aswellasinthestateinstitutions,butthencamethesoberingupandplungeofGDPin2009.Eventhoughthebankingsectorwasnotexperiencinganyproblems,norwasitinneedofabailout,andeventhoughtheimportshareintheGDPwasonaveragearound18percent,todatethepoliticalexcuseforthemany-yeardeclineandstagnationis“theworldeconomiccrisis”andconsequencesthereof,whilethereisnomentionofpoliticalstabilityasthereasonforlackofbothnationalandforeigninvestmentsandthefallinindustrialproduction.

The2010GeneralElectionscontinuedinthesametones,onthesamematrix.Thetopicsdominatingtheelectionswere:lawsorpar-liamentaryinitiativesregardingthecensus,banoffascism,stateholi-days,banoftheWahhabiandburkas,areferendumintheRS,etc.,propelledbyentirelydifferentpoliticalviewsofwhat is“my”andwhatis“your”fascismandradicalism,andbydisagreementsonhis-torically importantevents,withthereferendumcomingasathreatfromtheRSduringeveryelection,eversincetheSNSDcame intopowerin2006.Then,therewerevariousdevelopments,suchastheMostarFair,aneconomicevent,where,inaspeechattheopeningof


thefair,BiHPresidencyMemberHarisSilajdžićtalkedaboutpoliticalevaluationofregionalrelations;theIstanbulDeclaration,adocumentwhereinthepresidentsofSerbia,Turkey,andBiH(Tadić,Erdoğan,andSilajdžić)presentedajointvisionofanapproachtoregional issues;avisitbythe leadershipoftheBosniakPartyofDemocraticAction(SDA)toBelgrade;judgmentsbyinternationalcourtswithregardtothedeclarationofindependencebyKosovoandrestitutionofmilitaryhousing;anactofterrorism(anattackbymembersoftheWahhabimovementonthepolicestationinBugojno);warheritage,suchastheGanićcase(hisarrestinLondonuponanarrestwarrantissuedbySerbia),Srebrenicaandgenocidedenial,commemorationofthosekilledintheDobrovoljačkaStreet(anattackonthecolumnoftheYu-goslavNationalArmywithdrawingfromSarajevoin1992)andinanareaknownasMaltainTuzla(alsoYNA,ontheoneside,andmilitaryvolunteersandthepolice,ontheother),theburialofGeneralDelić,aprominentofficerandwar-timecommanderoftheArmyofBiH;andsimilartopics,allofthempresentinBiHduringeveryelection,and,thatyeartherewasalsothesupportbytheSNSDpartyfortheelec-tionoftheCroatmemberofthestatepresidencywithCroatvotes,andadvocatingthethirdentityandpeacefuldissolution.Acuriositythatfollowedthiselectionwastheunconstitutionalmathematicssur-roundingtheelectionoftheFBiHGovernment,suchaswaitingforthedeterminationoftheCouncilofMinistersforsome16-17months,andconsequently,forthebudgetofthestateinstitutions.

Periodsofpoliticalstabilitywerealwaysmarkedbystrongergrowthinproduction,and,consequently,bygreatergrowthinGDP,withoutevenhavingmajorreformprocessesorannouncementsthereof.


reforms on remote Control

Formanyyears,theWorldBankandtheIMF(andlatereventheEU)didnotneedto“impose”anysolutions.Thegovernmentswereactuallyhappytoreceivefromtheseorganizationspo-

licies theycouldfollow,withoutbearinganyresponsibility for theconsequencesofeconomicandpoliticalmeasures.Afteraminordiscontent,reformswouldgetwrittenandmeasuresacceptedandpromotedveryquickly.Itisclearevenfromthepre-electioncampai-gnsthateconomictopicsneverprevail,whilepartyprogramswouldgetwritteninbroadterms,withtheusual:wewillthrive,wewillfightfor,wewillinsist,etc.Fromconstitutionalamendments,defen-sereform,policereform,judiciaryreform(theleastsuccessful),publicadministrationreform,totheenforcementoftheJudgmentbytheCourtinStrasbourgintheSejdić&Fincicase,therewereperiodsofcooperationanddealingwitheconomicproblems.Relaxationofthepoliticalrhetoricanddemonstrablecooperationinevitablyloosentheeconomy,andthisisimmediatelyreflectedinthegrowthofindustrialproduction.

TheBritish-GermanInitiativeemergedinNovember2014,withareferencetotheCompactforGrowth.TheCompactforGrowthandJobsofficiallyappearedonthewebon11October2014,reading:“InlateMay,aForumforProsperityandJobsconvenedinterestedpar-tiesandthebroadercitizenryofBosniaandHerzegovinatoidentifyapackageofsixconcreteandurgentmeasuresthatwouldre-ignitetheprocessofmodernizingtheeconomy”.


ItwasannouncedwithpompthattheEUandtheinternationalcommunitywouldnowgenerallyfocusoneconomicreforms,settingasidepoliticalreforms.

Somereformsweretalkedaboutformonths,especiallythenewlaborlaw,whosetextdidnotappearinpublic,andwhichwaseven-tuallyadoptedin lateJuly2015bybothHousesoftheFBiHParlia-ment,withouttheblessingofthetradeunionsorthegeneralpublic.ItwasfirstadoptedbytheHouseofPeoplesintheformofadraftbill,andthedayafteritwassentasabillinsummaryproceduretotheHouseofRepresentatives,somethingwhichisunprecedentedinparliamentarypractice.Furthermore,thesummaryprocedurereferstothepassingofalawwhenitisconcludedthatitsadoptioninregularprocedurewouldbedetrimentaltotheFederation.IntheParliament,thisisdiscussedasapreliminaryissue,beforedecidingontheagenda.Publicdebateistheprocedureofgettingtheopinionsofthecitizenry,interestedbodies,scientificandprofessionalinstitutionsonadraftbilloronotherissuesofspecialrelevancetotheFederationofBiH.Aninitiativemaybesubmittedbyauthorizedbillsponsorsorcaucuses,andthebillmaybesentintoparliamentaryprocedureaftertheelapseof20daysfromthedayitwasdistributedtothedelegates.Followingthelogicoftheparliamentaryprocedure,citizensweresentthemes-sagethatthepassingoftheLaborLawinregularprocedurewouldbedetrimental,thattheissueoftheLaborLawisnotofspecialrelevancetotheFederationofBiH,andthatmembersoftheParliamenthadtobefamiliarwiththetextbeforethesession,whichwasnotthecaseforthegeneralpublic.BysupportingthismethodofsendingtheLaborLawintheparliamentaryprocedureanditsadoption,theEU


DelegationtoBiHbasicallyscoredanowngoalorautogoalagainsttheEuropeanprocesseswiththegeneralpublic, inparticularaftertheEUSpecialRepresentativeLars-GunnarWigemarkexpressedhissupporttotheGovernmentofFBiHwiththewords:“Thesystemwenowhaveisquiterigid,itisremnantofTitoism,tobefrank.Wehavetoaskourselvesdowewanttogobacktothosetimesordowewantsomethingmoremodern,”giventhatinSwedenthehighestdegreeofprotectionoflaborrightsisprovided,whilethemajorityofcitizens,inparticularintheFederationofBiH,basicallystillstandatattentiontothementionofTito’sname.EventhenameofthemainstreetinSarajevohasnotbeenchangedfromtheMarshallTitoStreet.

Inanyevent,economicreformswereduetoofficiallystarton11June,whenevenCommissionerHahnwassupposedtocomefortheceremonialsigning.On9June,thePresidentoftheCouncilofMinisters called on all representatives at all government levels in BiH tofulfill theirpromiseandsigntheagendathatarosefromwhatwaspromisedandagreeduponbyentitygovernments,theBrčkoDistrict,andtheCouncilofMinistersofBiH,withmajorsupportbytheEuropeanCommissionand internationalfinancial institutions.Thetextwasstillunavailabletothegeneralpublicand,byvotingalongentitylinesintheBiHParliament,thedelegatesfromtheFed-erationofBiHvotedagainst thisdocumentbeingdiscussedandmadeavailableforviewing.Finally,itbecamecleartoeveryonethatthedocumentof theReformAgendawaswritten inEnglish,andsubsequentlytranslatedintothelocallanguages.Itwasevenmoreclearthat,whiletheEUinsistsoneconomicreforms,politicalelitesevadetheirresponsibilitiesandwork,takingrecoursetowellknown


accusations,reactingwiththelowestofpoliticalpassionsandmutualaccusations,pushingasideanyseriousworktoconsolidatethestateandtheeconomyortofightmajorcorruptionandcrime.

Fortwodecades,thegovernmentsinBiHhavebeendoingthesamething:simulatetheirsupportforthereforms,theinitiativesforwhichalwayscomefromtheoutside,fromaninternationalelementinthetransitionprocessesorfromtheEuropeanUnion,asagoal.Fortwodecades,someoneelsehasbeendoingthehomeworkforthenationalpoliticalelite,withoutanyonebeingheldliable.ThismeansthateverythingthathasbeendoneinthestatefromthemomenttheDaytonPeaceAgreementwassignedtodatewasdonefromtheoutsidein.Theinternationalcommunitywasforcedtoconditionfurthermaterialandtechnicalassistanceuponlocalcooperationonreformprocesses,andithasincreasinglyempowereditselfbysimplyimposingkeyelementsoftheeconomictransitionpackage.InorderforBiHtobecomeaseriousstatewithresponsiblepoliticalelitesintheconditionsofamarketeconomyandstrongerentrepreneurialprivateinitiative,itisnecessary,firstandforemost,thattheprocessmustgo fromthe insideout. International supportandfinancialandtechnicalassistancemayonlybesoughtwhennationalforcesinitiatereformprocessesthemselves,whentheyclearlyagreeonthestepsinsidethestateandidentifytheimplementingactors,withoutanyabuseoftheDaytonAgreementprovisionsandafterpresentingmechanismsforremovalofblockadesinadvance.

Evenifthepathchosenandagreedupon-byandbetweenalllevelsofthestate-iswrong,itwillbetheirownpath,withfullcom-mitmenttoassumedinternationalobligations.

143

Bosnia and herzegovina’s QuanTiTaTive easing

marko radovanović

144

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: The Welfare State

To what extent if any does the welfare state as a social concept, holding in

its centre the human rather than the market, stand in contradiction with the

reform measures BiH has committed itself to? The inherited concept of the

social welfare state from the former SFRY has become fiscally unsustainable,

yet the question remains whether now it should be irreparably dismantled or

cleverly reformed? In the following period Bosnia and Herzegovina should not

only perform a rationalization of the welfare state (reforms of the tax system

through a decrease of income tax and better aimed social expenditures), but

also should stabilize public finances through its reduction. Thereby, what wo-

uld follow is a possible increase in competitiveness, a nominal increase in the

number of the employed, as well as a reduction of purchasing power and an

additional increase in the income inequality due to transfer of “wealth” from the

hands of consumers (workers and the public sector) into the hands of manu-

facturers. The analysis written by Marko Radovanović, economic analyst who

specialized in macro-economics at Queen Mary University of London, offers a

warning that an unsparing abolition of the social concept in BiH could lead to

intensified inter-ethnic tensions, because, in BiH, it is fairly easy to channel so-

cial injustice into “ethnic” injustice. The author therefore urges all to be wise. It is

necessary to create inter-ethnic consensus on joint industrial and export policy

and homogenized development strategy, as well as on concrete corresponding

measures in fiscal (and possibly monetary) policy. This is where the possibility

for serious analysis is offered to the BiH economic brains on some sort of BiH

quantitative easing, or to put it in more simple terms, how to employ existing

domestic capital into development goals. The Dayton Constitution is not an

obstacle for such a venture. The obstacle must be looked for in the “narcissism

of small differences” that feeds the (lack of) political (dis)agreement culture.

145Bosnia and Herzegovina’s quantitative easing

Welfare then and now – context for a new paradigm

Inmajorityofthecountrieswithacapitalisteconomysystem,thewelfarestate1 isa limitedformofsocialprotectionwhich, in itsessence,representsameansofsofteningthemarketshocksand

volatility. since Bismarck and disraeli, it represents a conservative responsetoinequalityandsocialendangermentofalargeportionof thesociety thathadbeen integrated intoacapitalisteconomysystem.Naturally, the roleof thewelfarestate is conditionedbyvarioussocio-economiccontexts,whichhavebeenswitchedseveraltimesinthepast30yearsinBosniaandHerzegovina,thusweareatthebrinkofyetanotherchange.FullemploymentandtherelativelypositivemacroeconomicimageofSFRYugoslaviaupuntilthe1980shadenabledthecreationandmaintenanceofwealthypensionanddisabilityfunds,universalhealthcareandsocialprotectionaswellasfreeeducation.ThewelfarestateinSFRYwasnotareactionto,butratherabackboneofthefunctioningoftheentiresystem.

Inthepost-warcontextofBosniaandHerzegovina,thismodelwashardlysustainable,primarilyduetotheconsequencesofwarde-struction,politicalfragmentation,economiccollapseandnewmar-ketimperatives,thathavecaughtupwithBosniaandHerzegovinaanditsbudgetsonitsroadof“transition”.Duetothedropintheeconomicactivityandbaseofcontributors,legislativefragmentation

1 social state or welfare state

146 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Marko Radovanović

andpoliticaloccupationofpartsofthesocialprotectionbyorganizedpoliticalactors,theremnantsofthewelfarestateinBiHarecurrentlydefinedbyalackoffiscalsustainability.

Creationofanopeneconomybasedonthegrowthofexportisoftencitedasalong-termdevelopmentgoalofBosniaandHer-zegovina.2Inthatcontext,thegoalofthisanalysisisnottosimplycontemplatetheproactivedevelopmentroleof thewelfarestate,buttoofferspecificargumentsbenefitingthethesisthatthewelfarestateisnecessaryintheframeworkoftheexistingeconomicdevel-opmentinBosniaandHerzegovina.Atthedoorstepofthereformsthatawaitus3,itistimetostartconsideringthewelfarestateasanactiveassetofdevelopmentpolicy,andnotasaparasiticsystemthatstandsinthewayofeconomicrecuperation.

Ingeneral,thedevelopmentofthewelfarestateinBiHmaybedividedintothreephases:thetimeofSFRY,post-wartransitionandtheupcomingneo-liberalreforms.

AfterWorldWarII,intheSFRYthereensuedaperiodofrapidindustrializationandmodernization.Thisprocessresultedinasignifi-cantabandonmentofagricultureandinthefortyyearsafterWWII,theagriculturalportionoftheSFRYsocietywasreducedfrom67.2%

2 BiH export council, 2011

3 FBiH Government and BiH Council of Ministers have adopted the ReformAgendawhichwasdevelopedincooperationwiththeEUandtheIMF,See:ReformAgenda,2015


to19.9%.4Thisdynamiccreatedtheconditionsfortheinitialdevel-opmentofsocialpolicyandplantedtheseedofthewelfarestateinSFRY.Theinitialfocusofthesocialpolicyatthetimewasonthewardisabled,childrenandyouth,and,intime,therewasanincreaseinthenumberofinstitutionsprovidingcarefortheyouth,aswellasanincreaseinthenumberofpeoplegainingtherighttoadisabilityallowance,familypensionorrentandchildbenefits.

Themid-1950ssawatimeofappeasementintheexternalpres-suresexertedbytheSovietUnionandagreateropeningtowardstheWest.Theeconomicsituationstartedtorecuperatesignificantlyand,beside improvedopenness, therewasanobviousdeparturefromacentrallyplannedtowardsasocialmarketeconomy.Paralleltothisprocess,self-governmentwastakingholdinpractice,whichincreasedthenumberofactorswhose interestsweretobetakenintoaccountwhileconsideringsocialpolicy.Inthelate1950s,severalfactorscontributedtotherapidspreadof theroleof thewelfarestateinSFRY,primarilyindustrialization,economicgrowthandself-government.Serviceswerebeingprofessionalized,andinadditiontothedisabledandtheyouth,thereweremoreandmoreservicespro-vided,includingeducation,socialandhealthprotectionoftheelderlyandtheretiredcitizens.Thelawsonhealth(1954),pension(1957)anddisability insurancewerepassedwithinsuchanenvironment.Strongereconomicactivityandfullemploymentenabledthefundsfromwhichthewelfarestateobligationswerepaidaccordingtothepay-as-you-goprinciple,andthesefundscouldofferqualitycarefor

4 Puljiz, 2005


theunemployed,thedisabledandthesick.Thismodel,withcertainmodifications,survivesuntilthisdayinBosniaandHerzegovina(andinthemajorityoftheotherformerSFRYcountries).

Theeconomicproblems thataffectedSFRY in the late1970sforcedthegovernmentatthetimetotacklethereformofthesocialsystem.Itbecameincreasinglyapparentthatwiththegrowingdebt,inflation,negativebalanceofpaymentsandholesinthebudget,thewelfarestateofthetimewasnotsustainable.However,thereformprocesswasinterruptedbytheeventsofthewar.

After1995,thefocusofpoliticalactorsinBosniaandHerzegovi-na,andoftheinternationalcommunity,hadcompletelydisregardedthereformanddevelopmentofsocialpolicythatwouldbeadaptedtothecontextofBosniaandHerzegovina.Thereareseveralreasonsforthis:theurgentneedtoreconstructthecountry,decentralizationofpoliticaldecision-makingonsocialpolicy,aclientelisticrelation-shiptowardswell-organizedinterestgroups(suchaswarveterans),andpoliticalcollapseandcorruptionofothers(forexample:unions).

TheexistingsocialpolicysysteminBiH,which,despitetheaboveproblems,survivedbyinertia,iscurrentlyfacingsignificantdifficultiesin itssustainability.Thedropineconomicactivity,highunemploy-mentrateandthespreadofthe“informal”businesssectorcontinuetoexertpressureontheredistributivemodelofthepensionanddis-abilityinsuranceinBiH(i.e.pay-as-you-go).Thissystem,whichwasconditioned,intheory,uponarelativelyhighratioofemployedtore-tiredpeople(ideally3:1)andfavourabledemographictrends,means


thatpensionsarepaidfromcurrentcontributionsofemployersandtheemployed,andthemeansfromthefundsarenotinvested.Ac-cordingtothe2009reportoftheInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO)5,forevery100retireesinBiH,thereare123employed,whichmeansthatforevery1BAMofgrossmonthlysalaries,0.30BAMgoes formonthlypensions.Therateofcontributions forpensionanddisabilityinsurancewithinthemonthlysalaryinRepublikaSrp-skais18.5%,whileinFBiHthatrateis23%(17%coveredbytheemployee,and6%bytheemployer).TheaveragemonthlypensioninBiHamountsto350BAM,whiletheminimalpensionamountsto50%(intheRS)to60%(inFBiH)oftheaveragepension.Peoplewith40yearsofpensioninsurancecoveredhaveaguaranteedpen-sionintheamountof80%(inFBiH)and100%(intheRS)oftheaverage pension.6

Thesekindsofmacroeconomicmovementsandcontributionsys-temsresultedindestabilizationoffunds,therefore,itisnecessarytopartiallyfinancethePensionandDisabilityInsuranceFund(PIORSFund)ofRepublikaSrpskafromtheRSBudget.In2015,thetransfersmadetothePIORSFundmade8.1%ofthebudgetexpendituresor190millionBAM7,whichwaspartlyfinancedbyissuingtreasurybillstotheRScommercialbanks.Ontheotherhand,thePensionandDisabilityInsuranceFundoftheFBiHmanagestomaintainthelevel

5 ILO,2009,p.7

6 Rašidagić&Maglajlić,2011,p.23

7 TheRSNationalAssembly,2014


ofcurrentpaymentsofpensionswithoutsubsidisingfromtheFBiHBudget,butwithsignificantdelaysofthepayments.

Inthepast20years,politicalclientelismhasresultedinfavorit-ismofcertaininterestgroupscomparedtoothers.Thesolidpoliticalorganizationofthesegroups(suchasthewarveterans)andasys-tembasedonrightsratherneeds,hasledtothefactthat,inBosniaandHerzegovina,closeto63%ofallnon-contributorytransfersfallontobenefitsacquiredbythewarveterans8.This,initself,doesnotconstituteaproblem;however,coupledwiththefactthattheratiooftransfersreceivedbythewealthiestandthepoorestfifthofthepopulation isdisproportionate, itbecomesclear that thecurrentwelfarestate inBosniaandHerzegovinarequiressignificantratio-nalization, regulation and de-politicisation.9

Healthinsuranceandhealthprotectionarefacingsimilarprob-lemstothoseofpensionanddisabilityfunds.Thefragmentedstateofthehealthsystem(particularlyintheFBiH)10additionallyamplifiesitslackofefficiencyandsustainability.Atthemoment,thereare13ministriesand13healthfundsatthelevelofBiHinwhichmanda-torycontributionsareflowingin,intheamountsof12.5%ofgross

8 WorldBank,2009

9 Heredepoliticizationimpliesliberationfrompoliticalpressuresandinfluences.

10 Thisfragmentedstateresultsfromhandingoversignificantcompetenciestothelowerlevels(primarilytothecantons)intheareaoffiscalpolicy,andwhicharederivedfromtheconstitutionalandlegislativestructureofBiH.Therefore,itispossiblethatinBiHthereare13ministriesofhealth(2attheentitylevel,1inBrčkoDistrictand10atthelevelofthecantons).


salary inFBiH (withanadditional4%paidby theemployer)and12%inRepublikaSrpska.Thisfragmentationofthehealthsystemleadstowardsthemultiplicationofinstitutions,theirinefficientgeo-graphicdistributionandtoanincreaseinadministrativeandoperat-ing costs.11Furthermore,duetogreatdecentralization,thefundsofthewealthiercantonscanaffordbetterhealthcareunlikethosewithweakereconomicactivity.Eventhoughthehealth fundsarecov-eredfrommandatorycontributions,investmentsandimprovementofhealthinstitutionsandequipmentdependonbudgetassignmentsforcapitalinvestments,whilecorruptionand“informalpayments”arewidespreadintheentirehealthsystem.

Basedontheabove-mentionedcharacteristicsofsocialpolicyintransitionalBiH,thefollowingconclusionisinescapable:Inthepast20years,thewelfarestateinBiHhasbecomefiscallyunsustainable,andthereformprocesswhichwasinitiatedinthe1980shasneverbeencompleted.Thedrop ineconomicactivity, inefficientuseoffundsandpoliticalclientilism,haspushedtheremnantsofthewel-farestatetotheveryedgeofsustainability.Thisisoneofthereasons(alongwithideology-motivatedattacks)whythewelfarestateinBiH,andinotherdevelopingWesternBalkancountries,isconsideredtobeanobstacleratherthanapredispositionandinstrumentforcre-ationofdevelopment.

11 Rašidagić&Maglajlić,2011,p.24


repression, manipulation, control...

Furtherinthetext,particularattentionwillbegiventothenewsocio-economiccontextwhichappearsonthehorizonintheformofaproposedReformAgenda.Thisreviewwillbebased

ontwoassumptions:1.thelong-termdevelopmentstrategyinBiHis thefrequentlyproclaimedexportbasedgrowth,and2. there isaclearpossibilityforreformsandeconomicdevelopmentwithoutalteringtheDaytonPeaceAgreement.Oneofthebasicthesesofthistext,whichwewilltrytodemonstrate,isthatsocialpolicyandthewelfarestatearenotsimplyparasiticremainsofthepastthatstandinthewayofrecovery,butrathertheyarenecessaryelementsoffu-turedevelopmentstrategyinthecontextofBosniaandHerzegovina.

Ifjudgingbywhathasbeenpresentedsofar,withintheframeof existingeconomic reforms comprised in the so-calledReformAgenda(whichisbasedonCompactforGrowthandJobsandcondi-tionssetbytheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorldBank)12, BosniaandHerzegovinashould,intheupcomingperiod,notonly

12 ReformAgenda,2015:Thisisasetofsocio-economicreformsviewed,bytheEuropeanUnionandtheInternationalMonetaryFund,asnecessaryconditionsfor progress towards the EU and acquiring the next tranche of the stand-by arrangement. The reforms should nominally create a more competitiveeconomy in BiH and, through flexibilization of the labourmarket, increasethenumberoftheemployed.Someoftheareascoveredbythereformsare:publicfinances,business climateandcompetitiveness, labourmarket, socialprotection,publicadministration,ruleoflawandfightagainstcorruption.


performa rationalizationof thewelfarestate (reformsof the taxsystemthroughadecreaseof incometaxandbetteraimedsocialexpenditures),butalsoitshouldstabilizepublicfinancesthroughitsreduction.Whilerationalizationandanincreaseinefficiencyarelongoverdue,thequestionariseswhetherthereductionofexpendituresforthewelfarestateisanadequatestrategyforacountrylikeBosniaandHerzegovina,whereeventheslightesteconomicvolatilitycanbemanifestedinincreasedethnictensions.

Aswaspreviouslystated,thelong-termdevelopmentofBosniaandHerzegovina issteeringtowardsgrowth,basedonanexporteconomy.Notwithstandingthefactthatofficialpolicieshavenever clearlydefineddevelopmentgoalsormeans,thesmallsizeofthelocalmarketandtheproximityoflargerneighbouringmarkets(theEU),issteeringtheBiHeconomytowardsopeningupandincreasingexports.Thisstrategyundoubtedlyleadstowardstransferofwealthfromonegroupofactorstowardsanother.Takingintoconsiderationtheannouncedreforms,itistobeexpectedthataportionofwealthwillchangehandsfromtheconsumers(workers)andthegovern-mentintothehandsofproducersinthisprocess.Inthatsense,itisnecessarytodebatetheroleofthewelfarestate.InordertobetterillustratethepotentialroadofBiH,it isnecessarytonameseveralexampleswithbasicelementsofdevelopmentpolicyforexport-ori-ented countries.

Development strategybasedonexport is amodelwhichhasbeenusedsincethe1960swhenJapanandGermany,andlatertheEastAsianTigers(Taiwan,SouthKorea,SingaporeandHongKong)


underwent rapidexport-oriented industrialization.Thethreebasiccharacteristicsofthiseconomicpolicyare:• Suppressionofwages(andincreaseofthedifferencebetweenproductivityrateandwages);

• Manipulationofcurrencyvalue;• Controlandregulationofthecountry’sfinancialmarket.

Intheaforementionedcases,thesethreemeasureshaveresultedinanincreaseofcompetitivenessofGermanandEastAsianproductsintheworldmarket,butalsointhereductionofthepurchasingpow-eroftheirconsumersandthetransferofwealthtowardsproducers.Nevertheless,therelativelygeneroussocialpolicyintheseexamples(particularlyinthecaseofGermanyandJapan),playedaproactivedevelopmentrole.Thedropinwages,aswellasthedropinthevalueofmoneyduetomanipulationofthecurrencyvalue,wasreplacedwiththedevelopmentofamoregenerouswelfarestatebothfortheconsumersandtheproducers.AccordingtoanOECDReport13,theshareofsocialpolicyexpendituresintheOECDcountriesisconstant-lyrising,andcontrarytothestereotypes,export-orientedGermanyisspendingalargerpercentageofitsgrossnationalincome(GDP)onsocialpolicythan,forinstance,Greece,PortugalorevenNorway.

AsobservedbyDaniRodrik14,thereisarobustpositivecorrela-tionbetweenthedegreeofopennesstowardsforeigntradeandtheincreaseofstateexpenditureswithinthosecountries.Thelargerthe

13 oecd, 2014, p. 1

14 Rodrik,1998


shareoftheoveralltrade(importplusexport)intheGDPofacoun-try,thelargertheshareofthestatesectoraswell.ApossiblereasonforthisissomethingRodrickcallshiscompensationhypothesis:lossofstandardsand“import”ofexternalvolatilitiesandglobalrisksarecompensatedforthroughcreationofshock-absorbingmechanismswithinthecountry (primarily throughdevelopmentofthewelfarestate).Therefore, theexamples fromEastAsia (SouthKoreaandTaiwan)pointtothefactthatsocialpolicyisnotnecessarilyamereresultofopeningone’seconomy,butthatitcanbeusedasaninsti-tutionalinstrumentofdevelopment15.

Forexample,inGermany,therealwages(nominalwagesminustherateofinflation)havebeenstagnatingforthepast20years,andinthetimeperiodbetween2004and2008theywereevendropping.16 Takingintoaccountthegrowthofproductivity,thisisjustonepartofanexplanationtothefactthatthiscountryhasweatheredthroughtheworldeconomiccrisisandmanagedtomaintainanenviablelevelofeconomicactivity.Anotherpartof theexplanation,which isofrelevanceinthecontextofBosniaandHerzegovina,isapresenceofarelativelystrongsocialpolicy inGermany.Eventhoughwestandaswitnessestotheriseof inequality in thiscountry, it still retainsmanyelementsofastrongsocialstatethroughfreeeducation,qualityhealthprotectionandrelativelygeneroussocialprotection.17Thisturn

15 Kwon, 2007

16 Dauderstädt,2012,p.6

17 ibidem,p.8


ofeventsinGermanyisnotaby-productofaneconomicstrategy,butratheroneofitscornerstones.

Let’sapplytheaforementionedstrategyinthecontextofBosniaandHerzegovina.Consideringthefactthat,inBosniaandHerzegov-ina,themanipulationofthecurrencyvalueandfinancialrestrictionsarecurrentlydimmed(yetnotimpossible),18thereisstilltheprimaryaspectofexport-orienteddevelopmentpolicyavailable,whichisthesuppressionofwages.Preciselythisshouldbetheresultofoneofthebasicdemandsinthesetofreformsuggestions,whichthepoliticalactors inBiHandthe internationalcommunity,atthetimeofthewritingofthistext,arestilldebating.

Listedasessentialgoalsofthesuggestedreformmeasuresaretheincreaseofcompetitivenessandeconomicgrowth.Someofthesuggestedmeasureswill, inmanyways,affectthesocialpolicy inBosniaandHerzegovina,yetitremainsquestionablewhethertheywill create preconditions for long-termdevelopment. Therefore,amongotherthings,reductionoftheincometax(theso-calledtaxwedge–pension,disabilityandhealth insurance,andunemploy-mentinsurance),apayfreezeinthepublicsector,separatinghealthprotectionandservicesfortheunemployed,andanincreaseoftheretirementage limit arebeing suggested,and, throughchangesintheLabourLaw,so istheabolishmentofcollectiveagreements

18 There is a significant internal and external pressure against abolishing thecurrent policy of the BiH Central Bank – i.e. its Currency Board. Controloffinancialmarket inBiHwouldbehard to reachpoliticallydue to lackofharmonizationwiththeEUguidelinesandregulations.


concludedforanindefiniteperiodoftime,givingpreferencetofixed-term employment contracts.

Theaforementionedmeasuresaresomeofthefirststepstowardsuppressionofwages,withthegoalofincreasingthecompetitive-nessoftheBiHworkforce.Nevertheless,thereformswillstillmainlybebasedonthereductionofwhatwas leftof thewelfarestate,thusproducinganunsustainablemodelofexport-orientedgrowth.Ifwetakeasanexamplethereductionoftheincometax, it istobeexpectedthatdirectlyafterthattherewillbeanincreaseinthe(formal)employmentrate,primarilyduetothefactthatapartoftheexistingworkersintheinformalsector(“grayeconomy”)willcrossintotheformalsectorandtherebyexpandthecontributorybase.Therefore,ontheoneside,wehavereductionofthetaxratesand,ontheother,anincreaseinthenumberoftheinsured.TheratioofthesetwofactorswilldeterminewhetherthePensionandDisabilityFundsandHealthFundswill faceevengreaterdifficulties.Havinginmindthatanin-depthrationalizationwillbenecessaryinmanyspheresinordertojumpstarttheBiHeconomyintime,aswellasthefactthattheexistingfundsarefinancedaccordingtotheprinciplepay-as-you-go,chancesarethatnotenoughmoneywillbeflowinginto these funds.Anadditionalmeasure thatshouldcompensateforthelossofthesemeansisanincreaseintheVATrate,whichisaregressiveformoftaxationandwilldisproportionatelyaffectnega-tivelythepoorerstrataofsociety.

Bothofthemeasuresmentionedabove:thereductionofincometaxesandtheincreaseofVAT,canresultinasignificantdecreaseof


consumptionaswell.Inthecaseoftheformer,theconsumerswillwanttosavemoreinfearofanuncertainfutureregardingoldageandpossible illness,andinthecaseofthe latter,theywillhavealowerportionoftheirsalaryleftattheirdisposal.

ThenominalgoaloftheReformAgendaistoraisecompetitive-nessandutilizethe“comparativeadvantages”ofBiHthatrestonthecheapandrelativelywell-qualifiedworkforce.Still,asstatedabove,thesuggestedmeasuresarebasedonsocialpolicytransformationandcarrywithinthemselvesaninherentcontradictionduetowhichtheworkforceinBiHwillprobablybecomemorecompetitiveintheshortrun,butattheexpenseofalong-termandmoreviablecom-petitivenessthatcouldbeachievedwithparallelstrengtheningandrationalizationofthewelfarestate(asinthecaseofGermanyandotherexport-orientedcountries).


Social inequality and ethnic divisions

EveryreformprocessinBosniaandHerzegovinamusttakeintoaccountthefactthatethnicdivisionsexist.Theupcomingwaveofsocio-economicchangesmayaddressthisissueontwofronts:

byremainingwithintheframeworkoftheDaytonAgreementandbyreducingthesocialtensionsinBiH,thusminimizingthepossibilityforthemturningintoethnictensions.Savingsmeasuresandreductionof thewelfarestatecarrieswithin itselfadangerouspossibilityofchannellingthosetensionsthroughthe“linesof lowerresistance”,or, inthecontextofBiH,throughethnicdivisions.Thecomplicatedstructureof theDaytonAgreementhasbeenusedmanytimesasanalibiforcessation(orlackofinitiation)ofthereformswhicharepossiblewithinthe legislativeframeworkwithasufficientdoseofpoliticalwillandcoordination.Itisapparentthatthesocio-economicstatusquoisnotsustainableandthatasignificantrationalizationofeconomicandsocialpolicy inBiH isnecessary.Still,currentreformsuggestionshaveat theircoreadifferent redistributionofalreadydeficientfunds,whileasustainabledevelopmentpolicywouldhavetobebasedontheincreaseandrationalizationofutilizationoffunds.Naturally,allcoherentreformstepsinthisdirectionareconditionedbytheexistenceofpoliticalwillandasignificantamountofpolicycoordinationofthethreeconstituentpeoples.

Takingintoaccountthepreviouslymentionedpossibilitiesofthenegativeconsequencesofarestrictivefiscalpolicyandreductionof


socialprogramsfortheoveralldevelopmentofBiHandinterethnicrelations,thenewdevelopmentparadigmshouldarisefromthe“ze-ro-sum”frame,and,inthecontextofeconomicandsocialdevelop-ment,anattemptto“increasetheportionofthecake”forallsocialactors inBiH.Thenewsocialcontract inBiHshouldstartfromaninter-ethnicconsensus,throughanindustrialandexportpolicyofthecountry,todevelopmentstrategyandspecific,appropriatemeasuresinfiscal(andeventuallymonetary)policy.Theindustrialpolicyshould,amongotherthings,clearlydefinetheexport-orientedbranchesandthusenableaproactivestatepolicyfortheirpromotion.in parallel withtheseefforts,thestateshould,throughrationalizationofthemoneyithasatitsdisposal,andthroughclearfiscalandcarefulmon-etarypolicyforthepurposeofdevelopment,“increasetheportionofthecake”.Itisnecessarytoseparateandstrategicallyemploytheexistinglocalcapitalindevelopmentgoals.BiHneedsdirectforeigninvestments,but thehistoric fact remains that those investmentsdonotcometocountrieswithnoeconomicgrowth.Thisgrowthmustbecreatedwithcommoneffortsthroughclearstrategies. Inthissense,thewelfarestateis justone,butanessentialpartofadevelopmentstrategyofasmallandopen,export-orientedeconomy.

161

consensus on The common good

Žarko Papić

162

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: Social (in)justice, (in)equality of revenues

There are multiple levels of social inequality in Bosnia and Herzegovina caused

both by the war and by inadequate policies over the last twenty years. The

country has been in deep recession since 2008, with high unemployment rates

and galloping debt levels combined with decreasing GDP, where 49.2% of the

GDP is spent by public administration on all levels. In a word, it is facing a very

unfavourable macroeconomic situation. Dr. Žarko Papić, expert for social policy

and humane social inclusion, presents a range of statistical and comparative

analyses that are a cause for concern, but at the same time, they provide an

answer as to the reasons for the demonstrations in February 2014. However,

they also indicate that there is only one possible way out: BiH has to finish

the transition that had been stopped by the war. This has to be accompani-

ed by the development and implementation of a policy which would enable

dynamic growth, employment, competition, etc. within the reformed system.

Simultaneously, this includes such policies that would ameliorate the negative

consequences of overall trade liberalisation. Like the authors of the two previo-

us essays, Papić sees an opportunity in cautious implementation of the reform

agenda in order to avoid copying of a neoliberal template, as BiH would not be

able to cope with something like that. Therefore he calls for reindustrialisation

and quantitative easing, i.e. smart management of monetary sovereignty and an

inflation programme in order to release cash for well-designed developmental

projects. This does not require any change in the Dayton Peace Agreement.

What it requires is a consensus on the common good.

163Consensus on the common good

Deepening global inequality...

Generallyspeaking,theearly21stcenturywascharacterisedbyasevereeconomicandfinancialcrisis. Itwasthefirstcrisisoftheprocessofglobalisation,whereforeitwaslogi-

caltoexpectthatitwouldhaveaglobalimpact.Theveryprocessofglobalisationhasalltheelementsofneoliberaleconomyand“mar-ketfundamentalism”,whicharethemaincausesoftheglobalisationcrisis.What is thisallabout? In theory,globalisationshouldhaveenabledfreemovementofcapital,goodsandlabourandglobalisa-tionofcommongoods.Thefirsttwoaspects,withoutanydoubt,contributedtotheintegrationoftheworldeconomy.Theabsenceofglobalisationofthecommongood(health,education,ecology,socialprogress,poverty reduction,etc.) resulted inan increaseofpovertyandinequalityatthegloballevel. 1

In thesenseofneoliberaleconomy, lowpurchasingpowerofthe population of entire continents, growth of production and

1 Criticism of the neoliberal concept of globalisation by numerous authors isreflected in theopinionof J.Stiglitz:“However, the issue that is commonlydebated—namely,whetherweshouldbe“for”or“against”globalization—is not the salient one. As a practical matter there is no retreating fromglobalization. The real issue is the conduct of the international economicorganizations that steer it. Ifwe continuewithglobalization as it hasbeenmanagedinthepast,itsagendadrivenbytheNorthfortheNorth,reflectingtheNorth’sideologiesandvalues,thefuturewillnotbebright.Therewillbeabacklashinthedevelopingworldandincreasingconflictwiththedevelopedworld.Therewillbegreaterglobalinstabilityandrisingdoubtsaboutthevalueofamarketeconomy.”

164 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Žarko Papić

accumulatedcapital inthedevelopedpartsoftheworldwerefo-cusedontheconsumers indevelopedcountries,while theircon-sumptionstimulated“soft”creditsonamass level.Thefinancial“bubble”(creditsandotherfinancialproducts)in2012amountedtoninetimesthevalueoftheannualGDPintheentireworld. 2Thebubblehadtoburst,whichhappenedintheUSin2008,afterwhichthefinancial“tsunami”hittherestoftheworld.Whatiscalledthe“financialcrisis”isonlythetipoftheiceberg,anditsmanifestationrepresentsamuchmoreseriouscrisis.However, this isnotonlyacrisisofneoliberaleconomy.Thecrisisinitiatestheprocessofdete-riorationoftheexisting“mannerofproduction”,whichifsimplified,couldbedescribedasaconsumersocietyanditsglobalisationwithentirelyunequaldistributionof resourcesat theglobal level.Thefinancialcrisisstolethelimelightfromotherelementsofthecrises,suchasthecrisisoftoday’sproduction,foodcrises,andtheenergyand environment crisis.

2 F.Čaušević,Globalizacija, Sjevernoistočna Evropa, i Svjetska Ekonomija(Edition:Routledge,Abingdon,Oxon,UK,NewYork,USA,p.23,January2015)


... and Causes of inequality in BiH

Inadditiontotheglobalcausesofinequality,therearespecificcau-sesof inequality inBiH.Duetofinancialandsocialconsequencesofwardevastationintheperiodfrom1992to1995whicharestillvisible,thisisparticularlypertinenttothegroupofinternallydisplacedpersons.Andtherearewidespreadsocialproblems,frompovertytothelossofbasicsocialvaluesamongthepopulation.Discriminationagainstmarginalisedgroups,includingmarginalisationofconstituentpeopleswholiveinaterritorywheretheyareaminorityisalsoverypresent.Qualityofhealthcareandtheeducationsystemsignificantlydeteriorated,andcitizenshavealmostnoinfluenceonpolitics(lackofparticipatorydemocracy,exclusionofcitizensand,formany,thenonexistenceof thepossibilityofchoice). Inadditiontoallof theabove,BiHiscurrentlyfacingtedioustaskswithincomprehensivere-formsrelatedtoacceptedobligationsfromthe“newEUapproach”(German-British initiative)and theReformAgenda forBosniaandHerzegovina.However,BiHhasnotevencompletedtheprocessofthethree-foldtransitionwhichbeganimmediatelyafterthewarandimplies:a) transitionfromwartopeaceandbuildingofnewjointinstitutions,b)transitionfromaone-partysystemtodemocracywit-hinacomplexnationalstructureaffectingfunctioningofinstitutions,andc)transitionfromcommandeconomytomarketeconomy.Thereasonsforsuchstrategicdelaysshouldbesoughtinaverycomplexstatestructure,definedbytheDaytonPeaceAgreement(AnnexIV,BiHConstitution)andpoliticalpartieswhicharecurrentlymorecartel-typeinterest-basedorganisationsthantruepoliticalorganisationswitha


clearprogramme-basedprofile.Corruption,nepotismandorganisedcrimearereasonablyexpectedmanifestationsofsuchasituation.

Allof theabove,combinedwith theneoliberal imperativeofthe“Washingtonconsensus”,resultedinthestateofapermanenteconomicandevenpoliticalcrisis.BiHhasbeenindeeprecessionsince2008.AccordingtotheWorldBank,itsGDProughlyreachedthe2008levelsonlyin2013.

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

WB 5.4 -2.9 0.7 1.0 -1.2 2.5 0.4 1.5 2.5 3.0

IMf 5.6 -2.7 0.8 1.0 -1.2 2.1 0.7 3.5 3.7 4.0

TheIMFexpectedafasterrecoverythantheWorldBank,partlybecausethe IMFexpects investments for reconstructionafter theMay2014floods.BiH lagsbehind thedevelopingandemergingeconomiesinEuropewhichrecoveredmuchfasterafter2009. 3

Ontheotherhand,theBiHpublicdebtreached11,249millionKMbytheendofSeptember2014,whichisanincreaseof822.32millionKMcomparedtotheendof2013.Theexternaldebtis8120millionKM,whichrepresentsanincreaseof711.35millionKMcom-paredtotheendof2013.Overthepastsevenyears,theexternaldebtincreasedbyapproximately90%.Theinternaldebtamounted

3 IMF,Reportno.14/189BosniaandHerzegovina,July2014,p.20.


to3129millionKMand it increasedby110.97millionKMcom-paredtotheendof2013.Paymentfortheexternaldebtincreasesfromyear to year. For example, in2008 itwas230millionKM,while in2014itwillamountto760millionKM,whichrepresentsanincreasingfiscalproblem.DuetothelackofIMFinstalments,thelastquarterof2014sawasignificantincreaseoftheinternaldebt(entitiesemitgovernmentandtreasurybonds).In2014,thepublicdebtmadeup46%oftheGDP,whilein2011itstoodat40.8%.4 ThekeyproblemisnotthedebtbuttheratioofthepublicdebttotheGDP.Therearetwofarmoreseriousproblems:• IncreasingindebtednessandsimultaneousdecreaseoftheGDP;• Alargepercentageofthedebtisusedforpublicspending,e.g.tocoverbudgetdeficits.Ontheotherhand,only11.2%ofthenewexternaldebtisutilisedforeconomicactivities.

ThecrucialproblemoftheBiHeconomyislargepublicspend-ingonoveralladministration(alllevelsofgovernment),whichwill,accordingtoIMFestimates,amountto49.2%oftheGDPin2014.5 Theexcessivedebt,bothexternalandinternal,influencesthepayrolltaxes(taxesandcontributions)foremployees,whichincreasescostsoflabourbyapproximately72%,stimulatesunreportedemploymentandhindersemploymentintheformaleconomy.Atotalof194,883personsareemployedinthepublicsector(administration,education,health),whichconstitutes27%of thetotalnumberofemployedpersons.13%ofGDPisspentontheirsalariesandtogetherwith

4 DatatakenfromanunpublishedresearchreportbySvetlanaCenić,January2015

5 IMF,ibid,p.20.


materialcostsandcompensations,theamountreaches20%ofGDP.TheBiHeconomycannotmaintainsuchadisproportionate,expen-siveandinefficientadministrativeapparatus.

Ontheotherhand,salarylevelsandoveralltransfersforeducationandhealthcareareinadequate.Aradicaldecreaseinpublicspend-ingwouldenabledevelopmentoftherealsectorandaccelerateGDPgrowth.BiHisalsocharacterisedbytheunequalpositionofemploy-eesinthereal,privatesector,particularlyinthe“gray”economyandemployees inthepublicsector (administrationandcompanieswithmajoritystateownership).ThelabourmarketinBiHrecoveredslightlyin 2014,6withamodestincreaseinemploymentanddecreaseinun-employment.Theaveragenumberoftheemployedgrewby1.2%7 intheperiodfromJanuarytoSeptember2014,amountingtoatotalnumberof698,900employedpersons. 8TheofficialunemploymentrateintheperiodJanuary-September2014was44.1%9,whenthetotalnumberofunemployedpersonswas550,200.Theunemploy-mentratecalculatedinlinewithILOmethodologyremainedat28%.

Thehighunemploymentratedirectlyjeopardisesthepensionsys-tem,astheratiobetweenemployedandretiredpersonsis1:1.1and

6 DEP„BosnaiHercegovina–EkonomskiTrendovizaperiodjanuar-septembar2014.”,December2014

7 Thegrowthratechangedcomparedtothesameperiodinthepreviousyear.

8 temporary data, source: BHas

9 Administrativeunemploymentrateisby0.3%pointslowercomparedtothesame period in 2013.


thecurrentsystemneedsaratioof1:4inordertofunctionproperly.Ontheotherhand,accordingtodataoftheLabourandEmploymentAgencyofBosniaandHerzegovina,theunemploymentrateamongyoungpeoplereachedconcerning levelsand in2014 itwas62%,whichis3.6%morecomparedto2013.Thefactthat56.3%oftheworking-agepopulationisinactiverepresentsasignificantproblem,andtheother43.7%areeitheremployedorlookingforajob.ThatisevenalargerproblemthantheunemploymentitselfconsideringthatBiHhasthelowestrateoflabourmarketparticipation(oractiv-ity)inEurope. 10

Themajorreasonforthelackofmotivationtobeactiveinthela-bourmarketisthesystemofsocialprotection(particularlyforveterans)whereacertainstatusguaranteesbenefits,whichdoesnotstimulateactivationinthelabourmarket,aswellasdiasporaremittances.How-ever,passivityinthelabourmarketis,accordingto64.2%ofrespon-dents,causedbythefactthatitisimpossibletofindajobwithoutpersonal contacts or political connections. Passivity is also a remnant oftheformersocialistunderstandingofemployment,as52.1%ofrespondentsthinkthatthestateshouldprovideemploymentforev-erybody(and45%ofrespondentsthinkthatthestateshouldprovideafavourableenvironmentforemployment). 11Itisclearthatthetransi-tionofthemind-setofpeoplewasactuallynevercompleted. 12

10 See:CompactforGrowthandJobs,p.6.

11 Prismresearch,ibid.

12 See: RCC, “Balkan Barometer 2015” Business Opinion Survey – AnalyticalReport, Sarajevo, May 2015 http://www.rcc.int/pubs/24/balkan-business-


Economicstagnationinfluencestheriseoftheaveragenetsal-aryinBiH.TheaveragenetsalaryintheperiodJanuary–September2014was829KMwiththenominalgrowthrateof0.5%y/y,whiletherealgrowthwassomewhatlargerduetodeflation.TheaveragenetsalaryinBiHgrewataslowerpaceattheendof2014thanatthebeginningoftheyear.

Atthesametime,accordingtoEurostatdata,therealindividualconsumptioninBiHisonly37%oftheEUaverage(onlyAlbaniaisworse,rankedwith33%oftheEUaverage).

barometer-2015


Poverty Dynamics

BiH,even20yearsafterDayton,facesanunfinishedtransitionandunfinisheddemocracy.Generally speaking, this is thecauseofdeepeninginequality,increasingsocialtensions,and

increasedpoverty,anditrepresentsagraveobstacletoeconomicandsocialdevelopment.Socialinjustice,insuchasituation,isaccompa-niedby“systematicdiscrimination”incertainsegmentsofsociallife,particularlyintermsofsocialpolicyandemployment:• Discriminationagainstdisabledpersonscomparedtodisabledwarveterans(intermsofdisabilitycategoriesandbenefits),

• Territorialdiscriminationintermsofcertainsocialbenefits(e.g.5cantonsintheFBiHpaychildbenefitsatdifferentrates,while5cantonsdonotpaychildbenefits),

• Employmentdiscriminationinthepublicsectorbasedonpoliticalaffiliation;rulingpoliticalpartiesemploytheir“soldiers”andnotprofessionalandqualifiedpersons,

• DiscriminationintheConstitutionandElectionLaw,particularlyagainstthe“Others”(Sejdić-Fincicase),etc.

Therearedifferentmethodologiestomeasurethepovertyrate.Fordevelopingandtransitionalcountries,whatmattersmostistheabsolutepoverty line. In2011,23.4%ofthepopulationlivedbe-lowtheabsolutepoverty line13 (accordingto theBiHAgency for

13 The absolute poverty line is 271KM a month per one adult person in ahouseholdtakingintoaccountprices in2011.ThesecondadultpersonandchildrenareweightedusingtheOECD2equivalencescale(theoldestperson


Statistics). This is a significant increase compared to2007when18.6%ofthepopulationlivedbelowtheabsolutepovertyline.14

If,hypotheticallyspeaking,weextrapolatethepovertygrowth(measuredagainsttheabsolutepovertylineintheperiodfrom2007to2011fortheperiodfrom2007to2014)then27%ofthepopula-tioninBiHlivesbelowthepovertyline,26%intheFBiHand29%inRS.This“dry”statisticcaneasilybevisuallypresentedbyindirectindicators:increasednumberofpeopledumpsterdiving,astonish-ingincreaseofthenumberofgold-buyingshops(whichmeansthatall family resourceshavebeenspentand it is timetosell theen-gagementring),offersinclassifiedads,etc.Atthesametime,newdataindicatethatthesocialprotectionsystemdeterioratedoverthepreviousperiod.In2011,thepoorestonefifthofthepopulationinBiHreceivedonly17.3%oftheoverallbudgettransfersforsocialprotection(notpayrollrelated)(in2011thiswas3.88%oftheGDPinBiH) (socialbenefits,civiliandisabledpersons,childprotection,civilianwarvictims,disabledveteransandveterans),whilein2007

inthehouseholdisweightedwithfactor1,otheradultpersonswith0.5,thefirstchildwith0.3,thesecondchildwith0.2etc).Thismeansthattheabsolutepovertylineforafamilyoffour,parentsandtwochildren,is569KM,whichisbelievedtobeenoughforminimumexistence.

14 Thesituation intheentities is identical (FBiH in2011–22.7%and in2007– 17.4%, RS in 2011 – 25.3% and 20.2% in 2007). See: IBHI/MaastrichtGraduate School of Governance. „Siromaštvo u BiH 2011 – Trendovi idostignuća i Indikatoriadekvatnosticiljanjabudžetskihtransferazasocijalnuzaštitu u BiH 2011” and „Budžetske novčane naknade za socijalnu zaštituuBiH–Štafunkcioniše,aštane“,Sarajevo,2013and„BudžetskenovčanenaknadezasocijalnuzaštituuBiH–Šta funkcioniše,aštane“.T.Dmitrović,IBHI,Sarajevo,June2014


thepoorestonefifthofthepopulationreceived18.3%ofthebud-gettransfers.

Ontheotherhand,thewealthiestonefifthofthepopulationreceived20%of these transfers in2011.Accordingly, the socialprotectionsystemincreasesinequality.Thissystemwasassessedassociallyunjustby80.3%oftherespondents(thepoordonotreceiveenoughaid). 15

ThesocialprotectionsysteminBiHdoesnotreducepoverty,ascanbeseenifonecomparesthegrowthofpovertywiththedecreaseofthepercentageoftransfersfromthesocialprotectionsystemal-locatedforthepoorestpopulation.Thesystemisbasedonstatusanditsrelativelylargebudgetisnotintendedtokeepthe“socialpeace”(asseen in thedemonstrations in2014)but tomaintainpoliticalpowerthroughthe“buying”ofvoters.

Enhancedtargetingofbeneficiariesandbenefitsinaccordancewithrealneedsisonlyoneaspectofthereformofthesocialprotec-tionsystem,anditcannotremainwithintheexistinglimitsofcivilianbenefits.Therefore, thesystemrequiresacomprehensivechange,startingfromtheestablishmentofadatabase,unifiedregisterofallbeneficiariesand labouractivationstrategies, incooperationwiththesocialcarecenters,employmentbureaus,etc.

15 Prismresearch,ibid.


Demonstrations

Discontent among citizens in BiH, particularly among em-ployeesof thecompanies ruined in theprivatisationpro-cess,hasbeen simmering for several yearsnow.Regular

demonstrationsorganisedinfrontofgovernmentalbuildingsatthecantonalorentitylevel,blockingoftrafficandevenhungerstrikeshavebecomearegularsight.Theauthoritiesdidnottakethede-monstrationsseriouslyandthesporadicsupporttothecompanieshitbythecrisisonlyprolongedtheiragony.

InTuzla,whichoncewasalargeindustrialcenterinBiH,workersorganisedprotestsinfrontoftheTuzlaCantonGovernmenteveryWednesdayfromthebeginningof2014,whichyieldednoresultsastheynevermanagedtoestablisheffectivecommunicationwiththeGovernmentrepresentatives.OnWednesday,5February2014,with thesupportonsocialnetworks,protestersclashedwith thepolice,whichledtotheculminationofviolenceandsettingofthemunicipalandcantonalgovernmentbuildingsonfire.Itisimportanttoemphasisethattheprotestswereofasocialcharacter,withtheprotestersdemandingthattheGovernmenttakeresponsibilityforthesituationanddemandingtheresignationofresponsibleofficials.DemonstrationsinTuzlacontinuedthenextday.

ThewaveofdemonstrationshitallmajorcitiesintheFederationofBiH:Sarajevo,Mostar,Bihać,Bugojno,Travnik,Goražde,Tešanj,etc.Sarajevodemonstrationson07Februarywereinstigatedonlyby


socialdiscontent,withoutanynationalistorpoliticalconnotations.Thedemonstrationswereviolent,culminatinginthebuildingsoftheBiHPresidencyandSarajevoCantonalGovernmentbeingsetonfire.AsimilarscenariohappenedinBihaćandMostar.

Theauthoritiesreactedinaconfusedmanner,withtheuseofthepolice.Differentpoliceagencieslaterblamedeachotherforinsufficientinvolvementandreaction.Underthepressureofthedemonstrations,fourcantonalgovernmentsresignedbutonlyonegovernment,theTuzlaCantonGovernment,wasactuallychanged,whiletheotherfourgovernmentsremainedinpowerintheso-called“technical”mandate.

Thekeymessageofthedemonstrations,thatthesocialandeco-nomicproblemsinBiHhavetobeurgentlyaddressed,wasnotun-derstoodbythelocalauthorities.

Ontheotherhand, internationalorganisationsheardthemes-sageclearly,primarily theEU,whichdesignedanewapproachforBiHfocusedoneconomicandsocialreforms.Aforumforprosperityandemploymentwasorganised inMay2014,followedbyaseriesofcomprehensiveactivitiesresultingintheCompactforGrowthandJobs(July2014).Asafinalstep,allgovernmentsinBiHatthebegin-ningof2015signeddocumentscommittingthemselvestoundertakecomprehensiveeconomicandsocialreforms.Thisresultedinthedraft“ReformAgendaforBosniaandHerzegovina”preparedinMay2015.

Foralongtime,unionsinBiHwere“undertheumbrella”ofpo-liticalparties,followingtheoutdatedlogicfromthesocialistperiod.


Itisimportanttopointouttheestablishmentofnew,independentunions (“Solidarity” inTuzla,withasymbolicname).Onecannotbeanoptimistwhen itcomes to theactive roleof theunions inBiH(numerousorganisations,divisionalongentitylines,historyofinactivity).However,reformof labour legislationcan instigatesig-nificantinvolvementoftheunionsinsocialdialoguewithaspecificconservative“anti-transitional”role.Theexistinglabourlegislationneedstobechanged,asitprotectsemployeesinthepublicsector(whoseunionsarebestorganised),whileworkersintheprivatesec-tor are protected only to some extent. accordingly, unions, regardless oftheirdeclarativefightforworkers’ rights,donotenjoyagoodreputation,particularlybecauseoftheirpassiveroleinthecontextofthedemonstrationsofworkersoffailedcompanies.


The road to recovery

ConsideringthefactthattheprocessoftransitioninBiHwasneverfinished,itisnecessarywithoutfurtherdelaytoinitiatecomprehensivereformsoftheeconomicandsocialsystem,

i.e.tocompletethetransition.Thishastobeaccompaniedbythedevelopmentand implementationofpolicieswhichwouldenabledynamicgrowth,employment,competition,etc.withinthereformedsystem.Simultaneously,thisalsomeanssuchpoliciesthatwouldame-lioratethenegativeconsequencesofoveralltradeliberalisation.

Theseradicalprocesseswilltakeplaceincircumstancesofhighsocialtensions,andthequestioniswhetherthegovernmentswillbewillingtocreate“newpolicies”thatcanopennewsocialissuesinthefirstyearsoftheir implementation.Therefore,developmen-talpolicieshavetomatchtherealityinBiH,acountryintransitionanddevelopment.Forexample,theneoliberalmatrixshouldnotberoutinelycopiedbecauseit,too,isfacingacrisis.Developmentofhumandevelopmentmatrices,theUNDPconcept,issignificantforBiH,havinginmindthehighratesofpovertyandinequality.Oneofthemainproblemsinthisprocessistheexistingfixedcurrencyrate(KMandEUR)andcurrencyboardwhichdoesnotallowtheBiHCen-tralBanktodefinemonetarypolicy.Therearereasonsbothforandagainstthecurrencyboard.Ontheonehand,itpreventsinflation,whichisveryimportantbecauseofthepsychologicalconsequenc-esofthepre-war inflationforcitizens inBiH.Ontheotherhand,strengtheningthefinancialpotential througharationalmonetary


policycouldcreatenewcashflowtorevivetheeconomy.ThiswasdoneinJanuary2015bytheEuropeanCentralBankwhichallocated60millionEURamonthfortheEUeconomy.Theinflationrateof6%ayearisconsideredtobeadesirablestimulusforeconomicgrowth.

Therealproblemstemsfromthefactthatitisdifficulttoassumethattherewillbeefficientcontrolofthemonetarypolicy,e.g.infla-tion,inthecomplexpoliticalandadministrativestructuresinBiH.

Preciselyspeaking,thepoliciesshouldbefocusedon:• Therealsector,moreprecisely,on industry (“re-industrialisati-on”).Thisalso implies increasedcompetitiveness,primarily ra-dicalimprovementofthebusinessenvironmentandsupportfortechnologicaldevelopment.

• Introductionofcorporatemanagementinstate-ownedcompa-niesandtheirde-politicisation.

• Generalreductionofpublicspending(whichisnotanadequatemodeltoovercomethecrisisintheEU)isnotasolution.Itisne-cessarytochangethestructureofspending–publicspending,particularly inadministration, shouldbe significantly reducedwhilespendingforpublicinvestmentsshouldbeincreased.Thiswillresultinreductionofoverallpublicspending.Thiswillenablegrowthofemploymentandwill change the structureofem-ploymentthroughthe“transition”ofunproductiveemploymentinthepublicsectortoproductiveemploymentinindustry.

• Theopeningofourmarkettodomesticproducts,primarilyagri-culturalproducts,whichmeansprotectionbyallformsofnon-tariffprotection.


• Developmentof thesocialprotectionsystem intoasystemofsocial inclusionthroughactivationofvulnerableandminoritygroups inthe labourmarket, inspecificwaystailoredtomeettheneedsandabilitiesofvulnerablegroups.

• Developmentofnewmethodstoimproveallocationofciviliancon-tributionsfromthebudgetinordertodirectthemtothepoorandendangered.Abettertargetingmechanismwouldassistinaddre-ssingtheaboveproblemsandprovidesupportforthetransferfromthepoliticisedrights-basedsystemtoanobjectiveapproachbasedonneeds,whichwillimprovebenefitsforthoseinneed.

TheCompactforGrowthandEmploymentinBosniaandHerze-govinacanbeconsideredtobethefirststeptowardscompletionofthetransitionprocess. Itdefinessixpreliminaryobjectives.16Theseobjectivesarefurtherelaboratedandaccompaniedbyproposalsforconcretemeasureswhichwillenabletheircomprehensiveimplementa-tion.ThekeypointsoftheCompactthatcarryriskarerelatedtothereformoflabourlegislation(collectiveagreements)anddecreaseoftaxesandcontributions.Itisexpectedthatunions,healthfundsandpensionfundswouldresistsuchmoves.Ontheotherhand,anotherseriousriskcanbeseeninthereservationsexpressedbytheministersinRSconcerningtheresourcesforpreparationandconsequencesoftheCompact.ItistobeexpectedthattheRSGovernmentwillprepareitsentityprogrammeofreformsand,fromwhathasbeensaidinthepublicappearancesoftheFBiHGovernmentPrimeMinister,itcanbeexpectedthattheFBiHwillchoosetopursue“soft”reforms. 17

16 TheCompactforGrowthandEmploymentinBosniaandHerzegovina,June2015, p. 5 -11

17 TV1,talkshow„Tema“,5February2015:announcementofanewagendaoftheFBiHGovernment;F.Novalić–candidateforprimeminister

181

CHAPTER THREE

EurOPEANiSATiON OF THE DAyTON CONTExT: Eu AND THE FuTurE OF BiH

183

from The BoTTom uP, forward

Jasmin mujanović

184

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: in search of a European future?

It is quite worrying that, twenty years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, we

still read well-argued narratives about the serious democratic deficit in BiH. This

is not quite the sort of democratic deficit (lack of trust in political parties and

institutions) which can be encountered in most parliamentary democracies in

the world nowadays but rather a deficit of citizens’ participation in the social

and political processes because the citizen has been “exiled” from democracy

by means of various clientelistic-collectivist methods. It is within this that the

potential for criticism of the Dayton system is the most pronounced. Yet what is

important and discernable from this analysis is that the absence of democracy

does not stem so much from the Dayton constitutional framework as it results

from the rigid political (anti)culture, political clientalism and the practice of poli-

tical sponsorship that has become an end in itself. The author deftly draws the

line between the sophisticated requirements of the Euro-Atlantic processes and

the inability of ethno-nationalist “kleptomania” (which regularly engages in theft

of the public interest) to meet these sophisticated requirements.

Jasmin Mujanović, PhD candidate in political science at York University in

Toronto, sees hope in the outbreak of civil unrest that instils “democratic fear”

into the heart of the political elites and reminds them of the reason for their

existence – to serve the common good of their citizens. According to him, it is

here that the emancipation of politics in BiH begins, along with the possibility

of an authentic European future for BiH. Emancipation is a painful process in

which the political elites are exposed to double pressures - active and parti-

cipatory pressure by the citizens who demand a more functional country and

pressure by the international community to align the implementation of these

reforms with European standards.

185From the bottom up, forward

Zero sum democratization

MuchasthesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAccordsin1995itself,thepotentialmembershipofBosniaandHerzegovina(BiH)intheEUandNATOtwentyyearssincetheendof

thewarshouldrepresentthebeginning,nottheendofacontinuousprocessofdemocratization.1However,intheofficialpoliticaldiscour-seinBiH,theDaytonAgreementandtheEU-NATO“package”areconsideredthefinalchapter(s)ofthatprocess.Yetthefactremainsthat forBiHtosurvive (andthrive)asastateandasociety, thereisnoalternativetoEUandNATOmembership.Thequestionthusbecomes:howcanBiHjointheEuro-Atlanticcommunityifasignifi-cantpartofitsleadershipdoesnotsupporttheintegrationprocessorevenseemstobefundamentallyopposedtothecountry’smem-bership?Whatisrequired,Iargue,isconsistentpopulardemocraticintervention.

ThepoliticaleliteofBiHactivelyseek toconvince thecitizensthatpoliticsanddemocracymustbeunderstoodasacloseddomainofthesaidelite,notasthearenafordiscussionwhichinvolvesallcitizenswhomakeupthiscountry.Thosewhocametopowerinthewakeofthewaranditsconsequences,asisthecasewithvirtuallytheentirepoliticalestablishmentinBiH,areclearlynotinterestedinapoliticswhosebasicatomconsistsoftheparticipationofallcitizens

1 Dr.MarinaAntićandDr.DarioČepoprovidedmuchhelpinthepreparationandwritingofthispaper.Iamverygratefulfortheirefforts.

186 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Jasmin Mujanović

ratherthanfearandhatred.Itisthisapproachtopoliticsthatmakesthiseliteananti-democraticoligarchy.

Therefore,thinkingaboutthe“Europeanfuture”ofBiHimpliesbeingabletodistinguishbetweenthetwotypesandconceptsofpolitics.Ontheonehand,youhavetheexistingpoliticalsystemofBiH:asystemthatisdefinedintermsofinstitutionaldiscriminationandasectarianconstitutionalorderpresidedoverbyanechelonofinternationalobserversanddominatedbyasinglelocalclassof“ethnically-colored”oligarchs.ThisBiHisneithercapablenorwor-thyofmembership intheworld’s leadingpolitical,economic,andsecurityorganizations.Therefore, theprimarycontributionof thispaperisitsattempttodescribethepossibilityofhavingadifferenttypeofpoliticsinBiH.HereIwillmakeacaseforaperspectiveonpoliticsanddemocracyasa“participatoryexercise”,i.e.asawayofcollectivesocialmanagementthroughwhich“themany”areabletochallengeandoverturntheselfishmachinationsoftherulingmi-nority.ThisvisionofdemocracyfollowsthetheoristSheldonWolin,amongothers,whoclaimsthat“afreesocietycomposedofdiversi-tiescannonethelessenjoymomentsofcommonalitywhen,throughpublicdeliberations,collectivepowerisusedtopromoteorprotectthewell-beingofthecollective.”Themannerinwhichthese“mo-ments”canbetransformedintoapermanentevolutionleadingtoagenuinelydemocraticsocietywillbethemainfocusofthispaper.

Atthispoint,wemustpointtothegrowingtideofsocialunrestandconflictthathaveengulfedBiHsince2012:fromtheparkpro-testsinBanjaLukaandthe“BabyRevolution”inSarajevotothecivil


unrestandtheplenummovementduring2014.Thesetrendsprimar-ilyrepresentevidenceoffailureofthecurrentapproachto“peaceimplementation”anddemocratization,asithasbeencarriedoutbythecountry’sleadersandsegmentsoftheinternationalcommunity.However,moreimportantisthefactthattheseprotestsrepresentamodelofthemannerinwhichthecitizensthemselvescanandmustbecometheleadingunitsofpopulardemocratizationinBiH.

Inotherwords,whilethispaperrecognizesthespecificityofthepost-warcontextinBiH,Istillmaintainthatdemocratizationofthissociety isnotpossiblewithout thecitizens’ intervention, i.e. thedemocratizationofBiHisnotpossibleaslongasthecitizensarenotarelevantpoliticalfactorinthissociety.Thisdynamicwillbecomea realityonlywhenelites in this countrycome toexpecta reac-tionintheformoforganizedcivicpoliticalmovementswillingandabletoconfrontthemfortheirincompetence.Assuch,thispaperwillanalyzethemannerinwhichthesemovementsareformedandmaintained,aswellastheirkeyrole intheprocessofsubstantivedemocratization.


Political clientalism in its labyrinth

InordertofullyunderstandthenatureoftheexistingconstitutionalsysteminBiH,theworkofAsimMujkićisinstructive.Mujkićclaimsthat,althoughtheDaytonconstitutionalordersuperficiallyresem-blesaparliamentaryorrepresentativedemocracy,thisdoesnotexistassuchinitsessence,andthatDaytonhidesadeepoligarchicpoliti-calculturewithinitself.Inreality,“legitimate,freeandfair”electionsinBiHareusedtotakeawayallpolitical initiativefromcitizensasindividuals(Mujkić2007,p.113).MujkićcallsBiHan“ethnopolis,”sincetheDaytonregimebestowspoliticalrightsalmostexclusivelyonthebasisofethnicityandthusnegatesallotherformsofpoliticalassociationandmobilization.Inthisregard,thecaseofBiHisuniqueinthecategoryofso-called“illiberaldemocracies”(Zakaria,1997).

Thegreatesttragedyinallofthisisthefactthatthesuffocationofdemocraticprincipleswithintheframeworkoftheexistingrep-resentativeregimeinBiHhasbeentoooftenimplicitlyendorsedbyBrussels,Washington,andtheWestingeneral.Foratleastthefirsttenyearsafterthewar,theinternationalcommunitywasintimatelyinvolvedintheeverydaypoliticsofBiH.However,twodecadesafterthesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement,wenowstandonthebrinkofasocialandsocietalimplosion.

Yetinordertotrulyunderstandthiscriticism,itisalsonecessarytocriticallyassesstheconceptof“democracy”inthefirstplace.Iusethatterminthesamemannerasother“radicaldemocrats”:by


makingacleardistinctionbetweenpoliticsasanexclusivepracticeandpoliticsasaninclusiveact.Nevertheless,Wolinthinksthatthissecondconceptionofdemocracyisonlypossibleintransitory“fu-gitivemoments”(Wolin1996).However, Iwouldarguethateventhemere“moments”ofthisgenuineparticipationareonlypossiblewhenwe,asordinarycitizens,lookformeanstomakethosemo-ments permanent.

Thisconceptionofdemocracyisbasednotonlyonparticipationbutalsoonacertaintypeofpopularantagonism.Thismeansthatparticipatoryunderstandingofdemocracy rejects inherentelitismofallrepresentativeregimesandinparticulartheethnically-coloredchauvinismoftheDaytonregimeinwhich,asMujkićremindsus,theperformanceoffreeelectionsandpoliticalrepresentationobscurestheprocessof thetotaleconomicplunderofcitizensbyelites. Inthisrespect,particularlyinlightofthevirtualobsessionwithrarelydefined“reforms”intheofficialpoliticaldiscourseofBiH,itisneces-sarytoremindourselves,asJamesScottarguesthat:

Mostofthegreatpoliticalreformsofthe19thand20thcenturies

havebeenaccompaniedbymassiveepisodesofcivildisobedien-

ce, riot, law-breaking, thedisruptionofpublicorderand,at the

limit,civilwar.Suchtumult,Iwouldargue,notonlyaccompanied

dramaticpoliticalchangesbutwas,often,absolutelyinstrumental

inbringing itabout.Representative institutionsandelectionsby

themselves,sadly,seemrarelytobringaboutmajorchangesinthe

absenceoftheforcemajeureaffordedby,say,agreateconomic

depressionorinternationalwar…Ordinaryparliamentarypolitics,


then, isnotedmorefor its immobility thanfor facilitatingmajor

reforms(Scott,2012,p.16-17).

Scott’s interventiononthesourcesofgenuinedemocratic iner-tia iscrucialsincehe,alongwithCarrieManning,remindsus,thattheproblemwithBiHisnotmerelyoneof“badleaders”whichcanbesolvedbyhaving“goodleaders”(Manning,2006).AccordingtoManning,thisisnotaquestionof“installingtherightelites,”ashasbeenthepreferredapproachofsegmentsoftheinternationalcom-munityinBiH,butrathertherecognitionofthefactthatanyseriousconceptofdemocracymustbebasedonthepracticeofcivicinvolve-mentandparticipation.Thisisthedemocraticpracticethatbringsustothemomentofrupture,i.e.themomentwhentheneedformajorrestructuringbecomesunavoidable.Indeed,itshouldbeobviousatthispoint,eventothemajorityof laypersonsthatthepossibilityofinstitutionalreforminBiHhasbeensystematicallyphasedout.Itfol-lowsthatonlyabreakwithallexistingarrangementscanreconstituteBiH as a democratic polity. accordingly, even a cursory analysis can demonstratethatthenatureofthesocio-economicandsocio-politicalcrisiswhichdominatesBiHasasovereignstateisofinstitutionalorigin.

ByreferringonlytotheextremelyfragmentedelectoralsystemwithintheDaytonconstitutionalorder,wecaneasilyconcludethatinthemodern“democratic”systeminBiHthereisessentiallynoneedfortheelitestoseekelectoralvotesoutsidetheirownethniccommunities.Thus,electionsinBiHrepresentlittlemorethanquasi-competitivecen-suses.Moreover,asofficialpoliticsaredominatedbyasmallnumberofparties,andstableemploymentinthestateapparatusisavailable


onlytothoseaffiliatedwiththesegroups,clientalismandcorruptionarerampantanddestroyall remaining impulses for reform.Giventhatonethirdoftheemployedlaborforceworksinthepublicsec-tor,amongthehighestsuchpercentagesintheworld,themajorityofhouseholdsinthecountrydependonrevenueswhicharedirectlyrelated to institutionalized corruption and clientalism.

Ofcourse,trustinthesystemisnon-existentforthesereasons,with45%ofregisteredvoterswhoabstainedfromvotinginthelastgeneralelections(IDEA2015).Suchalowturnoutfavorstheexistingauthoritieswhichhavebeenabletowinelectionsthroughonlythevotesoftheirmostloyalsupporters.Asthesevotersareeconomi-callydependentonthepatronageofthoseparties,theycannotandwillnotsupportanysortof“reformers”intheelections.Thus,theexistingelitesare restoredtotheirpositions,startingthecyclealloveragain.Withintheframeworkofthesearrangements,alterna-tivesseemimpossible.Votershaverepeatedlygiventheirsupporttonominallyreformistparties,socialdemocratsandanti-nationalistsofvariouskinds.Onseveraloccasions,thesereformistforcesformedgovernmentorwereleadingmembersofrulingcoalitionsateverylevelofgovernment.But since thenationalistpartieswithin thisconstitutionalsystemareabletoblockanyreformprogramwithlessthan15%ofthevote(e.g.theHDZ),reformistpartieswouldhavetosecuremorethan90%ofthevotesinordertohaveanyrealchanceof implementing theirplatform.This is,of course, anessentiallyimpossiblegoalinalmostalllegitimatedemocraticsystemsandthesameistrueofours.


The Arithmetic of (ir)responsibility

Giventheseinstitutionalbarriers,substantialchangesinBiHcan, intheend,originateonly“outside”of theconfinesoftheexistingpoliticalstructures,bywhichImeanthrou-

ghtheactionsofnon-parliamentarydemocraticmovements.Inthissense,alreadyvisiblecracksintheedificeoftheDaytonconstitutio-nalorderareindicatorsofpossibleformsforthechangeprocesstoproceed.Afterall,themoretimepassesbetweenthewarandthepresenttime,themorethestateofthecountry’seconomyandthelackofcompetenceofitsgoverningbodiesbecomeincomprehensi-bleforthecitizens.However,therearegrowingexpectationsonthepartofthecitizensregardingthedistributionofresourcesofvariouskinds,i.e.expectationsintermsofhavingasociallyresponsiblestatethatcanprovidehealthcare,educationandbasicinfrastructure.Stilltherulingcoalitionsfailtorespondtothesedemands,astheyfocusmostlyontheirintra-oligarchicconflictsand,ofcourse,theirecono-micplundering.Yetduetoentrenchedclientelisticandcorruptrela-tions,aswellasthefragmentationoftheelectoralsystem,changesthroughelectionsarehardlypossible.Electedreformistgovernmentsprovethattheycannotordonotwanttoimplementthenecessarychangestimeandagain.Meanwhile,theinternationalcommunitycannotordoesnotwanttopushthroughthenecessaryinstitutionalchanges.Frustrationgrowstotheextentthatitovertakeswidespre-adfeelingsofdisillusionmentandapathy.Atthispoint,itisjustamatteroftimebeforetheaccumulatedrageexplodes.


The“BabyRevolution”of2013wasaformativeepisodeinthisprocess(Dedović2013).Wecanrecallthatthedemandsrelatedtothisprotestweresimple:parentsofnewbornchildrenaskedfortheadop-tionofanewlawthatwouldallowtheirchildrentoreceiveacitizenIDnumberand,thus,cometoberecognizedasactuallyexistingcitizens.Naturally,theproblemwasnotjustthefactthatillchildrenwithoutanIDnumberwereunabletoreceivetreatmentathomeandabroad,butratherthefactthatnewbornsweredeprivedofthebasicrighttocitizenship,forwantofasolutionwhichthepoliticianswereunableandunwillingtoarriveat.Inotherwords,thequestforcitizenshipwasnotsomeabstractdesire,buttherighttoalegalpersonality,guaran-teedundertheBiHConstitution,andwhichultimatelyrepresentsafundamentalhumanrightinthemodernworld.

Thenextoutburstofdissatisfaction,partly inspiredbyunsatis-factoryoutcomesofthepreviousepisode,cameinFebruary2014intheformofaseriesofsocialprotestswhichhavebeenthemostsignificantcivicmobilizationssincetheendofthewar.Whiledisaf-fectedcitizenssetfiretothebuildingsbelongingtothegovernmentandpoliticalpartiesinTuzla,Sarajevo,Zenica,Mostar,atleastfourcantonalgovernmentsresigned.ByBosnianstandards,thiswasanunprecedentedwaveofaccountability,even if theresignations inquestionmainlycameaboutduetothepolitician’svestedinterestinpoliticalsurvival.Forthefirsttime inageneration,thepoliticaldiscourseofBiHwasmarkedbythegrowingtherecognitiononthepartofpoliticalelitesofthepossibilityofwidespreadcivilunrestasaresultoftheirpolicies.Inshort,thepeoplehadfinallydecidedtodirectlyinterveneinthepoliticalprocess.


Yet,evenbeforethefireswereextinguished,thousandsofciti-zensacross thecountrybegantogatheratadhocmeetings, theplenums,atwhichtheypresentednotonlytheirdemandsfortheremaininggovernmentsbutalso,begantodevelopacompletelynewpolitical discourse. as one local activist put it, plenums were, in es-sence,“teachingpeoplewithPTSDtoparticipate[inpolitics]”(Noni,2014).Withintheframeworkoftheplenums,citizenshadtheoppor-tunitytopubliclyvoicetheirgrievancesandtotogetherparticipateinthepublicdeliberationofissues,aswellascollectivelyformulatenew,meaningful,andpracticaldemandsofthoseinpower.

However,acombinationofthemediaandpolicepressure,aswellasthedevastatingfloodsinMay2014whichpromptedtheplenumstodiverttheirenergiestowardsorganizingvolunteerandfundraisingactions,meantthattheinitialsurgeofpoliticalenergysoonfizzledout.Eventhetimingof initialprotestswas“unfortunate” inoneimportantsense:theytookplacejustninemonthsbeforethe2014elections.Elsewhere,itmighthavepromptedthecandidatestoad-dressthecausesofproteststhemselves,toaddresstheissuesraisedbytheprotesters.Unfortunately,inBiHthistimingresultedonlyinthemonopolizationofmediaspacebypoliticalcampaigning,falsepromises,mudslinging,andoutrighthatespeech, resulting in thebrushingasideofallthesubstantiveconcernsraisedbytheeventsinFebruary.


Positive tensions

ThecausesoftheFebruaryprotestsandtheBabyRevolutionare still present. corruption, poverty, and unemployment are endemic,whiletheentiresystemisdominatedbynearlythe

sameoligarchs.Itisthereforelogicaltoassumethatsimilarprotestswilltakeplaceagain.Indeed,thequestionismerelywhenandhow,notwhethertheywillhappen.

MeanwhiletheintegrationofBiHintotheEUlegalsystemremainsanecessarybutinsufficientconditionforthedemocratizationofthecountry.WhileitwouldbeincorrecttotreattheEuro-AtlanticprojectinBiHasa“panacea”forallsocialills, institutionalreformsalonedonot representasufficientprecondition forsubstantialdemoc-ratization.Nevertheless,EUsupportforreformsinkeysectorscanstillprovideameaningfulpushtowardstherealizationofabroaderprocessofcivicengagementandcivicactivism.AnidealscenarioforthefulldemocratizationofBiHisonewhichincludespressuringtheelitesfromaboveandbelow,inotherwordsaprocessengagedinbyboththecitizensofBiHaswellasbytheinternationalcommunity.ThisisespeciallyimportantsincetheinternationalcommunitystillhasthemandatetoactonkeyissuesofstateandinstitutionalcapacitybuildinginBIH.ThereformofthejudiciaryandpoliceinstitutionsofBiH,asjustoneexample,representaninstanceinwhichtheinter-estsoftheEUanditsownsecuritylineupwithandBiH’sneedforafunctionalstateapparatus.Withoutthesereforms,neitherEUnor


NATOmembershipispossibleforthecountry,afactbywhich,inthefinalanalysis,bothEuropeandBiHareimperilled.

Inaddition,similar“unitsforchange”areavailableinotherkeyareas,particularlyinthefieldofagriculture(BassuenerandWeber2014).BiHdesperatelyneedsastate-levelministryofagriculture,apolicysupportedbymostBiH’sSerbs,yetopposedbythegovern-mentofMiloradDodikinBanjaLukawhichresistsfurther“central-ization”ofpoweratthestatelevel.AllthisindicatesthatthoughtheinternationalcommunitycannotreformBiHinplaceofitscitizens,itcanactdecisivelyintermsofhelpingwiththeestablishmentofsomekey institutionswhichfuturedemocraticmovements laterexpandandstrengthen.

Thispointgetsusbacktothe issueofprospectivedemocraticmovementsinBiH.Itisimportanttoemphasizethattheassumptionregardingthe“failure”oftheplenumstofullyreformthesocietythroughoneepisodeofunreststemsfromafundamentallynaïveanalysis(Bardos2014).Nevertheless,thisfeelingofdisappointmentshouldbetakenintoaccount.Wemustaskthough,whatweretheplenumsandwhatcouldtheyhaveeverreasonablybecome?

Forstarters,theplenumscanbebestunderstoodas“temporaryautonomouszones”assuggestedbyHakimBey(Bey,1991).Thesearesimultaneouslyphysicalbutalsoconceptualspaces thatmakeitpossible forpeople togather, to cooperateanddeliberate, ascouldbeseenintheexampleofourplenums.Itisafluidconceptthatencompassesa rangeofactivities, fromthewidespreadand


permanent squatter andoccupationmovementswhichwehaveseeninBarcelonaorAthens,totemporaryoccupationsinthestyleoftheOccupyMovement(Graeber2013).Inthesecircumstances,citizensandactivistscan“liberate”aphysicalterritory inordertodefend it, toorganizethemselveswithin itsconfinesandtogrowtheirmovements fromasolid foundation. Inaddition, it iswithinthesespacesthattheprocessofthedevelopmentofaparticipatorydemocracyactuallybeginsandevolves.Althoughthegoalissocialtransformationingeneral,thefocusinthemeantimeinanygivenmomentisalsoonlayingthefoundationsoffutureinstitutions.Intheacademicliterature,thisiscalled“prefigurativepolitics”(Shantz2010;Milstein2010).

Inotherwords, thedemocratizationofBiHrequires theemer-genceofdemocraticmovementsthatareabletoestablishhorizon-tal(non-hierarchical)participatorystructures,suchastheplenums..Thesenewpopularassembliesmustbecomeexperimentsindemo-craticpublicmanagementinandofthemselvesandcannotintheprocesssacrificesubstantivedemocraticparticipationtovanguardist“leadership”cliques.Moreover,theseassembliesmustremainfullyautonomousfromthestate,even if theirexistencewilleventuallybe legitimizedoreven integratedwithinthestateapparatus.Thisprocessistobeexpectedbutitshouldbedelayedforaslongaspos-sible.ThebestwaytodelaythisisthroughthecreationofmobilizedandorganizedsocialmovementsaswehaveseeninLatinAmericaforinstance(AzzeliniandSitrin2014).ButwhiletheemergenceoftheplenumsduringtheFebruaryprotestsrepresentedamajorstepforwardforBiH,becausetheircreationcoincidedwiththeproverbial


withdrawalfromthestreets,thepopularassembliessoonceasedtoexistasathreattotheestablishment.Inshort,democraticinstitu-tionsanddemocraticpracticescannotexistwhenthepoliticalelitesthemselvesarenotcompelledtorespondtotheminthefirstplaceandwhen theyhavenothadanecessary senseof responsibilityinstilled inthemby“non-institutionalactors,”which istosaythecitizensthemselves.

Whatisbeingproposedhereislargelyderivedfromtheexperi-encesofsocialmovementsfromallovertheworld(Collis2012;Piven2012;Gelderloos2013).Itisbasedonhistoricalrevolutionarydevel-opments,boththoseonlargerandsmallerscales,whichtookplaceduringthe19th and 20thcenturyandthatwereresponsiblefortheestablishmentofexistingliberal-democraticregimes.Inthisregard,myargumentisessentiallyaconservativeone.Evenifouraimisto“merely”establishasystemofliberalparliamentarism,wemustbeawareofthefactthatthebourgeois(civic)statebeginsandexistsinconstanttensionwiththemoreprogressivedemocraticelementswithinthesocietyatlarge.The“democratization”ofparticularpo-liticalregimecannotmeaningfullyproceediftherearenosubstantialconfrontationsorsubstantialdebatesalongtheway.Accordingly,thedemocratizationofsucharegimecannoteventrulybeginiftherulingelitesmaintaindominanceoverthestateandpoliticalprocesstosuchanextentthatevenelectionsarenothingmorethanamererotationofposts.Evenarepresentativedemocracyrequiresaplau-siblerangeofautonomouscivicorganizations.Republicsdominatedbyaristocracies, toparaphraseMachiavelli, turn into tyranniesalltooquicklywithoutthepresenceofagenuineplebeianresistance.


Assuch,genuinelydemocraticinstitutionalactors,suchaspoliticalparties,canonlyemergefollowingthesuccessofcitizen-leddemo-craticmovementswillingtoconfronttheexistingregime inall itsmultifacetedformsatboththeballotboxandinthestreets.Inshort,substantialchange,onbothgreatandsmall,canonlybeinitiatedfrombelow.

201

The ariThmeTic of Bad assumPTions

hoda dedić

202

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: is there a possibility for a turning point on the road to the Eu (from zero to hero)

Why did the ethnic concept and discourse “ensnare” Bosnia and Herzegovina on the road to Europe, when they are in no way mutually exclusive, presuming, of course, that things are done in an emancipated way where every collective iden-tity has its place but not an absolute supremacy? It seems as though the “abuse” of the ethnic has slowed down the reaching of a consensus without which there may be no EU process. Furthermore, at one stage, this has provoked an even greater intervention of the international community in order to strive to maintain system functionality, only to have it all end at point zero of the realization that BiH cannot enter the EU while foreign tutors are at the wheel. And then, instead of a smart approach, there came a period of no approach, probably due to fatigue and more pressing issues. Dr. Hoda Dedić, EU expert with a doctorate in political science from the University of Sarajevo and a specialization from the University of Vienna, describes this period of both domestic and foreign lack of interest as a time of wandering conditionality when anything could have become a condition for the European process. Dr. Dedić draws valid conclusions for the concept of the EU conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina by comparing examples of how EU conditions in various countries have influenced the consolidation of the EU process. She is of the opinion that it is a good thing that the EU has managed to establish a balance of conditionality and to separate the difficult from the easy and the relevant from the irrelevant issues through a new approach. According to the author, the Dayton Peace Agreement is not an obstacle for speeding up the EU integration process; however, the Dayton narrative about the blockade as the only means to protect the national interest is an obstacle. Perhaps the European narrative about the culture of compromise as the most powerful tool for protection of everyone should be put to the test. This is the key precondition to come out of the declarative consensus of how everyone in BiH wants to enter the EU, and towards a working consensus of how everyone should work on this without tongue in cheek.

203The arithmetic of bad assumptions

European road trapped inside ethnic discourse

Thedynamics of the EU integrationprocess of Bosnia andHerzegovinaarises fromseveral specificaspectsofpoliticalandsocialdevelopmentofBosniaandHerzegovina in the

post-Daytonperiod:thenatureofthepoliticalsystemandthecon-stitutionalconstructionofBosniaandHerzegovinaestablishedbytheDaytonPeaceAgreement,thepossibilityforreachinginterpartycon-sensus,andtheroleandauthorityoftheinternationalcommunitysetbytheDaytonPeaceAgreement.ThepoliticalsystempluralisationinBiH,establishedafterthefirstmulti-partyelectionsin1990,waspredominantlyachievedonthebasisofethnicity.Theresultofthepoliticalparty“ethnicgrouping”wastheeliminationofthenece-ssityforthepoliticalpartiestoseekwiderpublicsupport.Sufficientsupportreceivedthroughtheirrespectiveethnicgroupsresultedinaconsequentsubordinationofindividual,civilinterests,andhasen-couragedthepoliticalleaderstomaintaintheirsurvivalbyinsistingonrepresentingthecollectiveethnicinterests.Theaftermathofsuchmodusoperandiofpoliticalpartieswastheabsenceofinter-partyconsensusonall important issuesofpoliticaldevelopmentof thestate,andtheparticipationofpoliticalparties in thegovernmentwasreducedtopartnershipwithoutanysortofprogramcoalitionor responsibility.Thecomplexityof theconstitutionalarchitectureofBosniaandHerzegovinabasedontheDaytonPeaceAgreementhascontributedtothecontinuityofthesocio-politicaldominanceofethnicnationalism.TheelementsthatdefinetheConstitutionof

204 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Hoda Dedić

BosniaandHerzegovina,asenshrined inAnnex IVof theDaytonPeaceAgreement,arebasedonthesupremacyofcollectiverights,andconsequentlyonproportionalrepresentationoftheconstituentpeoplesasafundamentalprincipleofthepoliticaldecision-makingprocess.1 In itsOpinionon theConstitutional situation inBosniaandHerzegovinaandthePowersof theHighRepresentative, theVeniceCommissiondeemsthatthedecision-makingmechanismsatBiHlevelarenotefficientorrationalbutcumbersomeandwithtoomanypossibilitiesofblocking the takingofanydecision.2 similar assessments are comprised in the EU Progress Reports for BiH,3 european Parliament conclusions4andtheResolutionoftheCouncilofEurope’sParliamentaryAssembly.5

1 TheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina,ActIII,Paragraph1,ResponsibilitiesofandRelationsbetweentheInstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovinaandtheentities.

2 OpinionontheConstitutionalSituationinBosniaandHerzegovinaandthePowersoftheHighRepresentativeCDL-AD(2005)004,62ndPlenarySession,11-12March2005,Pointno42.

3 The 2009 EU Progress Report on BiH explicitly states recommendations onthenecessarychangesoftheBiHConstitution.Comparethe2009EuropeanCommission Progress Report on BiH, Commission StaffWorkingDocumentCOM{COM(2009)533}final,Bruxelles14.10.2009,SEC(2009)1338.

4 DecisionoftheEuropeanParliamentof23October2008onthesigningoftheStabilizationandAssociationAgreementbetweentheEuropeanCommunityanditsmemberstatesontheoneside,andBosniaandHerzegovinaontheother.

5 TheResolution1855oftheCouncilofEurope’sParliamentaryAssembly“TheFunctioningofDemocraticInstitutionsinBiH”ofJanuary252012.


Havinginmindthenumberofthelawsthathavebeenpassedso far, thedecision-makingmechanisms in theBiHParliamentaryAssembly thatwereestablishedby theConstitutionare,withoutadoubt,complicatedand inefficient.However,politicalpracticeindicatesthatentityvotingandtheprotectionofthevitalnationalinterest(BiHConstitution,ArticleIV/3.c,eandf)isnotexclusivelyaconsequenceoftheConstitution.TheConstitutiondoesnotstipu-latewhenthesemechanismsare tobeapplied.TheirapplicationstemsfromtheRulesofProcedureofbothhousesoftheBiHParlia-mentaryAssembly.Thisishowentityvotingbecameethnicvotingasaconsequenceoftheoperatingofpoliticalparties.6ThisiswhytheEUcommissionreportsspeakofthe“abuse”(andnotuse)ofentityvotingprovisionswhichpreventtheimplementationofreformsandleadtowardBiHstagnating intheEuropean integrationprocess.7 Draftlaws,theimplementationofwhichrequiredtheimplementa-tionofinstitutionalchangesatthestatelevelweremostlyrejectedeither through themajority’s vetoor throughentity voting.Thenonexistenceofaconsolidateddemocracycreatedconditions forconstant interventionoftheinternationalcommunity intheformofdecisionmakingbytheHighRepresentativeoftheinternational

6 Also compare Kunrath, B. (2010): “From Protection Measure to Barrier to FurtherAction:EntityVotinginBosniaandHerzegovina”,Collectionofpapers“BosniaandHerzegovina15yearsafterDayton”FacultyofPoliticalScience p.25,andBieber,F./Keil,S.(2009):“Power-SharingRevisited:LessonsLearnedintheBalkans?”,ReviewofCentralandEastEuropeanLaw,34,p.337-360.

7 European Commission 2009 Progress Report on BiH, Commission StaffWorkingDocument,COM{COM(2009)533}final,Bruxelles14.10.2009.,SEC(2009)1338,p.7


community inBiH.TheminimalelementsofBiHstatehoodwereestablished throughdecisionsmadeby theHighRepresentativepertainingtoestablishmentof institutionsat thestate level8 and introductionofstatesymbols.EntityConstitutionswereamended,andcitizenswereenabledtomovefreelythroughouttheentireareaofBiH.AsinglecityadministrationwasestablishedforthecityofMostar.AlmostalloftheinitiativesforreformsofBiHpost-Daytonpoliticaldevelopmentwereinitiated“externally”.Theyarenotare-sultofpoliticaleliteconsensusinBiH,andtheywouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheparticipationoftheinternationalcommunity.From1997until theendof2014, the internationalcommunity’sHighRepresentativeforBiHhadimposedatotalof948decisionswithexecutivepower.ThefrequencyofexercisingtheBonnPow-ershasdecreasedwithtime,particularlyaftertheannouncementin2006thattheOfficeoftheHighRepresentativeforBiHwillbeclosed,andthereformoftheBiHConstitutionwasstoppedattheattempt (Table1).Alongwith thedecreaseof the“interventionassistance”of the internationalcommunity, there isa significantholdupintheimplementationofthereformsasapreconditionforfurtherdevelopmentoftheEUintegrationprocessofBiH.Duringitsfour-yearmandatefrom2006until2010,theParliamentarymajor-ityfailedtoperformasinglesignificantreformintheBiHEUinte-grationprocess.StagnationintheimplementationofthereformsandtheEuropeanizationprocesscontinuedinthemandateperiod

8 Establishment of the State Border Service (DGS), State Investigation andProtectionAgency(SIPA),IndirectTaxationAuthority,institutionalstrengtheningoftheBiHCouncilofMinistersfromthreetonineministries.


2010-2014.9Duetolackofreformsinthemandateperiod2010-2014,primarilypertainingtothenon-implementationoftheEuro-peanCourtofHumanRightsverdictinthecaseof“Sejdić-Finci”10, inDecember2013,theEUDirectorateforIPAfundsdeniedBosniaandHerzegovina45MillionEurosofaidfromtheIPAfunds.11TheEUintegrationprocessofBosniaandHerzegovinahasfollowedthedynamicsofarticulationofinfluencesoftheinternationalcommu-nityinBiH.IncomparisonwiththeotherWesternBalkancountries,BosniaandHerzegovinahasmadetheleastamountofprogressintheEUintegrationprocess,anditistheonlycountrywithoutthestatusofacandidate.12

9 ComparetheEuropeanCommissionProgressReportsonBiHintheprocessofEuropeanintegrationfrom2007until2014.

10 Through the verdict in the “Sejdić-Finci” case from 22nd December 2009,(cases no. 27996/06 and 34836/06), the Grand Chamber of the EuropeanCourtofHumanRights inStrasbourgfoundthatBosniaandHerzegovina isinviolationoftheEuropeanConventionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms.TheCourtfoundthedenialofrightstoBiHcitizenstorunforstatePresidencyorHouseofPeoplesintheBiHParliament,iftheydonotbelongtooneofthethreeconstituentpeoplesinBiH,tobediscriminatory.

11 Compare„Oslobođenje“,9.December2013.

12 On July 1st 2013, Croatia became a fully pledged member of the EU.Montenegro and Serbia have both opened the negotiation process for EUmembership.MacedoniaandAlbaniaarebothcandidates,buthavenotyetopenednegotiationsformembership.BiHisastatewiththestatusofpotentialcandidateforEUmembership.


The wandering conditionality

AfterthefailuretoadoptamendmentstotheConstitutioninApril2006,andfailingtoreachanagreementonchangestotheConstitutionwithinthescopeoftheso-calledPrud

andButmirProcessesin2009,therehasbeennoseriousattempttoreformtheBiHConstitution.13DuetoabsenceofactiveparticipationoftheinternationalcommunityintheBiHreformprocesses,theBiHEuropeanizationprocessbecamechaotic.Thesubsequentnegotia-tions thatwere led, inanattempt to reachanagreementontheminimumcontentforconstitutionalreformsandtoprovideatleastformalimplementationoftheEuropeanCourtforHumanRightsru-linginthe“Sejdić-Finci”case,wereheldoutsidetheBiHinstitutionsandturnedintoinformaldebatesofleadersofpoliticalpartiesthat

13 Thetalksbetweenthe leadersof thePartyofDemocraticAction (SDA), theCroatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Alliance of Independent SocialDemocrats (SNSD) that were held in Prud, in the Municipality of Odžak,developed into long-term negotiations. The debated issues were thosenecessary formeeting the conditions of the Peace Implementation CouncilandforConstitutionalchangesthegoalofwhichisforthestatetobecomemore efficient and to join the EuropeanUnion. Further down the line, thenegotiationscameacrosscompletelyopposingpointsofviewofthepoliticalleaders. The Butmir negotiations began on October 8 and 9, and thenresumedonOctober20and21,2009.Theywereheldjustbeforethe2010parliamentaryelectionswhichiswhythemajorityofthepartieshadnointerestinreachingaconsensus.FormoredetailsseetheReportoftheInternationalCrisisGroup:“Bosnia’sunfinished transition:BetweenDaytonandEurope”,Europe Report 198, 9th March 2009, online: http://www.crisisgroup.org /~/media/Files/europe/s_incomplete_transition_between_dayton_and_europe_serbo_croatian.ashx.


formedthemajorityintheParliament.ThisledtofurtherdestructionofthedemocraticroleoftheBiHParliamentaryAssembly.Thelackofnecessaryconsensusproducedcrisesindecisionmaking,crisesofgovernment,andfinally,crisesofexpectations14–expectationsciti-zenshadofthepoliticiansandtheinternationalcommunity,thatthepoliticianshadoftheinternationalcommunity,thattheinternationalcommunityhadofthecitizensand,supposedly,forthepoliticians.The insistenceof the internationalcommunityontheapplicationof theconditionalityprinciple in thesenseofsimplymeetingtheformwithouttheessentialeffects,often ledtowardadeepeningofthepoliticalcrises.AstudyontheapplicationoftheEuropeanUnionconditionalityprincipleontheexamplesofLatvia,Slovakiaandturkey15confirmsseveral importantpoints fromtheaspectof theefficiencyofapplyingthisprincipleinBosniaandHerzegovina.First,onlysubstantialeffectsofthenegotiations,primarilyclearincentiveforEUmembership,havebeenproventobeanefficientmechanismofthedemocraticconditionalityprinciple.Second,theincentiveforachievingfullEUmembershipwasmoreefficientifthepoliticalex-pencesofthetargetedgovernmentswerelower.Thepointis,thepo-liticalactors“calculate”whethertheeffectsofthemembershipare“worth”thereformimplementation.Third,thegreatertheinfluence

14 CompareDžihić,V.(2010):“EuropeinBosniaandHerzegovina-BosniaandHerzegovinainEurope:WhereHaveWeStoppedandWhy,andHowtoGetGoingAgain?”;Collectionofpapers“BosniaandHerzegovina15YearsafterDayton”,FacultyofPoliticalScience,p.242.

15 Schimmelfenning,F.,Engert,S.,Knobel,H.(2003):“Costs,CommitmentandCompliance:TheImpactofEUDemocraticConditionalityonLatvia,SlovakiaandTurkey”,JSMS2003,Volume41.Number3,p.495-518.


thecitizenshave(socialmobilization),thegreateristhepossibilitythattheconditionalityprinciplewillbeefficient.Noneofthepre-requisiteswhichwere toenable the functioningof theEuropeanUnionconditionalityprincipleinthecaseofBosniaandHerzegovinawere ever set.16Therefore,theinsistenceoftheEuropeanUniononformalinstitutionalreforms,withoutvisibleeffects,hasnotproducedthedesiredresults.ThispreferentialtreatmentinthesolvingofthepoliticalcrisisinBiH,followedbythedenialoftheEuropeanmeansfromtheIPAfundsforBiH,wasnotonlyinsufficienttoinitiatethenecessaryreforms,buthas,toagreatextent,devaluedtheessenceandthemeaningoftheEuropeanizationprocess.

16 Although there is significantcitizens support forBiHmembership in theEU(over78%accordingtoallrelevantresearch),thewillofthecitizensfailstobearticulatedinthepoliticaldecision-makingprocess.ComparethepublicpollsconductedbyUNDP,GallupBalkanMonitor, aswell as thedataof theBiHDirectorateforEuropeanIntegration,www.dei.gov.ba(accordingtotheIPSOSPublicAffairsresearch).


How to proceed?

An important foreign-policyprerequisite for furtherdeve-lopmentoftheEuropeanintegrationprocessofBosniaandHerzegovinawasestablishedthroughtheshapingofanew

approachoftheEUtowardstheWesternBalkancountriesandthro-ughtheGerman-BritishinitiativeforBosniaandHerzegovina.ThischangeintheapproachoftheEuropeanUniontowardsBiHcameafter thesocialunrest thathadescalated in severalBiHcities inFebruary2014.17Throughthisnewapproach,theEuropeanUnionintends tosupport themacroeconomic,fiscalandfinancial stabi-lityof thestates intheregionandthusenabletheresultsof theintegrationprocesstobecomemoresubstantialand“tangible”atthisstage.Thepre-accessionfunds(IPAII)willbedirectedtowardssupportingtheimplementationofsectoralreforms.TheEuropeanUnionEnlargementStrategyfor2014and201518speaksofthreepillarsofthenewEUapproachtowardstheWesternBalkans: in-sistingontheruleoflawandfightagainstcorruption,promotingeconomic rule, andpublic administration reform. TheEuropeanUnion has also provided strong financial support to projects of

17 Thecitizenshaveexpressedtheirdisappointmentwiththeeconomicsituation(unemploymentrateofover40%)andthelackofreforms,throughprotestsinseveralBIHcities.TheprotestsresultedintheresignationsofseveralPrimeMinistersofthegovernmentsofSarajevoCanton,TuzlaCanton,Zenica-Dobojcanton and una-sana canton.

18 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-strategy-paper_en.pdf


infrastructuralconnectionbuildingintheWesternBalkancountries

–theConnectivityAgenda.19

Furthermore,throughtheGerman-Britishinitiative20 a special ap-proachwasdesignedforBiH.ThestandardsthatBosniaandHerze-govinaneedstoestablish intheEuropean integrationprocessandtheimplementationoftheEUAcquisremainthesame,buttheorderinwhichtheyhavetobeimplementedhaschanged.21 BiH politicians wereexpectedtocreateadocumenttodemonstratetheircommit-mentthattheywill,inthelongrun,implementthereformswhichwillleadtowardsamorefunctionalstateandprepareitforEUmember-ship.AfterthemembersoftheBiHPresidencysignedajointDeclara-tiononthecommitmentofpoliticalleadersinBiHtoimplementthenecessaryreformswithintheprocessofBiHjoiningtheEU,theDec-larationwasadoptedintheBiHParliamentaryAssemblyaswell,22 and

19 See Joint Statement ofWestern Balkan 6Ministerial ImprovedConnectivityand the Strong Core Network, online: http://www.seetoint.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2015/04/Final-statement-WB6-250315.pdf

20 On November 4th 2014, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the UnitedKingdomandtheFederalRepublicofGermanyreferreda lettertotheHighRepresentativeoftheUnionforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyandtotheEUEnlargementCommissioner,inwhichtheyadvocatethisnewapproachoftheEU towardsBiH.At themeetingof theEUForeignAffairsCouncilheldon17thNovember2014,theMinistersofForeignAffairsoftheEUmembercountriessupportedthisinitiative.

21 Implementation of the decision of the EU Court of Human Rights on the“Sejdić-Finci”caseremainsobligatory,butitisnolongeraconditionfortheenteringintoforceoftheStabilizationandAssociationAgreement.

22 Sessionof theHouseofRepresentativesof theBiHParliamentaryAssembly,February23rd,2015.


notlongafterthat,theCouncilofEuropeadoptedtheDecisionfortheStabilizationandAssociationAgreementtoenterintoforce.23 in thelaterstages,aftercertainprogresshasbeenmadeinthereforms,theEuropeanUnionwillconsidertherequestofBiHtojointheEU.24

Inthisway,theconditionalityprinciplesdealingwiththeissuesonwhichitishardtoreachacompromise,likeamendingtheBiHConstitution,havebeenpushedback,aimingtomakeprogressintheprocessofEuropeanizationofBiH,orachievingtangibleresults,primarilywithregardtoeconomicdevelopment.Creatingmomen-tum in the integrationprocessor theexpectedsubstantial resultsoftheprocess,suchasimprovementoftheeconomicsituationandimplementationofprojects thatcanenhance the livingstandardofthecitizenshavefacilitatedareachingof--fornowandonlyinprinciple--aconsensusoftheparliamentarypartiesforintegrationofBiHtotheEU.TheBiHCouncilofMinistershasmadetheDeci-sionontheestablishmentofateamthatwillcreateadocumentonBiHcoordinationmechanisms intheEU integrationprocess.25TheEconomicReformAgendaforBiHwasalsoadoptedwitha listofmeasuresandplansforthesecondhalfof2015andthefirstquarterof2016.

23 The Council adopted the Decision on April 21st and the Stabilization andAssociationAgreementcameintoforceonJune1st2015.

24 WhenrequestingtheopinionoftheEuropeanCommissiononthemembershiprequest,theCouncilwillasktheCommissiontopayspecialattentiontotheimplementationoftheverdictoftheEuropeanCourtforHumanRightsinthe“Sejdić-Finci”case.

25 The9thSessionoftheBiHCouncilofMinistersofJune2,2015.


Byfocusingonthe“politicsofwhat’spossible”,theinitiationofamoredynamicflowoftheintegrationprocesswouldimplymeetingseveralimportantinternalpoliticalassumptions.Inordertoavoidtheprojectedeffectsintheintegrationprocessbecomingpureinstitution-alismwithoutsubstantialchanges,oneneedstokeepinmindthene-cessityofcreatingcapacitiesforconsistentimplementationofreforms.Thisimpliesthetransferofthenecessarylegislativeandexecutivepow-erstothestatelevelinstitutionsinordertoestablishcompatibilitywithEUstandards.TheBiHConstitutiondoesnotstipulatetheprincipletobanthetransferofcompetenciestothestatelevel,whichbringsthisconditiontotheprocessofshapingatrueworkingconsensusofpoliti-calpartiesfortheimplementationofnecessaryreformsintheintegra-tionprocess.Laws,decisionsandreformsonlymakesenseiftheycanbeimplemented.Onlyfunctionalinstitutionscanmeettheintegrationprocessrequirements,andfurtherdowntheline,therequirementsofEUmembership.Infact,EUmembershipwithoutcapableinstitutionswouldbringmoredamagethangain.Having inmindthattheEUmembershipnegotiationprocessdoesnotimplynegotiationsonthemeritofthings,inotherwords,itissimplynotpossibletonegotiateonthesetstandards,butonlyaboutthemannerandtime-frameforadoptingthestandards, thenanyprocrastination inassumingthisobligationrepresentspoliticalinconsistency.

Anotherassumptiondealswithestablishingproceduresforsimpli-fiedadoptionoflawsintheworkoftheBiHParliamentaryAssembly.Aminimalcontentofthisassumptionwouldberealizedthroughchang-esintheRulesofProceduresoftheBiHParliamentaryAssembly.LawstacklingthemeetingoftheStabilizationandAssociationAgreement


obligationswouldbeadoptedthroughacceleratedprocedures,thusnarrowingthescopefortheapplicationofentityvotingwithinthepar-liamentaryproceedings.Themaximal,andoptimal,assumptionwouldbeachievedthroughtheadoptionofaEuropeanintegrationclauseintheBiHConstitution.Thistypeofcontentofconstitutionalprovisions,thatis,endorsingtheEuropeanintegrationclauseforEUmembershipasacountry’sconstitutionalgoal,isthepracticeinthemajorityoftheEUmemberstates.Theintroductionoftheintegrationclauseestab-lishesaconstitutionalfoundationfortransferofsovereignrightstotheEUlevel,itestablishesthesubsidiarityprincipleandstandardizestheprovisionsofinternalresponsibilityinacoordinationsystem,thatis,theinvolvementofalllevelsofgovernmentinreformimplementa-tionproceduresinordertoadopttheEuropeanlaws.Therefore,thispertainstotheinstrumentofharmonizationandimplementationoftheEUlegislationwhich isparticularlycommoninfederalsystems.“Constitutionalamendmentsinvariousfederalorregionalmemberstatesareclearsignsofadaptationoffederalandregionalstructurestomulti-leveladministrationdynamicsandchallengeswhicharechar-acteristicoftheEuropeanintegrationprocess.”26

TheEU-specificintegrationclausecomprisedintheConstitutionoftheRepublicofCroatia,27whichpertainstotherightsarisingfrom

26 Wolk, J. (2009):Balancing the Idea“United inDifferences”:FederalismandConstitutionalReform inBosniaandHerzegovina,WhereHaveWeStoppedandWhy,andHowtoGetGoingAgain?;Collectionofpapers“BosniaandHerzegovina15YearsafterDayton”,FacultyofPoliticalSciencep.62.

27 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, VII, European Union, 1. LegalGroundsforMembershipandTransferofConstitutionalPowers,Article143


theEUAcquis,stipulatesthatgovernmentalagencies,bodiesoflocalandregionalself-governmentandlegalpersonsvestedwithpublicauthorityshallapplyEuropeanUnion lawdirectly (ConstitutionoftheRepublicofCroatia,Article145).

TheexperiencesofMontenegrointhenegotiationprocesswiththeEU,28therevisionoftheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSloveniabeforeitsEUaccessionin2004,andthediscussionsontheamend-mentstotheConstitutionoftheRepublicofSerbiaforincorporationofanintegrationclauseonEUintegration29confirmthepossibilitiesthisapproachcanprovide.Reachingaconsensusontheintroduc-tionofanintegrativeclauseintheBiHConstitutionwouldregulatetheprinciplesofimplementationandlegislativecompetencies,andcontributetostateconsolidationinamannerthatwouldbuildef-ficientadministrativecapacitiestoopenthenegotiationsandreachfullEUmembership.

Withregardtotheproceduralactivitiesintheimplementationoftheintegrationprocess,allregionalstateshaveadoptedtheIntegra-tionProgrammebeforesubmittingtheapplicationforEUmember-ship.TheProgrammepresentsindetailthegoalsandtaskswithinthe integrationprocess. Itestablishes theplan for reform imple-mentation,that is,ofmeetingmembershipcriteria,aswellasthe

28 ConsititutionalchangesintheareaofjusticewereoneoftheconditionsforMontenegro toopennegotiations forChapters23and24.Changes to theConstitutionwereadoptedinJuly2013.

29 Compare“InitiatingnegotiationswiththeEU–thebeginningofconstitutionalchanges”,“Politika”magazine,April28th2015.


planforharmonizingthedomesticlegislationwiththelegislationoftheEUwiththebudgetprojectionforimplementationofthemea-sures. Infact,theIntegrationProgrammerepresentsastate’splanforharmonizationwith theEUAcquis,butalsoa foundation forreformactivitiesandthecreationofanAnnualPlanfortheworkofthegovernment.Atalaterstage,thestatescreateanEUAccessionProgramme-astrategicdocumentthatistoprovideresponsetotheneedsof thenegotiationprocess,andthis representsanefficientmechanismforgatheringdata,reporting,planningandrevisionofactivitiesofstateagencies.30

Acomparableexampleofamulti-yearblockintheprocessofEUintegration,andrapidcatchingupwithitsneighbouringcountriesintheEUintegrationprocessistheexampleofSlovakia’sEUaccession.EventhoughtherehadbeenadeclarativeconsensusforEUmember-ship,(bothfromthepoliticiansandthecitizens),VladimirMečiar’sGovernmentfailedtofollowsuchpro-Europeanorientation.31 in its 1997Report,theEuropeanCommissiondidnotrecommendforne-gotiationstobeopenedwithSlovakiaduetothefactthatSlovakia’sintegrationprocesswasfallingbehindothercountries.However,thestrongcommitmentofthecitizensforEUmembership,articulatedthroughthenon-governmentsector,andthecommitmentof theEuropeanUniontotheintegrationprocess,resultedinabandoning

30 compare Montenegro`s ProgrammeofAccessiontotheEuropean Unionfortheperiod2014–2018,MinistryofForeignAffairsofMontenegro.

31 CompareKneuer,M.(2003):„BewussteEntscheidungfürEuropa:DieSlowakeiund ihr schwierigerWeg in die EU“, Die politischeMeinung, Nr. 404, July2003, p. 25.


thepolicyofisolation,theformingofanewgovernmentandtheestablishingofaprogramplatformofthecoalitionpartiesforrapidlyachievingEUmembership.Theyhadaveryambitiousgoal:toopenhalfoftheChaptersoftheAcquisCommunautairein2001;inthesameyearthatmembershipnegotiationsbegan,toopentheotherhalfoftheChapters,andtoclosethenegotiationsin2002inorderforSlovakia toenter theEU in2004withotherVisegradGroupcountries.Intheend,thegoalwasachieved!ThePrimeMinisterofSlovakiapointedoutthesignificanceofshapingastrongworkingconsensusfortheadoptionoflawsandtheimportanceoftheex-istenceofinstitutionalcapacitiesfortheirimplementation.Equallysignificantwastheroleofthecitizens,whomanagedtoarticulatetheir interests through thenon-governmental sectorandnumer-ouscivic initiatives.Therewasanotherspecificitythatcontributedto thesuccessfulflowofSlovakia’s integrationprocess.Thisalsoinvolvedanintroductionofanovelty:aspecificityintheapproachoftheEuropeanUnion.AfterthegovernmentofMikulašDzurindawasformed,theEuropeanCommissionestablishedaspecialinstru-mentforSlovakia–theHigh-LevelWorkingGroup,tosignificantlyfacilitateandspeeduptheintegrationprocessuntiltheonsetofthenegotiations.32

32 The taskwas,basedona careful screening, todetectareaswhereSlovakianeeded to make adjustments. Compare Kneuer, M. (2003): „BewussteEntscheidungfürEuropa:DieSlowakeiund ihrschwierigerWeg indieEU“,DiepolitischeMeinung,Nr.404,July2003,p.28.


New approach and old expectations

Thewayout fromthispulsatingcrisisofexpectationsbeca-meapparentthroughtheshapingoftheEU’snewapproachtowardsBosniaandHerzegovinaintheformofaforeign-po-

licyassumptionforrealizationofasped-upprocessofEUintegra-tionofBosniaandHerzegovina.Themomentumintheintegrationprocessisnowpredominantlythechoiceofresponsibleinternalpo-litics.Thedecisionsofpoliticalactorsnowmust riseabovedecla-rative commitments and cross into working consensus at all levels ofexecutiveandlegislativegovernmentinawaythatprovidestheimplementationandsustainabilityofallnecessary reforms in theEuropeanizationprocess.Itispossibletoreachsuchaworkingcon-sensusbyinvitingcivilsocietytobethemainactorinthepoliticaldecision-makingprocessandthecarrieroftheEuropeanintegrationproject.Thearticulationofthewillofthecitizens,expressedthro-ughparticipatorydemocracyofthemulti-ethniccivilsociety,wouldstrengthenthedemocraticpowerof theParliamentandcreateafoundationfortheimplementationofnecessaryreformsthatwould--fromtheaspectofcreatingmechanismsforsimplifiedadoptionofEuropeanlaws(alllawscarryingthesocalledE-mark),transferofthecompetenciesmissinginthestatelevel institutionsandcoherenceintheimplementationofthereforms(“singlevoice”)--securetheinstitutionalcapacitiesforachievingcompatibilitywiththeEuropeanstandards.


Ontheoperationallevel,inthephasepriortosubmissionoftheapplicationforEUmembership,theworkingconsensuswouldresultindevelopmentofanEUIntegrationProgrammeofBiHwithexplic-itlydefinedactivities inthe integrationprocessandwithmeasuresnecessaryfortheirimplementation.Aimingtoefficientlymonitortheimplementationofobligationsand the simplifiedadoptionof theguidelines, itwouldbenecessarytoestablishaclosercooperationbetweenthestateadministrationinstitutionsandtheEUinstitutions,particularlywiththeEuropeanCommission.AgoodexamplewouldbetheestablishmentofajointexpertworkinggroupwhichwouldremainoperationaluntiltheopeningofnegotiationsforBiHEUmembership.

At the same time, theEuropeanUnionwouldhave to remainconsistentinitspro-activeapproachbyapplyingthistransformedcon-ditionalityprinciple,withthefocusonsubstantialreformsthatwillenablethedevelopmentoffunctionalstatestructures.ThiskindofaninvolvementoftheEuropeanUnionandtheinternationalcommunityinBiHisderivedfromthepowerssetbytheDaytonPeaceAgreement.

TheseassumptionswouldcreatearealisticfoundationforBiHtomeettheobligationsoftheStabilizationandAssociationAgreementandtoacquirethestatusofcandidateforEUmembershipbytheendofthemandateperiod2014-2018.

Thekeyinstrumentofthistransformedinstrumentariumofcon-ditionalitynowliesinourhands.Itislargelyuptous;ourconscious-ness,individualandcollective,todecidewhetherwewilltrytolearnto followthe rhythmof theOde to Joyorcontinue tocarry theethno-nationaltunesofthepast.


Tab

le 1

: Dec

isio

ns

imp

ose

d b

y th

e h

igh

Rep

rese

nta

tive

fo

r B

ih f

rom

199

7 u

nti

l th

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f 20

14.

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ision

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rtai

ning

to th

e ab

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ans

set w

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rior D

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of th

e H

igh

Repr

esen

tativ

e in

BIH

.

year

dec

isio

ns o

n su

s-pensionsandrelief

ofduty,aswellas

decisionsonabol-

ishingbanssetby

earli

er d

ecis

ions

oftheHighRepre-

sent

ativ

e

dec

isio

ns

pert

aini

ng

to ju

stic

e reform

dec

isio

ns

rega

rdin

g

prop

erty

la

w, r

etur

n

ofrefugees

an

d di

spla

ced

pe

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s an

d re

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iliat

ion

dec

isio

ns

pert

aini

ng

to s

tate

symbols,

issu

es a

t

stat

e le

vel

and

cons

titu-

tiona

l iss

ues

dec

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ns

pert

aini

ng

to in

divi

du-

alscharged

withwar

crim

es in

former

yugo

slav

ia

dec

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ns

inthe

areaof

ec

onom

y

dec

isio

ns

pert

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ng

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n,

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osta

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erze

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c

anto

n

dec

i-si

ons

on

m

edia

reform

tota

l

1997

00

01

00

00

1

1998

60

36

08

42

29

1999

323

387

02

53

90

2000

284

127

029

15

86

2001

147

203

05

23

54

2002

2144

1028

015

305

153

2003

731

1114

1811

40

96

2004

630

012

856

190

158

2005

3430

418

13

10

91

2006

2216

61

010

20

57

2007

311

115

13

30

37

2008

11

30

43

00

12

2009

95

19

20

50

31

2010

6*0

01

20

10

10

2011

1*0

12

42

00

10

2012

3*0

00

10

00

4

2013

1*0

00

00

00

1

2014

28*

00

01

00

028*

Tota

l22

218

212

011

411

997

7718

94

8

Source:OfficeoftheHighRepresentativeforBiH,OHR

223

The imaginary worLd of comPeTencies

adnan ćerimagić

224

Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords: Coordination conundrum

How did the coordination mechanism become an issue of political prejudice? It is as if all the political players in Bosnia and Herzegovina forgot that this is actu-ally an issue of the ability of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its entities and cantons to harmonize themselves with the legal heritage of the EU (Acquis Communautaire) which is impossible to achieve without coordination of different levels of go-vernment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is why all the levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be harmonized with the EU legislation uniformly and in the same time period. That is what coordination is, and it is not the betrayal of vital ethnic interests or outvoting… It is about taking common action in the interest of everyone. Perhaps it is exactly because coordination is seen as a po-litical and ethnic “power game” that different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina currently have not adopted a common document of the National Program for Integration into the EU (which all countries included in the EU enlar-gement process have). The said document sets forth “the plan for meeting the criteria for membership and the plan for harmonization of local legislation with EU legislation.” The author notes that everyone is suffering equally because of the obvious politicization of the coordination mechanism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only country in the region which, as a consequence, is allocated the least Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance fun-ds across sectors. The author does not see any obstacles in the Dayton-drafted constitution but rather in the lack of political will and willingness for cooperation. When there is willingness for cooperation then there are visible results, such as a harmonization of transport policy, and reaching a compromise for export of milk and potato to the EU market. Adnan Ćerimagić, an expert on the EU and analyst at the European Stability Initiative and the Foreign Policy Initiative BiH, proposes some important principles for overcoming the coordination crisis.

225The imaginary world of competencies

great expectations and wrong assumptions

In October 2011, the European Commission emphasized in itsProgressReportforBosniaandHerzegovinathe“strengtheningofcoordinationmechanisms”asa“matterofurgency”forprogressof

Bosnia and Herzegovina.1ThisstatementreflectstheConclusionsoftheCounciloftheEuropeanUnionofDecember2010,whentheEUmemberstates indicatedthat inordertoapplyforEUmembershipBosniaandHerzegovinawillneed“tobeinapositionabletoadopt,implementandenforcethelawsandrulesoftheEU”.2AdoptionofanefficientcoordinationmechanismasaconditionforsubmittingacredibleapplicationforEUmembershipwasconfirmedinJune2012.ItwasonthatdateinBrusselsthatBosnian-Herzegovinianpoliticallea-dersacceptedtheRoadMapforBosnia-Herzegovina’sEUmembershipapplication,makingacommitmentthatBosniaandHerzegovinawilldefineanefficientcoordinationmechanismbyOctober31,2012.3

Althoughanefficientcoordinationmechanismhasneverbeenadopted,alothaschangedsinceJune2012:theEUhasgivenup

1 European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report”,October12,2011

2 Council of the EU, “Council conclusions on enlargement/stabilization andassociationprocess”,December14,2010

3 EuropeanCommission,“JointConclusions fromtheHighLevelDialogueontheAccession Processwith Bosnia andHerzegovina and the RoadMap forBiH’sEUmembershipapplication”,June27,2012.

226 Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 years after the Dayton Peace Accords | Adnan Ćerimagić

ondirectparticipation infindingasolutionfor implementationoftheSejdić/Finciruling(February2014)andadoptedanewapproachtoBosniaandHerzegovina (December2014.)Thesaidapproachputsthemainpriorityonsocioeconomicreforms,butthematterofadoptinganefficientcoordinationmechanismhasbeenretainedasoneofthemostimportantpriorities.

Attheheightofthepublicdebateabouttheefficientcoordina-tionmechanisminApril2015,RepublikaSrpskaPresidentMiloradDodikpointedoutthismatteras“oneofthemost importantpo-liticalandlegalissuesforBosniaandHerzegovinaaftertheDaytonPeaceAgreement.”4At thesametimehewarnedthat“thestoryaboutthecoordinationmechanism...leadstowardscentralizationofdecision-makingonthelevelofBosniaandHerzegovinaandtransferof theoriginalcompetenciesofSrpskatothe levelofBosniaandHerzegovina.”5Amonthearlier,KurtBassuener,an independentanalystwiththeDemocratizationPolicyCouncil(DPC)warnedaboutthecompletelyoppositeobjectiveoftheinitiativeforadoptionofacoordinationmechanism.AccordingtoBassuener,thecoordinationmechanism“willturntheEUintegrationprocessintoalevertoes-sentiallyconfederalizethestate”6byallowingthecantons,entitiesandtheBrckoDistricttoblockanydecisionrelatedtoEUintegration.

4 Nezavisnenovine,“Dodik:Coordinationmechanismamongmost importantpoliticalissues”,April8,2015.

5 Nezavisnenovine, „Dodik: Ivanić uvodi novupraksu,mimoUstavaBiH“, 6.april 2015.

6 DPC,“MakingtheMarketonConstitutionalReforminBiHintheWakeoftheEUInitiative”,March20,2015.


AlthoughBosniaandHerzegovinaisnotthefirstcountryinwhichaneedarose foradoptingacoordinationmechanism, thesearchforanagreementhasbeengoingontoolonganditaboundswithwrong assumptions.7

Takingintoconsiderationtheimportanceofadoptionofthecoor-dinationmechanismfortheEU,aswellasthepublicdebatethereof,itseemsimportanttoanswerwhyitisso,andhowtoovercomethis,thecurrentsituation.

7 M. Lazarević, S. Marić and A. Orza, “Policy Making and EU AccessionNegotiations:GettingResultsforSerbia,”GIZ,2013.


Structural cacophony – what is important for the Eu?

During her visit to Sarajevo in February 2015, the HighRepresentative of the EU for Foreign Policy Affairs andSecurityPolicy,FedericaMogherini remindedtheBosnian-

Herzegovinianmembersofparliament thatoneof the twomostimportantprioritiesofBosniaandHerzegovinaon its roadtotheEUisestablishmentofawell-functioningcoordinationmechanism.8 Shepointedoutthat“itisnecessaryforanysuccessfulinteractionwiththeEUwhenpreparingforfutureEUmembershipandforthereceiptofEUfunding.”9

TherearethreefundamentalreasonswhytheEUhasbeeninsist-ingsince2010onestablishmentofanefficientcoordinationmecha-nism.ThefirstistheinabilityofBosniaandHerzegovinatoholdtalkswiththeEU institutionswithone (harmonized)voice.ThesecondistheinabilityofBosniaandHerzegovinatotakefulladvantageoffundingfromtheEUIPAfunds.ThethirdreasonistheinabilityofBosniaandHerzegovinatouniformlyandwithina jointdeadlineharmonize its legislationwiththeEUlegislation.ThecoordinationmechanismisimportantforBosniaandHerzegovinaaswell,whose

8 EU Delegation to BiH, “Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the BiHParliamentaryAssemblyfollowingtheadoptionofjointstatementonreformcommitmentintheEUaccessionprocess”,February23,2015

9 Ibid.


interestshouldbetotakefulladvantageoftheEUIPAfundsandtotakeupapositiontowardstheEUasacredible,harmonizedandorganizedpartner.Duetolackofcoordination,theonlyproductsofanimaloriginwhichBosniaandHerzegovinacancurrentlyexporttotheEUarehoney,fishandrawhide,plus,asofrecently,thelisthasbeenexpandedtomilkandpotato.

TheInterimAgreementonTradebetweenBosniaandHerzegovi-naandtheEUhadbeeninforcesincethesigningoftheStabilizationandAccessionAgreementbetweenBiHandtheEUinJune2008un-tiltheSAAenteredintoforceinJune2015.BosniaandHerzegovina(simplyspeaking)acceptedbysigningtheInterimAgreementthatitwouldharmonizeitslegislationandpracticeswithonesmallerpartoftheEUlegislation,standardsandpractices.Thesaidagreementprovides for regularmeetingsbetweentherepresentativesof theeu and Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to agree on, as well as to supervise,implementationthereof.

InJune2013theEuropeanCommissionwasforcedtopostponeonesuchmeeting“due to the inabilityof theBiHauthorities toreachacommonpositiononthetopicstobediscussed.”10Thesamemeetingwascancelledagain inNovember2013.11 In June2014,aEuropeanCommission seniorofficialexplained the reasons for

10 EUDelegationtoBiH,“Statementonthe5thInterimSub-committeeMeetingonInnovation,InformationSociety,SocialPolicyandPublicHealth”,May31,2013.

11 EU Delegation to BiH, “Interim Sub-committee Meeting on Innovation,InformationSociety,SocialPolicyandPublicHealth”,November26,2013.


cancellingseveralsuchmeetings:“DuetoproblemswithintheCoun-cilofMinistersofBosniaandHerzegovinainarrivingatapositionanddecidingonadelegation,fivesubcommitteescouldnottakeplace.”12FromSeptember2009toSeptember2014,42meetingsshouldhavetakenplace.Atleastfourwerecancelled.AndeachofthemwascancelledbecausedifferentlevelsofauthoritiesinBosniaandHerzegovinafailedtoreachacommonpositionand/ortodecideonthecompositionofthedelegation.

Table 1: Number of meetings under Interim agreement on Trade

(September 2008-September 2014)13

yeaR heLD caNceLLeD

2009 6 0

2010 8 0

2011 7 0

2012 7 0

2013 6 1

2014 4 3

Total 38 4

12 EUDelegationtoBiH,“InterviewwithChristianDanielsson,DirectorGeneralforEnlargementattheEuropeanCommission,fordailyDnevniAvaz”,June13,2014.

13 European Commission, Progress reports for Bosnia and Herzegovina from2009to2014.


InSeptember2013,theEuropeanCommissioncancelledfinan-cialsupportfortwoprojectsintheamountof€ 5million.ThesaidfundingwasallocatedassupporttoBosniaandHerzegovinainitsattempttoreachEUstandardsinthefieldofagriculture.14Thefund-ingwascancelledduetothefailureoftheauthoritiesinBosniaandHerzegovinatoagreeonthestructures tochannelEUagricultureandruraldevelopmentassistance.SincethentheEUhascancelledatleastfivemoreprojectsworth€ 9million.15TheEuropeanCom-missionpublished in2013 the2012AnnualReporton FinancialAssistanceforEnlargement.16Accordingtothereport, the imple-mentationofassistance inBosniaandHerzegovinabecamemoredifficultin2012asRepublikaSrpskatookasystematicapproachtousingprogrammingandimplementationofEUfinancialassistanceasaforuminwhichto“defend”theperceivedconstitutionalrightsofRepublikaSrpska.17

Duetofailureofthetwoentities,theBrckoDistrictandinstitu-tionsinBosniaandHerzegovinatoreachanagreementaboutharmo-nizedandcommon(state-levelnational)strategies,ofallcountrieswhicharepartoftheEUenlargementpolicy,BosniaandHerzegovina

14 EuropeanCommission,BosniaandHerzegovina2013ProgressReport,October16,2013.

15 EUDelegationtoBiH,“IPAMonitoringCommitteemetinSarajevo–agriculturalprojectscanceled”,September10,2013.

16 European Commission, “2012 Annual Report on Financial Assistance forEnlargement”,2013.

17 Ibid.


isthecountrywiththeleastnumberofsectorsforwhichitcanuseIPAfundsintheperiodfrom2014to2017.Accordingly,BosniaandHerzegovinacanuseEUIPAfundsinthesectorsofdemocracy,ruleoflaw,innovation,freemarket,education,socialpolicyandemploy-ment policy.18Othercountries,forexample,canuseIPAfundsforthesectorsofenergy,transport,environmentprotection,agricultureand rural development.

Table 2: Number of sectors for which countries can use eU IPa funds

(2014-2020)19

coUNTRy NUMBeR of secToRs

Serbia 9

turkey 9

Montenegro 8

fyr Macedonia 8

Albania 8

Kosovo 7

Bosnia and herzegovina 4

In the 2010 Progress Report for Bosnia andHerzegovina, theEuropean commissionpointedout theproblemofharmonizationof the Bosnian-Herzegovinian legislationwith the EU legislation.

18 EuropeanCommission,“IndicativeStrategyPaperforBosniaandHerzegovina(2014-2017)”,December15,2014.

19 Ibid.


HarmonizationpredominantlytakesplacewithoutanycoordinationbetweendifferentlevelsofauthoritiesinBosniaandHerzegovina.20 AndalllevelsofgovernmentinBosniaandHerzegovinashouldharmo-nizetheirlegislationwiththeEUlegislationuniformlyandinthesametimeperiod.OneofthereasonsforsuchasituationisthatthedifferentlevelsofgovernmentinBosniaandHerzegovinacurrentlyhavenotadoptedacommondocumentoftheNationalProgramofIntegrationintotheEU(whichallcountriesincludedintheEUenlargementprocesshave).Thesaiddocumentsetsforththe“planformeetingthecriteriaformembershipandplanforharmonizationofthe local legislationwiththeEUlegislation.”21ThedirectoroftheDirectionforEuropeanIntegrationofBosniaandHerzegovina(DEI)explainedevenin2012thatsuchadocument inBosniaandHerzegovinawouldunify“alltheplanningdocumentsintheprocessofBosniaandHerzegovina’sintegrationintotheEU,itwouldprovideanswerstoquestionsofwho,whenandwhattodo,anditwouldestablishbettersupervisionandcoordinationofthenecessaryreforms.”22AdoptionofthisdocumentisarequirementforBosniaandHerzegovinaprovidedforbytheSAA.Anefficientcoordinationmechanismshouldhelptoreachagreementonthisdocumentandenableeasierimplementationthereof.

20 European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 progress report”,November9,2010.

21 BiH Directorate for European Integration, “National Integration Program”,June24,2010.

22 BNTV,“Davidi:ProgramofintegrationofBosnia-Herzegovina’sobligationontheroadtotheEU“,April27,2012.


more than a sum of entities and ethnicities

The political narrative about the post-Dayton Bosnia andHerzegovinahasdeveloped fromtheashesofwar. Itsde-velopmenthasbeenmarkedby a strong influenceof the

internationalcommunity,ahigh levelofdistrustamong localpo-liticalplayersandaconflictingvisionof thefutureofBosniaandHerzegovina.Thishasleftlittleroomfordevelopmentofthenarra-tiveaboutcommoninterest.Eventhoughithasalsodevelopedfromtheashesofwar,thepoliticalnarrativeabouttheEUisinterwovenwithcommoninterestandsharedvalues.

ThedifferencebetweenthepoliticalnarrativeaboutBosniaandHerzegovinaandtheoneabouttheEUisbestreflectedinthefun-damentallegaldocumentsofBosniaandHerzegovinaandtheEU.IntheDayton-draftedConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinadivisionofcompetencieshasbeendoneveryclearlyandexplicitly.Thecom-petenciesofthestate-levelinstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovinahavebeen stated in the formof a list: ten issues in total.23 TheConstitutionstipulatesthatall“governmentfunctionsandcompe-

23 ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina:foreignpolicy,foreigntrade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, financing of institutions andinternationalcommitmentsofBosniaandHerzegovina,policyforregulatingtheissuesof immigration,refugeesandasylum,implementationofinternationalandinter-entitiescriminaljusticeregulations,includingtherelationswiththeInterpol,establishmentandfunctioningofcommonandinternationalmeansofcommunication,regulationofinter-entitytransport,airtrafficcontrol.


tencieswhicharenotexclusivelyentrustedbythisConstitutiontothestate-level institutionsofBosniaandHerzegovinashallbelongtotheEntities.”24

ThedivisionofcompetenciesbetweentheEUanditsmemberstates is farmorecomplex.Theyareclassified into four typesofcompetencies.Exclusivecompetenciesof theEUare thosewherememberstatescannotmakebindingdecisions (e.g.customsandtradepolicies).Thenwehavepolicies forwhich theEUdoesnothaveexclusivecompetence,buttheEUinstitutionscanmakedeci-sionsaboutthem(e.g.agricultureandthefishingindustry).SharedcompetenciesarewheretheEUandmemberstatescanmakeandimplementdecisions together (e.g.science, research, foreignandsecuritiespolicies).Andfinally therearesupportingcompetencieswheretheEUcanonlyintervenetosupportactionofthememberstates(e.g.healthcare,cultureandtourism).

Thepossibilityof“coordination”betweenstate-levelandentity-levelinstitutionsismentionedonlyonceintheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina,whereitstipulatesthat:“ThePresidencycanmakedecisionstostimulateinter-entitycoordinationinmatterswhichdonotfallunderthecompetenceofBosniaandHerzegovina”25,butonlyifneitheroftheentitiesopposessuchaction.

24 ArticleIIIparagraph4oftheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina.

25 ArticleIIIparagraph4oftheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina.


Whereastheword“coordination”ismentionedonlythreetimesintheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina, inthetwofunda-mentalEUtreatiesthesamewordismentionedthirteentimes.26 it is alsointerestingthattheword“cooperation”ismentionedonlytwotimesintheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovina,bothtimesinrelationtoprotectionofhumanrights.InthefundamentalEUtrea-tiesthatwordismentioned78times.

RepresentativesoftheEUinstitutionsandpoliticiansintheEUmemberstatesmostfrequentlytalkaboutcoordinationofpoliciesandmutualcooperationwith theaimofaccomplishingcommonintereststhoughmaximizationofindividualbenefits.SpeakingabouttheneedforcommonEUmeasures in thefieldofdigitizationofEurope’s economy, German Chancellor AngelaMerkel said that“memberstatescannottakecareofthetransitionontheirown,”andthatwithcoordinatedsteps“farmorejobsarebeingcreated.”27 PoliticiansinBosniaandHerzegovinahavetalkedaboutcoordina-tionofpoliciesandmutualcooperationintwodifferentwaysfrom1995untiltoday:atfirsttheytalkedaboutitassomethingwelcomeanduseful,andthenmoreandmoreasaboutsomethingwhichisunwelcome and damaging.

26 EuropeanUnion,“ConsolidatedversionsoftheTreatyontheEUandtheTreatyonFunctioningoftheEU”,2012.

27 EurActiv,“Merkel ralliesEUmemberstatestodrive ‘Europe’s Industry4.0’”,December5,2014.


Conflict of the Dayton and European narratives

AtthetimewhentheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinawasbeingdraftedin1995,theprospectoffullmembershipintheEUdidnotevenexist.Astheprospectoffullmem-

bershipforBosniaandHerzegovinawasbecomingmorerealistic,legislativeand institutional frameworksandpracticeswerebeingdevelopedinordertoachievethatprospect.SinceJune2000,whentheMinistryofEuropean Integrationwassetup,until today,wecantalkabouttwoperiods.28Thefirstperiodlastedfrom2000tilltheendof2010.ThisperiodwasmarkedbyBosnian-Herzegovinianpoliticianswho,inordertoaccomplishrealizationoftheEUmem-bershipprospect,weredevelopinganarrativeaboutthenecessityofcoordinationandmutualcooperation,andwhowerereadytotakeconcretesteps.Thiswaspartlyduetoastrongerinfluenceoftheinternationalcommunity,butpartlyalsoduetopublicpressurein Bosnia and personal expectations.

From2002to2007,theChairmanoftheCouncilofMinistersofBosniaandHerzegovinawasAdnanTerzić,with thepersonalambitionandinternationalsupporttoworkonintegrationintotheEU.ExplainingwhythiswashispriorityTerzićsaidthat“all parties

28 CouncilofMinistersofBosniaandHerzegovina,“MembersoftheCouncilofMinistersofBiH”,2010.


campaigned on integration into the EU, so I said, ‘Ok, let’s offer our citizens that we should go energetically towards Europe.’”29

During2003 theMinistryofEuropean Integrationwas trans-formedintotheDirectorateforEuropeanIntegration,apermanentbodyoftheCouncilofMinistersofBosniaandHerzegovina.30 up un-tiltodaythisbodyhasbeenchargedwithprovidingtechnicalsupporttotheinstitutionsofBosniaandHerzegovina.31AndthedecisionoftheCouncilofMinistersofBosniaandHerzegovinaaboutthewaytoachievecoordinationintheprocessofEUaccessionfromDecember2003assignedtotheDEIacentralroleincoordinationofactivitiesrelatedtoEuropeanintegrationofBosniaandHerzegovina.32

AccordingtotheassessmentoftheEUinstitutions, inthefirstsevenyearstheDEIcarriedoutcoordinationoftheaforementionedactivitiessuccessfully,whetherthiswasabouttheprocessoftheSAAnegotiationsorimplementationoftheInterimAgreementonTrade.

TheprocessofnegotiationaboutthesigningoftheSAAandtheInterimAgreementonTrade,whichtookplacefromNovember2005toDecember2006,wasassessedbytheEUas“competent”,“very

29 EuropeanStabilityInitiative,“AdnanTerzić–aunifyinggoalforBosnia”.

30 CouncilofMinistersofBosniaandHerzegovina ,“Directorate forEuropeanIntegration”.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.


good”and“professional”,theBosniansidewas“coordinated”and“prepared”.33

InOctober2008,theEuropeanCommissioncommendedBosniaandHerzegovinaforexcellentlyconductedpreparationsforimple-mentationof the InterimAgreementon Trade. TheCommissionpointedoutthatBosniaandHerzegovinahadpreparedanActionPlanandsetupbodiesprovidedforbytheInterimAgreementonTrade,andthat ithadstartedwith implementationofthepartoftheagreementrelatedtothecustomsprovisions.34TheEuropeanCommissioncommendedBosniaandHerzegovinain2009,sayingthat“theimplementationoftheInterimAgreement(IA)hasbeensatisfactoryoverallinitsfirstyearsincecomingintoforce.”35

IntheperiodfromJanuary2008toDecember2010,BosniaandHerzegovinasuccessfullycoordinatedtheactivitiesrelatedtomeetingtherequirementsforplacingBosniaandHerzegovinaontheSchen-genAreawhitelist,sothatcitizensofBosniaandHerzegovinacouldtravelvisa-freetotheSchengenArea.36Thatperiodwasmarkedbyhugepublicpressureforthisprocesstobecompletedsuccessfully.

33 SEETV,“Interview-OlliRehn”,November6,2006.

34 European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 progress report”,November5,2008.

35 European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 progress report”,October15,2009.

36 BiHServiceforForeigners’Affairs,“Visa-freetravelforcitizensofBosniaandHerzegovina”,2010.


Fromthebeginningof2011untiltoday,BosniaandHerzegovinahasbeeninasecondperiod,whichismarkedbyanarrativeofre-ducedpoliticalwillformutualcooperationandcoordinationofpoli-ciesandactivities.SincethentheEuropeanCommissionreportshavebecomemoreandmorenegative. In theBosniaandHerzegovina2011ProgressReportitisstatedthat“asharedvisionbythepoliticalrepresentativesontheoveralldirectionandfutureofthecountryanditsinstitutionalsetupislacking”forEUintegration.37

SincethenRepublikaSrpskahascrystalizedthepoliticalnarrativeabout theundesirabilityofcoordinationandmutualcooperationnecessaryfortheEUintegrationprocess.InFebruary2015,Repub-likaSrpskaPresidentMiloradDodikmadeastatementthat“noco-ordinationeitherofthedecisiveroleoftheCouncilofMinistersofBosniaandHerzegovinaoroftheDEIcanexist”intheEUintegrationprocess.38InthesameperiodRepublikaSrpskaPrimeMinisterŽeljkaCvijanovićsaid“ifwetalkaboutagricultureatthelevelofBosniaandHerzegovina,ifwetalkaboutecology,orenvironmentprotection,thenIcansaythatthoseareexclusivecompetenciesofRepublikaSrpskaandcooperationisnotpossibleinthatrespect.”39

37 European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 progress report”,October12,2011.

38 Vijesti.ba,“Dodik:Coordinationmechanismiscrucial”,February23,2015.

39 Nezavisnenovine,“Cvijanović:SupporttoEuropeanintegrationofBiH,butnottotransferofcompetencies”,February13,2015.


Thereareseveralreasonsforsuchadevelopmentofthesituation.FromtheaspectofEUintegrationwecantalkabouttherelationshipbetweenwhattheEUofferedtoandwhatitrequiredfrompoliti-ciansinBosniaandHerzegovinainthatperiod.Inordertosubmita credibleapplication forEUmembership, theEUdemandedanagreementonimplementationoftherulingoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinthecaseofSejdićandFinci.Thecredibleapplica-tionforEUmembership,fromtheaspectofalonganddemandingroadtowardsfullmembershipintheEU,doesnotamounttomuch,andtheprocessofreachinganagreementabouttheSjedićandFincirulingdevelopedintoadiscussionaboutethno-territorialandpoliti-calrelationsinthepost-DaytonBosniaandHerzegovina,requiringamendmentstotheConstitutionandtheelectionlaw.Thediscus-sionabouttheamendmentstotheConstitutionandtheelectionlawopeneduproomforpoliticianstoscorepoliticalpointswithvotersbyadoptionofirreconcilablepositions.


Who will have the final say?

AccordingtoinformationprovidedbytheDEI,thisgovernmentbodyhasmanagedtocoordinate90 to95percentofallmattersrelatedtotheEUintegrationprocess.40Anefficient

coordinationmechanismshould,therefore,helpsolvetheremainingissues:lackofonesingle,unifiedpositiontowardstheEU,lackofcommon/harmonizedsectorstrategiesforusingEUfundsandlackofanationalintegrationprogram.SomerepresentativesoftheDEIbelievethatanefficientcoordinationmechanismshouldincludeasolutionforsituationswhenitisimpossibletoreachacompromise,acoordinating“bodythatwillhavethefinalsay.”41

IfthewishtoachievetheprospectiveofBosniaandHerzegov-ina’sfullmembershipintheEUisreal,thenacoordinatingbodyisdefinitelynecessarytogatherrepresentativesofdifferent levelsofgovernmentand institutionscompetent forareascoveredby theEUlegislation.OnlyBosniaandHerzegovinaasacountry/statecanbecomeaEUmember,anditiscomposedoftwoentities,plustheBrckoDistrictandcantonswiththeircompetencies.WhenBosniaandHerzegovinawillbecomeamemberoftheEUdependsonwhenandhoweachofitssegmentsmeetstheconditionsforEUmembership.

40 Federalnatelevizija,“Pošteno“,April27,2015.

41 Federalnatelevizija,“Pošteno“,April27,2015.


The ideaaccording towhich suchacoordinatingbodycouldmakedecisionsbyamajorityvoteorwithoutparticipationofonelevelofgovernment (e.g.,cantons)canbe imaginedonly ifeachlevelofgovernmentagreestosuchanapproachtotheEUintegra-tionprocess.Withoutpreviousconsentgivenbyeveryone, takingintoconsiderationtheConstitutionofBosniaandHerzegovinaanditsentities(andcantons),suchmajorityvotedecisionsofthecoor-dinationbodycouldberightfullychallenged.Having inmindthestatementsmadebyrepresentativesofRepublikaSrpskaandsomecantons,itisnotrealisticthatconsentforsuchacoordinationbodywillbegivencurrently.Forthesimplereasonthatanycoordinationbodythatcomprisesrepresentativesofalllevelsofgovernmentandinstitutions,inaccordancewiththeconstitutionsinBosniaandHer-zegovina,hastomakeitsdecisionsbyconsensus.

InthecurrentbalanceofpoliticalpowersinBosniaandHerze-govina,ifEUmembershipisapoliticalpriorityforeveryoneinBosniaandHerzegovina,itappearstobetoocostlytobewastingenergyinanattempttocreateconditionsforgettingtheconsentofeveryoneinvolvedforthecoordinationbodytobeabletomakedecisionsbyamajorityvote,ortohavesomelevelsexcludedfromthedecisionmaking.Itseemstobemoreimportanttousethatenergytodevelopanarrativeabout thebenefits thatBosniaandHerzegovina (stateinstitutions,entities,theBrckoDistrict,andcantons)willreceivefromtheEUintegrationprocess.AnexcellentpracticalexampleismeetingtheconditionsfortheexportingofmilkandpotatoestotheEUfromBosniaandHerzegovinainJune2015.Inordertofulfilltherequire-mentsforexportingmilkandpotatoes,thefollowingthingswere


necessary,namely(1)synergyofinterestofalldairiesinBosniaandHerzegovinaand(2)thewillofpoliticiansandinstitutionstocoordi-natedifferentlevelsofgovernmentinBosniaandHerzegovina,and(3)thesendingofaclearmessagetothepublicaboutthecommonbenefitsofsuchaction.

Theagreementonmeetingtheconditionsforexportingmilkandpotato,andtheagreementabouttheFrameworkTransportPolicyofBosniaandHerzegovinafortheperioduntil2030,areproofthattheconstitutionalstructureofBosniaandHerzegovinatailored inDaytonisnotinitselfanobstacleonBosniaandHerzegovina’sroadtotheEU.TheobstaclesaretheaforementionedDaytonnarrativeandlackofunderstandingofthefullbenefitsandadvantagesofferedbyEUintegration.

Theapproachofincludingthestakeholdersandthepublicsoastomotivatepolitics,policiesandinstitutionsshouldbeusedinthefu-tureinordertoreachacommonpositiononsectorstrategies,whichwouldenableBosniatousetheEUIPAfundsformoresectorsasof2018,aswellastheadoptionofaNationalIntegrationProgram,inordertomakemoresignificantstepsontheroadtotheEU.

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shorT BiograPhies of The auThors listed in the order of publication of the essays

Srećko latal wasborn inSarajevo,wherehecompletedhisformaleducation.AsAssociatedPresscorrespondentandeditor,hecoveredBosniaandHerzegovinaandtheBalkansduringandafterthe1992-1995war,butalsoreportedfromotherwarhotspotssuchasAfghanistanandPakistan.Between2000and2008heworkedin thecapacityofcommunicationexpertandpoliticaladvisor fortheEuropeanUnionMonitoringCommissionandtheWorldBank,andbetween2009and2014heworkedastheBalkansanalystforoneoftheleadingglobalanalystorganisations-InternationalCrisisGroup, ICG.After ICGceased itspresence in theBalkans,SrećkoLatalestablishedanewthink-tankand, inparallel,workedasaneditoroftheBalkanInvestigativeReportingNetwork,BIRN,inBiH.Inaddition,overthecourseofthelast15–20years,hepublishedmanyarticles inOxfordAnalytics,Economist IntelligenceUnit,TransitionOnlineandmanyotherregionalandinternationalmediaandanalystorganisations.

Nerzuk Ćurak isatenuredprofessorattheFacultyofPoliticalSciencesoftheUniversityofSarajevo,acommittedpublicintellectual,civilsocietyactivist,essayist,andsciencepublicist.Hehasauthored

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fivepublishedbooks(andco-authoredone)intheoreticalandappli-edpoliticalscience,geopoliticsandpoliticalphilosophy,sociology,andpeacestudies.Hislatesttheoreticalresearchprojectsandpracti-calengagementinthecivilsocietysectorfocusoncriticismofethnicviolence,buildingofpeace,trustandreconciliationinpost-conflictcommunities.

Đorđe Vuković isprofessorattheSchoolofPoliticalScienceinBanjaLuka,whereheteachescoursesinpoliticaltheorysubjects.ProfessorVukovićisamemberoftheDepartmentofPoliticalSciencesof theAcademyofSciencesandArtsofBosniaandHerzegovina,theAssociationofWritersofRepublikaSrpskaand“Prosvjeta”.HereceivedhisBAandMAdegreesattheFacultyofPhilosophy,andobtainedhisdoctoratefromtheFacultyofPoliticalSciencesoftheUniversityofBelgrade.Hisopusincludesninesolo-authoredbooksandapproximately thirty sciencepapersonpolitical culture,eth-no-psychologicalcharacteristicsandculturalpatterns,politicalandnationalidentity,publicopinion,media,etc.

goran marković wasborninBijeljina.HegraduatedfromtheSchoolofLaw,UniversityofBelgradein2001,wherehealsorecei-vedhisMAdegreein2005andobtainedhisPhDdegreein2009.He isassistantprofessorat theSchoolofLaw,UniversityofEastSarajevo,whereheteachesconstitutionallaw.Since2011,hehasalsoservedinthecapacityofResearchandDevelopmentAssistant-Deanat this institutionofhigher education.He is amemberoftheBoardofDirectorsof theEuropeanPublic LawOrganization(EPLO), headquartered in Athens, and Institutional Institute for

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Self-management.ProfessorMarkovićisamemberoftheEditorialBoardoftheYearbookoftheSchoolofLaw inEastSarajevoandtheJournalofContemporaryCentralandEasternEurope,headqu-arteredinLondon.Hepublishedtwomonographsandco-authoredoneconstitutionallawtextbook.Heisaco-editorofNoviPlamen,aregionaljournalofpolitics,culture,andsociety,publishedinZagreb.

Svetlana Cenić, isadirectoratBusinessPlus(regionalbusinessassociation).Ms.CenićgraduatedfromtheSchoolofEconomicsandBusinessinSarajevoandpursuedherpost-graduatestudiesabroadininter-sectoralpartnership,sustainabledevelopment,anddiplomacy,whereshealsoreceivedherMBA.Sheworkedintheforeigntradeandmanufacturingsectorsandwasinvolvedininvestmentprojects.Shewasalsoinvolvedinmanyresearchprojectsandanalysescon-ductedforvarious institutions, theNGOsectorand industry.Ms.Cenićwasalso involved in thecivil servicesector in thecapacityofadvisor–externalassociateofthePresidentofRepublikaSrpska(2000-2005)andastheMinisterofFinanceofRSin2005.

marko radovanović isadiplomatattheMinistryofForeignAffairsofBosniaandHerzegovina.HeobtainedhisMAininterna-tional relations fromQueenMaryUniversityof Londonandgra-duated ineconomicsat theUniversityofEconomics,Prague.Hisworkisfocusedoninternationaleconomyandpoliticaleconomyofdevelopment.

Žarko Papić is a senior advisor for social policy and IBHIDirector(InitiativeforBetterandHumaneInclusion) inBosniaand

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Herzegovina.Heisaconnoisseurofsocialandlabourpoliciesandalso has amastery of policy pertaining to development of poorcommunitiesandsocialinclusion.Mr.PapićservedforfouryearsasMinisterofEducation,ScienceandTechnologicalDevelopmentoftheRepublicofSerbia.Inaddition,hewasthegeneralmanagerofYugoslavia’sFederalPlanning Instituteandministerof theFederalGovernmentforthreeyears.HewaslaterappointedanambassadorandHeadofthePermanentDelegationofYugoslaviatoOECD.

Jasmin mujanović holdsaPhD inPolitical Sciences fromYorkUniversity inToronto.Hisworkdealswith the roleofsocialmovementsindemocratisationofpost-authoritarianregimes,withaparticularfocusonthepost-warBiH.

Hoda Dedić is engaged in a diplomatic capacity, as an advisor at theMinistryofForeignAffairsofBosniaandHerzegovina.Ms.Dedićpursuedhergraduateandpost-graduatestudiesattheFacultyofPoliticalSciences inSarajevo,wheresheobtainedherMAandPhDdegrees.Shecompletedherfour-monthresearchprogrammeforherdoctoraldissertationattheLawSchooloftheUniversityinVienna.Ms.Dedićhaspublishedseveralscienceandtechnicalpapersandparticipatedinanumberofspecialistseminarsininternationalrelations,diplomacyandtheEuropeanintegrationprocess.

Adnan Ćerimagić currently works as an analyst at theEuropeanStabilityInitiativeinBerlin.HeisamemberoftheAdvisoryBoardof theForeignPolicy Initiative thinktank inSarajevo.AfterhavinggraduatedfromtheLawSchoolof theUniversityofGraz,

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austria in 2010, Mr. Ćerimagić pursued master studies in internati-onalrelationsanddiplomacyoftheEuropeanUnionattheCollegeofEurope inBruges.Followinghismaster’s thesis,hewasan in-ternintheSecretariatoftheCommitteeonForeignAffairsoftheEuropeanParliamentinBrusselsandtheMinistryofForeignAffairsofBosniaandHerzegovina.Mr.ĆerimagićalsoworkedfortheMissionofBosniaandHerzegovinaintheEUinBrussels.Overthelastfiveyears,hehaspublishedseveralpublicationsonEUenlargementpo-licy,ruleoflawandhumanrights.

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Schimmelfenning, F., Engert, S., Knobel, H. (2003):”Costs,CommitmentandCompliance: The ImpactofEUDemocraticConditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, JSMS 2003,Volume41.Number3

legal acts, declarations, reports and other documents:DokumentostrategijivanjskepolitikeBiH,dokumentbr.01-645-30/03od26.marta2003.godine,PredsjedništvoBiH

izvještaj evropske komisije o napretku Bosne i Hercegovine u 2014.godini

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Komisije, COM {COM(2009) 533} fnal, Brisel 14.10.2009., SEC(2009)1338

Mišljenje venecijanske komisije o ustavnoj situaciji u Bosni i HercegoviniiovlaštenjimaVisokogpredstavnika,CDL-AD(2005)004,62.plenarnasjednica,11.-12.mart2005.godine

Program pristupanja crne gore evropskoj uniji 2014-2018, MinistarstvovanjskihposlovaievropskihintegracijaCrneGore

Sporazumostabilizaciji ipridruživanjuizmeđuEvropskihzajednicainjihovihdržavačlanicasajednestrane,iBosneiHercegovinesa druge strane

Strategijaproširenja iglavni izazovi2013.-2014.(COM(2013)700final,Evropskakomisija

ustav Bosne i HercegovineUstavRepublikeHrvatske

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aBBrevaTions

BAM ConvertibleMark(KM)BiH Bosnia and HerzegovinaB-H Bosnian-HerzegovinianDEI DirectorateforEuropeanIntegrationBiHdPa dayton Peace agreementeu european unioneur euroFBiH EntityFederationofBosniaandHerzegovinaFES Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungfiPa foreign investment Promotion agencygdP gross domestic ProductHDZ1990 CroatianDemocraticUnion1990Hdz BiH croatian democratic union BiHHNS CroatNationalAssemblyHv croatian armyHVO CroatianDefenceCouncilILO InternationalLaborOrganisationiMf international Monetary fundIPA InstrumentforPre-AccessionAssistanceIPARD InstrumentforPre-AccessionAssistancein rural developmentNATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisation

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OECD OrganisationforEconomicCooperationand developmentOHR OfficeoftheHighRepresentativePIO PensionandDisabillityFundPtsd Posttraumatic stress disorderRS EntityRepublikaSrpskaSBiH PartyforBosniaandHerzegovinaSDA PartyofDemocraticActionsdP social democratic PartySDS SerbDemocraticPartySFOR StabilizationForceSFRY SocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslaviaSNSD AllianceofIndependentSocialdemocratsun united nationsundP united nations development Programme USA UnitedStatesofAmericavat value-added tax wB world Bankyna yugoslavian People’s army

Documents

The Legacy of Peace: Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years After the Dayton Peace Accords