The Introduction to Ibn Rushd's "Bidāyat al-Mujtahid"Author(s): Yasin DuttonSource: Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 188-205Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399333 .Accessed: 30/03/2011 21:00

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Islamic Law and Society.

http://www.jstor.org

THE INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID*

YASIN DUTTON

(Oxford, UK)

Abstract Ibn Rushd's Biddyat al-mujtahid is a book on legal differences (ikhtildf)1 in which he not only details the main points of difference between the various Sunni legal schools (madhahib, sing. madhhab) but also aims to explain the juristic principles (usul) that lie behind these differences in the details (furu') of the law. Presented here is a new annotated translation of the Introduction to this book, which is of interest both as a masterly summary of these basic juristic principles from a classical Muslim point of view, and for what it tells us about Ibn Rushd the jurist. The translation is prefaced by an introductory section giving brief details of Ibn Rushd the man and the nature and significance of his Biddya.

Introduction

DESPITE CONSIDERABLE and continuing interest in the West in Ibn Rushd the philosopher, very little has been written on Ibn Rushd the scholar of law. Brunschvig's "Averro&s Juriste," published in 1962,2 remains the best general, albeit limited, survey of the specifically legal aspect of his thought. In 1978, Abdel Magid Turki published a short essay on the place of Ibn Rushd's juridical thought in the history of the Miliki school in al-Andalus.3 More recently, Dominique Urvoy's

* I wish to express my gratitude to the Executive Editors of Islamic Law and Society and to Jamil Qureshi, who read through earlier drafts of this paper, highlighted many problem areas, and offered many suggestions for improvement. Any shortcomings that remain are, needless to say, my own.

In many instances the generic sense of the masdar (verbal noun) or the ism al-jins (generic noun) of Arabic is best rendered by a plural in English; hence the frequent use in what follows of a plural in English to translate what is grammatically a singular in Arabic.

2 R. Brunschvig, "Averrots Juriste," in Etudes d'orientalisme dediees a la memoire de Levi-Provengal (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1962), vol. 1, 35-68; reprinted in Brunschvig, Etudes d'islamologie, ed. Abdel Magid Turki (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1976), vol. 2, 167-200.

3 A.M. Turki, "La Place d'Averro6s juriste dans 1'histoire du milikisme et de 1'Espagne musulmane," in Multiples Averross: Actes du Colloque Internationale organisde l'occasion du 850e anniversaire de la naissance d'Averroes, Paris 20-23 septembre 1976, ed. J. Jolivet (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), 33-43; reprinted in

Islamic Law and Society 1,2 ? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1994

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYATAL-MUJTAHID 189

monograph on Ibn Rushd, published in 1991,4 contains some useful reference to Ibn Rushd as jurist, as well as including a good Bibliographical Guide. 1991 also saw the completion of Asadullah Yate's doctoral thesis on "Ibn Rushd as Jurist," as yet unpublished.5 Other than these works, research on this important aspect of Ibn Rushd's life and thought has been sparse indeed.

This article seeks to extend further our understanding and aware- ness of Ibn Rushd the jurist. It consists of a brief introductory outline of Ibn Rushd the man and his book the Biddya, followed by a new translation of his Introduction to the book.6 This Introduction is of interest not only because of its intrinsic value as a concise summary of the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) in Islamic law, but also for what it tells us about Ibn Rushd's attitude to, and mastery of, the

subject

Ibn Rushd the man

Ibn Rushd "the grandson" (al-hafid), as he is commonly known, was born in Cordoba in the year 520/1126, a few months7 before the death of his grandfather, the famous qa.dd and Milikifaqih, Ibn Rushd "the

grandfather" (al-jadd).8 He died in exile in Marrakesh in the year

A.M. Turki, Thdologiens et juristes de l'Espagne musulmane: aspects poldmiques (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1982), 283-93.

4 D. Urvoy, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). 5 A. Yate, "Ibn Rushd as Jurist" (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Cambridge University, 1991). I would like to thank Dr. Yate for kindly allowing me access to substantial portions of his thesis before it became publicly available.

6 Earlier translations of the Introduction to Ibn Rushd's Biddya include those of Ahmed Laim6che (in French), published in his Du Mariage et de sa Dissolution (Algiers: Minerva, Imprimerie "La Typo-Litho," 1926), 2-6; L6on Bercher (in French), published in the Revue Tunisienne du Droit, 3 (1955), 28-37; and Asadullah Yate (in English), in his "Ibn Rushd as Jurist," 68-77. All three are useful but, in my opinion, contain several misleading and/or erroneous inter- pretations; hence the need for a new translation.

7 This follows Ibn al-Abbar's Takmila (see Ibn al-Abbar, Kitdb al-Takmila li- kitib al-Sila [= Bibliotheca Arabico-Hispana V and VI] (Madrid: Matba' Rfikhas [= Rojas?], 1886-87), vol. 1, 270). Ibn Farhuin's Dibdj reads "one month" (see Ibn Farhun, al-Dibtj al-mudhhab fi ma'rifat a'ydn 'ulamd' al-madhhab, ed. Muham- mad al-Ahmadi Abf al-Nur [Cairo: Dar al-Turath, n.d.], vol. 2, 259). 8 For the biography of Ibn Rushd "the grandson," see Ibn al-Abbar, Takmila, vol. 1, 269-70; Ibn Farhun, Dibdj, vol. 2, 257-59; C. Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur (2nd ed., including Supplement, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1937- 49) [hereinafter GAL2], vol. 1, 604-06, Supplement, vol. 1, 833-36; Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed., Leiden/London: E.J. Brill/Luzac and Co., 1960-) [hereinafter El2], vol. 3, 909-10; Urvoy, Ibn Rushd, 31-36 (and 137-38, where the main Arabic biographical sources are conveniently listed). For that of Ibn Rushd "the grand- father" (450-520/1058-1126), see Ibn Bashkuwil, Kitdb al-$ila f akhbdr a'immat

YASIN DUTTON

595/1198. In the West he is best known, under the name Averroes, for his interest in philosophy, but, although he was probably the greatest authority on philosophy in his time, it should be remembered, firstly, that he was a highly qualified and respected physician and, secondly, that he was, like his father and grandfather before him, a highly qualified and respected qddi for the greater part of his life. He was appointed qddi of Seville in 565/1169, and then, two years later, qddi of Cordoba. In 575/1179 he was again, according to Urvoy, appointed qdid of Seville.9 Finally, in 578/1182, he was appointed to the office of Chief Q.di of Cordoba - a position that both his father and grand- father had held before him - by the Almohad caliph Abfi Ya'qfib Yfsuf.10 Thus, whatever his other interests, he spent much of his working life in exercising a knowledge offiqh and its sources (usul) in order to dispense justice according to the dictates of the sharia.

According to the biographical notice about him in Ibn al-Abbir's Takmila, Ibn Rushd's teachers included his father, Abfi al-Qasim,"l from whom he learnt the Muwatta', Abi al-Qasim b. Bashkuwil,12 Abfi Marwin b. Masarra,13 Abi Bakr b. Samh.in4 and Abu Ja'far b. 'Abd al-'Azizl5 - with all of whom he studied fiqh - and Abu

al-Andalus [= Bibliotheca Arabico-Hispana I and Ii] (Madrid: Matba' Rikhas [= Rojas?], 1882-83), vol. 2, 518-19; Ibn Farhun, Dibaj, vol. 2, 248-50; GAL2, vol. 1, 479-80, Supplement, vol. 1, 662; Urvoy, Ibn Rushd, 29-31.

9 See Urvoy, Ibn Rushd, 34. I have not found this piece of information in any other source.

10 For Ibn Rushd "the grandson" being qddi of Seville, and qddl and Chief Qadi of Cordoba, see Urvoy, Ibn Rushd, 34; E12, vol. 3, 910, and the sources cited therein. For his father (487-563/1094-1168), also known as Ibn Rushd, being Chief Qadi of Cordoba, see Ibn al-Abbar, al-Mu'jam fi ashdb al-Qadl al-lmnm Abi 'All al-Sadafi [= Bibliotheca Arabico-Hispana IV] (Madrid: Matba' Rikhas [= Rojas?], 1885), 44. For Ibn Rushd "the grandfather" being Chief Qadi of Cordoba, see Ibn Bashkuwil, Sila, vol. 2, 518. We may note here that, according to Ibn Abi Usaybi'a, a number of the sons of Ibn Rushd "the grandson" were also qddis (see E. Renan, Averroes et l'Averroisme [2nd ed., Paris: Michel L6vy Freres, 1861], 453), one of whom, Ahmad (d. 622/1225), is specifically mentioned by Ibn Farhfn (Dibdj, vol. 1, 221). 11 For Abi al-Qasim, the father of Ibn Rushd, see Ibn al-Abbar, Mu'jam, 44- 46; and n. 10 above.

12 For the well-known scholar and historian Ibn Bashkuwal (d. 578/1183), see Ibn al-Abbar, Takmila, vol. 1, 54-58; ibid., Mu'jam, 82-85; GAL Supplement, vol. 1, 580.

13 For Ibn Masarra (d. 552/1157), a onetime Chief Qiadi of Cordoba, see Ibn al-Abbar, Mu'jam, 253.

14 Although he is mentioned elsewhere by Ibn al-Abbar (e.g. as one of those who transmitted from Ibn Bashkuwil but died before him; see Ibn al-Abbar, Takmila, vol. 1, 57), I have not been able to identify this Abu Bakr b. Samhun.

15 This is presumably the Abu Ja'far b. 'Abd al-'Aziz listed both by Ibn al- Abbar (Mu'jam, 17-18) and al-Dabbi (K. Bughyat al-multamis ft tdrlkh rijail ahl

190

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYATAL-MUJTAHID 191

Marwan b. Jurrayul,16 with whom he studied medicine.17 However,

despite receiving a traditional education, his inclination was always, as Ibn al-Abbir puts it, towards "dirdya" rather than "riwdya," that is, towards understanding this knowledge and how it was structured rather than simply transmitting it in an unquestioning way; hence his

many works not only on philosophy (e.g. his numerous translations and paraphrases of Aristotle and Plato), but also about medicine (e.g. his Kitdb al-Kulliyyct), the relation of natural science and philosophy to the sharfa (e.g. his Kitab Fasl al-maqdl), and the sharla itself, both its theoretical bases (e.g. his Mukhtasar of al-Ghazfili's Musta.sf) and its application in practice (e.g. his Biddyat al-mujtahid). It is with this last work that we are here concerned.

Ibn Rushd's Biddya

Ibn Rushd probably began work on the Biddya when in his forties, but, due to various circumstances, did not finish it until some twenty years later in 584/1188, as he himself tells us at the end of the section on hajj.18 The full title - Biddyat al-mujtahid wa-nihdyat al-muqtasid (lit. "The beginning for the one who would exercise ijtihdd (inde- pendent reasoning)19 and the end for the one who would limit himself

[to a basic knowledge of the sharra]") - indicates part of his intent: it is for those who want to understand the basics of the sharra so that

they will then be in a position to think for themselves and exercise

ijtihdd on new matters that may arise about which there is no clear

ruling. Contrary to the practice in many other works that come under the genre of ikhtilif literature (i.e. that which deals with the differences

al-Andalus [Bibliotheca Arabico-Hispana Ill] (Madrid: Matba' Rikhas [= Rojas?], 1884), 155), although his death date (533/1138-39) would mean that Ibn Rushd was very young at the time. This faqih, and the famous Imam al-Mazari (d. 536/1141; see GAL Supplement, vol. 1, 663), are both said to have given the young Ibn Rushd ijazas - that is, indirect permission - to transmit their teachings (see Ibn al-Abbar, Takmila, vol. 1, 269).

16 For Abf Marwan b. Jurrayfl (d. ?), see Ibn al-Abbar, Takmila, vol. 2, 614. 17 See Ibn al-Abbar, Takmila, vol. 1, 269-70. According to Ibn Abi Usaybi'a,

Ibn Rushd also studiedfiqh under thefaqih Abu Muhammad b. Rizq (see Renan, Averroes, 448, 459), whom I have not been able to identify.

18 See Ibn Rushd, Biddyat al-mujtahid wa-nihdyat al-muqtasid (7th ed., Beirut: Dir al-Ma'rifa, 1405/1985), vol. 1, 380; also Brunschvig, "Averroes Juriste," 37.

19 The verb ijtahada is derived from the root jahada, meaning to "strive," "exert oneself," "make an effort." Here the meaning is that the mujtahid makes every intellectual effort to arrive at a clear ruling on a matter on which there has been no previous ruling.

YASIN DUTTON

- ikhtilf(&t) - between the different madhhabs, or legal schools), he mentions not only the differences between the various Sunni madh- habs,20 but also explains in detail the reasons for these differences. This he does by systematically considering all the main points of difference under the various subject headings familiar to the fuqahd', and then giving what he considers to be the principles behind these differences from an usulf's point of view. Occasionally he discusses these principles, or usul, at some length within the main body of the text,21 but his main treatment of this subject comes in the book's Introduction, which, in less than five pages of printed text, neatly summarizes the whole subject of usul al-fiqh and, at the same time, allows us interesting insights into Ibn Rushd's attitude to the science of usul and the usulis of his day.

This concise, but thorough, summary of the science of usIl demonstrates, firstly, Ibn Rushd's complete mastery of the subject.

Secondly, it shows his penchant for applying his intellect to the potentially confusing mass of detail that the discipline of fiqh had acquired, and, by so doing, to impose some sort of rational structure on it. Indeed, it is as if in the genre of ikhtildf literature Ibn Rushd had found an ideal mode of expression, since it provided him, as Dr. Yate notes, with "the ideal instrument for dissecting the body of the Law and revealing its inner mechanisms."22

Thirdly, it demonstrates his overtly stated conviction that difference of opinion is inevitable when dealing with the interpretation of language,23 as is evident from the multitude of madhhabs and varying juristic opinion illustrated. However, at the same time, his approach, as we have just noted, indicates an emphasis on, and preference for, the basic principles (usul) of the law rather than its details (fur),24 a preference which, as Dr. Yate also points out, "represents a return to the sources rather than a reliance on immediate judicial precedent."25

20 For examples of occasional reference to non-Sunni opinions, see Brun- schvig, "Averroes Juriste," 36, n. 2. We should also mention here that the madhhabs cited by Ibn Rushd include not only the five well known madhhabs of his day, i.e. Maliki, Hanafi, Shifi'i and Hanbali, plus the Zahiris, but also the "madhhabs," i.e. opinions, of many earlier authorities.

21 One such example is Ibn Rushd's discussion of Madinan 'amal ("practice") in the context of joining prayers because of rain (see Bidaya, vol. 1, 173-74).

22 "Ibn Rushd as Jurist," 33. 23 In the preamble to his Introduction, Ibn Rushd speaks of "the various

reasons which make differences of opinion inevitable" (see below, p. 197). 24 I have preferred to translate furu' (lit. "branches") as "details" rather than

the more usual "positive law," which, in the context of the sharra, is misleading. 25 "Ibn Rushd as Jurist," 45.

192

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYATAL-MUJTAHID 193

Fourthly, it shows us some of his frustration with certain of the 'ulamd' of his time, whom he considered to have given insufficient thought to their subject or even, in certain instances, to be insufficiently qualified to do so. This is shown in particular in his discussion of qiyas and its relation to specific expressions by which a more general meaning is intended (al-lafz al-khdss yurddu bihi al-'dmm), which, he notes, is a subject which is "very often a cause of confusion for the fuqahd'."26 This attitude is even more apparent elsewhere in the Biddya, such as where he criticizes the fuqahd' for too strong an attachment to the opinions of their predecessors (shiddat al-taqlld),27 and castigates them for measuring knowledge by quantity rather than quality and thus being like shoe-sellers who, although they have plenty of shoes for sale, are not able to actually make a shoe themselves when the need arises.28

Fifthly, and by extension from the above point, it shows how for him conscious thought (nazar) about a subject, i.e. the mental process behind qiyds, is necessary not only for a complete understanding of it but also for its practical application. His medical training in particular gave support to his conviction that independent intellectual activity is a necessary part of knowledge, for knowledge of medicine is the result of experience and experiment (tajriba), after which the intellect must then be used to derive and understand the more general principles illustrated by these experiments.

One particularly interesting example of this occurs in Ibn Rushd's discussion of how to determine the beginning of Ramadan if the new crescent moon is sighted during the day rather than at the normal time of after sunset. He gives the various views of the fuqahd' on the subject, including their distinction between whether the moon is seen before or after midday, and then cites the reports they use to support their views. However, he then points out that one knows from reason and direct experience (al-qiyds wa'l-tajriba) that the moon is only ever visible at the same time as the sun, i.e. during the day, when it is a long way away from the sun and much larger than the crescent moon that indicates the beginning of the month. Furthermore, he says, although the new crescent moon does vary in size, it is nevertheless a remote possibility - "and Allah knows best" - for it to be big enough to be seen when the sun has not yet set. Nor is there, he says,

26 See below, p. 202. 27 See Bidaya, vol. 2, 402; also Brunschvig, "Averroes Juriste," 56. 28 See Bidaya, vol. 2, 195; also Brunschvig, "Averrofs Juriste," 56.

YASIN DUTTON

any point in distinguishing between a sighting before or after midday, since one knows from experience that the only point of relevance in this context is whether the new moon is seen before or after sunset. In other words, considerations of observation and experience - what we could call "scientific" considerations - rule that the whole discussion is, in a profoundly technical sense, absurd, and that the only real concern is whether the new moon is seen before or after sunset, not before or after midday. In short, he says, this is a case where the fuqaha' have abandoned direct experience in a matter that can and should be correctly ascertained by direct experience (tark i'tibdr al-

tajribafi-md sablluhu al-tajriba) and resorted instead to those textual

reports that exist on the matter (wa'l-ruju' ild al-akhbdrfi dhilika).29 What is important, of course, from Ibn Rushd's point of view is

that rulings based on reason and experiment - al-qiyCs wa'l-tajriba - should be given their rightful place in the sharr'a and not be considered either contradictory to it or contradicted by it. Indeed, in his Fasl al-maqal he makes it quite clear that for him the shari'a and reason can never be at loggerheads:

We will say definitively (naqta'u qat'an) that whenever a conclusion arrived at by clear logical proof (md addd ilayhi al-burhan)30 is contradicted by the overt import (zahir) of the sharra, this overt import is susceptible of another interpretation (ta'wll) according to the rules of interpretation of Arabic. This is something about which no Muslim has any doubt and no believer any qualms... Indeed, we will say that there is nothing stated in the sharfa whose overt import seems to go against a conclusion arrived at by clear logical proof for which one does not find, when one considers the sharra properly in all its aspects, other elements whose overt import directly supports that interpretation, or very nearly does so.31

One final point may be noted here. Although Ibn Rushd grew up within the M&liki tradition (throughout the Biddya he refers by default to the Maliki madhhab as "the madhhab" and also, at the end of the section on qadhf [i.e. slanderous allegations of zind, or sexual

impropriety], announces his intention to write a book specifically on Mliki furi' because that is "the madhhab that is acted upon in this

peninsula, namely, the peninsula of al-Andalus"),32 and lived at a time

29 See Bidcya, vol. 1, 284-85. 30 Arnaldez (El2, vol. 3, 912) translates burhan as "demonstrative syllogism." 31 Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maq&l wa-taqrir md bayna al-sharia wa'l-hikma min

al-ittisal, ed. Albayr Nasri Nadir (3rd ed., Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1973), 36. 32 See Biddya, vol. 2, 443; also Brunschvig, "Averrobs Juriste," 40.

194

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYATAL-MUJTAHID 195

when, through the efforts of men such as Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) and his own contemporary Ibn Mada' (d. 592/1195), the Zahiri school had a certain influence in al-Andalus, he is nevertheless very much his own man. Thus, for example, he argues against a point about dowry endorsed by Malik,33 prefers the ruling of Abfi HIanifa to that of Malik on a particular point about usury,34 and expresses doubts about the Malikis' arguments for Madinan 'amal, although arguing that as a

concept it is stronger than the Hanafi idea of 'umum al-balwd (lit. "general affliction," i.e. those matters that one must assume to have been addressed in the early period because of their frequency of

occurrence).35 Similarly, he clearly disagrees with the Zahiris' position on qiyds, and, although allowing that their argument for rejecting it has some basis, accuses them, along with the rest of the fuqaha', of

mistaking a purely linguistic technique for qiyas.36 Having said this, it nevertheless seems reasonable to assume that, for the most part and on

33 See Biddya, vol. 2, 19-20. 34 See Biddya, vol. 2, 137. 35 See Biddya, vol. 1, 176. We should note here that Ibn Rushd's appreciation

of Madinan 'amal in the Biddya, despite its overwhelming importance in the Maliki madhhab, seems somewhat ambivalent. On several occasions he points out that such-and-such a ruling is endorsed by Malik because it was the 'amal in Madina, e.g. the rulings that it is permissible to do the prayer when the sun is at its zenith (Bidaya, vol. 1, 102), that one does not recite the Fdtiha during the funeral prayer (Biddya, vol. 1, 235), and that it is not permissible to do the prayer at someone's grave if one has missed the funeral prayer (Biddya, vol. 1, 238). But whereas in these instances he allows that 'amal is the sole justification for the ruling even though it goes against a seemingly clear hadith, on other occasions he sees the 'amal only as bolstering a particular hadith position when for Milik the 'amal is justification in itself, e.g. his discussion of the call to prayer (see Biddya, vol. 1, 105-06; Malik, al-Muwatta' (Cairo: Matba'at Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1370/1951) [hereinafter Muw.], vol. 1, 69-70; Sahnin, al-Mudawwana al-KubrC (Cairo: Matba'at al-Sa'ada, 1323-24 [1905-06]) [hereinafter Mud.], vol. 1, 57-58; also Y. Dutton, "Sunna, Hadith and Madinan 'Amal," Journal of Islamic Studies, iv (1993), 16-17, 19 n. 68), or the ruling that one raises one's hands only at the beginning of the prayer (see Biddya, vol. 1, 133-34; Mud., vol. 1, 68; also Dutton, "Sunna, Hadith and Madinan 'Amal," 20-21, which includes a critique of Isabel Fierro's recent articles on this point), or that only the two night prayers can be joined because of rain when not on a journey (see Biddya, vol. 1, 173-74; Muw., vol. 1, 122-24; Mud., vol. 1, 115). Furthermore, there are occasions when, although he is speaking about a ruling that is effectively based on 'amal, he makes no mention of that 'amal, e.g. his discussion of the iqdma (see Biddya, vol. 1, 110; Muw., vol. 1, 69-70), or not reciting the basmala when beginning the recitation in the prayer (see Biddya, vol. 1, 124; Muw., vol. 1, 78; Mud., vol. 1, 64, 67), or holding one's arms by one's sides (i.e. sadl al-yadayn) when doing the prayer (see Biddya, vol. 1, 137; Mud., vol. 1, 74; also Dutton, "Sunna, Hadith and Madinan 'Amal," 20-21). Does one sense here a philosopher's reluctance to accept the apparently speculative and amorphous - because non-textual - authority of Madinan 'amal?

36 See below, pp. 197 and 202.

YASIN DUTON

a practical day-to-day level, he gavefatwds and handed down judg- ments according to the traditional madhhab of the Andalusians, i.e. that of Malik, as indicated by his greater familiarity with it in the Biddya and the comment referred to above about his intention to write a book on the details of Maliki law because that was the madhhab of his country and people,37 to which one could perhaps add the respect shown in the Biddya for his grandfather's judgments.38

Translation of the Introduction to Ibn Rushd's Biddyat al-mujtahid

"When Allah wishes good for someone, He gives him understanding in religion'39

In the name of Allah, the Compassionate and Merciful

Praise be to Allah in all the ways that He can be praised, and blessings and peace be upon Muhammad, His Messenger, and on his family and Companions.

My intention in this book is to affirm (uthbita) for myself, by way of reminder, those points of the law (masa'il al-ahkdm)40 about which there is agreement and those about which there is dispute, together with their proofs (adilla), and to point out the differences between them in a way that will highlight the basic principles and rules to be applied to those cases (masd'il) on which the sharla is silent which might confront a mujtahid.41 These points (masd'il) are mostly those which are overtly mentioned (mantuq bihd) in the sharla or are closely

37 See above, p. 194. 38 For examples of his grandfather's judgments, see Biddya, vol. 2, 243, 402,

460. 39 For this hadith, see, for example, Muw., vol. 2, 208; al-Bukhari, $ahih al-

Bukhdri (in Arabic, with an English translation by Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1979), vol. 1, 61.

40 The word hukm (pl. ahkdm) presents certain problems in English. Except in this instance, where the meaning of the word masd'il ("points," "cases," "specific details of the law") predominates, I have chosen to translate it as "ruling": "judg- ment," in the sense in which it is used in the Authorized and Revised Versions of the Bible to translate the Hebrew mishpat(im) (e.g. Exod. 21.1, 24.3, Deut. 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and many other instances), would be a good alternative, were it not for the restriction in meaning that it seems to have acquired in contemporary usage. Other translations that have been suggested include "determination" and "assess- ment" (see, for example, A.K. Reinhart, "Islamic Law as Islamic Ethics," Journal of Religious Ethics, xi (1983), 186-203). 41 For the word mujtahid, see above, p. 191, n. 19.

196

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYATAL-MUJTAHID 197

related to those which are overtly mentioned, these being the points about which there is either agreement or on which well-known dif- ferences of opinion have existed among Muslim jurists (al-fuqahd' al-

Islamiyy!n)42 from the time of the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them, up to the time when unquestioning following (taqlld)43 became widespread.

Before doing this, though, we shall mention, in as brief a manner as

possible, the various ways (turuq)44 by which the rulings of the shari'a may be derived, the various categories of ruling (asndf al-

ahkdm) in the sharfa, and the various reasons which make differences of opinion (ikhtilaf) inevitable.

[Ways of deriving rulings]45 In general terms (bi'l-jins), there are three ways (turuq) by which

rulings may be derived from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and

grant him peace, namely, through his words (lafz), or his actions (fi'l), or his tacit approvals (iqrdr). With regard to those points on which the sharrfa (lit. al-shari', "the Lawgiver") is silent, most people (al- jumhur) say that the way to arrive at knowledge of them is by analogical reasoning (qiyds). The Zahiris, however, hold that ana-

logical reasoning is invalid as far as the sharia is concerned and that if the sharl'a is silent about something there is no ruling on it. The intellect (dalll al-'aql), however, testifies to the validity of qiyas, since the situations that may arise between people are infinite in number, whereas the texts, actions and tacit approvals of the Prophet are finite in number, and it is impossible (muhal) for what is infinite to be

exactly matched (yuqdbala) by what is finite.

42 As Dr. Yate has suggested, this phrase may indicate a conscious awareness of similar considerations among non-Muslim jurists (see "Ibn Rushd as Jurist," 69, n. 282).

43 Lane gives the following definition of taqlld: "A man's following another in that which he says or does firmly believing him to be right therein, without regard or consideration of the proof, or evidence" (see E.W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon [London/Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1863-77], s.v. qallada). 44 It becomes apparent from the use of the word tarlq ("way," "method," "technique") in the rest of the Introduction that Ibn Rushd often accords to the word some of the functions of the word asl ("source"). In other words, what is being indicated is not so much the technique of deriving the ruling as the pathway along which that ruling comes, and therefore, effectively, its source. I have retained the more literal translation "way" rather than "method" or "technique" in order (a) to retain some of this ambiguity and (b) to distinguish it from when he uses the word asl, which I have translated as "source."

45 This and all subsequent headings and subdivisions have been supplied by the translator and are necessarily interpretative.

YASIN DUTTON

[A. Words] There are four types of expression (asnafal-alfdz) by which rulings

may be derived from language (sam', lit. "what is heard"). There is agreement about three of these but disagreement about the fourth. The three about which there is agreement are: (i) a general expression that is understood in a general sense (lafz 'dmm yuhmalu 'ala 'umdmihi)46 or a specific expression that is understood in a specific sense (khdss yuhmalu 'ala khuussihi);47 (ii) a general expression by which a more specific meaning is intended (lafz 'amm yurddu bihi al-khusus); and (iii) a specific expression by which a more general meaning is intended (lafz khdss yurddu bihi al-'umum). This category also includes reasoning from the greater to the lesser (al-tanbih bi'l-a'ld 'aid al- adnd, i.e. 'afortiori reasoning'), from the lesser to the greater (bi'l- adnd 'ald al-a'ld), and from one equal situation to another (bi'l- musdwi 'ali al-musdwi).

An example of the first [type] is where Allah says, "Forbidden for you are carrion, blood and the flesh of the pig .. .,"48 since all Muslims are agreed that the word "pig" (khinzir) includes all types of pig, as long as it does not refer to something that is only called "pig" because it shares certain characteristics with pigs (bi'l-ishtirdk), like the [term] "water-pig" (khinzir al-md').49

46 The terms 'dmm/'umum and khdss/khusus pose problems in English. What is intended by the term 'umnm is the assumption of inclusion, i.e. the inclusion of all items coming under the class indicated by the word; thus one might equally well use "inclusive" instead of the more usual "general" for 'dmm. Similarly, the word khdss implies the restriction of meaning to the particular word or words used; thus one might use the word "restricted" instead of the more usual "specific" or "particular."

47 I have assumed, unlike Laimeche, Bercher and Yate, that these two phrases come under the same category, since in both instances the "face-value" of the expression is retained unchanged, i.e. what is general is understood as being general and what is specific is understood as being specific. Furthermore, this systematization agrees (a) with the fact that Ibn Rushd says he is going to mention three categories about which there is agreement, not four; (b) with the three categories exemplified in the three examples he goes on to give; and (c) with the fact that in the Arabic text the word lafz is not repeated for the second element of category (i) whereas it is for the other categories. This systematization also accords with his summary of these categories in the section on "The reasons for difference of opinion" (see below, pp. 204-05).

48 Qur'an [hereinafter Q] 5:3. 49 This is presumably the same as the lexicographers' khinzir al-bahr, i.e.

porpoise or (small) dolphin, as in al-Damiri's Kitdb Hayat al-hayawdn al-kubrC (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-Amiriyya, 1274 [1857-58]), vol. 1, 456-57, 503 (see also al-Munjid, Mu'jam madrasi li'l-lugha al-'arabiyya, ed. al-Ab Luwis Ma'liif al- Yasi'i (Beirut: al-Matba'a al-Kathfilikiyya, 1913), s.v. khinzir al-bahr; al- Mawrid, A Modern English-Arabic Dictionary, ed. Munir al-Ba'albakki (Beirut:

198

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYATAL-MUJTAHID 199

An example of a general expression by which a more specific meaning is intended is where Allah says, "Take alms (sadaqa, i.e. zakat) from their wealth to purify them and increase them in purity thereby .. .,"50 since all Muslims are agreed that zakdt is not obliga- tory on all types of wealth.

An example of a specific expression by which a more general meaning is intended is where Allah says, "And do not say 'Uff' to them"51 [i.e. one's parents], which is an example of afortiori reason- ing, since one understands from this that hitting them, cursing them and anything worse than that is also forbidden.

[Commands and Prohibitions] In all of these [types of expression] an action that is being com-

manded may be expressed either in the form of a command or in the form of a statement by which a command is intended. Similarly, an action which is being prohibited may be expressed either in the form of a prohibition or in the form of a statement by which a prohibition is intended.

Furthermore, when such expressions (alfdz) occur in such forms (siyagh), should the action that is being commanded be understood as

obligatory (wajib), or [merely] recommended (mandab) - according to the different opinions that will be mentioned regarding the definition of "obligatory" and "recommended" - or should one assume neither of these unless there is evidence that indicates one rather than the other? There is dispute on this point between the jurists, as is mentioned in the books on usal al-fiqh.

Similarly, do the forms used to express prohibitions indicate disapproval (kardhiya), or total prohibition (tahrim), or do they not necessarily indicate either of these? There is the same dispute on this

point as with commands.

Dar al-'ilm li'l-malayin, 1972), s.v. "porpoise"; al-Mandr, An English-Arabic Dictionary, ed. Hasan S. Karmi (Beirut: Longman/Librairie du Liban, 1970), s.v. "porpoise," "dolphin"), and not the "hippopotamus" suggested by Bercher and Yate, for whichfaras al-bahr, or some similar expression, is more commonly used (see al-Damiri, K. Hayat al-hayawan, vol. 2, 311-12; al-Mawrid, s.v. "hippo- potamus"; al-Mandr, s.v. "hippopotamus." Al-Munjid, however, states thatfaras al-bahr is "a large fish"). Dozy's capivert - i.e. the capybara of South America - for khinzir al-mdi' is not suitable in the Old World context of Ibn Rushd's day (see R. Dozy, Supplement aux Dictionnaires Arabes (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1881), s.v. khinzir).

50 Q. 9:103. 51 Q. 17:23.

YASIN DUT'ON

[Lexical ambiguity] [Furthermore], the items (a'yan) referred to in a ruling may be

indicated by a word or expression (lafz) which carries only one meaning, in which case it is known in the science (sind'a) of usul al- fiqh as a nass (lit. "text," i.e. an unambiguous text), and there is no dispute about the obligation of acting upon such a text; or the word or expression may carry more than one meaning, which can be in one of two ways: either all the meanings are equally possible, in which case the expression is known in [the terminology of] usul al-fiqh as mujmal (lit. "collected together," i.e. when a number of different meanings are collected together in one word), and all are agreed that such [a text] does not make a ruling obligatory; or one or more of these meanings is more usual than the others, in which case the more usual meaning is referred to as zdhir ("overt," "literal," "probable") and the less usual meaning is referred to as muhtamal ("conceivable," "possible"). When a word occurs in an unqualified way (mutlaqan), it is assumed to bear its zdhir meaning unless there is evidence to indicate that it should be taken in its less usual, muhtamal, sense.

Differences of opinion (khildf) thus arise among thefuqahd' with regard to the actual wording of the sharfa (lit. al-shcri', "the Lawgiver"), but they are the result of three different considerations (ma'dnin, lit. "meanings"):

i) ambiguity (ishtirdk) in the words describing the items referred to in a ruling;

ii) ambiguity regarding whether a definite article used generi- cally with a particular item should be understood in a general or a specific sense;

iii) ambiguity in the expressions used for commands and prohibitions.

[Implication] The fourth way (tariq) [of deriving a ruling by linguistic means]52

is when one understands that because a ruling is obligatory with regard to a particular thing, it is not obligatory with regard to other things, or [conversely, when one understands] that because a ruling is not obligatory with regard to a particular thing, it is obligatory with

52 This fourth "way" refers to the fourth, and disputed, "type of expression by which rulings may be derived from language," as mentioned at the beginning of the section on "Words" (see above, p. 198). In other words, it is the fourth of those techniques by which rulings may be derived by purely linguistic means.

200

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDA YATAL-MUJTAHID 201

regard to other things. This is the technique known as dalil al-khitdb (lit. "the implications of what is said").53 There is, however, dispute about this source (asl). An example is where the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "There is zakdt on free-ranging livestock," from which some people have understood that there is no zakdt on livestock that is not free-ranging.

[Qiyas (reasoning by analogy)] Qiyds, in the sense in which it is used in the sharia, is the appli-

cation (ilhaq) of a ruling that something is obligatory by the sharia to something else which the sharfa is silent about, either because of some similarity (shabah) between the latter and the thing which the sharrfa has declared obligatory, or because of some common rationale ('illa jami'a) underlying the two. This is why there are two types of qiyds, namely, qiyds shabah and qiyds 'illa. The difference between qiyds in the sense in which it is used in the sharl'a and a specific expression by which a more general meaning is intended (al-lafz al- khdss yurddu bihi al-'dmm) is that qiyds applies when there is a specific expression by which a specific meaning is intended, the ruling for which is then applied to something else. That is, what is not mentioned (al-maskuit 'anhu) [in the shar'a] is equated with what is mentioned (al-mantiuq bihi) because of some similarity between the two, rather than by some deduction of meaning from the words themselves (daldlat al-lafz). [This is so] because to equate a situation for which the ruling is not known with a situation for which the ruling is known by virtue of the implications (tanbfh) of a word or words is not qiyds but, rather, comes under the category of deduction of mean- ing from the words themselves (daldlat al-lafz). Both these techniques are very similar to each other since they both involve deriving the

53 This technique is also known as mafham al-mukhdlafa, i.e. what is understood by contrast, or "argument a contrario" (Brunschvig, "Averro,s Juriste," 51), meaning, as Ibn Rushd illustrates it here, that if you say X about Y, it only applies to Y and not to anything other than Y. A clear example is Malik's ruling that a free man may marry a slave-girl only if (a) he cannot afford to marry a free woman and (b) he fears that he will fall into illicit sexual activity, because Q. 4:25 says, "And those among you who do not have the means (tawl) to marry believing free women (muhsandt) [may marry] from among those of your believing slave-girls whom your right hands possess ... That is for those among you who fear illicit sexual activity ('anat)." Thus, if these two conditions are not met, so the argument a contrario goes, this permission does not apply. Similarly, because the permission is restricted to "believing" (understood as "Muslim") slave-girls, the implication, by this same technique, is that non-Muslim slave-girls are not acceptable (see Biddya, vol. 2, 42-43, 44; also Muw., vol. 2, 9, 11).

YASIN DUTTON

ruling for an unknown situation from a known one, and they are very often a cause of confusion for thefuqahd'. Examples of qiyds are that a drinker of wine is given the same hadd-punishment as a slanderer (qddhif),54 or that the minimum amount for a dowry is considered the same as the minimum amount for which the hand may be cut off [as punishment for stealing].55 Considering ribawi substances,56 however, to refer to either staple foodstuffs, or to those which can be measured, or simply to foodstuffs in general, comes under the category of a specific expression by which a more general meaning is intended (al- khdss urlda bihi al-'Cmm).57 Consider this well, because there is a great deal of confusion (ghumu.d) about it. It is the first category [i.e. qiyds in general] that the Zahiris have a right to argue about, whereas they have no right to argue about the second since it is a natural phenomenon of language (min bdb al-sam') and whoever rejects it is rejecting a method of expression of the Arabs.58

[B. Actions] Most people (al-akthar) agree that actions are one of the ways

(turuq)59 by which the rulings of the sharra may be derived, although some people say that one cannot derive rulings from actions since actions have no fixed, linguistic form (sigha). Those who hold that

54 For this example of qiyds, see Biddya, vol. 2, 444, where Ibn Rushd gives a shorter version of the report in which 'Umar once asked advice about the punish- ment for someone drinking wine and 'Ali b. Abi Tilib said to him, "We consider (nard) that you should flog him eighty lashes because if he drinks, he will get drunk, and if he gets drunk, he will speak uncontrollably, and if he speaks uncontrollably, he will slander (iftard)," after which 'Umar introduced the penalty of eighty lashes for drinking. (For the full version of this report, see Muw., vol. 2, 178). The penalty of eighty lashes for slanderous allegations of sexual impropriety (qadhf) is fixed by Q. 24:4.

55 For this ruling, see Biddya, vol. 2, 18-20; also Muw., vol. 2, 5, where Milik says, "I do not consider (la ard) that a woman should be married with [a dowry of] less than a quarter of a dindr, which is the least amount for which the hand may be cut off [as punishment for stealing]."

56 Ribawl substances are those foodstuffs which are subject to the rulings about usury (ribd).

57 For these rulings, see Bidaya, vol. 2, 129-33. 58 In other words, the Zihiris can justifiably argue against qiyds in that it

involves applying a known ruling about one situation to another situation that may in fact be very different - although both must share some similarity (shabah) or underlying rationale ('illa) - whereas understanding a specific expression to have a more general meaning is, Ibn Rushd argues, "a natural phenomenon of language," and so cannot be ignored.

59 This is one instance where the meaning of "source" behind Ibn Rushd's use of the word tariq is obvious since actions are more a potential "source" of rulings than a "way" of deriving them. See above, p. 197, n. 44.

202

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYATAL-MUJTAHID 203

rulings can be derived from actions differ, however, as to the nature of the rulings indicated by them. Some say that they indicate obligation (wujab) while others say that they indicate recommendation (nadb) [only]. The preferred view (mukhtdr) among the specialists (muhaq- qiqin) is that if they clarify a mujmal ruling which is obligatory, they indicate obligation, and if they clarify a mujmal ruling which is recom- mended, they indicate recommendation; if they do not clarify a mujmal ruling and come under the general category of acts of devotion (qur- ba), they indicate recommendation, and if they come under the catego- ry of permitted actions (mubzhdt), they indicate permissibility (ibdha).

[C. Tacit Approvals] Tacit approval [of an action] indicates permissibility (jawdz).

These then are the ways (turuq) by which rulings may be derived or deduced.

[Ijmd' (consensus)]

Ijmd' depends on (yastanidu ild) one of the four above-mentioned ways (turuq),60 except that if there is ijmd' based on any of these on a ruling which is not definitive (qat'i), that ruling moves from the category of high probability (ghalabat al-zann) to certainty (qat').61 Ijmd' is not an independent source (asl mustaqill) that does not depend on (min ghayr istindd ild) any of these four ways, because, if such were the case, it would necessitate affirming an additional shari'a after [that of] the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, since it would not have its origin in any of the sources of the sharfa.

[The different categories of ruling] As far as their application to those subject to the law (mukallafin) is

concerned, the commonly used categories [of ruling] that result from these linguistic ways (turuq lafziyya) [of deriving rulings] are, in

60 Here the four "ways" must refer to the three categories of words, actions and tacit approvals mentioned at the beginning of the section on "Ways of deriving rulings" (see above, p. 197), plus qiyds, rather than the four ways of deriving rulings by purely linguistic means (cf. above, p. 200, n. 52), since all the first four categories (except, in the case of the Zihiris, qiyds) can be a source of ijmd', whereas the dispute about the fourth linguistic technique of mafhfm al-mukhalafa (or dalil al-khitdb) precludes its being a source of ijmc'.

61 In other words, where before there was only a high degree of probability that a ruling be obligatory or prohibited, etc, after ijma' it is considered definitively so.

YASIN DUTTON

general terms, either: (i) that a thing is commanded; or (ii) that it is for- bidden; or (iii) that there is choice (takhyir) about it. If one understands that a command is of a definitive nature (jazm) and that there is a punishment for not doing it, it is called wajib ("obligatory"), whereas if one understands from it that there is a reward (thawdb) for doing it but no punishment for not doing it, it is called mandab ("recommended"). Similarly, if one understands that a prohibition is of a definitive nature and that there is a punishment for doing it, it is called muharram or mahzur ("forbidden" or "prohibited"), whereas if one understands from it that there is encouragement not to do it but no punishment for doing it, it is called makruh ("disapproved of'). There are thus five categories of ruling (asndfal-a.hkdm) in the sharfa that can be derived from these ways (turuq) [of deriving rulings]: obligatory (wajib), recommended (mandab), prohibited (mahzur), disapproved of (makrah), and optional (mukhayyarfihi), that is, permissible (mubcah).

[The reasons for differences of opinion] In general terms there are six reasons for differences of opinion

[among thefuqahd']: i) the fact that words and expressions may be expressed in any one

of the above-mentioned four ways (turuq), that is, they may be: (a) general expressions by which a more specific meaning is intended; or (b) specific expressions by which a more general meaning is intended; or (c) general expressions by which a general meaning is in- tended or specific expressions by which a specific meaning is intended; or (d) they may be expressions from which one can, or cannot, make a deduction by dalil al-khitdb.

ii) the ambiguity (ishtirdk) that exists in language. This may be either in individual words, such as the word qar', which can be used to mean both "period of purity between menses" and "menstrual period,"62 or [the consideration of] whether commands should be taken to indicate obligation or merely recommendation, and prohibitions be taken to indicate prohibition or merely disapproval; or it may be in a compound expression, such as where Allah says, "except those who

62 This refers to the ambiguity in the word qura' (sing. qar' or qur') in Q. 2:228: wa'l-mutallaqatu yatarabbasna bi-anfusihinna thaldthata quri' ("and divorcees should wait for three courses," i.e. before their 'idda is up and they are fully divorced from their husbands). For further details on this ruling, see Biddya, vol. 2, 89-91; also, for example, Muw., vol. 2, 29-30; Malik, al-Muwatta', riwayat al-Shaybanl, ed. 'Abd al-Wahhab 'Abd al-Latif (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, n.d.), 205-06.

204

INTRODUCTION TO IBN RUSHD'S BIDAYATAL-MUJTAHID 205

repent...,"63 which may refer only to the "wrong-doers" (fcsiqin) [mentioned in the preceding verse] or to both the "wrong-doers" and those whose testimony must never be accepted [mentioned in the preceding verse], in which case, if a slanderer repents, not only is he no longer afdsiq but his testimony is also acceptable.64

iii) differences with regard to inflection (i'rdb). iv) the fact that words may be used in a literal sense (haqiqa) or in

one of a number of figurative senses (naw' min anwd' al-majdz), namely, that words may be understood although they are not in the text (hadhf), or may be superfluous although they are in the text (ziydda), or their normal order may have been changed (taqdim and ta'khir), or they may bear both a literal and a metaphorical sense.

v) the fact that words may be unqualified (mutlaq) in one instance and qualified (muqayyad) in another, such as the word raqaba ("slave"), which is sometimes qualified by the word mu'mina ("believ- ing") and sometimes not.65

vi) the contradictions (ta'drud) that may arise when any one of the above types of expression (asndf al-alfdz) from which the rulings of the sharla may be derived is juxtaposed with any other; similarly, the contradictions that may arise between actions, or between tacit appro- vals; or the contradictions between different analogies; or the contra- dictions that may arise from a combination of these three categories, namely, a statement contradicting an action or a tacit approval or an analogy; or an action contradicting a tacit approval or an analogy; or a tacit approval contradicting an analogy.66

63 This refers to the ruling on qadhf in Q. 24:4-5, without which the rest of the paragraph cannot be understood. The two verses in full read: "And those who accuse innocent women [of zind] and do not produce four witnesses, flog them eighty lashes and do not accept their testimony ever, and those are the wrong-doers (fdsiqln); except those who repent after that and act correctly, for Allah is Forgiving and Merciful."

6 For further details on this ruling, see Biddya, vol. 2, 462-63; also, for example, Muw., vol. 2, 108.

65 This refers to the occurrence in Q. 4:92 of the qualified (muqayyad) phrase fa-tahriru raqabatin mu'mina ("then the freeing of a believing slave") when speaking about the kaffCira ("expiation") for accidental killing, as opposed to the unqualified (mutlaq) phrases aw tahrlru raqaba ("or the freeing of a slave") in Q. 5:89, referring to the kaffdra for breaking an oath, and fa-tahriru raqaba ("then the freeing of a slave") in Q. 58:3, referring to the kaffdra for zihdr. The point at issue is whether the unqualified expression should be understood to be qualified by the same qualifying adjective as the qualified expression, i.e. should the slave to be freed be "believing," i.e. Muslim, in all three cases. For further details on these rulings, see Biddya, vol. 1, 419-20 (oaths), vol. 2, 111-12 (zihdr); also, for example, Muw., vol. 2, 141, 140.

66 Biddya, vol. 1, 2-6.