The Kyoto ProtocolThe Effectiveness of an International Environmental Regime

Darren HardyMarch 15, 2004

Table of Contents

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................2

1.1. Two Key Questions .....................................................................................................................................21.2. Effectiveness as Goal Attainment ...........................................................................................................2

2. Evaluation Criteria for Effectiveness................................................................................................................3

2.1. Criteria for Assessing Behavior................................................................................................................42.1.1. Collective-Action.....................................................................................................................................42.1.2. Compliance ...............................................................................................................................................4

2.2. Criteria for Measuring Effectiveness......................................................................................................42.2.1. Causal Chain: Outputs, Outcomes, Impacts ..................................................................................42.2.2. Cost-Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................................5

3. Evaluation of Effectiveness ..................................................................................................................................5

3.1. Does the Kyoto Protocol Matter? ...........................................................................................................63.2. Assessing Behavior: Collective-Action & Compliance ....................................................................6

3.2.1. Collective-Action.....................................................................................................................................73.2.2. Compliance ...............................................................................................................................................8

3.3. Measuring Effectiveness: Causal Chain & Cost-Effectiveness.......................................................93.3.1. Causal Chain: Outputs ..........................................................................................................................9

3.3.1.1. Implementing Legislation within Participating Countries ....................................................93.3.1.2. Implementation of Kyoto Protocol’s Flexibility Mechanisms.............................................11

3.3.2. Causal Chain: Outcomes ....................................................................................................................123.3.3. Causal Chain: Impacts .........................................................................................................................133.3.4. Cost-Effectiveness .................................................................................................................................13

4. Conclusions............................................................................................................................................................14

5. References...............................................................................................................................................................16

6. Appendix – Figures & Tables...........................................................................................................................18

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1. Introduction

In 1997, dozens of countries signed the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997), an international

environmental regime to stabilize anthropogenic greenhouse gases, as they confronted the

mounting evidence behind global climate change. By 2000, more countries had signed the Kyoto

Protocol, and key players worked to negotiate intricate agreements (see Table 1) at Bonn (COP5)

and Marrakech (COP7). As of November 26, 2003, 84 countries signed and 120 countries ratified

or acceded the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2003b). Nonetheless, today the Kyoto Protocol fails to

meet its “double-trigger” requirement (Oberthür & Ott, 1999, p. 261, Article 25). Therefore, unless

the United States or the Russian Federation ratifies it, the Kyoto Protocol cannot enter into force.

For that reason, the Kyoto Protocol sits in limbo.

1.1. Two Key Questions

Despite this unclear situation, should international policy makers consider the Kyoto

Protocol as an effective regime? In this analysis, we will pose two key questions:

a. Does the Kyoto Protocol matter to us as an international environmental regime?

b. How well do the changes instigated by the Kyoto Protocol meet the normativecriteria for evaluation (as defined in Section 2)?

1.2. Effectiveness as Goal Attainment

The Kyoto Protocol designers placed its emissions targets and commitment timetables at its

focal point, and thus, set “common but differentiated” goals (Article 10) for each party to attain.

Unsurprisingly, we turn to goal attainment as key criteria for evaluating effectiveness; however, we

find that it alone is not sufficient for a careful evaluation (see Section 2).

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Contents

In this analysis, we conclude that (a) the Kyoto Protocol does matter as an international

environmental regime, and that (b) its effectiveness varies considerably based on the normative

evaluation criteria (as defined in Section 2) as shown in Section 3. Furthermore in Section 4, we

suggest that the United States, as the most egregious contributor to the global climate change

problem, has undermined the regime’s effectiveness significantly despites its ethical and economic

obligations to the contrary.

2. Evaluation Criteria for Effectiveness

To evaluate the effectiveness global climate policy regimes including the Kyoto Protocol,

Aldy et al. (2003, p. 374) suggest criteria:

“Six potential criteria can guide an assessment of proposed global climatepolicy regimes: (1) the environmental outcome; (2) dynamic efficiency; (3)dynamic cost-effectiveness; (4) distributional equity (both cross-sectionaland intertemporal); (5) flexibility in the presence of new information; and(6) participation and compliance. The last criterion has frequently beenignored, but is essential for achievement of the first four criteria. Whileclimate negotiations have focused on cost-effectiveness, attainment of thisobjective requires more than flexible mechanisms; it requires fullparticipation. Similarly, the negotiations leading up to Kyoto emphasizedthe need for stringent targets, but these are of little or no environmentalbenefit if participation is low or if parties fail to comply.”

Using the terminology from Aldy et al., we focus on three criteria in our analysis: (a)

environmental outcome, (b) dynamic cost-effectiveness, and (c) participation and compliance;

however, we use different terminology and organizational perspective. In our analysis, we focus on

two dimensions: (i) criteria for assessing behavior in which we look at collective-action and

compliance, and (ii) criteria for measuring effectiveness in which we look at causal chains (i.e.,

regime outputs, then regime outcomes, and then environmental impacts) and cost-effectiveness.

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2.1. Criteria for Assessing Behavior

2.1.1. Collective-Action

Instead of acting solely in each party’s own self-interests, a well-designed regime develops

solutions that benefit the parties as a whole. In other words, the collective-action decision-making

process should benefit the community as a whole more than the sum of the individuals. If a regime

does not support collective-action well, then arguably it provides no real value to its individual

members who could have otherwise acted alone. Therefore, establishing collective-action

principals in the regime’s doctrine is key criteria for encouraging participation.

2.1.2. Compliance

Without compliance, a regime is a nothing more than a “paper tiger.” Depending on the

nature of the environmental problem, compliance may or may not be critical to the environmental

outcome of the regime (i.e., highly toxic hazardous waste versus nuisance levels of air pollution),

however, compliance does factor into the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the regime. On

one hand, without compliance a regime is a “paper tiger” with no enforcement, basically a

voluntary regime, and on the other hand, a strict compliance regime may be feared but well-

adhered to regime by its subjects and perhaps litigated fiercely in the court system.

2.2. Criteria for Measuring Effectiveness

2.2.1. Causal Chain: Outputs, Outcomes, Impacts

We investigate the causal chain that forms from the consequences from a regime’s

processes and actions as the primary criteria for measuring effectiveness in our analysis. Within

this chain, we find evidence to evaluate to what degree the Kyoto Protocol contributes toward

solving the problem with which it’s chartered.

We identify the causal chain as three distinct components:

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a. Outputs – substantive measures taken on by participating parties that wouldhave otherwise not been carried out;

b. Outcomes – behavioral changes in the regime’s subjects influenced by theoutputs;

c. Impacts – any positive or negative contributions toward the regime’s solution(s)within its chartered problem area. Impacts may also include unintended sideeffects that create new problems.

2.2.2. Cost-Effectiveness

As a player in an international environmental problem area, the Kyoto Protocol must

contend with classic pollution abatement problems (Kolstad, 2000, p. 147) in which costs influence

participation and compliance. Aldy et al. (2003, p. 376) illustrate the problematic nature of using

cost-effectiveness as evaluation criteria:

“Cost-effectiveness analysis cannot be used to compare policies withdifferent benefit streams. Moreover, relying on cost-effectiveness as anassessment criterion can lead to the identification of a low-cost way of doingsomething that is fundamentally not sensible in economic terms. That is, itcan lead to the identification of “fast trains to the wrong station.” On theother hand, this kind of analysis can reveal that some policy measures aresimply inferior to others.”

Nonetheless using cost-effectiveness criteria thoughtfully, we assess how well the regime

balances the emission needs of its polluters with the economic needs of its polluters, and the

flexibility of the regime to maintain this balance over time.

3. Evaluation of Effectiveness

In this section, we address the question of whether or not the Kyoto Protocol matters as an

international environmental regime. Then, we evaluate the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol

based upon the criteria we establish in Section 2: (i) collective-action, (ii) compliance, (iii) outputs,

outcomes, and impacts consequent from the causal chain, and (iv) cost-effectiveness.

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3.1. Does the Kyoto Protocol Matter?

To begin to answer this question, we ask a simple question: what have we to learn from the

Kyoto Protocol? First, the science behind global climate change has much uncertainty, and the

policy-makers have not been able to find definitive threshold data, such as a dangerous level of

carbon-dioxide concentration in the atmosphere that they want. Second, the diversity in carbon

emissions and the reliance of the underlying economies on those emissions creates enormous

political conflicts of interests to emission control regimes. Third, the European Union is moving

forward with implementation of a carbon emissions trading market originally designed for Kyoto

but will operate regardless of Kyoto’s status.

Subsequently, we argue that the Kyoto Protocol does matter. The visibility of global climate

change science and its status, an attempt to deal with the scale of the challenges to decarbonize

economies, and emerging carbon emissions trading markets are significant events in their own

right. Furthermore, if the Kyoto Protocol moves forward, its relevance will grow accordingly, as will

the lessons learned from the experiences derived from it.

Turner & O’Connell (2001, p. 163) also argue in favor of the Kyoto Protocol’s relevance:

“What happened at Kyoto was important because at least it got the ballrolling and is beginning to stimulate investment. This investment has to bepoured into technological innovation, instead of panoply of false solutions.Planting trees, fertilizing the ocean and putting a windmill in everyone’sbackyard will do nothing to stop the process of climate change.”

3.2. Assessing Behavior: Collective-Action & Compliance

The Kyoto Protocol involves numerous participatory and non-participatory parties, each of

whom behaves to protect their own self-interests. Yet, an effective regime would assist these

parties in collective-action to guide their behavior to yield a lawful product that benefits all parties

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more than the sum of the individual parties’ own needs. However, due to negotiation pressures,

Aldy et al. (2003, p. 381) contend that Kyoto may prove ineffective in this respect:

“Entry into force only awaits ratification by Russia. To secure theparticipation of Russia (and other Annex I countries, including Japan),negotiating parties made concessions in Bonn and Marrakech. Giving thesecountries more (sink) allowances effectively relaxed the emissionsconstraints negotiated previously in Kyoto. These changes reduced theenvironmental effectiveness of the protocol and illustrate the potentialtrade-offs between participation incentives and the environmental outcomeof an international agreement. This may hint at a key consequence of theKyoto agreement: it may not achieve high participation and compliancewhile reducing emissions substantially.”

In this section, we examine Aldy et al.’s argument and analyze how well the Kyoto Protocol

measures up to both collective-action and compliance as criteria for effectiveness.

3.2.1. Collective-Action

The Kyoto Protocol sets “common but differentiated” goals (Article 10) for each of the

Annex I Parties. Since this institutional design appears to construct a common solution in which

the benefits outweigh the sum of the self-interested, nationalistic solutions, it might serve as a

model for collective-action. However, McKibbin & Wilcoxen (2002a) critique this regime design as

having the opposite effect, that is, discouraging collective-action behavior due to barriers associated

with surrendering sovereignty:

“Because the damages caused by climate change could be very large, aprudent legislature might want to adopt a climate policy to hedge its bets aslong as it could keep the policy’s costs within bounds. But Kyoto’s targetsand timetables design makes that impossible. Governments that adopt theprotocol risk taking on a disastrously expensive commitment — andsurrender part of their sovereignty in the process.”

In the same way, the White House concludes that the “Kyoto Protocol would leave the

United States dangerously dependent on other countries to meet its emission targets” (Staff, 2001,

p. 14). Then, in the ensuing withdrawal of the United States from the regime, President Bush

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offered some words to leave open the possibility of future collective-action: “America's

unwillingness to embrace a flawed treaty should not be read by our friends and allies as any

abdication of responsibility” (Bush, 2001). The United States has earned this responsibility by being

the top contributor to world carbon emissions, 38% in 2000 as registered in the UNFCCC GHG

database (see Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3).

3.2.2. Compliance

McKibbin & Wilcoxen (2002b, pp. 51-52) critique the Kyoto Protocol for providing too

little incentive for participants to comply with its requirements and base their results on its

institutional design of emission targets and timetables:

“[The Kyoto Protocol] remains unlikely ever to succeed in reducinggreenhouse gas emissions. At most, it will end up a paper tiger: anagreement that looks strong on the surface but has no viable mechanism forenforcement and does little or nothing to control emissions. It will never bemore than that because the fundamental principle on which it is based –setting targets and timetables for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions –is economically flawed and politically unrealistic. The core problem isstraightforward: in order to ratify the protocol, a developed country mustagree to reduce its emissions to a specified level by a particular date,regardless of the cost. Since the cost could be very large, few countries withsubstantial greenhouse gas emissions will ratify the treaty and those that dowill be unlikely to comply with its requirements. Developing nations, whichwill become the world’s largest emitters in coming decades, will have evenless incentive to adopt commitments. Long-term participation in theprotocol will end up being limited to countries that account for only a smallshare of world greenhouse gas emissions.”

In this argument, the abatement costs of emissions reductions are not a factor in the

emissions target goals, and therefore, compliance is problematic as those countries with high

abatement costs will be less likely to comply, especially the developing countries in the coming

decades. The Kyoto Protocol, however, does provide flexibility mechanisms such as Joint

Implementation (JI), Emissions Trading (ET), and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which

this argument largely ignores. Assuming that these flexibility mechanisms adequately mitigate

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abatement costs, then developing countries, in particular with CDM, may be more likely to comply

over time.

3.3. Measuring Effectiveness: Causal Chain & Cost-Effectiveness

In this section, we measure effectiveness using causal chain (outputs, outcomes, and

impacts) and cost-effectiveness as evaluation criteria for the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, we look

at the (a) outputs of implementing legislation in Germany, Canada, and the United States; (b)

outputs of implementations of two of Kyoto Protocol’s mechanisms: Joint Implementation and

Emissions Trading; (c) outcomes; (d) impacts; and (e) cost-effectiveness.

3.3.1. Causal Chain: Outputs

We consider various outputs of the Kyoto Protocol regime, such as the emissions inventory

infrastructure requirement, in this section. Many countries have developed emissions inventory

infrastructures to support the Kyoto Protocol, and they report their annual monitoring data to the

UNFCCC GHG database (http://ghg.unfccc.int). For example, Monni et al. (in press) analyze the

Finnish emissions inventory infrastructure from 1990 through 2001 to model how data

uncertainties effect results.

3.3.1.1. Implementing Legislation within Participating Countries

Federal Republic of Germany

Between June 1990 and November 1997, the Federal Republic of Germany defined a

national climate protection program and implemented federal legislation that went beyond its

GHG emissions reduction commitments in the Kyoto Protocol (8%, Annex B) to 25% reduction of

1990 levels by 2005 (Pielow, 2001, p. 75). However, Germany is unlikely to meet these more

aggressive targets (see Figure 2 and Figure 3), and as a result they have switched obligatory

regulations with more flexible and even voluntary mechanisms.

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Even so, Germany has managed a 15.44% reduction from their 1990 carbon emissions levels

as of 2000 as registered in the UNFCCC GHG inventory database (http://ghg.unfccc.int).

Canada

In 1998, the Canadian government established the Climate Change Action Fund (CCAF)

and many advisory boards (Lucas, 2001, p. 177) whose ultimate goal was to meet the Kyoto

Protocol emissions target (6% reduction, Annex B). The Canadian Environmental Protection Act

(CEPA) could have authorized the regulation of GHG emissions, even though the government had

not implemented such regulation yet. The CEPA 1999 revision also had authority to support an

emissions trading market for GHG to support the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, it has specific

provisions for mobile source emissions credits to enable automobile-based emissions trading

markets. Finally, the Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Trading Pilot (GERT) initiative

(www.gert.org) establishes a voluntary partnership between government and industry to support

the legislative efforts by studying emissions trading markets.

Despite these efforts, however, Canada failing to meet their 6% reduction target (see Figure

2 and Figure 3). In 2000, they are 21.18% higher their 1990 levels for carbon emissions as registered

in the UNFCCC GHG inventory database (http://ghg.unfccc.int), so they will need to reduce

carbon emissions by a grand total of 27.18% between 2000 and 2008 in order to comply with the

Kyoto Protocol.

United States

The United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol and has not passed any implementing

legislation that directly addresses how to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Instead in mid-2001,

President Bush established the U.S. Climate Change Research Initiative and the National Climate

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Change Technology Initiative which favors “voluntary actions, increased scientific research, and

market mechanisms” (Fletcher, 2001, p. 9).

3.3.1.2. Implementation of Kyoto Protocol’s Flexibility Mechanisms

Joint Implementation

Chadwick et al. (2001, pp. 81-89) illustrate the how Environmental Impact Assessment

(EIA), Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), and Social Impact Assessment (SIA) processes

apply to implementing the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism for ten case

study JI projects in the Czech Republic and Estonia. They conclude in support of “the need to

develop a consistent methodology for the environmental and social assessment of JI projects; and

[to develop] a set of agreed procedures for implementing this methodology within the Kyoto

flexibility mechanisms” (Chadwick et al., 2001, p. 110).

In another case study analysis of the JI implementations in the Czech Republic and Estonia,

Begg et al. (2001) propose “guidelines for acquiring key data during the design, approval and

reporting stage of project” (Begg et al., 2001, p. 76) as they found reliable data crucial to proper

analysis. Their analysis was often confused with incorrect or misleading data. Furthermore, data

complexity made baseline data difficult to construct as seemingly similar countries were, in fact,

quite different. For example, they found that “significant differences in the structure of energy

sectors and environmental legislation can exist even for countries which appear to be broadly

similar” (Begg et al., 2001, p. 77).

Lastly, if Russia were to ratify, a JI implementation between Russia and the EU might prove

to be a key output of the Kyoto Protocol (Laroui, Tellegen, & Tourilova, 2004, p. 913):

“There are two matching interests. From the Russia's side it is the need ofinvestments in energy saving/energy efficiency. From the EU side it issecuring the uninterrupted and safe supply from Russia with firm

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commitment to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. JointImplementation in the energy sector can be a bridge of meeting theseinterests while also insuring environmental outcome.”

Emissions Trading Market

The United Kingdom launched their own emissions trading market to prepare their own

industry’s infrastructure for the Kyoto Protocol. In April 2002 this market had “34 companies [sell]

to the government commitments to reduce emissions during the 2002–2006 period. In total, they

committed to lower emissions by 805 kilotonnes every year in exchange for an ‘incentive payment’

of £42.997 million. This works out to a price of £53.37 per tonne of CO2 equivalent per year”

(Johnson & Heinen, 2004, p. 280). Moreover, many more companies would be eligible to

participate in the market in the near future. Johnson & Heinen (2004, p. 288) “estimate

conservatively that by 2010, the EU scheme will trade as much as $1 billion in allowances each

year.”

Some emissions trading markets are still in development. The Australian Greenhouse

Office (AGO) provides “advice on the feasibility of a national emissions trading system” (Triggs,

2001, p. 316), and works in conjunction with an Emissions Trading Sub-Committee of the Council

of Australian Governments High Level Group on Greenhouse. In November 2000, the AGO

published Encouraging Early Greenhouse Abatement Action (www.greenhouse.gov.au) to solicit

public comment on developing a domestic greenhouse gas emissions trading market for Australia;

and, by March 2001, they received submissions from dozens of public parties.

3.3.2. Causal Chain: Outcomes

Next in the causal chain is outcomes, or behavioral changes in the regime’s subjects as a

direct result of the outputs. Overall, the European community exemplifies Kyoto’s success in this

realm. The UK and Germany, for example, both have seen significant behavioral changes in their

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industrial sectors as a result of climate change legislation based on implementing Kyoto Protocol

commitments. Evidence of these behavioral changes is seen in the success of the emissions

reduction programs for the countries; UK has reduced emissions 7% since 1990 and Germany has

reduced emissions by 15% since 1990.

3.3.3. Causal Chain: Impacts

Last in the causal chain is impacts, or the contributions toward solving the environmental

problem with which the international environmental regime is chartered. In short, Kyoto has

modest impacts at best; “Kyoto is too little, too fast — high costs for a small set of participants with

very modest environmental gains” (Aldy et al., 2003, p. 394). Many countries are well off target for

meeting their Kyoto Protocol Annex B commitments (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). For example,

Canada and Japan are 21.2% and 10.5% above their 1990 emission levels respectively, as registered

in the UNFCCC GHG inventory database, despite that their Annex B commitments are 6%

reductions below 1990 emissions levels.

3.3.4. Cost-Effectiveness

Due to the “common but differentiated” goals (Article 10) for each party to attain, cost-

effectiveness is problematic within the regime initially. Victor (2001, pp. 26-29) illustrates this

“Kyoto allocation of atmospheric assets” by assigning $14 per ton to the Annex B emissions targets.

The result is a wide distribution of “atmospheric assets” from $0.01 billion (Monaco) to $786 billion

(United States) that totaled $2,345 billion. “By setting emission targets, negotiators in effect

allocated permits that are worth over $2 trillion. […] Few nations would be able to meet their strict

Kyoto targets in a cost-effective manner unless they agreed to allow emissions trading” (Victor,

2001, pp. 26-29).

McKibbin & Wilcoxen (2004, p. 478) also criticize the Kyoto’s cost-effectiveness design:

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“The protocol’s core flaw is its focus on ‘‘targets and timetables’’ that, ineffect, require participants to agree to reduce greenhouse gas emissions tospecified levels regardless of the cost. Our results confirm that the costs ofthe protocol are very sensitive to key economic variables that cannot bepredicted with any precision. A single, modest change in projectedproductivity growth in Russia changes the costs of the protocolsubstantially. Many other variables would have similarly large effects.”

4. Conclusions

Although as an international environmental regime, the Kyoto Protocol does matter to us,

but its effectiveness is highly variable. For example, the regime presents a dilemma where countries

with small carbon emissions find compliance easier, whereas others like the United States find

abatement costs prohibitive.

United States’ Diminishing of the Kyoto Protocol’s Effectiveness

As the worst GHG polluters of the atmosphere and the most voracious consumers of

natural resources, we speculate if Americans will eat humble pie long enough to make the

necessary socio-economic sacrifices for the betterment of the global community as the threat of

global climate change looms. Consider Turner & O’Connell’s assertion that (2001, p. 20):

“Americans do care tremendously about the environment, and most wouldsupport any effort to reduce the possibility of climate change. Americainstigated the entire international effort that led to the formulation of theKyoto Protocol. Although the majority of Americans would support aninternational effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, they are simply notabout to put themselves on the same level playing field as the rest of theworld. Americans will not allow themselves to be governed by the samerules as Ecuadorians, Vietnamese or Ukrainians, nor will they allow theirlifestyles to come under the scrutiny of a critical world. This is equally truefor the most rabidly conservative tobacco farmer from South Carolina as itis for the most politically liberal and environmentally concerned housewifein Marin County.”

Moreover, Brown concludes that (2002, p. 235):

“the often-stated justifications of the United States for not implementing astrong global warming policy because of uncertainty in global warmingscience, cost-benefit to the U.S. economy, and the failure of the developing

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world to make binding commitments are all ethically bankrupt. [...] Ethicalconsiderations demand that the United States urgently and comprehensivelyreduce its greenhouse gas emissions to an equitable level.”

Importance of Locality in Regime Effectiveness

In the end, however, Turner & O’Connell suggest that (2001, p. 15):

“the theory that the world can solely use carbon credits to trade itself out ofimpending disaster ignores the fact that the majority of greenhouse gasesare not produced by industry but are, in fact, the result of the lifestyles welead. They will not go away without a government commitment toinfrastructure development on a local and national level.”

Perhaps the Kyoto Protocol is simply a minor step in the right direction, and the bulk of the

contributions toward solving decarbonization will come from local regimes rather than from

international environmental regimes by the simple nature of “the lifestyles we lead.

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5. References

Aldy, J. E., Barrett, S., & Stavins, R. N. (2003). Thirteen plus one: a comparison of global climate policyarchitectures. Climate Policy, 3(4), 373-397. from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clipol.2003.09.004

Begg, K., Kallaste, T., & Leutgöb, K. (2001). Case Study Projects. In T. Jackson, K. Begg & S. Parkinson(Eds.), Flexibility in climate policy: making the Kyoto mechanisms work (pp. 60-77). Sterling, VA:Earthscan Publications.

Brown, D. A. (2002). American heat: ethical problems with the United States' response to globalwarming. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Bush, G. W. (2001, June 11). President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (Speech), fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html

Chadwick, M., Begg, K., Haq, G., & Jackson, T. (2001). Environmental and Social Aspects of JointImplementation: Methodologies and case study results. In T. Jackson, K. Begg & S. Parkinson(Eds.), Flexibility in climate policy: making the Kyoto mechanisms work (pp. 78-110). Sterling,VA: Earthscan Publications.

Fletcher, S. R. (2001, December 17). Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol (No. RL30692).Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.

Grubb, M., Vrolijk, C., & Brack, D. (1999). The Kyoto protocol: a guide and assessment. London: Energyand Environmental Programme Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Johnson, E., & Heinen, R. (2004). Carbon trading: time for industry involvement. EnvironmentalInternational, 30(2), 279-288. from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2003.09.001

Kolstad, C. D. (2000). Environmental economics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Laroui, F., Tellegen, E., & Tourilova, K. (2004). Joint implementation in energy between the EU andRussia Outlook and potential. Energy Policy, 32(7), 899-914. fromhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00016-8

Lucas, A. R. (2001). Canadian Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Legal Implications for the EnergySector. In P. D. Cameron & D. N. Zillman (Eds.), Kyoto: From principles to practice (Vol. 60, pp.376). The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

McKibbin, W. J., & Wilcoxen, P. J. (2002a). Climate Change after Kyoto: A Blueprint for a RealisticApproach. The Brookings Review, 20(2), 7-10. fromhttp://www.brook.edu/press/REVIEW/spring2002/mckibbin.htm

---. (2002b). Climate change policy after Kyoto: blueprint for a realistic approach. Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution Press.

---. (2004). Estimates of the costs of Kyoto: Marrakesh versus the McKibbin–Wilcoxen blueprint.Energy Policy, 32(4), 467-479. from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00149-6

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Monni, S., Syri, S., & Savolainen, I. (in press). Uncertainties in the Finnish greenhouse gas emissioninventory. Environmental Science & Policy. from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2004.01.002

Oberthür, S., & Ott, H. E. (1999). The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st Century.Berlin: Springer.

Pielow, J.-C. (2001). Germany: Political Initiatives Concerning the Implementation of the KyotoProtocol. In P. D. Cameron & D. N. Zillman (Eds.), Kyoto: From principles to practice (Vol. 60,pp. 376). The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

Schröder, H. (2001). Negotiating The Kyoto Protocol: An Analysis Of Negotiation Dynamics InInternational Negotiations. Münster: Lit.

---. (2003). Climate Change Policy In Japan: From Dusk To Dawn. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation,Free University of Berlin, Berlin.

Staff. (2001, June 11). Climate Change Review: Initial Report. Washington D.C.: The White House. fromhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/climatechange.pdf

Triggs, G. (2001). The Kyoto Protocol and the Energy Industry: Australia and the Asia-Pacific. In P. D.Cameron & D. N. Zillman (Eds.), Kyoto: From principles to practice (pp. 299-324). The Hague:Kluwer Law International.

Turner, M., & O'Connell, B. (2001). The Whole World's Watching: Decarbonizing the economy andsaving the world. Chichester, West Sussex, England: John Wiley.

UNFCCC. (1997). Kyoto Protocol. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf

---. (2003a). Caring for Climate: A guide to the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat (UNFCCC).

---. (2003b, November 26). Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification. Bonn: United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change. from http://unfccc.int/resource/kpstats.pdf

Victor, D. G. (2001). The collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the struggle to slow global warming.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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6. Appendix – Figures & Tables

Year Meetings & Milestones1988 IPCC established by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

and the United Nations Environment Programmed (UNEP)

1992 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) adopts UNFCCC

1995 COP1 (Berlin); adopts Berlin Mandate

1996 COP2 (Geneva); adopts Geneva Ministerial Declaration

1997 COP3 (Kyoto); adopts Kyoto Protocol

1998 COP4 (Buenos Aires); adopts Buenos Aires Plan of Action

1999 COP5 (Bonn); adopts Bonn Agreements

2000 COP6 (The Hague); talks break down

2001 COP6 (Bonn); talks resume, adopts Bonn Agreements

2001 COP7 (Marrakech); adopts Marrakech Accords

2002 COP8 (New Delhi); adopts Delhi Ministerial Declaration

2003 COP9 (Milan); adopts Milan Agreements

2004 COP10 (Argentina)

Table 1 - Kyoto Protocol Regime Structure Historical Milestones.

Source: (Schröder, 2001, pp. 122-123; Schröder, 2003, p. 37; UNFCCC, 2003a, pp. 3-4)

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Figure 1 - Comparative Carbon Emissions showing that on average US citizens emit20 times more carbon per than Indian citizens, ten times more than Chinesecitizens, and twice more than other Annex 1 countries’ citizens.

Source: Chart design is based on (Grubb, Vrolijk, & Brack, 1999, p. 28, Figure 2.1);Data are from World Resources Institute (earthtrends.wri.org) 1998, Climate andAtmosphere – CO2 (CDIAC data): Emissions per capita).

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Figure 2 - Total Carbon Emissions (1980 – 1999) that shows 5 Kyoto Annex 1Countries and China carbon emissions. Both the US and China have grownconsiderably, 0.8M (15%) and 1.8M (53%) metric tons of carbon respectively,whereas the other countries have remained relatively flat in terms of absoluteemissions, with Japan a distant third at 0.2M (19%) metric tons.

Source: Chart design is from Author; Data are from World Resources Institute(earthtrends.wri.org) 1999, Climate and Atmosphere – CO2 (CDIAC data): Totalemissions).

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Figure 3 – Carbon emissions data for Canada, the European Community, Germany,Japan, Russian Federation, UK, and the USA parties between 1990 and 2000.

Source: UNFCCC GHG inventory database (http://ghg.unfccc.int).