The Leadership Factor in Administrative Reform in Malaysia

Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 5(2): 103-123 (1997) ISSN: 0128-7702© Universiti Putra Malaysia Press

The Leadership Factor in Administrative Refonn in Malaysia,with a Specific Study on the Leadership of Dr. Mahathir

Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia

AHMAD ATORY BIN HUSSAINDepartment of Political ScienceU niversiti Kebangsaan Malaysia43600 Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia

Keywords: leadership of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, public administration, public managementadministrative science, administrative reform, management science, development administration,reorganisation, administrative strategy, administrative politics, politics and administration, politicalleadership, bureaucratic politics

ABSTRAK

Dalam banyak usaha, kepimpinan merupakan suatu unsur yang penting untllk mencapai kejayaan. Dalam halini, pembaharuan-pembaharuan yang dinamik yang sedang dan tents berlakll dalam perkhidmatan alVamMalaysia banyak bergantung kepada kepimpinan Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. lni merupakan Sl.latll hlljjah yangUlama bagi perubahan-perubahan dinamik yang berlaku dalam birokrasi Malaysia. Ia boleh dilihat daripadabanyak program-program yang diperkenalkan yang mana secara umumnya telah diterima dengan baik olehpihak sektor awam dan juga swasta. Justeru itu, objektif rencana ini ialah untuk memberi tumpuan ke ataskepimpinan Dr. Mahathir Mohamad sebagai seorang yang dianggap "pemangkin" atau "penggerak" dalamperlaksanaan usaha-usaha pembaharuan pentadbiran. Ia juga mempamirkan kepimpinan yang dinamis danke arah berorientasi masa depan beliau dalam memainkan kejayaan gerakan pembaharl.lan tersebl.lt.

ABSTRACT

In many reform efforts, leadership is an important element in ensuring that the plan succeeds. In this respect,dynamic reforms which are continuing to take place in the Malaysian public service owe much to theleadership prO\~ded by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. This can be seen from the numerous programmes he hasintroduced which have generally been well received by both the public and private sectors. The objective ofthis article is to focus on Dr. Mahathir Mohamad as a prime mover or catalyst in the implementation of theadministrative reform efforts in Malaysia. It highlights the leadership dynamism and forward-orientation ofDr. Mahathir thus far, in playing a central role to ensure the success of the reform movement.

INTRODUCTION

Many factors have contributed to the success ofadministrative reforms in Malaysia since the1970s. These include better socio-economicconditions conducive to administrative reform,political stability, leadership support, bureaucraticsupport and the public demand for reform. In asurvey conducted by the writer on reform effortsunder Mahathir since 1981, he concluded thatmany programmes and policies in theadministrative reforms have achieved their target,and generally been successful (though morecould have been done) in changing attitudes ofcivil servants towards the goals of efficiency,

effectiveness and productivity. However, one hasto bear in mind that the leadership factor is ofparamount importance in ensuring the successof the reforms.

This article is not a detailed analysis of everysingle reform effort conducted in Malaysia duringMahathir's era, nor does it analyse his leadershiprole in the UMNO/Malaysian politics, nor makecomprehensive comparisons with past primeministers. However, for background purposes,brief examples of structural, procedural andbehavioural reforms are given as a backdrop to

the analysis of Mahathir's leadership role in theadministrative reform.

Ahmad Awry bin Hussain

Therefore, this article is divided into twomajor parts, the first covering the definition ofadministrative reforms, and the second detailingthe contribution of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.

Most of the data used in the first section wasobtained from survey and secondary sources,while data used in the second section is mostlybased on personal interviews with several formertop civil servants. Several selected criteria areused to analyse Mahathir's leadership, such ashis style of leadership, his attitude towards thebureaucracy, his strategies in managing the publicsector, his personal characteristics in thebureaucracy. By examining Mahathir's leadershiprole in administrative reform programmes it ishoped to contribute to a further understandingof the concept of leadership, or the wayleadership operates, in administrative science.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN MALAYSIA:THEORY AND PRACTICE, PAST AND

PRESENT

Definition of Administrative Reform

The concept of administrative reforms meansdifferent things to different people, which isechoed by Caiden in following words: "to all'improvements in administration ... to generaladministrative overhauls in difficult circums-tances to specific remedies for adminis-tration to any suggestion for bettergovernment. .. and to intentions of self-styledadministrative reformers" (Caiden 1969: 43).

In Malaysia, administrative reform is definedon the lines of contemporary Western thinking.In Western public bureaucracy, administrativereform, or 'reorganisation' in a contemporarycontext, usually encompasses changes in theinternal practices along with structure andprocedures of organisations. Therefore, thisarticle defines administrative reform as 'asystematic and integrated effort to bring aboutfundamental changes in public administrationto enhance public administrative capability toachieve national development goals' (Hanh 1970:78). The definition is also designed toaccommodate: (1) organisational improvements(both structural and procedural), and (2)improvements in the behaviour of civil servants.

Background to Administrative Reform

In Malaysia, administrative reform wasundertaken even during the colonial period inresponse to the political changes in the country

as a result of the freedom movement. WhenMalaysia achieved independence in 1957, sheinherited the British colonial administration. Theorganisational set-up of the governmentmachinery then was seen as no longer suitablefor the aspirations of the newly independentstate. Therefore, the Malaysian government tookimmediate steps to reform the civil service.Various measures were in troduced, such aslaunching the Malayanisation process,reorganisation of administrative machinery, restructuring of work in central agencies andministries, and the establishment of the PublicService Commission. These measures met withlimited success as the pace of development wasslow due to limited resources.

The period of restructuring of governmentmachinelJ' extended over a decade and a half,i.e., 1966-1981. The administrative reforms basedon the Montgomery-Esman proposal of theUnited States played a role in the restructuringexercise. The creation of the DevelopmentAdministration Unit (DAU) in 1966 representeda very important institutional reform inadministrative development in Malaysia. Themain thrust of reforms during the 1966-81 periodwas geared towards increasing efficiency,productivity and development orientation,especially in land and district administration.Since rural development planning was alsoheavily emphasised, the recommendations ofDAU obviously represented the desire on thepart of the Prime Minister (Tun Abdul Razak)to gain greater control of the bureaucracy.

The beginning of a more rigorous effort inadministrative reform in Malaysia began in 1970,when the New Economic Policy (NEP) wasintroduced. Since then the institution-buildingapproach has been employed, leading to thesetting up of a dozen public corporations andstatutory bodies. This has resulted in a hugenumber of new recruits into those agencies.During the six-year period of Hussein Onn'sadministration (1976-1981), there were importantadministrative reform efforts, particularly ininstitution building such as the formation of theMalaysian Administrative and ManpowerPlanning Unit (MAMPU) in 1977 as a newadministrative reform agency. It was establishedat what was considered a propitious time tofocus on the efficiency and the effectiveness ofcivil servants. Another significant reform effortwas the introduction of a code of ethics for civil

104 PertanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 5 No.2 1997

The Leadership Factor in Administrative Reform in Malaysia

servants. At the end of Hussein Onn'sadministration, there was an expansion of thecivil service (Operasi Isipenuh), but this wassubsequently aborted at the beginning of theMahathir era to reduce the size of the publicsector. The reform efforts undertaken by thegovernment under MAMPU can be consideredas the beginning of the series of reforms thatcontinued into the Mahathir administration. Theprevious reforms, which stressed mostly structuraland procedural changes and institution-buildingduring the Razak era, have shifted away to deinstitutionalisation during the Mahathiradministration. Since 1981, the establishment ofpublic corporations, statutory bodies andinstitutions has been sharply reduced. However,a certain number of new ministries andgovernment agencies have been set up duringthe Mahathir administration to meet theobjectives of expediting development plans dueto heightened economic development. Dr.Mahathir has attempted to infuse new valuesand behavioural characteristics among civilservants. In other words, the beginning of the1980s saw the introduction of a new direction inadministrative reform. Since Dr. Mahathir cameto power, he has issued many policy statements,introduced new concepts, and implemented newtechniques and styles of management. Some ofthese directions were directed towards the largersociety, others were geared towards changingMalay society, but most were targeted at shapingthe public bureaucracy into an efficient, dynamicand productive instrument for the modernisationof Malaysia. While it is sometimes difficult todisaggregate the target audiences of Dr.Mahathir's reforms, it is the writer's view thatthe thrust of Mahathir's reforms has been tochange the behaviour, attitudes and values ofthe employees in the civil service.

Administrative Ref01ms under Dr. Mahathir

Nevertheless, reform efforts introduced in theearly days of the Mahathir administration weretargeted at all Malaysians, in order to changetheir thinking and influence them to beprogressive, enterprising, hardworking,productive, and efficient. It seems that a 'holistic'approach has been adopted to affect the reformefforts. Various programmes have beenintroduced in order to upgrade the leadershipquality, efficiency, effectiveness and productivityamong the civil servants. Some of these

programmes are: (l) Improving Work Systemand Procedures; (2) Improving Services to thePublic; (3) Changing Attitudes of the CivilServants; (4) Inculcating Work Ethics; (5)Privatisation Policy; (6) Utilisation of Automationand New Technology; and (7) Budgetary Reformand Improving Financial Managemen System.The Mahathir administration has also providedtraining opportunities for all levels of civil servants;better terms of service, promotion prospects, andother fringe benefits, both extrinsic and intrinsic,such as opportunities for postgraduate studiesand sabbatical leave, and job rotation, in order togive civil servants wider exposure to the 'variousoperations of their respective departments.Another major reform has been to reduce thesize of the public sector; this was initiated in 1982in order to control the number of employees inthe public service at an appropriate and optimumlevel. This unprecedented move was also aimedat improving the capability of the public serviceand as a cost-saving measure to reduce theoperating expenditure of the public sector.

In addition to the above reformprogrammes, Dr. Mahathir has also launchedseveral concepts or slogans such as the LookEast Policy which was aimed at looking at theJapanese and Korean styles of management andthe fields of technical training, researchdevelopment and industry. 'Clean, Efficient andTrustworthy Government' is another conceptwhich is very much in line with the behaviouralor cultural psychological perspective aimed atthe propagation of ethics and moral values(Mohd. Rais 1988: 62).

Dr. Mahathir was concerned with instil1ing aset of ethics among civil servants in addition tothe procedural codes of the General Orders thatwas established long ago by the colonialgovernment (Mohd. Rais 1988: 62). The emphasis is on moral values and the attitude of civilservants, while the General Orders wereconcerned more with general work procedures.The guidelines of the new work ethics are aboutthe attitudes that civil servants should possesssuch as being 'clean, efficient and trustworthy'.Increase in efficiency and effectiveness of thepublic service through administrative reform hasbeen an important feature of the Mahathiradministration. Empirical data dealing withMahathir's reform efforts confirm that hisadministration has attempted to use structuraland behavioural strategies to reform bureaucracy

PertanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 5 No.2 1997 105

Ahmad Alary bin Hussain

Descriptive data. Questionnaires were mailed to980 senior civil servants, but. only 433 (44.3%)

and increase efficiency and effectiveness of thepublic service. However, not all the reformsintroduced have met success. This can beded~lced from the analysis of survey data whichpolled opinions of civil servants directly involvedin the reform exercises carried Ollt from 1981.

Objective oj opinion survey. The purpose of thesurvey was to bring into focus the opinions andperspective of those most affected by Mahathir'sreforms, namely administrative officials ingovernment departments. The opinion surveywas concerned with the following questions: Towhat extent has there been an increase inefficiency, effectiveness and productivity in thepublic bureaucracy since the introduction ofvarious reform programmes in 1981? How arethe types of reform related to the success orfailure of administrative reform?

TABLE 1

Discussion. Generally, there is evidence to suggestthat there is an overall improvement in theefficiency, effectiveness and productivity amongcivil servants and in the public bureaucracy as aresult of the introduction of various forms ofadmin istrative reform. There is abundantevidence of the public's general satisfaction withthe reduced time it now takes to apply for orrenew passports, road tax discs and drivinglicences. In government hospitals, waiting timefor patients seeking treatment has also beengenerally reduced.

The findings from the survey conductedamong civil servants seem to confirm this generaltrend, that there is a general overall improvementamong civil servants and in the publicbureaucracy. However, there are differences inthe degree to which there have beenimprovements in efficiency, effectiveness andproductivity in one government department oragency compared to another, or betweenindividual civil servants.

Because the administrative officers are closelyassociated with both the implementation ofprogrammes and the application ofadministrative reforms, they were asked toevaluate the effectiveness of eight categories ofprocedures and techniques: improving worksystems and procedures; improving service tothe public; improving attitudes of civil servants;inculcating work ethics; effectiveness ofprivatisation objectives; effectiveness of utilisationof automation and new technology; effectivenessof budgetary reform; effectiveness of financialcontrol. Individual comments are also analysed,since they better represent the true nature ofthe grievances of respondents.

As indicated in Table 2, of the nine workprocedures and techniques that have beenintroduced in the public service since 1981, onlytwo have not been favourably evaluated, namelyquality control circle (QCC) and productivity

completed questionnaires were returned. Thequestionnaires were sent randomly togovernment departments and agencies; thenumber ranged from 10 to 20, depending onthe importance of the ministry or agency. It was,thus, a purposive sampling. Table 1 presents aministry-by-ministry response rate-ranging froma high of 26.32% from the Prime Minister'sDepartment to a low of 0.46% from the Ministryof Justice. Overall, the response sample isrepresentative of the Malaysian civil service.

26.3210.3910.16

5.315.084.614.153.692.702.772..542.302.302.302.071.841.841.611.381.151.151.150.920.920.690.46

100.00

(N:433)

PercentageResponse No.

Source: Survey data

Distribution of respondel1ls

Cenlral Agency

PM's Deparunenl 114Finance Ministry 45State Secretariats 44MinistryEducation 23Agriculture 22Health 20Transport ] 8Rural Development ]6International Trade 12Human Resources 12Land & Cooperative ] 1Primary Industry 10Housing & Local Gov't 10Home Affairs ] 0Domestic Trade 9Information 8Welfare and Unity 8Telecoms, Post & Energy 7Defence 6Science and Environ. 5Public Works 5Public El1lerprise 5Youth & Sport 4Culture, Arts & Tourism 4Foreign Affairs 3Justice 2Total 433

106 PenanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 5 No.2 1997


Extremely Quite Neutral Quite ExtremelyEffective Effecti\'e Ineffective Ineffective

33.0 58.1 2.6 6.339.4 51.2 3.2 5.8 0.55.6 35.0 31.9 22.8 4.7

8.7 44.0 18.2 25.5 3.5

16.4 54.7 13.6 13.3 2.614.1 54.1 13.6 15.0 3.39.3 54.4 27.8 7.1 1.4

22.8 57.0 10.0 9.3 0.97.3 38.5 30.3 18.5 5.4

Work Systems& Procedures

Punch cardName tagQuality control circle

(QCC)Open-space & office

layoutWork proceduresDeskfile systemPostal correspondenceManagement thm meetingProductivity measurement

programme

Source: Survey data

TABLE 2Effectiveness of work systems and procedUl'es

Percentage Positive Evaluation

=433)

Percentage Negative Evaluation

measurement programme (PMP). Perhaps moretime is needed before their benefits become obviousand, hence, their acceptance. Table 3 indicates apositive evaluation of one-stop payment, serviceand licence centres. This may indicate a greatimprovement in productivity and efficiency.However, one written comment on a questionnairesaid that improvement of the one-stop centre wasonly in the fonn of physical facilities while actualdelivery of sel'\~ce is still slow.

One of the main thrusts of reform underthe Mahathir administration is the behaviouralmodification of civil servants. Towards this end,various slogans, such as 'clean, efficient and

trustwonh)' government', 'Ieadership by example'and 'Malaysia Incorporated' were unveiled. Anexcellent sel'\lice award was also created in orderto reinforce adoption of various desirable valuesthat the government has identified (Table 4 ).In line with the good intentions of thesestrategies, survey data showed that the m~ority

of the respondents thought that they wereeffective in instilling a more positive outlookamong their staff. This positive view was alsoextended to programmes for inculcating workethics (Table 5). For example, none of the 16measures introduced was seen as not beingeffective in instilling better work ethics among

Services

TABLE 3Effectiveness of services to the public (N=433)

Percentage Positive Evaluation Percentage Negative Evaluation

Extremely Quite !'\etmal Quite ExtremelyEffective Effective Ineffective Ineffective

One-sLOp payment centre 53.1 30.4 14.7 1.6 0.3One-stop selvice centre 39.5 38.7 19.7 1.8 0.3One-sLOp licence centre 32.4 34.9 29.9 2.5 0.3Suggestion box 6.5 35.5 24.9 27.1 6.0GIRO 17.1 39.2 34.5 7.5 1.7Efficient and courteous 20.3 56.9 14.7 7.1 1.0coun tel' service

Source: Survey data

PenanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol.::; No.2 1997 107

Ahmad Atory bin Hussain

TABLE 4Effectiveness of improving attitudes of civil servants (N=433)

Percentage Positive Evaluation Percentage NegativeAdmin istrati"e/BehaviouralTechniques

Clean, efficient &trustworthy

Leadership by exampleExcellent service awardMalaysia Incorporated

Source: Survey data

Extremely EffectiveEffective

16.6 55.2

19.7 49.716.8 48.610.5 47.5

Neutral

16.1

15.5]8.231.0

QuiteIneffective

10.0

11.614.59.5

ExtremelyIneiTective

2.1

3.51.91.4

Values

TABLE 5Inculcation of work ethics (N=433)

Percentage Positive Evaluation Percentage Negative Evalu<llillll

Highly Improved Neutral Somewhat NotImproved Improved Improved

Accountability 13.3 65.7 7.7 11.0 1.9Self-management 4.7 57.9 19.1 15.8 2.6Co-operation 13.3 64.7 5.8 14.0 2.1SeIf-developmen t 5.3 47.3 20.2 23.2 3.5Diligence 8.2 63.6 9.6 16.1 2.6Intellectual 7.5 47.3 24.6 16.9 3.7Team spirit 15.5 59.1 8.1 14.9 2.1Thrift 2.4 46.5 29.6 16.7 4.8Innovativeness 6.1 52.0 20.0 18.4 3.5Posi tive 'lui lude 10.7 55.1 17.1 14.7 2.1Integrity ]0.7 55.1 17.1 14.7 2.3Responsiveness ]J.8 56.5 14.1 16.2 1.4Self-disciplined 7.9 59.7 12.6 17.5 2.3Clien t-orien ted 13.3 57.6 10.5 15.7 2.9High performance oriented 9.1 48.9 21.1 18.5 2.3Professionalism 11.8 52.2 3.9 9.1 3.1Enterprising 4.3 39.9 30.6 20.0 5.2

Source: Survey data

the public employees. Survey data showed thatthe opinion of the majority of the senior civilservants interviewed was generally positive withregard to the behavioural approach in reform.However, their opinions were more favourabletowards the effectiveness of the structural andprocedural methods of reform. This can be seenfrom the positive evaluation by the civil servantsof the effectiveness of privatisation objectives(Table 6), utilisation of automation and newtechnology (Tables 7 and 8), and improvement

of the budgetary and financial managementsystems (Tables 9 and 10).

Reform stmtegy. Analysis of the survey data foundlittle difference among the three strategies(procedural, structural and behavioural) in termsof effect on increased efficiency, effectivenessand productivity among civil servants. Table 11shows that all three types of reform are all highlyeffective, but the procedural programmes appearto be the most effective of the three approaches.



TABLE 6Effectiveness of privatisation objectives (N=433)

Purposeor Motive

Percentage Positive Evaluation Percen tage Negative Evaluation

Extremely Quile NeutralEffective Effeclin'

To spur economic ~rowth 25.1 51.6 16.9Relieving financial 30.5 47.7 11.7and administratin' hurden

To promote competition, 16.9 17.~) 20.0efficiency & productivity

To stimulate entrepreneurship 16.5 I').~ 24.6To reduce the size 34.9 -10.4 12.2of public sector

Meeting objectives of NEP 14.4 42.8 27.8

Source: Survey data

TABLE 7Impact of privatisation on organisation (N=433)

Quite ExtremelyIneffective Ineffective

5.5 1.07.4 2.4

11.0 4.3

7.9 1.79.8 2.6

11.2 3.8

Purpose Percentage Positive Evaluation Percentage Negative Evaluation

Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree StronglyAgree Disagree

The fear of privatisation 3.1 21.2 2.9 48.2 12.6improved work discipline

Privatisation: more 7.8 44.2 16.1 26.0 5.9conscious about efficiency

Privatisation improved 7.7 50.5 11.5 26.5 3.8service delivery

Privatisation promotes 16.5 49.3 24.6 7.9 1.7enterpreneurship & investment

Privatisation: more conscious 7.1 45.8 15.6 27.4 4.2about public accountability

Privatisation: more conscious 12.7 58.7 7.0 18.1 3.5about productivity

Privatisation-Ied job insecurity 2.1 11.6 13.2 58.3 14.9

Source: Survey Data

For instance, the name tag identification andthe punch card system were the most positivelyevaluated by the respondents (see Table 12).

Ovemll improvement. Table 11 shows thedistribution of opinions of civil servants on theoverall state of improvement in efficiency andcapability in the public service. Respondentswere asked to indicate how much they thoughtthe civil service has improved in efficiency andcapability since 1981. Responses were categorised

by percentages, beginning with category 10%and increasing by a constant of 5%. To sum up,reform procedural measures undertaken by theMahathir administration have been able toincrease efficiency and productivity in the civilservice by about 62% (see Table 11 ). However,more effort is still needed, especially in reexamining the set target.

Sumrnmy offindings. Civil servants appeared to begenerally satisfied wi th the reform efforts



TABLE 8Effectiveness of the utilisation of automation and technology (N=433)


Extremely Quite Neutral Quite ExtremelyEffective Effective Ineffective Ineffective

Greater speed in 17.5 54.0 15.2 9.1 4.2policy & decisions

Improvement in accuracy, 26.6 58.7 11.9 6.3 0.5standardisation, consistency& co-ordination

Greater efficiency 29.1 56.3 11.1 3.3 0.2in counter service

Efficiency in 21.2 53.7 16.7 7.7 0.7correspondence

Efficiency in project 13.8 54.4 22.0 9.1 0.7implementation

Speedier programme 17.3 53.3 18.9 8.9 1.6

evaluation

Source: Survey data

TABLE 9Effectiveness of budgetary reform (N=433)


Extremely Quite Neutral Quite ExtremelyEffective Effective Ineffective Ineffective

Budgeting is now more 18.2 63.1 11.5 6.1 1.2programme & performanceoriented

Better evaluation of the cost 12.2 60.8 16.7 8.5 1.9& benefits

Ensure greater 16.2 61.2 12.9 7.0 2.1financial accountability

More rationality in the 12.5 59.2 18.4 7.3 2.6budget process

Source: Survey data

undertaken by the Mahathir administration. Butthere are also many weaknesses that still requireserious attention. This can be seen from thecomments and suggestions given in response to

several questions in the survey. Some civil servantsare still sceptical of some reform programmes,particularly those related to behavioural aspectswhich are regarded as 'slogan shouting' andpolitical gimmicks. Reform efforts pertaining toinstilling positive values and work ethics continueto be externally driven, not internally directed.Therefore, these have been less successful in

bringing about any significant change inattitudes. Some reforms are taking place toofast. Therefore, the effect of theirinstitutionalisation cannot be accurately assessed.In this respect, one senior officer claimed thatsome efforts are more of a protocol andceremonial nature rather than having realsubstance.

From the survey, it also appears that there isstill some degree of dissatisfaction among civilservants regarding various aspects, such aspromotion opportunities, salary schemes,

110 PenanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 5 No.2 1997


TABLE 10Effectiveness of financial management control (N=4331


Led to more consciousncssMore efficient, effectivein financial accountabilityutilisation of financialresources

More emphasison upgrading skills

Improvement in financialprocedure

More active roleof the PAC

More active roleof the ACA

Source: Survey data

ExtremelyEffective

15.213.2

12.1

10.0

17.6

14.3

QuiteEffective

65.565.5

63.4

64.4

53.4

49.5

Neutral

12.412.1

16.1

16.6

20.4

23.4

QuiteIneffective

5.17.5

7.0

7.2

7.0

10.0

ExtremelyIneffective

1.91.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

2.8

TABLE 11Overall improvement of administration reform

neutrality of the civil service in politics, valuesand motivation of civil servants, especially theMalaysian Civil Service (MCS) officers' tightcontrol of other branches of the civil service.These are ongoing issues to which a solution has

Percentage Rateof Improvement

10152025354045505560657075808590859095

100No Response

Source: Survey Data

PercentageEvaluation

1.50.73.46.81.55.11.77.02.4

12.96.6

16.05.8

18.42.43.92.43.90.52.44.8

Number ofResponden ts

63

1428

6217

29105327662476101610162

1021

yet to be found. There are likely to be adverseeffects on the efficiency in the service unlessthese are properly addressed by the leadership.

LEADERSHIP IN MALAYSIA'SADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: EVALUATING

THE CONTRIBUTION OFDR. MAHATHIR MOHAMAD

MahathiT Style of Leadership

In Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir's leadership is one ofthe important administrative reform agents. Hispolitical leadership role is an important externalfactor responsible for successful administrativereforms. In fact, his leadership has proven to bethe most dynamic as well as controversial inMalaysia's history (Noraini 1989: 155). WhenDr. Mahathir took office in 1981, his leadershipsignalled the lise of a new dimension in Malaysiansocio-economic and political developments.Amidst a sense of change and rapid development,his administration embarked on a series ofpolicies and actions that immediatelydistinguished it from previous administrations.

Administrative reform is most likely to besuccessful if it is done through the initiative ofthe top leadership (Montgomery 1969: 427-471;Dror 1970: 19-35). This opinion concurs withCrozier, who argued that:'Change in the bureaucratic organisation mustcome from the top down and must be

PertanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 5 '0.2 1997 111


TABLE 12Highest evaluation of selected reforms by strategies

Strategy

Structure

Procedure

Behaviour

Type of programme Effective Neutral Ineffective

% % %

Privatisation: 77 17 7Stimulate economicgrowth

Relieve financial burden of 78 12 10government

System and procedures:Punch card system 91 3 6Name tag 90 6 6Services:One-stop paymelll centre 84 15 2Utilisation of technology:Improvement. in accuracy, 81 12 7standardisation, consistency& co-ordination

Improvement in efficiency in 85 11 4counter service

Budget reform:Progress & performance 81 12 7-oriented

More comprehensive budgeting 78 6 8Financial management control,Consciousness of financial 81 12 7accountability

Utilisation of financial resources 79 12 9Improvement of attidude:Leadership by example 69 16 15Clean, efficielll & trustworthy 72 16 12Work ethics:Accountability 79 8 13Co-operation 78 6 16

Source: survey data

universalistic, i.e. encompass the wholeorganisation en bloc.' (Crozier 1964: 196)

Improvement in the output capacity of thebureaucracy in Malaysia could only be donethough intensifying administrative reform viadirect political influence. As Mavis Puthuchearyargued, 'Political and administrative developments must take place side by side if there is tobe a reform necessary to achieve administrativeefficiency and public accountability.' (Putl1llcheal]' 1978: 119).

Mahathir's administration began to

undertake changes almost immediately uponassuming office. The targets of his reforms arewide ranging, for example, civil servants,businessmen, the public and the ruling elite,including ministers and members of royalty. One

respondent suggested that given tIll" opportunityand the right political support, t Ill" public sectorcan accept the challenges of change and reform.The administrative reform movement of the1980s and the present economic/businessmanagement era have shown that administrativereform and political leadership priorities areinter-supportive and complemental]' (Asiaweek19 March 1976: 12).

Some major reforms undertaken have beenencouraged by the present top leadership. Forexample, the government began to liaise withthe private sector under the concept of MalaysiaIncorporated. This means that Malaysia shouldbe viewed as a company in which the government·and the private sector are both owners and coworkers. Mahathir also believes firmly in

112 PertanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hnm. Vol. 5 No. 21997


'leadership by example', which has become theslogan of his administration. Another drasticchange in his administration was the Look EastPolicy. Under this policy, the people of Malaysiawere encouraged to change their traditionalviews of Western countries as role models and to

look instead towards Japan and Korea as theAsean blueprint for economic success.

The 'clean, efficient and trustworthy'concept of government emerged from the LookEast Policy. Under this slogan, new systems,techniques and pr, )«'clures of administrationwere introduced in search of increasing efficiencyand effectiveness in the public service. Mattersfor re-examination included diligence anddiscipline at work, loyalty to the nation and tothe enterprise or business where the worker isemployed, emphasis on quality, productivity, andmanagement systems which concentrate on longterm achievement rather than short-termincreases in dividends.

The management of the nation was gearedtowards more efficiency so as to achieve politicalstability and development. Work manuals andcleskfiles were in troduced. Civil servants wereencouraged to be more punctual and efficient.All civil servants were required to wear nametags to make them more personally accountableto the general public. Time clocks were installedin every government office to ensure that thestated working hours were strictly adhered to.The shift in attitude towards the East wasaccompanied by a greater emphasis on Islamicvalues within the administration itself (Tilmanand Tilman 1977: 143). A fresh move againstcorruption and mismanagement was launched,and steps were taken to weed out officials whowere either known or suspected to be corrupt.Some civil servants resigned immediately onhearing that the new Prime Minister was planningto winkle them out of office (Tilman and Tilman]977: 143).

In each of the areas of reform, Mahathir hasshown his interest and commitment to achievethe desired goals of his policies. evertheless, asadministrative reform is a continuing process,

political leadership is vital in determining thefate of any reform at any given time. In theabsence of strong leadership traits such aspolitical skills, vision, philosophy or managerialmind to engineer and reinforce continualcommitment to results, administrative reformsare often doomed to failure.

Thus, it is suggested here that in the absenceof strong administrative leadership to initiatemajor reforms, Mahathir emerged in the midstof bureaucratic inertia and exerted his leadershipcapability authoritatively in his policy Jeforms.Emphatically, Mahathir's leadership has beenimportant in ensuring the fate of many reforms.But we should bear in the mind that besidesfactors like his leadership qualities, reformpolicies and executive power, other favourablefactors have enabled him to undertakeadministrative reform efforts. These include thestyle of his leadership-characterised astransactional and charismatic leadershipbureaucratic support, political stability, goodtiming as well as integrity in the eyes of thepeople of different races. All these favourablefactors have encouraged administrative reformswith minimum obstacles (Asiaweek 30 January1976: II). Mahathir's administration has beenable to forge a coalition of participating elitesuch as bureaucrats, military, politicians andbusinessmen to share rather than monopolisepower for the development process.

Attitude towards the BW'eaucmcy

Mahathir's political attitude started when he wasstill at school. His forthright way can be tracedback to his early writings beginning in 1949. Hewrote on political subjects under the pseudonymof C.H .E. Det (Adshead 1989: 25-26). Accordingto two former top civil servants, one reason whyMahathir is critical of civil servants (Mehden1981: 214), especially in the early days of hispremiership, was due to his bad experience as agovernment doctor on Langkawi Island, the mostbackward area in Keclah State during the late1950s. At that time, he was also conducting parttime business in real estate.! Therefore, he was

I. This point was described by Datuk Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad, Former Director General of MAMPU and SecretaryGeneral of Public Enterprises Ministry. Retired in 1988; in 1989 was appointed Petronas Vice President. Theinterview was held on 24 December 1989 and 4 September 1992. In 1977. Dr. Mahathir called Datuk Abdullahto his office together with the then Chief Secretary to the Goverment Tan Sri Abdullah Salleh and another seniol'civil servant to discuss the administrative reform efforts in the public service.


Ahmad ALOry bin Hussain

used to dealing with civil servants; he saw thatthe civil service was so slow to react to what heclaimed to be inefficiency in delivering servicesto the public.~

Therefore, besides being a generalpractitioner, he also had a little administrativeexperience before becoming Minister ofEducation in 1974. However, before beingappointed to the Cabinet, he had proven hisadministrative capability as Chairman of FoodIndustries of Malaysia (FlMA). He was said to beable to take on heavy responsibility. This can beseen in a comment made by Asiaweek:

'His boundless energy makes up for that. Heknows what he wants, and he is quick to makedecisions. He is a stickler for decisions and hisstrong convictions sometimes make him look moreuncompromising than he really is. Since becomingEducation Minister, he had tried to live down hisreputation. "I will try to do a good job - for allMalaysians" he promised on taking up that job in1974.' (Asiaweek 19 March 1976: 8).

Therefore, his critical view of thebureaucracy had its roots long before he becamea politician. His perception towards the civilservice was somewhat different from that of hispredecessors, particularly Tun Abdul Razak (thesecond Prime Minister). His perception iscoloured by his Kedah experience. While in hisclinic, he saw that the civil servants were morerelaxed than those in the medical service.:' Sowhen he became Prime Minister, he undertookto upgrade bureaucrats in order to be moredynamic, efficient and productive.~He knew thebureaucracy is a strong pillar for the Malays andthat the country's economy could be improvedif the bureaucracy was revitalised with moreefficien t civil servan ts."

More active interaction with the Malaysianbureaucracy began during his deputy primeministership (1976-1981). Mahathir held frequentmeetings and dialogues with all top civil servantsand was critical about bureaucratic inertia in thepublic service. In these numerous meetings withthe top civil servants, he would ask questionsuch as: What was the planning division at EPU(Economic Planning Unit), ICU (Implementationand Co-ordination Unit), PSD (Public ServiceDepartment) doing? What about the manpowerplanning and productivity level of the publicservants? 'Why were there so many grievancesarising from the public regarding bureaucraticinefficiency, absenteeism and 'colonial type ofbureaucrat' .Ii

Mahathir was concerned about administrativeproblems, particularly at district level throughoutthe country. One problem was the delay inproject implementation at the district level.Among the problems identified were inadequatefacilities in most of the district offices such asthe lack of computers, inefficient managementsystem, poor inventory and financial systems andlow quality of leadership of the officers. Mahathirdirected that a Cabinet paper be prepared toformulate strategies for modernising the districtoffices.7 The establishment of MAMPU was aimedat working to modernise the district administration. Since Mahathir took office as PrimeMinister in 1981, MAMPU has expanded its roleto modernise the whole machinery of the civilservice in response to the urgent need to expeditethe implementation of development plans.s

DlII-ing his deputy prime ministership,Mahathir could not start a comprehensiveadministrative reform plan because he was secondin commandY Due to his subordinate position

2. Interview in 29 August 1992 ,,~th Damk Alwi Jantan, a former State Secretary of Selangor, Director-GeneralEconomic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department; Director-General Public Se,-vice Department. He retiredin 1990. This is also supported by Tan Radin Soenarno Alhaj, fonner State Secretary of Perak, Secretary-GeneralMinistry of Lands and Regional Development, DirecLOr-General of Economic Planning Unit, Prime MinisterDepartment. I-Ie retired in 1987.

3. According LO Alwi Jantan, before Mahathir joined politiets, he saw the MCS officers were more relaxed than amedical dOCLOr. The)' had ample time to play golf, LO attend parties or gatherings, So, this gave him a differentperception about the iVICS officers.

4. Interview with Alwi .laman.5. Interview with Radin Soernarno on 20 August 1992.6. Interview with Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad on 4 September 1992.7. Interview with Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad.8. Interview with Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad on 4 September 1992.9. Interview with Alwi .lantan on 29 August 1992.

114 PertanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 5 '0.21997

The Leadership Factor in Adminisu'ative Reform in Malaysia

to Tun Hussein Onn (the third Prime Minister),Mahathir could not function as effectively as hehad wan ted. IU When he came to power, problemswere already mounting. His immediate thoughton taking office as the fourth Prime Minister on16 July 1981 was to find ways to improve theefficiency of the government machinery(Adshead 1989: 74).

Mahathir differs from his predecessors,particularly in his relationship with civil servants.Unlike Tun Razak, Mahathir was not an MCS(Malaysian Civil Service) officer and wasconsidered an 'outsider' by the bureaucracy. Inthe early days of his prime ministership,Mahathir's relations with civil servants were notas close as Tun Razak's had been. As a formergovernment officer, Tun Razak was consideredas one of themselves by the civil servants. TunRazak was also more comfortable dealing withcivil servants than politicians, especially at theimplementation level. Although he was a PrimeMinister, 'he was like a top administrator at thesame time'.11 In other words, Tun Razak reliedon the civil servants to carry out his policy,especially in the rural development projectsbecause he knew the psyche of the civil servants,in terms of their ethos, tradition and sub-culture,and he expected to refer to civil servants (Doh1981: 64). He knew the boundary between thecivil servants and politicians. To Tun Razak,success in the implementation of developmentprojects was a function of a leadership with theright attitude and dedication (Doh 1981: 64).This was partly because, during Razak's era, thepublic sector occupied a major role in thecountl)"s economic development. Unlike TunRazak, Mahathir was less appreciative of theroles played by MCS officers, especially in theearly days of his premiership.'2 This was because

the private sector played a significant role in thecountry's economy.

According to one senior civil servantinterviewed, Mahathir was initially indifferentwith regard to the role of the MCS because hebelieved that 'everybody can do a job in thepublic service',13 This belief was reinforced whenhe asked opinions of non-civil servants likebusiness and technical people to assist him informulating economic policies or inimplementing certain projects. A typical exampleis the privatisation policy which manifests hisentrepreneurial thinking.'~

Unlike Tun Razak, Mahathir did not placemuch faith in civil servants. This could be seenin a tussle between Mahathir and the bureaucratsin influencing public policy during the firstthree years of his premiership. Relations betweenMahathir and the civil servants became strained. I;;

Mahathir criticised civil servants openly in publicand upset a good number of them. lti He attackedcivil servants for inefficiency and ineffectiveness,delays, red tape, mismanagement and absenteeism.His criticisms were published in the nationalnewspapers and mass media. I? Another agencywhich had attracted his attention was theadministration of Kuala Lumpur City. \¥hile someof Mahathir's criticisms might have someelements of truth and were justifiable, civilservants thought that such criticisms should nothave been made publicly, but instead shouldhave been communicated diplomatically. IS

As criticism of civil servants becameincreasingly apparent, an open dialogue washeld in early 1984 between the Prime Ministerand members of the Association of MalaysianCivil Servants to discuss the matter. The latterexpressed their disappointment and grievancesover the open criticism fielded by the Prime

10. Interview with Alwi Jantan. This view was also expressed by Allmad Mustafa Hassan during an interview with thewriter on 8 October 1992. He is Chairman of Namfa Corporation, former Kedah state civil servant, PoliticalSecretary to Minister of Information (1965-1969), Press Secretary to Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak 1970-1976,Tun Hussein Onn 1976-1980, and General Manager of Bernama (National News Agency of Malaysia).

11. This point is supported by Alwi Jantan.12. Opinion of Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad.

13. Statement made by Radin Soenarno.14. Statement made by AI\\~ Jantan.15. Statement made by Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad.16. This is the view of Alwi Jantan and is also supported by Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad.17. Statement made by Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad.18. Opinion of Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad.



Minister and other politicians. During thedialogue, the Prime Minister was told that theMalaysian civil servants had contributed a lot tothe nation since independence. They evenclaimed that civil servants had done remarkablywell so far, had played their role in implementingthe development policy of the government, hadhelped assist the setting-up of the variousgovernment programmes such as ruraldevelopment projects, Operation RoomTechnique, DAU (Development AdministrationUnit), Red Book Plan and MAMPU. Thus, inthe view of the MCS Association, they had donetheir part and they should not be blamed totallyfor all discrepancies in the public bureaucracy.19

It was said that after the dialogue, therelationship between the Prime Minister and civilservants began to improvC'~o Amidst a leadershipcrisis in UMNO (the ruling party-United MalaysNational Organisation) in 1987, Dr. Mahathirsought the support of the bureaucrats, partly tostrengthen his political position.

Initially, a number of administrative reformefforts introduced by the Mahathir administrationreflected a new dimension in the bureaucracy.In the beginning, the civil service was wary ofthe many policies he introduced (Adshead 1989:166), particularly those that might affect theirroutine life styles. It was apparent that seniorstaff were more worried than their junior orlower level counterparts about Mahathir's reformefforts (Adshead 1989: 166).

Strategies in Managing the Public Sector: ExecutiveDominance

Since 1981, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad has beenkeen to adopt administrative reforms in theimplementation of development plans vis-a.-vis

policy implementation. Various administrativetechniques21 and reform efforts have beenintroduced to implement policy developments.In addition, two distinct strategies in managingthe public sector have probably characterisedMahathir's style of management, namelytransactional (Chee 1991: 15) and transformingor charismatic leadership.

Transactional versus transfanning leadership.

According to Burns, leadership 'is an aspect ofpower'. Thus, leadership may be interpreted 'asleader inducing followers to go for certain goalsthat represent the values, motivations, aspirationsand expectations of both leaders and followers'(Burns 1978: 8-9). From this leader-followerinteraction, Burns identifies two fundamentaltypes of leadership, namely transactional andtransforming leadership. In the developmentalstate, leadership acts are increasingly in thenature of transactions, bargaining or exchangerelationships between individuals, groups andlarger collectivities. Because of the instrumentalnature of transactions, transactional leadershiptends to depend on the availability of exchangeof values (Chee 1991: 1-5). One of the essentialvalues for the transactional or functionalleadership is dependency on the bureaucracy,which occupies a functional role in the society.Such dependency stems from the fact that thephase of development in the 1980s and 1990s isseen as the era of bureaucracy or technocracyrather than charismatic or personifiedrelationship as characterised in the transformingleadership (Chee 1991: 1-5). Transforming orcharismatic leadership is characterised by apersonified relationship between the leader andthe bureaucracy.

19. Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad.20. Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad. A sign of positively amicable relationship was expressed in his speech during the UMNO

meeting with the Division Heads in 1985 where he complimented the ci\11 servants. Among other things Mahathiradvised the politicians and UMNO members not to criticise the ci\il servants too openly as they also hadcontributerl to the country's development.

21. Administrative is borrowed from Benze's concept, which forms the basis of presidential management in the UnitedStates. The concept is broadly used to explain various reform efforts in American public bureaucracy such asreorganisation and ci\il selvice reforms. An increased focus on personnel (both political executive and career civilservants), an increased use of presidential stall in oversight and implementation capacities, and attempts to controlthe federal budget making process through PPBS, MBO and ZBB (see Benze 1980). Perhaps, owing to the broadconcept of administrative technique, the term could also resemble the term administrative reform. By usingadministrative technique vis-a-vis administrative reform, the presidential objective has been to obtain centralisedcontrol over the implementation of policy (Rose 1976: 15: Benze 1980; Chalmers 1982: 355; 1987: 13&-164).

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The Leadership Factol' in Administrative Reform in Malaysia

In general, transactional leadership is moreappropriate to describe Mahathir's leadershipstyle in energising administrative reform,However, it is slightly difficult to characteriseMahathir's leadership as either one or the other.He is probablv characterised by both leadershipstyles, transactional and charismatic. Oneexample of him as a transactional leader is thatsince becoming Prime Minister, he has beenable to show himself to be a dominant actor byintroducing the privatisation concept as one ofhis development policies acceptable to both thebureaucrats as well as private entrepreneurs. Inother words, being a good politician, Mahathirhas been able to forge an alliance betweencontending elites within the bureaucracy andthe private sector to accept his numerousadministrative reforms.

Mahathir has also brought his ownorien tation towards affecti ng adm in istra tivereforms. As the ensuing discussion will show,Mahathir plays a central role in formulatingpublic policies pertaining to administrativereform. Thus, due to this dominant views,Mahathir has brought a new kind of charismaticor 'transforming' leadership into the publicsector to change the attitudes of civil servantstowards more dynamism, competency andproductivity. Because he is a transforming leader,Mahathir has brought the bureaucracy underhis dominant control.

Leadership qualities, policy statements and executivepower. In the Mahathir administration,

administrative reforms have been used in aneffort to modernise the civil service. His intentionis to reform the bureaucracy which he thinks hasnot been able to implement development policiesefficiently and effectively. In this case, twomanagement techniques have been employed byMahathir. The first is the 'policy statement'techJ:lique characterised by administrative reformpolicies such as personnel improvements, scalingdown the size of the public sector, improvingsenrices to the public, Look East Policy, MalaysiaIncorporated, privatisation and financialmanagement in order to increase his ability tocontrol the implementation of policy.

The second is the 'leadership quality'techniquen such as the collection of personaland political skills, philosophy, motivationmission, vision, courage, self-confidence,flexibility, managerial mind, and also what heperceives to be important administrativeproblems and how administrative or reformtechniques can be applied to solve theseproblems. Thus, Mahathir felt that if thebureaucracy is left on its own to implement thedevelopment policies, they might not be carriedout according to his plans. Therefore, he has toimpose some control by providing administrativereform policies in the public sector in order tochange, innovate, move or create vision in publicorganisationsY

Apart from being characterised as atransactional and charismatic or transformingleader, two other additional variables, 'reformpolicies' and 'leadership qualities', are also

22. Leadership quality can also be termed 'internal dimension of power' as developed by Benze, to show that successfulmanagement depends not only on the application of administrative reform/techniques (the external dimensionof power). Instead, the success of administrative reforms has been shown to depend on the use of leadershipqualities or skills like a number of presidential personal characteristics (courage, intelligence, vision and selfconfidence) and political skills (ability to relate to Congress, ability to assess political realities, skills in timing, issuepositions, ability to maintain the public trust, and the ability to sell programmes). The extent to which a presidenthas these skills and is able to use them effectively may determine Ule success of his administrative progremmes orreform. (Summarised from Benze 1980; 194-195). "''bile reform policy could be termed 'external dimension ofpower'. which is used to explain the implementation of presidential power, e.g. reorganisation plans, ci\~l servicereform and forth (see Benze 1980: 105-117, Another scholar, James E. Skok equates the term administrativetechnique vis-a-vis adminisu'ative reform as 'strategic management' in the public sector which can effeerively resolveadministrative problems. Following his definition, strategic management is best understood as purposive actiontl1rough which agencies identify and realise organisation's objectives within their operating environments. Su'ategicmanagement for public agencies, therefore, should be seen as process designed to develop desired relationshipswith other participants in competitive situations in order to advance a preferred policy outcome and effectiveness.(Summarised from Skok 1989; 135-137.)

23. Personal interview with Tan Sri Zainal Mahmood, former Secretary General, Home Affairs Ministry, 5 October 1992Executive Chairman of Pos Malaysia.



helpful in understanding Mahathir's leadershipstyle. As prime ministerial power is of utmostimportance to ensure the fate of reform effortsin the bureaucracy, it is natural that theleadership qualities of his personal skills as theprime minister, especially his skills necessary forinteracting with other elite and to reform policies,would form an important prime ministerial powerand thus his management style.24

Although these skills (leadership qualities,reform policies and executive power) areconsidered to be important components of theprime ministerial power, it is obvious thatdifferent prime ministers will have these skills indifferent degrees and will employ them indifferent fashions. 25 Mahathir is seen as displayingall of these three elements of power-reformpolicies, leadership qualities and executivepower-over legislature, budget, information andtechnical personnel (Samonte and Hahn 1970:89). This triad of elements is a synergism whichdescribes different types of force moving togetherto become a movement of power of the PrimeMinister to push for successive administrativereforms. Such concepts of prime ministerialpower are listed in Fig. 1.

Perhaps such a conceptual framework shouldtherefore be closely watched for verification ofMahathir's style of administration. As seen inFig. 1, Dr. Mahathir has strong, decisive andcharismatic leadership, both in the political arenaand inside the bureaucracy. As such, hecompelled the bureaucracy to implement hisdevelopment policy-in other words, he is atransactional leader. Having identified Mahathiras being both a transactional and transformingleader, the other three characteristics of powernecessary for his remarkable success ofadministrative reforms are reform policies,leadership qualities and executive power. Theseelements move together for the Prime Ministerto push for successive administrative reforms.

Mahathir's personal characteristics in the bureaucracyand general strategy of development. First, it isnecessary to analyse the leadership qualities (thecollection of attributes such as personal skills,attitudes, perception and philosophy) thatMahathir brings into the process of governing.Several scholars and senior civil servantsconcurred with the opinion that basically

Executive Power

Over ParliamentBudget/funding informationTechnical personnelSecurityBudget reformFinancial management

Reform Policies

PrivatisationLeadershup by examplePersonnel improvementsMalaysia IncorporatedCon tro1, etc.

Leadership Qualities

Political and electoral skillsPhilosophyPolitical and bureaucraticsupportManagerial mindCourageMissionFlexibilityMotivationVision

Fig. 1 Tliad elements of power or management style of the prime minister

24. This view is adapted from Clayton and Lammers (1978). The specific skills that Clayton and Lammers found areimportant and are quite relevant to this study where the leadership support in administrative reform has essentialperimeters.

25. It is beyond the writer's intention to compare a continuum of adminisu'ative styles of previous ministers in detail.However, for Mahathir's leadership, in the words of Tan Sri Sallehuddin Mohamad: ' 0 doubt, Mahathir isdynamic, has strong conception of power. He is also a thinker and implementer.'



Mahathir has vision, sophistication, passion andthe ability to formulate goals.26

His philosophy of development strategy isquite different from that of previous PrimeMinisters. For example, Tun Razak placed moreemphasis on rural development in his efforts toupgrade the Malay economy.27 Dr. Mahathir, onother hand, emphasises the close relationshipbetween the public and private sectors, which isa more business-oriented policy. Therefore, theMalays have to change their notions aboutprogress so that they can be more successful andcompetitive. The campaigns on such themes ascleanliness, skill acquisition, honesty anddiscipline are attempts to change the value systemof the Malaysian community in order that theybecome more progressive and successful.

Mahathir has an eye for detail. When heconceptualises projects, he expects everything toget done properly. In the implementation of aproject, he takes a keen interest, makes personalvisits and gives his finishing touch.2R This is quitedifferent from Tun Razak, who would onlyinspect a project when it had been completedand looked more in to the account of proceduresand regulations or allocations. By the same token,Tun Razak knew exactly what was needed to bedone because he was formerly an MCS officer.~9

In contrast, Mahathir carries a reputation forwanting pragmatism. This tendency might havebeen inherited from his career as a medicaldoctor when quick decisions are necessary inemergencies; 'sometimes one has to act first andexplain later' (Adshead 1989: 166).

Mahathir is a visionary leader and at thesame time pragmatic, dynamic and highlyintelligent.30 While Tun Razak was a 'problem-

oriented' leader, Mahathir is 'policy-oriented',tending to look at programmes as means forlong-term results. As a leader Mahathir not onlyknows what has to be done 'to make a policy',but also knows how to get it done, 'to haveprogramme or guidance' to go by.:J!

It is perceived that Tun Razak did not havea long-term vision and the pragmatism neededto keep up with changing times. Thus, in onespeech he stressed, 'The time has come in ourpresent phase of development for the AllianceGovernment to produce immediate and quickresults in all fields of development' (Doh 1981:64). This led to programmes focusing on ruraldevelopment, which accounted for the emphasison the building of schools, roads, health centres,mosques, community halls, the digging of wells,the provision of utilities, the opening of landand so on (Doh 1981: 64). People were moreloyal to him, admired and loved him as a leaderrather than his ideas.32 Thus, Tun Razak'sleadership style exhibited characteristics of atransforming or a charismatic leader. This is anexample of how leadership can make a systemwork. The famous Operation Room and RedBook Systems became successful, especially inmonitoring the physical process of developmentprojects, owing largely to his personal drive andefforts in the form of unscheduled visits tooperations rooms at state and district levels, onthe spot checks and exhortations to officers tochange their attitude, to co-ordinate their workand to speed up the implementations of thedevelopment projects (Doh 1981: 65).

Mahathir is imaginative in the way he usesthe government officers. To ensure thebureaucracy's support for his policies, he placed

26. This obsel\'ed pattern of beha\~our is based on the writer's ~ew when undertaking research entitled 'The Split inUM 0 Politics: A Study on the Leadership Crisis after 24'h April 1987', sponsored by Universiti KebangsaanMalaysia, Bangi 1988. The writer first had an informal talk Dr. Mahathir on 24 September 1977. See also AhmadAtory (1987a, b). Several books have been written by authors who relatively praise Mahathir's standing as being themost capable leader in Malaysia such as Abu Hassan (1985): Nasarudin (1985); Hassan (1990); Aziz Zaria (1990);Idris (1990); Zakri (1990). In spite of the praise and acknowledgement of his standing, there has also been no lesscriticism by many writters, for example,jomo (1994a, b); The most recent literature on Mahathir is Khoo (1994).Among its contents 'is the dynamism of Mahathir's leadership since he came to power in 1981 towards more liberalpolicies on politics, economy and social issues for Malaysia's economic development.

27. Opinion of Abdullah Sanusi.28. Opinion of Radin Soenarno.29. This point is made by Abdullah Sanusi and A1wi jantan.30. Statement made by Radin Soenarno, Also the opinion of Tan Sri Sallehuddin Mohamad.31. Opinion of Sallehuddin Mohamad. Intemew held on 13th October 1992. Tan Sri Sallehuddin was Chief Secretary

to the Goverment 1985-1990. From 1990, the Employees Pro\~dent Fund's Executive Chairman.32. Statement by Radin Soenarno.

PertanikaJ. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 5 No.2 1997 J 19


his men in the strategic agencies of thegovernment. He retained some Chief Secretariesof the Government, reassigned others amongvarious ministries and took a personal interest inthose who share his views. Mahathir also choosesto rely on professionals outside the civil serviceto assist him in formulating his policies in matterssuch as privatisation or industrialisation. Forexample, he takes the initiative to bringconsultants from the private sector to givelectures and seminars to civil servants on business,management and entrepreneurship.'I~

As Chief Executive, Mahathir providesleadership to the civil servants and is regardedas a proactive leader in formulating administrative reform efforts. In turn, the civil servantsrespond to his ideas because they can stand upwith him. Thus, most of the reform efforts havebeen inspired and influenced by him; bureaucratssimply carry out the policies. They respect himas well as help him implement his policies.According to a former senior civil servant, RadinSoenarno, Mahathir really discusses ideas firstwith the civil servants before introducingprogrammes (especially in the early days of hispremiership such as Look East Policy, MalaysiaIncorporated or Leadership by Example). Butwhen the Prime Minister realises that not all ofthem are able to think intellectually as theyrarely give their views, even though some mighthave master's or doctorate degrees, he wouldthen make his presentation simple for them tounderstand.'I'! If a suggestion or a new idea is putforward by a civil servant, he/she is expected toconvince the Prime Minister of his/her plan.Otherwise, it might be turned down. Mahathir isalso firm in the sense that when he agrees tocertain things, he adheres to them.O"

However, it is doubtful whether two-waycommunication and flexibility exist between himand civil servants in most major public policymaking processes because there is evidence tosuggest that there has been little pondering amongcivil sel\'ants as a result of assertiveness.

Dr. Mahathir always believes that, to beworthwhile, an idea must be implemented, or atleast personally supervised, by its originator. Onlythe originator knows exactly what is required andneeds to be done to achieve the set objective. Asan example of his keenness to remain involved,he always carries a small notebook on his frequenttrips within the capital and around the country,in which he details things he has seen that appearto him to be wrong (Adshead 1989: 166).

To make leadership by example a reality,he himself sets examples even though they looksimple. For instance, when he introduced thepunch card and clock-in system in the publicbureaucracy, he himself set the example byleaving his office between 6.30 and 7.00 pm,well after the 4.30 pm clock-out time. In hisattempt to encourage civil servants to saveenergy, he sets an example by switching on thelights in his office himself and switching themoff when he goes out for lunch or leaves forhome. He never allows his office assistant toswitch on the lights. Another example is thathe himself gets involved in undertaking effortsto beautify Kuala Lumpur. He makes frequenttrips around the city in an effort to make KualaLumpur the most beautiful and clean city-acity of lights. He even decides the most suitableshady trees and flower plants to be plantedalong the major streets and sidewalks withinthe city. He also encourages and takes theinitiative in the building of fountains at themajor roundabouts within the city (Adshead1989: 166).'16

He is a keen reader of management books,and asks his Cabinet members to do the samefor the benefit of their organisation. Because heis a workaholic, well read and has many newideas, he expects his administrative staff to followhis example.37 Thus, he wants to see new things.and not just stick to old and obsolete ones.3M

Because of his impatience in undertakingdevelopment projects, there is a great possibilityof delay at the implementation level due to

33. Statement by Abdullah Sanusi Ahmad.34. Statement by Radin Soenarno.35. Statemel1l by Radin Soenarno.36. Statement by Radin Soenarno. Also the opinion of Ahmad Mustafa Hassan.37. Opinion of Zainal Mahmood.38. Opinion of Zainal Mahmood.



inadequate manpower. For example, Dr.Mahathir always queries or expresses doubt overred tape or delay in project implementation.~'l

His wide knowledge also stems from hisfrequent interaction with people of all walks oflife. People come in and out of his office andthey also write to him personally, not only forofficial purposes but sometimes just to give ideasand information. All these inputs certainly makehim well-read and a knowledgeable person, somuch so he is well versed and up-to-date on manysubjects such as technology, management,international politics, agriculture and environ-ment. 40 .

In UMNO politics, Dr. Mahathir is in directcontrast to the past UMNO presidents/primeministers, especially Tun Hussein ann. Dr.Mahathir revels in the rough and tumble ofpolitical intrigue. Tun Hussein ann seemed toprefer to be reticent and withdrawn, but Mahathirhas the courage to change things and dares totake risks:" Hussein ann was quite aloof, amilitary type and formal leader. 42 He wasstraightforward, did not go around to get detailedinformation, but instead, the information had tobe brought to himY Given these differences, itis small wonder that Dr. Mahathir has a differentattitude towards governing than Tun Husseinann had.

Although quite unpopular among civilservants in the beginning, Mahathir has managedto get strong support from heads of governmentdepartments, particularly the support of the thenChief Secretary to the Government and the thenDirector-General of the Public ServiceDepartment.H His direct involvement in thepublic policy-making process is clearly seen whenhe sends personal letters to the implementingMinistries or Agencies instructing them to carryout the reform efforts that were introduced.

Therefore, his use of administrative reform as amean of gaining control over the civil servicerepresents a genuine strategy in the applicationof policy implementation. This is furthersupported by written comments accompanyingthe questionnaire, which suggested that majorpolicies on establishments, salaries andallowances of the public service are decided bya Cabinet-level committee chaired by the PrimeMinister himselfY His involvement in the policymaking process has further enhanced him as acharismatic leader.

Mahathir's strategy of development isdifferent from his predecessors. His greatestcontribution is 'moving beyond'-both inwardand outward-looking perspectives of development. The outward-looking aspect of Mahathir'sapproach to development can be seen in termsof imitating selectively the good points, examplesand experiences of other countries such asJapanand Korea.

During Dr. Mahathir's era, initially theindustrialisation policy was not well developedbecause of the narrow manufacturing base, theweakness of industrial linkages and the lack ofbureaucratic-business interaction, not becauseof the lack of physical amenities such as roads,electricity and water supply. The manufacturingbase was clearly lacking in terms of forwardlinkages such as business networks, markets andskilled labourers. This is evidenced from themany failures and reverses in industrial projects,such as Perwaja Steel. As the emphasis is onindustrialisation, there was a need for heavycapitalisation which the government was thenunable to provide. Like Tun Razak, Dr. Mahathirfailed in his efforts to adopt the industrialisationpolicy because of Jack of supportive infrastructureto attract a number of urban people to invest inthe rural areas.

39. This statement was observed by the writer when undertaking research work entitled 'The Split in UMNO Politics'begun in 1988. Also the opinion of Radin Soenarno.

40. This statament is derived from Alwi Jantan.41. Opinion of Zainal Mahmood. According to Ahmad Mustafa Hassan, Hussein's leadership was far behind Dr.

Mahathir's. Hussein Onn was picked by Tun Razak to be deputy not because he could do the job but as a matterof destiny and being his brother-in-law; 'The only Prime Minister who goes to the office with a bundle of workingpapers.'

42. This view is from Radin Soenarno.43. Opinion given in response to question on the influence of administrative reform outside the civil service.44. This view is from Radin Soenarno.45. Opinion given in response to question on the influence of administrative reform outside the civil service.



There are also differences in the methodfor generation of financial sources fordevelopment between the various primeministers. For example, Tun Razak and TunHussein ann used externally-generated moneyfor development. On the other hand, Dr.Mahathir has sought financial sources locally.Joint ventures are one way Dr. Mahathir uses togenerate capital for development. Tun Razakencouraged agro-based industry by providingincentives such as pioneer status to attract foreigninvestors. There was a huge flow of foreigncapital during the era of Tun Razak and TunHussein. Unlike Tun Razak, Dr. Mahathir givespioneer status and incentives to local instead offoreign investors, and encourages capitalintensive industries so that local people can getinvolved in the manufacturing sector.

Tun Razak and Tun Hussein ann regarded'control' as the main weapon to effect policydevelopment. On the contrary, Dr. Mahathirregards 'accountability' as his main tool. Forexample, during the period of Tun Razak andTun Hussein, the policy of awarding scholarshipsto students for tertiary education was aimed atattracting them to serve in the public sector andstatutory bodies. Dr. Mahathir, on the otherhand, regards scholarships as a tool to servegovernment policies such as the industrialisationpolicy. Government-sponsored students are nowtied to either the public or private sectors. Inother words, the most important factor to Dr.Mahathir is not the 'procedure' but the 'method'for effecting his policy development.

In conjunction with the above, Dr. Mahathirhas brought about a 'mental revolution' in hisefforts to change the attitudes of governmentservants towards entrepreneurship. Educationhas become the basis to change the orientationfrom the rural-urban development which waslaid down by Tun Razak to a new orientation,that is a metropolis centred-development in thecontext of the industrialisation policy in whichthe emphasis is satellite production. Dr. Mahathirhas not only a vision but also a future orientation,as seen in his Vision 2020.

In conclusion, it is observed that the reformprogramme has succeeded (though more couldhave been done) in making a substantialcontribution to enhance efficiency, effectivenessand productivity of the Malaysian bureaucracytowards realising the pace of nationaldevelopment goals. Hence, Dr. Mahathir

leadership role is of paramount importance ineffecting such administrative reforms in Malaysia.

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(Received 12 April 1996)


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The Leadership Factor in Administrative Reform in Malaysia