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MAY 15, 2014, 5:55 P.M.

By Joshua Benton

The leaked New York Timesinnovation report is one of the keydocuments of this media ageIt’s an astonishing look inside the cultural change still needed in the shift to digital — even inone of the world’s greatest newsrooms. Read it.

There are few things that can galvanize the news world’s attention like a change inleadership atop The New York Times. Jill Abramson’s ouster yesterday afternoon probablyreduced American newsroom productivity enough to skew this quarter’s GDP numbers.

We don’t typically write about intra-newsroom politics at Nieman Lab, leaving that toManhattan’s very capable cadre of media reporters. But Abramson’s removal and DeanBaquet’s ascent has apparently inspired someone inside the Times to leak one of the mostremarkable documents I’ve seen in my years running the Lab, to Myles Tanzer at BuzzFeed.It’s the full report of the newsroom innovation team that was given six full months to ask

big questions about the Times’ digital strategy. (A summary version of it was leaked lastweek, but this is the big kahuna.)

And that is something we’re interested in here — one of the world’s leading newsorganizations, giving itself a rigorous self-examination. I’ve spoken with multiple digital-savvy Times staffers in recent days who described the report with words like“transformative” and “incredibly important” and “a big big moment for the future of theTimes.” One admitted crying while reading it because it surfaced so many issues aboutTimes culture that digital types have been struggling to overcome for years.

I confess I didn’t see anything quite so revelatory when I read last week’s leaked version —which read like an indoor-voice summary expected and designed to be leaked to thebroader world. This fuller version is quite different — it’s raw. (Or at least as raw as digitalstrategy documents can get.) You can sense the frayed nerves and the frustration at anewsroom that is, for all its digital successes, still in many ways oriented toward an oldmodel. It’s journalists turning their own reporting skills on themselves.

When last week’s version was sent out to the newsroom, a joint Abramson/Baquet memo

(their last together?) expressed support for its findings. (“The masthead embraces thecommittee’s key recommendations.”) But I have to say, reading that memo and then the fullreport, it still feels like there’s a big gap between leadership and the digital troops. Some ofthat could, understandably, be management’s desire not to air its dirtiest laundry in anewsroom-wide memo. But the tone of the memo is we’re almost there! The tone of thereport is these people don’t realize how far away we are.

Our media reporter friends are still chasing down why Jill Abramson was fired, and I’msure in the coming days and weeks, our knowledge of that will grow clearer. The earliestreporting, at least, doesn’t seem to suggest lack of digital vision as a leading significantfactor. Baquet had made his biggest marks as an excellent reporter, editor, and manager,not as an online innovator. A big leadership change can sometimes lead to a report like thisbeing put on the shelf; let’s hope that doesn’t happen here.

As bad as this report makes parts of the Times’ culture seem, there are two significantreasons for optimism.

First: So much of the digital work of The New York Times is so damned good, despite all theroadblocks detailed here. Take those barriers away and think what they could do.

And second: The leader of this committee is Arthur Gregg Sulzberger, the publisher’s sonand the presumed heir to the throne, either when his father retires in a few years orsometime thereafter. His involvement in this report shows that he understands the issuesfacing the institution. That speaks well for the Times’ future.

I asked our three wonderful Nieman Lab staffers — Justin Ellis, Caroline O’Donovan, andJoseph Lichterman — to read through the report and pick out the most importanthighlights. Those are below.

They will be of interest to Times watchers, of course, but it’s much more important thatthey reach a much broader audience. I doubt there is a newsroom in the world thatwouldn’t benefit from understanding the cultural issues laid out below.

If you have time, read the full report. If not, this’ll do in a pinch.

The value of the homepage is decreasing. “Only a third of our readers ever visit it. Andthose who do visit are spending less time: page views and minutes spent per readerdropped by double-digit percentages last year.” The Times must do a better jobencouraging sharing of content: “But at The Times, discovery, promotion and engagementhave been pushed to the margins, typically left to our business-side colleagues or handed tosmall teams in the newsroom. The business side still has a major role to play, but thenewsroom needs to claim its seat at the table because packaging, promoting and sharing

our journalism requires editorial oversight.” (p. 23-25)

Michael Wertheim, former head of promotion at Upworthy, turned down a business-sidejob leading audience development. “He explained that for anyone in that role to succeed,the newsroom needed to be fully committed to working with the business side to grow ouraudience” (p. 25)

There are about 14.7 million articles in the Times’ archives dating back to 1851. The Timesneeds to do a better job of resurfacing archival content. The report cites Gawkerrepackaging a 161-year-old Times story on Solomon Northup timed with the release of 12Years A Slave. “We can be both a daily newsletter and a library — offering news every day,as well as providing context, relevance and timeless works of journalism.” (p. 28)

The report proposes restructuring arts and culture stories that remain relevant long afterthey are initially published into guides for readers. They give an example of a readerwanting to find the Times’ initial review of the play Wicked. “The best opportunities are inareas where The Times has comprehensive coverage, where information doesn’t need to beupdated regularly, and where competitors haven’t saturated the market.” They viewmuseums, books, and theater as the best options for that. Travel and music would be moredifficult, the report says. These guides should supplement, not replace current pages. (p. 29)

The Times must be willing to experiment more in terms of how it presents its content: “Wemust push back against our perfectionist impulses. Though our journalism always needs tobe polished, our other efforts can have some rough edges as we look for new ways to reachour readers.” (p. 31)

Andrew Phelps (full disclosure: a former Nieman Lab staffer) made a Flipboard magazineof the Times’ best obits from 2013 on a whim. It became the best-read collection ever onFlipboard. Why wasn’t the Times doing stuff like that on its own platforms, the reportwondered. (p. 33)

The product and design teams are developing a collections format, and they should furtherconsider tools to make it easier for journalists, and maybe even readers, to createcollections and repackage the content. The R&D department and the new products teamhave built a “widget-like tool that any reporter or editor could use to drag and drop storiesand photos” into a collection. Ultimately this could be something the reader even uses. (p.34)

They experimented by repackaging old content in new formats with a collection of videosrelated to love on Valentine’s Day and a collection of stories by Nick Kristof on sextrafficking. “The result? Both were huge hits, exclusively because our readers shared themon social.” The Kristof collection page and the articles in it totaled 468,106 pageviews oversix days. “Very few articles from a typical day’s paper will garner this much traffic in amonth.” Readers spent an average of 2 minutes and 35 seconds on a Kristof story from1996, for example. (p. 34-35)

The Times’ dialect quiz was the most popular piece of content in the paper’s history withmore than 21 million pageviews — but projects like that and Snow Fall are not easilyreplicable. “We have a tendency to pour resources into big one-time projects and workthrough the one-time fixes needed to create them and overlook the less glamorous work ofcreating tools, templates and permanent fixes that cumulatively can have a bigger impactby saving our digital journalists time and elevating the whole report. We greatlyundervalue replicability.” They point out that competitors like Vox and BuzzFeed viewinnovating with their platforms as a key function and allow them to create products likeBuzzFeed’s quizzes — incredibly popular, but also easy to create over and over again. “Weare focused on building tools to create Snow Falls everyday, and getting them as close toreporters as possible,” said Quartz editor Kevin Delaney. “I’d rather have a Snow Fallbuilder than a Snow Fall.” (p. 36)

The Times is planning on creating a section of the homepage that uses reader patterns tocustomize a list of content that readers missed but would most likely want to see. It’s beingplanned for the newly redesigned website and iPhone app. “Though all readers would seethe same top news stories, the other articles we show them would be customized to reflectwhat they haven’t seen.” But in order to accomplish this, the newsroom must clarify how

much personalization it wants on the website and on the apps; it’ll be difficult to moveforward without knowing that. (p. 37-38)

The report suggests creating a “follow” button that would allow readers to easily followcertain topics or columnists. What they choose to follow could be sent to a “FollowingInbox.” They could also have alerts sent to their phone or email. Before the websiteredesign, the only way readers could get notified of favorites was by email. The feature had338,000 users and “unusually high engagement rates” even though it was hard to find andlaborious to sign up for. (p. 39)

The Times is woefully behind in its tagging and structured data practices. It consideredimproving its tagging efforts in 2010, but the paper decided not to pursue it. “Withoutbetter tagging, we are hamstrung in our ability to allow readers to follow developingstories, discover nearby restaurants that we have reviewed or even have our photos showup on search engines.” (p. 41)

Recipes were never tagged by ingredients and cooking time. Because of that, “wefloundered about for 15 years trying to figure out how to create a useful recipe database.”They spent “a huge sum to retroactively structure the data.” Structured data problemsprohibit the Times from automating the sale of photos and keep Times stories from doingas well in search rankings as they should. (p. 41)

It took seven years for the Times to begin to tag stories “September 11.” They need to do abetter job tagging articles together and follow a single topic or news event. “We never madea tag for Benghazi, and I wish we had because the story just won’t die,” Kristi Reilly of thearchive, metadata, and search team said. The report cites The Washington Post, The WallStreet Journal, and Circa as outlets who the Times could emulate. (p. 41-42)

In a section addressing promotion of New York Times content — essentially, social mediadistribution — the report’s authors survey the techniques of “competitors” and comparethem to the Times’ strategy. For example, at ProPublica, “that bastion of old-schooljournalism values,” reporters have to submit 5 possible tweets when they file stories, andeditors have a meeting regarding social strategy for every story package. Reuters employstwo people solely to search for underperforming stories to repackage and republish. (p. 43)

Contrastingly, when the Times published Invisible Child, the story of Dasani, not only wasmarketing not alerted in time to come up with a promotional strategy, “the reporter didn’ttweet about it for two days.” Overall, less than 10 percent of Times traffic comes fromsocial, compared to 60 percent at BuzzFeed. (p. 43)

Meanwhile, outlets like The Huffington Post “regularly outperform” the Times in terms oftraffic, simply by aggregating and repackaging Times journalism. Regarding thedeployment of this strategy around Times coverage of Nelson Mandela’s death, aHuffington Post executive said: “You guys got crushed. I was queasy watching the numbers.I’m not proud of this. But this is your competition.” (p. 44)

The report advises that simple steps can be taken to lessen the loss of traffic to competitors:“Just adding structured data, for example, immediately increased traffic to our recipes fromsearch engines by 52 percent.” (p. 44)

The report points to organizational problems inside the company that contribute to laggingsocial media promotion and traffic. “Our Twitter account is run by the newsroom. OurFacebook is run by the business side,” they write. (p. 45)

In addition, while many in the newsroom are under the impression that the social mediateam exists to promote their work, that team was in fact originally conceived of as aprimarily information gathering body. (p. 45)

An attempt to have Times employees experiment with content promotion centered aroundthe Times Magazine’s “Voyages” issue was disappointing. Traffic actually decreased fromthe previous year, the report states, and overall leadership was lacking — team experts wereconfused about the tools available to them and tended to err on the side of theconservative. (p. 46)

Their response? “Our approach would be to create an ‘impact toolbox’ and train an editoron each desk to use it. The toolbox would provide strategy, tactics and templates forincreasing the reach of an article before and after it’s published. Over time, the editor couldteach others.” (p. 47)

The report invests some time in highlighting the independent social media self-promotionefforts by Times reporters and staffers that have been effective. The authors specificallymention KJ Dell’Antonia, Gina Kolata, C.J. Chivers, Nick Kristof, Nick Bilton, David Carr,Charles Duhigg, and more. (p. 47)

Specifically, they point to the fact that many of their best social staffers learned those skillsthrough the book publishing process, not in the newsroom. Their research included anexperiment in identifying social influencers, both in the newsroom and outside it, prior toa story being published. The result of their experiment — getting Ashton Kutcher, who has15.9 million followers, to retweet a Times story — was considered a success. (p. 48)

The report also singles out comments as a place where the Times nominally attempts to

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interact with readers. While the Times takes pride in its ability to encourage discoursewhile maintaining the brand by moderating its comments, the report suggests this level ofengagement may not be sufficient. “Only a fraction of stories are opened for comments,”they write. “Only one percent of readers write comments and only three percent of readersread comments. Our trusted-commenter system, which we hoped would increaseengagement, includes just a few hundred readers.” (p. 49)

The report suggests the Times considerexpanding further into live events. Theyhighlight the success media brands such asThe Atlantic and The New Yorker have hadwith their festivals and conferences. Theystress that there is enormous opportunity forboth revenue and engagement in the eventsspace for the Times. “There is no reason thatthe space filled by TED Talks, with ticketscosting $7,500, could not have been createdby the Times. ‘One of our biggest concerns is that someone like The Times will start a realconference program,’ said a TED executive.” (p. 53)

The merging of platforms and publishers has garnered some attention in the media spacelately, and the report’s authors do not neglect that conversation. They look at whatorganizations that allow users to create content on their sites are doing, and question howthe Times could develop a strategy without diluting its brand. They suggest that the Times’audience is full of educated and interesting people who could easily pen valuable contentthat might find enthusiasm from readers in the digital space. A new push to expandproducts around opinion reflects this consideration. (p. 52)

Interestingly, the report mentions that what readers see as innovation at the Times —graphics and interactives — is not reflected internally, in terms of workflow, organization,strategy, and recruitment. (p. 57)

For example, the Times fails to fully take advantage of opportunities to learn about itsaudience, not doing “things that our competitors do, like ask readers whether they wouldbe willing to be contacted by reporters or if they are willing to share some basicinformation about their hometown, alma mater and industry so we can send them articlesabout those topics.” (p. 54)

The leadership of the recently fired Jill Abramson is briefly mentioned, including “thesignificant improvement in relations between news and business under the leadership ofJill, Mark and Arthur.” The authors write: “Embracing Reader Experience as an extensionof the newsroom is also the next logical step in Jill’s longstanding goal of creating anewsroom with fully integrated print and digital operations, since these departments haveskills to build on our digital successes.” (p. 61)

“The very first step,” the authors write about the need for more collaboration, “should be adeliberate push to abandon our current metaphors of choice — ‘The Wall’ and ‘Church andState’ — which project an enduring need for division. Increased collaboration, done right,does not present any threat to our values of journalistic independence.” (p. 61)

The report calls for increased communication and cooperation between the sections of thecompany they call “Reader Experience” and the newsroom. In the report, ReaderExperience refers to R&D, product, technology, analytics and design. (p. 63)

Those departments are not tiny: roughly 30 people in analytics, 30 in digital design, 120 inproduct, and a whopping 445 in technology, with around two dozen teams of engineers. (p.63)

Specifically, they praise the recently released Cooking vertical and the NYT Now app,which were spearheaded by Sam Sifton and Alex MacCallum and Cliff Levy and BenFrench, respectively. (Other individuals mentioned include James Robinson, Aron Pilhofer,Danielle Rhoades Ha, Kelly Alfieri, and Brian Hamman.) (p. 66)

There have been significant obstacles to this kind of cooperation, however. “People say tome, ‘You can’t let anyone know I’m talking to you about this; it has to be under the radar,’said a leader in one Reader Experience department. ‘Everyone is a little paranoid aboutbeing seen as too close to the business side.’” (p.64)

The report also describes a developer who quit after being denied a request to havedevelopers attend brown bag lunches along with editorial staffers. This sort of rejection canmake recruitment of top developers and designers a challenge. (p. 68)

According to the report, there is a sense at the Times that Reader Experience staffers and

newsroom staffers are not supposed to communicate. Says David Leonhardt of the processof developing The Upshot, in which he had unanswered questions about competition,audience, platform strategies, promotion and user-testing, “I had no idea who to reach outto and it never would have occurred to me to do it. It would have felt vaguelyinappropriate.” (p. 66)

The report proposed creating a newsroom strategy team to take some of the strategy workoff the masthead: “The core function would be ensuring the masthead is apprised ofcompetitors’ strategies, changing technology and shifting reader behavior. The team wouldtrack projects around the company that affect our digital report, ensuring the newsroom isat the table when we need to be.” (p. 71)

Times leaders frequently ask former NYTimes.com editor Rich Meislin for advice becauseother editors and managers, even those tasked with looking at the bigger picture, were toobusy. Meislin “remains such a critical resource, providing information, insight and counselabout digital issues to a range of people in the newsroom and on the business side. Inaddition to having a deep well of institutional knowledge, he also has time. ‘They go toRich because he’s available and because he’s not dealing with the daily report,’ said amasthead editor.” (p. 72)

Even the Times, with all its staffing and other resources — its R&D lab, its mobile team, itseditors focused on issues around design, digital, or new initiatives — feels like it doesn’thave the time or power to get outside of the day-to-day grind of making a newspaper tothink about its future. Even the mobile group doesn’t have time to look at how the Timescan use new technologies, the report says. “That helps explain why it took a group removedfrom the daily flow of the newsroom — NYT Now — to fundamentally rethink our mobilepresentation.” (p. 72)

“Another [desk head] suggested that the relentless work of assembling the world’s bestnews report can also be a ‘form of laziness, because it is work that is comfortable andfamiliar to us, that we know how to do. And it allows us to avoid the truly hard work andbigger questions about our present and our future: What shall we become. How must wechange?’” (p. 72)

“‘We’ve abdicated completely the role of strategy,’ said one masthead editor. ‘We just don’tdo strategy. The newsroom is really being dragged behind the galloping horse of thebusiness side.’” (p. 72)

Rival publications talk to one another and share intel. New York magazine’s Adam Mosssaid “I talk to [Nick] Denton all the time. We both talk to Jacob [Weisberg]. We’reconstantly telling each other what’s working, what we’ve experimented with…About halfthe choices I make come about because someone from another site tells me somethingworked, and so we adopt it.” (p. 73)

While the business side strategy team is already doing some of that work — they providedan 80-page transcript of interviews about social strategy from talking with other mediacompanies and competitors — the masthead is disconnected from strategy talks: “In recentmonths, the masthead has been left out of several important studies that will affect thenewsroom, including marketing-led exploration of our audience development efforts and adetailed assessment of our…capabilities and needs. In both cases our senior leaders wereunaware that these conversations were happening, despite the newsroom’s growing interestin both subjects.” (p. 74)

The Times, like many newspapers, does not like failure. It usually doesn’t like to talk aboutit, in public or in private. “For example, our mobile app, ‘The Scoop,’ and our internationalhome page have failed to gain traction with readers, yet we still devote resources to them.We ended the Booming blog but kept its newsletter going. These ghost operations distracttime, energy and resources that could be used for new projects. At the same time, wehaven’t tried to wring insights from these efforts. ‘There were no metrics, no target, nogoals to hit and no period of re-evaluation after the launch,’ said a digital platforms editor,about our international home page.” (p. 75)

The point of the strategy team would be to help prioritize issues that need to be fixed, aswell as being able to lend a voice to problems that staff are reluctant to talk openly about.One of the biggest problems is the Times’ CMS, according to the report. “But desks andproducers spend countless hours on one-time fixes to the platform, rather than permanentsolutions, even when it is clear the problems will emerge again and again. One seniormember of the news desk said that leaders would be ‘horrified’ if they understood thesituation.” (p. 76)

One problem within the Times is consolidating innovation and experiments to a few desks,namely graphics, interactive news, social, and design. The result of this has been thatindividual staffers and desks, like the news desk, have not had the permission or tools toexperiment on their own. The proposed strategy group would help desks work onindividual experiments and find ways to replicate that elsewhere in the company. (p. 77)

In the triangle of business side, Reader Experience, and newsroom, the newsroom is oftenseen as defensive or risk averse. “One reason for our caution is that the newsroom tends toview questions through the lens of worst-case scenarios,” the report puts it. “And thenewsroom has historically reacted defensively by watering down or blocking changes,prompting a phrase that echoes almost daily around the business side: ‘The newsroomwould never allow that.’” (p. 78)

The big question: How can the Times become more digital while still maintaining a printpresence, and what has to change? “That means aggressively questioning many of ourprint-based traditions and their demands on our time, and determining which can beabandoned to free up resources for digital work.” (p. 82)

A big tension at the Times is what it means to be digital-first, and how the newspaper canget there. Senior editor for digital operations Nathan Ashby-Kuhlman apparently set off abomb in the form of an email that questioned if the paper was doing enough to prepare forthe future. This may not sound revolutionary, but the paper, he argued, needs to focus ondigital-first reporting that later flows into a print product. “Years of private complaintsaround the building suddenly had a very public forum.” (p. 83)

On the Michael Sam story, which was brought to the Times and ESPN, the report says theTimes “package was well-executed and memorable, but some of our more digitally focusedcompetitors got more traffic from the story than we did. If we had more of a digital-firstapproach, we would have developed in advance an hour-by-hour plan to expand ourpackage of related content in order to keep readers on our site longer, and attract new ones.We should have been thinking as hard about ‘second hour’ stories as we do about ‘secondday’ stories.” (p. 84)

The Times’ publishing schedule is out of sync with digital: “For example, the vast majorityof our content is still published late in the evening, but our digital traffic is busiest early inthe morning. We aim ambitious stories for Sunday because it is our largest printreadership, but weekends are slowest online. Each desk labors over section fronts, but payslittle attention to promoting its work on social media.” (p. 86)

According to the report, The Times doesn’t pay attention to how it presents its content onmobile or within apps. Business Day columnists often show up at the bottom of thebusiness section in mobile because the site loads from the web section fronts. Also, storiesand columns often ask people to provide reader comments, but that functionality isn’t

available on the iPhone or iPad apps. “Instead of running mobile on autopilot, we need toview the platform as an experience that demands its own quality control and creativity.” (p.87)

Why they leave: They asked 5 people who worked on digital for the Times what led themto leave — Soraya Darabi, Alice DuBois, Jonathan Ellis, Liz Heron, and Zach Wise. Nonesaid they regretted leaving. Some quotes: “I looked around the organization and saw theplum jobs — even ones with explicitly digital mandates — going to people with littleexperience in digital. Meanwhile, journalists with excellent digital credentials were stuckmoving stories around on section fronts.” (p. 88)

“When it takes 20 months to build one thing, your skill set becomes less about innovationand more about navigating bureaucracy. That means the longer you stay, the more you’redoubling down on staying even longer. But if there’s no leadership role to aspire to, stayingtoo long becomes risky.” (p. 88)

The Times doesn’t offer much of a career path for people working on the digital side in thenewsroom. And many staffers feel like their skills are either undervalued, ormisunderstood. One larger problem for the Times is that there is a shortage of people insenior positions who understand digital news, which also leaves the paper not knowingwho should be promoted on the digital side, the report says. “The reason producers,platform editors and developers feel dissatisfied is that they want to play creative roles, notserves roles that involve administering and fixing. It would be like reporters coming herehoping to write features but instead we ask them to spend their days editing wire storiesinto briefs.” (p. 89)

There seems to be agreement from editors, reporters, desk editors and more that the Timesspends too much time thinking about Page One. This quote from a Washington reporterhelps paint a picture: “Our internal fixation on it can be unhealthy, disproportionate andultimately counterproductive. Just think about how many points in our day are stilloriented around A1 — from the 10 a.m. meeting to the summaries that reporters file in theearly afternoon to the editing time that goes into those summaries to the moment theverdict is rendered at 4:30. In Washington, there’s even an email that goes out to the entirebureau alerting everyone which six stories made it. That doesn’t sound to me like anewsroom that’s thinking enough about the web.” (p. 90)

On the hiring front, the report says the Times can’t simply assume people want to work for

the paper. While ambitious journalists are drawn to the Times, digital talent wants thechance to create something new and experiment. “We can’t pitch ourselves as a greatInternet success story, selling potential hires on the satisfaction of helping transform aworld-class, mission-driven organization.” (p. 91)

But the report also stresses that the paper needs a broader array of digital talent, not justreporters and editors, but “technologists, user experience designers, product managers,data analysts,” among them. The Times also needs to do better hiring the digitally-inclinedinto leadership positions rather than waiting to promote from within, the report says.When the Times promoted Aron Pilhofer and Steve Duenes to associate managing editorpositions, both improved the hiring efforts on the digital side, the report says. (p. 91)

On finding and developing digital talent, the report has a variety of recommendations forthings inside and outside the building, including finding ways to empower the current staffto do more, identifying the top digital talent in the newsroom and giving themopportunities. But the Times also needs to “accept that digital talent is in high demand. Tohire digital talent will take more money, more persuasion and more freedom once they arewithin The Times — even when candidates might strike us as young or less accomplished.”Another idea? Make a big splash: “Make a star hire,” because top digital talent can helpbring in similar-minded people. (p. 96)

Photo of the Times building by Alexander Torrenegra used under a Creative Commonslicense.

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