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Jonathan Webber Rethinking Existentialism Draft: January 2016
10.TheImperativeofAuthenticity
Existentialism is the theory thatweought to recognise and respect thehuman freedom
encapsulatedintheslogan‘existenceprecedesessence’.Itis,asSartrepointsout,aformof
humanismthatgroundsallmoralvalueinthestructureofhumanexistence,ratherthanin
humanachievementsorpotentialforachievement(EH:ref).Butthisethicaltheorystands
in tensionwith the theoryofhumanexistence that it refers to.For tosay thatexistence
precedesessence is,aswehaveseen, tosaythat thereasonsweencounter in theworld
reflectthevaluesatthecoreofourprojects,whichwehavechosenandcanchange.What
reason could therebe, therefore, that requiresus to endorse anyparticular value?How
could there be reason for everyone, irrespective of their existing commitments, to
undertakeanyparticularproject,suchastheprojectofauthenticity?
Onestrategy foranswering thisquestion is toargue that inauthenticityhas implications
thataredisvaluedby the inauthentic individualnomatterwhat theirotherprojectsare.
FanonandSartrepursuethisstrategyprimarilywiththepsychoanalyticaimofuncovering
and countering sources of distress. In this context, they aim only to derive what Kant
describesasa‘hypotheticalimperative’,animperativetoundertakesomemeanstoanend
thatonealreadyhas.Thegoalistoovercomethedistress,themeansisconversiontothe
project of authenticity. Sartre wants to derive a moral conclusion from the same
considerations, because he thinks that the distress he diagnoses is a necessary
consequenceof inauthenticity.But this strategycannotsucceed,aswesaw inchapter9.
For it can at best provide reasons for authenticity that might be outweighed for an
individualbycontraryreasonsthataregroundedintheirprojects.Anditsconclusiononly
rulesoutcommitmenttotheideathatpeoplehavefixednatures,whichdoesnotseemto
setmuchconstraintonpermissiblebehaviour.
Existentialist eudaimonism therefore fails as a moral position. The imperialist
entrepreneur who subjugates thousands of people in pursuit of their own goals, for
example, might reasonably conclude that the benefits from continuing this practice
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outweighanybenefitsofgivingitupoutofrespectforhumanfreedom,ormightconclude
thatauthenticityonlyrequiresthattheyareawarethatthepeopletheysubjugatehaveno
fixednatures.Beauvoiroffers analternative route to the imperativeof authenticity. She
aimstoderiveitnotfromtheinternalcontradictionsoftheprojectof inauthenticity,but
rather from the structure of human existence itself. If this argument succeeds, the
imperativewill be not hypothetical but categorical. It will apply to all creatureswhose
existenceprecedestheiressence,irrespectiveoftheirexistingprojects.Anditwillrequire
themtovaluehumanfreedom,notmerelytorecogniseit.
1.AKantianMoralCogito
In her works of the 1940s, Beauvoir rests hermoral philosophy on this claim that the
imperativeofauthenticityfollowsfromthenatureofhumanexistence.Moreprecisely,she
arguesthatthefactthatwefreelyadoptvaluesthatshapeourexperienceentailsthatwe
ought to treat this feature of human existence as objectively valuable. She occasionally
asserts this entailment without explanation (MIPR: 189; EA: 57-8). She does sketch an
argumentforitinheressayTheEthicsofAmbiguity,butsobrieflythatshecanseemtobe
offeringnothingmore than a series of unsupported assertions (EA: 71-2). This explains
why Iris Murdoch, in her review of The Ethics of Ambiguity, criticised Beauvoir for
providingnoargumentfortheclaimthattheimperativeofauthenticityfollowsfromthe
existentialistconceptionofhumanexistence(1950:127).Beauvoirdoesclearly indicate,
however, that these remarks in TheEthicsofAmbiguity are intended to summarise the
argument of her earlierworkPyrrhusandCineas (EA: 71). To identify her argument for
authenticity,weneedtoturntothatwork.
IfthesummaryinTheEthicsofAmbiguityobscurestheargumentbybeingtooconcise,its
full statement inPyrrhusandCineas obscures it by beingnowherenear concise enough.
Thisshortbook,firstpublishedin1944andunavailableinEnglishuntil2004,iswrittenin
thestyleoftheclassicalFrenchessaypioneeredbyMicheldeMontaigne.Herargumentis
regularly illustrated and substantiated by references to literature and examples from
medieval European politics, the development ofWestern art, the postulates of classical
physics,andthetensions inChristiantheology.There isnoclearsummaryoftheoverall
sequence of thought to ensure that itsmessage is properly conveyed, though there is a
liberalsprinklingofanecdotes,witticisms,andaphorismstokeepthereaderentertained.
Itcanreadlikeaniterativelydigressivestreamofconsciousness.Itcanseem,thatistosay,
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like a breathless rush to expound a host of novel ideas without the editorial discipline
requiredtoensurecoherenceandclearoveralldirection(Sandford2006:12,18).
Yetwe should take seriouslyBeauvoir’s claim inTheEthicsofAmbiguity, publishedonly
threeyears later, thatthisessaypresentsanargumentfortheimperativeofauthenticity
onthebasisoftheideathatexistenceprecedesessence.IfwereadPyrrhusandCineaswith
thisinmind,wecanfindinitspagessuchanargumentthatdeservesseriousattentionin
moral philosophy. This argument parallels in the moral domain the structure of the
argumentDescartes develops for thepossibility of knowledge. It begins fromapremise
that the reasoning subjectmust accept.Descartes begins his argumentwith the claim ‘I
think’,whichhearguescannotbedoubtedbythethinker(1984:16-17). It isacommon
criticismofDescartes thathe isonlyreallyentitledat thispoint to thepremise ‘there is
thinking’ or ‘there are thoughts’ (e.g.Nietzsche1998: § 17). Beauvoir’s parallel opening
premisecouldnotbesubjectedtoasimilarobjection,sinceherargumentbeginsnotwith
thethoughtthatIvaluethings,butwiththethoughtthatsomethingsarevaluable.
Ihavetoacceptthispremise,accordingtoBeauvoir,becauseitisanessentialstructureof
humanexistencethattheindividualvaluestheendstheypursue.Thisis,aswehaveseen
throughout this book, the basic ontological claim of existentialism: existence precedes
essence;theindividual’sbehaviourisultimatelyexplainedbytheirpursuitofvaluesthat
they have set for themselves. From the first-person perspective, those ends appear
phenomenologicallytobevaluableandaretreatedinpracticeasvaluable.Ifstayingalive
is one ofmy projects, then it seems tome inmy unreflective experience thatmy life is
valuableandItreatitassuch.JustasDescartesdoesnotneedtospecifywhatit isthatI
think,orwhatthosethoughtsareabout,BeauvoirdoesnotneedtospecifywhatvaluesI
acceptintheinitialpremise.AllthatisrequiredisthatIacceptthatmyendsarevaluable.
AndIdoacceptthis,shethinks.AlthoughIcanreflectivelydecidethatnothingisvaluable,
myunreflectiveexperienceandactioncannotembodythisnihilism. ‘Ilive,evenifIjudge
that life isabsurd, likeAchillesalwayscatchingupwith the tortoisedespiteZeno’ (P&C:
100;compareEA:55-6).
JustasDescartesaimstoderiveanobjectiveconclusionfromhissubjectivestartingplace,
so Beauvoir aims to derive the conclusion that I ought to treat the basic ontological
structure of human agency as objectively valuable. Descartes does not merely want to
establish that knowledge is possible, however. He wants to show how it is possible,
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thereby establishing which beliefs are knowledge. Beauvoir’s conclusion sets similar
constraints in therealmofvalue.The imperativeofauthenticityrequiresthatwedonot
treatasvaluableanyendsthatconflictwiththevalueweoughttoplaceonhumanagency
(P&C:137-8;MIPR:189;EA:71).
ThisoutcomecloselyresemblesoneofKant’sformulationsofthecategorical imperative,
theinjunctiontotreathumanity,orrationalagency,‘whetherinyourownpersonorinthe
personofanyother,alwaysatthesametimeasanend,nevermerelyasameans’(1997:
4:429).Kantdefinesan‘end’assomethingvaluedforitself,a‘means’assomethingvalued
foritscontributiontoanend.Someendsaresubjective,onKant’sview,havingtheirvalue
onlybecausetheyarepursuedasends.Buthumanityisan‘objective’end,havingitsvalue
irrespective of whether anyone recognises it (1997: 4:428). Beauvoir does not indicate
thissimilarityinPyrrhusandCineas,whereheronlycommentsonKant’sethicsarguethat
it is incapableofprovidingpracticaladvice inaworldwherepeopleareopposedtoone
another’s ends (P&C: 127, 131, 138). However, she soon comes to acknowledge the
similaritybetweenherunderlyingtheoryandKant’sformulaofhumanity(MIPR:189;EA:
17, 33). But before reconstructing her argument for thisKantian conclusion, it isworth
seeingwhyherargumentitselfisCartesianratherthanKantian.
2.FromSubjectiveEndstoObjectiveValue
Kant has been read as arguing in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals that the
imperativetotreatrationalagencyasanendinitselfcanbederiveddirectlyfromtheidea
ofrationalagencyasthecapacitytopursueends.AsareadingofKant,thisismistaken.He
isclearthathedoesnotintendtoestablishanymoralimperativeinthepartofthebook
containing these comments (G:444-5).The first sectionof theGroundwork analyses the
concept of moral goodness to show that it is the concept of obedience to a categorical
imperative.Thesecondanalysesthisconceptofacategoricalimperativeinordertoshow
what such an imperative would be if there were any. The statement of the formula of
humanity occurs in this second section. His argument there is intended to show that if
thereisanycategoricalimperative,thenitcanbestatedastheformulaofhumanity.Itis
notanargument that there isanysuch imperative.Theargument thatwearesubject to
thecategoricalimperativeisinthethirdsectionofthebookanddoesnotexplicitlyreferto
theformulaofhumanity.
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Despite this, it is worth considering an argument for the formula of humanity that has
been assembled from Kant’s comments in the paragraphs surrounding it in the second
sectionoftheGroundwork.ForthisargumentresemblesBeauvoir’s:bothbeginfromthe
ideaof rationalagencyorhumanexistenceas thecapacity to setandpursueends;both
aim to establish the objective value of that capacity. The argument derived fromKant’s
comments,however,doesnotsucceed.Thereasons for its failurewillhelpus tosee the
strengthsofBeauvoir’sargument.Ratherthanconsidereveryvariationoftheneo-Kantian
argument, we will focus on the version that has received the most attention, the one
propoundedbyChristineKorsgaard.Her initial statementof it argues that thevaluemy
endshavedependsonmysettingthemasends,whichentailsthevalueofmycapacityto
doso,andsincethisvaluedoesnotdependonanysubject’sattitudetowardsthatcapacity
itisanobjectivevalueratherthanasubjectivevalue(1986:196-7;seealso1997:xxii).1
Various objections have been raised against this argument. For our purposes, themost
important isthat itcannotestablishtheobjectivevalueofrationalagencyingeneral. If I
accept that the foundationof thevalueofmyendsmust itselfbevaluable, thenIamled
only to the value ofmy own rational agency,my own capacity to set and pursue ends.
Korsgaard claims that it is incoherent to value one’s own rational agency but not other
people’s(1986:196).Shedoesnotsaywhy,butperhapsherthoughtisthatthecapacityto
setendsisthesameineveryoneanditisincoherenttotreatcasesdifferentlythatarein
factthesame.However, it is incoherenttotreatcasesdifferentlyonlywhentheyarethe
sameintherelevantrespect.Ifthevalueofmyrationalagencyisestablishedonthebasis
thatitgroundsthevalueofmysubjectiveends,thenmyrationalagencyisdifferentfrom
everyone else’s in the relevant respect. Nobody else’s capacity to set ends grounds the
value ofmy subjective ends. It is perfectly coherent to valuemy rational agency as the
groundofmysubjectiveendswithoutvaluingotherpeople’srationalagency.
1Sartre’scommentsontheinconsistencyofbadfaithinExistentialismIsaHumanismhave
beenreadassuggestinganargumentlikethis(Poellner2015:238).But,aswesawinthe
lastchapter,themostthiskindofargumentcouldshowwithintheframeworkofSartre’s
initialformofexistentialismisthatweoughttovalueourownprojects,notthatweought
eventorecogniseourfreedomoverthoseprojects.
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Alternatively,perhapsKorsgaardintendstobearguingthatifIrecognisethegroundingof
thevalueofmyownsubjectiveendsinmyownrationalagency,thenImustalsorecognise
thatthevalueofotherpeople’ssubjectiveendsisgroundedintheirrationalagency(see
1996:123;1997:xxii).ButthiswouldassumethatIrecognisethevalueofotherpeople’s
subjective ends. This assumption fails to recognise the subjectivity of subjective ends.
Korsgaard treats subjective ends simply as conditional values, so that what makes a
subjectiveendsubjectiveisthatitsvalueisconditionalonitbeingwilled(see1996:123-
4).Butthisisnotwhatitisforvaluetobesubjective.Kantrightlydefinesasubjectiveend
as something that ‘hasaworth forus’ (1997:4:428).Mysubjectiveendsarevaluable to
me,sotheirvaluecanbeusedinanargumentintendedtoleadmetosomeconclusion.But
other people’s subjective ends are only valuable to them. (Theymay coincide with my
subjectiveends,butthatdoesnotmeanthatIvaluethemasotherpeople’sends.)SoIdo
notneedtoacceptthevalueofotherpeople’ssubjectiveendsasapremise.
Anyattempttoderivethevalueofrationalagencydirectlyfromitsstructureassettingthe
valueofendswillbecaughtinthisdilemma.Eitherthepremiserefersonlytothevaluemy
own ends have forme, in which case themost it can establish is the value ofmy own
capacitytosetthatvalue.Orthepremisereferstothevalueofallsubjectiveends,inwhich
case I can reject its claim that other people’s subjective ends are valuable.Kant himself
doesnotfallfoulofthisdilemma,becausehedoesnottrytoderivetheobjectivevalueof
rationalagencydirectlyfromthecapacitytosetends.Hisargumentfortheobjectivevalue
of rationalagencyrestson theargument in the thirdsectionof theGroundwork thatwe
are subject to moral imperatives.2We are not concerned here with identifying which
interpretationofKantiscorrect,butwearenowinapositiontoseeclearlytheproblem
thatBeauvoir’s argument inPyrrhusandCineas is trying to solve:howcananargument
reachtheconclusionthatrationalagency,ratherthansimplymyownrationalagency, is
objectivelyvaluable,iftheonlystartingpremisethatImustacceptisthevalueofmyown
subjectiveends?
2Inhermostrecentpaperonthe formulaofhumanity,Korsgaardno longerattemptsto
deriveitdirectlyfromthevalueofsubjectiveends.Instead,shedevelopsareconstruction
ofKant’sargumentthatrestsonthethirdsectionoftheGroundwork.Specifically,sherests
itonthatclaiminthatsectionthatIamrationallycommittedtotreatingmyownrational
agencyaslegislatingvalueinasharedkingdomofends(Korsgaardforthcoming,§III).
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3.AReconstructionofBeauvoir’sArgument
Beauvoiraimstoestablishthe imperativeofauthenticityonthebasisof thestructureof
human existence. Her argument is therefore distinct from Kant’s, which combines an
argumentthatanycategoricalimperativemustbeexpressibleintheformulaofhumanity
with an argument thatwe are subject to a categorical imperative. But it is also distinct
fromKorsgaard’s, fortworeasons.Oneisthat itbeginsfromaproperrecognitionofthe
subjectivity of the individual’s subjective ends.This iswhatmakesBeauvoir’s argument
distinctivelyCartesian:itstartsfromapremisethatthereasoningindividualmustaccept,
accordingtohertheoryofhumanexistence.ThesecondisthatBeauvoir’sargumentdoes
not aim to derive the objective value of human existence directly from this premise.
Rather, she proceeds via the axiological concept that Kant deploys in his formula of
humanitybutwhichKorsgaardignoresinformulatingherargument:theideaofameans.
Somethingisvaluableasameans,accordingtoKant,ifitisrequiredforsomevaluableend
(1997: 4:428). I might value exercise as something that contributes causally to good
health,forexample,orvalueafreepressasanessentialconstituentofdemocracy.
More precisely, Beauvoir’s argument proceeds via her concept of a ‘point of departure’
(pointdedépart),somethingthatisvaluableasapotentialmeansirrespectiveofwhether
itiseveractuallydeployedasameans.Thisideaisrequired,sheargues,inordertomake
senseofthevaluethatweaccordourends.Forinpursuingourendsweaccordthatvalue
tothoseends,nottoourpursuitofthem.Thismeansthatwevaluetheendbeingachieved.
Once the end is achieved, argues Beauvoir, any value it has must reside in its being a
potentialmeans,a ‘pointofdeparture’, for furtherends.Thisvalueasapotentialmeans
restsonthecapacitytouseitasameans,whichisthecapacitytosetandpursueends,but
itdoesnotrestonanyparticularinstanceofthiscapacity.Anachievedendisapotential
means for anyone pursuing a relevant end. The value of a potential means therefore
derives from the value of rational agency or human existence in general, a value that
humanexistencethereforehasirrespectiveofwhetheranyonerecognisesthatvalue.
Thisreasoningcanbeclarifiedbysettingitoutasasequenceofnumberedpropositions.
Theopeningpremiseis:
(1)Someendsarevaluable.
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Beauvoirconsiderseachofustobecommittedtoacceptingthispremise,whetherweare
awareofitornot,becausewedoinfacttreatsomeendsasvaluableinaction.Thisisthe
natureoftheprojectsthatshapeourexperience.Thesecondpremiseclarifiesthattotreat
anendasvaluableistotreatitsvalueasattachingtothatend,ratherthantomypursuitof
it:
(2)ItisincoherenttotreatanendasvaluableandasvaluableonlybecauseItreat
itasvaluable.
Totrytobringsomethingaboutistotreatitasvaluable.Itmaybevaluedasameanstoan
endorasanend.Butnothingcouldbevaluedasameansunlesssomethingisvaluedasan
end (P&C:112).On reflection, it can seem tous that our ends seemvaluable tousonly
becausewepursuethemasends.Butthisreflectivethoughtthreatensourcommitmentto
thoseends.Itdoesnotclarifythekindofvaluetheendhas,butrathermakestheendseem
arbitraryandunjustified.It isthisreflectivethreattoourvaluesthatBeauvoirconsiders
to be the experienced problem of absurdity, as we saw in the last chapter. The third
premise draws out an implication of this point that we treat our ends themselves as
valuable:
(3)Totreatanendasvaluableistotreattheachievementofitasvaluable.
Totreattheachievementofanendasvaluableistotreattheachievedendashavingsome
propertythatmakesitvaluable.Thiscannotbethatitisanend,sinceonceitisachievedit
isnolongerpursued.Ifthereistobesomethingvaluableaboutthisend,thenitmustbe
thataddingittotheworldwouldbevaluable.Whatcouldmakethisvaluable?
(4) Anachievedendisa‘pointofdeparture’forotherends;apotentialmeans.
(5) The existence of a potential means is necessary for a subjective end that
requiresthatmeans.
(6)Anachievedend,therefore,isvaluable.
If thereasoninguptothispoint iscorrect, thenitshowsthattotreatanendasvaluable
commitsone to treating theachievementof thatendasvaluable,whichcommitsone to
the idea that its value lies in its being a potentialmeans for other ends. But this value,
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Beauvoir argues, requires that the capacity to use the achieved end as ameans is itself
valuable.
(7)Thisvalueofanachievedenddependsonthecapacitytosetendsforwhichit
isameans.
(8)Thecapacitytosetends(humanagency)isthusvaluable.
Sinceproposition(8)isintendedtofollowlogicallyfromthecommitmenttothevalueof
one’sends,acommitmentthataccordingtoexistentialismwecannotavoid,theargument
this far aims to show that we ought to treat human agency as valuable. Finally, the
argument thenconcludesthat thisvalueof thestructureofhumanexistencemustbean
objectivevalue,ratherthanasubjectiveone:
(9)Thisvaluedoesnotdependonhumanagencybeingpursuedasanend.
(10)Therefore,humanagencyisobjectivelyvaluable.
Fromthefactthatwedotreatourownendsasvaluable,then,Beauvoirhasarguedtothe
conclusion that we ought to treat human existence, or human agency, as objectively
valuable. If this reasoning is right, then the imperative of authenticity, the requirement
thatweall value thebasic structureofhumanexistence, follows logically from thevery
structureofhumanexistenceitself.Thisambitiousargumentisverysubtle,however,and
notallof itscommitmentshavebeenelucidated inthisreconstruction,sothenext three
sectionsofthischapterwillclarifyitfurther.
4.TheCommitmentsofBeauvoir’sArgument
WearelikelytomisunderstandtheimplicationsofBeauvoir’sargumentifwefailtokeep
inmind that it isonlyanargument,whichMontyPythonrightlydefinedasa connected
seriesofstatementsintendedtoestablishadefiniteproposition(Chapmanetal1989:87).
Beauvoir’s argument, that is to say, is an epistemic device. It is intended to lead the
individualfromthevaluetheyplaceontheirownendstotheimperativetotreathuman
existence as objectively valuable. It is not an attempt to trace the contours of the
metaphysicsofvalue.Thestepfromonepropositiontothenextisintendedtoarticulatea
relationof logical implication,nota relationofmetaphysicaldependence.Theargument
doesnotclaim, therefore, that thevalueofanenddependson itbeingable tobecomea
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potentialmeans once it has been achieved. Neither does it claim that any end that can
become a potential means is thereby valuable. So the argument is not subject to the
objection that some ends cannot become potential means or the objection that some
morallydisvaluableendscanbecomepotentialmeans.
It may well be, for example, that I value listening to music as an end, but my regular
achievementsofthisendcannotbeusedbyanyoneasameanstoafurtherend.Myloveof
musicmightbeusedasameansbymusicianswhoaimtomakemoneyfromtheirart,of
course, but perhaps no particular event of my listening tomusic can, once it has been
completed,beusedasameans.YetImighthaveaimedatbringingaboutthateventasan
end.Beauvoir’sargumentdoesnotdenythis.Allthatisrequiredfortheargumentisthat
some end that I value would become a potential means once it is achieved. Neither is
Beauvoir’s argument committed to the idea that an end that cannot become a potential
means isnot truly valuable, or is absurd. For the conclusionof the argument is thatwe
musttreathumanexistence,thesettingandpursuitofends,asobjectivelyvaluable.This
conclusion is perfectly consistent with the idea that the ends we pursue are valuable
because they are expressions of that objectively valuable structure of human existence.
Theargumentisconsistent,thatistosay,withthemetaphysicaldependenceofthevalue
ofendsonthevalueofthecapacitytosetandpursuethem.
The conclusion of Beauvoir’s argument does set a constraint on the value of ends,
however.Foritentailsthatweoughtnottreatanendasvaluableifitisincompatiblewith
the objective value of human existence. This rules out ends that involve killing people,
because this is the destruction of something objectively valuable. It also rules out the
suppressionofwhatisobjectivelyvaluableinpeople,theircapacitytosetandpursuetheir
own ends. Slavery is an extreme form of this suppression, but any form of coercion or
subordination isa failuretorespect thisobjectivevalue.Beauvoir’sargument, therefore,
entails that our ends must respect the existence and autonomy of any human agents
affectedbythem.Yetthisdoesnotrestricttheendsthatthereasoningsubjectcantreatas
valuable in order to accept the opening premise. At that stage of the argument, all that
mattersisthatthereasoningsubjecttakessomeendtobevaluable.Ifdoingsoleadstothe
conclusionthattheendoughtnotbetakenasvaluable,thenitistheendthatneedstobe
rejected,nottheargument’sconclusion.
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Although the conclusion sets this constraint, the argument should not be read as
concluding that I should respect thevalueofhumanity,or rationalagency, inorder that
my ends will be valuable. Because the problem of absurdity plays a significant role in
Beauvoir’sarticulationofherargument,shecanseemtoberecommendingmoralityasan
antidote to absurdity. Read in this way, Beauvoir’s argument aims to establish the
hypothetical imperative ‘to avoid absurdity, respect the value of humanity’. Thiswould
seem an objectionably egotistical basis formorality (Sandford 2006: 19). It would also
allowonetoevadetheconstraintsofmoralitybytakinguptheironicattitudethatitdoes
notmatterwhetherone’sownendsaretrulyvaluable.Butthisreadingmistakesthelogic
oftheargument.Theconclusionisthecategoricalimperativethatyouought,irrespective
ofyourownaims,torespectthevalueofhumanagency.Thisisnotarguedtobeameans
to establishing the value of your own ends. The argument is that this categorical
imperativeislogicallyimpliedbythevaluethatyoudoinfactplaceonyourends.3
Theargumentasawholecanbestatedasaconditional.Ifyouareanagentthatpursues
endsandtreatsthemasvaluable,thenyououghttotreatthiskindofagency(whetherin
yourownpersonorinanyoneelse)asobjectivelyvaluable.Butthisisnotahypothetical
imperative.Inahypotheticalimperative,theantecedentreferstosomeendthatyoumight
or might not pursue, such as ‘if you value your health, then you should take regular
exercise’.IntheconditionalstatementofBeauvoir’sargument,theantecedentrefersonly
3Beauvoirseemstohavereadherownargumentinthismistakenway.Intwovolumesof
her autobiography,writtenmore than a decade and a half afterPyrrhusandCineas, she
chastises her younger self for thinking that the individual ‘should hammer out his
"project" insolitarystate,andonlythenaskthemassofmankindtoendorseitsvalidity’
andforplacing ‘asearchforthemeaningof life’at thecoreofherethics,addingthat ‘to
lookforreasonswhyoneshouldnotstamponaman’sfaceistoacceptstampingonit’(PL:
549-50;FC:77).These criticisms,which target theargumentofPyrrhusandCineas both
directlyand indirectlyas thephilosophicalbasisof themoralessaysshepublishedsoon
afterit,readPyrrhusandCineasasrecommendingarespectforhumanityonthegrounds
that it gives one’s own life meaning. If we read it more sympathetically, however, her
argumentseems intended toestablishnot that stampingonpeople’s faces threatens the
meaning of one’s own actions, but that stamping on people’s faces is categorically
unacceptablebehaviorfromahumanagent.
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tothekindofcreaturethatissubjecttotheimperative.Thefactthattheargumentcanbe
expressed as a conditional statement, that is to say, simply reflects the fact that the
imperativeofauthenticityappliesonlytoagentsthatvaluetheirownsubjectiveends.Only
things thatexist in theway thatweexist,only thingswhoseontological structure isour
formofagency,arerequiredtotreatthatformofagencyasobjectivelyvaluable.Forthose
subjecttotherequirement,however,theimperativeiscategorical.
Itmight seem, therefore, that one can reject the argument by rejecting the ontology of
human existence thatmotivates it. Beauvoir’s aim in this argument is to show that the
existentialist theory that thereasonswe find inexperienceareshapedby thevalueswe
freely adopt and can replace entails that we ought to treat the capacity to set ends as
objectivelyvaluable.Buttheexistentialisttheoryoftheoriginsofreasonsdoesnotappear
amongthepremisesoftheargument.Thereasoningsubject ledthroughtheargumentis
notaskedatanypointtoaccepttheexistentialisttheoryofagency.Rather,theroleofthat
theory is to substantiate the claim that the reasoning subject must accept the opening
premise.But thisdoesnotmean that thebestway topersuadesomeone that theydo in
fact have ends, goals that they value in themselves, is to argue for the full existentialist
conceptionofhumanagency.Thebestwaymightratherbe for thatperson toreflecton
what theycareabout. If theexistentialistsareright, thispersonshouldcometosee that
theydohaveendsthattheyconsidervaluableinthemselves.
5.TheValueofaPotentialMeans
Beauvoir’sargumentaimstoestablishtheobjectivevalueofapotentialmeansasastepon
thewaytothevalueofhumanity.Weshouldtreatapotentialmeansashavingobjective
value,ratherthansubjectivevalue,becauseweshouldseeitsvalueasdependentonlyon
itspossibilityofbeingdeployedasameans,noton theactualityofanyone inparticular
deployingitasameans.Theargumentholdsthisobjectivevaluetobeimpliedbythevalue
ofmyachievableends:because Iamcommittedto thesebeingvaluableonceachieved, I
mustaccepttheirbeingvaluableaspotentialmeans.Atthispoint,however,anobjection
might be raised thatwouldparallel theobjection againstKorsgaard’s argument thatwe
consideredinsection2.WhyshouldIacceptthatanachievedendisvaluableasapotential
means in general, rather than simply as a potential means for me? If the value of my
achievedendweredependentonlyon itbeingapotentialmeans formyownsubjective
ends,thenapotentialmeanswouldhaveonlysubjectivevalueandthemosttheargument
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could establishwould be that I ought to treatmyownhumanity or agency, rather than
humanityoragencyingeneral,asobjectivelyvaluable.
To accept this alternative, however, would be to undermine the argument’s opening
premise that some ends are valuable. For this conclusion would set only minimal
constraintontheendsthatIcouldadopt.Itwouldprecludetherebeinganyvalueinends
thatkilledme,enslavedme,or impairedmyability tosetandpursuemyownends.But
withinthatconstraint,anythingthatIwilledwouldbeequallyvaluable.Theproblemhere
parallelsonehornofthefamousEuthyphrodilemma,whichpointsoutthatifthereareno
constraintsonwhatGodcanproclaimtobegood,thenGod’sproclamationsarearbitrary
ratherthanvaluable(EA:41).Perhapsthatproblemcanberesolvedbyappealtofeatures
ofGod,buttheparallelproblemforexistentialethicscouldnotbesolvedinthatway.The
idea that just about any endwould be valuable if Iwere to pursue it asmy end seems
incoherent.ForitwouldnotmatterwhetherIachievedanyparticularend,becauseIcould
instead simply replace itwith just about anyotherpossible end.This isnot to treatmy
endsasvaluable,buttoacceptthattheyarearbitrary.
In itself, this does not show thatmy ends are indeed valuable rather than arbitrary. If
acceptingthevalueofmyendsintheinitialpremisecouldbeshowntoentailthatmyends
areinfactarbitrary,thenwewouldhavetoacceptthattheinitialpremisewasmistaken.If
we indeed cannot live except by treating our ends as valuable, thenwewould have to
concludethatlifeisabsurd.Beauvoir’sargumentshows,however,thattheinitialpremise
doesnotentailthisconclusionthatunderminesit.Forwedonotneedtoaccountforthe
valueofthepotentialmeansintermsofourownagency.Wecaninsteadunderstanditas
valuableasapublicpotentialmeans.Beauvoir’sargumentleadsfromheretoaconclusion
that is consistent with the premise that some ends are valuable. If her argument is
successful,therefore,thereasoningsubjectworkingthroughtheargumentshouldaccept
atthatstageoftheargumentthatthevalueoftheirownachievedendsconsists inthese
endsbeingpotentialmeansforrationalagency,orhumanexistence,ingeneral.
Itmightbeobjected,however,thatthevalueofmyachievedendasapotentialmeansfor
other people does not require the value of human agency in general. For the value of a
potential means might instead consist in the possibility of its being deployed by other
peopleasameanstowardsendsthatIforeseeandvalue.Perhaps,thatistosay,itsvalue
mightbeconferredbymysubjectiveends,butimplythevalueofotherpeople’sagencyin
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bringing about those ends. Themost we could conclude from this would be that other
people’sagencyisvaluablewhenitmightbedeployedtofurthermyownsubjectiveends.I
wouldberequiredtovaluetheagencyonlyofpeopleinapositiontofurthermysubjective
ends.Indeed,ifthevalueofotherpeopleisdeterminedbytheirroleinbringingaboutmy
own subjective ends in this way, then their valuewould not rule out killing, enslaving,
coercing,orsubordinatingthemwheneverdoingsowouldbeexpedienttofurtheringmy
ownends.
Beauvoir obviates this objectionbypointing out that a potentialmeans canbe used for
purposes incongruent with my ends. ‘Everything that comes from the hands of man is
immediatelytakenawaybytheebbandflowofhistory’,shewrites,‘andgivesrisearound
ittoathousandunexpectededdies’(P&C:109;seealsoP&C:117,135).Anachievedend
cannotbevaluableonlyasapotentialmeanstomyends,sinceitspotentialtodefeatmy
endswouldcanceloutthisvalue.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatitsvalueisconferredbythe
ends to which it is put by other people. For this would lead to an infinite regress: if a
necessaryconditionofthevalueofsomeendisthatitbeusedasameanstosomefurther
valuableend,thenthesamenecessaryconditionappliestothisfurtherend,andsoon.An
infinitechainofnecessaryconditionscouldnotbefulfilled,sonoendsormeanscouldbe
valuable; our ‘transcendence’, or pursuit of ends, ‘would be dissipated in time’s elusive
flight’(P&C:106;seealsoP&C:112).Forthesereasons,accordingtoBeauvoir’sargument,
thevalueofanachievedendmustconsist in itspossibilityofbeingdeployedasameans,
whichentailsthevalueofthecapacitytouseitasameans.
6.WhyTheArgumentCouldNotBeShorter
TwointerpretationsofPyrrhusandCineasattributetoBeauvoirshorterargumentsforthe
objective value of human agency in general. Both are grounded in comments that she
makesinPyrrhusandCineasandbothareencouragedbyherratherambiguoussummary
inTheEthicsofAmbiguity (EA:71-2).One is theargument thatmyendscanbevaluable
only if they are carried forwardbyotherpeople (Arp2001:25; Sandford2006:17-18).
ThisisprimarilybasedonBeauvoir’sclaimtowardstheendofheressaythatmyactions
will ‘fallbackonthemselves, inertanduselessiftheyhavenotbeencarriedofftowarda
newfuturebynewprojects’pursuedbyotherpeople(P&C:135).However,sheisnothere
contradicting her earlier rejection of this idea as requiring an infinity of necessary
conditions.Rather,thisstatementistheopeningstageofabriefdialecticalargumentthat
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draws together points already made with the aim of establishing that to treat an
achievableendasvaluableistotreatitsachievementasthecreationofapotentialmeans
forotherpeople(P&C:135-6).
Thesecondshorterargument thathasbeenattributedtoBeauvoir is focusednotonthe
potentialofmyownendstobedeployedasmeansbyotherpeople,butontherole that
other people already play in my pursuit of my own ends. There are two parts to this
interpretation.Oneisthattheworldisalreadyrepletewiththeproductsofotherpeople’s
projects,whichIcandeployasmeanstomyends(Arp2001:64).‘ThehousethatIdidnot
buildbecomesminebecauseIliveinit’,asBeauvoirputsit(P&C:94).Theotheristhatthe
ends Ipursueare inherentlysocial: theirmeaning isconferredon thembyotherpeople
(Arp2001:64;Tidd2004:35).‘Thewriterdoesnotwantonlytoberead;hewantstohave
influence’,Beauvoirwrites,andthe‘inventorasksthatthetoolheinventedbeused’(P&C:
132).Accordingtothis interpretation,otherpeople’scapacitytopursueends isvaluable
because itprovidesmeansandmeaning formyownends.However,aswehavealready
seen,anargumentthatholdshumanitytobevaluableonlyinthepursuitofmyownends
would not rule out killing, enslaving, coercing, or subordinating other peoplewhenever
doingsowouldbeexpedienttofurtheringmyownends.Itwouldnotruleout,asBeauvoir
points out, a selective respect for only those who do further my ends (P&C: 130-1). It
thereforewouldnotreachtheconclusionthatBeauvoiristryingtoestablish.
A third shorter argument would combine elements of Korsgaard’s argument for the
formulaofhumanitywithoneoftheconsiderationsagainstaccountingforthevalueofa
potentialmeansintermsofone’sownsubjectiveends.Thishybridargumentwouldnotbe
concernedwiththevalueofapotentialmeans,butwouldinsteadproceedfromthevalue
of subjective ends directly to the objective value of humanity. If the value of my end
depends onmy pursuit of that end, this argument would run, thenmy end is valuable
eitherbecauseitiswilledbyarationalhumanagentorbecauseitiswilledspecificallyby
thisrationalhumanagent.Butthefoundationofthevalueoftheendcannotbespecifically
myagency,sincethiswouldleadtotheconclusionthatmyendsarearbitraryratherthan
valuable, forreasons thatparallelonehornof theEuthyphrodilemma.Somysubjective
endisvaluableonlybecauseitispursuedbyarationalhumanagent,whichestablishesthe
objectivevalueofrationalhumanagencyingeneral.
16 / 19
However,weshouldnotaccepttheopeningpremiseof thishybridargument.Beauvoir’s
argument itself provides reason not to accept that my subjective end is valuable only
because Ipursue it asanend.Forherargument restson theclaim that it is incoherent,
fromthefirst-personperspectiveofthereasoningsubject,toconsideranendvaluableand
toconsideritsvaluetoconsistinmypursuingitasanend.Theintuitiveplausibilityofthis
claim, which forms premise (2) in the reconstruction of her argument in section 3, is
substantiatedbythepointthatparallelsonehornoftheEuthyhrodilemma:ifthevalueof
anendisnotconstrainedbyanythingotherthanmypursuitofitasanend,thentheendis
arbitrary rather than valuable. Beauvoir’s argument begins from the recognition that I
mustaccept,indeeddoaccept,thatsomeendsarevaluable.Icannotaccept,therefore,that
thevalueoftheseendsconsistsinmypursuingthem.
Thispointdoesnotcontradicttheideathatsubjectiveendscanbevaluableasexpressions
ofhumanagency,becausethisideaiscompatiblewiththerebeingotherconstraintsonthe
valueofsubjectiveends.IfweaccepttheconclusionofBeauvoir’sargument,thatistosay,
thenwemustacceptthatsubjectiveends incompatiblewiththevalueofhumanity,ends
that involvekilling,enslaving,orcoercingpeople, forexample,aredisvaluable.It follows
from this that the value of an end does not consist in it being willed by the person
pursuingit.Forsomeendsthatpeoplepursuearedisvaluableintheseways.Butwecan
stillholdthatendscompatiblewiththevalueofhumanagencyarethemselvesvaluableas
expressions of human agency. If Beauvoir’s argument as reconstructed in section 3 is
sound,thenwecanacceptthatourendscanbevaluableinpreciselythisway.Allofthisis
also consistent with the further claim that some of our ends are valuable as providing
potentialmeansforexpressionsofhumanagency.
7.AnExistentialistKantianEthics
Thecoreclaimofexistentialismisthatthevaluesthatshapeourexperienceandbehaviour
are ones thatwehave freely chosen and can replace. This iswhat the slogan ‘existence
precedesessence’means,aswehaveseenthroughoutthisbook.Itcanthusseemtoentail
that there are no objectivemoral values that restrict the permissible choice of projects.
Beauvoir’sargumentinPyrrhusandCineasisaparticularlysophisticatedresponsetothis
reading of existentialism. It does not simply aim to establish that existentialism is
consistentwithamoral imperative that canboth constrainandground thevalueofour
ownends.Itaimstoestablishthismoralimperativebyachainoflogicalimplicationsfrom
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apremise that the reasoning subjectmust accept. It aims to establish the imperative of
authenticityonthegroundsofthesamesubjectivevaluingthatthecriticsofexistentialism
interpretasprecludinganyobjectivevalue.
Beauvoir’s argument, that is to say, presents a sophisticated solution to the problem of
establishingtheobjectivevalueofhumanagencywhentheonlyopeningpremisethatthe
reasoning subjectmust accept thevalueof theirown subjective ends.Her strategy is to
argue that this opening commitment entails that Imust think ofmy subjective ends as
havinganobjectivevalueonceachieved.Itisthisvalueasapotentialmeans,ratherthan
asanactualmeans,thatprovidesthebridgefromthesubjectivityofthevalueofmyown
ends to the objective value of human agency in general. The categorical imperative of
authenticity, that we must value the structure of human agency as the setting and
pursuing of ends, is claimed to be establishednot as something external tomyprojects
thatImustrespect,butasanimplicationofmyprojects,whateverthosehappentobe.If
theargumentissuccessful,Beauvoirhasshownthattheimperativeofauthenticityis‘self-
legislated’, meaning that its authority derives from the agency of the individual who is
subjecttoit,eventhoughitdoessoirrespectiveofthatindividual’schoices.
It is therefore no threat to the individual’s autonomy. Rather, as Kant argued, if an
imperative is legislated by the structure of agency, then the individual is not truly
autonomous,not fully self-governed,unless they accept the authorityof that imperative
(19974:440-1;seeReath1994:§§3-5).Againsttheideathatanindividual’sauthenticity
consistsintheirpursuitofwhateverendstheysetforthemselves,Beauvoir’sargumentis
that authenticity requires one’s ends to be constrained by the imperative to respect
human agency. Failure to obey this categorical imperative is inauthentic, because it is a
failuretoactinawaythatisconsistentwithone’sownstructureasanagent.Thisisnotto
say,however, that there is someprior imperative thatwemustbehave inways thatare
consistentwithour structure as an agent.The conclusionofBeauvoir’s argument isnot
thehypotheticalimperativethatweshouldrespectotherpeople’sagencyifwewanttobe
consistent,orthatweshoulddosoifwewanttobeauthentic.Theargument’sconclusion
is a categorical imperative:weought to respecthumanagency. If the argument is right,
this imperative is implied by the structure of our agency, sowe cannot be authentic or
consistentunlessweobeyit.
18 / 19
Beauvoir argued inPyrrhusandCineas that this imperative requires us to strive for the
conditions people need in order to exercise their agency fully. Respecting the value of
humanity requires aiming to ensure ‘health, knowledge, well-being, and leisure’ for
everyone ‘so that their freedom is not consumed in fighting sickness, ignorance, and
misery’(P&C:137).Sheacceptedthatthismoraloutlookaslimitedbydilemmasinwhich
one cannot respect the agency of everyone concerned, arguing that sometimes we are
‘condemnedtoviolence’(P&C:138).Therearesituations,thatistosay,inwhichitisnot
possibletokeepourhandscleanandourconscienceclear(P&C:127;MIPR:189-90).But
latershesawthisproblemasadecisiveobjectiontotheethicsshehadbuiltonthevalue
ofhumanagency.ShedescribedPyrrhusandCineasascontaining‘astreakofidealismthat
deprivedmyspeculationsofall,ornearlyall,theirsignificance’(PL:550).Shewrotethat
ofallherbooks,TheEthicsofAmbiguity‘istheonethatirritatesmethemosttoday’,inpart
becausethemoralityitarticulatesis‘ashollowastheKantianmaxims’(FC:75-6).
It is unclear, however, whether these comments concern the foundation of her earlier
moralphilosophyor theparticularpracticalethicalclaimsthatshemadeonthebasisof
thatfoundation.‘Iwasinerror’,shewrites,‘whenIthoughtthatIcoulddefineamorality
independentofsocialcontext’(FC:76).Thiscouldbearejectionoftheideaofanabstract
categorical imperative of authenticity defined and established independently of the
agent’shistoricalsituation.Oritcouldbetheclaimthatthepractical implicationsofthat
imperativecannotbedefinedindependentlyoftheagent’shistoricalsituation.Ratherthan
takeherownlaterrejectionofhermoralphilosophyatthisstageofhercareerasareason
to reject it ourselves, therefore,we should assess the structure and implications of her
argumentfortheimperativeofauthenticityourselves.Wehaveseenthatitisadistinctive
argumentthatwithstandstheanalysiswehavesubjecteditto.Itpromisestoestablishthe
categoricalimperativeofauthenticity,perhapswiththefurtherimplicationthatweshould
treat as valuable any human endeavours within the constraints of that imperative. For
these reasons, the argument deserves careful attention in contemporary moral
philosophy.
19 / 19
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