“The Iranian Revolution”

Charles Kurzman

Explaining a Revolution

Failure of States: Objective and Subjective Factors

Structural: Govt undercuts or alienates its social bases of support (either through repression OR reform)

Perception: A sense that state repression has loosened, thus opportunity for action emerges

Explaining a Revolution

SM theorist have long emphasized either Structural or subjective and failed to treat them in combination.

Some Example of Combined AnalysisMcAdam, in Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency

(1982), did look at structure and consciousness.

Need structural opportunity or opening, but you also need “cognitive liberation.” Oppressed need to “break out of pessimistic and quiescent patterns of thought and begin to do something.”

Revolutionary Opportunity

Structural Opportunities and Perception “Structural opportunities generally coincide with perceived opportunities…”

People typically feel optimistic that opportunities for change exist when the system is in fact opening to change…

Of course, this is not always true.

4

Revolutionary Opportunity

Iran: Structural Opportunity and Perception did NOT MatchProtestors “based their assessment of…opportunities” based not on the

strength of the state than the perceived strength of the opposition movement itself.

5

Revolutionary Opportunity

Historical Context of Iranian Revolution (1977-1979)The revolutionary process started in mid-1977, when liberal opponents

began questioning the monarchy.

Opposing the ShahIn 1977, some Islamic leaders called for removal of the Shah. State

responded with violence, and a cycle of mourning sustained the protests. But, the bulk of the population did not take part.

6

Revolutionary Opportunity

Revolutionary Movement: Starts in September 1978A massacre of peaceful demonstrators dramatically expanded the

movement. A series of strikes followed, culminating in a general strike that lasted until the revolution’s success in February 1979.

Shah’s Response: Repression and Reform (appointed a reformist PM in late 1978).

7

The Structure of Political Opportunity

Explaining Fall of the Shah: Four (4) Reasons“Four structural weaknesses are often cited as constituting a structure of

political opportunities conducive to revolution.”

8

The Structure of Political Opportunity

1) Monarchy’s Social Support Undermined by ReformsShah’s efforts at reform actually undermined his base of support.

Response: Three problems with this argument: 1) Affected groups (elites, shop owners: bazaari)

were oppositional2) Reforms created enemies, but also allies3) Shah did not depend on internal support4) Many elites (including military) benefited from

the Shah.

9

The Structure of Political Opportunity

2) International Pressure on the MonarchyDid international pressure prevent the Shah crack down?

Response:There was no real international pressure on the shah. Carter backed the shah.

10

The Structure of Political Opportunity

Overcentralization and Paralysis of the StateWould a crack down by the state have worked? Did the state simply lack the

will?

Response:Shah did not crack down, but he could have, that the state had the capacity.

11

The Structure of Political Opportunity

State VacillationState response was inconsistent, repression, then reform, then repression,

reform, again.

Response: 1) Shah had used similar co-opting tactics for

years. Shah sought to suppress and 2) appease his opponents. His message was two-

part (but consistent): protest and 3) you will be killed, stop and you will get

reforms.

12

The Structure of Political Opportunity

Perception of the State’s Coercive PowerPeople feared the govt, but state repression only heightened their

revolutionary zeal.

Perception of the Opposition’s PowerThe people consistently thought the opposition was stronger than it was. It

was not, initially a well founded idea.

13