The Kurdish Experience

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MIDDLE EAST REPORT

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July-August 1994 No. 18 9 Vol . 24 No. 4

ARTICLES

PHOTO ESSAY

UPDATE

INTERVIEW

REVIEWS

DEPARTMENTS

PHOTOS/GRAPHICS

TH E KURDISH EXPERIENCE

2 Th e Kurd ish ExperienceAmir Hassanpour

12 Mad Dreams of Independence:Th e K urd s o f TurkeyChris Kutscliera

16 City in th e W ar ZoneAliza Marcus

20 Kurdish Broadcasting in Ira qAn n Zimmerman

8 Th e Remains of AnfalSusan IVIeiselas and Andrew Whitley

C O L U M N 22 Washington Watch: Clinton, Ankaraan d Kurdish Human RightsMaryam Elahi

24 Algeria Between Erad ica torsan d Concil iatorsHugh Roberts

28 The Is lamist Movement an d thePa les tin ian Authori tyBassam Jarrar/Graham Usher

3 0 D an Co nn eW Against All OddsBasil Davidson

31 Salma Khadra Jayyusi Anthology of ModernPalestinian LiteratureSalah Hassan

32 Editor's P icks : N ew an dRecommended Reading

Nadia Benchailah, R. Maro, Susan Meiselas,An n Zimmerman.

Cover Photo: Saddam wanted to squeeze us.Halabja, Iraqi Kurdistan. R. Maro/Medico international.


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FROM THE BNT0R8

Board of Di rectors : Hady Amr, Dale Bishop,Judith Chomsky, Dan Connell, David Cortright,N ina Dodge , Rhonda Hanson, Donna Nevel,David Nygaard, Doreen Tilghman, John Viste,Andrew Whitley.

Editorial Committee: Joel Beinin, SheilaCarapico, Beshara Doumani, Sally Ethelston,Lisa Hajjar, Barbara Harlow, Joost Hiltermann,Peggy Hutchison, Suad Joseph, FareedMohamedi, Julie Peteet, Marsha Pripstein,Yahya Sadowski, Susan Slyomovics,Jo e Stork, Bo b Vitalis.

Contributing Editors: Ervand Abrahamian,Eqbal Ahmad, Noam Chomsky, Jean-FrangoisClement, Nigel Disney (1951-1978), MarionFarouk-Sluglett, S am ih F ar so un , MichaelGilsenan, Sarah Graham-Browfn, Alain Gresh,Fred Halliday, Bertus Hendriks, Jochen Hippler,Diane James, Penny Johnson, Rashid Khalidi,Fred Lawson, Ann Lesch , Joan Mandell, TimMitchell, Lee O'Brien, Roger Owen, James Paul,Karen Pfeifer.MaximeRodinson, Mir iam Rosen,Philip Shehadi (1957-1991), Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Salim Tamari, John Tordai, FawwazTrabuis i, Jud ith Tuc ker, An it a Vitullo,Martha Wenger, Sami Zuba ida .

Publisher: Peggy Hutchison

Editor: Joe StorkAssistant Editor: Maggy ZangerCirculation Manager: Esther MervesAdministrative Assistant: Ann SchaubReview Editor: Joel Beinin

D esign and Production: Julie FarrarInterns: Elizabeth Hiel, Deevy Holcomb,

Amy Schmidt

Review Intern: Rebecca SteinProofreaders: Bryce Giddens, Sarah ShoenfeldPrinting: IVIcArdle Printing Co. Copyrigrit; July-August 1994, Middle Easl Research &Information Project. Printed in the U.S.A

F o r many decades now, those states whose borders include anddivide Kurd is tan have alternately tried t o i gnore , deny, man ip

ulate and suppress widespread Kurdish demands fo r polit ical rights.In th is , the rulers have en joyed th e unstinting support o f their greatpower patrons , t he broad suppor t o f th e majori ty communit ies, andoften enough support as well among d i ffe ren t Kurd ish communities and social strata. These pol ic ies comprise a disastrous recordthat has exacted a horrible price in blood, t reasure, and democrati c rights of Arabs, Iranians and Turks as well as of Kurds themselves. These po li cies have fai led miserably in their repressivegoals, and y et th e y cont inue as th e o rd e r of th e day.

W e have tr ied to highl ight here severa l aspects of th e Kurd ishexperience. One is the t remendous changes over th e last tw o decades,as new economic and social forces, as well as armies, have penetrated and altered Kurdish societies. Another is t he persi stenceoft radit ional polit ical leaderships and r ivalr ies. As Amir Hassanpourpoints out, th e serious clashes in M ay 1994 between th e t wo dominant part ies o f the Kurdish Regional Government, th e KD P an dth e P U K , have similarities with th e territorially-based opposit ion in South Africa o f Inkatha to th e A f ri ca n N a t io n a l Congress.Wh a t is crucially missing, though, is a regional equiva lent to th eANC. While th e main responsibil i ty fo r this lies with th e Kurdishleadership, other factors play a r o l e th e r ecen tness and uneven-ness of social transformations, th e meddl ing of neighboring rivalsIran and Turkey, and, not least, th e punishing economic embargo and political isolation imposed by the United Sta tes and otherpowers as well as b y B a gh da d.

T he U S remains, fo r th e m o m e nt, a most reluctant protector ofthis experiment in Kurdish self-rule, forced by Turkey's need tostem th e refugee crisis that would come with I raq's reconquest .Here is where we see how little has changed: Western compl ici tyand silence in th e face of Baghdad's w ar of ex te rmina t ion in 1987-88 is reprised, as we write, in t he s tud ious inattent ion to th e latest Turk is h fina l offensive to crush Kurd ish po lit ica l m ili tancywithin its borders. The dimens ions o f t his cu rre nt campaign arestaggering: some 400,000 Turkish troops are deployed against30,000 gueri l las; nearly a thousand vil lages have been depopulated s ince 1993; tens of thousands o f Kurds in Turkey now seekrefuge in Iraq, and hundreds o f thousands of others have been displaced within th e country. The economic and political crisis whichthis w ar has exacerbated m ay well t r igger a military coup. It is aw ar that Ankara cannot w in , th o ug h everyone ca n lose.

Wh a t happens in Turkeywhere two-thirds of th e Kurds l iveand in the sel f- ru le area of Iraq over the coming months and yearsis l ikely to determine th e political contours of this region fo r along t ime to come. It is a matter to which we wil l return.


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Vot ing lor tlia Congrett, Zakhu, 1982. Ann Zimmerman

The Kurdish ExperienceAmir Hassanpour

It is difficult to reach a firm assessment concerning th e prospects fo r th eKurdish movement . Th e present c i rcumstances th e ability of th e PKK-le d movement In Turkey to survive extraordinary state repress ion, andth e existence In Iraq of a Western-protected Regional Governmentareunprecedented. Yet th e obstacles confront ing a polit ical resolution o f th eKu rdish prob lem are no less daunting than before.

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N u m b e r i n g over 22 million, the Kurds are one of thelargest non-state nations in the world. Their home

land, Kurdistan, has been forcibly divided and lies mostly within the present-dayborders ofTurkey, Iraq and Iran,with smaller parts in Syr ia , Armenia and Azerba i jan . Thegreatest number of Kurds today still live in Kurdistan,though a large Kurdish diaspora has dev el oped in this century, especial ly in th e main c it ie s o f Turkey and Iran andmore recent ly in Europe as wel l . Between 10 and 12 million Kurds live in Turkey, where they compr ise about 20percent of the population. Between 5 and 6 million live inIran, accounting for close to 10 percent of the population.Kurds in Iraq number mor e than 4 million, a n d c o m p ris eabout 23 percent of the population.

In the modern era, the Kurdish nation, with its distinctive society and culture, ha s had to c on fro nt in a ll o fth e h o st states centrahz ing, ethnical ly-based nationalist reg imes Turkish, Arab and Persianwith little or notolerance fo r expressions ofna t i ona l autonomy within theirborders. While th e modes and scale ofoppress ion have varie d in time and by place, th e condit ions of Kurds sharesome important features. First, the Kurdish areas overla p nat ion-state borders: t hey thus acquire significance fo rnat ional security and ar e vulnerable to interference an dmanipulat ion by regional an d internat ional powers. Second,th e Kurdish regions of these countr ies are usual ly th e poorest, least developed areas, sys temat ica lly marginalized byth e centers o f economic power. Third, t he d yna m ics o fassimilat ion, repression and Kurdish resistance in eachcountry have af fec ted the direct ion a n d o u tc ome o f th eKurd ish struggles in t he ne ighbor ing countr ies. A fourthshared feature, and th e focus o f this ess ay , is tha t theseKurd ish soc ie t ies are themselves internal ly complex , andf raught with differences of po l it ics and ideo logy, socialclass, dialect and, still in a fe w places, clan.

In spi te of a long history of struggle, Kurdish nat ion-ahsm has not succeeded in achieving it s goal of independence or even enduring autonomy. D o recent events requireus to cha ng e this assessment? In 1992, a RegionalG o v e rn m e n t o f Iraqi Kurdistan was established, but it iseconomically besieged and functions very much at the sufferance of a Western military umbrel la . In Turkey , a ten-year-old armed struggle ha s effectively defied th e unrestrained efforts o f th e Turk ish state to im p os e a militarysolution, but a political solution acceptable to th e Kurdsdoes not appear imminent.

The Kurdish movement , in c on tr as t to many othernational liberation movements , has exper ienced a persistent contrad ic tion between its t radi t ional leadershipand th e relatively developed society it seeks to l iberate.Only to th e e x te n t that this m ay be changing does th e futurehold some promise fo r Kurdish aspirat ions. Today , abouthalf th e populat ion l ives in urban centers , and feudal relations of production in rural areas have almost disappeared.Y et th e polit ics and ideo logy o f much o f the leadership ca nAmir Hassanpou r teaches communication s tud ies and is a u th or o fNationalism and Language in Kurdistan. 1918-1985. He is f rom Mahahadand presently l ives in Montreal.

hard ly be d i st ingu ished f rom the worldview o f landed notables of the past.

Nat iona l Awaken ingOne reason fo r this m ay be that Kurdish nationalismemerged as an ideology long before th e formation of th eKurds as a nation, n ot in a middle class milieu but in alargely agrarian society with a power fu l tribal component .From th e 16th century to th e mid-19 th cen tu ry, much o fKurdistan was under th e rule of i ndependen t andautonomous Kurdish principalities that produced a flourishing rural and urban life in the 17th century.'

Kurdish dest in ies changed radically around this time,when th e Ottoman and Pers ian empires divided Kurdis taninto spheres of inf luence, agreeing on a border in 1639.In order to protec t their sovereignty, th e principalitiessupported on e o r th e other power, and fo r most o f th e nex tt hree cen tu r ies a prevailing w ar economy destroyed th eagrarian system, devastated villages and towns, precipitated massacres and led to forcible migra t ions o fKurdsa nd th e set t lement of Turkish tribes in parts of Kurdis tan.All of th is inhibited further g ro w th o f urban a re as a ndsett led agrarian product ion relat ions, reinforcing tribalways of life.

Although th e war economy retarded th e consol idat ion of th e Kurds as a nat ion, th e destruct ion and suffering stimulated a political consc iousness that w as unprecedented in th e region. This emerged first in th e re alm s o flanguage and l iterature when, in th e 16th century, Kurdishu lama b ro ke th e m o no po ly o f A r a bic and Pers ian languages over literary p ro d u ctio n . I n 1597, Shara f K h a n ,prince o f th e powerful Bidl is principality, c o m pile d th efirst history of Kurd istan, S h a ra fn a m c h . A l th o u g h writte n in P e rs ia n , th is t ex t presents historical data on th edegree of independence enjoyed by di fferent Kurdish states.T h u s, t he first chapter is a b o ut t he dynasties that enjoyedth e privilege of royalty; th e second deals with rulers whodid not claim royal ty but sometimes struck coin and hadkhutha (Friday prayer s er m on s j r ec ite d in their names,and so forth. -^

T he m o st important literary manifestat ion of poli t icalawareness was Ahmad-e Khani (1651-1706), who in 1694-95 rewrote th e Kurdish popular ballad M em u Zln inthe form of a poetic narrat ive romance. W hy have th eKurds been d e pr iv ed , w h y have th ey a ll been subjugated? he asked. He re je cte d th e v ie w that it w a s b ec au sethey were ignorant o r without perfect ion. They weresubord inated, ra ther, because they were orphans, i.e.,without a king who would unite th e discordant principalit ies an d form an independent k ingdom. Although theyexcel led in qualities o f muni f icence and bravery, th epr inces refused to unite under th e suzera in ty of a Kurdishk in g . K h a n i is explicitly modern in his conceptual izat iono f th e Kurds as a nation. He referred to Kurds, Arabs,Persians and Turks as milal (plural ofmilla) not in th ethen-prevailing mean ing o f rel igious community butrather in an ethnic sense,

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Th( Hfrcond apost le ofKurdish nationalism, Haji QadiriKoyi ( 1H17?-1897) , w as a ls o a mullah and poet, but evenmore secu lar . B y the time he w as compos ing his fiery poemsin ttic laic I9lh century, the remaining principalities hadijccri overthrown by the Ottoman and Persian states. Koyiallackcd the shaikhs and mullahs w ho did not care for theKurdish language and the notables who ignored the destinies of their peop le . Living his last years in cosmopol itan IsLariijul, hi? w as familiar with the nationalist s trugg le s a nd l,li(; material advanct-ment of modern nations. Hecoiisl.ant.ly adv (K :a l< 'd us e of the Kurdish language. Althoughh is ow n medium w as poc'lry, he urged the Kurds to publish maga/incs and newspapers.

Ktiani and Koyi's propositions amount to a politicalmanifesto: t.tic Kurds ar(,' a distinct people with a distinct language, homeland and way of life. The road to is the formation of an independent and unified Kurdish slate. Ideologically, however, Khani spokefor Itie ruling fifinces and sought liberation in unificationunder a powerful king. By contrast, Koyi's ideas reflected budding modern social forces within Kurdish society.' H e advocaU^d l)oth national liberation and trans-formalion of Kurdish society.

Although these mod( ; rn is t ideas were constantly repeated in poetry and journalism, social forces capable of translating them into political parties and platforms did notent( r the scene until the 1940s. ' ' How ca n we account forthis lag? For one thing, th e fall of the principalities hadnot b(;en due to the rise of new social forces, and did notl)y any mcians put an vnd to f euda l relations and tribalism,leather, the system of Kurdish principalities w as overthrown and replaced l)y tw o centralizing although loosely integrated imperial regimes in Istanbul and Tehran.The vacant leadership of the princes w as filled by theshaikhs, notables and remnants of princely families w horetained property and influence.

These are the elements that continued to shape thenationalist struggle until the mid-20th century. In spiteof the diversity of revolts in the first part of the century , their struggle w as for a purely nationalist agenda aiming to replace foreign rule by a native rule that wouldkeep traditional structures intact. Democratic rule, thedemands of the peasantry for land and water, the hopesof urban masses for a decent life, and the freedom ofwomen were ignored. Militarily, the village and the m o u n tains were the main sites of armed resistance, and theleadership tended to rely on outside powers rather thanon a strategy of social transformation of their own societies. When opportunistic outside support withdrew, theygave up the struggle.

Middle Class NationalismThe first organizational break with feudal and tribal politics occurred in 1942, with the formation of the Society forthe Revival of Kurdistan (known as Komalay J.K. or asKomala, the Kurdish word for society or leagiie) inMahabad. Iran.* Its leadership and membersh ip were large

ly drawn from the urban bourgeoisie, large and small, educated youth, and nationalist-minded members of the clergy and landed aristocracy.

Komala became the Kurdistan Democratic Party in 1945in order to establish an autonomous republic in part ofthearea then in the Soviet sphere of influence. The KurdishRepublic of 1946 was the nationalist movement's mostimportant achievement in modem state-building: althoughit did not claim independence, it had a president, a flag,a cabinet, a national army, and Kurdish was the officiallanguage. It w as ruled by a party whose leade rs w er e drawnmostly from the ranks of the urban petty bourgeoisie,and which show ed respect for the rights of minorities andcertain rights of women. ' Although formed within the borders of the Iranian state, hundreds of Iraqi Kurds tookan active part in the military and civil administration,including Mustafa Barzani, who became a prominent m ilitary le a d er . T h e national anthem w as a p o em c om p os edby a Kurd from Iraq.

The US and Britain viewed the Kurdish and Azerbaijanrepublics as extensions ofSoviet influence, and supportedthe shah's military campaign against them. Soviet troopswithdrew from Iran in May 1946, and seven months laterIranian forces forcibly suppressed both autonomousrepublics. Kurds throughout the world still celebrate duyrebendan (January 22), the foundation date of the republic; its anthem h as b ee n adopted as the national anthem;portraits of Qazi Mohammad, the head of the republic,today decorate public and private spaces in areas controlledby the Regiona l Government of Kurdistan in Iraq.

Following the fall of the Kurdish republic, KurdishDemocratic Parties formed in Iraq and later in Syria andTurkey. T he majority of l eaders and activists were fromth e modern intelligentsia, but included anyone w ho w ascommitted to nationalist aspirations. Each party aimed atachieving autonomy for its respective part of Kurdistana n d d e m oc ra cy for the country of which they were part.This w as d ue b oth to political e x p ed ie n cy a n d t o th e inf luence of communist parties in the opposition movements ofIran, Iraq and Syria.

Kurdish SocietyThe 1950s were years of major political upheaval in theMiddle East. In Kurdistan, feudal relations of production suffered major setbacks, largely due to peasant upr isings and later to land reforms initiated by the central governments . '^ A visible change in Kurdish society in this periodw as t he r is e of th e urban population d ue to th e land reformsand the wars in the countryside. Newly-freed peasantsmov ed into Kurdish cities, where the lack of industrialenterprises seriously hindered their transformation intowage laborers. While some rural migrants engaged in seasona l or temporary construction work (contractual or wagel abo r) , o the rs e nd ed u p in street vending activities. S om emigrants maintained their village ties by working in townswhile continuing to farm for family consumption.s

The differentiation and specialization in urban

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economies introduced new soc ia lstrata. A small Kurdish working class formed in the oil industry, construction, and a fewfactories. Small workshops required auto mechanics, electricians, printers, mechanics,plumbers and painters, whileservices and transport employedmany others. A modern bourgeoisie emerged, comprisingmainly professionals rather thanentrepreneurs doctors, nurses , engineers, teachers, bankmanagers, lawyers and journalists. Migrant labor maleand female travelled as far asAnkara, Baghdad, Istanbul,Tehran, Isfahan and Europe.The traditional intelligentsia,mainly ulama and educatedlanded notables, was displacedby a growing modern intelligentsia. Another feature ofchanging social relations w as the increasing access ofurbanwomen to education, and their participation in social , economic, political and cultural life outside their hom es .

These transformations left their impact on the nat ionalist movement, expanding its social bases and increasingpolitical, ideo log ica l and organizational tension. The urbanintelligentsia eventually m a d e their presence felt in thecountryside, the traditional domain of the landed aristocracy this time not as nationalists who sought protection but rather as political and military leaders. Thismarked thebeginning ofa bitter struggle within the autonomist movement.

Radica l National ismConflict between old and new broke out in early 1964 inth e Kurdish Democrat ic Party of I raq. The K D P was headed by a politburo composed of leftist-minded nationalistsand a traditionaUst tribal leader , Mustafa Barzan i . H e h ada reputation for courageous struggle aga ins t th e Iraqi state,had been a military l eader in th e 1946 Kurdish Republ ic,a nd s pe nt 11 years of exile in th e U S S R . Fact ions of th elanded notables, threatened by Baghdad's land reform andother radical measures, supported the autonomist movement , but were a p p re h e ns iv e a b ou t t he radical politics ofth e politburo. They supported Barzani , w ho cared little fo rparty organization or peasants' unions.

T he conflict erupted when Barzani, without th e knowledge of th e politburo, signed what members consideredto be a humiliating deal with a weak Iraqi government.The conflict w as not over tac ti cs on ly, but rather over th equestion of democracy, the role of party organization,and the social component of th e mov emen t . But whi le modernists m a n e uv e re d to c on te st Barzani's abuse of power ,

leOKm10 0 miles

David Mcnowall, The /Crf/.s7Minority RighU Group

he quickly mobilized peshmerga (guerrilla) forces andreplaced the modernists with a loyal politburo. Unpreparedfor what they called a coup d'etat, the modernists lostthe initiative and took refuge in Iran.'

Between 1964 and 1975, the reformists failed t o ac h iev ehegemony in the movement, in spite of considerable support especially in urban areas . In 1966, they entered analliance with Baghdad again.st Barzani. Following the 1968Ba'th takeover, Baghdad and Barzani agreed in 1 97 0 o nan autonomy plan to be implemented within four years.The modernists aga in joined the Barzani c amp , althougha group who described themselves as Marxist-Leninistcam e together with urban intelligentsia to form an underground organization that later took the name of theKurdfstan Toilers' League (KTL, or Komala).

Baghdad stalled on implementing autonomy, makingBarzani increasingly receptive to U S, Israeli and Iranianoffers of support should the KDP take up arms again. In1974, Baghdad unilaterally decreed a Kurdish autonomousregion on its terms and l aunched a military of fensive. W h e nTehran and Washington abruptly terminated supportf o r t he K D P in March 1975, fo l lowing an ag reemen t be tw eenBaghdad and Tehran, Barzani announced the collapse ofth e a rm e d struggle. In th e absence of a n y p la n s for retreat,thousands of peshmergas surrendered U) Iraqi forces, while100 ,000 t o 200,000 peshmergas and their families and supporters fled, mostly into Iran.

The KTL and other leftists had long maintained thatth e K D P , with it s traditional structure and srxnal base andautocratic leadership, c ou ld n ot successfully lead a campaign for Kurdi.sh self-determination. Together with JalalTalabani, a leading Barzani critic within th e KDP politburo , they formed the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan f PUK)

.Jiia 1975 and resumed armed struggle inside Iraqi

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Kurdistan. 'I'h(;ir success motivated Iran and Turkey to(rncoiirage the rc^mnants of the Barzani leadership toresume; guc^rrilla activities in Iraq as well. The KDPhad its main strength in the Dohuk governorate(Badinanregion), while the PUK had the upper hand in the gover-noratesof Ert)il, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyya, which coversmore than 75 perctmt of the Iraqi Kurdish population.(Kurds in this latter region speak a dialect called Sorani,which is also spoken by most Kurds in Iran; Kurds inBadinan speak Kurmanji, which is also spoken by mostKurds in Turk(.'y.)

The period aftc^r 1 975 w as one of heavy repression. Iraqiforces d( Stroycd hundreds of villages in order to create asecurity belt along the; borders with Iran, Turkey andSyria, and ri^settled the inhabitants in camps in south-( rn a nd less mountainous areas. B aghdad also bought support by distributing som e of its risingoil revenues , althoughproductive investmcmts were channt'led to the center andsouth of the country.

With the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in September1980 , both regimes tried to use the Kurds against eachother. Baghdad, forced to concentrate its troops on the.southern front with Iran, stepped up military conscription,and in the north recruited new lightly-armed militias,which Kurds referred to as//j.s7? (little donkeys), headedby traditional clan leaders.

Differences of ideology and political practice as wellas tactics produced p(,'riods of heavy clashes between thePUK and the KDP. The two came together, at Tehran'surging, as the Kurdistan Front in July 1987 , just prior toBaghdad's genocidal Anfal offensive.

By 1987, as Ira(| t )egan to gain militarily in its long warwith Iran, it moved to impose a final solution in theKurdish region. Ali Hassan al-Majid, a cousin of SaddamHussein, took over as head of the Ba'th Party's NorthernBureau, with full authority over state and party resourcesin that region. Baghdad progressively transferred infantryand armored units from the southern front to the northwhere, together with tens of thousands ofJahsh militiamen, they carried out the Anfal campaign in eight stagesfrom February to September 19HH.

In early March 1991 , following Iraq's defeat by theUS-led coalition, popular uprisings erupted first in thesouth of Iraq and then in the Kurdish cities, towns andcomplexes. The PUK and ICDP quickly moved to take control. They declared a general amnesty, inviting the /o/;.s7;commanders to join, and in less than three weeks took overvirtually all of Kurdistan. In the weeks that followed,though, Iraqi forces retook much of this territory. Aftermillions of Kurds fled to the mountains bordering Turkeyand Iran, Western forces intei \ened to set up a small safehaven zone around Dohuk and Zakhu, in the Badinanregion dominated by the KDP, and, subsequently, a no-fly zone above tlie . 'Uith parallel.

The KTL, despite its formative role in the PUK, wasovershadowed by the personality and influence ofTalabani, After the fall of the Soviet Union, and thenthe formation of the Regional Government of Iraqi

Kurdistan in 1992, the KTL dissolved itself into thePUK. Today the KDP and PUK run the government jointly, with small radical and communist groups and newerIslamist groups on the margins. 12

The M ov em en t in IranThe 1961-75 struggle in Iraq overshadowed the Kurdishmovements in Iran and Turkey. Although the armed resistance in Iraq initially contributed to the revival of the KDPin Iran (KDPI), Barzani argued that Kurds in Iran shoulddelay their struggle until the KDP had achieved meaningful autonomy in Iraq. In exchange for limited support by Tehran, he ordered those Kurdish activists fromIran who had escaped into Iraqi Kurdistan to stop anti-Iranian activism. O ne faction followed Barzani, but a groupof activists split to form the KDPI/RevolutionaryCommittee. The Iranian army was able to crush theirresistance, helped when Barzani c losed the borders. Therest of the KDPI leadership remained in Baghdad andEurope until the Pahlavi monarchy w as on the verge ofcollapse in late 1978 .

During their absence, Kurdish society and politics hadchanged. In 1969 , a group of radical intellectuals cametogether as the Revolutionary Organization of Toilers ofKurdistan, better known as Komala, similar to and helpedby the KTL in Iraq. Komala, opposing both pro-Soviet tendencies and the urban guerrilla emphasis of s o m e Iranianrevolutionary groups, worked to form peasant unions afterthe Islamist revolution and acquired much popular support among Kurdish peasants and youth.

As in Iraq, organizational conflict reflected the emergence of new social forces and radical perspectives in thenationalist movement. The KDPI denounced Komala'sactivities to organize the peasantry and recruit women,arguing that issues of class struggle should await theachievement of autonomy. The KDPI began armed assaultson the leftist groups as early as 1980, and in 1984 launcheda confrontation against Komala that continued for several years and took a heavy toll on both sides. The KDPIhas since split, weakened by the assassination of twogeneral secretaries.

Unlike Iraq, where the KTL eventually dissolved intothe modernist front, Komala has maintained itself as analternative to KDPI with its call for a socialist Iran in whichKurdish rights to self-determination will be honored.However, much like KTL, Komala has not been able to l iberate itself from the burden of traditionalism, or to turnthe nationalist movement into a social revolution or a people's war. Since 1984, the leadership and much of the organization of both parties h as b ee n b as ed in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Although both Komala and KDPI formally demandautonomy within Iran, an increasing number ofKurds inIran and Iraq are arguing more openly in favor of independence, pointing to the failure ofnego t ia t ions and numerous d e a ls b e tw e e n the Kurds and various central governments, government associat ions of Kurdish leaders, andchanging international relations. '3

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The Movement in TurkeyTurkey's Kemalist regime w as intent on building a Western-type secular nation-state b as ed o n Turkish national, l inguistic and cultural identity. The Kurdish response wasa ser ies of revolts throughout the 1920s and 1930s led bya combination of landlords, tribal chiefs, shaikhs and urban-based intellectuals. By 1939, the last of th e se w a s brutally repressed, leading many to believe that the Kurdishproblem had been so lved. Hundreds of thousands ofKurdswere forcibly deported to western Turkey.

By the early 1960s, however, nationalist struggleresumed, encouraged by the upsurge of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and led by younger Kurdish intelligentsiaboth in Kurdistan and in Istanbul, Ankara and otherTurkish cities, which by then h a d s iz a bl e Kurdish populations. The political spectrum and agendas, while diverse,were influenced, as in Iraq and Iran, by leftist and communist formations.

The period between the military coups of 1960 and 1980is characterized by recurrent crises within th e Turkishstate, cycles of repression, and continuing proliferationof Kurdish political and cultural groups in Kurdistan, inTurkish cities, and among Kurdish workers in Germany.Unlike Iraqi Kurdistan, in Turkey m o s t Kurdish organizat ions in th e 1970s espoused soc ia l ism. The military regimefollowing th e 1 98 0 c ou p w a s a ble to suppress most of theseorganizations.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party, better known by itsKurdish initials, PKK, survived th e repression followingth e 1980 coup, and launched i ts first at tacks aga inst Turk ishmilitary targets in 1984. The PKK is distinguished fromother Kurdish political parties by its socia l base, whichincludes a sizable port ion ofworkers and peasants. It advocates both socialism and independence for greaterKurdistan, and puts a priority on a rm e d s tr ug g le . In th epast , it has avo ided coopera tion with other Kurdish politi ca l organizat ions. The PKK has been open to women's participation, a nd now claims to h av e thousands of w o m e nin its ranks. Although it has benefi t ted from some Syrianaid, it ha s effectively rel ied on th e organized suppor t of th eK u rd s in Kurdistan and in th e d ia sp ora in Turkey andabroad. W hile th e PKK is n ot th e o nly K u rd ish p o li tica lorganizat ion in Turkey, its ability to sustain a campa ignof armed s trugg le aga inst th e wel l -armed Turkish armyhas won it a leading posit ion and popular suppor t in bothurban and rural Kurdish areas, as wel l as in th e Kurdishdiaspora.

ProspectsIt is difficult to re ac h a firm assessment concerning theprospects for th e Kurdish m o v em e n t. T he present circumstances th e survival of th e PKK- led mo v e me n t inTurkey against extraordinary Turkish state repress ion ,and th e existence in Iraq o f a W estern-protected RegionalGovernment are unprecedented. Y et th e obstacles confronting a political resolut ion of th e Kurdish problem

are n o le ss daunting than before.In Turkey, th e state has l aunched th e mo s t recent of

its final offensives designed to c ru s h th e P K K . The scaleof repression and devasta t ion h a s b ee n a w es om e . Turkishhuman rights organizations report that many hundredsofvillages some estimates go as high as 900 or so havebeen depopulated and many razed to the ground sincethe beginning of 1993. Scores of journalists and humanrights activists have been abducted and tortured, killedor d isappeared . The ability of th e PKK to survive to thispoint, and to sustain itself largely on the support ofTurkey's Kurds rather than outside powers, ind icates thatits claim to represent a new kind of leadership m ay bewell-founded.

Unlike in Iran and I raq, w h e re th e movemen t is led byrival part ies, th e independence movemen t in Turkey is le dby a single organization, one that can boas t leading thelongest uninterrupted armed r es is tance in mode rn Kurdishhistory. Also, while th e Kurdish part ies of Iran and Iraqhave no t been a ble to undermine t he o il -based financialand economic power of those states, th e PKK h as b ee n ableto strike a t Turkey's economy, particularly th e vulnerabletourist industry. In addition, Ankara is anxious to becomea full member of the European Union, and if the currentoffens ive fails, it may be persuaded by the Western powers to grant th e Kurds .some concessions a lo n g th e linesof token linguistic and cultural rights. But any policythat falls short ofgenuine autonomous rule is likely to fail.Although th e PKK has indicated it is willing to negot iateon th e basis o f a u to n om y , Ankara r ema i n s d e te r m in e d tocrush it.

In Iraq, many Kurds view the Regional Governmentof Kurdistan, with its elected parliament and authorityover la w e n fo rc e m e n t units, as an edif ice of genu ine autonomy. The exper ience of th e Regiona l Government is important; elect ions and th e relative f reedom ofpolitical expressio n a nd a s s oc ia tio n h a ve been politically invigorating.Many Kurds insist that they prefer the excruciating economic deprivations they must endure now to any returnto rule under Saddam Hussein.

This state-building exper iment , though, is threatenednot only by external foes including Tehran, Ankara,Baghdad and Damascus but a ls o b y internal conflict.After .several years of cooperat ion in building th e Regiona lGovernment , th e K D P and PUK began a new round of serious fighting in May 1 9 9 4 ironically on the .'30th anniversary of th e 1964 Barzan i putsch agains t th e K D P politburo. A s of th e end of M a y , interventions by Kurdishgovernment ofTicials and by th e Iraqi National Congress(the Iraqi opposit ion front of w hic h th e tw o Kurdish part ies are th e largest and militarily mo.st significant part)had been unable to halt th e killing. Kurdish public opinion inside and outs ide Kurdi.s tan ha s accurately assessedthis as a potentially suicidal civil war.

It mu s t be empha.sized, as this essay has tried U) do , thatthis confl ict , much like that in .South Afr ica between th eAfrican National C o ng re ss a nd Inkatha, is rooted in the

.SV'c Hassanpour /7a^'e 23

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Dreams Of IndependenceTlie Kurds of Turkey and die PKKChris K paWill th e Kurdish civi l soc ie ty that ha s taken shape little by little be doomed to disappear in ye t a n o th e rphase of total war ?

P o l i t i c s has always been a difficult and risky businessfor Kurdish nationalists in Turkey. The hegemony

today of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), with its his-tor\' ofdogmatic Marxism-Leninism and its attachment toarmed struggle, is very much a reflection of the refusal ofsuccessive Turkish nationalist regimes to accommodateKurdish aspirations for cultural and political autonomy.

The stirrings of progressive Kurdish nationalist poli

tics in Turkey date to the late 1950s and early 1960s, whenKurdish intellectuals in Istanbul and Ankara formed cultural clubs and organizations. The summer of 1967 sawmass student demonstrations in 19 Kurdish cities andtowns, including 10,000 marchers in Silvan and 25,000

Chris Kutschera i> th e author of Le Mouvement National Kurde (19791.This text is excerpted and adapted b y J oe Stork from a chapter ivritten foran expanded and updated English edition of that book.

12 Middle East Report July-August 1994


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in the southeastern city of Diyarbakir.Organized activism took two forms, very much as it did

in neighboring Iraq. One was the July 1965 formation ofan explicitly Kurdish organization, the Kurdistan D e m ocratic Party ofTurkey (KDPT), in Diyarbakir. The KDPTprogram included an explicit demarcation of Kurdistanwith Kurdish as the official language and an exclusivelyKurdish government bureaucracy, proportional Kurdishrepresentation in Turkey's parliament, and economic investment. By 1968, many KDPT leaders were imprisoned,assassinated or in exile.

The other path of Kurdish political engagement wasthrough the leftist Workers' Party of Turkey (TiirkiyeIs9i Partisi, or TIP). Although the TIP officially took a n eg ative stand on the Kurdish question, by 1969 the secretary-general and the president of the party were both Kurds.At the end of 1969 , TIP president Mehmet Ali Asian challenged a 1 9 67 d e c re e outlawing the distribution in Turkeyof any material of foreign origin in the Kurdish language,and started a bilingual Turkish-Kurdishjournal, YeniAki(New Current), which raised explicitly the question ofKurdish national rights until it w a s s us pe n de d after fourissues. This period also saw the publication of a Kurdish-Turkish dictionary and soc ioeconomic studies ofKurdistan.Like the Communist Party in Iraq, the TIP, in its fourthcongress in 1970 , acknowledged the Kurdish questionthe first time a legal Turkish party had taken even thissmallest of steps.

The formation in early 1969 of the RevolutionaryCultural Centers of the East (DDKO in Turkish) marksthe beginning of the separation of the Kurdish nationalistleft from its Turkish Marxist counterpart. DDKO cam etogether initially in the two university cities ofAnkara andIstanbul before spreading to Diyarbakir and other cities.It represented a new generation, some ofwhose members,like Mahmut Kilin? and Mehdi Z a n a, a re key figures in thenon-PKK political leadership today.

The Kurdish attention to culture was a response to apolicy of forced, systematic assimilation emanating fromthe Turkish center . Starting in the early 1960s, for instance,Kurdish peas an t children w e re s en t to boarding schools inlarge villages in which Kurdish w as forbidden. My fatherw as a nationalist, one s c hool teac he r s a id in 1980, but w ewere ten children and he wanted to finish with this misery. To have a teacher's diploma w as a dream, it guaranteed economic independence. For this m y father forcedus to speak Turkish at home . There w as a small box inwhich w e had to put 25 kurus every t ime we u.sed a Kurdishword Many Kurdish militants today tell a similar story.

The Turkish government 's a la rm a t th e reviva l o fKu rd ishnationalism increased following the March 1970 autonom y ag reemen t in Iraq between Baghdad and th e KurdishDemocrat ic Party (KDP) led b y Mustafa Barzani. Underpressure fro m th e a rm y . P rim e Minister Sule iman Demire llaunched authorizedc ommando ope r a ti ons against a num ber ofKurdish towns and vi l lages that se t a pattern fo r abusive col lective punishment that cont inues today. This repression increased following the March 1971 army coup .

The military government proceeded to outlaw leftistTurkish as well as Kurdish organizations, including theTIP and the DDKO, and imprison many of their cadres .The prisons functioned as schools, however, and this period spawned explicitly Kurdish leftist groupings including the Socialist Party ofKurdistan in Turkey, better knownas Ria Azadi (Kurdish for R oad to Freedom, the name oftheir journal) and Rizgari (Liberation, which also published a journal of that name). The 1970s and early 1980sw as a period of ferment, in which Kurdish left nationalist formations experienced serious factionalization.

Military OptionParadoxically, the PKK w as born not in Kurdistan but inAnkara, where Abdullah Ocalan and other Kurdish students were active in the Turkish extreme left but questioned the attitudes of those groups towards the Kurdishquestion. More surprisingly, some of the founders and laterleaders of the PKK were Turks. They disseminated propaganda, recruited members, and established regionalcommittees that would only come together on certain occasions such as the end of Ramadan so as to avoid attractingthe attention of the authorities. They adopted the PKKname in late 1978 - early 1979 . What distinguishes thePKK from other Kurdish parties is less the democraticcentralist organization or the Marxist-Leninist languagethan an emphasis on armed struggle distinguished by itsferocity. The other distinguishing feature is PKK emphas is on the need to mobilize the peasantry: southeasternTurkey has virtually no industrial working class, as almostall industry is in the west and center, and the rural economic structure is marked by very large landholdings withserf-like conditions for workers.

The formative years of the PKK as an organization coincided with the years of martial law that followed theSeptember 1980 military coup. The repression of the 1980s,both in numbers of persons seized and imprisoned and inthe extent ofsystematic torture, w as far worse than before.T h e few journalists w ho managed to attend trials inDiyarbakir wrote that prisoners w e re s o m e ti m e s broughtto court in metal cages loaded on trucks, hardly able towalk or stand. Prison conditions were so harsh that prisoners staged prolonged hunger strikes that lasted morethan a month at a time, or, in more than a few cases, committed suicide. O n March 21 , 1982, Mazlum D ogan lit threematc hes to celebrate .N'owruz and hanged himself in hiscel l rather than mak e a te lev i.sed confess ion . A fe w w eek slater, on May 18 , four prisoners wrapped themselves inbenz ine-soaked newspapers and set themselves on fire.W hen their comrades attempted U) put out th e f lames theyrefused, insisting that it w as a freedom fire.

In Kurdistan, the extent and ferocity of the repressiondec imated the Kurdish parties, .some of which decided todisband. The regime thus cleared th e w ay for the PKK.Abdullah Ocalan left for Syria a nd L eb a no n just prior tothe September coup and set about regrouping the PKKthere. The first PKK armed assaults on Turkish forces.

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in 9 8 4, w ( re on gf.-ndarme f o rt s. The Turkish r eg im e , m u c hlike th( Fninch in Algeria, recruited village guards1 6,0 00 b y th e end of 1989 and nearly twice that numberf)y 199.'i. But this did nothing to im p ed e th e growth of thePKK, which .systematically attacked them as col laborators. PKK guerrillas they do not use the term peshm er ga b( cause of its association with Barzani's feudalm ov( ,' m en t i n Iraq w ere n ot fussy about w ho might endup in their line of fire. Between 1987 and 1989 theydestroy('d somi' l.'i7 schoo ls as instruments ofAnkara's[jolicy of assimilation. It w as not until th e end of the decadethat Ocalan indulged in an autocriti(juc, saying that PKKarmed actions needed to be more seh^ctive.

I'KK tactics gave the 'f urkish authorities a great dealof leeway in |)ortraying them as bloody terrorists, a taskmade all the easier by the rigid censorship of events inKurdistan and the obliging attitude of most of the Turkishpress. It was only aftei' some 'I'urkish journalists noticedthat many victims of the so-cal led R ed Kurds had beenkill(;d by army weapons that the dimensions and conse-( |U( 'nces of Turkish martial law began to breach the wallof silence surrounding the Southeast.

'f he 'f urkish government has maintained a martial lawregime over the country's 1 1 Kurdish provinces to this day.'fhe option of choice has persistently been the militaryoption: from launching hot pursuit raids into IraqiKurdistan to destroying villages and killing and displacing tens of thousands of people . For a brief period in thewakeofthc 1991 Persian Oulfwar, President TurgutOzalspoke in measured terms of a more liberal policy towardsthe Kurds, a nd laws prohibiting the use of the Kurdish language were repealed. But following Ozal's death in April1993, it ha s become clearer than ever that when it comesto the Kurdish question, it is not the civilian elected government which determines policy but the army-dominated National Security Council.

Many have lost a great dea l in this war, but the leastof them is the PKK. IfJezireh is ours today, says Ocalan,speaking of a town near the Iraqi-Syrian border, it ishalf thanks to our efforts. But the other half Turkey presented to us on a silver platter. The I'KK have an estimated 1 2 ,0 0 0 t o 15, ()()() full-time fighters. Ocalan declaredlast September that he would have twice as many atthe end of 1994.

Tact ica l Relat ionsThe recent course of events in Turkish Kurdistan cannotbe understood without appreciating the relationships ofthe PKK with the Kurdish parties of Iraq. Despite sharpdifferences of ideology, strategy and method, the PKKsigned an agi-eement in 1981 with the KDP. which, afterall, controlled the Iraqi part of Kurdistan along the borderwith Turkey. The agreement gave the PKK transit rightsand rear bases in KDP territory. Turkish military pressures after September 1983 heightened the differencesbetween the two groups that were not overcome even bysummit meetings between Ocalan and Masoud Barzani

(son of KDP founder Mustafa Barzani) in Damascus in1984 and 1985. It was then the turn of Jalal Talabaniand the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK), which s igneda memorandum of agreement with the PKK in May 1988.The agreement w as never implemented but at least theparties maintained bridges.

The establishment of a Kurdish government in northern Iraq in June 1992 brought the contradictions betweenthe two movements to a head. O ne factor w as the IraqiKurdish leadership's effort to establish good ties withAnkara as a way of maintaining relief supply routes andthe allied military protective cover over Iraqi Kurdistan.In November 1991 , Talabani appealed to Ocalan to declarea ceasef i re, or at least to cease operations from cam ps inIraq. Instead PKK attacks inc reased, a n d O c a la n denouncedTalabani as an agentof imperialism. As the dispute escalated, the PKK enforced a blockade on the only road fromTurkey into Iraqi Kurdistan in July 1992 , exacerbatingth e negat ive effects of the UN s anct ions and th e Iraqi blockade on the Kurdish region of Iraq.

The PKK and the Iraqi Kurdish parties each considerthemselves to be the leading force in the struggle forKurdish liberation. For the PKK, the government ofErbildoes not represent much. . . .Each tribe is a power. The PKKcould tolerate tactical relations between the Kurds ofIraq and Ankara, but not the alliance that they se e theKurdistan Regional Government having established withthe Turkish army and intelligence forces. The Kurds ofIraq, for their part, are not prepared to sacrifice a freeKurdistan, with freely elected political institutions. ..forthe death of two Turkish gendarmes that does not bringmuch, said Jowhar Nameq, chair of the Kurdish parliament in Erbil, at a Paris press conference in December1992 . The PKK claims there a re no borders between theparts of Kurdistan, said Adnan Mufti, formerly a leaderof the small Kurdistan Socialist Party. S o w e ask themthen, why don't you fight Saddam Hussein?

O n October 4, 1992, the Kurdish government in Erbilissued an ultimatum to the PKK: either withdraw fromthe border bases or be expelled. Iraqi Kurdish attacks beganthe next d ay , a nd Turkish government forces intervenedthe following week. O n October 27 , after heavy fighting,including extensive Turkish air attacks, PKK leader OsmanOcalan (Abdu l lah 's bro ther) discussed ceasef ire te rms withTalabani and Barzani. Turkish forces renewed their attackstwo days later. Estimates of PKK losses ranged from 150(Osman Ocalan) to 4,500 eliminated (Turkish chief-of-stafTGen. Dogan Giires). By any reasonable measure thePKK suffered a serious defeat.

For years Jalal Talabani had been striving to convinceAbdullah Ocalan to proclaim a unilateral six-month ceasefire to test the will and strength of Turkish civilian leaders. In the spring of 1 99 3 , o n March 17 , at a base in Lebanonwith Talabani present, Oc a lan announced a ceasefire fromMarch 20 to April 15 and declared that the PKK did notintend to separate immediately from Turkey. Two dayslater, on March 19 , a PKK agreement with the KurdistanSocialist Party brought an end to the longstanding PKK



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vendetta against the other Kurdish parties. More significantly, the March 19 agreement proposed that the Kurdishquestion could be solved in the context of a democraticand federal regime and set out nine conditions for a political solution.

Ankara chose to see only PKK weakness in the ceasefire. All that was left to Ocalan, said Interior Minister IsmetSezgin, was to surrender without conditions. Nevertheless, on April 16 , Ocalan announced an unlimited extension of the ceasefire and repeated the conditions for negotiation outlined earlier. To this Demirel replied, If [Ocalan]gives up killing, w e won't reward him [with] a region ofTurkey. O z al, w h o had been the most forthcoming Turkishleader regarding the Kurds, died suddenly the next day.Within a month, Turkish Kurdistan was again engulfedin violence.

The Kurds of Turkey are in a paradoxical position.Cultural repression in Turkey is fiercer than in Iraq orIran, yet Turkey is also where at least the formal attributes ofd e m o c ra c y a re most respec ted. Scores ofKurds haveserved in the Turkish parliament over the years, but inthe past these have been landed notables with long-standing ties to Ankara and no wish to advertize theirKurdishness. Since 1983 , though, the several legislativee lec t ions hav e provided an arena in which militant youngerKurdish politicians have been able to seize very limitedmaneuvering r oom. The elections ofOctober 1991 were thefirst to witness the emergenc e of a genuine and explicitlyKurdish bloc, when 18 deputies elected on the SocialDemocratic (SHP) ticket broke off to join the small People'sLabor Party (Halkin Emek Partisi, o r H E P ). It w as a mixed

group some saw themselves as close to the PKK, whileothers were more traditional social d e m o c ra ts a n d nat ionalists. The Turkish authorities, though, had little tolerancefor anyone aspiring to the equality of the Turkish andKurdish peoples. . . within the framework of the legitimateprinciples of law, as former HEP chair Feridun Yazarput it during his trial. On July 3, 1992, the State SecurityCourt indicted the founders of the HEP for separatist propaganda. O n July 15, 1993 , the Constitutional Court outlawed the HEP, a fe w days after the deputies had resignedto form the Party of Democracy (DEP). In December 1993,Hatip Dicle, considered close to the PKK, w as e lec ted DEPchairperson. O n March 3, 1994, the parliament voted to liftthe parliamentary immunity of seven DEP deputies. Theywere arrested at the door of the parliament and chargedunder Article 12 5 of the penal code ( crimes against thestate ), which carries the death penalty.

The DEP will likely meet the same fate as the HEPbefore it, but the recomposition of the Kurdish movementin Turkey seem s irreversible. The access to power of aKurdish government in Iraqi Kurdistan, the acce leration of the war in Turkish Kurdistan, and the March 1993agreement between the PKK and other Kurdish parties inTurkey can hardly be interpreted otherwise. The questionnow is what course will prevail among Turkish politicalauthorities th e brief open ing initiated by President Ozalbefore his death, or the military-dictated hardline ofPresident Suleiman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu(filler. Will the Kurdish civil society that has taken shapelittle by little be d oo m ed to disappear in yet another phaseof total war ?

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18/36

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City in tiie War ZoneAliza Marcus

R. Maro/Medico International

Ankara, In its ze al to c ru sh Kurdisti nationalism, ha s managed to undermine and destroy non-violent Kurdishmovements, in ef fec t he lp ing ensure PKK dominance

S a k i I^ikfi sits in a cof feeshop below a picture of thefounder of the Turkish republic Mustafa Kemal

Atnturk and ticks off the prob lems he faces as the deputymayorofCizre: b ad ro a ds , p o or schools, not enough water,no jobs. The city's monthly budget barely covers municipal salaries, and emigrants from outlying villages arestraining social services.

Ai\d then there is the war between the Turkish army andthe Kvudistan Workers' Party (PKK) to control southeastTinkcy, h o m e to about half the coimtry's estimated 12 mil-Alizn Marcus f'. a \a\:r::aUsi wh o fn-qucr.tly iLritcs on Turkey.

lion Kurds. The government isn't interested in us, saysIik9i, w hose house and car were firebombed last Augustby Tirrkish soldiers claiming to be ferreting out PKK guerrillas. They are only concerned about the war, and driving us from the southeast. To them, w e a re all terrorists.

If ik9i, a nervous looking man, these days rarely visitsthe municipality's office, a ramshackle building with bullet-scarred walls and darkened hallways. Last summer,the mayor, Ha^im Haf imi, w as detained by police w hoaccused him of aiding the PKK, and now Hafimi, too,spends most of his time elsewhere. Nothing h as b ee n

16 Middle Eas t Report July-August 1994


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spared, says Iik9i, marveling for a moment at the lack ofauthority elected officials in the southeas t hold these days.My house, the mayor's building, even the hospital, theyhave all been attacked by soldiers.

Cizre is on the verge of col lapse. Decades ofgovernmentinattention and the United Nations economic embargoagainst neighboring Iraq have crippled the economy. A fe wdimly lit shops struggle on, selling cheap goods, and a c ou p le of grimy garages hawk s mugg led Iraqi fuel.

If Cizre one day disappears, its people scattered westward, far from the widening war zone, it will be du e to aconfluence of events rooted in the Turkish government'slong-standing desire to destroy Kurdish nationalism andthe PKK. And when Cizre finally d oe s c ea se to exist, asmany here believe will happen if the fighting continues,it will mark yet another setback for Ankara as well as fo rth e people w ho cal l it home. The human rights abuses ofthe government and its security forces translates into moresupport for th e guerrillas. Desp i te th e P K K 's ow n violentpract ices, the group is respected as the only organizationwith th e will and strength necessa ry to pursue Kurdishgoals of self-determination.

Turkey fo r th e TurksCizre and its 24 outlying villages scattered in the surrounding plains and mountains were never high onAnkara 's Ust of priorities. Since th e f ound ing o f th e republic in 1923, successive Turkish regimes, determined toestabl ish a s t rong central government , have v ie w ed th esoutheast 's per iodic d isp lays ofKurdish nat ional ism withapprehension.

The first of these localized insurrect ions erupted in 1925,a n d o th e rs fo llo w e d through th e mid- 1930s. Al though th eKurds ha d f ough t s id e b y side with th e Turks in th e w aro f l iberat ion, le d by Mustafa K e ma l, th e y emerged with fe wr ights under a regime self-defined as Turkish. Kemal , whot ook the name Ataturk ( fa ther of th e Turks) in 1934, movedto dest roy Kurdish nationalism by decimat ing Kurdishsocial structures and implement ing a policy of forced assimi lat ion. Leaders of th e upr is ings w e re h an g ed a nd their suppor te r s impr isoned. Land w as expropr iated, families wererelocated to western Turkey and Kurdish l anguage us e w asbanned. The regime opened cultural an d educational societies to te ac h Turkish la n gu a ge a n d history and implanta new national Turkish identity.

Economic investment lagged, however. People in Cizrestill recall when th e trappings of development firstappearedit w as not until th e mid-1950s that th e city washooked up to electricity and running water . *

The decade o f wate r and light fo llo w e d th e country 'sfirst multi-party elect ions in 1947, in which Kurds werewooed by the new Democrat Party. The party w as not pro-Kurd ish , but was unta in ted by th e h a rs h assimi la t ion istpolicies of th e Kemalists. When the party t riumphed in th e

an d other historical details about Cizre come from Abdullah Ya.sin, BulunYonleriyle: Cizre ( 1983).

1950 national elections, Kurds were rewarded with somebas ic s oc ia l s e rv ic es .

Since the beginning of the republic, the governmentdidn't give a ny h elp to this region, says Mayor Haimi.It w as not until 1961, w hen a Kurd from Diyarbakir becameminister of health, that th e r eg io n a c q ui re d health facilities. But since then, the mayor adds, no improvementshave been m a d e on the facility.

B y 1968, C iz re h ad received a br idge, new roads andwidened streets, a park n a m e d after Ataturk, a cinemaand a variety of municipal buildings. Ankara consideredsuch favors sufficient to bring the Kurds of Cizre andthroughout th e region into th e a rm s of th e Turkish state.

Cizre 's economic heyday in th e 1980s w as thanks to th ehighway which cuts through th e c e n te r of th e city, a roadthat crosses into Iraq to the e as t a nd Syria to the west .At th e height o f commerc ia l traffic, some 5,000 gaily painted trucks passed through Cizre daily, lumbering to Iraqand back , bringing with them a huge demand for serv ices.Repa i r shops, restaurants and cheap hotels cropped up onboth sides of the road for miles outside of th e city. Youngb o ys s old cigarettes as truckers idled at Cizre 's one stoplight. O th e rs b u stle d a b ou t th e te a shops offer ing t o c le a nthe grease off drivers' shoes.

W e had th e c h ea p e st, b e s t goods in th e a re a, saidHa^imi, recalling th e days before th e 1991 Gulf war, w hentrade with Iraq w as e m b ar go e d. From all over peoplecame here to buy a nd s el l. Everyone was earn ing a goodliving, fro m th e small children to their fathers. But whenthe bo rde r was c losed, 90 percent of th e shops closed down.For all its r iches, Cizre has n e v e r c o m p a re d with a cityin western Turkey. T he highway is p a ve d , but the narrowdirt roads in residential neighborhoods a re b is e ct ed byst reams o f ra w sewage. The shops are wel l -stocked, butwith th e cheapest , most basic goods. The .schools ar e stillovercrowded even though some families canno t afford tosend their chi ldren to school. Electricity is avai lable onlyintermittently and water p ipes do not extend to everyhouse. Cizre never had a proper factory, and some peop le only survive on migrant la b o r. D e p e n d in g on th e season, famil ies ca n be found picking cotton in A d an a, sellin g fruit in Istanbul, or working in restaurants alongthe Mediterranean coast.

Good Vi l lage/Bad Vil lageIn th e s u m m e r of 1984, 84 kilometers away from Cizre,guerr i l las fr om th e P K K opened their first offensive again.stTurkish security forces. The military's response was quickand harsh: hundreds were ar res ted, and securi ty forcestortured a nd b ea t recalcitrant suspects. The governmentwas no doubt caught o ff guard: t he reg ion had been underemergency and then martial la w since 1979, an d th e 1980military coup had ushered in a whole new ro un d o f repress io n . T e ns of thousands of Kurds throughout th e countrywere detained, periodicals shut do wn a nd restrict ions onKurdish express ion strictly enforced.



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Around Cizre, the guerrillas made more enemies thanfriends. By this time, nearly every village in the area hada schoo l , 'f urkish television was intermittent, but a proper transmitter was under construction. Turkish newspapers were available every day or at least every otherday. By one count, in 1983 there were more than twosheep for every one of the area's some 32,500 people, notto mention the Angora goats (one per person), cows andwater buffalo. With the coal mine up the road and thetraffic off the highway, many villages found that tradewas a lot smoother if they remained on g oo d terms withthe authorities.

But Turkish security forces treated everyone harshly.By the late 1 980s, they had separated good villages frombad by means of a simple test: if villagers did not agreeto join the village guard, a government-sponsored Kurdishmilitia which paid participants a hefty wage, they imme-(liat( ly came under suspicion. Around Cizre, a number ofvillag( s provided village guards, some of whom joined solely to deflect military pressure.

The PKK attacked villages and guards and also dealtseverely with villages that refused to support them withfood and water, or which did not seem amenable to thegroup's Marxist-Leninist message of liberation. Still, whenall was said and done, many Kurds around Cizre came torespect the PKK's campaign of Kurdish nationalism.Feelings toward the PKK grew warmer as the securityforces upped their pressure. The PKK might come in andkill a pro-government mukhtar and his family, but thesc'curity fo rces would detain a whole village, beat the menand women, ransack houses and then k i l l a couple of peop le just for show. By the end of the 1980s, the army hadbanned villagers from grazing animals and farming on themountains into which the PKK retreated after attacks.Tractors were confiscated and nightly curfews wereenforced. Villagers f led to nearby towns.

Around the time the rural economic base started to c rumble, Turkey embarked on its ambitious Southeast AnatoliaProject (GAP), a multi-billion-dollar project to harness thewaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The plan envisions nearly two dozen dams and some 19 power plantswhich will boost irrigated land by a third and double electricity capacity. The government touts the project as anexample of its commitment to developing the southeast.The dams, once complete, will make arable huge swatches of now-arid land. The boost in agricultural output willpresumably increase jobs and wealth, and attract lightindustry to the region.

S o m e Kurds fear that big landowners will quickly takepossession of the new arable land, leaving villagers notmuch better off than before . The government has also usedthe project as an excuse to relocate Kurds whose homeswere targeted to disappear under vast lakes. The GAP,meant to integrate potentially productive parts ofKurdistaninto Turkey's e c on o m y , is more likely to marginalize further the mountainous region to the east where the PKKis strongest. PKK guerrillas have recently torched machinery and tried to bomb a couple of dams.

Nor have the guerrillas ignored Ankara's other investments in the region. Oil refineries in nearby Batman havebeen bombed, as has the now-idle pipeline through whichTurkey used to transport Iraq's oil. Guerrilla attacks haveslowed road construction (the PKK argues that the roadstransport soldiers), cut tourism (last summer close to 30tourists were kidnapped by the group) and halted archaeological digs. The burgeoning war in which 11,700 people have died, s om e 5 00 in the first two-and-a-halfmonthsof this year alone is a ls o cited by Central Asian statesthat a re loath to pipe oil to Western markets through Turkey.

Establishing AutonomyT h es e d ay s, downtown Cizre is a dismal sight ofhalf-shuttered shops and overcrowded cof feehouses . Under pressure from the security forces, thousands of people havestreamed in from the countryside. The city's populationis now around 60,000, up from 20,200 in 1980. Many immigrants are not from Cizre's outlying villages of whichat least a fourth have been forcibly emptied by soldiersbut from more distant parts of the region.

S o m e in Cizre fear their city will go the way of Sirnak,a nearby town of 29,000 bombed by soldiers almost twoyears ago. The attack on Sirnak was ostensibly precipitated by a clash with the PKK, but when the shootingstopped about 50 hours later, the police station, government buildings and military base had escaped virtuallyunscathed and almost all casualties were civilian. So far,promised government restitution has not materialized.

Cizre may indeed become another Sirnak. Its people areknown for being strong PKK supporters, something thatoften sets off a shooting spree by soldiers. The guerrillasare Kurds, they are fighting for our homes, our lives andour national identity, says a truck driver who frequently passes through town. But the government well, theyare only interested in beating and killing us. Every nightI go to bed and wonder if I will live to the morning.

Last September, Cizre was closed off for two days aftersoldiers clashed with three guerrillas hiding out in a house .When the smoke cleared, the guerrillas were dead, thehouse in which they were hiding destroyed, and lots ofotherhouses had been damaged. By the time the curfew was lifted , downtown Cizre w as littered with shattered glass. Amonth earlier, soldiers had also embarked on a shootingspree no on e is quite sure what set it off during whichthey managed to destroy a row of restaurants and service stations just outside the town. Along the way, a coup le of houses in a nearby village were shot up and, whenhis truck w as firebombed, a sleeping driver burned to death.

Local residents say there is no civil authority to whichthey can appeal. The mayor and deputy mayor readilyadmit they have no power. The government-appointedadministrator has not been open to complaints about secu

r i t y forces abuses. When M. Ali Dincer, a human rightslawyer whose office was firebombed by soldiers, tried tocomplain, he was told that the guerillas must have perpetrated the act. At one o'clock in the afternoon the PKK



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is driving around Cizre in tanks? asks Dincer. The people are lying because they are afraid of the terrorists,responds Omer Adar, the smooth-talking governmentadministrator.

For now, the only economic aid seem s to be going tothe neighborhood controlled by village guards. They needtheir own schoo l they are so hated by other residents thattheir children cannot safely be sent to schools in the center of the city. S oon , when the fighting ends , there a re alot ofthings w e vrill do all over Cizre, insists Adar, describing proposals for a vast irrigation system, agriculturalinvestment and a host of vocational training programs.A Kurd himself, Adar bel ieves Kurdish agitation for greaterrights is nothing mor e than PKK propaganda. Only someignorant people w ho don' t know anything a b o ut th e worldwant Kurdish educat ion after all, what use would it bein the world? The Turkish language and culture a re veryrich, while the Kurdish culture is a very ignorant culture. There is no future for Kurdish.

The PKK cannot add electricity lines or pump morewater, but it does offer a well-functioning judicial system, after-school classes in Kurdish, and an en fo rceab lemoral code. Tired of being beaten by your h u sb a nd ? T h ePKK will explain to him that m en no l onger are al lowed tobea t their wives. Trouble collecting on a bill? The guerrillas do not like it w h e n on e Kurd tries to c he at another .To o m a n y teenage boys getting drunk? T h e g ro u p will banalcohol . Is pornography ruining lo ca l m o ra ls ? T he m o vietheater will be shut down. W as your brother murderedin a fight over a woman? The PKK will p u t th e assai lanton trial.

There's no lo n g e r a n y need fo r people to seek out th ePKK w h e n they have a prob lem, because th e PKK is everywhere . It will hear about the problem and take s te ps todeal with it, explains on e local Kurd ish professional. ThePKK has to do this. The government doesn't care anymore

if one Kurd kills another Kurd.Cizre's experiences are reflected throughout th e south

east. According to th e Turkish H u m a n Rights Associat ion,at least 874 vi l lages have been forcibly empt ied a nd m o rethan 500 Kurdish act iv is ts myster iously murdered since1991. Torture of p o lic e d e ta in e e s is rampant , as is a rb itrary arrest and harassment.

Economical ly , much o f th e region is in a state of disrepair and disintegration. Rarely a week goes by without apolitician in Ankara stating that economic factors are atth e ro o t o f t he guerrilla war, but establ ishing a well-functioning economy in southeast Turkey means creating asecure env i ronment for businesses an d farmers. This wouldrequire halting arbitrary detent ion and torture, mysteriou s murders of activists and shooting sprees by th e security forces. Vil lages could no longer be burned down becauseth e people refused to take up a rm s a g ain s t th e guerrillas. It also m ea ns a n e n v iro nm e n t i n which discussion ofKurdish life and aspirat ions is not throttled as separat istpropaganda. Restrict ions should be l i f ted on free discussion of Kurds in Turkey , their past, present and fu ture.W ith state-protectedand even promotedfreedoms, pub

lic and private interests will feel free to invest in economic development in the southeast.

After all these steps are taken, it might turn out thatth e Kurds want more . Perhaps the PKK is the party ofchoice for the Kurds. Ankara, in its z ea l to crush Kurdishnationalism, has managed to undermine and destroy nonviolent Kurdish mov emen ts , in effect helping ensure PKKd o m in a n ce . B e t w e e n the state and the guerrillas, Kurdshave not had many options for protesting restrictions ontheir identity. But even without the PKK, a majority ofKurds may continue agitating for full separation fromTurkish control . Ankara must take th e chance and dea lwith it democratically. Right now , th e only thing certainis further bloodshed by both th e PKK and th e Turkish a rmyas long as c hanges a re not made.

Further Reading on th e Kurdsand KurdistanMart in van Brvine8Ben,Agha, S ha ikh and State: Th e Socialand Political Struc tures ofKurdistan, London: Zed Press,1992 .

_, The Kurds Between Iran an d Iraq, MiddleEast Repor t No. 14 1 (July-August 1986). , Between Guerrilla War and PoliticalMurder: The Worke rs ' Party of Kurdistan, Middle Eas tReport N o. 15 3 (July- August 1988) .

Bill Frelick, T he False Promise o f Operation ProvideComfort : Protect ing Refugees or Protect ing State Power?Middle E a st R e p or t N o. 17 6 (May-June 1992).

Amir Hassanpour , Nationalism and Language inKurdistan, 1918-1985, San Francisco: Mel len ResearchUniversity Press , 1992 .

Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement : ItsOrigins and Deve lopmen t , unpubl ished P hD dissertation,Syracuse University, 1960.

Phi l ip G. Kreyenbroek an d Stefan Sper l, eds. Th e Kurds:A Contemporary O ve rview , L on do n and N ew York;Routledge, 1992 .

Chris Kutschera, Le Mouvemen t National K ur de, P a r is ,1979.

David McDowal l , The Kurds: A Nation D e n ie d , L o nd o n:Minority Rights Group , 1992.

Middle Eas t Watch , Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaignaga ins t th e Kurds, N ew York, 1993.

_, Bureaucracy of Repression: The IraqiGovernmen t in Its O w n Words, N ew York, 1994.

Midd le East R epo r t July-August 1994 19


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Kurdish Broadcasting in I Ann Zimmerman

i t it iM I t dM PUK li ZiklMi, I raqi NurdiitM, 1982. Ann Zimmerman

In the transition from exile to autono m y , Iraqi Kurdish parties have set

up the first Kurdish-controlled television channels in the Middle East.Their broadcasts now reach more thanhalfof the estimated 3 to 4 million people in Free Kurdistan. i

The battle over who def ines Krudishculture is inherently linked to politica l control. The evolution ofBaghdad'sKurdish-language TV channel reflectsa history of carrot-and-stick policiesaimed at undermining resistance tothe central government. Iraqi concessions to Kurdish autonomy in 1970included adding Kurdish-languageprograms to the Arabic channel inKirkuk. By 1972, the station hadadded a Kurdish language channelwith programs for other minorities.Its transmission covered the provincesof Kirkuk, Sulaimaniyya and Erbil.

All official mass media producedwithin the autonomous Kurdishregion was censored by the government. Attracted by the prospect ofreaching larger audiences, however,Kurdish writers, performers and

Ann Z i m m e r m a n worked with Kurdishtelevision stations in northern Iraq in 1992producing health education programs.

artists from these provinces beganproducing works for the new channel.Older Kurds living in Zakhu, a bordertown, say that before the 1991 uprisings they preferred Baghdad'sKurdish station to the channels ofneighboring Turkey (available at thetwist of an antenna) or the nationalArabic broadcasts.

Following the collapse of theKrudish resistance movement in 1975,Baghdad embarked on an Arabizationcampaign which included the relocation of thousands of Kurds into concentration camp-like complexes within and outside of Iraqi Kurdistan.Among its efforts to make such repressive policies more palatable, the government distributed truck-loads ofcolor television sets to Kurdish civilservants, casino owners and Ba'thParty members. In 1979, 30,000 colorsets were given to Iraqi Kurdishrefugees repatriating from Iran. In1986, Baghdad started a secondKurdish channel to service the Mosuland Dohuk districts.

Most government censors wereArabs, dependent on Kurdish translators to interpret Kurdish originated or adapted scripts. A Kurdish play

wright described these security officers as thugs who did not understandthe art of theater. In order to presentKurdish nationalist messages , KurdishTV producers and playwrights usedsubversive subtexts. Sympathetictranslators neg lec ted to interpret suchnuances to censor officers. For example, the MinistryofInformation accepted scripts on the nationalization ofBritish oil holdings and on Israelioppression ofthe Palestinians ^topicsripe for comparison with Baghdad'seconomic and social repression of itsKurdish population. These parallelsw er e highlighted by featuringkey characters in traditional Kurdish clothing and using titles referring to Kurdishheroes and nationalist symbols.

Iraq later boasted of an increasein Kurdish language degree holders,and a significant number of these wereearned by Arabs assigned to learnKurdish for security purposes. In thebeginning, recalls a Kurdish actorfrom Sulaimaniyya, they really didn'tunderstand what w e were doing. Butby 1988, they had well-trained censors . Instead of reviewing a translated script, they sat in the studio andmarked our performances word forword. We felt like they knew our culture better than w e did.

By the 1990s, television sets hadreached necessity status in urbanareas. When Saddam was here, wewere not free to move because of thecurfews and military poHce, a Kurdishsportscaster said. Now we are freeto move, but we s t i l l have no entertainment, no fuel to travel, and manyare without jobs. So w e spend a lot oftime watching television. A surveyfollowing the 1991 uprising showedthat in Zakhu and Dohuk, 31 percentofhouseho lds had pvuchased new televisions as part of their i n i t i a l furniture replacements.

During the uprising, governmenttelevision facilities were priority targets. PUK leaders ordered their peshmerga to seize transmission towers



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and equipment. After people returnedfrom exile, the PUK held a monopolyon opposition broadcasts until 1992when election campaigns for theKurdish National Assembly generated two other channels.

Regular programmingby the threechannels averages five hours perevening and all day Fridays and otherIslamic and Kurdish holidays. A typical evening begins with lines from th eQuran, followed by cartoons, international and local new s , traditional andcontemporary music from Iraq andneighboring countries, a weekly loca lfeature show, political commentary,and an international film.

The programming reflects partypolicies, but th e sponsors agree on th eimportance ofKurdish self-definition.Local producers create most of theiro w n s ho w s, covering topics on education, women's issues, entertainment,Kurdish history, the performing arts,comedy, folklore, arts and sciences,medic ine , spor ts , and spec ia l programsfor the region's smaller Assyrian,Turkoman, Yezidi and Arab minorities. Show hosts and hostesses now

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en joy status as l oca l ce lebr it ies , thoughmost had never seen the insideof a station before the uprising.

The new channels also provide Iraqiintelligence with a window into thenorth. S o m e Kurds fear that association with the opposition through theirbroadcasts will endanger relatives ingovernment-controlled areas. Threedoctors from Dohuk and Zakhudeclined on separate occasions toappear on politically neutral progi-amsto discuss health issues. For Kurdswho continue to cross into Baghdad-controlled areas to visit family or conduct business, appearance on TVincreases their risk of being singledout at government check points.

The new transmissions have provided public opportunities to addressforbidden political i ssues andacknowledge once-banned historiesand heroes. The increase in foreignprogramming smugg led into the regionhas also served to break Baghdad'sstranglehold on information from theoutside. Iraqi government films ofatrocities have become importantdenominations for contemporary

Kurdish identity. Other foreign andres is tance-made documentaries in thisgenre include records of the aborteduprisings, the m a s s exodus , the Anfalcampaign, the chemical attack onHalabja, and v ideo tapes captured fromIraqi security buildings during theuprisings w h ic h d oc um e n t torture andexecutions. Saddam's Crimes area m o n g the most popular video rentals.As one shopowner explained, Somepeople sleep through 'Rambo,' but ifyou ask them about any part of'Saddam's Crimes' they can recallevery point in detail.

Since its first b r oadc as ts in Oc tobe r1991, the PUK channel has featuredthese films on a daily and week ly basis,reflecting PUK determination to convince northern Kurds to shut all doorsto future negotiation for Saddam'sreturn. The other parties are less sureof the W est 's reliability and the limitson S a dd am , a nd their stations rarelys ho w S a d da m 's crimes.

F o o t n o t e1 Slal ions in D oh uk hiivc lit-i-n fiirccti u, a virtual standstill . s in t i- AuKu .s l 199: i when l .iKhd;i(J .slopped providing to the ^ovt-rnorntt'.

Th e Joint Commil lcc on the Near an d Micklle East o j the AmericanCouncil of Learned Societies and the ScKial Science Research Councilannounces an intemational competition for outstanding papers in the

social sciences and human it ies .

T h e competi t ion is open to all graduate students working ontopics relating to the contemporar>' Middle Easl and North Africa

or on historical topics in that region sin ce the beginning of Islam.Comparative studies incorporat ing the Middle Easl and other regionsof the world are encouraged . There arc no citizenship requirementsan d submissions wil l be accepted in either English or French.

A p riz e o r prizes totaling SI ,000 wil l be awardedfo r th e best paper(s) received.

Papers m ust n ot exceed 35 double-spaced, typewrit ten pages,including footnotes and bibl iography

Deadline fo r receipt of papers: September 1 , 1994For more information, contact:

The Near a nd Middle Ea s t Program605 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10158(212) 661-0280

Middle East Repor t July-August 1994 21


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Washington W atct i

Clinton, Ankara and Kurdish Human Riglits Maryam Elahi

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. r%; W^v :.: 1t t r i TMiny.

C h i n a makes the headlines, but USpolicies toward the top three

recipients of US aid Israel, Egyptand Turkey are perhaps the mostegregious examples of the failure ofthe Clinton administration to makegood on its commitment to humanrights. While the human rights si tuation in the Israeli-occupied territories and Egypt has received somemedia attention in the US, that ofTvu-key has by and large been ignored.In 1993 , when Turkey re-ceived closeto $500 million in military assistancefrom the US, the situation had deteriorated to the point where tortureof political prisoners and extrajudicial killings were the norm in thesoutheast of the country. The government is extremely reluctant toprosecute those responsible for torture in the name of the state. In fact,human rights violations are carriedout %vith impunity by members of theTurkish security forces, leading onet o c o nc lu d e that they operate with de

MHrj'ain Elahi is program officer on th e MiddleEast. North A f r i c a and Europe at AmnestyInternational i n W a s h in g to n , D C .

Susan Mcisclas/Magnum

facto government endorsement.The US is fully aware of the situa

tion, yet no clear high-level m essagehas been sent warning that the systematic abuse of human rights constitutes a violation of US law authorizing foreign assistance. To thecontrary, the Clinton administrationhas signaled Ankara that gross hrunanrights violations are acceptable in thebattle against terrorism. Meetingwith Turkish Prime Minister TansuQiller on October 15 , 1993 , PresidentClinton stated: It's not fair for us. ..tourge Turkey to not only be a democratic country but to recognize humanrights and then not to help the government ofTurkey deal with the terrorism within its borders. He went onto praise Turkey as a shining example to the world of the virtues of cultural diversity. Clinton's tribute fliesin the face of overwhelming evidenceof massive persecution of advocates ofKurdish cultural rights.

The escalation of the armed conflictbetween the Kurdistan Workers' Party(PKK) and Turkish seciudty forces hashad a direct impact on the deteriora

tion of the human rights situation insoutheastern Turkey. The interiorminister admits that 600 villages havebeen empt ied . This systematic destruction h a s b ee n accompanied by threats,abductions, disappearances, tortureand killings ofcivilians. On September17 , 1 9 93 , o ne day after nearby clashes between security forces and thePKK, helicopters flew over Palamdzuvillage tents, pitched on the Cet pasture in the Ovacik area. The helicopters dropped explosives on the f leeing villagers, killing two and woxmdingseven all unarmed civUians. In a similar incident on March 2 6, 1 9 94 , eightpeople, including three children, werekilled when warplanes bombed Kum-cati village near Sirnak. Official statements claimed the bombing was accidental, although at least three otherKurdish settlements were bom bed thesame day. All had refused to join thestate armed village guards.

Last year, several hundred peop lewere victims of political killings insoutheastern Turkey. The currentscale and pattern ofextrajudicial executions is unprecedented in recentTurkish history. The victims, who are.often taken from their homes in themiddle of the night and shot, includemembers of the independentTurkishHuman Rights Association and theDemocracy Party (DEP), and journalists. The government has deniedthe collusion of the security forces,instead pointing to the PKK andHizbullah (an Islamist organization),but has failed to regularly and systematically investigate cases or to produce sufficient evidence for indictments. The PKK has committedkillings, but it f

Documents

The Kurdish Experience