The Implications of Botswana-South African Relations for American Foreign Policy

The Implications of Botswana-South African Relations for American Foreign PolicyAuthor(s): Richard DaleSource: Africa Today, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Feb. - Mar., 1969), pp. 8-12Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184985 .

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Articles

The Implications of Botswana-

South African Relations for

American Foreign Policy Richard Dale

THE HISTORICAL LEGACY The major purpose of this essay is to scrutinize the

nature and extent of the nexus between Botswana and South Africa, and to draw implications for American foreign policy.

Botswana's history suggests that the nature of its linkages with its southern neighbor can be clarified by separating two factors: the question of the incorporation of Botswana (and her sister High Com- mission Territories, Lesotho and Swaziland) into South Africa and Great Britain's reliance upon South Africa for the actual administration of the territoryv

Following the defeat of the two Boer Republics in 1902, the Union of South Africa was formed by melding the two British colonies of Natal and the Cape along with the former Boer Republics. The newly-drafted constitution for the Union, approved by the British Parliament, envisaged a Greater South Africa. It provided for the possibility of incorporating the High Commission Territories of South Africa into the Union. From the time of union until the advent of World War II, there were desultory negotiations between the British and the South African authorities regarding the proposed annexation. After Dr. Malan's National Party came to power in the General Elec- tions of 1948, the issue of the incorporation of the three British protectorates came again to the fore. 2

Successive South African Governments continued to press the issue. Various British Govern- ments refused to acceed to these requests, being supported by a substantial proportion of the British electorate and the Batswana themselves. The issue became increasingly moribund when South Africa left the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961-and hence the British could treat it as a foreign nation rather than as a nation enjoying the status of a Commonwealth member. Dr. Verwoerd's final attempt in 1963 to revive the issue ended with a decisive negative response from both the British and the Batswana.3 Since 1963, then, this question of the territorial integrity of Botswana has become a politically stale matter and no longer exacerbates the relationship between the neighbors.

The type of administration utilized by the British in Botswana, stems principally from the geographical propinquity of South Africa and Botswana and, to a lesser extent, from the pragmatic and undoctrinaire nature of British colonial policy. Three particular

facets of that policy are most germane. First, the use of South Africa as the site for the Imperial Reserve (the administrative headquarters) for Botswana; second, the preference for a geographically oriented chain of command in the administrative hierarchy which provided the British High Commissioner to South Africa with two hats-one as ambassador to South Africa and another as the link between the three Resident Commissioners in the Protectorates and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in London; and third, the employment of South African nationals (usually whites) in the British Colonial Service in Botswana.

In 1885 the British selected Vryburg, in north- eastern Cape Province, as the administrative capital of Bechuanaland. Ten years later when the territory was bifurcated, with the southern portion being annexed to the Cape Province and the northern portion being designated as the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the capital was moved northward along the rail line to Mafeking, British Bechuanaland. Consequently, the Bechuanaland Protectorate was unique in the annals of British colonial history as the only British territory with an extra-territorial capital. The anomaly persisted for seventy years until 1965, when the administrative capital was transferred northward on the railway line to Gaberones in time for the 1965 General Elections, which signalized the advent of self-government for the Protectorate.4

Slightly prior to the removal of the administrative headquarters from the Imperial Reserve in Mafeking to Gaberones, a second South African ingredient in administration was eliminated when in 1963 the office of Resident Commissioner was restyled Queen's Commissioner, which was equivalent in status to that of Governor. The redesignation of the office was coupled with a streamlining of the administrative apparatus whereby the chain of command ran directly from the Queen's Commissioner to the Secretary of State for Colonies. In addition, in 1964, the office of the British High Commissioner in South Africa was eliminated. When South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth, it no longer made any sense to deal with Botswana affairs in the Commonwealth Office and hence they were transferred to the Colonial Of- fice.5

In this century, it became common practice for England to multilateralize its Colonial Service and

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consequently South Africans were accepted into its ranks.b It has been alleged that as many as half of the civil servants in Botswana were South Africans.7 Even if such an estimate be accepted, it should be borne in mind that the Botswana Government has been making progress in localization of its civil service in addition to securing short-term, contract specialists both from the United Kingdom and the United Nations, as well as volunteer workers such as Britons in the International Voluntary Service and the Americans in the Peace Corps. In the near future, South African nationals who have not opted for Botswana citizenship will be phased out of the public service in the process of localization. THE PRESENT REALITIES

The relationship between the two states is not simply a client-patron relationship. Botswana lacks the requisite infrastructure either to defend adequately its territorial integrity or to fulfill the social revolution of rising expectations of her citizens. Therefore, principally due to its geographical position and the present paucity of its human and natural resources, it lacks a wide array of meaningful options. South Africa is in a far better geopolitical position and can create and maximize to a greater extent the options that count in world politics.

With regard to natural resources, Botswana has minerals which have only recently been discovered and charted. It will take time and considerable capital to exploit the new copper and nickel discoveries in the northeast of Botswana and a miniature Wit- watersrand - to be called the Shasi complex - will have to be built out of the veld before there can be an appreciable economic payoff. The United Nations has been of inestimable assistance in conducting prein- vestment surveys for the Shashi complex, and it is hoped that private investment (including South African private investment) will materialize to make the Shashi complex a viable and profitable un- dertaking.8 In addition to copper and nickel discoveries, recent geological surveys indicate the presence of diamonds in Botswana; yet, it will take further research to determine the feasibility and profitability of diamond mining.9 Botswana also has coal deposits, but it has been ascertained that they are not significant enough to mine10The vast salt deposits in the north at the Makarikari Salt Pans are currently uneconomical to exploit.11

Since Botswana lacks both skilled labor and employment opportunities for all its citizens, the result is an annual exodus to the mines and farms of South Africa. The deferred pay and taxes on that deferred pay are, of course, a boon to the fragile economy of Botswana,12 but the practice of migrant labor has been shown to have a deleterious effect upon familv life of the Batswana.13 In addition, migrant labor must be adjudged prejudicial to the African mine workers of South Africa, whose wages are the product of the inflexible official price of gold oa the world market and of the disequilibrium between supply and the demand for African labor in the mines.

If the labor exodus to South Africa can be reduced and possibly terminated, Botswana will benefit directly and the Africans of South Africa may derive indirect gains through a readjustment of the forces of

supple and demand. But obviously Botswana must be able to absorb its 'surplus' labor. Over time it may accomplish this difficult task as a result of its increased emphasis on scientific agricultural education and on vocational education to prepare Batswana for lower-and-middle-echelon posts in the public and private sectors of the economy.

Botswana is essentially a pastoral country, with approximately 90 pct. of its employed labor force concentrated in the agricultural sector,14 It is therefore unlikely that this work force will be very rapidly redeployed from the agricultural sector into the commercial or mining one, but two changes in agriculture might be advantageous to Botswana with respect to its economic dependency on South Africa. The first change would be the absorption of the export labor force into the domestic labor force, while the second would be the rationalization of agricultural technology to diversify and increase farm output. This will diminish to some extent its dependence on South Africa for imported foodstuffs.

If one accepts the view that Botswana is South Africa's hostage, then it would seem that the most visible hostages would be the migrant workers. Were it possible to reabsorb these workers into the modern and or modernizing sectors of the Botswana economy, then at least one of South Africa's politicoeconomic options vis-a-vis Botswana would be similarly curtailed: the threat (overt or covert) of economic lockouts against the Batswana migrnnt laborers would no longer be credible. This might have the long-run and indirect effect of improving the wages of the South African Africans working in the Republic's mines and farms through ordinary market forces.

Almost two-thirds of Botswana's imports in 1966 came from South Africa; whereas, in the same year, South Africa took slightly less than one-fifth of Bot- swana's exports of beef and animal products. Some of the disparity in the import pattern could be reduced, to Botswana's advantage, by greater self-sufficiency in agricultural production, but this will entail a considerable modernization of the agricultural sector and will also depend on the fate of nature because of the prevalence of drought in the region. The recent and protracted drought had a devastating effect upon the country. However, there are encouraging signs in the expansion of agricultural education, the formation of a National Development Bank to advance loans to farmers and the growth of a vigorous agricultural cooperative movement.

Less amenable to change are the customs agreement and the Rand currency area. At present Botswana receives 0.27 pct. of the customs receipts collected by South Africa, not an insignificant amount of its current operating budget."6 Botswana has in- dicated that it wishes to see that percentage revised- upward-and there have been pourparlers with the South African authorities on this matter, though no agreement has yet been drafted, much less ratifiedl7 Perhaps a multilateral agreement will be forth- coming now that Swaziland has achieved its independence. Apropos of the Randi currency zone, at one time it was rumored that Botswana thought in

AFRICA TODAY 9



terms of going it alone with its own currency, but it would appear that for the time being at least its decision-makers prefer to remain in the zone!8 It is conceivable that at some future date Botswana, probably acting in concert with her sister states of Lesotho and Swaziland, might ask for multilateral reconsideration of the matter of the currency zone. An unknown factor, though, is the extent to which the South African Government might make overtures to the three former High Commission Territories, as part of its 'outward-looking' foreign policy towards Black Africa, to decentralize and multi-lateralize its economic power structure19 If such a demarche were to occur, it is probable that it would.take place within the Southern African context, considering its much- bruited plans for a Southern African Common Market. Acting in conjunction with the 'have-nots' in such a

projected Common Market, Botswana might well be able to establish a new politicoeconomic equilibrium with South Africa by diluting (through multilaterization) the awesome economic power of its southern neighbor.

There is one final factor in the relationship between the two republics that could adversely affect the balance of forces between the two states. That is the military factor. When the British forces departed from the B.B.C. relay station in Francistown (which aimed British broadcasts into Rhodesia) in 1968, the British no longer had any military presence in Southern Africa.21 South Africa confronted Botswana with an impressive military machine unobstructed by any British defense shield between the two. Botswana, of course, has no armed forces, but only police forces. Because of its almost complete isolation at the United Nations, it is highly unlikely that South Africa would engage in military adventurism in Botswana, being. aware that such forrays into Botswana could invite Anglo-American, if not United Nations, retaliation and would be coun- terproductive in terms of her policy of cultivating an avuncular image in Southern Africa.

The military problem, then, from the perspective of the Botswana Government, is not one of escalating force levels in Botswana to achieve either credible deterrence or arms parity. Rather, it is a problem of protecting its territorial integrity against African guerrillas who wish to use Botswana as a staging area to launch attacks into South Africa, Rhodesia, and South West Africa and as a sanctuary for rest, regroupment, and resupply. Botswana's paramilitary (police) forces have been effective in preventing the use of its territory for assaults on its western, eastern, and southern neighbors. Enlargement of its police forces has caused the President considerable distress from the economic point of view .22These resources are desperately needed for economic development. An attempt was made to secure iron-clad pledges from the Organization of African Unity to have insurgency forces respect the frontiers of Botswana. The results have been relatively satisfactory, according to the President. 23

If, however, in their zeal, the 'freedom fighters' (who have taken umbrage at Botswana's restriction of their activities24) escalate their activities further

Botswana might find itself unable to support a police establishment adequate in size, firepower, and mobility to safeguard its own borders. It might possibly, like its sister state Swaziland,25 be forced to rely on South African help. Were such an eventuality to occur, Botswana would indeed find itself in a precarious position caught between the logistical needs of the 'liberation movements' and punitive South African action.

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Presently, the problem of dealing with African nationalist guerrillas who, through inadvertence or design, trespass on Botswana territory has not proved insuperable, if only because the numbers involved have not been especially large. The Government strategy has been to establish a comfortable balance between the needs of national security and the needs of cordial relations with the Organization of African Unity. Although Botswana has no omnibus or Draconian Terrorism Act comparable in scope and severity to the South African one, it nevertheless has

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adequate legal powers to keep the guerrillas in check. The guerrillas are usually charged with possession of explosives, with illegal entry, and with illegal im- portation of arms and ammunition, and, so far, the maximum sentence passed by a Botswana court for contravention of the relevant statutes in the guerrilla cases has been fifty-four months.26 Indeed, the Chief Justice of Botswana on one occasion reduced somewhat the sentence in an appeal case brought on behalf of some of the guerrillas. 27 Perhaps this reduction in sentences met with favor in O.A.U. cir- cles, for seven months later (in June, 1968) a two-man O.A.U. team visited Botswana, and it was speculated that the underlying purpose of the visit was to prevail upon the Khama Government to release the African "freedom fighters" now imprisoned in Botswana. 28

New immigration legislation enables the president to prohibit the entry into Botswana of those individuals and groups deemed to be a security threat to the nation; those who ignore the proscription and attempt to enter the country are liable to twenty-four months imprisonment and deportation?9 So it would appear that Sir Seretse's Government intends to serve notice to actual and potential guerrillas and perhaps to the O.A.U. as well that it takes very seriously indeed the defense of its territorial integrity. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The nub of the problem in readjusting the balance of forces between Botswana and South Africa is economic. The economic factor is much more susceptible to manipulation than political beliefs in separate development, or apartheid, on the one hand and the goals of non-racialism on the other. With at least a partial redressing of the economic balance, political parity might well become more of a reality.

The first step is patently obvious-: assisting Botswana on the road to economic self-sufficiency and affluence. This lengthy task is one in which South Africa can participate with no undue harm to the recipient, provided of course, that Botswana makes the necessary effort to maximize the number of aid donors. That way it can enjoy the economic benefits that South Africa is prepared to bestow at the same time that it dilutes that aid by adding to it aid from the rest of the international community. The fact that it can have options in terms of donor nations will tend to neutralize the political leverage that South African unilateral aid might have.

Having already secured access to limited private and public foreign aid, Botswana can begin, albeit slowly, to modernize her pastoral economy by following through on programs of self-help that were inaugurated as food-for-work in the austere drought days. It has begun the difficult task of restructuring the traditional forms of authority by making the role of chiefs more circumscribed and functionally specific and by reallocating some of the traditional rights of the chief-in-kgotla (the equivalent to king-in-council) to local district councils. These can serve as catalysts in the economic mobilization and modernization process. The top leadership in Botswana is remarkably alert, competent, and honest, but the secondary and tertiary levels of leadership need improvement. It is here that the United States, but not

South Africa, can play a vital role in conjunction with other non-South African aid donors. Moreover, it is here that the United States has perhaps the greatest single opportunity to assist Botswana to achieve a new power equilibrium.

One of the paradoxes of the South African- Botswana relationship is that South Africa has had a greater impact on the older leadership of Botswana than on the younger Batswana - primarily because a high percentage of the Botswana Cabinet members were educated at South African secondary schools and universities. With the closure of the famous so-called open (English-medium) South African universities to all but a handful of Africans, South Africa in effect forfeited her opportunity not only to train future African leaders but also possibly to influence them favorably. The various African tribal colleges in South Africa exercise little or no attraction to upwardly mobile Batswana. Hence, the provision of scholar- ships in American universities as well as the recent Carnegie Foundation gift of $50,000 to the fledgling University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland in Maseru, Lesotho is a step in the right direction *?

Modernization should enable Botswana, in due course, to retain its 'surplus' labor force which South Africa has been absorbing and it could allow Bo- tswana to restructure its import-export relationship with South Africa to further minimize its dependency status.

But a different approach will probably have t- he taken to cope with the customs and currenrcy agreements. America and Britain, as two of South Africa's most important partners, might act as Botswana's amici curiae, urging a more generous distribution of wealth in lieu of capital outlays of South African foreign aid. Or, quite possibly the United States might wish to act in harmony with Britain as energizing elements nudging South Africa into a Southern African Common Market. Such a Common market, if weighted voting procedures were proscribed, could furnish Botswana with bloc voting strength from her sister former High Commission Territories and possibly Malawi and thus provide her with a position of strength with which to negotiate multilateral customs and currency agreements. Moreover, such a Southern African Common Market might entail para-diplomatic relations between South Africa and the former High Commission Territories with Ambassadors accredited to the Market. The headquarters might be located in Botswana as 'neutral' territory.

Finally, the question of territorial integrity is perhaps the most refractory of all. Much depends on the temerity of the 'freedom fighters' and their leadership, and here Botswana is caught in a cruel bind between the Scylla of the Organization of African States (and its Liberation Committee) and the Charybdis of South Africa. Obviously, it is of the ut- most importance that Botswana's delegates to the Organization of African Unity impress upon the members the awesome consequences of violating her frontiers in view both of its retrogressive impact on her precarious economy (which could not support a large border force) and on the devastating first-strike

AFRICA TODAY 11



capability of the South African armed forces. Con- sequently, the role of the United States in the main- tenance of Botswana's territorial integrity is problematic. This is essentially a continental problem and all-African diplomatic machinery should be the court of first resort.

-FOOTNOTES- 1. See Jack Halpern, South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965). 2. See The Unprotected Protectorates, Fabian Research Series No. 250 (London: Fabian Society, 1965). 3. On the proposed incorporation of Botswana by South Africa, see Lord Hailey, The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission Territories (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Edwin S. Munger, Bechuanaland: Pan-African Outpost or Bantu Homeland? (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 78-80. 4. On the relocation of the capital, see G. B Dix, "Gaberones," Journal of the Town Planning Institute (London), vol. 51, no. 7 (July- August, 1965), pp. 290-295. 5 See Great Britain. Colonial Office, Bechuanaland: Report for the Year 1964 (London: H.M.S.O., 1965), pp. 130-131. 6. For the recruitment procedures of the briTrsn Colonial Service, see Ralph Furse, Aucuparius: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer (London: Oxford lJniversity Press, 1962); and Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963). 7 Edwin S. Munger, op. cit., p. 46. 8 See "Big Plans for Botswana's Economy," The Star (Johan-

nesburg) City late ed., March 11, 1968, p. 5, cols. 1-3; and "Mineral Finds -New Hope for Botswana," The Star, City late ed., November 13, 1967, p. 23, cols. 1-2. 9. "Exitement (sic) at Botswana's Diamond Find," The Star, City iate ed., May 16, 1968, p. 23, col. 5. 10 "Mining of Coal Not Practicable in Bechuanaland," The Star, City late ed., April 20, 1950, p. 3, col. 7. However, the matter is being reconsidered; see "Coal Mining Area," The Star, City late ed., March 30, 1967, p. 33, col. 3. 11 See "Salt Deposits Could Draw R6-m. to Bechuanaland," The Star, Second stop press ed., April 24, 1963, p. 4, col. 9; and "Botswana Expects Mighty Boom in Economy," The Star, City late ed., February 24, 1967, p. 3, cols. 1-2. 12 Out of R11.8 million exports in 1966, R1.1 million came from

migrant labor; see Information Service of the Botswana Government, Republic of Botswana Fact Sheet (Gaberones: Author, 1968), p. 5. 13 See Isaac Schapera, Migrant Labour and Tribal Life: A Study of Conditions in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (London: Oxford University Press, 1947). 14 According to the 1964 census: Information Service of the Bot- swana Government, op. cit., p. 7. 15. See Ibid., p. 6. 16. Ibid. 17. See "Customs Talks for Pretoria," The Star, City late ed., November 7,1967, p. 26, cols. 4-6; and Clive Cowley, "Customs Deal Is Not Enough," The Star, City late ed., November 22, 1967, p. 20, cols. 8- 9. 18. "Botswana Is Considering Cash Report," The Star, City late ed., January 27, 1967, p. 29, cols. 5-6. 19. See J. E. Spence, "South Africa's 'New Look' Foreign Policy," The World Today, vol. 24, no. 4 (April, 1968) pp. 137-145. 20. See D. V. Cowen, "Towards a Common Market in Southern Africa: Economic Integration and Political Independence," Optima (Johannesburg), vol. 17, no. 2 (June, 1967), pp. 43-51. 21. "British Defence Cuts," The Star, City late ed., February 17, 1967, p. 19, col. 5; and, "Francistown Cost Britain R1,268,570," The Star, City late ed., May 14, 1968, p. 21, col. 6. 22. "Botswana's Security Forces Doubled," The Star, City late ed.,

January 10, 1968, p. 5, cols. 1-2. 23 "O.A.U. Conference Highlighted Activities of 'Freedom Fighters'," Botswana Daily News (Gaberones), September 18, 1967, pp. 1-2; and "H. E. Welcomes Press Interest in Botswana's Welfare," Botswana's daily news, September 22, 1967, pp. 1-2. 24. "Our Fight Is Against Apartheid, Not Botswana," Sechaba (London), vol. 2, no. 2 (t-eoruary, 1968), p. 15. 25. "We Would Expect Aid From S. A.': Swazi Premier on Terrorist Threat," The Star, City late ed., April 8, 1968, p. 21, cols. 2-3 26. See "Names of Jailed Raiders," The Star, City late ed., August 29, 1967, p. 5, col. 3, and "Four More Terrorists Give Up," The Star, City late ed., September 4, 1967, p' 1, col. 7. 27. "Terrorists' Sentences Reduced," The Star, City late ed., November 3, 1967, p. 21, cols. 4-5. 28. "Secret O.A.U. Mission," The Star, Second city ed., June 19, 1968, p. 19, col. 1. 29. "ARMED Groups' Threat to Botswana," The Star, City late ed., April 5, 1968, p. 27, col. 2. 30. Jane W. Jacqz, Development Needs in Botswana and Lesotho (New York: AfricanAmerican Institute, 1967), p. 38.

Who Benefits From Growth in South Africa? Reprinted from: Fact and Comment

Issued by C. A. Algar, Progressive Party of South Africa, 1107 Dumbarton House, Church Street, Cape Town, and printed by Pioneer Press (Pty.) Ltd., Shelley Ktoad, Salt River.

A. B. Dickman

South Africa's record of economic expansion has been a good one. Since the early years of this century we have probably averaged an annual growth in national income, after allowing for price increases, of about 5k. Assuming that the population has grown at around 2?/2%c per annum, we can say that real living standards have increased by roughly 21/2'S) per annum. The world today is, however, vastly different from past periods of history, and I do not think it is particularly profitable to dwell on the long-term historical trend. Of more interest in this world of rising expectations is our performance over the past few years and our position in what is fashionably termed "the international growth league" and, furthermore, our current and potential rate of advance.

Taking the period 1955-66 and measuring the average annual growth in real gross domestic product, we find that, in comparison with Western Europe and Japan, our record of expansion does not look so impressive. Japan heads the list with an extraordinary 10.4'S p.a. closely followed by that other "miracle-economy", West Germany,

with 10'(/. The list continues with Italy, Holland, Sweden, Belgium and France, at rates going down from 7.81/( to 5.0'/j' before we discover South Africa, third from the bottom of the ten selected, with an average of 4.9%/, followed by the U.S.A. and U.K. with 4.3% and 2.9%/, respectively.

Two Distinct Phases But this eleven year period conceals two very

distinct phases. In the first phase, South Africa's growth had tended to level off after the post-war upsurge and was affected by the recession of 1958/9 and the post Sharpeville uncertainty from early 1960, whereas Europe continued to forge ahead. By contrast, from 1962 onwards, we were to experience probably the most remarkable boom in our history while the European countries, although doing reasonably well, found that infla- tionary pressures were necessitating a more se- date pace. The figures speak for themselves. In the first seven years, from 1955-62, South Africa was second from the bottom, with the U.S.A., with a mere 3.8%c annual growth, compared with 13.3Cc for Germany in first place, 11.2% for Japan and 9.8%,, for Italy. Only the U.K. did worse than South Africa, achieving a mere 2.5%.

Tn the second four vears from 1962-66. however, the story is very different. From being almost the worst perfomer, South Africa sprang into second place with 6.9%Y annual average

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The Implications of Botswana-South African Relations for American Foreign Policy