The Joint Multinational Training Command Training Journal 2

URNALOJ URNALOJ

7TH U.S. ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND w w w . h q j m t c . a r m y . m i l w i n t e r / s p r i n g 2 0 1 0

T R A I N I N GT R A I N I N GT R A I N I N G

JOIN

T MU

LTINATIONAL TRAINING COM

MAN

D

7TH UNITED STATES ARMY

AFGHANISTAN:THE WAY AHEADBY GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL

DEFEATING IED’SKNOWING YOURENEMY

A F G H A N I S T A N

FOCUSING ON THE FIGHT:UNDERSTANDING THEARMY'S TRAINING NEEDSBY BRIG. GEN. STEVEN L. SALAZAR

7th UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL WINTER / SPRING 2010

afghanistan - isafrc and prt locations

Regional Command Capital (RCC)Lead Nation: Italy (rotates: FRA, TUR)

Stage 1 Regional Command NorthLead Nation: Germany

Stage 2 Regional Command WestLead Nation: Italy

Stage 3 Regional Command SouthLead Nation: Canada (rotates: GBR, NLD)

Stage 4 Regional Command EastLead Nation: United States

Photo: Pfc. Andrya Hill, 25th ID PAO

AFGHANISTAN

key to the the isafmission: stability

11

Afghanistanfact sheet

GeographyLocation: Southern Asia, north and west ofPakistan, east of IranGeographic coordinates: 33 00 N, 65 00 E

Border countriesChina, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan

Land useArable land: 12.13%;permanent crops: 0.22%; other: 87.65%

Environment - current issues:Limited natural fresh water resources;soil degradation; overgrazing; deforestation;desertification; air and water pollution

People of AfghanistanPopulation: 29,928,987 (July 2009 est.)Age structure: 0-14 years: 44.7% 15-64 years: 52.9% 65 years and over: 2.4% Life expectancy at birth: 42.9 yearsNationality: noun: Afghan(s), (not Afghani)

Ethnic groupsPashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%,Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, other 6%

ReligionsSunni Muslim 80%, Shi'a Muslim 19%,other 1%

LanguagesAfghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%,Pashtu (official) 35%, Turkic languages 11%,30 minor languages with much bilingualism

LiteracyAge 15 + can read and write oftotal population: 36%

Government Country name:Islamic Republic of AfghanistanCapital: KabulAdministrative divisions: 34 provinces

Constitution: new constitution drafted14 December 2003 - 4 January 2004;signed 16 January 2004

Note: The boundries represented in this map do not necessarily indicateofficial recognition of the political status of the territories concerned.

Commanding GeneralU.S. Army, Europe Gen. Carter F. Ham

Commanding General 7th U.S. Army JMTC

Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar

is an unofficial publication of the7th United States Army Joint

Multinational Training Command.

Circulation is 5,000 copies.

Editorial views and opinions arenot necessarily those of theDepartment of the Army.

Correspondence may be sent to:HQ 7th Army JMTC

Attention: Public Affairs Office,Building 123, Room 101

APO AE 09114or via Bundespost:HQ 7th Army JMTC

Attention: Public Affairs OfficeLager Grafenwoehr, Geb. 123

92655 Grafenwoehr

Telephone: DSN 475-7776or commercial 09641-83-7776email: [email protected]

Public Affairs Officer 7th U.S. Army JMTC

Maj. Jennifer R. Johnson

Deputy Public Affairs Officer7th U.S. Army JMTC

Denver Makle

JMTC Public Affairs SpecialistsChristian Marquardt

Michael Beaton

JMTC Public Affairs StaffSgt Maj. Rodney WilliamsStaff Sgt. Lyttleton Yates

2

J M T C C O M M A N D

JMTC PUBLIC AFFAIRS


THE JOINT MULTINATIONALTRAINING COMMAND

THE JOINT MULTINATIONALTRAINING COMMAND


JMTC PUBLIC AFFAIRS


JMTC PUBLIC AFFAIRS

TRAINING JOURNALTRAINING JOURNAL

Photo: Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini, HHC JMRC

Photo: Staff Sgt. Richard Roman

Photo: Spc. Tia Sokimson

Cover photo byPhoto: Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini, HHC JMRC

This page:U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Efren Lopez


3

UR NA LOJ UR NA LOJT A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

joint multinational training command

4FOCUSING ON THE FIGHT:

UNDERSTANDING THE ARMY'S TRAINING NEEDSBrig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar, JMTC

6ISTC: SPECIAL TRAINING FOR SPECIAL FORCES

Denver Makle, JMTC

7AFGHANISTAN: ONE BOOK AT A TIME.

Col. John M. Spiszer, JMRC

11 - 15PROTECTING THE PEOPLE IS THE MISSION

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, ISAF

16 - 17INTEGRATED TRAINING DEFEATS IMPROVISED

EXPLOSIVE DEVICESCapt. Ronald J. Gevry, JMTC

18 - 19BATTLE STAFF TRAINING PREPARES

SOLDIERS FOR AFGHANISTANSgt. Major Lance T. Dyckman, CATC

20 - 21 ENSURING A LEGACY:

BATTALION-LEVEL REAR-DETACHMENT OPERATIONSCapt. Joshua D. Buchanan, 172nd Infantry Brigade

22 - 23BUILDING THE AFGHANISTAN MISSION NETWORK,

ONE TRAINING EVENT AT A TIMEMaj. Wallace N. Smith, 69th Signal Command

ONE TEAM, ONE SYSTEM:INTEGRATING CENTRIX FOR SUPPORT TO ISAF

Capt. Robert Hoover, 2SCR

24 - 25AFGHANISTAN METRICS:

ASSESSING TRAINING EFFECTIVENESSDenver Makle, JMTC

26 JMSC: FEEDING REALITY INTO SIMULATIONS

Brad Joy, JMSC

27FLEXIBLE STRUCTURE LEVERAGES POWER

OF THE 18TH CSSBMaj. Jerome K. Barnard, 18th CSSB

29PRE-DEPLOYMENT AFGHANISTAN READING LIST

V I S I T J M T C O N L I N E A T WWW.HQJMTC.ARMY. MIL

7th UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL WINTER / SPRING 20107th UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING JOURNAL WINTER / SPRING 2010

his past December at West Point, our Commander in Chief announced the Afghanistan surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to support General. Stanley A.McChrystal's, commander of the International SecurityAssistance Force (COMISAF’s), Counter-Insurgency (COIN)strategy. Previously, U. S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and theJoint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) trained anddeployed forces to support the Iraq surge. In the past fewmonths, JMTC has shifted its training focus toward supportingthe COMISAF, both for U.S. forces,and our NATO allies and TroopContributing Nations (TCN).This edition of your Training Journalfocuses on preparing for operationsin the Afghanistan operationalenvironment. There is no better place to preparefor operations in Afghanistan thanhere in Europe. We train with 37of the 45 ISAF TCN. Along withcombat troops, our partners pro-vide Operational Mentoring LiaisonTeams for the development of theAfghan National Army troops, Provincial ReconstructionTeams, U.S. Special Operations Forces detachments, Close AirSupport and more. We train U.S. and multinational forces atGrafenwoehr Training Area; our Joint Multinational SimulationsCenter (JMSC), the only Joint National Training Capabilitycertified battle command training venue in the U.S. Army, atthe Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels,Germany, and during the many exercises the JMTC supportsfor USAREUR and the U.S. European Command. Training, like operations, begins with understanding.Your Afghanistan reading list (see the JMRC Commander’sreading list on page 6), Center for Army Lessons Learnedpublications, seminars like the Leader Development EducationSeminar Program (see page 19), and hopefully this publication,

the Training Journal, will help form your understanding of theoperational environment. In this edition, you will find referencematerial, training tips, operational lessons and information onthe training resources available to commanders in USAREUR. Addressing staff at the NATO Training Conference by video-teleconference, Gen. McChrystal spent 75 percent of the timeavailable illustrating the importance of “understanding.” He suggested we start by ensuring we understand our COINdoctrine and its historical application. For example, in COIN operations, the Afghan people are “key” to the fight. In the Afghanistan area of operations, tribes and informal power brokers are important, along with the government of Afghanistan and its local representatives, the Pakistani Military, the Afghan National Security Forces, NATO, and the Taliban. He made the point of stating the Taliban last, noting that in most cases they are the least important and the simplest to understand and affect. International Joint Command (IJC) is executing itscampaign plan by district, using an evolved “clear, build,hold,” Concept of Operations (CONOP). The IJC CONOPstarts with “understand,” includes “shape,” then “clear,build, hold,” and eventually, “transition”. Once you under-stand the requirements and consideration of each phase,you will understand that preparing to build, and ultimatelyto transition are more complex activities, requiring moretime and resources.So, how do we train, and prepare for operations in sucha complex environment? Training is leading. Leading in a complex, challenging environ-ment requires the use of available tools, starting with our BattleCommand doctrine: Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct,

J M T C C O M M A N D E R ’ S C O L U M N

4

T

By Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar


Focusing on the �ght:understanding theArmy’s training needs

soldiers have to believe in thevalue of the training, which means

the training must be realistic.

our new trainingand leader

developmentstrategy identifies

outcomes-basedtraining as an

imperative.

3


Lead and Assess. Understanding includes the culture, history,and people as described above. It also includes the resourcesavailable such as lessons-learned along the training pathof Army Force Generation, the plan for deploying troops.I encourage you to use our emerging design doctrine to formyour training vision:• Frame the problem: how do you get this formation ready? • Visualize the process: how will you get your troops from here to there — trained and ready. • Develop the tools: describe your desired end state • Assess your progress Our new Training and Leader Development Strategy identifiesoutcomes-based training as an imperative. At the JMRC, we use this technique every day. It’s aboutcapturing the cause and effect. Soldiers have to believe inthe value of the training, which means the training must berealistic. Soldiers should “believe” they are in the operationalenvironment, and understand the importance of the trainingtasks. Observer controllers (OCs) “capture,” and “document”what happens during training, by video or other instrumentedsystems. After analyzing the actions, reactions, effects andconsequences, the OCs can use the documented results of aleaders’ decision-making process, and the Soldiers’ actionsduring the training and reactions based on feedback to benefitthe entire training audience. These detailed lessons-learnedcontribute to the Army‘s OC Green Book, and creates anexchange that fortifies the knowledge and understandingof the greater Army’s corporate knowledge. We can all benefitfrom multiple perspectives — the “what” happened.” With afull understanding of the “what happened” most can readilydetermine for themselves, the “why” and most importantly,“how to improve.” We are fortunate to have the latest Army training devicesand simulations available. I encourage you to seek out newand improved training offered by our professional cadre andstaff. The training is as realistic as it comes. The VirtualBattlespace 2 is a first-person simulation that allows Soldiersto virtually conduct mounted and dismounted missions ongeo-specific or geo-typical terrain. The Combined Arms TrainingCenter in Vilseck, Germany, offers a new Counter-IED TrainerCourse, which incorporates training feed-back, current operationsand new technologies. The ranges at GTA, and the trainingdevices, simulations and gaming capabilities at the Directorateof Simulations and Training Support, which incorporatesTraining Support Activity Europe and the JMSC, all supportthe commanders’ training program that ultimately leads toa Mission Rehearsal Exercise at the JMRC. The JMTC Team is ready to support your training requirementsand assist your efforts to become Ready Thru Training!

5

STEVEN L. SALAZARBrigadier General, U.S. ArmyCommanding

DARIEUS A. ZAGARACommand Sergeant Major, USAJMTC CSMArmy Training Network

JMTC COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR’S COLUMN

enhancingthe overalltrainingexperience


The Joint Multi-national TrainingCommand (JMTC)h a s t u r n e d i t sattention towardsupporting the ISAFtheater of operation. Our leaders, planners, controllers, andtrainers at every level have taken on this challenge withtotal abandon, tapping every resource available to enhancetheir technical and tactical knowledge, while also providingsome of the most relevant and realistic training oppor-tunities for U.S. and multinational Soldiers and units.The training offered at the JMTC is among the very bestavailable, anywhere in the Army. In U.S. Army Europe, we share a unique relationshipwith our European partners. This relationship enhancesthe overall-training experience and its effectiveness.Our junior Soldiers are exposed to cultural differences,and the unique challenges associated with working withour international partners during Warrior Leader Course;our mid-grade Noncommissioned Officers and Officersshare the multinational experience equally through morethan 60-courses provided at our Combined Arms TrainingCenter, and our units train routinely with coalition forcesat our live-boots-in -the-mud maneuvers and live-firetraining area at the Joint Multinational Readiness Centerin Hohenfels. While supporting NATO in Afghanistan, the JMTC isin a unique position to work jointly with our coalitionforces to further enhance all of our training rotations.Our European partners provide us with a myriad offorces from all services, which accounts for a very robustand realistic training experience for every Soldier goinginto theater. ISAF is our focus; training is our mission, and ourSoldiers stand trained and ready to support the needs ofour Army, anytime, anywhere.Ready Thru Training!

ByCommand Sgt. Maj.Darieus A. ZaGara


loose interpretation of the Special Operation Imperative #2 could imply that since U.S. Field Manual 1-108, states a special operations Soldiermust, "understand the Operational Environment," and thecurrent environment consists of Joint and Multinational troopengagements, involving more Special Operations Forces (SOF),while serving in coalitions in Afghanistan. There is nobetter organization to teach advanced Soldier skills thanthe International Special Training Center (ISTC) located inPfullendorf, Germany.

Across the globe, sustained operations in Iraq, Afghanistan,the Horn of Africa, and the Philippines continue to representa need for NATO SOF to collectively develop and share theirunique skill sets. ISTC teaches SOF Soldiers to operate in thenew overseas contingency operations by giving typicalexamples and lessons learned from the current operatingenvironment.

"Soldiers attending ISTC get experience, and are initiatedinto an international brothers-in-arms network," said anISTC Soldier from Germany, who didn't want to be named."They definitely benefit later - when they deploy, frombuilding those relationships. For example, specific training,such as, the sniper training could probably be taught in theirown nation, but it is the combined training environment withother SOF Soldiers from other Nations that is important.Here, we train as we fight."

The ISTC offers standard NATO SOF training in TroopLeading Procedures, medical protocols, sniper integrationand standardization, Close Quarter Battle tactics, recognition,as well as, operational planning and Command and Control.

"The ISTC is unique and draws strength from its internationalcommand structure, in addition to the unmatched skill setsand combat experiences of its Special Operations instructors,"said the SOF Soldier. "As a result, the member states fromnine NATO countries [Belgium, Germany, Greece, UnitedStates, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Turkey]serving as an international working group, provide some ofthe most experienced and highly renowned instructors tomeet national training requirements for SOF and in somecases SOF enablers, while reducing costs and also sharinginteroperability advantages and opportunities."

To function in this diverse combined environment, ISTC isrequired to specialize in cross-culturization and cross-pollenization of each nation's skill set. However, by workingtogether, the Soldiers of each Nation learns from the others.“We all benefit,” he said.

WEB WATCHJMTC G3

6

Why you should bookmark it:This fully interactive portal is designed specifically fortraining professionals, and is regularly updated with recentnews and informationby the Army’s seniorleaders and trainers.Find the tips you needbased on the latestlessons-learned sub-mitted by the units intoday’s fight.Site is updated daily.

WWW.ATN.ARMY.MIL

Where to find it: www.atn.army.mil

Why you should bookmark it:If you are looking for official policy and informationon such topics as registering your POV in Germany,deployment and re-union information,birth registrations,local national andDOD employmententit lements andyour entitlements ingeneral, THIS is thesite for you!

WWW.AEPUBS.ARMY.MIL

Where to find it: www.aepubs.army.mil

WWW.ARMY.MIL/CSF

Where to find it: www.army.mil/csf

Why you should bookmark it:This comprehensive website is greater than the sum ofits parts! Materials found on this site are designed tohelp the soldier balance physical fitness with mentaltoughness and includes specialized features that addressevery aspect of personal well-being.Features include a variety of topics and commentaryfrom professionals inall facets of healthcare and psychology.Real life studies andexamples speak tothe issues that con-cern Soldiers and mil-tary families.

istc: special training forspecial forces

ABy Denver Makle, JMTC Public Affairs

V I S I T J M T C O N L I N E A T WWW.HQJMTC.ARMY. MILV I S I T J M T C O N L I N E A T WWW.HQJMTC.ARMY. MIL

7

T

COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER FITNESS

he Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program represents the Army's investment in the readiness of the force and the quality of life of our Soldiers,Family members, and Army Civilians, to provide Soldiers thecritical skills they need to take care of themselves, theirfamilies, and their teammates. The CSF program develops the "whole person," by givingthe same emphasis to psychological, emotional, and mentalstrength that is often given to physical strength. This enablesSoldiers, Family members and Army Civilians to more easilymanage various physical and psychological challenges intheir personal and professional lives along the five specificdimensions of strength.

composition and flexibility derived through exercise, nutritionand training. Emotional - Approaching life's challenges in a positive,optimistic way by demonstrating self-control, stamina andgood character with your choices and actions.Social - Developing and maintaining trusted, valued relation-ships and friendships that are personally fulfilling and fostergood communication including a comfortable exchange ofideas, views and experiences.Spiritual - Strengthening a set of beliefs, principles or valuesthat sustain a person beyond family, institutional, and societalsources of strength.Family - Being part of a family unit that is safe, supportiveand loving and provides the resources for all members to livein a healthy and secure environment.The end-state of CSF is a fit, resilient, and ready Army com-prised of individuals with "Strong Minds and Strong Bodies."

J M R C C O M M A N D E R ’ S R E A D I N G L I S T

his reading list was provided to the Observer/Controller/ Trainers (O/C/Ts) of theJoint Multinational Readiness Center(JMRC) by Col. John M. Spiszer, the commander. This listing of books and articleswas meant to enhance the O/C/Ts background and knowledge of thehistory, culture, and current trendsin Afghanistan prior to the executionof the most recent training rotationconducted in Hohenfels TrainingArea for the 2nd Stryker CavalryRegiment.

T

ISAF COIN References: - COMISAF Tactical Directive, 1 JUL 09- COMISAF Tactical Directive (unclass.), 6 JUL 09- COMISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance, 26 AUG 09- COMISAF Tactical Driving Directive, 15 AUG 09- HQ ISAF FRAGO 221–08 Civilian Casualty Reporting, 24 JUL 08- HQ ISAF SOP 353 – Force Escalation Awareness, 2 MAR 09 - CALL: Handbook 10-11 Escalation of Force: Afghanistan, DEC 09The above references may be accessed at the following link on the JKO-S Portal:

www.us.army.smil.mil/suite/page/16656

AFGHANISTAN: ONE BOOK AT A TIME...CURRENT ENVIRONMENTHeroes of the AgeBy David Edwards

The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapsein the International Systemby Barnett Rubin

HISTORYAfghanistan: A Short History of its People and PoliticsBy Norman Friedman

Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fallof the Taliban by Stephen Tanner

SOVIET ERAThe Soviet-Afghan War: How a superpower fought and lostBy Lester Greiss

Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen FightersBy Ali Ahmad Jalali

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tacticsin AfghanistanBy Lester Grau

CULTURAL (FICTION)Islam and Resistance in AfghanistanBy Oliver Roy

A Thousand Splendid SunsBy Khaled Hossein.

Three Cups of TeaBy Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin

The Dimensions of Strength are:Physical - Performing and excelling in physical activities thatrequire aerobic fitness, endurance, strength, healthy body

7

Col. John M. Spiser,Commander OperationsGroup, Joint MultinationalReadiness Center


8

N E W A T T S A E

EUROPE’S NEWEST TRAINING DEVICE IMMERSES SOLDIERSIN VEHICLE MISSIONS

Training Support Activity Europe (TSAE)has fielded the Army's newest virtualtraining device and it is open for businessto U.S. Army Europe Soldiers at theGrafenwoehr Training Area. The Reconfigurable Vehicle TacticalTrainer, or RVTT, officially opened duringa ribbon-cutting ceremony at CampAachen on February 18, 2010. The RVTT is unlike traditional com-puter simulators or engagement skillstrainers because it surrounds Soldiersin a realistic, 360-degree virtual world,said David W. Darnall, Soldier ProgramManager for the 7th Army Joint Multi-national Training Command (JMTC). "In any other computer simulationsyou're constrained by a 14, 18 or 19-inch monitor that you view your world through," said Darnall. “All of the RVTTsimulators that we have are 360 degrees," said Darnall."There's no such thing as moving your mouse to glance right.In here, you glance right and you see the terrain moving.It becomes much more immersive." The RVTT system consists of a series of trailers equippedwith four life-size replica HMMWVs surrounded by floor-to-ceiling movie screens, said Darnall.These HMMWV simulators contain everything you wouldfind in a real HMMWV, to include secure radios, individualand crew-served weapons, and current command and controlsystems. Soldiers familiar with their equipment requireonly moments to be fully operational in the simulator.A third trailer provides command and control and full AARcapabilities. The system can accommodate a whole platoon trainingsimultaneously on the same mission, said Darnall."The last (simulator) we did was not this advanced," saidSpec. Selah Hadi, who wentthrough the RVTT as part ofthe JMTC's Theater SpecificIndividual Readiness Training(TSIRT) course. "This was morerealistic, fun, I mean. I alwaysenjoy doing stuff like this," saidHadi. The RVTT simulators cansave commanders immense timeparticularly when the unit isconducting complex trainingmissions, said Darnall. The RVTT is equally capableof helping units train basicdrills and tasks or enablingwell-trained units to conduct more complex and demandingtraining, some of which would be impossible to replicate ina live training environment. Each RVTT scenario is fully-customizable by the training unit, said Darnall.

Story and photos by Christian Marquardt, 7th Army JMTC PAO

Currently, the RVTT has access to eight terrain databases,which include northern California, the National Training Center,and the ranges and training sites of the JMTC's Grafenwoehrand Hohenfels Training Areas. Even though it looks like agiant arcade game, the Army has made all the scenarios andthe simulator equipment as realistic as possible, said Darnall. "You're going to have the same rate of acceleration in(RVTT's) HMMWV. You're going to have the same rate offire on that weapon as you would in real life," said Darnall.“You have to do the things you would normally do tobe successful." In addition to RVTT, the JMTC's Virtual Device TrainingFacility (VDTF) will eventually also incorporate the currentarmored vehicle simulators (Mobile Close Combat TacticalTrainers) with the future Dismounted Soldier Virtual Trainer,a system that will allow up to 12 Soldiers to physicallymaneuver through a three-dimensional virtual world withthe use of goggles and body sensors, said Darnall. When it's fully operational, the VDTF will be able to simultaneously train up to a battalion of soldiers in one location on virtual missions, said Darnall. "Right now we don't have the capability to plug everything together. When we get the other simulators that are coming in, they will arrive being able to be plugged into each other." "Beyond that, the only limit is what the unit commander's imagination is," said Darnall. TSAE identifies, acquires, manages, and sustains training resources to support all echelons of training throughoutEurope. TSAE is geographically dispersed throughoutEurope at Regional and Training Support Centers in 18cities and six countries.


9

R S T C S P O T L I G H T

For more information contact the JointMultinational Simulation Center atDSN 475-JMSC.

LEARNING TOCONDUCT TACTICALQUESTIONING ANDDEBRIEFING IN AVIRTUAL WORLD

An evolution in training, just likebeing there! Following the successful imple-mentation of Virtual Battle Space2 (VBS2) into realistic virtual trainingfor Company-sized elements and below,the new Human Intelligence (HUMINT)Control Cell (HCC) is the next step intactical gaming.

The HHC is an automated system thatallows Soldiers to interact directlywith a virtual entity. Using a life sizeprojected image and voice recognitionsoftware, the HCC is an excellent toolfor teaching tactical questioning toany unit. A soldier can walk in, sitdown, put on a set of head phones andstart talking directly to the Avatar. The system stresses simple directquestioning which is key to garneringinformation quickly and accurately.The training can be conducted in Englishor Arabic with or without a virtualinterpreter. Scenarios include TacticalQuestioning and friendly debriefing.

THE BATTLE FORINTELLIGENCE:

Your unit is deploying to an austere training location to conduct training witha host nation. How do you obtain the training resources you need?The 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s (JMTC) Training SupportActivity Europe’s (TSAE) Regional Training Support Center-Expeditionary (RTSC-E)is ready to support your deployed training resource requirements. RTSC-E provides units deployed in Romania and Bulgaria with Training AidsDevices and Simulators (TADS), including first generation Multiple IntegratedLaser Engagement System, medical TADS, Escalation of Force Kits, ImprovisedExplosive Device TADS, and audio-visual equipment. The Training Support Center(TSC) enhances a unit’s individual and crew collective training capabilities withonsite premiere training simulators such as the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000and Call for Fire Trainer. It also provides support for six live fire ranges. In Romania, there is one 25M static range located just outside of MK Airbase and five live fire ranges located at Babadag Training Area (BTA) in Bulgaria.The capabilities include a 25M static range for zeroing individual weapons and modified ranges, such as, a two lane multi-purpose machine gun range, a four laneCombat Pistol Qualification Course, an eight lane Modified Firing Range and a onelane Sniper Field Fire Range. All ranges are supported with Deployable RangePackage targetry and a range crew.

The RTSC-E can deliver a turnkey range with programmed target scenarios thatmeet unit live fire objectives if the area around the range can support the requiredSDZ for the weapon systems being fired. To capture remaining training enablersRTSC-E provides Military Operations on Urban Terrain support in the form of14 Mobile MOUT containers at BTA that can be configured into different types ofsingle story buildings to support individual squad, platoon, or company/battalionlevel collective training requirements. Validating training support resources required with the deploying unit 180-270days out allows for the proper resourcing of the required training simulators.Deployable Instrumentation System, Europe (DISE) is managed from RTSC-E’sparent unit TSAE. A total of three DA civilians, three contractors, and five Soldierscomprised the DISE team which provided the deployed TFs in both Romania andBulgaria with instrumented simulations exercise support and immediate After ActionReview capability. To find out more about DISE please visit your local TSC. Now that you know what RTSC-E can offer, you should know what RTSC-Erequires to best support you. The key is “early coordination and early planningbetween the training supporters and the training unit”, said Mr. John Barnett,RTSC-E Chief.Working with your unit through advanced planning and coordination, RTSC-E isdedicated to providing training support for any mission, anywhere.

DEPLOYING TRAINING RESOURCES TODEPLOYED SOLDIERS: TSAE EXPEDITIONARYSUPPORT KEY TO SUCCESS OF JTF-EAST

Photo courtesy JMRC

Photo courtesy JMSC

Photo courtesy JMSC


10

THE IMPORTANCEof the ISAF MISSION

Phot

o C

redi

t, c

lock

wis

e fr

om t

op le

ft:

ISAF

PAO

/ S

gt.

Rus

sell

Gilc

rest

/ S

taff

Sgt

. Ju

stin

Hol

ley

/ Sta

ff S

gt D

alla

s Ed

war

ds /

Pf

c. R

icha

rd W

. Jo

nes

Jr.

/ S

taff

Sgt

. And

rew

Sm

ith

/ Sta

ff S

gt.

Ada

m M

anci

ni /

Pfc

. C

ody

A.

Thom

pson

/ T

ech.

Sgt

. C

icili

o M

. R

icar

do J

r. /

US A

rmy

Col

lect

ion

/ Spc

. M

atth

ew M

cKin

ny /

US A

rmy

Col

lect

ion


FEATURE STORY BYGEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL

COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE and U.S. FORCES AFGHANISTAN

SAF’s mission is to help the

Government of the Islamic Republic

of Afghanistan (GIRoA) defeat the

insurgency threatening their country.

Protecting the Afghan people is the

mission. The Afghan people will decide

who wins this fight, and we [GIRoA and

ISAF] are in a struggle for their support.

The effort to gain and maintain that

support must inform every action we take.

Essentially, we and the insurgents are pre-

senting an argument for the future to the

people of Afghanistan: they will decide

which argument is the most attractive,

most convincing, and has the greatest

chance of success.

The Afghan people are a diverse mix of

ethnicities and tribes with strong traditions

and a fierce sense of independence.

Their country has been scarred by 30 years

of war, and the fabric of Afghan society has been badly

damaged. Traditional tribal structures have been undermined

deliberately by the insurgents; many communities have

fractured. State weakness and corruption erode confidence

in government. Nearly eight years of international presence

has not brought the anticipated benefits.

The Afghan people are skeptical and un-

willing to commit active support to either

side until convinced of a winning proposition.

We need to understand the people and

see things through their eyes. It is their

fears, frustrations, and expectations that

we must address. We will not win simply

by killing insurgents. We will help the

Afghan people win by securing them,

by protecting them from intimidation,

violence and abuse, and by operating in

a way that respects their culture and

religion. This means that we must change

the way that we think, act, and operate.

We must get the people involved as

active participants in the success of

their communities. Every action we take

must reflect this change: how we interact

with people, how we drive or fly, how we

patrol, how we use force, how we fund work

programs and projects. This is their country, and we are their

guests. We must think carefully about everything we do and

understand the impact of our actions on the people we are

here to partner with and protect. Security may not come

from overwhelming firepower, and force protection may mean

more personal interaction with the Afghan people, not less.

I

ISAF Commander’sCounterinsurgency Guidanceprotecting the people is the mission.

“the conflict will bewon by persuading

the population,not by destroying

the enemy”.


Phot

o: L

ance

Cpl

. Ja

mes

Cla

rk,

USM

C

ISAF Commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal speaks withAfganistan Foreign Minister Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta.

Photo: Sgt David Alvarado

11


JMTC HONORS AND CELEBRATES THE YEAR OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER

12

ow insurgents operate. Our task is complicated

and threatened by a resilient, highly adaptive

and multifaceted insurgency. An insurgency is

unlike a conventional military threat. The insurgent’s attack

is a secondary effort to discredit the government and provoke

a counterinsurgent response that alienates the people.

Corruption and abuse of power by government officials feeds

into the insurgent narrative. Behind the smoke of battle, the

insurgents are principally focused on political and social

activities, to include information operations, designed to

gain control over the population. In so doing, they displace

the government’s legitimacy.

We must understand how the insurgents compete in order

to combat their strategy. They adapt to local conditions.

They influence the population through both intimidation and

attraction. In their propaganda they claim to protect Afghan

culture and religion. They include social strife and undermine

traditional structures. In places, they control the roads,

collect revenues, and mete out swift justice. They co-opt

disenfranchised groups and pay young men to fight.

They exploit ISAF mistakes and inappropriate actions to

reinforce their argument.

laying into their hands. A military force, culturally

programmed to respond conventionally (and predict-

ably) to insurgent attacks, is akin to the bull that

repeatedly charges a matador’s cape - only to tire and

eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent.

This is predictable – the bull does what comes naturally.

While a conventional approach is instinctive, that behavior

is self-defeating.

First, an insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition; its supply

of fighters, and even leadership, is effectively endless. Roughly

seventy percent of the Afghan population is under age 25.

Vast unemployment, illiteracy, and widespread political and

social disaffection create fertile ground for insurgent influence

and recruiting.

The intricate familial, clan, and tribal connections of Afghan

society turns “attrition math” on its head. From a conventional

standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten

H

P

leaves eight remaining: 10-2=8. From the insurgent stand-

point, those two killed were likely related to many other who

will want vengeance. If civilian casualties occurred, that

number will be much higher. Therefore, the death of two

creates more willing recruits: 10 minus 2 equals 20 (or more)

rather than 8. This is part of the reason why eight years of

individually successful kinetic actions have resulted in more

violence. The math works against an attrition mind-set.

This is not to say that we should avoid a fight, but to win, we

need to do much more than simply kill or capture militants.

Second, conventional military action against insurgents con-

sumes considerable resources with little real return and is

likely to alienate the people we are trying to secure.

Large scale operations to kill or capture militants carry a

significant risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral

damage. If civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who

shot them – we still failed to protect them from harm.

Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of

an entire family-and creates more insurgents. We sow the

seeds of our own demise.

Although disruption operations may be necessary at times,

we must recognize their effects are temporary at best when

the population is under insurgent influence or control.

Sporadically moving into an area for a few hours or even a

few days solely to search for the enemy and then leave does

little good, and may do much harm. The local insurgents hide

in plain sight and the people remain ambivalent. Once we’ve

departed, the militants re-emerge and life under insurgent

control resumes. These operations are not only ineffectual,

they can be counter-productive. In conducting them, we are

not building relationships with people, and we are not helping

Afghans solve Afghan problems.

In short, we don’t have to be stupid or ineffective to fail-

just misguided in our approach.

“conventional military actionagainst insurgents consumesconsiderable resources with

little real return.”

temporary at best:insurgent disruption

Photo: ISAF PAO


13

COVER STORY BY GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL : ISAF COMMANDER’S COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDANCE

hanging our mindset. We need to think and act

very differently to be successful. The will of the

people is the Objective. An effective “offensive”

operation in counterinsurgency, therefore, is one that takes

form the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose-control of

the population. We must think of offensive operations not

simply as those that target militants, but ones that earn the

trust and support of the people while denying influence and

access to the insurgent. Holding routine jirgas with community

leaders that build trust and solve problems is an offensive

operation. So is using projects and work programs to bring

communities together and meet their needs. Missions pri-

marily designed to “disrupt” militants are not.

Think of counterinsurgency as an argument to earn the

support of the people. It is a contest to influence the real

and very practical calculations on the part of the people

about with side to support. Every action, reaction, failure to

act and all that is said and done become part of the debate.

The people in the audience watch, listen, and make rational

choices based on who can better protect them, provide for

their needs respect their dignity and their community, and

offer opportunities for the future. Ideology can influence the

outcome, but is usually subordinate to the more practical

considerations of survival and everyday life.

C

Earn the support of the people and the war is won, regardlessof how many miltants are killed or captured. We must undermine the insurgent argument while offering amore compelling alternative. Our argument must communicate -through word and deed - that we and GIRoA have the capabil-itiy and commitment to protect and support the people.Together, we need to provide a convincing and sustainablesense of justice and well-being to a weary and skepticalpopulace. We must turn perceptions from fear and uncertaintyto trust and confidence.To be effective, therefore, we have to help change the local

context so people are more attracted to building and protectingtheir communities than destroying them. Leverage economicinitiatives and routine jirgas with community leaders toemploy young men and develop young men and developpeaceful means to resolve outstanding issues; create viablelocal alternatives to insurgency.

At the same time, it would be naïve to ignore the fact thatthe enemy often gets a vote on how we focus our time andenergy. This is certainly the case in times of high kineticactivity as well as in the areas where “shadow government”influences the population. There is clearly a role for precise operations that keep the insurgents off balance, take thefight to their sanctuaries, and prevent them from affectingthe population. These operations are important but, in andof themselves, are not necessarily decisive.

They can be effective when the insurgents have become soisolated for the population that they are no longer welcome,have been kicked out of their communities, and are reducedto hiding in remote areas and raiding from there. Settingthese conditions throughout the year will enable kineticoperations to have an enduring rather than fleeting impact.

Keeping the right balance over time is critical and there isno mathematical formula for it. Mobilizing the community toparticipate actively for their own safety, stability and successis the crux of counterinsurgency at local levels – and createscircumstances to end insurgent influence permanently.

continued on next page.

“we must understand howthe insurgents compete...they exploit isaf mistakes

and inappropriate actions.”

setting the conditions:in word and deed.

the key: earning thetrust of the people

Photo: US Army

Photo: PLance Cpl. Tommy Bellegarde

GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTALISAF COMMANDER


uild Governance Capacity and Accountability. Developing good governance is everyone’s responsibility. Build capacity and accountabilityat all levels, down to local communities. Promote Afghanleadership that serves the people. Empower those whodisplay competence, care and commitment for their people.But be discerning and make distinctions. Confront self-serving officials who monopolize wealth and power andabuse the people’s trust. Working alongside our Afghancounterparts, we must find incentives and mechanisms tochange behavior, and demand Afghan leaders take theappropriate action to hold corrupt officials accountable.

14

and teach them to lead these efforts. Use your relationships with the people, the ANSF, and theGIRoA officials to become an expert on the local situation.Get to know the neighborhood. Learn who is the mostsuccessful farmer and why, who feels excluded and why,and which families are the most powerful and who they areunited to by marriage. Be a positive force in the community,shield the people from harm, and foster safety and securityso people can work and raise their families in peace.

Carefully assess risk and project confidence – excessive forceprotection is distancing, not inspiring. Think of how you wouldexpect a foreign army to operate in your neighborhood, amongyour families and your children, and act accordingly. The wayyou drive, your dress and gestures, with whom you eat lunch,the courage with which you fight, the way you respond to anAfghan’s grief or joy – this is all part or the argument.

Win the argument. Use localized development and economicsupport to bring community leaders and people together fortheir own success. Listen, share, and get buy-in. Build localownership and capacity. Together with legitimate GIRoAleaders, work all local issues with the local shura and com-munity. Foster ownership. As the Afghans say, “If you sweatfor it, you will protect it.”

mbrace the people. Build connections and be conscious of the need to pass them off to your successor. Afghan culture is founded on personalrelationships. Earning the trust of the people is a large partof our mission. Build relationships with tribal, community,and religious leaders. Success requires communication,collaboration, and cooperation. Seek out the underprivileged,the disenfranchised, and the disaffected and bring them onthe team. Understand the local grievances and problems thatdrive instability, and take action to redress them. Work withthe children and students. Insist the Afghan National SecurityForces (ANSF) and GIRoA officials support these efforts,

E

B

P artner with ANSF at all echelons. Our job is to hold

them accountable for performance in serving the

Afghan people and protecting them from harm. Build

their capacity to secure their own country. Foster ownership –

their success is our success. Live and train together, plan

and operate together. Share the same battle-rhythm and

information. Integrate your command and control structures.

Put them in the lead and support them, even before they

think they are ready. Coach them to excellence, and they

will amaze you with how quickly they take charge.

We must know the people, their environment and aspirations,and work together with them to meet their needs. Strive tofocus 95 percent of our energy on the 95 percent of the pop-ulation that deserves and needs our support. Doing so willisolate the insurgents. Take action against the 5 percent –the insurgents - as necessary or when the right opportunitiespresent themselves. Do not let them distract you from yourprimary tasks:

“afghan culture is founded onpersonal relationships.

earning the trust of the peopleis a large part of the mission.”

ansf & isaf: plan andoperate together

Photo Sgt Russell Gilchrest

Photo Spc. Derek L. Kuhn

the afghan peoplerespect courage


15

G et better every day. Take action to improve

stability in your area. Learn how to adapt, how

to shape the environment, and how to be more

effective with the community leaders and the people. Listen

to our Afghan colleagues; talk with the Afghans you meet;

ask questions about how we can improve and help them

achieve their goals. Listen to their stories and what they

want to tell you. You are authorized – indeed, it is your

responsibility – to adjust your actions within the intent of

this guidance to adapt to local conditions.

Over-communicate. Quickly share critical information and

ideas. Challenge the conventional wisdom if it no longer fits

the environment. This is a battle of wits – be vigilant as the

environment shifts and the enemy adapts. If you are com-

fortable, the enemy is probably ahead of you.

To win, we must understand their strategy and learn from

their successes and their failures – and from our own as well.

Adapt faster than they are able to adjust.

We (GIRoA and ISAF) will succeed by transforming the

environment through local security, connecting responsible

and credible governance to the community leaders and

people, and facilitating compelling alternatives to the insur-

gency. The people will decide the contest in GIRoA’s favor.

ISAF CASE STUDYLooking the other way or enabling government officials who

fail to meet their obligations makes you part of the problem.

Protecting the people not only requires protecting them from

physical harm, but also from corruption and abuse of power.

“strive to focus 95 percent of

your energy on the 95 percent

of the population that deserves

and needs your support.”

an ISAF unit was often takingrocket fire from nearby

a certain village.rather than raiding thevillage, the commander

decided instead to find outmore about them and the

reasons for hostility.the ana commander

suggested an ana patrol tolearn more about the village.

the patrol discovered thevillage was upset about

a night raid that occuredover two years ago.

he also learned educationwas important to the village

but they had no schoolor supplies.

the commander sent anotherpatrol to the village a

few days later with atruckload of supplies.

the next day, the villageelders came to the base tomeet with the ana and isaf

commanders.they delivered over 100

thank you notes fromthe children.

soon, several local projectswere coordinated with the

elders for the village -the projects they owned.

the rocket attacksstopped.

security: transformingthe local environment

Photo Spc. Matthew Freire

COVER STORY BY GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTAL : ISAF COMMANDER’S COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDANCE

GEN. STANLEY A. McCHRYSTALISAF COMMANDER


t is well known the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is one of the insurgent's most effectiveweapons against U.S. and multinationalforces in Afghanistan. As such, the threatrequires units deploying to the CentralCommand area of operation to have themost comprehensive package of individual,collective, and leader training available.The JMTC's Counter-IED (C-IED) trainingcan help units meet pre-deploymenttraining requirements and objectives.

C-IED training is available at the JointJoint Multinational Simulation Center(JMSC) at Camp Aachen, Joint Multi-national Readiness Center (JMRC) inHohenfels, and at the Combined ArmsTraining Center (CATC) at Vilseck,Germany.

insurgent, creating the awareness, byidentifying the need to assess risks,establish controls, and mitigate the risksfor their units." The course is designed to have thestudents "turn the map around" andidentify the challenges of operations inthis environment, he said. The training teaches units to Attackthe Network (AtN) and Defeat theDevice (DtD). Live, virtual, and constructive assetsare available to train individual, leaderand collective tasks for all units.C-IED training is tailored to specific unitmissions, areas of operation requirementsand the unit's specific ARFORGEN cycles. "The JMRC applies C-IED trainingthrough hands on C-IED classes, vehicleoperator training and situational traininglanes that supports individual andcollective training tasks, said Capt.Andy Rose of the JMRC C-IED Academy."JMRC incorporated C-IED training intoall aspects of full spectrum operationsfocusing on the Soldiers tasks, andtraining staffs and leaders on attackingthe network that supports the IEDs”.

16

JMTC Counter-IED training F E A T U R E

Story by Capt. Ronald J. Gevry, JMTC G3 plans officer, photos by JMRC PAO (except where noted).

integrated training defeats improvisedexplosive devices

I

The training curriculum is consistentlyreviewed and updated by the JMTCC-IED training synchronization workinggroup based on training feedback,current operations, enemy tactics,techniques and procedures, and newtechnologies. "The JMSC provides the "crawl" stageof the "crawl, walk, run" training-model,before a Soldier goes out on a C-IEDlane to perform the mission live," saidTom Lasch, chief of Models and Sim-ulations Branch of the JMSC. "Units gothrough a rehearsal using the VirtualBattlespace 2." The VBS2 is a first-person simulationthat allows Soldiers to virtually conductmounted and dismounted missions ongeo-specific or geo-typical terrain witha robust after-action review feature. "They become familiar with the terrainand the threats," said Lasch. "It graduallybuilds up to a capstone event, like anexercise at the JMRC." The ultimate goalis to ensure U.S. and multinational forcesdeploy to Afghanistan prepared for theC-IED challenges expected in theater. JMRC constructs realistic devices thatare being used downrange that operate asIEDs. The JMRC incorporates professionalfire-markers to facilitate the IED effects,during training lanes, and uses Soldiersfrom the 1st Bn., 4th Inf. Regt. as pro-fessional Opposing Forces to recreate notonly the IED on the ground but the supportnetwork behind the IED emplacer.

Incorporating the latest guidancefrom the Joint IED Defeat Organization,the Improvised Explosive Device DefeatTrain-the-Trainer course offered at FortLeonardwood, Missouri, and tactics,techniques and procedures gatheredfrom lessons-learned during past de-ployments, the training can be tailoredto meet the specific unit's mission, pro-jected area of operation requirementsand the unit's specific Army Force Gener-ation (ARFORGEN) cycle. "The course taught by the CATC isdesigned for small unit leaders, whotrain their units on operating in the IEDenvironment, said Capt. Raymond Bijolle."The trainers first learn to think like an


17

oldiers conducting operations face the IED threat every day, and protecting the Soldier isevery unit's priority. JMTC facilitatesdefeat the device training at all levels.Live training facilities available for unituse are robust and adaptable, and arelocated at both Hohenfels and Grafen-woehr Training Areas. Range 211 atGrafewoehr provides units the ability toconduct C-IED combined arms live firetraining in a realistic and complex IEDenvironment. Range 211 supports Full-Range Training Ammunition up to 120mmmortar systems and Attack AviationTraining Ammunition allowing unitsconducting C-IED training to incorporatesupporting forces into training scenarios.This allows units to train at all levels fromthe basic battle drill to full combinedarms route clearance or mounted patrolmissions. A training lane coordinator isavailable to assist units in preparing andconducting C-IED lane training on Range 211.The JMRC, through the C-IED Academyprovides IED Awareness training, with afull complement of working IED triggerdevices, a homemade explosives lab

K

defeat device

mation, make decisions and monitorbattlefield action by subordinate or-ganizations.

attack networkthe

the

S

and two search tra in ing houses.Route Clearance training is also taughtby individual drivers training on routeclearance vehicles to platoon level routeclearance patrols. The C-IED Academyprovides operator and leader trainingon all Counter Remote Controlled IEDElectronic Warfare devices. Surrogateand interrupt devices are available forunits to train with during live trainingto provide a fully integrated IED lanetraining experience.

The CATC provides a one week IEDTrain the Trainer course. The courseprovides units with the ability to trainleaders to provide homestation IEDtraining. Training dates are availableon the ATRRS website for units to reserveseats in the course. JMTC has receivedfunding to develop a C-IED IntegrationCell, which units will directly contact toschedule training and Mobile TrainingTeams for C-IED training. The personnelassigned to the cell assist units in de-veloping a full C-IED training schedulethat synchronizes training according tothe units ARFORGEN cycle. JMTC's C-IED training assets areavailable now to increase your unit'scombat capability. For assistance andinformation contact the JMTC G3 Plansoffices at DSN: 475-8254/8005. At the individual level, Soldiers are

trained on systems operation and main-tenance. Available training includesBiometric Automated Tool Set, Handheld Interagency Identity DetectionEquipment operator courses, CombinedInformation Data Network Exchange,Tactical Ground Reporting network,tactical questioning, Human Intelligence,tactical site exploitation, and search.These courses provide trained and readySoldiers to support the commander andstaff with accurate, timely, and valuableinformation. Attack the Network training is inte-grated by JMSC to fully exercise thestaff to process information, makedecisions and monitor battlefield actionby subordinate organizations.The JMSC integrates Attack the Net-work training during exercises to drivethe commander's staff to process infor-

ey to the C-IED fight is elimin- ating the network supporting the enemy. Financiers, bombbuilders, logisticians and emplacerswork together to attack Coalition Forces.Units must train to recognize, and elimin-ate the members of the network to limitthe enemy's ability to conduct operations. Catching unauthorized network mem-bers is not easy, but the training JMTCprovides can improve a unit's effort. JMTC provides battlestaff training toBrigade and Battalion staffs enablingstaffs to integrate all of the assets avail-able to a commander in theater. Unit staffs train on integrating intelli-gence, surveillance and reconnaissance,route clearance, biometrics, and intel-ligence fusion systems to develop net-works and create actionable informationfor the commander.

train forcethe

Download our brochure online at:www.hqjmtc.army.mil/organization/G3/G3-main

Photo courtesy of JMTC DOS TS


18

commander’s ability to decisively impact mission accomplishment is based largely on the accuracy and thoroughness of the information he has to shapehis decision-making. Never in history have commanders hadaccess to more information to help this process. Unfortunately,the sheer volume of information available quickly overwhelmsa lone individual’s ability to identify, assimilate and compre-hend the available information. That is why commandershave battle staffs.

The traditional picture of the battle staff is the battlecaptain at the Tactical/Joint Operations Center (TOC/JOC)on-the-floor controlling the mission or the staff major, who isdiligently planning the next operation. This is no longertrue. A current Brigade Task Force JOC, usually only oneor two officers, is a permanent fixture on any given shift.The majority of actions are being conducted by the BattleStaff Noncommissioned Officer (BSNCO). The pace ofplanning cycles has increased often requiring each sectionto have representatives at multiple meetings, simultaneously.For most sections this means the officer goes to one and theBSNCO goes to another. Many NCOs assigned to a battle staff for the first timefind themselves feeling like a fish out of water. As juniorsergeants or staff sergeants, often their only experience isworking directly with Soldiers in their functional MOS’s,as Infantry squad leaders, supply sergeants, combat medics,or fire control sergeants. The JOC pushes these juniorleaders out of their comfort zone, and into the often hecticworld of the battle staff. Traditionally, the NCO EducationSystem has not included battle staff tasks, instead focusingon the leadership, and MOS skills needed for the NCO gradeand specialty in question. Recognizing this as mission criticaland a specialized skill, the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academyat Fort Bliss, Texas, developed the Battle Staff NCO Course(BSNCOC) and implemented the S2 Additional Skill Identifier(ASI) to prepare and designate NCOs for battle staff duty.

A

F E A T U R E

Battle Sta� training prepares Soldiersfor Afghanistan By Sgt. Major Lance T. Dykman, Combined Arms Training Center

course exposes ncos to the rigors of working thetactical operations center

The BSNCOC prepares sergeants through sergeants majorto serve as BSNCO for battalion and higher level staff positions.The course provides selected Noncommissioned officers withthe tools necessary to learn specific staff duties and becomefamiliar with the duties of other staff sections. Likewise, thecourse provides technical and tactical curriculum that isrelevant to missions, duties, and responsibilities assignedto staff members in battalion and brigade-level units.The Battle Staff NCO Course is the only course offered bythe United States Army to educate NCO Staff membersabout operating as part of a Battalion or higher staff. Thiscourse is an intense, fast paced, performance-oriented pro-gram of instruction that focuses on the battle staff duties andresponsibilities of the coordinating and special staff sections,regardless of the NCOs functional area of assignment. The Battle Staff NCO Course is a two-phase non-branchrelated functional course for sergeants through sergeantsmajor selected for staff assignments. Phase I consists of 75hours of self-study using Interactive Multimedia Instructionproduced by the USASMA. Phase II is 177 academic hours,a course taught via video-teleconference (VTT) to distantsites from the US Army Sergeants Major Academy. Studentsmust complete Phase I before they are accepted into Phase II.Seating in this VTT course is always limited. Priority seatinggoes to those Soldiers who are currently assigned to staffpositions where the S2 ASI is warranted. Any Soldiers notcurrently assigned to a S2 coded position, will need to presenta signed memo by an O5, or higher, to justify their seat.The CATC supports both phases by registering students, andproviding digital classrooms and instructors during phase II.

With the current pace of operational deployments, the Army’sLeadership felt that all NCOs should benefit from a level ofBattle Staff NCO instruction. The latest evolution of NCOEScourses such as the Advanced Leader Course and the SeniorLeader Course incorporate much of the current BSNCOC’scurriculum.

if you know the enemy andknow yourself you need not fearthe results of a hundred battles;

if ignorant both ofyour enemy and yourself,you are certain to be in peril;

know your enemy and know yourselfand you can fight a hundred battleswithout disaster.

sun tzu

Photo: JMTC PAO


19

The CATC is hosting two more BSNCOC classes via VTTthis fiscal year. The dates for those classes are Class Nr. 00201 JUN-02 JUL and Class Number 003 30 AUG-01 OCT. Our NCO Corps sets the standards for professionalism andcompetence that many other countries would like to emulate.The ability of U.S. Army junior NCOs to plan, coordinate,and execute missions independently sets them apart frommany of their peers. This is a product of service culture,professional education, and dedicated leadership develop-ment through a Soldier’s career. Part of the JMTC’s partner-ship mission is to bring some of this NCO development toour partner nations. Many countries still have regimentedroles for officers and NCOs on their staffs with NCOs rarelysharing duties with an officer. A version of our Battle StaffNCO Course is one way CATC is working to develop foreignNCOs and their ability to lead and train. So although the BSNCOC will no longer be offered by theCATC for U.S. Forces after these last two classes, it willmorph into the Battle Staff Training Program (BSTP) for ourPartner Nations’ Students via Mobile Training Team (MTT).This 10 Day MTT will be available for request from PartnerNations’ Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) LiaisonOfficers via USAREUR’s Staff. The intent of the course is thesame, but incorporates NATO standard terminology. Thehosting country will provide the training facilities, inter-preters, and some supplies such as translated lesson plans.With this MTT, partner-nations can provide their Soldierswith valuable and relevant staff training toward any futureISAF deployment or simply to increase their units’ operability. Recently, at the Polish Land Force’s NCO Academy inPozen, Poland, JMTC completed a The Battle Staff TrainingProgram (BSTP MTT). Approximately, 46 Senior NCOs fromunits throughout the Polish Land Forces were trained. The combination of a professional hosting organization and the JMTC MTT instructors made short work of thiscourse’s challenging curricula. The key to ensuring thesuccess of the BSTP as with any MTT is coordination, thosewho do so get the most from their BSTP MTT.We at the CATC look forward to bringing MTT to our PartnerNations and our brothers-in-arms. The continuing pace of operations and the continuingevolution and advancement of information collectionguarantees the NCO a valued place on the Battle Staff.As NCOES adapts to meet the changing duties of the NCO,what was once specialized instruction for a select few willbecome standard knowledge for all.

early 100 participants, ranging from coalition staff officers to U.S. battalion commanders, were immersed in the history, politics, andculture of Afghanistan, as part of the Leader Develop-ment and Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP) programat the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) inHohenfels, Germany in February. The seminar gave troops an insight into the govern-ance and politics of the country, as well as, the latesttrends in the counterinsurgency fight. The LDESP is a graduate-level educational seminaroffered by the Naval Postgraduate School. The programwas created to provide military and civilian leaders witha comprehensive overview of operational environmentsthroughout the world. "This academic endeavor is about developing a frameof reference that facilitates clear understanding anddecision-making in complex environments," said BobTomasovic, the LDESP Program Manager, who organizedthe team of instructors that included a former ambassador,as well as, professors with long ties to the region. Participants learned how to best use a linguist, and howto interact with the media in Afghanistan. They learnedAfghanistan was an oral culture, and the consequencesassociated with the oral practice. "To build a good re-lationship with a local national you are working with,communicate with him orally," said Tomasavic. Through-out the three days of instruction, participants listened toeconomic, cultural, and historical vignettes that providedrelevance to current coalition operations in Afghanistan. "All leaders should understand the environment in whichthey plan to operate," said Lt. Col. Michael Lefebvre, chiefof the JMTC G3 Plans and Operations Section. "As leaderswe should strive to understand our environment to makethe most effective decisions." While the seminar, hostedat the JMRC, was specific to Afghanistan, the LDESPprogram offers other courses, which focus on numerousregions, including Iraq and Kosovo. The first of the program's three phases begins onlinewith a Web site that offers distance learning trainingmodules. The training offers the participant the abilityto explore the material at his own pace and convenience. The second phase is the seminar, which is taught byacademics, or subject matter experts with practicalapplication of their expertise in the field. The final phase is a bi-weekly news update on thespecific area of interest. This phase allows the participantto further his education by exploring news articles, aswell as, other region-specific material provided by theprogram managers. Upon completion of phase I and phase II, free coursecredits are offered for the successful-completion ofcertain course requirements. The culmination of thestudent's efforts is a 7,500-8,000 word research paper.

For information on the LDESP, go towww.ldesp.org/public/spd.cfm/spi/training_centers.

F E A T U R E

afghanistan: increasing culturalawareness

NBy Capt. Fernando Pelayo, JMTC G3 Operations

Photo courtesy of JMRC Hohenfels PAO


20

JMTC HONORS AND CELEBRATES THE YEAR OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER

he noble goal of ensuring the legacy of the next generation of warriors and their families must include the selection and training of a successful rear-detachment team. The challenges brought about by thehardships of a deployment can be daunting, not only for theSoldier on the front lines, but also for his or her familymembers at home. The complexities of multiple deploy-ments further exacerbate these challenges. Rear-detachment teams, including the family readinessgroup (FRG), are born of necessity. Their missions areimportant; their efforts help define the unit’s success. A battalion that fails to train a quality rear-detachmentteam will fail to leave a positive legacy. SMA Kenneth O.Preston recognized the importance of ensuring the foundingof dependable rear-detachment teams when he stated:

T

A

Each particular unit imparts a legacy to the Army, and theArmy in turn passes a legacy to the nation. Leaders willensure a positive legacy only by ensuring the selection andtraining of a successful rear-detachment team.

hat defines success in battalion-level rear- detachment operations? Overall, the mission includes at least three fronts: supporting theforward-deployed command, maintaining high levels of familyreadiness and coordinating with the local garrison command.

All three of these fronts must be sustained for the length ofthe deployment, through each stage of the emotional cycle.The team must ensure effective information flow on each ofthe fronts, identifying useful information and disseminatingit to the formation. Examples include information-operationsproducts, such as, pictures of ceremonies and family activities,and changes to home-station policies and procedures, toinclude new passport guidelines and changes in openinghours for installation services. Official notifications, such ascasualty messages, are also included. A timely and accurateflow of information is extremely important. The primary mission of the rear detachment is to supportthe forward-deployed command. Properly sponsoring newSoldiers, familiarizing their families with the community,completing mandated predeployment activities and de-ploying the Soldiers to combat operations are steps in asystem established prior to the unit’s initial deployment.Providing world-class care for wounded warriors, fallenSoldiers and their families forms the most important aspectof supporting the forward command. Providing a casualty-notification or assistance officer is the most important taskfor the team. By being proactive, a team will maintain high levels of familyreadiness. This task is best achieved by anticipating the needsand requirements of the formation. Family members rightlyexpect timely and accurate information and an easily accessible,open-minded soldier team. Countless resources have beenpublished and are available to a rear detachment to aid inbetter understanding how to thrive in the uncertainty that adeployment brings. Each family and servicemember mustdiscover how to best maintain a proactive attitude. Two helpful resources are Surviving Military Separation:A 365-Day Activity Guide for the Families of DeployedPersonnel by Marc Maxwell and Courage After Fire: CopingStrategies for Troops Returning from Iraq and Afghanistanand Their Families by licensed clinical social worker KeithArmstrong and his colleagues. Both offer numerous re-sources, strategies and advice for both family and soldierteams. A proactive rear-detachment will incorporate allresources and ideas to achieve high levels of family readiness.

F E A T U R E

convoy travels through the desert. No matter how many times this platoon of soldiers completes an escort mission, it never becomes routine. A sudden,single explosion strikes the lead vehicle with devastating force. To the occupants of the trail vehicles, the overwhelmingdamage from the improvised explosive device becomesamazingly clear in seconds. Despite the flames, a darknesssettles over the soldiers—the realization that one of theirown was lost. The blast is staggering, but its sound does not travel thethousands of miles to the home front. Instead, there arethree knocks on a family’s door. Inside, a mother hurriedlygets her children ready for school. She pulls the door open,curious. Two soldiers stand on the doorstep. She noticesthat one is a chaplain. The other is from her rear-detachmentteam—a familiar face, but now without a smile. The soldiershave been charged with carrying a message that will devastateher family.

born of necessity

Wthe mission

“We must ensure that each Soldier is equipped and trained tofight and win. We must also provide for our families. We willnot be successful if we fail to care for our loved ones. … Wemust fight for their health care, children, housing and well-being with the same vigor we fight with on the battlefield”.


21

By Capt. Joshua D. Buchanan, 172nd Infantry Brigade

Finally, the local garrison command stands as the gatewayto important installation services and organizational resources.The benefits of maintaining open lines of communication andprofessional working relationships with those individuals andagencies that form the local military community are crucialto a rear detachment’s success. This front cannot be over-estimated and is especially applicable to those units stationedoverseas. A team that fails to demonstrate its proactivestance will find success elusive.

battalion commander must begin his or her efforts to achieve successful rear-detachment operations by selecting the right team members and trainingand equipping them for the important mission ahead.Training accomplished prior to the actual deployment willprove invaluable. A consistent opportunity for a smaller-scale “deployment” is the unit’s mission-readiness exercise. In addition to selecting the right people for the job,battalion and company commanders must set the climatein which they operate. A rear-detachment commander andfirst sergeant who can aggressively tackle any task whileproviding a caring and resourceful environment for soldiersand families are a prerequisite for success. A family readi-ness liaison is a company commander’s representative onthe home front.

ith the recent reduction in deployment lengths from 15 months to 12, many of the accompany- ing stressors will be proportionately reduced.For soldiers on the front lines and their families on the homefront, however, 12 months remains a long time to be apart. The timeline of a deployment may be divided into fivestages: predeployment, during which the rear-detachmentteam is selected, resourced and trained; deployment;sustainment; redeployment and reintegration; and post-deployment, this includes the dissolution of the rear-detachment team.

WTHE TIMELINE

ATHE FIRST STEPS

He or she must, therefore, select a reliable and professionalnoncommissioned officer to fill this role. It is important that the primary staff sections also designate a high-caliberrepresentative to serve as the respective subject-matterexpert on the reardetachment team. The team is not limited to soldiers, however. Its ranksalso include experienced volunteers, usually in the roles ofFRG leaders and the chain of concern. The insights andexperiences contributed to the team by spouses who haveendured one or more deployments are priceless. Their con-tributions often prevent the loss of institutional knowledgegained from past experiences that is invaluable when newchallenges arise. Supporting the forward command, providing for highlevels of family readiness and working together with thelocal garrison compose the mission of a rear-detachmentteam. The mission is accomplished over the course of allthe various stages of the deployment, essentially over aperiod lasting 18 months. The battalion commander holdsthe responsibility for the climate in which the soldiers andfamilies of a rear detachment operate. Ultimately, he or sheowns the team’s overall success or failure—the responsibilityof ensuring a legacy. Years from now, when the current campaigns in Iraq andAfghanistan have run their course, what legacy will have beenleft to the next generation of warriors and their families?Commanders directly affect the hearts and minds of soldiersand families. If leaders within our Army wish to ensure a positive legacy,then they must combine successful forward operations withsuccessful rear-detachment operations. The former, alone, isnot enough. A deploying battalion commander must select adedicated team of professionals and train them to create aproactive environment of individual and collective readiness.Company commanders must follow suit. Soldiers and familiesmust know they are a top priority—they deserve nothing less.

This article is easily dowloaded on the web at:www.hqjmtc.army.mil

Photos courtesy of Grafenwoehr Garrison PAO


22

ntil now, all Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, to include the United States, relied on their "own" national classified network (SIPRNET) to receivetheir intelligence and Situational Awareness information. As aresult of these "Independent", non-integrated networks, allof the data from the coalition partners supporting operations in Afghanistan were NOT shared. In an effort to correct this deficiency, the commander for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) directed the creation of the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN). There is a requirement that all Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) will operate on AMN, while in country. For US forces, this required the

n December 2009, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR) received a Warning Order from the Inter- national Security Assistance Force Joint Command thatall units in Afghanistan fight on the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (Centrix) network bythe summer of 2010. In a CENTRIX environment, instead of a Common OperatingPicture (COP) and intelligence analysis tool residing on anisolated, US forces only, network; units must begin toembrace the coalition environment, turning its focus tounderstanding the types of information-sharing needed tofunction in areas of operation, such as Afghanistan.No one really knows the impact of this new way of com-municating, but, a recent 30-day rotation for the 2nd StrykerCavalry Regiment at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center(JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, has initiated the developmentof a template for use, during an upcoming deployment, usingthe CENTRIX Domain. The process, for making the transition to CENTRIX, beganwith negotiations between 2SCR staff and Program Managers(PMs) from all the participating organizations. The PMs provided hardware, software and field service representatives. The Program Executive Office Command Control and Communications Tactical (PEO-C3T) is the overallprogram office responsible for the program managers that handle the major systems, such as, Warfighter Information

Network Tactical (WIN-T) and many of the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). It's a template to be replicatedfor other units facing similar deployments. “It is been a long time coming," said Col. James Blackburn,the 75th Regimental Commander for 2SCR. "We are glad to have a common NATO communications architecture in Afghanistan." One of the challenges associated with thetransition to CENTRIX was establishing the relationshipbetween the Exchange servers, the unit [2SCR], and thedigital "higher headquarters." Unlike existing, tactical Secret Internet Protocol Routing(SIPR) network servers, where units have substantial control

F E A T U R E

U

I

Building the Afghanistan Mission Network,One training event at a time By Maj. Wallace N. Smith,

69th Signal Command

One team, one system: IntegratingCENTRIX for support to ISAFBy Capt. Robert Hoover, 2SCR Public Affairs

migration of the US Battle Command Systems from SIPRNETto the AMN. This change in operations required a shift in training forunits preparing to deploy into the Afghanistan Area ofOperations. To support this training requirement, the 69thSignal Bn., working with 2nd Signal Brigade, 5th SignalCommand and the Southwest Asia Theater NetworkOperations Security Center, extended the operational AMNinto Hohenfels, Germany. The configuration of theircommunications equipment wil l be validated on thetheater operational network, AMN, prior to their arrival inAfghanistan. The extended network allows BCTs to prepare

the transition tocentrix representssomething muchmore challengingfor units preparingto deploy.


23

over the systems, using CENTRIX, units are at the mercy of a technical control facility located far from the Tactical Oper-ations Center and outside of the operational chain-of-command. "Ultimately we achieved our goal of migrating our serversinto the CENTRIX one-domain environment," said WarrantOfficer Chad Jones, the Signal Systems Technician at 2SCR."Most of our problems in this process arose from the lack ofprivileges we were given from higher. Working through theseproblems now will result in a smoother transition intoAfghanistan for 2SCR and other units to come." The one domain setup means that instead of a unitoperating its own domain, using its own naming conventions,or standards for naming the servers, and creating domainadministrator accounts to operate. They operate as a sub-organizational unit underneath the Regional NetworkOperations Security Center. While in theater they are subjectto patches, policies and naming conventions that are pushedout by Joint Network Operations Control Center-Afghanistan. The two major hurdles of moving all of these systems ontoCENTRIX are hardware and data filtering. "Data filtering is a necessary step any time you are talkingabout data transmission and two different enclaves. You can'thave classified data being broadcast across an unclassifiednetwork for all to see," said Jones. "2SCR, along with thePMs for each system, heavily scrutinized why each systemwas on SIPR, be it the data that it transmitted, softwareembedded on the system, or databases that the systemcame in contact with. We have transitioned most of thesystems, but are still trying to develop solutions for others." The hardware solutions were straight-forward but, involvea lot of logistics and short timelines. This requires thecooperation from the Program Manager’s office managingeach individual product.

For the exercise, the conversion meant imaging massiveamounts of hard drives for each ABCS system with a newCENTRIX product and the new Internet Protocol addressesassociated with those devices. "The reconfiguration of an entire data product, andimaging that product onto the hard drives was a verytime intensive process, as well as, shipping them [theproducts] to Germany in time to install and use them forour MRE," said Jones. "The hardware tasking was evenmore difficult for the WIN-T program office because thesystem, as fielded, was only able to support two enclaves[Unclassified and U.S. Only: Secret]. " There was a lot of configuration and rearrangement ofassets needed to accomplish the goal. The PEO-C3Tprovided subject matter experts to facilitate these changes,he said. ”We were taking devices used to operate in theSIPR environment, and moving them to the CENTRIX side,which made a lot of program offices very wary of movingtheir systems over to a network open to our coalitionpartners, said Jones. "The intelligence community isparticularly sensitive to the situation. "Although CENTRIXis a hot buzz phrase in the signal communications, JointOperations arena, the transition to CENTRIX representssomething much more challenging for units preparing todeploy, it is a fundamental shift in how a unit sees itself,the enemy and the environment. It requires coordination and cooperation.

for deployment and train as they will fight. This endeavor permits the units to immediately connectto the network upon arrival in theater, which saves morethan six weeks of configuration and validation of theirsystems. The AMN connection also allows units, like the 2ndStryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR) the opportunity to createtheir data products, data mine it on the AMN, and to remaincurrent with the daily situational update. The 69th Signal Battalion Operations Center in Hohenfelsenabled the 2SCR to become the first unit Army wide, toprepare for deployment by training with the same networkconfigurations they would use in Afghanistan. The networkallows the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) to download Afghanistan Situations and to build them into thetraining scenarios for the 2SCR rotation there. This effort will enhance the 2SCRs ability to react if facedwith a similar situation in theater. During exercises, this

This article is easily dowloaded on the web at:www.hqjmtc.army.mil

Photo courtesy of 5th Signal PAO

capability in Hohenfels enables support to coalition partnersduring exercise rotations in both Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr.


24

F E A T U R E

he Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) evaluates the proficiency of Soldier's COIN skills, while preparing for operations in Afghanistan, usingthe 10 Counter Insurgency (COIN) Fundamentals. "The 10 COIN Fundamentals help us provide feedback torotational training units on what we believe are the essentialfundamentals that every Soldier, leader and unit must be ableto execute to a high standard to achieve mission success inAfghanistan," said Col. John M. Spiszer, commander of theoperations group at the JMRC. The 10 COIN fundamentals expand on a set of criteria firstdeveloped at the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC)in Fort Irwin, Calif. The NTC established eight fundamentalsfor high intensity conflict in the '80s and '90s, and thenadapted the concept to COIN in the midst of the current fight. "We did not try to create anything from scratch with the10 COIN Fundamentals; we took a product that was originallydeveloped by the NTC, and modified it for what we felt werethe most essential 10 COIN Fundamentals that units neededto be able to perform to be successful in Afghanistan." saidSpiszer. "JMRC's 10 COIN Fundamentals are continuouslyassessed and updated as we identify new training require-ments, COIN Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, and theatercommander guidance and needs." Two additional skills were added to reinforce "tried and true,"Army principles, basic small unit and Soldier skills - CompositeRisk Management (CRM) and Pre-Combat Check and Pre-Combat Inspection (PCC/PCI). These are especially importantin the decentralized operations conducted in COIN operatingenvironments.

JMRC COIN Fundamentals

TBy Denver Makle, JMTC Public Affairs

"One of the two fundamentals we added to our list is CRM,which provides a method for systemically identifying riskfactors, and ways to mitigate those risks not only to per-sonnel or equipment, but to the overall ISAF mission,"said Lt. Col. Jack L. Rich, operations officer at the JMRC."The second fundamental we added to our list is the PCCand PCI, to reinforce the importance of this fundamental,JMRC dedicates a full-day for Troop Leading Procedures inbetween Situational Training Exercise (STX) Lanes to allowunits time to conduct PCC and PCIs to standard." The intent is to reinforce Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's,Commander International Security Assistance Force andU.S. Forces Afghanistan's, intent and tactical directivesthroughout the rotational unit's training. During the preparatory phase, leaders can influence thesuccess on any mission - anywhere, said Rich. "We felt thatPCC and PCI has a direct impact on the unit's ability to success-fully perform any of the other fundamentals." The JMRC's observers, controllers, and trainers provide dailyfeedback to the unit leadership during STX, and force-on-forceoperations using these metrics. Just like NTC, the 10 COINfundamentals use a number value of one through five; thenumber "three" describes proficiency in each task. A numberless than "three" is below standard proficiency, while a numberabove "three" indicates a certain level of mastery. "This is a living-document, we regularly go through externalreferences, and theater directives to assess the validity of thetactics and techniques. We look at these fundamentals andevaluate if these are still needed in theater," said Rich. "Thisis a set of metrics we use over the course of a 16-day exercise.On E1, the first day, we start observing the unit on that day."

Photo : Airman 1st Class Kenny Holston


25

ENGAGEMENT SKILLS (KLE)

Not conducted or observed. No preparation conducted. Leader engagementsconducted to standard.

Unit identifies intended outcome,conducts mission analysis,wargames

potential variations with talking pointsand rehearses the principal.

ZOPA is identified and bestalternatives to a negotiated agreementare identified for the principle and hiscounterpart. A recorder is present and

prepared to provide objective inputthroughout to help the principle.CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

Not conducted or observed. Unit has smart cards and isattempting to display sensitivity towards

cultural differences.

Cultural understanding is conductedto standard.

All Soldiers have thoroughunderstanding of cultural differences.

Incorporates cultural understandinginto patrol rehearsals.

LANGUAGE CAPABILITY

Not conducted or observed. Unit has smart cards and isattempting to display sensitivity

towards cultural differences.

Cultural understandingis conducted to standard.

All Soldiers have thoroughunderstanding of cultural differences.

Incorporates cultural understandinginto patrol rehearsals.

COUNTER-IED

No knowledge of 5 C's and 5 & 25;no knowledge of current hotspots;

No knowledge of CREW implementationand Patrol/Convoy planning related to

CIED; No CIED equipment on hand.

Equipment on hand not distributedor used properly; Nonspecific knowledge

of IED indicators; Knowledge of 5 C'sand 5 & 25 but no knowledge of

locations or current status.

Counter-IEDconducted to standard

Patrol/convoy leaders, squad leaders,and TC's knowledgeable of Tier 1 hotspots

and knowledge of IED indicators in AO.75% of Soldiers trained on 5 C's and 5 & 25

procedures and using them. Soldiers maintain anduse CREW. Equipment distributed properly .

All Soldiers knowledgeable of Tier1 hotspots and knowledge of IED indicators

in AO. All Soldiers trained in 5 C's,5 & 25 procedures as well as using them;

All Soldiers trained on, maintaining,and using CREW. All Soldiers know

the established observations guidelines.ESCALATION OF FORCES

No understanding or EOF training. Equipment and procedures trainedto squad leader level, equipment on hand notdistributed or used correctly, Language cards/

electronic interpreters on hand;

EOF conducted to standard Smart-Card/SOPs enforced. Effective useof language cars/Electronic interpreters tomitigate EOF incidents, accurate and timely

reporting through the COC when an EOF incident occurs.

Thorough and complete investigationis conducted by the command within

72 hours of an incident being reported.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

No understanding or EOF training. Equipment and procedures trainedto squad leader level, equipment on hand

not distributed or used correctly, language cards/electronic interpreters on hand;

EOF conducted to standard. Smart-Card/SOPs enforced. Effectiveuse of language cars/Electronic interpreters

to mitigate ROE incidents, accurate and timelyreporting through the COC when a ROE violation occurs.

Thorough and complete investigationis conducted by the command within 72

hours of an incident being reported.

PRE-COMBAT IMPLEMENTATION

Not conducted. Did not check all the areasor did not fix identified problems.

PCC/PCI's conducted to standard. Progress of checks sent to higher,commander inspects,

critical deficiencies corrected.

All deficiencies ID'd and corrected.Soldiers anticipate requirementand anticipate requirements.

RISK MANAGEMENT

Not Done. Risks identifiedbut not reduced.

Risk Managementconducted to standard.

Uses the unit's SOP, IDs and assesseshazards, develops control measures;

disseminates.

Continues to refine and update therisk assessment; tracks risk levels,

IDs different types of risk.

EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR / TACTICAL QUESTIONING

No understanding oftactical questioning.

Sporadic, ineffective, Smart Cardson-hand, understanding of JUMPs,Understanding of TCP Screening

Systematically and routinelyconducts: patrol preparation, currency

of info and debriefing process as itrelates to the 4Bs, ROE/EOF,

IO Talking points, Tips.

All Soldiers have thorough understandingof the situation. Soldiers study and

memorize HVI, BOLO lists, etc. Proficientuse of interpreter, Communication aids,

or Personal command of target language.

Feedback assessed, incorporated into nextpatrol/targeting cycle. SALUTE reportsubmitted to S2 or HUMINT Collection

Team (HCT) using the Smartcard's"Indicators of CI/HUMINT Interest"

& SALUTE format reference.

EVERY SOLDIER AN AMBASSADOR

Not present. No formalized individual or collectivetraining conducted. Soldiers don't haveor aren't using language cards/aids.

Unit has smart cards and is attemptingto display sensitivity towards

cultural differences.

Use common and accepted hand gesturesin normal conversations, carefully treatscultural considerations in all meetings/

contact with indigenous people. Language cardson hand, use of key phrases, language customs

understood and interpreters incorporated.

Enforced, Effective All Soldiers havethorough understanding of cultural

differences. Use of language tools whileinteracting with locals. Leaders are enforcing

key phrase memorization and rehearsalswith interpreters.

Feedback assessed, incorporated into nextpatrol/targeting cycle. Incorporates cultural

understanding into patrol rehearsals.Unit integrates on hand trained or native

linguists, is communicating effectivelywith locals at all levels.


26

F E A T U R E

JMSC: Feeding reality into simulationstraining units with real-world feeds from Afghanistan

A ccording to the Army Chief of Staff's Training and Leader Development Guidance for Fiscal year 2010-11, "Corps and Division headquarters andBrigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are required to deploy . . .execute a Combat Training Center-supported mission rehearsal/readiness exercise (MRE/MRX), prior to deployment.Similarly, functional and support brigades execute an 'MRX-like'culminating training event, supported by the Battle CommandTraining Program or the Centers of Excellence." The JointMultinational Training Command maintains the capability toconduct both types of events. While the Joint MultinationalReadiness Center (JMRC) provides support to the BCT, theJoint Multinational Simulations Center (JMSC) provides thecapability to provide "MRX-like" training events for functionaland support units within U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). During Dec. 2009, the 95th Military Police Battalion (95thMP Bn.) completed a JMSC supported "MRX-like" event, amaster-events list, simulations-supported, command postexercise in preparation for a Police Transition Team (PTT)mission in Afghanistan in support of International SecurityAssistance Force Afghanistan. The JMSC provided the unit with access to a realisticCommon Operating Picture (COP). "Being able to provide a realistic COP allows units de-ploying to different parts of the world to conduct operationssupporting the nation's interests and to train in the environ-ment that they will operate out of when they arrive at theirdestination.” said Maj. Jose G. Collado, deputy chief ofthe models and simulations branch at the JMSC. "They [theunits] can plan and rehearse missions and contingencieswithout real world consequences, and become familiar withthe area of operation, and take charge of that area almostseamlessly when they arrive”. During the exercise there were two feeds. The first, the real-world feed, provided current unit position reports for groundand air, as well as access to significant activities for adjacent units. The second, the simulation feed provided control ofthe battalion's military police units. The combination of bothtools provided a realistic and dynamic operating picture thatsupported current operations training objectives, while alsoproviding access to accurate and relevant information todrive unit assessment and planning of future operations. This exercise design construct also facilitated the integrationand use of the MP battalion's battle command systemsfocusing on Command Post of the Future, Distributed CommonGround System-Army, and Force XXI Battle Command forBrigade and Below. The JMSC provided access to additionalweb-based and communications assets including MicrosoftInternet Relay Chat, Joint Training Counter-Improvised

our new jmsc digital university courses:our new jmsc digital university courses:

By Maj. Robert E. Young, Joint Multinational Simulations Center

Explosive Device Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC),Adobe Connect Services, and FM radio replication throughVoice over Internet Protocols. These tools enhanced therealism of the event by providing access to the same toolsand data used by units currently in theater. Units scheduling these types of events require higherheadquarters, USAREUR, and JMTC resources to create arealistic training event, and should submit a request fortraining at least 180 days prior to the start of any trainingevent. The request should be sent through their normalcommand channels to USAREUR and identify the type ofJMTC support needed. This process facilitates the trainingmanagement process, ensures command support, andallows JMTC to leverage all aspects of its training capabilityto provide units with training that allows forces and leadersto dominate in Full Spectrum Operations in any environment,under all conditions.

battle command systems executive seminar(bcses)

four-hour overview of keyarmy battle command systems (abcs) and

their integration into staff processesand battle drills Target Audience:

battle captains, commanders

digital master warfighter (dmw)four varients

(40 hours each): intelligence, supply,Command and Control and Artillery

Target Audience:system operators and cell ncos & officers

battle command system of systems (bcsos)24-hour course emphasizing

the integration of ABCS into TOCs target audience:

battle ncos and officers

simulationunit

simulationair

liveunit/air


27

he 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) leveraged partnership training events andtrained deploying units despite commonchallenges related to a condensed ArmyForce Generation (ARFORGEN) timeline,and the degradation of habitual supportrelationships with combat arms units within its Bavarian footprint. Understanding the challenges meansone has to understand the organizationaldesign of a CSSB. The doctrinal organi-zation, a CSSB is not fixed, battalionsare tailored to meet specific missionrequirements to provide support on anarea basis. A CSSB may have anywherefrom three to eight subordin-ate companies supporting unitsin or passing through an areaof operations; this could bea Brigade Support Battalion(BSB) and/or non-brigadealigned units. CSSBs do notnecessarily deploy as entirebattalions. They deploy individ-ual companies, platoons, ordetachments into theaters ofoperation determined by theaterrequirements. This deployment method-ology has dictated the battalion’s sub-ordinate companies into different stagesin the ARFORGEN process at the sametime. The Headquarters Company, whichis the center of gravity for commandand control, is very often out of cyclewith its units. This fact contributes tothe difficulty in exercising the battalion’sfull command capabilities during anysingle exercise. For the 18th CSSB Headquarters thishas meant that their train up and missionreadiness exercises have not included allits' subordinate companies or a supportedunit. The battalion’s Joint MultinationalReadiness Center (JMRC) rotations haverelied heavily upon higher and lower head-quarters cells to inject events from aMaster Scenario Events List (MSEL).

The Joint Multinational Training Command in Grafenwoehr, Germany, provided supportfor the development of realistic scenariosas part of the rotations. The battalionheadquarters received the latest tech-nology for training, and instruction tothe command and staff. The instruction for the battalion’s lasttwo deployments has included trainingon the Blue Force Tracker, Air GroundIntegration, Battle Command SustainmentSupport System, MEDEVAC procedures,and Counter Radio Controlled ImprovisedExplosive Device Electronic Warfare. This training translated into the 18th

CSSB executing command and controlof 2,480 Combat Logistics Patrols, andcovering 2,785,000 miles, during thepast two deployments. The condensedARFORGEN timeline experienced by manyunits within Bavaria is demanding, withmost units deploying three times withinthe past six years. Constant deploymentand reset has left many units little timeto posture themselves to establish supportmissions and relationships in garrison thatallow the support operations to exercisesustainment management and the oper-ational control of logistics. The developing partnerships withinUSAREUR support agencies and leveragingUSAREUR level exercises to provide theadditional MOS training to units to miti-gate the battalion’s training challenges isone of the keys to success. For example,

a partnership between the AmmunitionCenter in Europe (ACE) and the 18th CSSB,established several mission support exer-cises that included the 1st Inland CargoTransfer Company (ICTC) and the 23rdOrdnance (ORD) Company. The 1st ICTC established central re-ceiving and shipping point (CRSP) yardoperations, moving and tracking hundredsof containers of ammunition. The 23rdORD broke down ammunition pallets,repacked, and prepared ammunition fordistribution throughout USAREUR orreturn to the United States.These exercises provided the two companies with training opportunities they don’t normally have otherwise. The exercises also served as part of 1st ICTC’s road to war training for deploying platoons and provided much needed support to ACE. The battalion’s continued partnership with ACE helps ensure proficiency for six MOS’s and helps with ARFORGEN training challenges. The 18th CSSB has planned a Field Training Exercise (FTX)that allows the battalion to train as a whole,exercising it’s full command capabilities.The battalion conducts the 14-day cul-minating FTX to prepare the battalionto operate as part of a combined, jointand multinational team across the fullspectrum of operational environments.The Headquarters establishes a TacticalCommand Post and Tactical OperationsCenter for command and control of theexercise. In addition, the staff receivestraining from JMRC on systems, such asthe Command Post of the Future, duringthis training, which ensures commandand control training readiness.

Flexible structure leverages power ofthe 18th CSSBunderstanding the organizational design of acombat sustainment support battalion

T

cssb: understandingthe challenges

This article available on the web at:

www.hqjmtc.army.mil

Photo : USAREUR PAO

By Maj. Jerome K. Barnard, 18th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion


T H E L A S T W O R D

“Power is not revealed bystriking hard or often butby striking true.”

PlutarchAncient Greek Biographer and Author

Winston ChurchillBritish WWII Prime Minister

Gustave FlaubertFrench Author

Honore de BalzacFrench Writer and Patriot

28

“The first thing is to be honestwith yourself. You can never havean impact on society if you havenot changed yourself... The greatpeacemakers are all people ofintegrity, honesty and humility.”

“Perseverance is moreprevailing than violence;and many things whichcannot be overcomewhen they are together,yield themselves upwhen taken bit by bit.”

Persuasion, perseveranceand patience are the bestadvocates on questionsdepending on the willof others. A good causeis often injured moreby the ill-timed effortsof its friends than by thearguments of its enemies.Thomas Jefferson US President and Author of theDeclaration of Independence

“Whatever you do, you needcourage. Whatever course youdecide upon, there is alwayssomeone to tell you that youare wrong. There are alwaysdifficulties arising that temptyou to believe your critics areright. To map out a course ofaction and follow it to an endrequires some of the samecourage that a soldier needs.Peace has its victories, but ittakes brave men and womento win them.

Peace cannot be keptby force; it can onlybe achieved byunderstanding.

Ralph Waldo EmersonU.S. Author, Essayist and Lecturer.

Nelson MandalaSouth African president and Statesman

If you have knowledge,let others light theircandles with it.

The most gloriousmoments in life arenot the so-called daysof success, but fromthose days when outof dejection and realdespair you feel risein you a challengeto life, and thepromise of futureaccomplishments.

Benjamin FranklinAmerican Statesman

“Any fool cancriticize, condemnand complain andmost fools do.”

Albert EinsteinMathematician and Physicist


PRE–DEPLOYMENT AFGHANISTAN READING LIST

instructions:

tactical level small unit leaders

additional readings:

These reading lists are divided into three distinct levels tailored to the rank and mission role deployingmembers will most likely fulfill. The Tactical Level list is designed for deploying E1-E3 personnel, theSmall Unit Leaders list is designed for deploying E4-E6 and O1-O3 personnel and the Operational/Strategic Planners list is designed for deploying E7-E9 and O4-O6 personnel.

Revised COMISAF Tactical Directive (6 July 2009)published by COMISAF

Commander’s Initial Guidance (13 June 2009;available AFPAK SIPR Portal) published by COMISAF

MCIA Afghanistan Cultural Field Guide and MCIAAfghanistan Culture Smart Cardpublished by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

Twenty–Eight Articles: Fundamentals of CompanyLevel Counterinsurgencyby Dr. David Kilcullen

Counter-Insurgency – Commander’s Guidance by LTG Sir Graeme Lamb

Afghanistan 101 by Ehsan M. Entezar

Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism inCentral Asiaby Ahmed Rashid

Afghanistan’s Cave Complexes 1979 – 2004by Mir Bahmanyar

Hezbollah by Hala Jaber

Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to PromotePeace...One School at a Timeby Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin

MCDP 1, Warfighting published by the USMC

Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgencypublished by COMISAFUSMC

Culture and Customs of Afghanistanpublished by Hafizullah Emadi

Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asiaby Ahmed Rashid

The Kite Runner (FICTION NOVEL)by Khaled Hosseini

A Thousand Splendid Suns (FICTIONAL NOVEL)by Khaled Hosseini

Flashman: A Novel (FICTION NOVEL)by George MacDonald Fraser

Additional Operational/Strategic Planner Readings:MCDP 1-1, Strategy and MCDP 1-2, Campaigningpublished by the USMC

The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire inCentral Asia by Peter Hopkirk

The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim Leagueand the Demand for Pakistanby Ayesha Jalal

War at the Top of the World: The Struggle forAfghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet by Eric Margolis

Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of theMujahideen Fightersby Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau

The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral Historyby Peter Bergen

Imperial Hubris by Michael Scheuer

Ghost Wars by Steve Coll

The Village by Bing West

Afghanistan by Louis Dupree




Counter-Insurgency – Commander’s Guidanceby LTG Sir Graeme Lamb

Afghanistan: A Military History by Stephen Tanner

The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formationand Collapse in the International System,by Barnett Rubin

Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster inPakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asiaby Ahmed Rashid

The Soviet Afghan War: How a Superpower Foughtand Lost by Russian General Staff

The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’sPower and Purposeby General Anthony Zinni

6 Nightmares: The Real Threats to American Securityby Anthony Lake

Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Bennett Jones


Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, RegionalPolitics, and the Rise of the Taliban by Larry Goodson

The Punishment of Virtue by Sarah Chayes


Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: CounterinsurgencyLessons from Malaya and Vietnam by John Nagl

War In The Shadows: The Guerrilla In Historyby Robert Asprey



Small Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency published by USMC

Counter-Insurgency – Commander’s Guidance by LTG Sir Graeme Lamb

MCIA Afghanistan Cultural Field Guide andMCIA Afghanistan Culture Smart Cardpublished by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

Afghanistan 101 by Ehsan M Entezar

Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism inCentral Asia by Ahmed Rashid

Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asiaby Ahmed Rashid

Afghanistan’s Cave Complexes 1979 – 2004by Mir Bahmanyar



Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistanand Pakistan by Robert Kaplan

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Riseof American Power by Max Boot

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tacticsin the Soviet–Afghan Warby Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet CombatTactics in Afghanistan by Lester Grau

Additional Small Unit Leader Readings: War In the Shadows: The Guerrilla In History by Robert Asprey

Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of theMujahideen Fighters by Ali Ahmad Jalali & Lester Grau

Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden,Radical Islam, and the Future of Americaby Michael Scheuer

Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant MuslimCombat Methods by H. John Poole and Ray Smith

Soldier Sahibs: The Daring Adventurers Who TamedIndia's Northwest Frontier by Charles Alan

Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Qa'ida andthe Holy War by Michael Griffin

The Man Who Would Be King: The First American inAfghanistan by Ben Macintyre

Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politicsby Martin Ewans

MCDP 3, Tactics and MCDP 6, Command and Control published by the USMC


operational / strategicplanners

additional readings: additional readings:

postage andfees paid by

u.s. departmentof defense

OFFICIAL MILITARY MAIL

7th

un

ite

d s

ta

te

s a

rm

yjo

int

mu

lt

ina

tio

na

lt

ra

inin

g c

om

ma

nd

hq

. 7th

ar

my

jmt

cp

ub

lic

af

fa

irs

of

fic

eb

ld

g.12

3, r

oo

m 10

1U

nit

28

130

AP

O A

E 0

9114

ww

w.h

qj

mt

c.a

rm

y.m

il

JM

TC

JU

RN

AL

OJ

UR

NA

LO

JOINT MULTINATION

AL TRAINING COMMAND

7TH UN

ITED STATES ARMY

RE

CY

CL

E

T R

A

I

N I

N G

Documents

The Joint Multinational Training Command Training Journal 2