The Impact of U.S. and U.K. Legislatures on Aid Delivery

8/14/2019 The Impact of U.S. and U.K. Legislatures on Aid Delivery

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Economic Policy PaPEr SEriES 09

THE IMPACT OF U.S. AND U.K.

LEGISLATURES ON AID DELIVERY

SIMON BURALL

Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute

JONATHAN M. WHITE

Senior Program Officer, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

ANDREW BLICK

Senior Research Fellow, Democratic Audit


2/49

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3/49

The Impact of U.S. and U.K. Legislatures on Aid Delivery

Economic Policy Paper Series

July 2009

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4.3 E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

4.4 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

4.5 C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

D S, C T: L L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45


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The Impact of U.S. and U.K. Legislatures on Aid Delivery 3

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Acknowledgments


5/49

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6/49


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Executive Summary1


7/49


A central

consideration for

any legislature

is how to pursue

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sufficient freedom

to be able to

carry-out its work

well in changing

circumstances

and contexts.

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8/49


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9/49


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10/49


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Key Findings


11/49


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12/49


Congress must

carefully choose

how much

discretion it

should afford to

agencies in orderto potentially

improve their

operational

and overall

effectiveness,

weighing the

potential costs

and benefits of

exercising more

or less political

control overagency operation

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M, M. (5). W x? DevelopmentPolicy Review, 3 (6). L, U.K.: ODI.

1 B. W M. M (183). B D C C?: R Pk b FT C.Journal of Political Economy 1: 7658.

11 R. C, M. MCbb, B. W (18). A T P C A D.American Journal ofPolitical Science (V. 33, N. 3, A 18), . 588611.

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American Political Science Review, V. 8, N. 1, . 673.

14 S. L, S. OH (A, 14). DG US T P: T E. Inter-national Organization, V. 48, N. 4, . 5563.

15 J. S, The Core Executive in Britain, (Bk:M, 1).

16 S. B, B. D, S. W (6). N O N:D F P U.K. L, U.K.:Politico, . x.

Legislative Impact on Government:

The Theory2


13/49


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The amount

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an executive

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be impacted byCongressional

reactions to

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society concerns

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attention by the

Executive Branch

to that specific

agencys priorities.


14/49


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4 A. K (1 [176]). M x -: G B, F, W G, N, P.(), Legislatures. Ox, U.K.: Ox U P.

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15/49


16/49


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35 S. C, Donor Accountability in the UK(L:O D I, ).


17/49


The greater

prominence of

aid meant that it

attracted more

parliamentary

attention.Parliamentary

questions could

now be put to a

minister who was

solely responsible

for aid and ran

the department

delivering it.

3.1 Legislative structures and procedures

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A Golden Age?3


18/49


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19/49


A remarkable

feature of the

post-1997

Parliament is the

strong support

for a singleanti-poverty

objective for the

U.K. aid budget,

which buffers

development

policy from other

competing foreign,

security, and trade

policy objectives.

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4 ://www../P/W_w_/I-_D.x, Db 5, 8. LbD (8). Pocket Guide to Liberal Democrat Policies,Liberal Democrats, London.

Figure 1: The position of developmentwithin the U.K. Government since 1964

Less

Parliamentary

Scrutiny

More

Parliamentary

Scrutiny

A free-standing department,

but with a minister outside the Cabinet

(19671970; 19745; 19769)

A free-standing department, with a

Minister or Secretary of State inside

the Cabinet (19647; 19756;

1997present)

Absorption within the Foreign Ofce

(197074; 19791997)
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20/49


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43 IDC (8). Work of the Committee in 2007; Third Reportof Session 200708. L, U.K.: I DS C.

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w w w IDC

.

3.2.2. The objectives of the Public Accounts

Committee

T PAC U.K.

P. T

b P

b . T DFID

. I

b NAO b

wk. A w , NAO

PAC .

T wk PAC q

. T,

w DFID

. W PAC

- , b b . T PAC

w DFID

b,

, ; w

. G


21/49


Others express

this view

more starkly,

disagreeing with

DFIDs gradual

delegation ofauthority through

budget support

or the channeling

of funds through

multilaterals.

Those with this

view feel that

the visibility of

aid with a U.K.

flag is important

for thesebroader aims.

DFID , PAC

b - . A

PAC z

w ,

. I w w, PAC j

w . I q

j. I PAC w

w w

w w . I, ,

ex postw

b.

3.2.3 Other objectives

T IDC P

DFID

bj, DFID

. P, w

b, b .

DFID w

. P b w

U.K. b

w 48

3 74 67 (F ).45 T

w

. S P

b U K

w bj .

O x w k,

w DFID

b

. T w w

b w U.K.

b . T w x

w P w b

, b ,

b , .46

45 DFID A R 8.

46 S x PAC, , M 3, 8.

F DFID NGO, w

b x

.

Source: DFID Annual Report 2008

2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/070

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

48.21

58.45 57.36

68.08

74.31

Figure 2: Percentage of total U.K.bilateral aid to low income countries

(GNI per capita below $825 in 2004)45

Percent

T w

DFID b P b

b .

A k P, IDC

, DFID b

.

I b w

bj, IDC b

. F

x, HIV/AIDS, IDC

b w A w

U K. T

b k W

b G

x.


22/49


3.3 Effectiveness of legislative structures

and procedures

3.3.1 Parliamentary strengths

A b ,

b P

w b 17. F, DFID

w Cb

P IDC z

. I , P

q H C

w -

17. T P

z .

S, wk w w

DFID P

. T b.

T I D A, b

DFID bj, b

w P b w

b . I , ,

bj , ,

w bj. T

w b b

w, [ A] b

k .

A , DFID

w . I

, b bj

w MDG

. T

b P.

P w w

: DFID

bj, x b

bj ? I, b

A DFID, k T

S

, x,

b w A .

T R T A, q

DFID b P,

k

.

M b b, w

q , b

P b .I , q

b P

.

I w R

T A w

DFID w bb

wk

w. A

q DFID

. T b IDC

b

8

7 w Mb

P (MP) ,

x , b

. I ,

.

T w

z DFID. T

w . I ,

w k b

k . T

. T b bk

w P.


23/49


Within Parliament,

visits to country

programs are

valued as a way

of understanding

effectiveness ofDFID policies and

programs.

A b b

, b w

. W P,

w

DFID . S

b

H.

T w .

T PAC, w w NAO b ,

b z

b . Uq b, PAC ,

j ,

A O.

DFID k q

PAC NAO . F

PAC w

: DFID kw w

w b

b

; [ PAC]

; PAC x

.

T PAC k DFID

. T IDC b

b b

.

B w ,

w P w

w

z DFID. T

w

b w w .

F,

. Q b

b

. W

,

. Ajb w MP

w k b

. S,

b b .

B ad

hoc b, w P

DFID .

T w bb,

wk

.

T

. T w

H L, x, w

b q

b b. I

, , w

b

DFID. F C

-

w

DFID, b

b q.

P w

b .

I w ,

DFID. M,

w b j

C, w b,

. P

w

w w DFID , ,

PAC, w

. T w

b kw w

w w q

w b k. P k

[DFID] .


24/49


While it is possibl

to pick-up specific

issues in the pos

budget debate,

line-by-line scrutin

is not possibleand the vote is

on the budget

as a whole and

not on the DFID

departmental

budget alone.

I , w b P DFID,

b

w w

w b

. T b

w DFID P. T

b

wk. T

w b P

b b b

.

I P

w wb b DFID. O

, NAO NGO w

U K OECD/DAC ,

z

P. T bw DFID

T, PSA

. T

b w

DFID P, P

z PSA, b

.47

I b b b

. W

w j

C, k

. I k ,

b , bkb MP w

,

. T

w , b w x.

47 Hw, ; Governance of Britain , k b b bj W .

T w k w

b k b w

.

R b

DFID b

b

w

b U.K. b

.

3.3.2 Parliamentary weaknesses

T wk P

b z DFID. A , w

wk

w .

P k w w. F,

b

, b . A,

H C. W

b k- -

b b, -b- b

b w DFID b .

S,

b, w P

. T

R T A

w DFID. T A

wk ;

b

b DFID. A b

k ,

b .

T w

,

, . Tw U.K.

w DFID

, b z

b ,


25/49


, , ,, ,

, b , b,

, , k.48 I z

b,

, U K

Gb C P P

A C P P.4 T

b

, -W

. Hw, P

j- -x.

T IDC x j-

S Ex

C C, w D;

B, E R R;

F A C. T

U.K. x w

. Hw,

bj

. A b b, I D A

bj

DFID. T A wk

DFID

b

. T x

- . A

, w b,

48 D I D (17). EliminatingWorld Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century, C. 378. L-: T S O; D I D- (). Eliminating World Poverty: Making GlobalizationWork for the Poor. C. 56. L: T S O.

4 T w b M D, F O D- I D, .

A .

T w b

b b , b,

bw b

b z

.

A wk

k , .

T b

, b S U,

w x w . TIDC, x, kwb k,

b w b. I , ,

b b kw

q. MP, b

w,

b wk w

x . M w

IDC w b b

w, - .

I ,

. MP ,

, bz

w

. W

P

DFID, b

w . T

b b

.

T H L

. T b-

E U C.5 I , w

L w DFID

H q

F O w

5 F A, D D P (b- C).

A change in

government

priorities, or a

shift in the way

it does business,

could reducethe strength of

the International

Development Act if

other departments

gain a greater role

in development.


26/49


DFID is also

committed to

medium term

predictability

and it often

signs three-yearagreements with

governments

and even has

some ten-year

partnership

agreements.

w b wk. D 67, L ad hoc

, C I

Oz, b L L C

. T k

b L

w P w

b x.

A b, IDC w

z DFID ,

w, , . D ,

w DFID

. G

j .

3.4 Impact of oversight

DFID w

P D A E, w

.51 A DFID b

D b

, w,

z,

. I

DFID

. F,

DFID

b.5 DFID

8 P M

S 1

51 OECD/DAC (6). United Kingdom DAC Peer Review, P.

5 N. T M. Cx (8). Evaluation of the Paris Dec-laration: DFID Donor Headquarters Case Study. L, U.K.:A.

.53

DFID b -

w

- .54

DFID D

z . I w

bj,

x wk.55 DFID

w

w P D.56

T xb z

b .

T q x w

P DFID

, b

x.

I w I

D A b

P DFID; A

wk w w DFID

P z .

T bw w

b . B, A w

b, b Ex.

P w

,

DFID

b z.57

T w P

Ex R

T A. T w

53 OECD/DAC. (8) 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Dec-laration: Making aid more effective by 2010, P, OECD/ DAC.

54 OECD/DAC (6).

55 T Cx (8).

56 OECD/DAC (6) T Cx (8).

57 T Cx (8), w.


27/49


b b b T Ck, MP,

b bw DFID

P.

A w

b w

DFID , A b

b, P

b . T ;

b

DFID b b

bj,

bj. T DFID

k k w .

P I

D A wk w

z DFID

w b

b . T , w

DFID b

.

F, P w b x. I w

P DFID b

b b w b

w b w , b

x w

z . S,

Zbbw B w

b b. I

x w

k

. T b P

w

,

w w

.

Nw j b P DFID

b ,

b . T ,

b

. O w, ,

PAC b

(GBS) k q

k w .

DFID w , b

ww, k k

DFID w.

F, k

,

w P w. T

w

x DFID w

w DFID

.

3.5 ConclusionN w,

P P

w. A w , w b

DFID

. I , P

w Ex

. T bj

11

b b

. G B

b j P. W

b

b H

bj.


28/49


Despite their

attraction in term

of promoting long

term developmen

these modalities

come with someshort- to medium

term risk in the

form of allegation

of corruption

for example,

putting DFID in

a challenging

position in relatio

to maintaining

high-level politica

and broaderpublic support fo

delivering aid in

this way.

I k, , wqk w w

P,

, b b

b bj. T k

, b Aw

M w w DFID S

S b DFID wk

,

w

Cb- . P

w

b.

W DFID

P D.

A

b .58

D -

, w

- - k

x, DFID

- b b w.5 G b

b kw

b DFID.

58 A The 2008 Survey on Monitoringthe Paris Declara-tion U K k w b b (PFM) -b . O,DFID b 5 bw /1/3 (15 b x). T 345 3/4 j 6 b 5/6. I , -

75 DFID b .5 OECD/DAC (6) T Cx (8).

T w DFID. T

w DFID deliver

, w , b 5

MP x .

W j b IDC

P D,

w w

b

x, w b b

j P. T PAC, x,

k

w U.K. , GBS .

D k w,

b P

w DFID -

bj. C PAC

, b w IDC w

b

DFID b k

w

w . A w , w I P

b , b

k GBS

. P [] b P

D . A w

b

DFID; .


29/49


As U.S. President

John F. Kennedy

stated nearly a

half century ago,

no objective

supporter offoreign aid can

be satisfied

with the existing

program, actually

a multiplicity

of programs.

Bureaucratically

fragmented,

awkward and slow,

its administration

is diffused overa haphazard and

irrational structure

covering at least

four departments

and several

other agencies.

4.1 Legislative structures and procedures

I 161, U.S. F A A (FAA) w

b U.S. C, w z

U.S. . S USAID w

b b Ex O,

U.S. w bj w -

. I

b w b

.

U.S. P J F. K w

b USAID b : w k

w A w,

U.S. ,

b

z w.

T w b w

b

b . A P

K ,

bj b w x ,

. B ,

wkw w,

z

.6

S FAA, b

x . T

w , ,

w USAID. A

k bw

w USAID . E U.S.

w, USAID A

6 P J F. K, S M C F A, M , 161.

b 4,58 18 , 8. A 6

,

.61 T ODA,

USAID

j.

4.4.1 Reforms under President Bush

T b

USAID ,

B . I M , U.S.

P G W. B

M C A

UN F D C

M, Mx. T b

M C C (MCC),

b

w ,

, w j

b .

S /11, U.S. z

U.S.

xbk . R

w Iq

A U.S. .

I MCC, B

P E P AIDS

R (PEPFAR). A

, U.S.

M P.6 T

U S b w

b $6 b

ODA 8

61 J. Aw, M. MP, A. N (Nb/D-b 8). A D: Mk F A ME T. Foreign Affairs, V. 87. Nw Yk, NY: C F R.

6 C. L (8). Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos?W, DC: T C Gb D.

USAID and Congress: Complexity and

Effectiveness4


30/49


The United States

continues to

be the worlds

largest donor in

absolute terms

providing $26billion in ODA in

2008 accounting

for 22 percent

of aid worldwide,

and even small

changes in U.S.

foreign assistanc

can have an

important impact

on the overall

system.

ww, U.S.

.63

I b w

k HIV/AID

-b , B

q

U.S. . I U.S. N S

S 6, wk, ,

w

U S w w z

.

D , B

b kw w

b w

. I J 6,

kw F .

A w D F A (DFA) w

U.S. D S. T DFA

- b b A

USAID k q

D S S. T DFA

USAID w D

S - .64

A USAID

,

b

S S. U F

w F A Fwk (FAF)

w , b,

bw

U.S. D S USAID. I

63 OECD/DAC (). Development aid at its highest level everin 2008.

64 T M C A O Gb AIDS C D F A, b DFA k w - U.S. .

w ,

U.S. .65

T w b -S

S Czz R

, w

. I b

k MCC PEPFAR, F

q

b w , b

. WS USAID b

w C F ,

USAID b .66

Tw C

z. A

w

, , . Az

b wk

w, x

, .

Hw, b C

w b.

4.1.2 The role of appropriators

E , b M

65 I , b - USAID U.S. D S, O D F A w , U.S. . T - U.S. - - - .

66 T U.S. D S w b U.S. C E E 18 S U 1, w USAID b . E, 1, U.S. SD k USAID - w O M B. S J. Aw,M. MP, A. N (Nb/Db 8).A D: Mk F A M E- T. Foreign Affairs, V. 87. Nw Yk, NY: C F R.


31/49


Appropriators

have considerable

influence

over foreign

assistance. They

effectively controlthe budgetary

allocations at

the agency and

program levels for

foreign assistance.

Fb, P b bq U.S. C .

I w

I A (F 15) B

Rq. T U.S. H R

S B C b

. T

(b ) w, b

P b q,

I A. T

: z.

F w b w .67 T j

H

S A C, w

. T

b

b . A

b bk

b-

b j. T

A b- S, F

O, R P (

H S) b

. A ,

b w w

.

A H S b

b

H S A C

. T b H

S . T H S b w

. I

b . O , b H S. T

b b P

67 A C R S, - b -- z .

b w ( F 3).

A w USAID

w b:

w b ;

, , ;

b ;

;

w USAID b

b -.68

Ek b w b

. Ek

USAID w

. T .6 I

w ,

- ,

b ( ). I

b , k

P q b C

.. w b

, ,

b P

q. Ek b

.

A b

. T

b

. A

, x b

j . A

68 C R S (7). Congressional Over-

sight Manual. W, DC: C R S.6 A C R S, k b b b. The Congressional Quar-terly A C D - k. A O M B, k j, , b q b P, b - b C.


32/49


b w I A

B q D

S, USAID, MCC, P C, T

O P I C (OPIC)

. T -b

b w USAID ,

, NGO, ,

x, -- .

4.1.3 The role of authorizers

T U.S. S F R C

U.S. H F A C

z (

USAID). Az

w w ,

z

. T

b

USAID k

.

Az -

: ,

, b,

w Ex . S

, z

USAID w

- k q .

C

b z, ,

b. F b

b z. T

bw z .

.

Figure 3: The U.S. Congressional Appropriations Process

Drafting of the

Congressional

Budget Justication

Appropriations

Other agencies (MCC, PEPFAR, etc)

United States Agency

for International

Development

U.S. Department

of State

The President/Ofce of

Management and Budget

The U.S. Senate ConferenceThe U.S. House

of Representatives

Senate Budget

Committee

House Budget

Committee

Appropriations

Committee

Appropriations

Committee

State Foreign

Operations

Subcommittee

State Foreign

Operations

Subcommittee

BudgetResolution/

302a

BudgetResolution/

302a

302bs 302bs

Legislation Legislation

Legislation


33/49


Despite the

proliferation of

aid legislation,

authorizers

have been less

engaged, at leastuntil recently;

the FAA, which

is the statutory

basis for USAID,

has not been

comprehensively

reauthorized

since 1985.

U, z b w ,

w x .7 I ,

b b

w P.

O USAID w b

b . D

, z

b , ; FAA,

w b USAID,

b z 185.

T w b x bw.

4.1.4 Other Congressional procedures

C N (CN)

w USAID. CN

b USAID , ,

z b

j

C. A z

j ,

H S,

CN

Ex .71 T

. T

b b

C . F x, C

USAID b

Cb, Pk, S b w

C S

D b 1 .7

7 T b 18 w R - w bw W H Cz w z. P , b - , .

71 N b U.S. C x .CN q C. H z w.

7 USAID (). Rq C N:FY O Y B (OYB).

A z -

, ,

x

. USAID -

; C

xb .

C w

USAID b P. T

b U.S.

. T w

S. T C b P

w w

.

C b

,

B P b,

USAID

w , b

, q ,

, , w. C

ad hoc .

T x

USAID. C w

b, k ,

q C

, ,

w q. F , G

Ab O (GAO)

.73

73 I I A B q, -

C. F , USAID O I G b -, w . C w.


34/49


The cumulative

effect is that U.S.

foreign assistanc

now, in total,

has at least 140

broad priorities.There are at leas

400 specific

directives on how

to implement

the priorities.

4.2 Legislative objectives in oversight

F C ,

: ,

, , ,

, x k,

,

b ,

, . D C W j

b U.S.

w w: C.

T bj w b C

Ex. I w b w b

C b.

I wk

.

T b

U S F

A A 161. F ,

C W, b w

w

( Bx 1). A w

, b USAID w . T

U.S.

w, , 14 b .

T 4 w

.74 I ,

5 , ,

w

b. T k

.

T F FAF USAID

U.S. D S . I - bj : P

S, G J D,

74 Ox A (8). Failing the Cardozo Test: Why U.S.foreign assistance legislation needs a fresh start, Ox. B b D LLP.

I P, E Gw,

H A. B

w bj,

.75 T

bj wk

.

Hw, USAID

b bw C

USAID k bw

w w bj

75 T w U.S. D S USAID ( ) - Fwk. T : 1.) b, .) , 3.) ,4) , 5.) .

Box 1: Additional legislation governingU.S. foreign assistance since 1989

Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act

of 1989

Freedom for Russia & Emerging Eurasian Democracies

& Open Markets Support Act of 1992

South African Democratic Transition Support Act

of 1993

Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998

Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999

African Growth and Opportunity Act

Global Aids and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000

Microenterprise for Self-Reliance and International

Anti-Corruption Act of 2000

Famine Prevention and Freedom from Hunger

Improvement Act of 2000

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act

of 2000

Millennium Challenge Act of 2003

United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,

Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003

Microenterprise Results and Accountability Act of 2004

Assistance for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children

in Developing Countries Act of 2005

Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005


35/49


Whether the

United States

has a specific

earmark for

poverty reduction

or not seems lessrelevant than

the fact that the

United States

does not have an

overarching goal

or even a set of

goals to design a

strategy for aid.

. W - , FAF

b . O USAID

x w ,

. T FAF objectives

. I

b w U.S. , b

w

bj.

T FAF b b-

, , bw C W

H. S w w

bw w b

bj . I w w

w C. I

b bj

. A USAID ,

b

w

k

w b.

T bj b b-

bw C

Ex . O

, Ex

bj b P I

C b

I A A

. T w

, b

k. I ,

USAID w

w .

O , C w

k

b w A.

W k w,

bj, ,

. Exk ,

,

wk . B b

U.S. .76

P bj

k USAID. O w

bj . O

w w, ,

b xb b

- .USAID b j

- k

, b -.

USAID x b

x w. F ,

, x k q

w b

wk.

A, q w U

S k

U S

. DFID

MDG

w. M k

DFID

b b .

76 C bw C Ex b U.S. , b . O w b x k x -, U S w. B C Ex , b b .


36/49


37/49


The Foreign

Assistance

Framework is

too generic

and does not

provide unifyingobjectives that

would allow USAID

to effectively

rationalize

accounts,

budgeting,

operations, and

resources.

w . C ,

, ,

USAID. S

DFID, wb b

USAID b .

A USAID A F R

C. I USAID

z ,

, , ,

, . T

w

. I 13, C

G P R

A, w USAID -b

. O

. USAID b

I E

S. I OMB P

M A, w k

. I

P A R T

(PART) OMB , w .

T MCC x w

bw C Ex

bj b

,

. T MCC

w

C . T

MCC bj,

b

(kw MCC ). I w,

w, . C

w w

MCC , w

P D A E. T

MCC . Uk FAA , MCC

bj B A .

4.3.2 Congressional oversight weaknesses

T k bw

C Ex w

w

b. A

, w bk

.

T 5 U.S. ,

,

. O USAID U.S. D

S F . T k

. T F A

Fwk

bj w w USAID

z , b,

, . C

b wk F

C ,

b

w U.S. .

W

USAID,

C

. O

C w

. T w

w

. T b

w C w

, . C

b, USAID ,

w q w

w b? C

bj b

b


38/49


. S w

USAID

.78

C USAID

bw C x

q .

S USAID b

w C b

w w

, , q w w . S

w w

bw C USAID.

T

USAID

. F bw C

Ex

. I b

U.S.

w z

FAA. R bw

z , z

z

.7 B

185.

S ,

, b C

w

78 D HELP C, U.S. S C F R Embassies

Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid b C- U.S. , w USAID b b . Nw k C .

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The United States

is sometimes

unable to

participate in

country level

donor and partnedialogues becaus

of excessive

earmarking or

because U.S.

foreign assistanc

is channeled

through other

specialized

agencies that ma

have less interes

or capacity toparticipate in

policy coordinatio

discussions.

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U.S. .

85 C F R U S S. RG. L, Rk M Mb. Embassies Grapple to

Guide Foreign Aid. W, DC, Nb 16, 7.86 OECD/DAC (6). P Rw U.S.; GAO Afghani-stan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO--473SP.W, DC, A .

87 C F R U S S. RG. L, Rk M Mb. Embassies Grapple toGuide Foreign Aid. W, DC, Nb 16, 7.

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4.4 Impact of oversight

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Whether it is

participating in

international

efforts like

Gleneagles or

responding tothe changing

political and

economic climate

in a recipient

country, USAID

must be able to

shift its priorities

and resources

and adapt to new

circumstances.

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4 The HELP Commission Report on Foreign AssistanceReform, 7.


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Figure 4: 2007 Donor Countries Percentage of Tied Bilateral Aid95

.

Ireland

Luxembourg

Sweden

United Kingdom

Norway

Switzerland

Australia

Denmark

Japan

Germany

France

Belgium

Finland

Spain

New Zealand

Austria

Netherlands

Canada

Portugal

United States

Italy

Greece

0 5 10 15 20 25

Percent30 35 40 45 50

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.1%

0.3%

1.6%

4.5%

4.9%

6.6%

7.4%

8.0%

9.3%

10.9%

11.8%

13.4%

18.9%

25.4%

30.9%

31.5%

32.2%

47.4%


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b , ,

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q

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b

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7 E. C, M. G, L. N, D. V, D. (8).Thematic Study The Developmental Effectiveness of Untied Aid:Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration and ofthe 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the LDCs,Phase I Report. L, U.K.: O D I.8 USAID (ADS 1.3.4.) - , w b U.S. , - , b- .

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j . I q

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4.4.1 Successful cases Congressional impact

on USAID

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44/49


b k w . F C

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U.S.

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While both

Congress and

USAID appear

to accept the

need for robust

accountabilityand reporting

systems that

ensure financial

and managemen

performance,

there are

differences of

opinion over

investing in

measuring result

for developmentoutcomes.


45/49


There is increased

awareness of

the diminishing

capacities of the

United States

developmentand diplomatic

resources, and

authorizers are

considering

legislation to

tackle these

problems. This

could help

increase focus on

the effectiveness

of USAID so thatthe oversight

process matures

into something

more than

allocations of

funding.

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46/49


The debate is les

about what U.K

aid will do and

more about how

it will achieve the

agreed goals.

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Different Systems, Common Themes:

Lessons Learned5


47/49


The effect of

this systemic

complexity has

been to make

it harder for

Congress toscrutinize the

system as a whole

and therefore to

hold it to account.

This undermines

transparency and

accountability

to taxpayers.

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Off i c e s

Documents

The Impact of U.S. and U.K. Legislatures on Aid Delivery