The Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics (LIMP ...LIMP Exercise Data Handbook . ... Baker disappeared until 1998 when a small explosion occurred on a pipeline northeast of the

The information in this book is hypothetical and is not based on any performance tests that have been conducted by the United States Government, Department of Energy.

Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics—The Hypothetical Facility 1 The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course

The Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics (LIMP) Hypothetical Facility Exercise Data Handbook

Table of Contents¶

Section

Title

Page Section 1. Country of Lagassi Description and Map .............................................................. 3 Section 2. City of Hashbakar Description and Map ............................................................... 4

Figure 2. Hashbakar City Map ............................................................................ 4 Section 3. LIMP Introduction with Environmental and Physical Conditions ............................ 5 Section 4. LIMP Site Layout and Response Force Location .................................................. 6 Section 4. Target Identification .............................................................................................. 7

Table 1. Nuclear Materials and Their Enrichment at the Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics ........................................................................... 7

Section 5. Threat Assessment .............................................................................................. 8 Section 6. Response Forces at the Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics .................... 15

Table 2. Response Force Deployment Data ..................................................... 17 Table 3. Average Times for Physical Protection System Functions .................. 18

Section 7. Operations at Gates and Portals at LIMP ........................................................... 19 Section 8. Waste Storage Site—Description ....................................................................... 23 Section 9. PTR Research Reactor ...................................................................................... 24 Section 10. PTR Exterior Physical Protection Elements ...................................................... 26 Section 11. PTR Wall Thicknesses and Distances .............................................................. 27 Section 12. PTR Access Control Plan ................................................................................. 28 Section 13. PTR Building Floor Plan ................................................................................... 29 Section 14. PTR Interior Physical Protection Elements ....................................................... 30 Section 15. PTR Lighting .................................................................................................... 31 Section 16. PTR Video Monitoring System .......................................................................... 33 Section 17. PTR Alarm and Camera Display Console ......................................................... 34 Section 18. NBR Pulse Reactor—Description ..................................................................... 36 Section 19. NBR Above-ground Wall Thicknesses and Distances....................................... 38 Section 20. NBR Above Ground Access Control ................................................................. 39 Section 21. NBR Above Ground Building Floor Plan ........................................................... 40 Section 22. NBR Below Ground Building Floor Plan ........................................................... 41 Section 23. NBR Exterior Physical Protection Elements ...................................................... 42 Section 24. NBR Above Ground Interior Physical Protection Elements ............................... 43 Section 25. NBR Below Ground Interior Physical Protection Elements ............................... 44 Section 26. NBR Lighting .................................................................................................... 45 Section 27. Detection Component Data .............................................................................. 47

Table 4. Intrusion Detection Component Class ................................................. 47 Table 5. Access Control Detection Component Class ....................................... 48 Table 6. Human Surveillance Detection Component Class ............................... 49 Table 7. Contraband and CATEGORY 1 Detection Component Class ............. 50

Section 28. Delay Component Data .................................................................................... 52 Table 8. Barrier Delay Component Class .......................................................... 52 Table 9. Security Officers Delay Component Class .......................................... 54

LIMP Exercise Data Handbook


Table 10. Penetration Times—Fences .............................................................. 55 Table 11. Penetration Times—Gates ................................................................ 56 Table 12. Penetration Times—Walls ................................................................. 57 Table 13. Penetration Times—Doors ................................................................ 60 Table 14. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using 1-Meter Bolt Cutters ...... 64 Table 15. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using Portable Oxygen/

Acetylene Cutting Torch...................................................................... 65 Table 16. Cutting Rates for Mild Steel Sheet & Plate Using Oxygen Acetylene

Cutting Torch or Iron Oxygen Burn Bar ............................................... 66 Table 17. Time Required to Set an Explosives Package as a Function of

Package Weight ................................................................................. 67 Table 18. Running Rates .................................................................................. 68 Table 19. Vehicle Rates for Experienced Drivers .............................................. 69

Section 29. Table of Trials and Failures Giving PD for Designated Confidence Level ........... 70 Table 20. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials .................................... 70 Table 21. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures .............................. 73



Section 1. Country of Lagassi Description and Map{ TC "1. Maps" \f C \l "1" } The Republic of Lagassi, the smallest of the regional republics (Figure 1), possesses large fossil fuel reserves and plentiful supplies of other minerals and metals. It also has a large agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. Lagassi’s industrial sector rests on extracting and processing these natural resources and also on a growing machine-building sector that specializes in construction equipment, tractors, agricultural machinery, and some defense items. The country’s solid 3.5% economic growth is largely due to its booming energy sector but also to economic reform, good harvests, and foreign investment. To prevent overdependence on the oil sector, the country has embarked on an industrial policy designed to diversify the economy by developing light industry and a nuclear energy infrastructure.

Current industrial policy issues include expanding the development of the country’s emerging nuclear energy resources, achieving an export capacity of electrical energy to border countries, and strengthening relations with neighboring states and other foreign powers.

Figure 1. Country Map of Lagassi



Section 2. City of Hashbakar Description and Map The capital of Lagassi, Hashbakar, is an ancient city that originated at the crossroads of early trading lanes (Figure 2). Today, the city is a modern metropolis of two million inhabitants. Hashbakar contains a major roadway, a rail system, a private and military airport, and a limited waterway.

Figure 2. Hashbakar City Map



Section 3. LIMP Introduction with Environmental and Physical Conditions Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics The hypothetical nuclear research center, Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics (LIMP), was started in 1950 to serve as the nation’s premier nuclear energy research facility. The Institute houses various research, administrative, and plant support facilities. The LIMP is located in the Republic of Lagassi, approximately 29 km (18 mi) east of Hashbakar.{ TC "2. Physical and Environmental Conditions near the LIMP" \f C \l "1" }

Topography LIMP is located in the semi-arid steppes of Central Asia.

Vegetation Small shrubs, cacti, hardy desert trees, and grass are the only vegetation.

Wildlife Small animals inhabit the area, such as rabbits, squirrels, prairie dogs and coyotes. Birds of all sizes are also present.

Background Noise Regional earthquakes cause seismic disturbances occasionally. Some noise may also occur because of heavy passenger vehicle traffic and low-flying aircraft.

Climate/Weather The climate is a typical high-desert environment with approximately 300 clear days of bright sunshine per year. On cloudy days, there are areas with a high light-to-dark ratio because of moving cloud shadows. Rainfall is about 15 cm per year, with the majority occurring during thunderstorms in the late July-August rainy season. The spring is very windy for 2 to 3 months, with continuous winds of 2 to 5 km/hr and gusts up to 50 km/hr. Dry debris, dust, and dead vegetation are blown about during the windy season.



Section 4. LIMP Site Layout and Response Force Location



Section 4. Target Identification Theft Targets The theft target analysis, conducted in accordance with the recommendations of NSS-13, Nuclear Security Recommendations On Physical Protection of Nuclear Material And Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), identified the following target sets (Table 1).

Table 1. Nuclear Materials and Their Enrichment at the Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics

Facility Location Form of Material

Amount of Material On-site

(wt% enrichment) Total Isotope

Amounts Level of

Radiation

PTR Research Reactor

Reactor BeO-UO2 Fuel Rods (236 in reactor) 67.5 kg U (36% 235U) 24.3 kg 235U High

>1 Gy/hr at 1m R090 Fresh Fuel Vault

BeO-UO2 Fresh Fuel Rods (50 in storage) 14.3 kg U (36% 235U) 5.2 kg 235U Low

Irradiated Fuel Pool

BeO-UO2 irradiated fuel Rods

(100 in pool) 28.6 kg U (35% 235U 10.0 kg 235U

High 0.02-0.03

Gy/hr at 1m

R091 Product

Vault

Pu Experiments

HEU metal Other Sources

9.3 kg 239PuO2 (100% 239Pu)

23 kg U (95% 235U) Cs, Am, Sr

8kg 239Pu

22 kg 235U 3 kg total

Low

Low High

NBR

Reactor Facility

R100 Fuel in Reactor Core (10 discs)

14 kg U (93% 235U) 13 kg 235U Low

R102 HEU-metal Fresh Fuel (9 discs)

12.6 kg U (93% 235U) 11.7 kg 235U Low

R102 Used Fuel (1 discs)

1.4 kg U (93% 235U) 1.3 kg 235U

Low <0.003 Gy/hr

contact Waste

Storage Facility

Vats Liquid Mixture (2 vats, 2000 liters each)

Trace Amounts of Pu (75% 239Pu) and U

(18% 235U) trace

High 0.5-1.0 Gy/hr

at 1m

Sheds Solidified Waste (50 containers)

Trace Amounts of Pu(31% 239Pu) and

U(12% 235U) trace

High <0.5 Gy/hr at

1m



Section 5. Threat Assessment{ TC "4. Threat Data" \f C \l "1" } The following Threat Assessment is prepared to assist in the development of the State Design Basis Threat (DBT). The Threat Assessment is organized into threats from ideological terrorist groups, geo-political terrorist groups, subversives, criminal groups, and activist groups. As you review the Threat Assessment, consider the following policy issues for the State of Lagassi when developing the DBT:

• Lagassi is a developing state with limited economic resources. Significant increases in protection costs could strain the fragile economy.

• Lagassi has evolved from a somewhat unknown state on the world stage to an emerging economic state. This emergence has quickly increased the crime rate and a recently growing interest from terrorist groups.

• The people of Lagassi are proud of the historical accomplishments and their intellectual contribution to science. Their scientific contribution includes the many accomplishments of the research reactor, which was recently awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics.

• The State is politically democratic but has several political factions. The current government struggles to maintain its power base.

• A DBT review is scheduled for every 3 years. • The people of Lagassi trust their government to make the appropriate decisions to

protect them. Any breach of that trust will greatly undermine the government’s ability to maintain power.

International Ideological Terrorist Groups Two ideological terrorist groups are assessed in this report: (1) the Antarctics and (2) the Peoples Liberation Movement. The Antarctics

The Antarctics were founded and continue to be a led by Adrian Baker, a former professor of global economics. His deputy is Jose Digger, a former nuclear scientist and committed revolutionary. Baker embraced anarchist politics as a graduate student and developed a distinctive academic stance. He was dismissed from his academic post for his revolutionary views. He spent time working with various rebel groups before he put his thoughts into print. His most famous book, “The Antarctic Economy,” was published in 1985. In it, he argued that global trade is responsible for all environmental degradation and that the major economic blocks deny the opportunity for the rest of the world to develop environmentally sustainable local economies. In the book, he develops his arguments by theorizing how an anarchist terrorist group might return the world to a pre-trade era. He chose the name the Antarctics because, he said, it had symbolic value. It was white, pure, and pristine. Baker disappeared until 1998 when a small explosion occurred on a pipeline northeast of the Republic of Varnado. The explosion was commonly thought to be the work of a local terrorist group, but they denied it. Noticed only by one or two of the world’s intelligence agencies – and dismissed as a hoax – was a claim on a website in the name of the Antarctics.



Less is known about Jose Digger. After national service in a nuclear submarine, he trained as an engineer and has worked at nuclear power plants. He is believed to have spent some time on a research project designing novel small nuclear reactors. He is a committed revolutionary. It has been suggested that he blames western capitalism for the world’s poverty and for this purpose he has allied himself with Baker. Digger came to official notice after a second explosion at an oil refinery in Northern Stoyia. The explosive was placed on sensitive processing equipment within the controlled area of the refinery. It was again attributed to, but denied by, a local political terrorist group. Again, the Antarctics claimed responsibility and included a description of the device, confirmed months later by forensic analysis, on their website. The whereabouts of Baker and the Digger are typically unknown but recent highly sensitive intelligence reports their location as being in the mountains just north of Lagassi. They are thought to move easily among a number of separatist groups (Uplanders). Because of their intelligence and competence—as well as their anti-everybody stance—they are trusted by serious criminals. The latter are believed to offer them protection and, in exchange for small favors, operational support such as false documentation and small arms. These criminals, however, will not risk their lucrative lifestyles by becoming too closely identified with the Antarctics. The Antarctics originally believed they should have only two members. However, the number of plausible Antarctics claims has risen substantially in the last 18 months and it is clear that they have recruited some dedicated support. It is estimated that there are up to five capable operatives involved. Forensic evidence suggests that there is now more than one bomb maker, although it is likely that they are all trained by Digger. Analysis of the metals used suggests that he has created a sophisticated workshop or small factory. The metal case of one device contained minute quantities of CO60, but it was not possible to say whether this was from contaminated scrap metal or had been picked up in the factory. It is believed that Baker is feeling older, he may even be terminally ill. If so, the fear is that he will want to do as much damage as he can before he dies. He cannot be confident that his beliefs and passion will outlive him. Based on this belief, his greatest desire would be to cause a nuclear winter and Digger’s explosive expertise may be designed to support this effort. The intelligence consensus is that he now has no constraints other than to avoid capture. That too may end as he nears death and he may be prepared to risk arrest to achieve one final victory. The most common means of attack used by the Antarctics is the improvised explosive device (IED). Improvised is something of a misnomer. These are sophisticated, highly reproducible devices built to precision. There is a preference for plastic explosives but black powder as well as a variety of non-commercial explosive mixtures have been used. To supplement their income, the Antarctics have been accused of several bank robberies in a series of central continental States. This claim is unproven, but the professional planning and use of sophisticated, light equipment and weapons tend to point to the group. The method of operation for the robberies was three individuals entering the bank; taking control of the employees, customers, and guards; completing the robbery, with one of two others providing cover; and escaping. In each case, the alarm communications systems of the bank had been disabled just before the robbery and the video cameras diverted.



It is unlikely that the Antarctics will turn to suicide attacks. There is no evidence that they are even willing to risk their lives, but their ultimate motivation and Baker’s health may change that. The People’s Liberation Movement

The People’s Liberation Movement (PLM) was founded in 1994 by their religious messiah, know publically as Reverend X. The group’s goal is to lead the world to the pious way prior to the end of the earth through dialogue, proselytism, and, if necessary, intimidation. They view governments as the barrier to the path to piety and are, therefore, staunchly anti-government. They are also competitively anti-other religious beliefs, believing their theology, which is a mixture of the world’s major religions, is the only true approach. The group’s objective was announced publically on December 31, 1999, when they claimed responsibility for a truck bomb made of fertilizer and diesel fuel, which leveled the Evanistan parliament building. There were no casualties, but the announcement came with a warning to heed the way or else. A break up in 2002 greatly weakened the group’s organization, and many leaders—not including Reverend X—were arrested. Since this time, PLM members have dispersed, gone underground, and infiltrated many other organizations. They await instruction from Reverend X. As a result, they are viewed as very resourceful, highly educated, very dangerous, and potentially suicidal. A recent PLM member was captured during a foiled attempt to disable a military airport traffic control station using a home-concocted lethal gas in Dianistan. Interrogation of the member by a military officer at the air traffic center provided great insight into the mindset of the membership at large. From what was learned, it appears that members work alone and have little communication with each other. The PLM received instruction and the recipe for the lethal gas from an unknown (to him) source.



Indigenous Threats The indigenous threat is complex and falls roughly into two types: criminal and ethnic. Geo-political Background of Indigenous Threats

Indigenous threats are largely an issue of the north and west. The roots pre-date independence. The populations in some of the mountains and high pastures have always been robustly independent and self-sufficient. They have never really wished to be part of any State to which they would have to pay taxes, provide national service, etc. When independence was being established, the cartographers drew the lines roughly along the watersheds except where it made more sense, for example in wide valleys, to draw the line half way from the boundary of what would be Lagassi to whichever country was at the far end of the valley. The effect was that families that had shared the same mountain for centuries suddenly found themselves in different countries. Valleys that had been thoroughfares for traders and nomadic farmers suddenly achieved international boundary status. Those borders, of course, needed to be guarded and the local residents were formed into a militia. The governments of the day alienated the populations of the uplands and then armed them. It continued to do so until about 1950 when a dedicated Border Unit was created within the regular army. Some of the people in the valleys and family groups believe that belonging to the Republic of Lagassi is the lesser of the two evils. Originally, Lagassi was largely pastoral and these groups could carry on in their traditional fashion. Other family groups, especially some large groups that ended up in different countries, have been protesting violently ever since. Some groups want border changes (some changes would increase Lagassi’s area, others would diminish it); some want to have greater autonomy while remaining part of Lagassi; yet others want outright independence. The situation is made more complex by the provocation of Evanistan. Evanistan wants to annex the entire northern mountains and makes this claim on the basis that the groups living there are Evanese. Evanistan, therefore, covertly supports the groups in those mountains on the Lagassi side of the border. Not everyone supports this viewpoint especially those on the Evanistan side of the border who want the mountains to be independent. Intelligence suggests that Evanistan wants the whole of the Northern Range for the minerals and rainfall, which falls largely on the southern slopes. (Note: The Lagassi uranium mine is in this area.) Upland Criminal Organization (UCO)

Before describing the UCO, it is worth commenting briefly on policing in the area. As I am sure you will appreciate, policing is difficult and the population despises central authority. The population is armed and willing to defend its mountain fastnesses. The weaponry is chiefly hand-guns and rifles and are mostly from the first half of the 20th century. From time to time regional governors have tried to bring the area into line. This effort has almost always been counter-productive. Not only has there been open confrontation between the armed civilians and the police, but the Uplanders have also resorted to terrorist attacks in towns, including the capital. The most effective governors (effective in terms of minimizing terrorist attacks) have been those willing to turn a blind eye to comparatively low level criminal activity. In return, the Uplanders do, from time to time, turn over to the authorities their more extreme young men responsible for atrocities. Time in prison, coupled with growing older and wiser, seems to have the desired calming effect. However, at least two



individuals have developed a strong resentment and are leading the call for a unified mountain state. For most of the last decade, UCO activity has taken the form of a protection service, prostitution, and drug trade with violence to retain a market edge. The UCO would on occasion kidnap government officials, especially those involved with taxation. These officials were always released before the police and army could respond. On two occasions, militia units guarding the border were “arrested” by the UCO and their weapons confiscated. It is not known what happened to those weapons, but we understand that at least one of these UCO groups now has at least 6 modern pistols and 2 modern sub-machine guns. There are intelligence reports that document the group as transitioning to larger scale crime and away from its traditional business. This change is partly due to the limited economic resources of the region. The addition of weaponry will enable larger scale “attacks” to achieve economic objectives. The UCO has focused attacks in recent months that seemingly undermine authority, law and order, and the national infrastructure in the region. Since 2010, there have been over 700 civilian casualties and 11 army and police deaths. Army and police deaths have been mostly in or near the western mountains. A handful of deaths have been the result of rifle sniper fire but the majority are the result of a roadside ambush including IEDs detonated by cable. Improvised mortars have been used on barracks and one military hostel was set on fire (it is believed by an incendiary device hidden in a video). Civilian deaths (5 in total) have mostly been away from the mountains, chiefly in or near the capital or railway stations. One device was a vehicle-borne IED triggered by a movement detector; there were about 10 improvised incendiary devices; and the rest were hand-portable IEDs of about 5 kg each carried in sports bags, shopping bags etc. Nearly all were triggered by cheap mechanical timers. Circuitry in a couple of more recent devices has been sent out for further forensic analysis. We believe they may have been triggered by mobile telephone. The explosives in the IEDs tend to be constructed from chemicals and fuel readily available to the farming community. Most recently, the group committed an armed assault of a branch of the Bank of Lagassi. Their approach was overt, violent, and effective. The assault was initiated by detonating an IED at the local government headquarters. The bank robbery then proceeded quickly with use of weapons and physical intimidation of the bank employees and customers. Both bank guards were killed at the onset of the robbery. Our sources provide limited pre-emptive intelligence. Parts of that area of the country are barely governable. The sources are generally reliable. Ethnic Terrorist Group Within the mountain areas are three valley complexes each virtually cut off from the outside world. One of these is in the area that Evanistan wishes to annex; the other two are in the western mountains. Although most of the surface transport routes to developed countries run through these western mountain passes, travelers are generally completely unaware that two counties virtually untouched by modern life are only a few miles away. These three valley complexes do have something in common: they are each home to an ethnic group brought in or left behind by ancient waves of population movement. These groups share the vigorous independent mindedness of the other mountain peoples. However, by and large, they wish to be left alone. Intelligence sources consistently report



that the county elders wish to do nothing that might cause the authorities to try to take control. They recognize that in the end they would lose, because the UCO would not protect them. The UCO despises these enclaves and has been known to attack individuals from the group. Increasingly vocal ethnic views are being expressed in both the valleys. These views are expressed by only a few, who tend to be ostracized by the rest of their communities. However, intelligence suggests that this isolation is causing them to become radicalized. We believe there may be up to four small and completely independent groups of radicals each no more than 6 strong. There is no intelligence to support this, but we believe it is only a matter of time before we see suicide attacks of the same sort seen elsewhere in the world. Their weaponry is primarily primitive hunting rifles with which they are very effective. There is no evidence of use of explosives, although future use cannot be ruled out. Indigenous terrorism from the western mountains constitutes a serious potential challenge. It represents something more than superficial sparring between the State and ethnic groups that wish to distance themselves to a greater or lesser degree from the State. Although there is no specific intelligence, past experience suggests it is only a matter of time before a leader emerges who will unite the groups. Our sources provide limited pre-emptive intelligence. Parts of that area of the country are barely governable.



Domestic Threats

Yellow-Green League Although vehemently denied by its official spokesman, the Yellow-Green League is the political front for the Environmental Defenders (ED), one of the oldest environmental activist groups. The Yellow-Green League stands in elections and currently holds about 15% of the seats in the Regional Assembly. It came in a close second in four of the National Parliamentary seats at the last election. The ED has historically pursued aggressive and even violent means to achieve its ends, which are to protect the environment from damage for future generations. The approach has included protests, sabotage of facilities and transport, and physical violence against workers and government officials related to the research reactor. There is reported to be vigorous debate within the League and ED about future strategy. A younger leadership is emerging that believes that any hint of violence may be counter-productive to the desire to pursue a national anti-nuclear stance, whereas older members are more inclined to pursue methods that have worked in the past. The last large activity of the group was a demonstration two years ago that turned violent. A group of 300 protesters advanced on the reactor at dawn on a Sunday morning and climbed the fences in unison. The guards were called out but were quickly overwhelmed by the mob who came to paint a slogan on the reactor building. A few guards tried to use force to repel the protestors, and the confrontation turned violent. One guard was killed, and two were hospitalized. It is thought that a few violent instigators were responsible for inciting the violence. There is some evidence that the group may have been infiltrated by local terrorist groups. Miscellaneous Intelligence Thought to be Relevant Yellow-Green League Intelligence A source has reported that the YGL leadership plans to buy land adjacent to the site of the research reactor. The land includes the road over which fuel shipments are transported. The intention is to resell the land in lots of 1 sq. km. Assessment The source volunteered this information to us. The source is new and unproven but is known to have direct access to the ED leadership. We believe the source to have been motivated by personal vengeance and assess the intelligence to be credible.



Section 6. Response Forces at the Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics Types of Response Force Personnel

The response force consists of two types of security personnel:

• unarmed guards • the tactical response force

Responsibilities of Response Force

These security personnel are responsible for:

• assessment of alarms • administrative duties such as access control and key service • routine patrol and staffing of fixed posts • armed response to all intrusion alarms

All posts and patrols have defined policies and procedures with which the security personnel must comply.

Supervisors For each shift, two supervisors are present:

• Supervisor 1 supervises the guards that conduct administrative duties and access control

• Supervisor 2 is the commander of the tactical response teams

Tactical Response Team Members

Tactical response teams have five members each. A two person response team is on random patrol. All members are trained in close-quarters combat and have the authority to enter target locations to ensure the safety of critical assets and target material. The tactical response force commander for each shift is responsible for the oversight and supervision of all daily activities as well as emergency response to intrusion alarms. During operational hours, three teams are present at the institute, with the following responsibilities:¶

• Team 1 responds to the research reactor • Team 2 responds to the NBR facility • Team 3 is in a training mode, but can be available to respond

as directed by the response force commander During non-operational hours, weekends, nights, and holidays, there are two tactical response teams on site. They are dedicated to intrusion alarm response at either the research reactor or the NBR facility.

Equipment: Guards

All guards are equipped with: • a straight baton • one set of handcuffs • a small flashlight • a handheld radio



Equipment: Tactical Response Team

The tactical response team members are equipped with • one Markov pistol with a fully loaded magazine but without a

round in the chamber • one Kalishnikov assault rifle with a fully loaded magazine but

without a round in the chamber • two spare magazines of ammunition for each weapon. (Both

weapons are carried with a fully loaded magazine but without a round in the chamber.)

• a straight baton • handcuffs • flashlight • handheld radio • body armor is readily available in the response force

headquarters

Training Classroom training (all security staff): • access control procedures • use of force continuum • target locations • response procedures • chain of command • other administrative responsibilities

Tactical response team personnel receive additional training on:

• close quarters combat • recapture and recovery of nuclear material/facilities • advanced firearms training for both the pistol and the assault

rifle Firearms training:

• Tactical response team personnel are required to qualify with their firearms four times a year

• Tactical response teams are provided with firearms training each month to ensure proficiency

All personnel receive routine physical fitness training when in the training mode.

Alarm Stations and Communication

The Central Alarm Station (CAS) is located in P1 and is staffed by two guards during the day and one guard at night. All alarms are received at the CAS. Alarms from the PTR facility are assessed by P1 using video. Alarms from the NBR are assessed by the guard at P8. The Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) is located in P7 and is staffed by two guards during the day and one guard at night. The SAS monitors the activities of the CAS to ensure appropriate actions are taken. The CAS only relinquishes monitoring and control during maintenance and other temporary facility outages.



Both the CAS and the SAS are equipped with: • 100-watt radios that can communicate to all posts and patrols

within the boundaries of the Institute. • 2 telephone lines. One is linked to each fixed post via a buried

telephone cable, and the second is a direct link to the Ministry of Interior headquarters located in the city.

Extensive testing of the communication system has shown that the radio communications are good throughout the Institute with the exception of the lower level interior of the NBR facility. Testing concluded that security personnel inside the NBR facility are able to monitor transmissions from both the CAS and the SAS but are unable to transmit to the CAS and the SAS with their handheld radios. All handheld radios and fixed posts are equipped with a duress switch to allow a covert signal to the CAS and SAS of unauthorized activity. When the CAS or SAS receive a duress alarm, the response team is notified and the response force commander initiates a tactical response.

Deployment of Response Force

The response force is deployed as described in the following table.

Table 2. Response Force Deployment Data

Post No.

Description Security Personnel

No. of Personnel Workdays Non-

workdays S1 Response Force Commander Captain 1 1 S2 Guard Commander Lieutenant 1 1 P1 Response Force Headquarters Response Force 15 10 P1 Central Alarm Station Guard 2 1 P2 Institute Personnel Entrance Guard 3 1 P3 Institute Vehicle Gate Guard 2 1 P4 Institute Delivery Vehicle Gate Guard 1 0 P5 PTR Personnel/Vehicle Portal Guard 1* 1 P6 PTR Building Personnel Portal Guard 1 0 P7 Secondary Alarm Station Guard 2 1 P8 NBR Personnel Portal Guard 1 1 P9 Waste Storage Facility Guard 1 1 P10 Random two-man patrol of Institute Response Force 2 2

Totals 33 21

*When a vehicle requires entry into the PTR, the guard at P5 calls another guard to assist.



Response Procedure for Response Force

All alarms are received and assessed at the Central Alarm Station. The Secondary Alarm Station verifies the CAS operator’s assessment to ensure all alarms are properly assessed. The CAS operator immediately notifies the Commander of the Response Force so preparations for deployment can begin by the appropriate tactical team. In addition, institute procedures require that the nearest guard also be dispatched to the point of the alarm to provide additional assessment and to observe and report any unauthorized activity. The appropriate response force:

• collects their firearms from the armory, • puts on their body armor, and • prepares to respond either by foot or vehicle as directed by

the commander. Once the tactical team arrives at the appropriate facility, they deploy as a team and proceed with operations to enter the facility and ensure the protection of material and assets.

Response Force Performance Data

The LIMP has conducted extensive performance testing of the response force in the areas of alarm assessment, alarm communication, preparation, travel and deployment times to alarms at the PTR research reactor and the NBR facility. The average times are listed in Table 3. Institute procedures require that all tactical responders be available to respond to an alarm from P1. All tactical responders are fully equipped with their duty gear with the exception of their rifles, which are kept in storage in the armory until needed.

Table 3. Average Times for Physical Protection System Functions

Description Time (seconds) Research Reactor NBR Facility

Alarm communication time 1 1 Alarm assessment time 45 45 Response force communication time 18 18 P1 Response force preparation time 90 90 P1 Travel time by vehicle 75 65 P1 Travel time by foot 250 200 P1 On-site deployment time (after arrival) 90 90 P10 Preparation time 0 10 P10 On-site deployment time (after arrival) 20 30 P10 Travel time by vehicle 45 45



{ TC "6. LIMP Site Layout and Response Force Locations" \f C \l "1" }Section 7. Operations at Gates and Portals at LIMP{ TC "7. Operations at Gates and Portals at LIMP" \f C \l "1" } Institute Vehicle Gate (P3) The gate is unlocked and open during normal working hours and locked during off-shifts. Guard Force Staffing: During operational hours, 2 guards are present; one at the gate and one available for other duties. At night, 1 guard is present.

1. On entry, vehicles drive slowly and all passengers show the guard their badges. 2. The guard looks inside the vehicle and allows it to pass. 1. On exit, the vehicles must stop and wait for the guard to wave them out. 2. A guard observes exiting vehicle for proper actions.

Institute Personnel Entrance (P2) Guard Force Staffing: 3 guards are present, including one inside the front door at all times; however, only 1 guard is present at night.

1. On entry, personnel form a single line and show the guard their badge as they enter. If an individual does not have a badge, the guard directs him or her to the badging station in Administration Building.

2. Personnel enter through the front door of the Administration Building and continue out the back of the building to go to other areas in the facility.

3. A guard observes personnel for unusual behavior.

1. On exit, personnel wait in a line inside the Administration Building. 2. The guard waves personnel to pass one at a time out the front door. 3. The guard observes personnel for unusual behavior.

Institute Delivery Vehicle Gate (P4) This gate is normally closed and locked with a high security padlock. Guard Force Staffing: 1 guard is present during the workday, none during off-shift.

1. On entry, when a delivery truck arrives, the guard at P4 notices it. 2. The guard inspects the vehicle and the authorization papers. 3. The guard inspects the badges of the driver and passengers in the vehicle. If an

individual does not have a badge, the guard directs him or her to the badging station in Administration Building.

4. If all is acceptable, the guard unlocks and opens the gate. 1. On exit, the guard at P4 notices the vehicle approaching. 2. The guard unlocks the gate, inspects the vehicle, and then opens the gate and

allows the vehicle to proceed.



PTR Personnel/Vehicle Portal (P5) Guard Force Staffing: 1 guard is present at P5 at all times. If a vehicle requires entry into the PTR, the guard at P5 calls another guard to assist with the vehicle entry. Personnel Entry:

1. On entry, personnel approach the portal door, run the badge through the reader,

and, if necessary, press the electric buzzer button on the door to alert the guard. 2. If authorized from the badge code or by the guard inside P5, the gate will unlock

and a single person enters the portal. 3. Under observation of the guard in P5, the person presents a picture badge at the

window. 4. If the badge picture matches the employee’s face, the guard in P5 electronically

unlocks the inner door.

1. On exit, the personnel form a line at the portal door. 2. Personnel run the badge through the reader, and, if necessary, press the electric

buzzer button on the door to alert the guard. 3. If authorized from the badge code or by the guard inside P5, the door will unlock

and a single person enters the portal. 4. The person presents the picture badge to the guard at window. 5. The guard at P5 electrically opens the outer door and lets the person exit. 6. If there is any question, the person is held in the portal.

Vehicle Entry:

1. On entry, the vehicle’s driver drives the vehicle up to the outer gate. (Vehicles larger than 30 feet are not permitted in the PTR.)

2. The driver may push an electric buzzer button at the gate to alert the guard. 3. The P5 assist-guard radios the CAS to pre-announce expected alarms from the

BMSs and IR sensors in the vehicle portal. Then the assist-guard at P5 unlocks and opens the outer gate.

4. The vehicle enters the portal and the assist guard inspects the paperwork authorizing the vehicle in the area. Then the driver and any passengers leave the vehicle and go to the personnel portal to enter.

5. The assist-guard shuts and locks the outer vehicle gate. 6. The driver and any passengers enter the pedestrian portal, where they are

subjected to the same checks as all personnel entering the PTR area. They proceed to the inner vehicle portal gate.

7. While the driver/passengers are in the personnel portal, the assist-guard inspects the vehicle for contraband while it is still in the vehicle portal.

8. When the inspection is complete, the guard unlocks and opens the inner vehicle gate and waits for the driver/passengers.

9. The driver/passengers reenter the vehicle, and drive into the area. 10. The inner gate is closed and locked by the assist-guard.

1. On exit, the process is slightly different than the reverse. The vehicle’s driver

drives the vehicle up to the inner gate. 2. The driver may push an electric buzzer at the gate to alert the guard. 3. The guard at P5 calls for assistance at the P5 vehicle portal.



4. The assist-guard inspects driver/passenger badge and paperwork. The assist-guard inspects the vehicle for stolen material.

5. Once cleared, the P5 assist-guard radios the CAS to pre-announce expected alarms from the BMSs and IR sensors in the vehicle portal.

6. The assist-guard at P5 unlocks and opens the inner gate. 7. The vehicle enters the portal and the assist-guard closes the inner gate. 8. Then the assist-guard unlocks and opens the outer vehicle gate. 9. The vehicle exits the vehicle portal.

10. The assist-guard shuts and locks the outer gate. PTR Emergency Vehicle Portal Guard Force Staffing: Manned only in times of emergency or special use.

1. For entry, a guard must be present to unlock and open the outer gate manually, 2. The guard manually checks the vehicle and the driver. 3. The guard unlocks and opens the inner gate and allows the vehicle to proceed

quickly. 4. The guard shuts and locks both gates.

1. On exit, the process is reversed. 2. A guard must be present to unlock and open the inner gate manually. 3. The guard manually checks the vehicle and the driver. 4. The guard unlocks and opens the outer gate and allows the vehicle to proceed. 5. The guard shuts and locks both gates.

PTR Building Personnel Portal (P6) Guard Force Staffing: 1 guard is present whenever there is any person inside the inner area. At other times, the doors are locked and the guards are not present.

1. On entry, the employees, one at a time, enter through the unlocked outer door. 2. Each person presents his picture badge to the guard for badge exchange. 3. If the picture on both badges and the person’s face match, the person can

continue. 4. Under the observation of the guard, the person walks through the metal detector. 5. If there is an alarm or if a package is suspicious, the guard manually inspects the

package. 6. Once past the metal detector, the employee scans the exchanged badge and

enters his personal identification number (PIN.) 7. The turnstile will turn and allow entry into the building. 8. The guard will allow the next employee to enter the portal and repeat the process.



On exit, the process is reversed. The employees exit through the door next to the turnstile. 1. If the portal is empty, the first person scans the exchanged badge and enters a

PIN. 2. If the PIN is correct, the door will open to let them enter the portal. 3. The person walks through the metal detector under the observation of the guard. 4. If there is an alarm or if a package is suspicious, the guard manually inspects the

package. 5. The person re-exchanges his badge with the guard and exits the portal.

NBR Personnel/Vehicle Portal (P8) Guard Force Staffing: 1 guard is present at P8 at all times. Using an alarm system workstation, the guard places all alarms for the NBR facility, except D103, in “access” at the beginning of the shift and places the alarms in “secure” at the end of the shift. The guard and a second authorized individual unlock the high security padlocks on the main entrance at the beginning of the shift and lock the padlocks at the end of the shift. Pedestrian Portal:

1. On entry, personnel show the guard their badge at the P8 entry window. 2. The guard waves personnel to the gate and “buzzes” them through, unlocking the

magnetic lock. 3. Personnel scan their badge at Door D40/1 and enter a PIN. 4. If the PIN is correct, the door will open allowing them to enter the building. 5. The personnel walk through the metal detectors and if there is an alarm, the person

ensures he/she does not have contraband.

1. On exit, personnel scan their badge at Door D40/1 and enter PIN. 2. If the badge is valid, the door will open allowing the person to exit. 3. Personnel then approach P8 and show the guard their badge at the exit window. 4. The guard waves personnel to the gate and “buzzes” them through, unlocking the

magnetic lock. Vehicle Portal:

1. On entry, the driver and any passengers approach the entry window at the P8 pedestrian portal and shows the guard their badge and authorization to drive into the facility.

2. The guard leaves P8 and unlocks and opens the vehicle entrance. 3. The guard allows the vehicle to enter and relocks the gate.

1. On exit, driver and any passengers approach the guard and show their badge at the

P8 exit window. 2. The guard leaves P8 and unlocks and opens the vehicle entrance. 3. The guard allows the vehicle to exit and relocks the gate.



Section 8. Waste Storage Site—Description{ TC "8. Waste Storage Site—Description" \f C \l "1" } General Description The Waste Storage Site is located in the northeast corner of the Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics, a hypothetical nuclear research center. The Waste Storage Site is an IAEA Category III site that is used for the storage of radioactive wastes from the PTR, NBR, and other reactor facilities. The site contains an unloading structure, a storage area for low-level liquid wastes, a burial area for wastes mixed with concrete, and three storage buildings for medium-level and high-level wastes, isotopes, and metals. Because of recent theft attempts by local civilians and a group of students, all of whom were contaminated during the theft attempts, the site is now under 24-hour guard (P9). The medium-level and high-level metals and isotopes are the main concern of LIMP safety and health physics personnel. Liquid Wastes Liquid wastes are placed in one of two buried tanks until the tanks are full. The tanks have two-metric-ton lids that can only be lifted by crane. When the tanks are full, the liquid is mixed with concrete and then buried. Low-Level and Medium-Level Solid Wastes Low-level and medium-level wastes are stored in sealed containers in two of the three storage buildings. The majority of these wastes consists of contaminated clothing, irradiated components, and maintenance equipment. High-Level Wastes, Isotopes, and Metals High-level waste consists of severely irradiated components, isotopes, and isotope-contaminated materials, and some highly irradiated metals. This material is stored in sealed containers in one of the three storage buildings. The material in this building has been the target of two theft attempts that resulted in contamination and radiation exposure of some of the thieves.



Section 9. PTR Research Reactor{ TC "9. PTR Research Reactor" \f C \l "1" } Note: The description of this reactor is purely hypothetical. General Description The PTR is a light water moderated, highly enriched uranium (HEU) fueled research reactor located within the Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics, a hypothetical nuclear research center. The Institute is located in the Republic of Lagassi, approximately 29 km (18 mi) east of the capital city of Hashbakar, the major population center. The reactor is used for research on advanced reactor components, special fuel assemblies, and production of radionuclides for the medical industry. Other experiments are performed to investigate power reactor fuel when heated to the point of melting. A neutron radiography facility is also available as well as extensive irradiation tubes and hot cell facilities. A total of 32 people work at the PTR research reactor; usually, the reactor is not operated during the evening or off-shifts. During the off-shift periods, only response force guards are at the facility and doors to the reactor building itself are locked and alarmed. Reactor Data

1. The pool-type research reactor is used in a steady-state operation of 2 MW. 2. The central irradiation cavity is dry and 23 cm in diameter. 3. The annular core is formed by 236 cylindrical fuel elements arranged in a hexagonal

grid around the central irradiation cavity. 4. The reactor is controlled by 7 fuel-followed control rods with rod drive motors

accessible. 5. At least 5 control rods must be removed for the reactor to go critical. 6. Fuel material is BeO-UO2, 22 wt% UO2, 78 wt% BeO with uranium enriched to 36

percent 235U. 7. Each fuel element is approximately 1 meter long and 2 cm in diameter, and weighs a

total of 2 kg. 8. Each fuel element contains 103 grams of 235U and is clad in stainless steel. 9. Fuel rods are placed in a grid and may be removed with a rigid fuel-handling tool.

10. Centerline fuel temperatures range up to 1,500 °C. 11. The core is located in an open pool 3.1 meters in diameter and 8.5 meters deep. Cooling System

1. The pool contains 62.5 cubic meters of deionized water at a maximum temperature of 60°C.

2. The core is cooled by natural convection in the water pool. 3. The pool is constructed of stainless steel. 4. A forced air/water heat exchanger is used to discharge the waste heat to the

atmosphere. 5. The heat exchanger is inside the reactor building with air ducts (and grids) through

the building walls. 6. Air ducts are mild steel, 0.3 cm thick and the grill is #4 (13 mm) rebar on 15 cm

centers. 7. The reactor core is designed so that if a complete loss of water occurs after

sustained 2-MW operation, air is sufficient for cooling. (However, natural circulation of air is essential.)



8. Pumps are located below the reactor coolant level to ensure adequate Net Positive Suction Head.

9. The cleanup loop flowrate of 1 to 2 liters/sec is used to: • remove impurities, • maintain pH, • maintain resistivity within specifications, and • provide deionized makeup water.

Irradiated Fuel Storage and Handling

1. Irradiated fuel elements are transferred underwater to the spent fuel storage pools. 2. The elements are transferred in storage racks using rigid handling tools. 3. The dose rate of freshly discharged spent fuel at 1 meter is approximately 20 to 30

rad/hr (0.2 to 0.3 Gy/hr).

Nonirradiated Fuel Storage and Handling 1. Fuel rods arrive in shipping containers. 2. Fuel rods are stored in a reinforced concrete storage vault, R090, in the reactor

building. 3. Fuel storage racks capable of holding 10 fuel rods are used to transfer new fuel rods

into the reactor pool. 4. The storage vault can hold 5 storage racks. 5. Cotton gloves are worn when directly handling the fuel elements. 6. A rigid fuel-handling tool is used to transfer the fuel element to its intended position

once in the reactor pool.

Experiment Materials 1. A total of 3 kg of highly radioactive medical radionuclides, including Cs, Am, and

Sr90. 2. Mixed oxide fuel rods. A maximum of one assembly is in the reactor core at one time

and no more than 4 are located on site at one time. Each MOX assembly weighs a total of 30 kg and each contains 2 kg of Pu239.

3. Targets are used in other irradiation and activation experiments.



Section 10. PTR Exterior Physical Protection Elements

{ TC "13. PTR Exterior Physical Protection Elements" \f C \l "1" }



Section 11. PTR Wall Thicknesses and Distances{ TC "12. PTR Wall Thicknesses and Distances" \f C \l "1" }



Section 12. PTR Access Control Plan{ TC "15. PTR Access Control Plan" \f C \l "1" }



Section 13. PTR Building Floor Plan{ TC "10. PTR Research Reactor – Building Floor Plan" \f C \l "1" }



Section 14. PTR Interior Physical Protection Elements{ TC "14. PTR Interior Physical Protection Elements" \f C \l "1" }



Section 15. PTR Lighting{ TC "16. PTR Lighting" \f C \l "1" }

• Thirteen 1000-watt incandescent floodlights are mounted on the reactor building at 6

meters high. • Beam half-angle is 26 degrees. • The surface is low reflectivity dark gravel with some vegetation. • Lights are activated by exterior IR sensors. • LUX at perimeter are shown in boxes. 10 LUX=1 footcandle.

Approximate center-line illumination is given in the table below:

Meters: 25 50 75 100 LUX: 8 2 1 0.5



PTR Lighting{ TC "PTR Lighting" \f C \l "2" }



Section 16. PTR Video Monitoring System{ TC "17. PTR Video Monitoring System" \f C \l "1" }

• The PTR CCTV assessment system consists of four external and four internal

cameras. • One external camera, located at the Pan View SE corner of the perimeter, has pan-tilt-

zoom capability. All others are fixed cameras. • The system has no automatic alarm-to-video display capability and no motion

detection capability. • When an alarm occurs, the console operator must operate the controller manually to

assess the alarm. Assessment requires 45 seconds, on average.



Section 17. PTR Alarm and Camera Display Console{ TC "18. PTR Alarm and Camera Display Console" \f C \l "1" }

Central Alarm Station (CAS) The alarm system equipment is located in a room in P1, the CAS, and uses a hybrid star/bus network topology for communication throughout the LIMP facility. Alarm system monitoring and control workstations are located in the CAS, SAS, and P8. Alarms annunciate both visibly and audibly at both the CAS and SAS. The CAS/SAS operator can silence the alarm during assessment. Although both the CAS operator and SAS operator can control the alarm system when logged in, procedurally, the SAS only monitors the CAS actions for appropriateness. The SAS monitors and controls the systems during CAS maintenance or other facility outage. The P8 workstation only allows the guard to monitor and control the NBR facility alarm zones (secure/access). Video Management System Because the PTR building is the only facility with cameras, the video management system equipment is located in P7, the SAS. Video system controls and displays are located in both the CAS and SAS. The controls are independent such that the CAS operator can select the



cameras to display at the CAS console, and the SAS operator can select the cameras to display at the SAS console. The Alarm Station Operator assesses the PTR facility alarms by using the video system controller to manually display the video for the alarm. For the NBR alarms, the Alarm Station Operator dispatches the P8 guard for assessment. The video system is an analog system that uses coaxial cable and a star type communication between the cameras and the video system equipment. Communication to the CAS is by dedicated fiber communication links, one for the controls and two for the displays. The communication links for the video system are shown in Section 16. Entry Control System The entry control system equipment is collocated with the badging station in the Administrative Building. Neither the CAS or SAS has an entry control system workstation. Therefore, the system is not monitored and doors in the secure area cannot be remotely locked or unlocked for access control. Note that when the guard at P8 “buzzes” personnel into the Portal; the door is only temporarily unlocked. The entry control system uses a ring topology, shown below, which links the equipment at the Administration Building with field panels at the NBR Facility, then links to field panels at the PTR facility, then links back to the Administration Building. The links between the Administration Building and the NBR and between the PTR facility and the Administration Building are radio-frequency wireless links.



Section 18. NBR Pulse Reactor—Description{ TC "20. NBR Pulse Reactor—Description" \f C \l "1" }

Note: The description of this reactor is purely hypothetical. General Description The LIMP Neutron Burst Reactor (NBR) is a reflected GODIVA-type research reactor designed for conducting experiments related to the collection of basic nuclear physics data for code validation purposes. The reactor fuel assembly is a metallic oralloy (93.71 wt% U-235, 5.24 wt% U-238, 1.05 wt% U-234) sphere of 14-kg weight surrounded by a 10-cm-thick beryllium reflector. This design allows material quantities—and thus theft consequences —to be at a minimum level in contrast to bare-core designs. The core assembly (fuel and reflector) is actually segmented into 10 equal-weight plates of constant mass (1.4 kg uranium) that vary in thickness and overall diameter. The plates are normally separated by very small air gaps such that the assembly is normally subcritical. In a test “firing,” a compressed air cylinder momentarily shoves the plates together into what becomes a critical configuration, resulting in the production of a burst of energy (e.g., neutron radiation) for experimental purposes. (It is interesting to note that this energy release also serves to drive the plates apart, returning the core to a subcritical configuration.)

Reactor Data 1. The NBR pulse reactor is capable of very short duration pulsed operation for neutron

burst experiments. 2. The reactor core is formed by 10 disc fuel elements of varying dimensions (constant

weight of 1.4 kg) that, when stacked together with a reflector, exactly form a critical sphere.

3. The reactor is controlled by momentarily decreasing the gaps between the fuel element discs.

4. The fuel is HEU metal (93.71 wt% U-235, 5.24 wt% U-238, 1.05 wt% U-234).

Cooling System Between test firings the reactor has a procedural and safety-interlock controlled down time to allow the core time to cool. (No forced cooling system provided.)

Irradiated Fuel Storage and Handling 1. Because of its designed use, the NBR fuel is never subjected to any significant burn

up, and thus it will never be “spent.” However on rare occasions, the shock and thermal stresses in the fuel elements cause cracks to form. In such cases, the damaged fuel plate is replaced with a spare and stored as “used fuel” for later reforging.

2. Damaged fuel elements are transferred manually to the “used fuel” storage container.

3. Damaged fuel elements are transferred in locked storage boxes. 4. The “used fuel” locker is located in the fuel vault, R102, in the NBR reactor building

lower level. 5. The surface dose rate of used (damaged) NBR fuel is approximately 2 mSv/hr, while

the dose at one meter is hard to distinguish from background (100 nSv/h).



Nonirradiated Fuel Storage and Handling 1. Fresh fuel discs are forged on-site. 2. Fuel discs are stored in storage lockers in the fuel vault, R102, in the NBR building

lower level. 3. The storage vault can hold up to 50 discs. 4. Cotton gloves are worn when directly handling the fuel discs.



Section 19. NBR Above-ground Wall Thicknesses and Distances{ TC "21. NBR – Above-ground Wall Thicknesses and Distances" \f C \l "1" }



Section 20. NBR Above Ground Access Control{ TC "27. NBR—Above Ground Access Control" \f C \l "1" }



Section 21. NBR Above Ground Building Floor Plan{ TC "22. NBR Above Ground Building Floor Plan" \f C \l "1" }



Section 22. NBR Below Ground Building Floor Plan{ TC "23. NBR Below-ground Building Floor Plan" \f C \l "1" }



Section 23. NBR Exterior Physical Protection Elements { TC "24. NBR Exterior Physical Protection Elements" \f C \l "1" }



Section 24. NBR Above Ground Interior Physical Protection Elements{ TC "25. NBR --- Above-ground Interior Physical Protection Elements" \f C \l "1" }



Section 25. NBR Below Ground Interior Physical Protection Elements{ TC "26. NBR --- Below Ground Interior Physical Protection Elements" \f C \l "1" }



Section 26. NBR Lighting { TC "28. NBR—Lighting" \f C \l "1" }

• Twelve 1000-watt incandescent floodlights are mounted on the reactor building at 7

meters high. • Lights are activated by microwave sensors or P8. • Beam half-angle is 26 degrees. • The surface is low reflectivity dark gravel with some vegetation. LUX at the perimeter are shown in boxes. 10 LUX=1 footcandle.

Approximate center-line illumination is given in the table below: Meters: 25 50 75 100 LUX: 8 2 1 0.5



NBR Lighting{ TC "NBR Lighting" \f C \l "2" }



Section 27. Detection Component Data Each of the following tables represents a detection component class. Within each table, the component types and descriptions are listed with the probability of detection by adversary defeat method or adversary attribute. Table 4. Intrusion Detection Component Class Component

Type Component Description No

EquipmentPD

Hand Tools

PD

Power Tools

PD

High Explosives

PD

Land Vehicle

PD Exterior Sensors

Seismic Buried Cable 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 Electric field 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9 Infrared 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 Microwave 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 Video motion 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 Multiple non-complementary 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.99 Multiple complementary 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.99

Interior Sensors

Sonic 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Capacitance 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Video Motion 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Infrared 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Ultrasonic 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Microwave 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Multiple non-complementary 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 N/A Multiple complementary 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 N/A

Position Sensors

Position Switch 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 N/A Balanced Magnetic Switch 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 N/A

Fence Sensors

Taut Wire 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.85 Vibration 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.75 0.85 Strain 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 Electric Field 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.75 0.9 Multiple Sensors 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9

Barrier Sensors

Vibration 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.9 N/A Glass Breakage 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 N/A Conducting Tape 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.9 N/A Grid Mesh 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.95 N/A Multiple Sensors 0.99 0.9 0.9 0.99 N/A

Helicopter Detector

Radar 0.1 Sonic 0.1



Table 5. Access Control Detection Component Class Component

Type Component Description Independent

PD Land

Vehicle PD

ID Verification Casual Recognition 0.02 Credential 0.05 Credential and PIN 0.35 Picture Badge 0.1 Picture Badge and PIN 0.6 Exchange picture badge 0.5 Exchange picture badge and PIN 0.8 Retinal scan and PIN 0.99 Hand geometry and PIN 0.95 Speech pattern and PIN 0.95 Signature dynamics and PIN 0.95 Fingerprint and PIN 0.95

Personnel Access Authorization Check

General observation of authorization

0.1

Authorization verification each time location is accessed

0.6

Two Person Rule

Presence in area 0 Within sight 0.1 Dedicated observation 0.5 Dedicated observation with alarm 0.95

Vehicle Authorization Check

Authorization form check 0.35 Serial number verification 0.45 Visual check of insignia/ license plate

0.15



Table 6. Human Surveillance Detection Component Class Component

Type Component Description

No Equipment

PD

Small Arms

PD

Light Antitank Weapons

(LAW) PD

Independent of Threat Attribute

PD

SO at Post Observation

Duress, LAW protected

0.8 0.8 0.8

Duress, small arms protected

0.8 0.8 0.45

Duress, small arms protected: LAW protected on alert

0.8 0.8 0.45

Duress, unprotected 0.8 0.45 0.45 Duress, unprotected: LAW protected position on alert

0.8 0.45 0.45

Duress, unprotected: small arms protected position on alert

0.8 0.45 0.45

No duress, LAW protected

0.8 0.8 0.45

No duress, small arms protected

0.8 0.45 0.45

No duress, small arms protected: LAW protected position on alert

0.8 0.45 0.45

No duress, unprotected

0.8 0 0

No duress, unprotected: LAW protected position on alert

0.8 0 0

No duress, unprotected: small arms protected on alert

0.8 0 0

SO in Tower Observation

LAW resistant tower 0.05 0.05 0.02 Small arms resistant 0.05 0.05 0.02

SO on Patrol

Random 0.02 Scheduled 0.01

General Observation

Personnel always in vicinity

0.02

Personnel generally in vicinity

0.01



Table 7. Contraband and CATEGORY 1 Detection Component Class Threat Attribute

Component Type

Component Description

No

Equi

pmen

t P D

Han

d To

ols

P D

Pow

er

Tool

s P D

Hig

h Ex

plos

ives

P D

Met

al

Con

trab

and

P D

Smal

l Arm

s P D

Rad

ioac

tive

Con

trab

and

P D

Explosives Detector

Animal Olfaction

0 0.1

Handheld vapor collection

0 0.45

Thermal Neutron

0 0.25

Vapor Collection

0 0.35

Handheld Metal Detector

Ferrous and solid lead materials

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Ferrous materials and all forms of lead

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Ferrous materials only

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Item Search

Cursory 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Rigorous 0 0.75 0.75 0.45 0.65

Personnel Search

Pat down 0 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.9 Strip inspection

0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Portal Metal Detector

Ferrous and solid lead materials

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Ferrous materials and all forms of lead

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Ferrous materials only

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Vehicle Search

Cursory 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Rigorous including cargo

0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.4

X-Ray Inspection

Standard 0 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.9



Threat Attribute Component

Type Component Description

No

Equi

pmen

t P D

Han

d To

ols

P D

Pow

er

Tool

s P D

Hig

h Ex

plos

ives

P D

Met

al

Con

trab

and

P D

Smal

l Arm

s P D

Rad

ioac

tive

Con

trab

and

P D

Drive thru CATEGORY 1 Monitor

Plastic Scintillator *

0 0.5

Sodium Iodide Scintillator*

0 0.5

Handheld CATEGORY 1 Monitor


0 0.75


0 0.75

Portal CATEGORY 1 Monitor


0 0.85


0 0.85



Section 28. Delay Component Data{ TC "19. Barrier Penetration Times" \f C \l "1" } Each of the following tables represents a delay component class. Within each table, the component types and descriptions are listed with the delay times by adversary defeat method. Table 8. Barrier Delay Component Class

Component Type

Component Description

No Equipment

(mm:ss)

Hand Tools (mm:ss)

Power Tools

(mm:ss)

Explosives (mm:ss) Land

Vehicle (mm:ss) Stage

1 Stage

2 Walls 60 cm reinforced

concrete wall Infinite Infinite 15:00 3:00 5:00 Infinite

30 cm reinforced concrete wall Infinite Infinite 14:00 2:00 0:54 N/A

20 cm reinforced concrete wall Infinite Infinite 10:00 2:00 0:00 N/A

Wood studs and sheetrock 1:00 0:30 0:30 0:30 0:00 N/A

Doors 60 cm steel and concrete rolling door Infinite Infinite 15:30 3:20 5:00 N/A

30 cm steel and concrete rolling door Infinite Infinite 10:40 2:40 0:54 N/A

30 cm wood door with metal sheeting Infinite Infinite 8:50 2:40 0:30 N/A

10 cm wood door with metal sheeting Infinite 5:00 3:00 1:18 0:00

0:05 for large vehicle door

5 cm wood door Infinite 0:12 N/A 5 cm wood door with glass panel Infinite 0:12 0:12 0:12 0:00 N/A

.75 cm steel plate door Infinite 5:00 0:12 0:12 0:00 N/A

Class V or VI vault door Infinite 8:00 0:30 0:30 0:00 N/A

Steel turnstile Infinite 1:12 1:00 1:00 0:00 N/A Miscellaneous Barriers

High security padlock Infinite 1:30 0:18 0:18 0:00 N/A

Concrete Block Vehicle Barrier 0:00 5:00 1:00 0:30 0:00 0:05

2.5 m chain link mesh fence 0:10 0:10 5:00 0:30 0:00 0:01

Welded wire fabric fence 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:00 0:01

2.5 m concrete panel wall 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:00 N/A

Tempered glass window 0:05 0:05 0:10 0:10 0:00 N/A



Electromagnetic Strike Lock 0:15 0:10 0:05 0:05 0:02 N/A



Table 9. Security Officers Delay Component Class

Component Type Component Description

No Equipment

(mm:ss)

Small Arms

(mm:ss)

Light Antitank Weapons

(LAW) (mm:ss)

SO at Post Delay

Unprotected post 500:00 0:00 0:00 Small arms protected post 500:00 0:30 0:00 Unprotected post normally but moves to small arms protected position on alert 500:00 0:30 0:00 LAW protected post 500:00 2:05 2:05 Unprotected post normally but moves to LAW protected position on alert 500:00 2:05 2:05 Small arms protected post normally, but moves to LAW protected position on alert 500:00 2:05 2:05

SO in Tower Delay

Small arms resistance 1:00 0:30 0:00 LAW resistant tower 2:05 2:05 1:00



Table 10. Penetration Times—Fences

Penetration Time (mm:ss)

Barrier Description Penetration Equipment

Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

2.5-m chain-link mesh with outriggers 4-mm x 50-mm mesh

Ladder 5.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Tarpaulin 2.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Manual bolt cutters 3.0 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Circular saw 10 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Manual bolt cutters, gloves (more cuts)

3.5 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Circular saw (more cuts) 11.0 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Gloves 0.5 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Vinyl-coated 3-mm x 50-mm mesh


Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Circular Saw 11.0 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

2.5-m chain-link mesh without outriggers vinyl-coated, 1.8-mm x 40-mm mesh

Ladder 5.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

No equipment 0.0 0:03 0:06 0:09 0.02


Pliers 0.5 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Vise grip pliers 0.5 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07



Table 11. Penetration Times—Gates


Barrier Description Penetration Equipment



Chain-link mesh pipe 2.4-m x 4-m chain-link gate on metal pipe frame, chained and padlocked

Truck 1,500 0:03 0:06 0:09 0:01

Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Chain-link mesh pipe 1.2-m x 2.4-m gate, 11-gauge x 5-cm mesh on 4.8-cm metal pipe frame, chained and padlocked

Sledgehammer 5 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

1.8-m pry bar 10 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Bolt cutters 3 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Hacksaw 0.2 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25



Table 12. Penetration Times—Walls


Barrier Description

Penetration Equipment



Concrete-10 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, 6.4-mm dia., 15-cm x 15-cm mesh

Sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

10 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Sledgehammer, cutting torch 30 2:30 5:00 7:30 1:01

Circular saw, sledge-hammer 5 4:18 8:36 12:54 1:46

Rotohammer, chisel, punch, sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters, generator

50 3:12 6:24 9:36 0:34

Explosives (1.0), sledgehammer, manual bolt cutters

20 2:18 3:30 5:15

Explosives (3.0), hand bolt cutters

10 1:12 2:30 3:42


7 1:12 2:18 3:24

Explosive (10) 10 1:00 2:00 3:00

Sledgehammer, hand hydraulic bolt cutters

20 2:24 4:48 7:12 0:59

Concrete- 210 kg/cm2 one layer No. 5 rebar, 15-cm centers

Sledgehammer, cutting torch 30 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Rotohammer, chisel, hand hydraulic bolt cutters, generator

50 3:54 7:48 11:42 1:35



Table 12. Penetration Times—Walls (continued)


Barrier Description




Concrete- 15cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 4 rebar, 20-cm centers

Sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

15 4:00 8:00 12:00 1:38

Explosives (1.0), sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

14 2:30 3:42 5:36


5 1:54 2:54 4:18


7 1:42 2:30 3:48

Concrete-20 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 5 rebar, 15-cm centers

Rotohammer, drill, sledge, chisel, punch, cutting torch, generator

65 7:00 14:00 21:00 2:52

Explosives (2.0), sledgehammer, hand hydraulic bolt cutters

30 4:18 6:30 9:42

Explosives (3.0), hand hydraulic bolt cutters

20 2:30 3:45 5:36

Explosives (5.0), hand hydraulic bolt cutters

22 2:30 3:45 5:36

Explosives (12) 12 1:30 3:00 4:30



Table 12. Penetration Times—Walls (continued)


Barrier Description




Concrete-30 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete- 210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 4 rebar, 15-cm centers


8 2:12 3:15 4:54

Explosives (7), hand bolt cutters

9 2:18 3:30 5:12


14 2:30 3:48 5:36


18 2:30 3:48 5:36

Concrete-46 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-350 kg/cm2 two layers, No. 4 rebar, 15-cm centers

Explosives (16), hand-held power hydraulic bolt-cutters, generator

282 5:00 7:30 11:12 1:13


22 2:30 5:00 7:30

Concrete- 60 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-350 kg/cm2 four layers, No. 6 rebar, 15-cm centers

Explosives (30), gas-powered hydraulic bolt cutters

59 7:18 11:00 16:30



Table 13. Penetration Times—Doors

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description




Sheet Metal Standard industrial pedestrian door, 1.6-mm metal, panic hardware, cylinder lock, rim set, butt hinges with removable pins

Explosives (1.0) 1 1:15 1:54 2:48 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire resistant suit

171 1:36 3:12 4:48 0:39

Cordless drill 2.7 1:30 3:00 4:30 0:37

Pry bar 7 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:25

Fire ax 4.5 1:54 3:48 5:42 0:47 Hammer, suction cups, punch, chisel

4 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Suction cups, sledge, cutting torch

25 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Explosives (.5) 2.5 1:12 2:30 3:12 Lock picking tools 0.2 0:06 2:30 5:00 1:00

Pipe wrench 1 0:12 1:12 2:30

Explosives (2.0) 2.0 1:12 2:30 3:42

Standard industrial pedestrian door, hollow steel 1.6-mm narrow glass one side, louvers near bottom.

Hammer 2.0 0:09 0:18 0:27 0:04

Fire ax 4.5 0:48 1:36 2:24 0:20



Table 13. Penetration Times—Doors (continued)

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description




Sheet Metal Standard industrial pedestrian door, 1.3-mm half glass expanded metal 2.8-mm grill

Grappling hook, wire cable, truck

1,520 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07


Standard industrial vehicle door, hollow steel panel, 1.6-mm

Explosives (0.5) 0.5 0:45 1:06 1:42 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 0:48 1:36 2:24 0:20

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, fire-resistant gloves, water

275 1:30 3:00 4:30 0:37

Truck 2,025 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07 Pry bar, wooden plank 9 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Fire ax 4.5 1:06 2:12 3:18 0:27 Explosives (1.0) 1.0 1:15 1:54 2:48

Standard 10cm wooden vehicle door, with 1.6-mm sheeting

Explosives (0.5) 0.5 0:48 1:18 1:54

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit

171 0:39 1:18 1:57 0:16





Table 13. Penetration Times—Doors (continued)

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description Penetration

Equipment Equipment Weight (kg)


Sheet Metal Truck 2,025 0:21 0:42 1:03 0:08 Pry bar, wooden plank 9 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Fire ax 4.5 1:06 2:12 3:18 0:27

Explosives (1.0) 1.0 1:18 1:54 2:48

Steel Plate Magazine door, 6.4-mm steel plate, one padlock

Explosives, linear shaped charge (0.5)

0.5 0:30 1:00 1:18

Sledge hammer, cutting torch, fire-resistant gloves, water

248 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Circular Saw 16 2:06 4:12 6:18 0:52 Suction cups, sledge-hammer, chisel

4.5 0:36 1:12 1:48 0:14

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 1:15 2:30 3:45 0:31

Steel Plate/Void/Steel Plate Heavy door with two large-hinged hasps for padlocking, 19-mm steel, 10-cm air space, 1.3-mm

Explosives (4) 10 1:18 1:54 2:48 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 3:06 6:12 9:18 1:16

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant gloves

165 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07



Table 14. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using 1-Meter Bolt Cutters

Num

ber O

f Reb

ar C

uts



Table 15. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using Portable Oxygen/ Acetylene Cutting Torch

40 80

Time (seconds)

0

No. 5 (16-mm)

120 160 200 240 280

5

10

15

20

0

25

30

No. 4 (13-mm)

No. 6 (19-mm)

Num

ber O

f Reb

ar C

uts



Table 16. Cutting Rates for Mild Steel Sheet & Plate Using Oxygen Acetylene Cutting Torch or Iron Oxygen Burn Bar

Thic

knes

s (c

m)

Burn Bar

Cutting Torch



Table 17. Time Required to Set an Explosives Package as a Function of Package Weight

Expl

osiv

es P

acka

ge W

eigh

t (K

g)



Table 18. Running Rates

Dis

tanc

e (m

eter

s)



Table 19. Vehicle Rates for Experienced Drivers

Dis

tanc

e (m

eter

s)



Section 29. Table of Trials and Failures Giving PD for Designated Confidence Level Table 20. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials

PD at designated Confidence level (sorted by number of trials)

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 4 0 71% 67% 62% 56% 47% 21 0 94% 93% 91% 90% 87% 4 1 46% 42% 37% 32% 25% 21 1 88% 86% 85% 83% 79% 4 2 24% 21% 18% 14% 10% 21 2 82% 81% 79% 77% 73% 4 3 7% 5% 4% 3% 1% 21 3 77% 75% 73% 71% 67% 5 0 76% 73% 68% 63% 55% 22 0 94% 93% 92% 90% 87% 5 1 55% 51% 47% 42% 34% 22 1 88% 87% 85% 83% 80% 5 2 36% 33% 29% 25% 19% 22 2 83% 82% 80% 78% 74% 5 3 19% 17% 14% 11% 8% 22 3 78% 76% 75% 72% 68% 6 0 79% 76% 73% 68% 61% 23 0 94% 93% 92% 91% 88% 6 1 61% 58% 54% 49% 42% 23 1 89% 88% 86% 84% 81% 6 2 45% 41% 38% 33% 27% 23 2 84% 82% 81% 78% 75% 6 3 30% 27% 24% 20% 15% 23 3 79% 77% 76% 73% 70% 7 0 82% 79% 76% 72% 65% 24 0 94% 94% 92% 91% 88% 7 1 66% 63% 59% 55% 48% 24 1 89% 88% 87% 85% 82% 7 2 51% 48% 45% 40% 34% 24 2 84% 83% 81% 79% 76% 7 3 38% 35% 32% 28% 23% 24 3 80% 78% 76% 74% 71% 8 0 84% 82% 79% 75% 69% 25 0 95% 94% 93% 91% 89% 8 1 70% 67% 64% 59% 53% 25 1 90% 88% 87% 85% 82% 8 2 57% 54% 50% 46% 40% 25 2 85% 84% 82% 80% 77% 8 3 44% 42% 38% 34% 29% 25 3 80% 79% 77% 75% 72% 9 0 86% 84% 81% 77% 72% 26 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 89% 9 1 73% 70% 67% 63% 57% 26 1 90% 89% 88% 86% 83% 9 2 61% 58% 55% 51% 45% 26 2 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 9 3 50% 47% 44% 40% 35% 26 3 81% 80% 78% 76% 73%

10 0 87% 85% 83% 79% 74% 27 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 10 1 75% 73% 70% 66% 61% 27 1 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 10 2 64% 62% 59% 55% 49% 27 2 86% 85% 83% 81% 78% 10 3 54% 52% 49% 45% 39% 27 3 82% 81% 79% 77% 74% 11 0 88% 86% 84% 81% 76% 28 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 11 1 77% 75% 72% 69% 64% 28 1 91% 90% 88% 87% 84% 11 2 67% 65% 62% 58% 53% 28 2 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 11 3 58% 55% 53% 49% 44% 28 3 82% 81% 80% 78% 75% 12 0 89% 87% 85% 83% 78% 29 0 95% 95% 94% 92% 90% 12 1 79% 77% 75% 71% 66% 29 1 91% 90% 89% 87% 85% 12 2 70% 68% 65% 61% 56% 29 2 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 12 3 61% 59% 56% 52% 47% 29 3 83% 82% 80% 78% 75% 13 0 90% 88% 86% 84% 79% 30 0 95% 95% 94% 93% 91% 13 1 81% 79% 76% 73% 68% 30 1 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 13 2 72% 70% 67% 64% 59% 30 2 87% 86% 85% 83% 80% 13 3 64% 62% 59% 56% 51% 30 3 84% 82% 81% 79% 76% 14 0 91% 89% 87% 85% 81% 31 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 14 1 82% 80% 78% 75% 70% 31 1 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 14 2 74% 72% 69% 66% 61% 31 2 88% 87% 85% 84% 81% 14 3 66% 64% 62% 58% 53% 31 3 84% 83% 82% 80% 77% 15 0 91% 90% 88% 86% 82% 32 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 15 1 83% 81% 79% 76% 72% 32 1 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 15 2 76% 74% 71% 68% 64% 32 2 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 15 3 68% 66% 64% 61% 56% 32 3 85% 83% 82% 80% 78% 16 0 92% 90% 89% 87% 83% 33 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 16 1 84% 82% 80% 78% 74% 33 1 92% 91% 90% 89% 86% 16 2 77% 75% 73% 70% 66% 33 2 88% 87% 86% 85% 82% 16 3 70% 68% 66% 63% 58% 33 3 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 17 0 92% 91% 89% 87% 84% 34 0 96% 95% 95% 93% 92% 17 1 85% 83% 82% 79% 75% 34 1 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 17 2 78% 76% 74% 72% 67% 34 2 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 17 3 72% 70% 68% 65% 60% 34 3 85% 84% 83% 81% 79% 18 0 93% 91% 90% 88% 85% 35 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 18 1 86% 84% 82% 80% 76% 35 1 92% 92% 91% 89% 87% 18 2 79% 78% 76% 73% 69% 35 2 89% 88% 87% 86% 83% 18 3 73% 71% 69% 67% 62% 35 3 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 19 0 93% 92% 91% 89% 85% 36 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 19 1 86% 85% 83% 81% 77% 36 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 19 2 80% 79% 77% 74% 71% 36 2 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 19 3 75% 73% 71% 68% 64% 36 3 86% 85% 84% 82% 80% 20 0 93% 92% 91% 89% 86% 37 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 20 1 87% 86% 84% 82% 78% 37 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 20 2 81% 80% 78% 76% 72% 37 2 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 20 3 76% 74% 72% 70% 66% 37 3 87% 86% 84% 83% 80%



Table 20. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 38 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 55 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 38 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 55 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 38 2 90% 89% 88% 87% 84% 55 2 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 38 3 87% 86% 85% 83% 81% 55 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 87% 39 0 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 56 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 39 1 93% 93% 92% 90% 88% 56 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 39 2 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 56 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 39 3 87% 86% 85% 84% 81% 56 3 91% 90% 90% 88% 87% 40 0 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 57 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 40 1 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 57 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 40 2 90% 90% 89% 87% 85% 57 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 40 3 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 57 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 41 0 97% 96% 95% 95% 93% 58 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 41 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 58 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 41 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 58 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 41 3 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 58 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 42 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 59 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 42 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 59 1 96% 95% 94% 94% 92% 42 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 59 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 42 3 88% 87% 86% 85% 83% 59 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 43 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 60 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 43 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 60 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 43 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 60 2 94% 93% 92% 91% 90% 43 3 88% 88% 87% 85% 83% 60 3 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 44 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 61 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 44 1 94% 93% 93% 91% 90% 61 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 44 2 91% 91% 90% 88% 86% 61 2 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 44 3 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 61 3 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 45 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 62 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 45 1 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 62 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 45 2 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 62 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 45 3 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 62 3 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 46 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 63 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 46 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 63 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 46 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 63 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 46 3 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 63 3 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 47 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 64 0 98% 98% 97% 96% 95% 47 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 64 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 47 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 64 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 47 3 89% 89% 88% 86% 84% 64 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 48 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 65 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 48 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 65 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 48 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 65 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 48 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 65 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 49 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 66 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 49 1 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 66 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 49 2 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 66 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 49 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 66 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 50 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 67 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 50 1 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 67 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 50 2 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 67 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 50 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 67 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 51 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 68 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 51 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 68 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 51 2 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 68 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 51 3 90% 89% 89% 87% 86% 68 3 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 52 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 69 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 52 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 69 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 52 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 69 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 52 3 90% 90% 89% 88% 86% 69 3 93% 92% 91% 91% 89% 53 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 70 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 53 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 70 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 53 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 70 2 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 53 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 70 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 54 0 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 71 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 54 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 71 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 54 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 71 2 95% 94% 93% 93% 91% 54 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 71 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 89%

PD at designated Confidence level (sorted by number of trials)



Table 20. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 72 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 89 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 72 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 89 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 72 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 89 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 72 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 90% 89 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 73 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 90 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 73 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 90 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 73 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 90 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 73 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 90 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 74 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 91 0 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 74 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 91 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 74 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 91 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 74 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 91 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 75 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 92 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 75 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 92 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 75 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 92 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 75 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 92 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 76 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 93 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 76 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 93 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 76 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 93 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 76 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 93 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 77 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 94 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 77 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 94 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 77 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 94 2 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 77 3 93% 93% 92% 92% 90% 94 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 78 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 95 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 78 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 95 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 78 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 95 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 78 3 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 95 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 79 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 96 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 79 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 96 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 79 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 96 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 79 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 96 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 80 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 97 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 80 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 97 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 80 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 97 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 80 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 97 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 81 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 98 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 81 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 98 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 81 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 92% 98 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 81 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 98 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 82 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 99 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 82 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 99 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 82 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 99 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 82 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 99 3 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 83 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 100 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 83 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 100 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 83 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 100 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 83 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 100 3 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 84 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 84 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 84 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 84 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 85 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 85 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 85 2 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 85 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 86 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 86 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 86 2 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 86 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 87 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 87 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 87 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 87 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 88 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 88 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 88 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 88 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 91%



Table 21. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures

Failu

res

Tota

l Trie

s

Confidence Levels

Failu

res

Tota

l Trie

s

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%

0 4 71% 67% 62% 56% 47% 0 72 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 5 76% 73% 68% 63% 55% 0 73 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 6 79% 76% 73% 68% 61% 0 74 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 7 82% 79% 76% 72% 65% 0 75 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 8 84% 82% 79% 75% 69% 0 76 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 9 86% 84% 81% 77% 72% 0 77 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 10 87% 85% 83% 79% 74% 0 78 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 11 88% 86% 84% 81% 76% 0 79 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 12 89% 87% 85% 83% 78% 0 80 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 13 90% 88% 86% 84% 79% 0 81 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 14 91% 89% 87% 85% 81% 0 82 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 15 91% 90% 88% 86% 82% 0 83 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 16 92% 90% 89% 87% 83% 0 84 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 17 92% 91% 89% 87% 84% 0 85 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 18 93% 91% 90% 88% 85% 0 86 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 19 93% 92% 91% 89% 85% 0 87 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 20 93% 92% 91% 89% 86% 0 88 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 21 94% 93% 91% 90% 87% 0 89 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 22 94% 93% 92% 90% 87% 0 90 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 23 94% 93% 92% 91% 88% 0 91 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 24 94% 94% 92% 91% 88% 0 92 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 25 95% 94% 93% 91% 89% 0 93 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 26 95% 94% 93% 92% 89% 0 94 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 27 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 0 95 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 28 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 0 96 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 29 95% 95% 94% 92% 90% 0 97 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 30 95% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 98 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 31 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 99 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 32 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 100 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 33 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 1 4 46% 42% 37% 32% 25% 0 34 96% 95% 95% 93% 92% 1 5 55% 51% 47% 42% 34% 0 35 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 6 61% 58% 54% 49% 42% 0 36 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 7 66% 63% 59% 55% 48% 0 37 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 8 70% 67% 64% 59% 53% 0 38 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 9 73% 70% 67% 63% 57% 0 39 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 1 10 75% 73% 70% 66% 61% 0 40 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 1 11 77% 75% 72% 69% 64% 0 41 97% 96% 95% 95% 93% 1 12 79% 77% 75% 71% 66% 0 42 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 13 81% 79% 76% 73% 68% 0 43 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 14 82% 80% 78% 75% 70% 0 44 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 15 83% 81% 79% 76% 72% 0 45 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 1 16 84% 82% 80% 78% 74% 0 46 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 17 85% 83% 82% 79% 75% 0 47 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 18 86% 84% 82% 80% 76% 0 48 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 19 86% 85% 83% 81% 77% 0 49 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 20 87% 86% 84% 82% 78% 0 50 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 21 88% 86% 85% 83% 79% 0 51 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 22 88% 87% 85% 83% 80% 0 52 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 23 89% 88% 86% 84% 81% 0 53 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 1 24 89% 88% 87% 85% 82% 0 54 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 25 90% 88% 87% 85% 82% 0 55 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 26 90% 89% 88% 86% 83% 0 56 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 27 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 0 57 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 28 91% 90% 88% 87% 84% 0 58 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 29 91% 90% 89% 87% 85% 0 59 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 30 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 0 60 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 31 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 0 61 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 32 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 0 62 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 33 92% 91% 90% 89% 86% 0 63 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 34 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 0 64 98% 98% 97% 96% 95% 1 35 92% 92% 91% 89% 87% 0 65 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 36 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 66 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 37 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 67 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 38 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 68 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 39 93% 93% 92% 90% 88% 0 69 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 40 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 0 70 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 41 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 0 71 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 42 94% 93% 92% 91% 89%



Table 21. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures Failures Total

Tries Confidence Levels Failures Total

Tries Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 1 43 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 2 14 74% 72% 69% 66% 61% 1 44 94% 93% 93% 91% 90% 2 15 76% 74% 71% 68% 64% 1 45 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 2 16 77% 75% 73% 70% 66% 1 46 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 17 78% 76% 74% 72% 67% 1 47 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 18 79% 78% 76% 73% 69% 1 48 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 19 80% 79% 77% 74% 71% 1 49 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 2 20 81% 80% 78% 76% 72% 1 50 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 2 21 82% 81% 79% 77% 73% 1 51 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 22 83% 82% 80% 78% 74% 1 52 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 23 84% 82% 81% 78% 75% 1 53 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 24 84% 83% 81% 79% 76% 1 54 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 25 85% 84% 82% 80% 77% 1 55 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 26 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 1 56 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 27 86% 85% 83% 81% 78% 1 57 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 28 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 1 58 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 29 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 1 59 96% 95% 94% 94% 92% 2 30 87% 86% 85% 83% 80% 1 60 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 2 31 88% 87% 85% 84% 81% 1 61 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 2 32 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 1 62 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 33 88% 87% 86% 85% 82% 1 63 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 34 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 1 64 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 35 89% 88% 87% 86% 83% 1 65 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 36 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 1 66 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 37 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 1 67 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 38 90% 89% 88% 87% 84% 1 68 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 39 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 1 69 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 40 90% 90% 89% 87% 85% 1 70 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 2 41 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 1 71 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 2 42 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 1 72 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 2 43 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 1 73 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 2 44 91% 91% 90% 88% 86% 1 74 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 45 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 75 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 46 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 76 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 47 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 77 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 48 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 78 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 49 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 1 79 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 50 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 80 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 51 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 81 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 52 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 82 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 53 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 1 83 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 54 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 1 84 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 55 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 1 85 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 56 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 1 86 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 57 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 1 87 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 58 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 88 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 59 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 89 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 60 94% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 90 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 61 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 1 91 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 62 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 1 92 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 63 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 1 93 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 64 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 1 94 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 65 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 95 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 66 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 96 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 67 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 97 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 68 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 98 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 69 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 99 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 70 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 1 100 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 71 95% 94% 93% 93% 91% 2 4 24% 21% 18% 14% 10% 2 72 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 5 36% 33% 29% 25% 19% 2 73 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 6 45% 41% 38% 33% 27% 2 74 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 7 51% 48% 45% 40% 34% 2 75 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 8 57% 54% 50% 46% 40% 2 76 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 9 61% 58% 55% 51% 45% 2 77 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 10 64% 62% 59% 55% 49% 2 78 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 11 67% 65% 62% 58% 53% 2 79 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 12 70% 68% 65% 61% 56% 2 80 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 13 72% 70% 67% 64% 59% 2 81 95% 95% 94% 94% 92%



Table 21. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures

Failu

res

Tota

l Tr

ies Confidence Levels

Failu

res

Tota

l Tr

ies Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 2 82 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 53 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 2 83 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 54 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 2 84 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 55 91% 90% 89% 88% 87% 2 85 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 56 91% 90% 90% 88% 87% 2 86 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 57 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 87 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 58 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 88 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 59 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 89 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 60 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 2 90 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 61 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 2 91 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 62 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 2 92 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 63 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 2 93 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 64 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 2 94 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 3 65 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 95 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 66 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 96 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 67 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 97 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 68 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 98 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 69 93% 92% 91% 91% 89% 2 99 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 70 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 2 100 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 71 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 3 4 7% 5% 4% 3% 1% 3 72 93% 92% 92% 91% 90% 3 5 19% 17% 14% 11% 8% 3 73 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 6 30% 27% 24% 20% 15% 3 74 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 7 38% 35% 32% 28% 23% 3 75 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 8 44% 42% 38% 34% 29% 3 76 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 9 50% 47% 44% 40% 35% 3 77 93% 93% 92% 92% 90% 3 10 54% 52% 49% 45% 39% 3 78 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 3 11 58% 55% 53% 49% 44% 3 79 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 3 12 61% 59% 56% 52% 47% 3 80 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 13 64% 62% 59% 56% 51% 3 81 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 14 66% 64% 62% 58% 53% 3 82 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 15 68% 66% 64% 61% 56% 3 83 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 16 70% 68% 66% 63% 58% 3 84 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 17 72% 70% 68% 65% 60% 3 85 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 18 73% 71% 69% 67% 62% 3 86 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 19 75% 73% 71% 68% 64% 3 87 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 20 76% 74% 72% 70% 66% 3 88 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 3 21 77% 75% 73% 71% 67% 3 89 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 22 78% 76% 75% 72% 68% 3 90 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 23 79% 77% 76% 73% 70% 3 91 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 24 80% 78% 76% 74% 71% 3 92 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 25 80% 79% 77% 75% 72% 3 93 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 26 81% 80% 78% 76% 73% 3 94 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 27 82% 81% 79% 77% 74% 3 95 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 28 82% 81% 80% 78% 75% 3 96 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 29 83% 82% 80% 78% 75% 3 97 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 30 84% 82% 81% 79% 76% 3 98 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 31 84% 83% 82% 80% 77% 3 99 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 3 32 85% 83% 82% 80% 78% 3 100 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 3 33 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 3 34 85% 84% 83% 81% 79% 3 35 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 3 36 86% 85% 84% 82% 80% 3 37 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 3 38 87% 86% 85% 83% 81% 3 39 87% 86% 85% 84% 81% 3 40 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 3 41 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 3 42 88% 87% 86% 85% 83% 3 43 88% 88% 87% 85% 83% 3 44 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 3 45 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 3 46 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 3 47 89% 89% 88% 86% 84% 3 48 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 49 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 50 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 51 90% 89% 89% 87% 86% 3 52 90% 90% 89% 88% 86%

Documents

The Lagassi Institute of Medicine and Physics (LIMP ...LIMP Exercise Data Handbook . ... Baker disappeared until 1998 when a small explosion occurred on a pipeline northeast of the