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The Influence of Turkey’s Accession to the European Union on the EU-Russian Energy Relations. Dr. Tatiana Romanova Associate Professor School of International Relations St. Petersburg State University [email protected]. Nicosia, 11 June 2009. How shall I proceed. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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The Influence of Turkey’s Accession to the European Union on the EU-Russian Energy Relations
Dr. Tatiana RomanovaAssociate ProfessorSchool of International RelationsSt. Petersburg State [email protected]
Nicosia, 11 June 2009
How shall I proceed
The essence of EU-Russian energy relations
Turkey’s energy sector and energy aspirations
How would Turkey’s accession to the EU affect EU-Russian energy relations
Why EU-Russian energy relations? EU’s External Dependence
ALGERIA
NORWAY
OTHERS
RUSSIA
EU imports > 60% = 20% EU consumption Rus NG export >40% EU import
Natural Gas
AMERICA
RUSSIA AFRICA
MIDDLE EAST
OTHERS
NORWAY
Oil
EU imports >50% = 20% EU consumptionRus oil export > 20 % EU import
EU’s import of oil and gas is projected to grow in the coming decades
Why EU-Russian energy relations? Russia’s Interest
oil
natural gas
electricity
housing sector
coal
energy efficiency
0
50
100
150
200
250
Russia’s Energy SectorInvestment Needs up to 2020 (bln.$)
What Legal Framework? Energy Charter Treaty and April 2009 Proposals
Energy Charter, the Hague 1991 Political document
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Lisbon 1994 Trade, investments, transit, energy efficiency
Russia signed but never ratified the ECT Document defends consumers’ interests Nuclear energy is excluded Transit controversies between the EU and Russia (regional
integration clause, available pipelines etc) Russian proposal of 21 April 2009
Can be either an alternative document or a revised ECT Interdependence in energy security rights of suppliers (security
of demand) and consumers (security of supply) Energy sovereignty Market access rights, including the security of transit
What Policy Process? Energy Dialogue
2000: EU and Russia launched the Energy Dialogue to “enable progress to be made in the definition of an EU-Russia energy partnership and arrangements for it”
Results: Modification of long-term contracts for gas supply Contribution to the Russian ratification of the Kyoto protocol Maritime safety for heavy oil transport by tanker (within the IMO) Cooperation on gas flaring reduction, renewables, energy efficiency Feasibility study on the synchronization of their electricity grids Construction of the Nord Stream is underway Assurance that there is no 30% restriction on the import of natural gas
or oil from Russia to the EU
BUT! No strategic partnership!!!BUT! No strategic partnership!!!•From the beginning the EU and Russia had different views on the
long-term goal of the dialogue•Their views on the energy dialogue have evolved in different directions
Why are the results so limited? EU
Initial Vision A common market on the basis of the
EU’s acquis EU legislation – a reference for the
energy sector reform in Russia Evolution Reasons:
Initial vision did not work Growth of oil and gas prices Growing assertiveness of Russia EU’s enlargement 2006, 2009 – Russo-Ukrainian crises
Growing politicization and eventual securitization as of 2004
Measures: alternative pipelines + diversification of suppliers and resources + energy-saving
Securitization theory (Buzan,Waever)
Initial Vision: short-term problem-solvingGradually: development of strategic
thinking Reasons:
Assertiveness of the new leadership High oil and gas prices In line with the Russian pattern: the state
as a key modernizer Essence of new thinkingProfit maximization (Personal interest +
resources to reform the country) Support of specific companies
investment possibilities, prices, pipeline control, stability of demand
Enhancing political standing in the international arena (multi-polarity + realpolitik + reassessment of the 1990s) Demand for equality in designing a
new regulatory regime, cooperation with producers, pipelines’ control
EU RU
Turkey Energy Sector and Aspirations
Turkey’s energy strategy is different from those of Russia or the EU Ensure diversified, reliable and
cost-effective supplies for domestic consumption
Liberalize the energy market Become a key transit country
and energy hub Wish to capitalize the
geographic trump card to Improve its economic situation Upgrade its status in Europe Achieve the goal of membership
in the EU Ambition to move from the role
of a policy-taker to that of a policy-maker
Oil Natural gas
93% 97%
External dependence
BUTFortunate geographical position
In-between producers (72,7% of world oil and 71,8 of world gas reserves) and consumers15% of the EU’s oil and gas needs will soon transit Turkey
Flows: East-West, North-SouthGood relations with different countries of the region Aspirations of a transit country
Turkey is NOT a substitute of Russia as the EU’s main energy partner!
Oil and Gas PipelinesFlows East to West (mainly)and South to North (have been secondary so far)
Gas pipelines Flows East to West (mainly)and South to North (have been secondary so far)
How would Turkey’s accession affect EU-Russian energy relations?1.
The border between the EU and producing countries would extendEast-West: Russia will lose its monopoly on transportation of Central Asian gas
It will affect its commercial interests It will be a blow to its political aspirations
Strengthening of the competition for Central Asian resources EU would improve its chances to diversify away from Russia
Central Asian countries can become more responsive to the EU’s proposals New ways of transportation of Central Asian gas are more certain to be put to life
(Nabucco – South Corridor being the most widely discussed) Substantial additional costs to taxpayers
Construction of new pipelines The pipeline as an instrument to demonstrate Russia the limits of its power (J. Roberts)
Russia, being deprived of it, will have to develop its own resources increase the price for gas in Europe
South-North Iran more certain to enter the EU’s energy picture growing competitiveness in the
gas market
How would Turkey’s accession affect EU-Russian energy relations? 2.
A new actor in designing energy legislation In case of the ECT reform (in line with
Russia’s April 2009 proposals), Turkey will certainly contribute Particularly transit issues It’s views would differ from both those of Russia
and the EU’s Negotiations will be more complicated
How would Turkey’s accession affect EU-Russian energy relations? 3.
Hub is a central market place where, in addition to pipelines, storage facilities, refineries, terminals, petrochemical units and other energy-related business may be located, which offer jobs and boost the local economy
Benefits of a hub: Political and security Economic and financial
Preconditions Unbundling and liberalisation
(EU) A good balance between
suppliers and consumers… (including Russia)
2 variants of hubs Turkey inside the EU (with its
regulation) Turkey outside the EU (good
relations with all neighbours)Can the two be combined?
Problems: Fall in prices and economic crises Instability in the region Instability in Turkey proper Competition with other energy
hubs in the EU (i.e. Germany, Austria but also Italy, Bulgaria)
Turkey may also be oversupplied with contracted gas (take or pay contracts)
Turkey as an energy hub
How would Turkey’s accession affect EU-Russian energy relations? 4
Nuclear issues Construction of the nuclear power plant in
Turkey (Mersin Akkuyu) Consortium includes Atomstroyexport, Inter
RAO, and Turkish “Park Teknik” – 13 February 2009
Question of limits on the export of Russian nuclear materials in the EU will become more urgent (unresolved since 1992)
How would Turkey’s accession affect EU-Russian energy relations? 5
Perpetuated heterogeneity of the EU’s external energy policy
Already now the EU is struggling to design a common external energy policy
Divergent interests, particularly in respect to Russia unwilliness of EU MSs to cede their competences
Turkey will contribute to further heterogeneity
What facilitates enhanced role of Turkey in EU-Russian energy dialogue?
The EU’s politicization and securitization of the energy relations with Russia benefit Turkey By securitising EU-Russian energy relations, EU desecuritise certain
aspects of relations with Turkey and Central Asian countries (including the issue of human rights)
It provides Ankara with a chance to secure special status in the EU and eventually membership in the EU (provided cultural distinctions are ignored) In which case energy security becomes a tactical issue
It allows Turkey to solve its own energy problems (energy security) and eventually make the EU pay for its energy security
R.T. Erdogan: Turkey is the answer to [the EU’s] energy issues Turkey depends on Russia (60% of gas, 30% of oil
Issue of dependence is over-emphasized to what extent is it real / constructed to please the EU?
Concern that Russia does not invest enough in the oil and gas exploration
What complicates Turkey gaining a larger role in EU-Russian Energy Dialogue?
EU’s insistence on legal approximation O. Rehn “the EU can assist in turning Turkey into an energy cross roads… But ..
Turkey would also need to introduce … clear and enforceable rules on gas transmission, the liberalisation of Turkey’s domestic market at least for gas and the increase of investment on infrastructure, most importantly in gas storage.”
EU’s energy behaviour is a litmus test Growing assertiveness of Turkey coupled with the difficulties of accession
A. Davutoglu: Turkey should be seen as located in the very heart of Eurasia In energy:
R.T. Erdogan: if Turkey is confronted with the deadlock on the energy chapter it can revise its position on Nabucco;
Partial privatization and liberalization; Energy Community Treaty (observer); No negotiations on the energy chapter of the acquis Effort to be central to both pipelines and bypasses (reminds Russian tactics)
Lack of investor’s confidence Instability in the region Legal status of the Caspian sea No gas committed for new transit routes (8 May – Nabucco summit in Prague) Russian-Georgian war demonstrated Russia can control all the by-passes