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This article was downloaded by: [Texas A & M International University]On: 06 October 2014, At: 03:39Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
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The Integration of Immigrants from the Former SovietUnionTamar HorowitzPublished online: 09 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: Tamar Horowitz (2005) The Integration of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union, Israel Affairs, 11:1,117-136
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1353712042000324481
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The Integration of Immigrantsfrom the Former Soviet Union
TAMAR HOROWITZ
Abstract: Analysis of the integration of immigrants from the FSU is complicatedfrom both theoretical and empirical points of view. First, Israel is at a turningpoint. The current wave of immigration began at a time when the country wasundergoing change. Israeli society is less collectivist and more individualistic thanin previous decades, less Zionist, less idealistic and more pragmatic. The economyis less rigidly structured. In other words Israel has become socially, culturally andeconomically diverse. As a result there are more communities and more identitieswithin the territorial and political entity.
Second, most paradigms for the integration of immigrants deal withimmigrants moving from non-developed countries to developed countries. Incontrast, the case of Russian immigration to Israel is in a sense a Brain Drain ofeducated people from Russia.
Third, in most immigration countries the immigrants are a small minority. InIsrael Russian immigrants make up 20 per cent of the population. Three factorsaccount for the integration of Russian immigrants in Israeli society: policies,climate of opinion and the immigrants’ ability to organize themselves. Analysis ofthe interplay between the three factors reveals that the different factors are pushingin different directions.
The official policies encourage assimilation. The climate of opinion, especiallyin some sectors of the Israeli society, creates among many immigrants the feelingthat they are not welcomed by Israeli society, and the ability of the community toorganize itself is pushing, sometimes, towards segregation of the community. Themain conclusion of this article is that it is impossible to identify models ofintegration .We have to try to identify scripts which are more fluid than models.There are four main scripts of integration of Russian immigrants: AssimilationScript, Separation Script, Transnational Script and Hybridity Script. None of thesescripts is dominant; they can coexist with one another.
Between 1989 and 2002, some 900,000 immigrants arrived in Israel fromthe former Soviet Union (FSU). Adding in the 120,000 who came in the1970s makes the Russians the largest ethnic group in Israel.
Analysis of the integration of immigrants from the FSU is complicatedfrom both the theoretical and the empirical points of view. First, Israel is ata turning point. Social and cultural boundaries have become blurred.
Israel Affairs, Vol.11, No.1, January 2005, pp.117–136ISSN 1353-7121 print/ISSN 1743-9086 online
DOI: 10.1080/1353712042000324481 q 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd
Tamar Horowitz is a Professor of Sociology in the Department of Education, Ben GurionUniversity and holds the Samuel and Miriam L. Hamburger Chair in Integration of ImmigrantCommunities.
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The current wave of immigration from the FSU began reaching Israel at atime when the country was undergoing change. Israeli society is lesscollectivist and more individualistic than in previous decades. Theeconomy is less rigidly structured. Several large state-owned enterpriseshave been privatized, and Israeli society is less Zionist, less idealistic andmore pragmatic. In other words, Israel has become socially, culturally andeconomically diverse. As a result, there are more communities and moreidentities within the territorial and political entity.
Second, most paradigms for the integration of immigrants deal withimmigrants moving from an unindustrialized society to an industrializedsociety; in contrast, the case of Russian immigration to Israel is, in a sense,brain-drain, as educated people with at least a post-secondary educationmoved from one industrialized country to another. We have to ask whetherthe old paradigms can be used to analyze this group.
Third, the newcomers are not a small minority; this wave of immigrationhas accounted for about 20% of the Israeli population. Considering thatthey are rich in human capital, it is hard to view them as a dependentminority group, even in their early days in the country. Fourth, ten years is ashort time in an immigrant’s lifetime, and any conclusions are limited.
Bearing in mind these limitations and difficulties of the old paradigms,we shall try to analyze the integration of the recent Russian immigrantswhile being cautious in making generalizations.
Three factors account for how the integration of the Russian immigrantshas proceeded: policies; climate of opinion; and the Russian community’sability to organize.
POLICIES
There are several major determinants of immigration policy.
The Law of Return
The 1950 Law of Return serves as the legal framework for immigrantabsorption in Israel. This law entitles any Jew, except for one who actsagainst the Jewish people or is a public health or security risk, to settle inIsrael. The law initially failed to define who is a Jew and the resultingproblem became a bone of public contention. In response to periodiclitigation regarding the question of who is a Jew, the Knesset amended thelaw in 1970, adding a definition coinciding with that of Jewish law: a Jew isanyone who was born to a Jewish mother or who converted. In an attemptto solve the problem of Soviet immigrants who had married non-Jews, theamendment also extended the law to apply to the non-Jewish children andgrandchildren of Jews and the spouses of these children and grandchildren.
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When the new wave of immigrants from the Soviet Union began toarrive in the early 1990s, most of them were Jews according to Jewish law.By the late 1990s, however, 30% of the newcomers were not Jewish, andmany of them were not covered by the Law of Return. They could notobtain Israeli citizenship and full immigrant benefits. The problem reachedthe public agenda when parents of soldiers who died in battle were deniedcitizenship because they were not Jewish, and when casualties of terrorattacks who were not halakhically Jewish could not be buried in Jewishcemeteries.
The issue of non-Jews from Russia evoked a public debate about theLaw of Return and whether it should be amended. There are three mainviews. The first is the ultra-Orthodox view, which holds that the Law ofReturn should remain based on the definition of a ‘Jew’ and that only Jewsshould be eligible to enter Israel under this law. Hence, there is no need torepeal or even amend the law.
The second position is that of secular Jews who see the Law of Return asthe raison d’etre of the State of Israel and the embodiment of the Jewishdemocratic state, with no distinction between nationhood and religion.They would like to see a simplified process of conversion and rapidacquisition of the Hebrew language as a manifestation of Israelicitizenship.
The third is the liberal view, based on the idea of a distinction betweennationhood and religion. Advocates of this position favour extension of theJewish collectivity and introduction of new avenues for joining it – tests ofknowledge of Hebrew and Jewish history, for example, instead of thereligious route. This view calls for a major amendment to the Law ofReturn. In a sense, it eliminates the symbolic meaning of grantingautomatic citizenship to Jews coming to Israel.1
In 1999, at a conference of the Federation of Jewish Organizations andCommunities, the delegates were asked their opinion of the Law of Return.Twenty per cent favoured making the law more restrictive, 45% wanted itleft as is and only 22% favoured extending its application to morecategories of immigrants. Apparently, both Russian immigrants and Jewsin Russia favour keeping the law as it is.
Israel-Diaspora Relations
Is Zionism the road preferred by the Jewish people? This question arisesmost saliently in the attitude of American Jewry towards Israel. In the late1950s there was an academic and political debate about whether theUnited States was a place of diaspora or dispersion. The dominant viewwas that the establishment of the State of Israel had put an end to theDiaspora and created a synthesis of political Jewish nationhood in Israeland Jewish life in the Diaspora.
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The question of diaspora versus dispersion did not come up in Russiauntil perestroika. Since then, Jews have been able to live Jewish liveswithout interference. Moreover, the Russian government acknowledgesand supports entities such as the Federation of Jewish Communities inRussia and the Congress of Jewish Organizations and Communities.Another group, the Russian Jewish Congress, tries to model itself afterAmerican Jewry in terms of its organizational pattern. Although it does notreceive government support, it is recognized by the government. Theassumption is that all these organizations will concentrate on religious andcultural issues.
Another development since the early 1990s is that Jews no longer losetheir Russian citizenship if they emigrate. In a study conducted by Ryvkinain 1995, people were asked whether Russian Jews should immigrate toIsrael or stay in Russia and preserve their identity. Some 16% said theyshould go to Israel; 42% said they should stay in Russia and preserve theiridentity; and 11% said they should assimilate.2
Since the 1990s, the Israeli government has been involved in Jewish lifein Russia. The government’s assumption is that not all Jews want toimmigrate to Israel, whether for practical reasons (fear that they will beunable to find work) or because they are too old to immigrate and do notwant to leave their families. Many Jews who are immersed in Russiansocial, cultural and economic life nevertheless also have strong feelings forIsrael and want to learn about the country. Consequently, the Israeligovernment has opened centres and schools to promote Israeli and Jewishculture. Semi-governmental bodies are also involved in communityactivities and care for the elderly. The result of this policy is that RussianJews maintain their Russian identity as well as their Jewish and Israeliidentity, and they are under no pressure to discard either one. Zionismseems to be only one of many manifestations of Jewish ethnicity.
Assimilation versus Pluralism
Israel–Diaspora relations have an Israeli angle. What image should thenew Israeli society project, and what is the immigrants’ place in it? WillIsrael evolve into a pluralistic society in which each ethnic group has equalweight and contributes equally to the social structure but retains some ofits original group identity, or will the assimilationist model prevail? Studiesshow that while Israel is developing in the direction of moderate pluralism,the focus and central values of society are still those that coalesced in theearly years of the state. Israel is far more tolerant today of group values,symbols and rights;3 nevertheless, schools teach ethnic subjects thatemphasize symbols and rituals but go no further. No attempt is being madein Israel to construct ethnic groups with a consciousness of uniqueness andseparatism.
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The ulpan (Hebrew-language school) is still the most important tool forthe cultural integration of immigrants. In addition to teaching the Hebrewlanguage, it introduces norms and values of Israeli society and Jewishhistory. In the past it was assumed that cultural integration was no lessimportant than housing and employment; in recent years the concept ofcultural integration has been given lower priority.
Interestingly enough, the Russian themselves have raised the issue ofpluralism versus assimilation. They want to master Hebrew andunderstand Hebrew culture, but they also want to preserve the culturethat they brought with them.4 The Russians are the only group to havechallenged the monolithic cultural demands of Israeli society, and the resulthas been a greater degree of pluralism.
Government Intervention versus Market Forces
Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the immigrant absorptionpolicy had been one of strong government intervention. This changedsomewhat in the 1990s, as the government advocated letting market forcesact. Leading economists opposed this move due to the difficulty ofabsorbing such a large group of immigrants, especially one rich in humancapital. Some of them argued for selective intervention in fields ofvocational training, labour mobility, and research and developmentprogrammes.5
The free market ideology has been implemented through two majormechanisms: ‘direct absorption’ and the ‘absorption basket’. Directabsorption means that when immigrants arrive at the airport they aredriven to their new homes without first living in a transitional setting. Theabsorption basket is a package of services, allowances and entitlements thatthe immigrants use as they choose.
Studies conducted in 1992 showed that this policy was effective forsome of the immigrants but marginalized others, especially older peopleand single-parent families. That year, when the Labour party came topower, heavy government intervention was reintroduced in all aspects ofabsorption. Nearly 14 years after the start of this wave, the governmentstill intervenes but less than before, because the immigrants have creatednetworks that take the place of government aid.
Population Dispersion versus Concentration
Since the establishment of the state, the Israeli government has regardedpopulation dispersion as a national goal. The Jews who came from Muslimcountries in the 1950s and 1960s were directed to the peripheral andborder areas of Israel. This policy created a social problem as they wereisolated from the mainstream, educational and cultural facilities were poor,they lacked the skills to develop their own economic resources, and private
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sector investment was minimal. Thus they were doomed to poverty andbackwardness.
This dilemma reappeared in the 1990s, but this time the governmentrealized that it would be difficult to direct the immigrants to the periphery.First of all, they would not be able to find jobs there. Second, they are citypeople accustomed to a rich cultural life and would resent such a policy.
In late 1991, the government introduced a National Outline Plan (NOP)for discussion. The plan, which addressed the mass immigration from theSoviet Union, examined several options for population dispersion: intensivesettlement in the south, intensive settlement in the north, moderatedispersion throughout the country, small-scale dispersion in the centre, andthe continuation of existing trends based on supply and demand withemphasis on the centre. After exploring the issues, the government decidedto distinguish between long-term solutions and short-term solutions.
The short-term emphasis was placed on central Israel, because this areahad infrastructure for jobs, housing and services. The long-term emphasiswas placed on the creation of infrastructure for immigrant absorption inthe periphery. This policy was effective. The new immigrants tended tosettle in the central part of the country, not in the major cities but in smalltowns, suburbs and satellite towns around the major cities. Fewer of themwent to the periphery, but those who did tended to move to the north ratherthan the south, since the north had more high-tech industry.
CLIMATE OF OPINION
The climate of opinion regarding immigrants affects their integration. InIsrael the ‘absorption’ of new immigrants is the raison d’etre of the state –a country that brings together Jews from all over the world and turns theminto one nation. All Israeli governments without exception have declared,upon assuming office, that the integration of new immigrants is one of theirmajor goals, but actions have not always conformed to declarations. In theearly 1990s, surveys showed willingness among non-immigrants to lowertheir standard of living for the sake of the integration of the newcomers.6 Ina survey by Shai and Duchin in 1990, only 4% of non-immigrants wereopposed to living in the same building as new Russian immigrants. Inpoverty-stricken areas near the major cities, the local population exhibitedgenerosity towards the new immigrants who settled in their areas andcooperated with them.7 Many voluntary associations were established inorder to help the new immigrants and many existing voluntary associationredefined their roles.
The favourable disposition had already started to erode by 1991, justtwo years after the beginning of this wave. In a 1991 study, Shwartzfound that non-immigrants perceived the immigrants as a ‘socialproblem’. Researchers also found that the local population had developed
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negative stereotypes.8 In a survey done in 1994, 25% of Israelis expressedopposition to living with new Russian immigrants.
Children and teenagers also displayed intense intolerance towardsRussian immigrants. The main argument for the negative attitude was thatthe Russians did not want to integrate in accordance with the norms andvalues of Israeli society.9 Nevertheless, studies consistently found that halfof the local population viewed the immigrants favourably.
In a study conducted by al-Haj and Leshem in 1999, non-immigrantswere asked about the Russian immigrants’ contribution to Israeli society inthe realms of culture, the economy, security and science. Between 40% and75% replied that they were having a positive influence; the least positiveimpact was seen in the realm of security, while the most positive was inscience. More than half saw a positive influence on the economy andculture. Israeli Arabs were less positive than the Jews about theimmigrants’ contribution to Israeli society; only 11–24% viewed theireconomic, cultural and scientific contribution as being positive.
In a study carried out in 2000, Lissitsa, Peres and Ben-Rafael found thatthe groups with the most positive attitudes towards immigrants weresecular, educated Ashkenazim with high income. Less educated, religiousOriental Jews with low income were the least favourably disposed.10 Thereare two explanations for this. One is social distance between the educated,secular European immigrants and the less educated, religious OrientalJews. The second explanation is competition in the labour market. At leastin the first few years after their arrival, the immigrants were prepared towork at jobs below their educational and professional level and thus werecompeting with upwardly mobile Oriental Jews. The Israeli Arabs wereless positive for the same reasons. Furthermore, the Arabs were afraid thatthis wave of immigration that was rich in human capital would strengthenthe State of Israel.
Another aspect of the climate of opinion is the attitude of the religiousestablishment towards the immigrants. The fact that about 30% of theRussians are not Jewish and are therefore ineligible for full immigrantbenefits elicited sympathy for the immigrants. The success of the Shinuiparty in the 2003 elections, among both immigrants and non-immigrants,was partly related to the fact that the religious establishment was opposedto granting full citizenship rights to non-Jews from Russia.
In the past two years, the pendulum has swung to a more positiveattitude towards the immigrants.11 There are several explanations for this.The first is that Israeli society has become more ideologically multicultural.The immigrants are now a recognized, legitimate group in the Israeli ethnicmosaic. Second, their young people’s service in the Israeli army and thenumber of casualties suffered by immigrants have elicited sympathy andfeelings of solidarity.
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THE COMMUNITY’S ABILITY TO ORGANIZE
Unlike other immigrant groups in Israel since the establishment of the state,the Russian immigrants succeeded in organizing as a community. Five yearsafter the beginning of the wave of immigration of the 1990s, dozens ofRussian voluntary associations were active. Some were run in cooperationwith Soviet immigrants who came in the 1970s and 1980s; others were theproduct of the new wave of immigration.
The organizations varied widely. Some were self-help groups for single-parent families, people with health problems or old people. Others werecultural organizations that tried to bridge the gap between Israeli andRussian culture or to spread Russian culture. There were sports andentertainment organizations. There were also groups whose main functionwas to lobby for economic and political causes. The most importantorganization was the Soviet Jewry Zionist Forum (SJZF), founded in 1988by a group of immigrant activists and former prisoners of Zion. In thespace of five years, the SJZF transformed itself from a small-scale voluntaryassociation dealing with individuals to a powerful organization that couldmobilize thousands of immigrants for demonstrations; from anorganization that functioned on a limited administrative level to abureaucracy with control mechanisms; from an organization assistingsmall businesses to an initiator of economic projects; from an organizationhelping individual artists to a supporter of large-scale projects. In 1995 theSJZF had 42 constituent organizations representing 60,000 members.
Another manifestation of the immigrants’ ability to organize was theestablishment of an immigrant political party, Yisrael Ba’aliya. In the early1990s there were two attempts to establish immigrant parties, but theyended in failure due to the relative obscurity of the party leaders and a lackof effective infrastructure. Things changed in the mid-1990s. First of all,there were more immigrants in Israel by then – more than half a millionwith valuable human capital and awareness of their power. Second, despitetheir numbers they were not represented in the existing political parties.Third, new leaders had emerged who had been politically socialized inIsrael and understood how the system worked. Fourth, the SJZF couldserve as the infrastructure for the new party, using its facilities to mobilizepeople.
In another study, Horowitz traced three stages in the increase in thepolitical participation of Russian immigrants.12 The first was the 1992elections, when the Labour party’s victory was attributed to the Russianimmigrants, giving the community a feeling of efficacy despite their lack ofKnesset representation. The second stage was the 1996 elections, when thenew Yisrael Ba’aliya party won seven seats in the 120-member Knesset andbecame a part of the political system that any government had to take intoconsideration. The third stage was the municipal elections of 1998, in
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which the new immigrants did superbly. Out of the 1,049 local councilseats at stake, immigrants won 162, or 15.4%, outstripping their share ofthe population. (These results include seats won by Yisrael Beitenu,another Russian party.) The success on the municipal level can beexplained by two factors. The first is the involvement of well-known figuresin the immigrant community. Second, after its success in the Knessetelections, Yisrael Ba’aliya started building a political and socialinfrastructure in towns with a large immigrant population by establishingcultural centres and absorption committees. The party directed resourcesto voluntary organizations and raised money for the election campaigns ofYisrael Ba’aliya candidates.
The emergence of the Russians as a political force followed a patternvery different from the usual among immigrants either in Israel or abroad.Whereas oriental Jews first gained influence in the periphery and thenexpanded it to the national level, the Russians’ increased power began onthe national level and moved downward to the local level.
Another manifestation of the community’s ability to organize was thedevelopment of the Russian-language press, which functioned as asocializing factor. From the press the immigrants became informed aboutIsraeli society and learned the rules of the game. The Russian pressmoulded their identity and played an important role in the formation ofYisrael Ba’aliya.
By 1993, 50 Russian-language newspapers – dailies and monthlies,local papers and national papers – were being published in Israel. Someconcentrated on the Russian experience, while others focused on the Israeliexperience. Some were quality papers geared towards the intellectuals,while others were low-brow. Most of the newspapers were owned by non-immigrants, although in recent years more and more immigrants havebecome owners of newspapers.
Self-organization in the field of education is a recent phenomenon. Sincetheir arrival, the Russian immigrants have consistently complained aboutthe quality of Israeli education, but they were not involved in shaping theeducational system either as innovators of ideas or as teachers. Of 50,000Russian teachers, about 15% worked in the Israeli educational system.Many felt that they had something to contribute but could not find jobs.
The combination of dissatisfaction with the educational system andunemployment among Russian teachers led Russian immigrants toestablish educational organizations. From a legal standpoint, these arenon-profit organizations. The first attempt started in 1992, when a groupof teachers who had taught in elite schools in Moscow and Leningradopened a school for immigrants in a rundown old school building in TelAviv, giving new life to the facility and the area. The school was namedMofet, a Hebrew acronym for ‘mathematics, physics, culture’. Its successled to a series of activities organized by the group leaders.
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The group became involved in extracurricular activities in schoolsaround the country and provided special classes for immigrant childrenhaving difficulty at school. Initially, many of the activities were conductedin Russian; later they switched to Hebrew. It is noteworthy that at first thetuition was paid by the parents.
Another development was the introduction of Mofet as an integral partof state schools rather than an extracurricular activity. These schoolsoffered special classes for capable, highly motivated students. Threecategories of people were involved in putting Mofet in the schools: schoolprincipals, parents and heads of municipal education departments in townswith a high percentage of Russian immigrants. Mofet classes were gearedtowards students who showed aptitude for science and motivation to studyscience in school.
The introduction of Mofet classes was controversial. Many officials inthe Ministry of Education claimed that it creamed off the best studentsfrom regular classes, thereby contravening the policy of integration.Nevertheless, the government could not stop Mofet classes.
Although Mofet initially attracted Russian students, today many nativeIsraelis are enrolling in the classes. Mofet classes are based on the methodsand philosophy of Russian schools, which are subject-oriented rather thanstudent-oriented and place heavy emphasis on the sciences. Many of theteachers are Russian, but over the years numerous non-Russians haveadopted the method and the philosophy. Although the Mofet classes arepart of the school curriculum, the teachers are trained by the non-profitorganization. At present there are 140 classes in high schools and 200classes in elementary schools all over Israel.
Another example of an educational project organized by Russianimmigrants is the Shuvu network of schools, developed within theindependent religious school system. Shuvu was founded with the help ofrabbis in the United States and at the initiative of Russian teachers. Theidea was to combine Jewish studies and science. The network was gearedtowards Russian students who were interested in science and found itdifficult to adjust to Israeli schools. A high proportion of the curriculumconsists of science classes. The number of classes in Jewish subjects issimilar to that in the state religious schools. In 2002 the Shuvu systemencompassed 30 schools, 33 preschools and numerous educationalprogrammes in non-Shuvu schools. Shuvu attracts children who do notnecessarily come from religious homes and there is no pressure to observereligious practices at home. The only requirement is that one behave inaccordance with Jewish tradition while at school. As in Mofet, teacher-training and materials are provided by the organization.
A third organization is Igum – the Organization of ImmigrantTeachers – which specializes in extracurricular activities, preschools andpreparation for the matriculation exams. Unlike the offerings of Mofet
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and Shuvu, which are integral parts of the system, Igum’s programmes aresupplementary and are paid for by parents.
Mofet, Shuvu, and Igum are all examples of bottom-up educationalorganizations. Although they initially attracted immigrants, they are nowattracting non-immigrants as well.
THE IMPACT OF POLICIES, CLIMATE OF OPINION, AND ABILITY
TO ORGANIZE ON INTEGRATION
Analysis of the impact of the three factors – policies, climate of opinionand ability to organize – on the integration of the immigrants reveals thatthe different factors are pushing in different directions.
Official policies – especially dependence on governmental economicassistance, indirect absorption and consequently settlement in centralIsrael, and the cultural pressure exerted in the ulpan – encourageassimilation. The climate of opinion (especially in the mid-1990s, whenimmigrants felt alienated from Israeli society due to negative attitudestowards them by some segments of the Israeli population), thecommunity’s ability to organize, and the policy of strengthening RussianJewry in Russia seem to be pushing the community in the direction ofsegregation.
The following question arises: Can we view the absorption of the newimmigrants as a continuum from assimilation to segregation, with variouspatterns in the middle, or are there variations that are not on thiscontinuum? The continuum interpretation seems to be less applicable thanthe variation interpretation.
In her analysis of the integration of Russian immigrants in Israel,Horowitz argued that the ways in which integration has proceeded shouldbe viewed as scripts and not as models.13 Scripts are more fluid, theirboundaries are not marked, and they interact with other entities. Heranalysis found four scripts of integration; these are not separate entitiesand they sometimes overlap.
The Assimilation Script
The assimilation script has existed since the establishment of the Stateof Israel. New immigrants are expected to dissociate themselvesfrom the norms and values of their old country, drop their old identityand adopt the norms and values of Israeli society, thus developing a newidentity.
In the past 20 years, the assimilation script has become less ‘purist’.Allowances are made for the inclusion of some elements of the immigrants’culture, such as holidays, ethnic stories and ethnic music, which thenbecome incorporated in the new Israeli culture.
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Yael Tamir suggests that what underlies the ‘integration model’, as shecalls it is the concept of ‘renewal of identity’.
Renewal of identity is thus used to reflect a belief concerning a certaincontinuity of identity across generations. It assumes that, when anindividual of Jewish parentage chooses to define himself as a Jew, he isthereby returning to his roots, renewing his ties with his community oforigin, and embracing an identity that could be his.14
If we accept Tamir’s interpretation, we can argue that assimilation is notone of many possible scripts, but rather a script that eclipses all others,because the motivation to move to Israel and renew one’s connection to thecountry is basically inherent in one’s identity. The immigrants do not haveto acquire a new set of values; they merely have to ‘refresh’ the old one.
Assimilationist policy is implemented through a series of activitiesaimed at bridging the gap between old-timers and newcomers. Thebridging process starts back in Russia, where approximately 100 ulpanimhave broadened their mandate beyond teaching language skills to includeJewish education, Jewish and Israeli history, and Jewish traditions andholidays.
The cultural role of the ulpan is emphasized no less in Israel. In 1991,Avraham Zivion, the head of the Adult Education Department in theMinistry of Education, described the ulpan’s role as follows: ‘We do notwant to teach everyday Hebrew only. We would like to open new culturalhorizons to the newcomer to our society. New immigrants should notlearn grammatical rules only; they should also learn about their national-historical identity and roots.’15 Some sociologists regard the ulpan as a‘rite of passage’ – a ritual or symbolic act through which new immigrantstrade in their old identity for a new one.
Special radio programmes are another bridging mechanism. The subjectmatter of these programmes includes Israeli society, politics and culture.They also provide practical help in matters relating to everyday life inIsrael. Other bridging programmes include workshops for young leadersselected from immigrant groups. In addition, the preparatory courses(mekhina) at the universities are meant not only to prepare students foruniversity coursework, but also to strengthen their Israeli identity.
The foregoing programmes are organized by the government. Dozens ofother cultural programmes are conducted by the Joint DistributionCommittee, local authorities, community centres, and even religiousorganizations such as the Reform movement and Chabad.
As we have seen, the immigrant absorption authorities invest heavily inthe cultural integration of Russian immigrants. But what is the effect of thisinvestment? Two surveys on this subject have been published, one in 1998and the other in 2000. According to the first, in 1998 about 73% ofimmigrants who had arrived in 1990 stated that they knew Hebrew well or
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reasonably well.16 The second survey informs us that, three-and-a-halfyears after their arrival, 41% of the immigrants who had arrived in 1995said they spoke simple Hebrew without difficulty.17
As to identification with Israel, from the 1998 survey we learn that 95%of those who came in 1990 expected to stay in Israel, 86% expressed a wishto become actively involved in Israeli life, and 64% felt they were alreadydoing so. Some 65% felt that Israel was their home. The 2000 surveyshows that 7% of 1995 arrivals saw themselves as completely Israeli and24% felt equally Russian and Israeli. Some 90% of the immigrants in thissurvey said they were sure they would stay in Israel and 91% said theywould still move to Israel if they had to make the choice again. However,both surveys found that very few of the immigrants had any social contactwith Israelis.
With regard to housing, 43% of those who came in 1995 had boughtapartments (2000 survey), as had 68% of those who came in 1990 (1998survey). Buying a home is a sign of a desire to integrate and put down rootsin Israeli society. Employment is another indicator of integration. Most ofthe immigrants in the labour force have found work (according to bothsurveys). Of the 1990 arrivals, 93% were working, as were 87% of thosewho arrived in 1995; in most cases (about two-thirds), however, they werenot employed in the occupation for which they trained.
The assimilation script existed throughout the 1990s, especially in theearly years of the decade. It is noteworthy that the ministry dealing withimmigrants is still called the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, and thatmunicipal, institutional and school officials in charge of immigrants areknown as ‘absorption officers’. This shows that the assimilation script isfirmly anchored in the perception of Israeli officials and the Israeli people.
The Separation or Ghettoism Script
Those who see immigrant integration in these terms claim that a Russiancommunity has developed in Israel. Its members have distinct traits: theyare educated (most have a post-secondary education), they had a richcultural life in the FSU, and they have a strong desire to continue theircultural activities in Israel. Another important characteristic of theimmigrants who arrived in the 1990s is that, unlike other immigrantgroups since the 1950s – especially the North African Jews – who were cutoff from their elite, the Russians brought their elite with them.Approximately 20,000 scientists, a similar number of journalists andstage artists, 14,000 physicians, 40,000 musicians and 50,000 teachersarrived in Israel. In a sense, they are a culturally self-sufficient communitywith the potential for effective leadership.
At first, they were organized in what sociologists call a ‘languagecommunity’. As early as 1994, Ben-Rafael et al. found that althoughRussian immigrants have a positive attitude towards Hebrew, they feel
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more favourably about Russian.18 The Hebrew language is perceived aspractical, but Russian is considered cultured, respectable and inter-national, and it sounds nice. About a third of the immigrants want theirchildren to speak Russian as their first language.
The language issue does not stand on its own; it is part of the culturalissue. Nudelman describes the cultural orientation of the Russianimmigrants as follows: ‘The Russians have created an ethnic culturalenclave of their own, with newspapers, shops, theatre, and even a politicalparty.’19
They also express pride in their culture. As a Russian intellectual namedGoldstein put it at a meeting of Israeli and Russian intellectuals: ‘TheRussian ethnic group in Israel has managed to create literature; they havepoets and prose writers, literary critics and consumers of literature.’20 Arecurrent theme among the immigrants is that Russian culture is high,universal and modern, and it is the task of the Russian intelligentsia tointroduce it to Israel.21
The desire for partial cultural autonomy is also reflected in thedevelopment of Russian-language newspapers and periodicals. In 1993,approximately 50 newspapers and periodicals were being published inRussian. Most of the Russian immigrants read Russian-languagenewspapers. Zilberg et al. believe that the Russian press serves as aforum for expressing opinions and for venting frustrations that have builtup.22 It also helps to promote economic interests and provides a mechanismfor bolstering self-esteem and identity.
The Russian press has had an enormous impact on Israeli political lifeby putting the issue of the political and cultural integration of the Russianimmigrants on the agenda. The establishment of the SJZF and animmigrant party may be regarded as supporting the ghetto script. The SJZForganized the immigrants in a body that addresses issues on the nationallevel and not on the local level. The SJZF became a multi-functionalorganization, initiating economic activity, serving as a labour exchange,offering cultural and educational activities, protecting immigrants’ rights,providing links with the Diaspora, and offering psychological support tothose in need. It was also an immigrant pressure group and protestmovement and later provided the infrastructure for the first effectiveimmigrant political party.
The founding of an immigrant party further reinforces the ghetto script.Prior to the 1996 national elections, all attempts to establish immigrantparties had failed. There were various reasons why Yisrael Ba’aliya wasable to succeed. It had the infrastructure of the SJZF, a support system inthe press, and skilled activists with experience in voluntary associations;the huge number of Russian immigrants (about l5% of the Jewishpopulation of Israel in 1996) gave it a feeling of strength; and
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the immigrants were frustrated with the Israeli party system, which did notguarantee Knesset seats for Russian immigrants.
The SJZF and Yisrael Ba’aliya served as vehicles for civic and politicalsocialization. They were sources of pride for the Russian community, theygave resources and a few thousand jobs to the community, and above allthey gave the immigrants a political identity.
The establishment of various educational organizations as a resultof parental dissatisfaction with the educational system and unemploy-ment among high-calibre teachers added another dimension to the ghettoscript. Mofet’s experience was a landmark in the history of Israelieducation – the first time a group of immigrants established its ownsystem of educational programming. Over the years at least two moresignificant educational organizations were founded.
The ghetto script is further reinforced by the extensive networks ofcontacts among the immigrants, most of whom came during the recentwave of immigration, but some of whom came from the Soviet Union in the1970s. At first the networks were based on family ties. Later they werebased on city or republic of origin, place of residence in Israel, orprofession. The next phase was when the immigrants organized on a locallevel to solve acute problems – mainly employment and housing problems– and to meet social and cultural needs.
Another element that can be interpreted as contributing to the ghettoscript is the immigrants’ economic activity. Many Russian immigrants donot work in the fields for which they trained. Instead, they may work inservices related to the Russian community. They have opened shops,mainly selling food for their community’s consumption. They have formedassociations to build housing. They have opened small businesses rangingfrom house-cleaning services to high-tech companies, and have even set upcompanies that trade with the FSU.
One might argue that this is a parallel economy. There is no doubt thatsome kind of Russian economy has developed, with its own rules and logic.Those who argue that the Russian community constitutes a ghetto havesubstantial evidence to prove it. There are indeed signs of separatism in thesocial, political, economic and educational spheres. But is the separatismmotivated by the idea of creating a ghetto? Is it a temporary arrangementto mitigate the pangs of integration or is it a new phenomenon in Israel?
The Transnational Script
The concept of transnationalism is a product of globalization and themovement of capital and commodities from one country to another. Manypeople today have dual citizenship and two or more identities. They maywork in one country and live in another. Many people are bilingual andbicultural. The Russian community in Israel is very different from otherimmigrant communities in Israel. It is the largest ethnic community in
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the country, with ways of life very different from those of the rest of thepopulation. The Russians are the first group of immigrants that has tried notto lose its identity upon arrival in Israel. When asked about their identity,they say that they feel Russian, Jewish and Israeli.23
The Russians are perhaps the first immigrant group to realize that theiroriginal identity can be compatible with Israeli and Jewish identity.Connections to Russia are multifaceted. Immigrants have been alloweddual citizenship since 1992 and it is estimated that about 500,000 of themhave taken advantage of it. Many of them vote in elections in the FSUstates. Tourists move freely between Israel and Russia.
It has been estimated that 10% of Russian immigrants travel to Russiaevery year, and the number is increasing as their standard of living rises.Children who have not done well in the Israeli educational system go toRussia, while others come to study in Israel and then return to Russia.Russians who emigrated to Western Europe and the United States makefrequent visits to Israel and vice versa. In many families, one spouse, havingbeen unable to find a job in Israel, works in Russia and comes to Israelfrequently. Although no research has been done on the subject, there arenumerous joint ventures between Russian immigrants in Israel andRussians in Russia, as well as many import-export businesses.
The immigrants keep in touch with Russian culture through the Russianmedia. Many musicians and other performers appear both in Israel and inRussia. Interestingly, most intellectuals do not perceive themselves asRussians-in-exile, but as Israeli Russians or Russian Israelis.
Although we have insufficient evidence for this script, we can see astrong element of transnationalism in the Russian community, which isanchored in Israel but has not dissociated itself from its Russian identity. Itdoes not seem to be a matter of time before they become exclusively Israeli.They enjoy moving from one cultural zone to another and having the bestof both worlds.
The Hybridity Script
The term hybridity comes from biology and refers to people of mixed race.Cultural hybridity, according to Bhabha, is ‘what happened in the thirdspace of the interstitial passage between fixed identification’.24
Ten years is not long enough to judge whether the hybridity script exists,but there are many indications of it. The first indication is the celebrationof public holidays. In the Soviet Union there were numerous rituals andcelebrations, but because they were politically based, the people did notconsider them holidays and they shunned them whenever possible. Theonly holiday they celebrated in Russia was New Year’s Eve. In Israel theystarted celebrating Jewish holidays, though without any meaningfulreligious content, very much like other secular Israelis. In contrast, thewidespread celebration of New Year’s Eve in Israel is the result of Russian
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influence. Once celebrated by upper-class Israelis only, it is now enjoyed by
all segments of the Jewish population. In some Israeli schools with many
immigrant children, New Year’s Eve celebrations have been legitimized.
The end of the Second World War – Victory Day – is now celebrated by
Israelis, while Russians participate in the events marking various Israeli
memorial days. Russians celebrate weddings and births very much as
Oriental Jews do; both groups combine Middle Eastern and Eastern
European dishes.
In the sphere of youth culture, especially rock and pop music, groups
have a strong influence on one another and cooperate with each other. The
most notable example of this is Arkady Duchin appearing with Ehud
Banai, a very Israeli performer. The film Yana’s Friends is another example
of hybridity. The director sees it as an Israeli film in which the oriental and
Russian cultures mingle. The verbal expressions are neither purely Israeli
nor purely Russian. Many other influences can be seen superficially.
Generally speaking, however, signs of hybridity are visible on the fringes of
Israeli cultural life.
In Jerusalem an institution known as ‘the Library’ was established as a
cultural centre with one of the largest Russian-language libraries outside
Russia. Its schedule of activity is determined by immigrants and includes
numerous cultural activities all week long. Informal groups meet at the
Library to learn about Israeli culture, and attempts have been made to
publish Hebrew and Russian literature together in the same volume.
Concerts are introduced in both Russian and Hebrew.
Many literary evenings have been organized at which Hebrew literature
is read in Russian and Russian literature is read in Hebrew. The Gesher
theatre is an Israeli Russian theatre with a repertoire of Russian and Israeli
works; the Russian works are performed with simultaneous Hebrew
translation and the Israeli works have a simultaneous Russian translation.
In the Andalusian Orchestra, one of the best musical ensembles that play
traditional Eastern music, the conductor is Moroccan and many of the
musicians are Russian.
It is too early to substantiate the hybridity script. Although there are
signs of hybridity, the question is whether it will take place on the fringes of
Israeli society or in the mainstream. At the 1995 meeting of Israeli and
Russian intellectuals, theatre critic Olga Leviatan described her vision of
Israeli society as follows: ‘In the future, Israeli culture will be eclectic. It
will absorb many elements of other cultures, showing them respect and
love. The new Israeli culture will combine tolerance and a democratic
attitude in a refined intellectual game.’25
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE EFFECT OF THE IMMIGRANTS FROM
THE FSU ON ISRAELI SOCIETY
Our analysis of the integration of the Russian immigrants in Israel lookedat the subject from the immigrants’ perspective. One can also look at itfrom a macro-perspective, focusing on their effect on Israeli society. Thiskind of analysis has two difficulties. The first is that it is hard to see aneffect from a perspective of only 15 years. Second, it is difficult todistinguish between the effects of ‘natural’ processes unrelated toimmigration and effects of the immigration itself. Moreover, the abilityof Israeli society to integrate the new immigrants better than it did in the1950s is arguably a result of changes that Israeli society underwent in the1970s and 1980s.
Nevertheless, although we cannot identify effect, we can talk abouttrends. First, the Russians changed the ratio of Ashkenazim to Sephardim.Second, the old pattern of a Sephardi working class and an Ashkenazimiddle class no longer exists. There is now a large Sephardi middle classand a large Russian working class. In other words, the new wave ofimmigration blurred the boundaries between Ashkenazim and Sephardim,and the emphasis is now on class differences rather than ethnic differences.As for ethnic tension between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, there is somecompetition between the groups, especially in occupations that call forpost-secondary and technical education. Nevertheless, there have been fewcases of overt hostility or violence against immigrants.
In the economic sphere, waves of immigration since the establishmentof the state have tended to result in a rise in the non-immigrants’ standardof living. This wave was no exception. Interestingly, the unemploymentrate in the early 1990s was low among both immigrants and non-immigrants. Politically, Israeli society initially appeared to be experiencingethnic politics, with the emergence of Shas and a Russian immigrant party.When the dual system of elections for prime minister and a party list wasrepealed, however, ethnic politics became less noticeable.
Although at first the Russian immigrants had little impact on theeducational system, over the years their influence increased, as manifestedin greater emphasis on science and special attention to talented andmotivated students.
With respect to lifestyle, there is more tolerance for secularist activities:shopping malls are open on Saturdays, non-kosher food is sold in mostIsraeli towns, non-religious burial is an option, and many young non-immigrants are having non-religious weddings. In the cultural sphere, thenumber of people taking part in cultural activities is growing, even in poorareas with a Sephardi population.
The major question that may be asked in this context is whether Israel isbecoming a multicultural society as a result of the immigration. If we define
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multiculturalism as the opposite of monoculturalism, we can say thatIsraeli society is on its way to becoming multicultural. The Russians haveposed a challenge to the hegemony of the dominant culture by claimingequality for Russian culture. But what they actually formed is a subculturewithin the dominant culture, rather than a cultural community of theirown. They have enriched the social and cultural fibre of Israel,while remaining within the bounds of the ‘imagined community’ createdin the 1950s.
NOTES
1. Moshe Lissak, ‘Law of Return – Past, Present, Future’, The Jews of the Former Soviet Unionin Israel and the Diaspora, Vols.20–21 (2002), pp.24–30 (Hebrew).
2. Rosalind Ryvkina, ‘New Trends in Jewish Life in Post-Soviet Russia’, The Jews of the SovietUnion in Transition, Vol.4, No.19 (2000), pp.221–31 (Hebrew).
3. Compare with the intolerance of the Mizrachi culture during the 1950s. Cf. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘Cultural Pluralism and the Israeli Nation-Building Ideology’, International Journalof Middle East Studies, Vol.27 (1995), pp.461–84.
4. Eli Ben-Rafael, Elite Olstein, and Idit Geist (eds.), Aspects of Identity and Language in theIntegration of Russian Immigrants, Jerusalem, 1994 (Hebrew).
5. Avia Spivak, ‘Panel Discussion: Government Intervention in Immigrant Absorption’,Economic Quarterly, Vol.149 (September 1991), pp.325–7.
6. Natalia Damian and Yehudit Rosenbaum, Trends in Attitudes of the Israeli Public towards theImmigrants, Jerusalem, 1992.
7. Noah Lewin-Epstein, Gila Menachem, and R. Brham. ‘Attitudes of Nonimmigrants in TelAviv towards Immigrants’, in David Nachmias and Gila Menachem (eds.), Studies in PublicPolicies, Tel Aviv, 1993 (Hebrew).
8. Eli Leshem, Attitude of the Israeli Public to Immigrants: Ten Years Later, Tel Aviv, 2003(Hebrew).
9. Ziona Meir, ‘Attitudes of Israeli Students towards Immigrants in High School’, MA thesis,Ben-Gurion University, 1995.
10. Sabina Lissitsa, Yochanan Peres and Eli Ben-Rafael. ‘The Attitude of the Oldtimer toImmigrants from the CIS: The Prospect of Multiculturalism’, The Jews of the Former SovietUnion in Israel and the Diaspora, Vols.20–21 (2002), pp.187–205 (Hebrew).
11. Leshem, Attitude of the Israeli Public.12. Tamar Horowitz, ‘Increasing Political Power of Immigrants from the FSU in Israel: From
Passive Citizenship to Active Citizenship’, International Migration, Vol.41, No.1 (2003),pp.47–75.
13. Tamar Horowitz, ‘The Integration of Immigrants from the FSU: Four Scripts’, inShlomo Avineri and Werner Weidenfeld (eds.), Politics and Identities in Transformation:Europe and Israel, Munich Contributions to European Unification, Vol.5, Bonn, 2001,pp.59–71.
14. Yael Tamir, ‘The Quest for Identity’, in Shlomo Avineri and Werner Weidenfeld (eds.),Integration and Identity: Challenges to Europe and Israel, Munich Contributions to EuropeanUnification, Vol.4, Bonn, 1990, p.12.
15. Avraham Zivion, Introduction to the Curriculum for Continuing Ulpanim, Jerusalem, 1991,p.1 (Hebrew).
16. Mina Zemach and Rimona Weizel, Follow-up Study of Immigrants (1990–1996), Jerusalem,1998 (Hebrew).
17. Natalia Damian and Yehudit Rosenbaum-Tamari. Follow-up Studies of ImmigrantsIntegrated through ‘Direct Absorption’, Jerusalem, 2000 (Hebrew).
18. Ben-Rafael et al., Aspects of Identity and Language.19. Rafail Nudelman, ‘In Search of Ourselves’, Jews from the Former Soviet Union in Transition,
Vol.3 (1997), pp.19–41 (Hebrew).
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20. Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, ‘A Dialogue between Researchers and Writers on theIntegration of Russian Immigrants’, 3 March 1995 (Hebrew).
21. Moshe Sicron and Eli Leshem, Profile of a Wave of Immigration, Jerusalem, 1998 (Hebrew).22. Narspy Zilberg, Eli Leshem, and Moshe Lissak, The Russian Community between Messages
of Integration and Messages of Separation, Jerusalem, 1995.23. Ben-Rafael et al., Aspects of Identity and Language.24. R.D. Grillo, Pluralism and the Politics of Difference, Oxford, 1998, p.232.25. Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, ‘A Dialogue’.
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