The Impact of Recent Immigration on the London Economy, LSE, 2007

7/31/2019 The Impact of Recent Immigration on the London Economy, LSE, 2007

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The Impac t ofRecent Immigra tion

on the LondonEconomy

July 2007

TheImpactofRecentImmigrationonthe

LondonEconomy

July2007

Exec utive Summary


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The Impac t ofRecent Immigra tion

on the LondonEconomy

July 2007

Lond on Sc hoo l of Ec ono mic s a nd Politica l Sc ienc e

Houg hto n St

Lond on WC2A 2AE

Tel: +44 (0)207 405 7686

www.lse.ac.uk

Exec utive Summary


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The Imp ac t of Rec ent Imm igration on the London Ec onomy is published bythe City of London. The a utho rs of this rep ort a re Ian Gordon, Tony Traversand Christine Whitehe ad of the Lond on Sc hoo l of Ec onomics and Politica lSc ienc e.

This report is intend ed as a basis for d isc ussion only. Whilst every effort hasbe en ma de to ensure the a c curac y and c ompleteness of the m ate rial in thisrep ort, the autho rs, the Lond on Sc hool of Econom ics and Politica l Sc ienc e,and the City of London, give no warranty in that regard and accept noliab ility for any loss or da ma ge inc urred through the use o f, or reliance upo n,this rep ort or the informa tion c onta ined herein.

July 2007

City of Lond on

PO Box 270, GuildhallLondonEC2P 2EJ

http:/ / www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/ ec onomic research


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Table of Contents

Foreword..1

Executive Summary3

1. Introduc tion....6

2. Historic and overall trends.....92.1 The histo ry of migration to Lond on ... 92.2 The Twentieth c entury.... 112.3 Conclusion....15

3. Migrant flows, stoc ks, com position and dynam ics.... 163.1 Sources and definitions...163.2 Mig rat ion trends 1991-2005.... 173.3 London s role in UK migration .... 213.4 Cha rac teristics of the migrant pop ulat ion to Lond on... 243.5 The long er term demog raphic imp ac t of internationa l

migration to London... 273.6 Conclusions...... 31

4. Ac commoda ting the migrant pop ulation the imp ac t on housing

markets...33

4.1 Imm igration and projec ted housing req uirements.... 334.2 The imp ac t of imm igration on mo vem ent out of Lond on. 364.3 Migration and tenure.. 374.4 The effec t of imm igra tion on Lond on house p ric es... 404.5 Migration and p riva te rents... 424.6 Migration and the soc ia l rente d sec tor... 434.7 Bringing the sto ry together.... 444.8 Conclusions...... 45

5. Impa c ts on the labour ma rket and c ompetitivenessin Lond on 46

5.1 The role of immigrants in the Lond on lab our ma rket . 475.2 Employment sta tus, oc c upa tions and ea rnings of migrants in

London..... 495.3 Imp ac ts of migrants on the Lond on labo ur ma rket... 525.4 Entrep rene urship, innova tion and c om pet itiveness.. 575.5 Conclusions...... 61

6. Migration, diversity and London gove rnment..... 646.1 Different typ es of migrant...... 646.2 Ethnic ity, d isc rimination and the d iversity agend a .... 66

6.3 Pub lic servic e nee ds... 676.4 Resource a lloc a tion and pop ula tion me asurement . 70


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7. Conclusions... 737.1 The new mig ra tion into London .... 737.2 What we have lea rned .. 737.3 What we still nee d to know ....757.4 Two perspe c tives on the rec ent migration to Lond on.. 76

Appendices....78Ap pend ix 1 Offic ial sta tistics....... 78Ap pend ix 2 Definitions..... 82

Abbreviations........ 84

Bibliography... 85

Acknowledgements.... 92


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Foreword

Michael Snyder

Cha irman, Policy and Resources Com mittee

City o f Lond on

The C ity has alwa ys bene fited from the p resenc e o f internationa l talentamong its wo rkforc e and m anage ment. Street names suc h as LombardStreet remind us of the impa c t o f foreign ba nkers as far ba c k as the M idd leAges, while institutions such as Schroders and Rothschilds originated frominternational enterprise in the 18th and 19th c enturies. The City ha s rema inedop en to talent from ab roa d through to the p resent d ay; and , with somethinglike a quarter of its employees coming from outside the UK, must have astrong claim to be the most cosmopolitan of all international financialservices. The p resenc e of suc h ta lent is one of the key fac to rs underpinningour globa l comp etitiveness.

Migration from abroad has also played a key long-term role in London as awho le. Onc e ag a in, the modern age ha s seen an ac c elera tion in arriva ls.The fo reign-bo rn pop ulation has grow n from 1 to 2 million d uring the last 20yea rs. In the last de c ade a lone , Lond on has experienc ed a ne t ga in of some800 thousand immigrants from an increasingly diverse range of countries oforigin.

Despite the scale of this globalization of our resident population, there hasbeen surprisingly little analysis of its impact on Londons economy, socialfab ric and g ove rnance. With this in mind, we co mm issioned the Lond onSc hoo l of Ec onomics to prod uce a resea rc h rep ort spec ifica lly foc ussed onthe composition and dynamics of migrant flows, and their impact on thehousing a nd lab our ma rkets. In ad d ition, we asked the c onsulta nts toconsider the consequences of increasing diversity for the government ofLond on and ho w it is financ ed .

Despite the public data limitations that bedevil any research into the UKspo pulation and wo rkforc e, the a uthors have produc ed a c omp elling a nalysisof Lond on s new inhab itants. Ove ra ll, they a re young and a re likely to havehad significantly more e duc a tion a nd possess highe r leve l qua lifica tions thanthe co mp arab le ag e co hort of the Lond on-born po pulation. Ma ny of thosec oming from ric her countries tend to b e temp orary residents, coming here forseveral years to work (often in the City) and to enjoy the benefits of adynam ic glob a l c ity, befo re returning home . Those from othe r c ountries a refar more likely to be permanent additions to the population, exercising along -term effec t on the housing a nd lab our markets.

The imp ac t o f migration on Lond on s alrea dy strained ho using stock mighthave b een limited to da te d ue to relative youth and low household formationra tes. This situat ion is likely to c hange w hen, as the rep ort forec asts, we rea c ha point where the majority of children in the capital will be born into familieswho have c ome from ove rsea s.


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The impa c t on the labo ur ma rket has be en more immed iate , with theevidence suggesting that better educated new arrivals are displacingLondon-b orn wo rkers from the lowe r end o f the labour ma rket. Thisphenomenon might be expected to extend further and further up theearnings scale as immigrants integrate and take fuller advantage of their

ed uc a tion a nd skills.

From a local government point of view, perhaps the most compelling sectionof the report is that dealing with the financial implications of international in-migration. Lond on rec eives a much la rge r share of the c urrent wa ve of newarriva ls than the rest o f the c ountry. The c entraliza tion of revenue c ollec tion,and relative rigidity of the formulae used to re-allocate funds for localspending, means that neither the GLA nor the London boroughs receivefinancial resources proportionate to the increasing size and diversity of theirpop ulations. Unless this ba lanc e is redressed , the strain on loc a l governmentfinanc es c an only inc rea se, with nega tive conseq uenc es for the qua lity of the

services they are expec ted to p rovide. It would be a trag ed y if the c urrentpositive impact of new migrants on Londons competitiveness andsustainability were to be increasingly undermined by inadequate publicfinanc ing. This rep ort points the way towa rds the more com prehensiveanalysis required to support the major shifts in public policy necessary toensure tha t this doe s not happen. I trust the rep ort s findings will be heard a ta ll leve ls of go vernment.

Micha el Snyde r

London

July 2007


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Executive Summary

Twe nty years of strong inward migra tion, with net ga ins to ta lling som e 800thousand people since 1998, have produced both overall populationgrowth and a much more co smo polita n mix in Lond on. The foreign born

population has grown from 1 to 2 million over the 20 year period.Whereas, in 1986 just 6 countries of origin accounted for half of thispop ula tion, now it ta kes 15 to d o so.

Particular elements, suc h a s asylum seekers and rec ent A81 migrants, havec ontributed to this growth but a re only minor parts of a strong trend d rivenby international forces combined with Londons particular attractions.These trend s appea r set to c ontinue.

Net immigration into Lond on from ab roa d tend s to d isp lac e som e existingresidents, who m ove out into o the r parts of the Greater South East though the short-run effect is nearer to one for two than one for one.This substantially reduc es the imp ac t o f immigration on Lond on po pula tion

growth, while p rob ably intensifying that on the pop ula tion mix.

Charac teristics of migrants The new migrants c om e from ma ny plac es, but share c harac teristics of

relative youth, above average qualifications, and positive ratings byemployers.

There a re m a jor limita tions in the o fficia l sta tistics about migrants, nota b lyon out-migration, whe ther by the UK-born or by temp orary residents here.Similarly it is not possible to track migrants subsequent moves within theUK. The b asic fac ts a re reasona b ly c lea r, but the p ic ture is c omplic ated ,and our current unde rstand ing is only pa rtial.

Those who c ome from richer c ountries tend to rem ain for shorter period s(pa rticularly the most q ua lified ), while those from less deve lop ed countriesare fa r mo re likely to m ake Lond on the ir long -term ho me .

Impa c ts on the London econom y Two d istinct p ositive e ffec ts of m igration a re its qualitative impact on the

London labour force and economy, through diversity, flexibility,international experience and skill sets; and its quantitative contributionthrough expanding labo ur supp ly and thus enabling e mp loyment growthand red uc ing up wa rd wa ge pressure.

Migrants wo rk in mo st type s of job in London. There are conc entrationsma inly from riche r c ountries in the financ ial and business services. Ma nywo rk in c ate ring and hospitality. A8 in-migrants a re particularlyc onc entrate d in construc tion.

Those c om ing from less develop ed c ountries tend (at least initially) to ta keup low er sta tus job s tha n their qualifica tions wo uld wa rrant. Ove r time thisd ifferentia tion tend s to d isappea r.

An effect of the concentration of migrants in the worst paid segment ofthe labour market has been a significant downward pressure on wages atthe bo ttom end of the market. This seems to have enc ouraged jobgrowth in these occupations, but earnings among workers in this sector

1 A8 the 8 ea stern and c entral Europe an a c c ession c ountries of the EU25.


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have suffered , fa lling b ehind g row th in the c ost of living. At the same timethe ga p betw een ea rnings leve ls for this group in Lond on a nd those in therest o f the UK has bee n substa ntially erod ed .

High levels of net inward migration in the working age range (averagingabout 70 thousand per annum (p.a.)) have continued since 2000, despite

both the substantial cut-back in numbers of asylum-seekers and the factthat Lond on em ployment g row th has slowed do wn.

So fa r, this imb a lance in labour supp ly and dem and trends has beenmitigated particularly by increased out-commuting, with no evidentincrea se in unemp loyment in Lond on. Ac ross the wider set of southeastern regions including London, there may, however, have been somedo wnwa rd effec t on lab our ma rket pa rtic ipa tion.

Both employment rates and earnings among new migrants tend to belowe r tha n for otherwise c om parable Londone rs. This suggests tha t the irpote ntial is not being fully used a t p resent by Lond on employers.

Acc omm oda ting the migrant pop ulation New migrants form fewer households than their indigenous counterparts.

They a lso c onsume less housing a nd live d isp rop ortiona te ly in the p rivaterented sec to r. Over time the ir housing de ma nds increa se as inco me s riseand people become more settled but if there is significant turnover inmigrants this longer term imp ac t is more limited .

Add itional demand from migrants and foreign investors, have put p ressureon house p ric es. In the priva te rented sec tor, how eve r, rents haveremained fairly stable as demand increases suggesting that supply hasbe c ome more elastic .

Migrants are not usually eligible for social housing immediately on entry.

Those w ho rema in on low inc om es and in p oo r housing cond itions,espec ially those w ith fam ilies, will be e ligible for assista nc e a nd may ob ta inpriority if they bec om e hom eless. This c an ad d to existing tensionsbetween meeting housing need among newer entrants and perceivedhousing entitlements among esta b lished residents.

Use o f pub lic services by migrants The m ajority of m igrants use relat ive ly fewe r pub lic servic es tha n

indigenous households and are therefore less costly to the public purse.There a re, howe ver, add itiona l pressures from the d iverse needs ofmigrants, and the c laims of tho se in the we akest situat ion. The c osts of

housing, translation services, health provision, schools and social securitybenefits have increased as a result of the additional needs of some newmigrants to Lond on.

Finance to secure additional local government services is often not fullyunderwritten by central government, resulting in councils having to makesta tuto ry p rovision without an ad eq uate resource base. Lond on fac esparticular problems when revisions are made to estimates of migranta rriva ls (and thus loc a l popula tions), as these lea d to unpred ic tab le shiftsin c entral grant supp ort to loc a l gove rnment, the NHS and othe r servic es.


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Summary Soc ial c ohesion within London ha s gene rally rem a ined strong during the

rec ent p eriod of rap id in-migrat ion. There is som e risk tha t this c ouldc hang e if there w ere a long-term m isma tch between a vailab le resourc esand ad ditiona l spe nding need s.

London is experiencing an unprecedented period of sustained high levelsof international migration, of very diverse kinds, with potentially majorimpac ts on the growth and c om pet itiveness of London. This firstassessment has identified some of the key effects, especially with respectto the lab our market, housing and loc a l services. It has a lso shown tha tthe relationships between increased in-migration and the functioning ofthe c ap ital are c om plex. Substa ntial further resea rc h will be req uired fullyto assess their ove ra ll imp ac t on the Lond on e conomy.


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1 Introduction

Migration, which is often a politica lly-c onte sted and awkwa rd subjec t, is a lsoseen as a p ow erful indica to r of a c itys mo dernity, op enness and its willingnessto adap t to econo mic p rog ress. City lea ders tend to ta lk op timistica lly about

the benefits of a c osmopo litan pop ulation and a bo ut the flow o f new peop leinto their city.

Thus, the introd uc tion to the Mayors London Plan sta ted tha t Lond on is themost c ulturally diverse c ity in the world . It we nt on to ma ke a strong case forinternational in-migration:

Londons diversity is one of its great historical social, economic andc ultura l streng ths. New a rriva ls mo ving to Lond on from o versea s willc ontribute further to it. Lond on is a lrea dy a highly diverse c ity, one o fthe most multi-rac ial in the world . Nea rly one-third o f Lond oners a re

from b lac k and m inority ethnic c om munitiesand) a signific ant growthin (these) is p rojec ted over the next 15 yea rs. Inte rnationa l in-and out-migration has been high and is projected to remain so (MoL, 2004,p26).

London is not a lone in see ing migra tion as a p ow erful asset . The Mayor ofNew Yorks Commission for Immigrant Affairs has stated:

If New York City is the capital of the world, it's because of the energyand v ision of gene ra tions of immigrants. Imm igrants a re 36% of NewYork's pop ulation and 43% of the lab or force. They c ont inue a long

history of spurring growth, fuelling our ec onomy, and building dynam iccom munities (NYMOIA, 2007).

The Ma yor of Toronto, Da vid Miller, has linked his c itys la rge immigrantpo pulations more spec ific ally to Torontos po tential to ta ke ad vanta ge ofgrowth in China a nd India in the yea rs ahea d:

It ha ppens tha t Toronto's two large st g roup s of imm igrants are fromChina and South Asia. That mea ns we ha ve a na tura l advantage inthis shifting globa l ec onomy. We a lrea dy have the cultura l andbusiness links to ma ke Toronto a hub of t rade a nd business betwe en

North Americ a and Asia (CoT, 2005).

Ma yors in other c ities wo uld make similar rem arks. Migration is seen asevidence tha t a c ity is cap ita l of the w orld or the m ost c ultura lly diverse c ityin the world , with the imp lic at ion tha t this is a g ood thing . New m igrants a rebelieved to strengthen the economy and also provide a signal of the citysglob a l rea ch. Set ag a inst such confident judg em ents, hard evide nc e is,how eve r, much mo re d ifficult to pin dow n. The a im o f this rep ort is to sta rt thetask of build ing a relevant evidenc e base for the c ase of Lond on. Thisinvolves identifying those impacts about which knowledge is available butalso the significant areas of ignorance where more evidence needs to be

ga thered , and those fields where ac tual imp ac ts will de pe nd o n how the c ityrespond s to the oppo rtunities and c hallenges tha t m igration now p resent.


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At the sta rt o f the 21st c entury, Lond on is in a c onfiden t a nd expa nsive m ood,thanks both to growing incomes in its professional financial and businessservices (and the spend ing p ow er of those w ho w ork in them ) and a symb olicturnaround in population trends within Greater London after half a century ofc ontrac tion. The imm ed ia te causes of these two d eve lop ments a re, in the

first case, the combination of a very strong competitive position in thesesectors built up over decades, with a burgeoning (national and international)demand for sophisticated services, and in the second case an extraordinarygrowth in international immigration, not in itself unique to London, butsc arc ely ma tc hed elsew here for its sc a le and d iversity. Two key questionsnow a re:

Whether these two developments are causally linked, and mutuallysupp ortive in a wa y tha t w ill help unde rwrite further expa nsion; and

how closely they are, or can be, connected in labour market terms, withboth:

international migration supplying the kinds of labour that Londonreq uires to susta in its com petitive a dvanta ge , and

the growth sectors offering the employment opportunities makingeffective use of the labour potential offered by the new migrants,and suc cessfully integ ra ting them in soc ial and ec onomic terms.

As highlighted in publications linked to Gordon Browns last two Budgetspee c hes (HM Treasury, 2006, 2007), Lond on is now a lso identified sta tistic a llyas the UK region with the lowest employment (and highest unemployment)rates among its population which seems a great paradox for such asuc c essful c ity in overall ec onom ic terms. Ano the r question to be addressed

is whether the discovery of this phenomenon is somehow linked to a coupleof decades of large scale immigration into London either becausepopulation growth is running ahead of (a much less certain) expansion inemployment, or because migrants are feeding particularly into the bottomend of the labour market and undermining the position of those Londonerswho we re a lrea dy oc c upying the w ea kest positions in a high skill ec onomy.

Another key issue is whether the city can actually accommodate within itsborders the sc ale of growth that imm igrat ion has b roug ht. For dec adesLondoners demands for more space to match their rising incomes, have ledan increasing proportion to move out, allowing lower densities to be

ac hieved inside Grea ter Lond on. The reve rsa l of pop ula tion dec line in thecity over the last 20 years may well owe something to changes in tastesam ong a n increasingly educ ated pop ulation, some of whom atta c h greaterwe ight to a c c essib ility to the c ultura l and soc ial opp ortunities of the c ity thanto more space (at ground level), as well as the changing values of planners.It a lso (p erhaps p rep ond erantly) see ms to reflec t the w illingness of m igrants tolive at substantially higher densities than established residents.

Two questions of imp ortanc e then a re:

how far it is the case that the presence of increased numbers of migrants

has been responsible for densification and (thus) the new populationgrowth w ithin Lond on; and


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whether suc h d ifferences in housing asp ira tions will be susta ined over time,and thus whethe r further densific ation c an be expec ted , without a stea dyac c elera tion in the rate of internationa l imm igration.

Beyond these relatively straightforward labour and housing market issues,

there are more profound ones about the potential long-run impacts of amuc h mo re d iverse p op ula tion on the c ity s c rea tivity and its politica l c ulture.These a re m ostly beyond the sc op e o f this stud y, which is foc used onec onomic imp ac ts and currently visib le cha nge s. There a re, how eve r,important short-term aspects to both of these, one of which concerns theeffects of migration on demands for public services and the political/fiscalissues involved in respond ing to suc h de ma nds at a loca l level within the c ity.

Until rec ently, ra ther little ha s been known a bout the signific anc e o f migrationfor the Lond on ec onomy. Sinc e, and even during, the ea rlier post-wa r wa vesof Commonwealth immigration into London, the focus has been more on

ethnicity/race than on migration itself, largely because discrimination and itssecondary effects have continued to impact on the London-born childrenand g randc hild ren of these ea rlier migrants. There is, how ever, c urrent ly aburgeoning of research about many aspects of migration, including itsec onomic e ffec ts. Imp ortant e lements in this wo rk are underway but a re stillin quite e arly sta ges. The intent ions of this stud y a re thus la rgely exp lora to ry:to survey what can readily be established about the scale and role of thenew migration in relation to the London economy from accessible datasources and from pa pers emerging from c urrent resea rc h; and to assess boththe significance of these and key areas of ignorance requiring more focusedresearch effort.

To p ursue this, the fo llow ing c hap te rs first set the c ontext for the c urrent wa veof immigration into London, in relation particularly to Londons history ofreceiving migrants (Chapter 2); then examine the scale and character ofmigration over the past 20 years (Chapter 3); before considering itssignificanc e a nd imp ac ts in relation to the housing system (Chapter 4); labo urmarket/competitiveness (Chapter 5) and; public service provision (Chapter6). A conc lud ing chap ter d raws the threa ds tog ethe r, and identifies keypoints for consideration in relation to public policy in London anddevelopment of further research.


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2 Historic and overall trends

2.1 The history of migration to Lond onLond on is often d esc ribed as an internationa l city , onc e p rima rily in relationto its imperial role, but since the 1980s more broadly as a global city servingthe whole world . The ma in justific a tion for this title has been theconcentration of many dynamic command and control functions for anincreasingly integrated world economy, most notably in and around the Cityitself (e.g. Sassen, 1991). An eq ua lly rem arkab le and even more pervasivekind of internationalisation of the city in this period has been in its population,which has become dramatically more diverse over the past 20 years, withlarge numbers of new migrants from many places, most of which (unlike thehom es of ea rlier post w ar migrants) we re never part o f the British Emp ire.

The rea sons why pe op le ha ve t rave lled from oversea s to Lond on for wo rk,refuge, stimulus, profit, personal development and pleasure are almost asvaried as their origins, but b y no m ea ns unique to this c ity. Ma ny la rge urbancentres have a history of immigration, some on a much larger scale than wasthe c ase fo r Lond on for exam ple Toronto, Los Ang eles, Sydney and NewYork but these too have experienced large new waves over recentde c ad es which have a very similar cha rac ter to that a ffect ing London. OtherEuropean cities, like Paris and Amsterdam, are also experiencing morecosmopolitan (as well as larger) inflows now, if not to the same degree asLondon. In all these cases it is very muc h bound up with their urbancharacter, their openness, economic vitality, existing cultural diversity andc onc entrations of ec onomic , soc ial and pow er. The relationship , howeve r,seems to be a two way one, with a strong belief at least that the presence(and turnover) of migrants from a wide variety of origins will contributestrongly to all of these urban assets if also probably to the accompanyingtensions and prob lem s end em ic in suc h c ities.

The c onnec tion of international migration with high-leve l politica l pow er isc lea rly a very old one . Three mona rc hs c ame from Europ e and a numb er ofothers ma rried foreigners. Strong c onnec tions we re develop ed w ith rulersand roya l families in ma ny other Europ ea n c ountries. With a ll these links andtransitions there came larger groups of foreign migrants, some to the courtsthemselves, and some to pursue the commercial opportunities opened up bythe interna tionalisa tion of the m ona rc hy.

Londons trading role was also a major stimulus to migration, and migrantscont ributed grea tly to it from the very beg inning. The City deve lop ed as ac entre o f oversea s trad e from the p eriod of Roman o c cupa tion onwa rds, andthe fact that its main city was a wholly Roman creation, with no native past,marked Britain out from virtually all other provinces of Rome: London beganas a city of foreigners, and long continued as a government town, whoseresident authority overawed native British custom (Morris, 1982, 280-281).

By the end of the Roman period in the 5th century, however, most ofLond on s pop ula tion would have b een born here, and its subseq uent dec linehalted further immigration. When it re-emerged as an Ang lo-Saxon c itya round 600, it wa s sett led by migrants from othe r pa rts of England , who we re


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assimilated through both intermarriage and peaceful commerce (Ackroyd,2000). Afte r further occ upation b y Dane s, Eng lish rule w as esta b lished by KingAlfred , bringing a n era o f sec urity and trad ing suc cess, which w as ma inta ineda fter the Norman c onq uest. Peop le from m any different co untries passedthrough the c ap ital, as trad ers, d iplomats, servants and , late r, slaves. In the

13th century, the City of London was described as overflowing with Italians,Spanish, Provenc a ls and Poite vins (Selwoo d , Sc hwarz and Me rrima n, 1996).Lom bard Street in the C ity bec ame esta b lished as a b anking c entre a fterLom bard merc hants from northern Ita ly sett led there in the 12th century.

By the 15th century there were estimated to be 1850 foreigners in London,rising to 3,000 in 1501 (Selwood , Sc hwarz and Me rriman, 1996; Thrupp , 1969).Londoners would from time to time react against the privileges granted tosuch outsiders, and, on occasion, vented their fury and prejudice uponthem (Barron, 2004, p14). The mona rchy, however, was often enthusiasticabout the potential for taxation and lending provided by such overseas

traders: inc rea sing the power of foreigners (who we re unlikely to form a pow erbloc) was more attractive than strengthening London and its merchant class(who , in the C ity of Lond on, were p olitica lly po werful). The c itys willingness toattract and (for most of the time) tolerate foreign traders contributed to itsme rc antile suc c ess. In the period p rior to the Refo rma tion, Lond on seems tohave flourished as a truly cosmopolitan city (Barron, 2004, p115), though asubsequent wave of Huguenot immigration into London (fleeing Catholicpersec ution) p rovo ked a la rm during the mid-1560s.

By the midd le of the 17th c entury, Lond on s expa nsion wa s fuelled entirely bymigration, mo stly dom estic but partly internationa l. Jews, who ha d been

expelled from the country 350 years earlier, were allowed back in by OliverCromwell. Ma ny fled to Lond on from a nti-Sem itism in c ontinenta l Europ e,build ing a Sep hardic c ommunity of some 20 thousand , nota b ly in Spita lfieldswhe re they lived side-by-side with the Huguenots in an a rea now sett led byBanglad eshis. There we re a lso b etw een 5 and 10 thousand b lac k inhab itantsin Georgian London (Porter, 1994). High levels of immigra tion and ec ono micgrowth were seen as leading to higher wages and costs, making Londonexpensive compared both to the rest of the country and other cities inEurop e. These high wa ge s and c osts appea r, however, to ha ve energised itsec onomy, not dama ge d it (Porter, 1994). Moreover, ove rsea s traders beg anto ta ke an ac tive pa rt in the c ity s politica l life.

During the mid-19th century, famine in Ireland pushed people toward British(as well as American) cities in search of work, with 46 thousand emigrantssett ling in Lond on, ad de d to the 84 thousand w ho a lrea dy lived there. Thecitys Jewish population doubled between 1850 and 1880, especially aspeo p le fled pogroms in c entra l Europ e, Poland and Russia. The East Endbec am e a hea vily ove rc row ded d istric t of new m igrants. By 1901, 42thousand Russians and Poles lived in Stepney. Ma ny from this com munity la te rac hieved prominence in b usiness, sc ienc e and the a rts.

It was not only the poor and dispossessed that moved to London as the city

grew . The c itys we a lth and a ttrac tions b roug ht aristoc ra ts, investo rs andleisure-see kers from ac ross the world. The Grea t Exhib ition in 1851 was a


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publicly-backed initiative to show London as what would today be called awo rld c ity. The streng th o f its financ ial ma rkets with the ir op enne ss (at thisstage) to foreign participants brought European financiers to the city withinnovative practices that reinforced its competitive position (Michie, 1998).London also became a place where immigrants could foment ideas in a

relatively anonymous and tolerant po litica l environm ent. Lond on was aplace where dangerous continental anarchists could drop out of sight andbec ome a b rood ing p resenc e (Nash, 2005, p114).

2.2 The Twentie th centuryDuring the first Great Age of Migration (and globalisation) before the FirstWorld War, the UK (like Europe in gene ra l) was involved p rimarily as a p lac e o forigin ra ther than a s an important destination for internationa l flow s exce p tin its role as asylum fo r refug ees from Russia. During the first ha lf of the 20thcentury, particularly in the 20s and 30s, international migration was muchmore limited and Londons core activities became more insulated from

international influences while the emergence of a new round of refugeeflows in the late 1930s had rather little impact on the UK, although it broughtsom e d istinguished migrants to Lond on.

In Europ e g enerally, the period sinc e the Sec ond World War has been one ofvery much larger scale migration, both into and within the continent, thoughwith ma rkedly shifting p a tte rns, seve ra l of which have ha d d istinctive impac tson Lond on. In broa d te rms, we c an distinguish four sub -periods in whichd ifferent p roc esses have op erated to quite d ifferent effec ts:

Post-war resettlement: On the continent, the aftermath of the war (and the

division of Germany) brought massive movements, with many millions ofpeople being repatriated, forcibly displaced or voluntarily seeking asylum.The d riving fo rc es were a lmost ent irely po litica l, but with very ma jor ec onom iceffects, notably in providing a large boost to West German labour supplygrowth, continuing through the 1950s until the Wall halted the refugee flowfrom East Ge rma ny. The impac t of these flows on the UK was more mo dest,but a few hundred thousand European Volunteer Workers were recruited bythe post-war Labour government, primarily from Displaced Persons camps,and directed to employment in essential industries, mostly productionsec to rs where lab our wa s in short supp ly. At the t ime this source o f supp ly wa schosen over the importation of non-white workers from British colonies, who

we re seen as less soc ially ac c ep ta b le (Kay and M iles, 1992). Bec ause o f thetargeted sectors, these flows were mostly directed to areas of the countryaw ay from Lond on.

Managed labour importation: Throug h the 1950s and 1960s, most northernEuropean countries actively promoted labour immigration as a tool ofec onomic polic y, drawing in wo rkers from outside no rthern Europ e o n a basisinitiate d a nd m ana ged jointly by a c ombination of the sta tes c onc erned a ndma jor em p loyers in sea rc h of rep lac ement labour. The a rrange ments too kdifferent forms in different countries, with a major contrast between theGerma nic na tions. Citizenship was defined b y desc ent a nd fo reign migrants

had the status strictly of guest workers (gastarbeiter), and the main colonialpowers (such as the UK), where most of the new migrants either already had


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c itizenship rights or co uld rea d ily ac quire them. There were a lso significantdifferences in the sectors to which migrants were recruited, with a Germanfocus on expanding manufacturing sectors, contrasting both with a Britishemphasis on public services (and later on less competitive industries) and aFrench tendency for more migrants to go into private services/construction.

In the UK, though the interest of West Indians in coming to Britain (andparticularly London) was signalled by the arrival of The Empire Windrush atTilbury in 1948, la rge sc a le migrat ion from the re only followe d a t the end ofthe 1950s, thanks to rec ruitment initia tives by London Transport, and of theNat iona l Hea lth Service, continuing until it wa s large ly c ut o ff by the 1962Immigration Ac t.

Imm igrat ion to Lond on c ontinued through the 1960s thoug h, with a new influxof south Asians, includ ing refug ees from Kenya and Uganda . Rec ruitment oflarge numbers of Pakistanis at this time to work in a number of increasinglyuncompetitive manufacturing industries mostly brought migrants to northern

c ities rather than to Lond on. As far as tradab le good s we re conc erned ,howe ver, it b ec am e increasingly fea sible and at trac tive to use c heap lab oursupplies in situ, by of f-shoring wo rk.

Halting the inflow: This p lanned importa tion was ha lted in the early-mid 1970sfor reasons primarily associated with the oil price shock and risingunemployment in d omestic ec onomies, though British restric tions had c ome inea rlier, for essentia lly politica l reasons. In the ga sta rbe iter c ountries, inparticular, there was an expectation now that migrants would go home,reducing the size of the foreign-born population, for whom there was nolonger an ec onom ic need . Even with strong enc ourag eme nt in some p lac es,

this mostly did not occur. Cyc lic al (bac k and forwa rd) movem ent wa s greatlyreduced, however, facing earlier migrants with a much starker choicebetween permanently returning home, or staying on a more settled basis,which is wha t the g rea t ma jority did. From the 1980s onw ard , gove rnmentpolic ies in the ma in migrant c ountries inc rea singly c omplem ented restric tionson further primary immigration2 with efforts to enhance settlement andintegration am ong previous immigrants, including ac c ep tanc e o f sec ond arymigration a s a means of fa mily reunific a tion.

New (Post-Fordist)3 migration: From the later 1980s, long-distance migrationinto western Europe revived on a much more heterogeneous and less

ma naged basis. In pa rticular, the re was an upsurge in asylum-see king (fromea ste rn Europe a nd from war-torn area s of the Third World ), in movem ents bythe highly skilled , and in sponta neous ec onomic migration b y individua ls fromma ny areas of the wo rld now in possession o f muc h better informat ion ab outavailable work opportunities abroad, both through globalised media, andc onta c ts with ea rlier migrants. Thoug h immigration c ontrols rema ined in forcethey were less effec tive in stem ming this new migration. Globa lly the numbersof p eop le living o utside their country of origin are estimated to ha ve g row n by

2 i.e. migration o f single pe op le or princ ipa l family brea dwinners.3 Post-Fordism refers to a shift in the balance of economic activity over the last 25 years or so

from one characterised by mass production of relatively standard goods in large firms or stateorga nisa tions, to a mo re flexible, dive rse and ma rket-oriente d mix. Post-Fordist m igration sharessimilar fea tures, co ntrasting with the mo re organised and hom og ene ous flows of the 1960s.


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80% between 1980 and 20004. One fa c tor in this wa s the g rea t upsurge inrefug ee flows, p rincipa lly from o ne Third World c ountry to a nother, but a lsoinvolving a t the pea k of asylum seeking in 2001 som e 638 thousand a rrivals inOECD c ountries (with som e 15% c om ing to the UK).

The red uc ed role o f ma jor em p loyers in shap ing this new d iverse set of flow s,the much enlarged set of origins, and the increased representation ofgrad uates in them all sugg est that ma jor c ities (espec ia lly those w ith a rangeof established minority populations) should be of special significance asdestinations for the new migration. At a n internat iona l sc a le, the OECD( 2004)reports that current immigrant flows into advanced economies arepa rtic ularly c onc entrate d in a rea s which a re: ec onom ic ally att rac tive, urbanin charac ter, c lose to relevant p orts of entry, and with existing c onc entrationsof potential imm igrant g roup s.

Lond on ha s c ertainly figured p rom inently in the upsurge of immigrat ion to the

UK over the past 20 years, typically receiving about 40% of the gross inflows(three times its pop ula tion share). In net te rms the c onc entration has beeneven more striking indeed until the la te 1990s Lond on e ffec tively acc ounte dfor 85-90% of additions to the UKs migrant stock, coming down to 55-60% inthe last 5 years, as migra tion has sta rted to ta ke off in other reg ions. Theimpact on Londons own population over the last 20 years has beendrama tic , bo th quantitatively and q ualitatively. The chronic p op ulationde c line of the p revious qua rter century has be en rep lac ed by net growth (ofaround 50 thousand p.a.); the share of foreign born in the population hasalmost doubled over 20 years, reaching about one-third of the total, and thenumber of nationalities heavily represented among its residents has grown

enormously, with a much larger proportion now coming from non-Englishspea king c ountries (Table 2.1).

Tab le 2.1: The c osmop olitanisation o f Lond ons population 1986-2006

1986 2006

Foreign born po pulation 1.17 million 2.23 million

Proportion o f total 17.6% 30.5%

Share c oming from

former British territories

76% 59%

Dom inant o rigins:

Number of countriescontributingmajority of migrantstock

6 co untries

Ireland , Ind ia, Kenya ,Jama ica , Cyp rus,

Bangladesh

15 countries

Previous 6 +Nigeria, Poland, Sri

Lanka, Ghana , SouthAfrica, Pakistan,

Somalia, USA, Turkey

Source: Lab our Forc e Survey (LFS).

4 From 96 to 174 million ac c ord ing to UN sta tistics.


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In this respect, London has truly become a global city, rather than simply anex-imp eria l one . A rec ent interna tiona l c om parison (Benton-Short et a l., 2004)places London just in the top quartile of international cities (24th out of 116) interms of its proportion of foreign born, well behind places such as Dubai,Miami and Amsterdam all clearly smaller than London and with a smaller

absolute number of fo reign born tha n New York, Los Ang eles or Toronto(whe re 2 million foreign born rep resent 45% of the c ity pop ulation). On abroader total immigrant index, reflecting diversity as well as the overall shareand number of foreign born, this study places London in 5th position, justahead of Am sterdam and well ahead of a ny other Europ ea n c ity (Tab le 2.2).

Tab le 2.2: The Top 10 internationa l c ities for immigration and po pula tion

diversity

Cities Tota l imm igration index

New York 2.11

Toronto 1.92

Dubai 1.89

Los Angeles 1.79

London 1.28

Amsterdam 1.13

Vancouver 1.08

Sydney 1.06

Miami 1.03

Melbourne 0.86

Sourc e:Benton-Smith et al., 2004.Note: The tota l immigration inde x presented here c omb ines mea sures of a bsolute a nd relative immigrantstock, together with its diversity in terms of national origins5.

Thoug h from a ra ther d ifferent sta rting p osition, Lond on c ould be seen a s nowfollow ing the c ourse p ursued by New York a d ec ade o r so earlier. Thoug hNew York had a lwa ys been a c ity of imm igrants (or their descend ants), from avariety of, mostly European origins, the influx was very severely cut back from1924 until 19656 (Moorhouse, 1988), after which high rates of immigration frommany new origins brought a turnaround, from heavy decline to substantialgrowth, between the 1970s and 1980s in the citys population trends (NYDCP,

2004). In fac t, since sec urity-ba sed restric tions cut immigration to the US bac kfrom its 2001 pea k, Lond on seems to have c aught up with, and possib ly evenovertaken New York in terms of the net inflow, with each gaining some 500thousand people from abroad between 2000 and 20057. This must surely bethe first time that London has matched that great immigrant city in theseterms, and concerns are starting to be expressed there that the newconstraints on immigration of skilled workers may be starting to affect thatc itys ab ility to a ttrac t skilled ta lent (Mc Kinsey, 2007, p16).

5 Tec hnica lly, this index is a z sc ore, sc a led to prod uc e a me an va lue of 1.0 ac ross the full set o f

c ities, with a sta ndard d eviat ion of 1.0 a lso.6 With some post World War II concessions for displaced persons from Europe.7 The Lond on estima te is from ONS and the New York figure from Demo grap hia (2007).


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2.3 ConclusionWhat the rea l significanc e is for Lond on o f this pop ulat ion turnaround , and ofthe new migration which triggered it beyond the simple addition of extranumbers to those living in the c ity is the foc us of the rest o f this rep ort. Insom e w ays it m ight be a rgue d tha t the re is nothing e ssentially new ab out the

influx which Lond on (like New York) is now e xperienc ing. The c ity has longexperience o f p laying host to c ultura l elites (or cu ltura l servants of the e lite ), torefugees and would be revolutionaries, to upwardly mobile people seekingan introduction to the world of affairs, and to larger numbers looking simplyfor work. What is novel ab out the p resent situa tion seems principa lly to be thecoincidence of each of these kinds of flow, operating on a much largersc a le, and from mo re c ountries of o rigins than Lond on ha s eve r expe rienc edbefo re. We sta rt our investigat ion in the next c hap ter by seeking to c hart thekinds of flow now coming into London, their scale and the dynamics of theirchange.


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3 Migrant flows, stocks, composition and

dynamics

This c hap ter foc uses on the new migration into Lond on a nd the UK ove r the

past 20 years, seeking to establish some basic facts about: who has beenc oming to London, in wha t numb ers, and wha t the ma rgins of unc ertainty areabo ut this. It a lso a na lyses how and why trends have b een evo lving o ver thisperiod and what the implications are for longer term population change inthe c ity.

3.1 Sourc es and definitionsFrom the outset it must be recognised that there are particular problems inpinning down the numbers, characteristics and thus the impacts ofinternationa l migrants. These reflec t va rious fac to rs:

the heterogeneity of types of move and difficulties in establishing whoshould b e c ounte d as a migrant, a s d istinc t from e.g. a visitor;

the elusiveness of recent, frequent or weakly integrated migrants as far asc onventional surveys or administra tive records a re c onc erned;

the impacts of controls on migrants or their permitted activities on countsfor those w ishing to a void d ete c tion; and

the failure o f c onventiona l nationa l sta tistica l sources in rec ording o utwa rdmo vem ents ac ross na tional bound aries.

In the face of the growing importance of migration (and specificallyimmigration) as a phenomenon, UK official statistics are recognised to have

ma jor inad eq uac ies. Indee d the Inte rdep artmenta l Task Force (2006) rev iewof m igration sta tistics hea d lines an ob servation by John Sa lt, the lea d ingac ad emic expert in the UK, that:

The rea lity is we don t rea lly have a sa tisfac tory me asurem ent of thenumb er of peop le who a re c om ing to live in the UK (p. 15).

While this is clearly true, it is important not to interpret it as meaning that thepublished official estimates are necessarily biased downwards, or that there isnot a great deal to be learned from them about the role and significance ofoversea s migration. It should a lso be rec og nised tha t, with the very d iverse

types of trans-national movement which have grown up over the past 20years or so, some of the major uncertainties actually involve the questionwho should be counted as a migrant (for particular purposes), and notsimp ly how ma ny imm igrants a re there . In London s c ase, as we sha ll see ,there are many people from overseas who spend time working and living inthe c ity, but not long enough to c ount a s migrants, and ma ny others who arecounted as migrants but d o no t stay p ermanently.

The sta tistica l sources c urrent ly used by UK government to estima te inflow sand outflows of international migrants, and those (notably the Labour ForceSurvey (LFS) on w hich we rely for informa tion a bout the c harac teristics of

London s mig rant po pulation, a re d isc ussed in Append ix 1. There are a lsodefinitions of the key te rms used to refer to va rious related c ateg ories which


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are sometimes c onfused . Our judge me nt is tha t, desp ite the range o fp rob lems discussed there, the c urrent Tota l Inte rna tiona l Migrat ion (TIM) seriesprovides a reasona b le indica tor of the sc a le o f flows and of c hange s in thesesince the e arly 1990s, while the LFS offers a reasona b ly unbiased view of thecharac teristics of those who c om e to and rema in in Lond on. Due to the

limitations of available sub-national data, however, we need to start bylooking quite closely at UK level patterns of migration and how these havebe en evo lving in the rec ent p ast.

3.2 Mig ration trend s 1991-2005After an era of relatively modest, stable and balanced international flows forthe UK as a whole since the mid -1970s, the period a fter 1991 (when the TIMseries start) has been one of strong and rising immigration, with sizeable netinflow s in every year excep t 1992 and 1993 (Figure 3.1). Althoug h on averageoutflows are of a c ompa rab le m ag nitude to inflows (averaging some 300 and400 thousand per year respectively over these 14 years), it is in-migration

which is the ma in d river of c hange. This very la rgely (around 85%) com prisesprimary immigration by people born outside the UK, whereas a larger part ofout-migration represents return moves by recent immigrants (with the UK-bornac counting for just half the outflow ). Thus ove r the p eriod as a whole,international emigration from the UK has tended to grow, alongsideimmigration.

Figure 3.1: International migra tion flows UK, 1975-2005

Source : ONS da ta p resente d in ITF (2006).

Notes: Da ta fo r 1975-1991 from the Interna tiona l Passenge r Survey (IPS) on ly; for 1991-2005 on a TIM ba sis(includ ing a sylum seekers and sta tus switc hers).

Comparing the two halves of this period (the calendar years 1991-97 and1998-2005) it ca n be seen (Tab le 3.1) tha t out-migra tion has g row n by ab outone-third as much as in-migration (65 thousand p.a. compared with 194

thousand) with net-migration increasing by two-thirds as much (129 thousandp.a.). Higher levels of a sylum seeking were partly responsible for the


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inc rea sed inflow up 31 thousand p .a. on average. This ac tua lly reflec tsmuch higher levels in just 4 years, 1999-2002, when they averaged 88thousand c om pared with 32 thousand in the other 11 yea rs. (A sha rpreduction in asylum flows since 2002 presumably partly reflects a tightening ofcontrols, but is in the context of reduced applications to all West European

c ountries, and a ha lving of inflows to OECD na tions).

Tab le 3.1: Internationa l migrant flows into and out o f the UK, 1991-2005 (annua l

averages in 000s)

1991-2005 1991-97 1998-

2005

Change

between

sub-

periods

Tota l in-flows 407 304 498 194

Tota l out-flow s 298 264 329 65Tota l balance 109 40 169 129

Asylum seekers in-flow 50 34 65 31

Asylum see ker out-flow 11 5 15 10

Irish in-flow 11 16 6 -10

Irish out-flow 18 18 16 -2

Other in-flow 346 254 427 173

Other out-flow 269 241 298 57

Sourc e: ONS (annua l), MN series (Total Interna tiona l Migrat ion estima tes).

Note: The othe r c ate go ry rep resents migrants rec orded by the IPS and subsequent a djustme nts (ad dingabout 20 thousand p.a. to both inflows and outflows) reflecting recorded switches by individuals between

visitor and mig rant status.

Partly off-setting this factor was a reduced in-flow from Ireland, falling by 75%since the mid-1990s (reflecting the marked strengthening of the Republicsec onomy). The ma in fac tor, how eve r, has been a fa irly co nsistent g row th inother kinds of imm igration from ma ny other orig ins. These flow s have risensteadily from 1995 on, with growth rates of 8-9% p.a., reaching 454 thousandin 2003. There wa s a step up to 537 thousand in 2004 and 2005, p rinc ipa llyreflecting the impact of heightened flows from the new (A8) EU accessionc ountries in ea ste rn/ c ent ra l Europe from May 20048.

The ma jor orig ins in terms of the a rea of last o r next c ountry of residenc e a reshow n in Tab le 3.2 for the 2005 flows. For the b roa d reg ions which w e ide ntify,the EU15 (i.e. the 15 countries of western Europe within the EU prior to its lastexpansion) stands out in terms of the combined volume of flows in and out,reflecting both its proximity and the free internal movement of labour.Relative to the population sizes of the countries involved, however, the flowsto and from Australia/New Zealand are actually the most remarkable,showing the p otenc y of c ontinuing c ultural connec tions.

Within Europe too, it is remarkable that the EUs new accession countries tothe east (dominated numerically by Poland) generated almost as large an

8 For 2005, the IPS estima tes an inflow to the UK of 70 tho usand mig rants from the se c ountries,and an outflow of 17 thousand (ONS, MN32, 2007).


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inflow to the UK in 2005 as the vastly la rger pop ulation of the EU15, though theoutflows from the UK we re ve ry muc h sma ller. Clearly the c ombination of thelarge wage differentials relative to the A8 countries, and the lead taken bythe UK in opening up its borders immediately in 2004 to labour migrants fromthese new ac c ession countries has much to d o w ith this. In terms of the large

proportional excess of inflows over outflows, the A8 countries seem, however,to fit into a ra ther simp le p a tte rn. The rela tively po or/ low wa ge reg ions of theworld generate substantial net inflows to the UK, whereas the richer regionsare either in b a lance (in the c ase of the USA) o r attrac t substantially largerout flow s from the UK (in the case o f the EU15 and Australia / New Zea land ).

Tab le 3.2: Migration flows by international reg ions of last/next residenc e, 2005

Inflow

(000s)

Outflow

(000s)

Net balance

(000s)

Ind ian sub-c ont inent 86 17 +69

EU A8 c ountries 81 18 +63

AfricanComm onwea lth 62 20 +41

Rest of the World 159 102 +58

USA 25 27 -1

EU15 95 114 -18

Australia / NewZealand

57 82 -27

Tota l 565 380 185

Rich c ount ries 184 236 -52

Poor c ount ries 381 144 +237

Source : ONS (2007) International Migration MN32.Notes: 1.These d ata are on a TIM basis. 2. Rich c ountries inc lude the O ld Com mon wea lth (OCW) (excep tSouth Africa ), the EU15, and the US, while Poo r countries includ e a ll others.

In terms of country of birth, the general pattern is, not surprisingly one of netgains by migration of those born abroad and net losses from the UK-bornpop ulat ion. The sc a le of the estimated ne t outflow of the la tte r group ,however, is remarkable, averaging 81 thousand p.a. during 1998-2005,

alongside average gains of 249 thousand p.a. among the foreign-born.Taking the EU15 and the O ld Comm onw ea lth (OCW) as an app roxima tion tothe g roup of rich countries , there wa s an ave rage net inflow of those b orn inthis part of the world of 43 thousand per year, against a gain of some 203thousand p .a. from the po orer rest of the world . Given that m igrat ion by theUK-born is very largely to or from other rich countries, we can see that the netoutflow from the UK to other rich countries equates with there being muchlarger net losses by migration o f the UK-bo rn tha n the net ga ins to the UK fromthe migration o f those b orn in other affluent c ountries.

The ba lanc e betw een these groups in UK migration ha s c hange d substa ntially

since 1991 (see Figure 3.2). The inflow of those born in other ric h countries(EU15 and OCW) grew substantially in the early 1990s, as the economy


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moved out o f rec ession, and then levelled off. By contrast, the inflow of tho sebo rn in the g enerally poorer remainder of the w orld rap idly ac c elerated afte r1998, increasing by 200 thousand over just 7 years, and reaching 3 times theleve l a t which it sta rted out in 1992. The inflow of the British-born, i.e. earlierout -migrants returning home , while expe rienc ing short-term fluc tua tions has

shown no real trend, but the outflow of this group has moved up stronglysince 1998, when it totalled 125 thousand, to touch 200 thousand in 2004,befo re fa lling b ac k slight ly in 2005. The p a tte rn of overall c hange s among a llem igrants over these yea rs suggests tha t the shift relates very large ly to:

people intending to stay away for 4 or more years (whereas inflows havegrown mainly among people expecting short 1-2 year or uncertainsta ys); and

to people with reasons other than work/study or accompanying/joiningothe rs, and to wo men muc h more tha n men. (This group c omprises of acombination of other reason and no reason stated in the statistics e.g.

they would include retirees, people taking extended breaks, individualsset ting up businesses, and if answers a re not c onsidered work rela ted .)

Figure 3.2: UK migration inflows and outflows by birthplace of migrants: UK-

bo rn, other rich countries and poor c ountries, 1992-2005 (000s)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

1992 1995 1998 2001 2004

Rich Country Inflow

Poor Country Inflow

Rich Country OutflowPoor Country Outflow

British_Inflow

British_Outflow

Source: ONS (annual) MN series.Note s: 1. Rich Coun tries a re de fined he re as the EU15 plus the O ld Co mm onw ea lth. 2. Data a re on a TIMba sis and exp ressed in thousands.

There a re interesting p atterns of c orrelat ion amo ng these streams of m igrants.In the c ase o f migrants born in rich countries, there is a strong positive rela tionbetw een the sc a le o f out flow s from the UK and those o f inflow s in the p reviousyear, suggesting that the pro-cyclical fluctuations in the inflows of this group


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contain a large element of short-term migrants9. For those born in poo rcountries there is no such relationship while for those born in the UK, thesignificant (positive) relationship is between their outflow rate, and the inflowof migrants from poo rer c ountries 2 yea rs p reviously10.

This latter c orrelat ion suggests the possibility o f som e kind of d isp lac em ent orreaction process caused by the inflow of poor country migrants stimulatinghigher out-migration11. Certa inly there has been a la rge increase inemigration of the British-born since 1997, in a period when UK economicperforma nc e ha s been relatively strong rem oving one t rad itional rea son fo remigration and when an unusually large proportion of emigrants expectedto be aw ay fo r more tha n 4 years, and ga ve reasons for going other than aspe c ific job , study o r joining/ ac c omp anying a fam ily mem be r.

3.3 Lond ons role in UK migrationOver the period since 1991, the pub lished TIM series suggest tha t Lond on (with

just 12% of the na tiona l popula tion) was a ssoc iate d with 40% of the inflows,30% of the outflows, and absorbed 67% of the net balance of overseasimmigra tion. In the sec ond ha lf of this period , Londons share of the inflowappears even higher, though this actually peaked in 1997-2001 years bothof high leve ls of a sylum seeking na tionally, and of strong e mp loyment growthin London when it averaged 44%, ag ainst 38% in the yea rs befo re a nd since .

As we note in Appendix 1, however, these estimates of Londons share of theinflow are now understood to be significantly exaggerated in relation towhe re m igrants ac tua lly end up . Comb ining the sets of revisions p rop osed forthe years 1999-2002 and for 2002-5, and making a similar adjustment for 1998,

a mo re likely figure fo r to ta l internationa l migrat ion into Lond on o ver the last8 years appears to be approximately 185 thousand p.a. gross and 87thousand p.a. net.

At 38% and 51% of the UK to ta ls (for gross and net f lows), the se still rep resent 3times and 4 times (respectively) Londons expected share on a simplepop ulat ion basis. This d isp roportion is not new: through the 1970s and 1980sLondon a pp ea rs to ha ve a bsorbe d ab out a third of inward migrants to the UK(on IPS estima tes), with an ab ove average ratio o f inflows to o utflows. As thetotal volume of inward movement has gone up and net immigration hasbec ome the no rm na tionally, so Lond on s share seems to have inc rea sed .

9 Reg ressing the outflow rate on the p revious yea rs inflow rate fo r this group yields a c oe fficientof 0.45, with and adjusted R-squared value of 0.75 over the years 1993-2005.10 The c oe fficient on the la gg ed inflow ra te is 0.39, and the a d justed R-squa red va lue 0.889,reflec ting a n extreme ly signific ant relationship.11 A simple regression of out-migration by British nationals in the years 1994-2004 on foreign-bornimmigration rates 2 years earlier yields an adjusted R-squared value of 0.83 and a regressioncoefficient of 0.28 (rising to 0.50 if the previous years unemployment rate is included as ac ontrol variab le. There is a similar rela tion for out-mig ration from the UK by foreigners, in rela tion

again to their lagged in-migration rate, but this seems essentially to reflect the incidence ofreturn/onw ard m igration (a view supp orted b y the fac t that similar relations c an b e found on amo re d isaggrega ted leve l, e.g . for asylum seekers, Irish flows, EU c itizens etc .).


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Figure 3.3: Gross international migration 1985-2005: London versus the rest of

the UK (RUK), 000s

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

RUK In

RUK Out

London In

London Out

Source: ONS (annual) MN series.Note s: 1. Data are o n a TIM ba sis, co ve ring c alenda r years and exp ressed in thousand s. 2. RUK is the rest of

the UK (exc luding London).

Inspec tion o f the annua l TIM series (Figure 3.3) show s tha t b oth London andthe rest of the UK have had strong upward trends in immigration since themid-1980s, along side a slowe r but steady inc rea se in emigration. The t imingof periods of strong growth has been rather different, however, withimmigration into London growing most steeply between 1994 and 2000, then

levelling off, while in the rest of the UK the upturn came later and rapidgrow th was c onc ent ra ted in the years 1998-2004. The ra tio o f inflow s tooutflows has almost always been greater in London than in the rest of the UK.London has had consistent net gains from immigration since 1985, whereasthis only bec ame the norm ac ross the rest of the c ountry in 1998. OutsideLond on, it is a lso no tab le tha t rates of out flow seem to have b een muc h moreheavily shaped by inflows 1 or 2 years earlier, which may imply more shorterterm imm igra tion there. Of the two spec ia l fac tors ge nerating sharp yea r onyear fluctuations nationally asylum seekers and the recent A8 influx Lond on seem s to ha ve b een m ore affec ted by the former, though there arema jor da ta unc ertainties in bo th c ases.

Over the period 1983-97 (during which large scale refugee flows to the UKemerged and rose to almost their peak level), London has been estimated tohave received between 240 and 280 thousand refugees 85% of a UK totalestimated at between 282 and 330 thousand 12 (Storkey and Bardsley, 1999).In the years since 1997, ONS figures for net movements by asylum seekerssuggest tha t the UK to ta l should ha ve risen b y som e 400 thousand . Dispersa lpolicies introduced in 2000 appear to have substantially reduced Londonsshare of these new a dd itions to the refugee pop ula tion. Ove ra ll this has

12 This 85% estima te origina lly derives from ana lysis of a samp le o f Home O ffice files for tho segranted asylum or exceptional leave to remain between 1983 and 1991 (Carey-Wood et al.,1995).


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averaged about 31%, since although only about 5% of those supported withac c ommo dation under the National Asylum Supp ort Sc heme live in Lond on,the proportion remains at about 73% for those just receiving financialassista nc e (HO, annua l). Over the p eriod 1998-2005 then, it appea rs likelythat London will have added a further 180 thousand or so to its refugee

po pulation (i.e. an ave rag e o f abo ut 23 thousand pe r yea r, though fa lling toperhap s a q uarter of tha t rate in the last c oup le o f years).

In the case of the A8 migrants, who started arriving in the second half of 2004,there is only a year and a ha lf of da ta on whic h to base judgem ents. There isalso a great deal of uncertainty about the to-ings and fro-ings and length ofstay of this group (am ong who m the Poles a re numerica lly do minant).

National statistics indicate that intending migrants (as distinct from workingvisitors) numbered some 52 thousand in 2004 and 80 thousand in 2005.Estimates of Londons share in this total vary between 13% based on Worker

Registration Scheme (WRS) registrations and about 33% on a nationalinsurance number (NINO) basis, with an intermediate figure from the AnnualPopulat ion Survey (APS) of 19%. The p oint see ms to be tha t Poles in pa rtic ularhad been c oming to Lond on in increasing numb ers sinc e the ea rly 1990s (withvery much smaller flows to the rest of the country) and continue to come,independ ent ly of ac c ession and the WRS. The new (WRS-ma naged ) flowshave spread workers (most of whom intend staying less than 3 months) muchmore evenly across the country, including rural areas where a sizeableminority have taken seasonal jobs in agriculture/food-processing (HO et al.,2007).

The a dd ition to Lond on s migrant inflow c onseq uent on allow ing immed iateentry to job-seekers from the A8 countries is probably in the region of 5-10thousand p.a., with the likelihood of some additions to the outflows of thisgroup reduc ing the net imp ac t further. A8 a rriva ls have thus been anotherfactor, along with the recent slowing and dispersal of asylum arrivalsc ontributing to Lond on s red uc ed share in UK immigration over rec ent yea rs though in numeric te rms it has sta b ilised , not a c tua lly fa llen.

In te rms of the more spec ific na tiona l origins of rec ent migrants to Lond on, wehave p oo led da ta on the m ost recent year s a rriva ls from LFS unde rtakenbetwee n 1999 and 2006. The results, presented in Tab le 3.3, show a b roa d

spread of intakes across regions of the world, including particularly Europe(East and West), Africa and Asia (bo th South and East). The c ountriesresponsible fo r the largest inflow s we re (in o rder) Australia , Ind ia, South Africa ,Poland, the US and Brazil.


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Table 3.3: Origins of immigrants to London, 1998-2005

Country of origin Percentage of inward flows

Western Europ e 18%

of which Franc e 5%Central/ Eastern Europe 14%

of which Poland 5%

Australia/ New Zea land 9%

North Ame rica 6%

of which US 5%

Caribbean 2%

Central/ South Am erica 5%

of which Brazil 3%

Middle East 4%

South Asia 12%

of which Ind ia 6%

East Asia 10%

Africa 19%

of which South Afric a 6%

Sourc e: LFS s 1999-2006.

Note: Data relate s to p ersons arriving in the yea r prece ding the survey .

3.4 Charac teristics of the mig rant po pula tion to LondonFor evidence on the characteristics of London migrants we shall rely onestima tes from the Annua l Emp loyment Survey fo r 2005-6 (which rep resents ac onsolida ted and extended version of the LFS). Its princ ipa l limita tion is tha t itexcludes all those living in institutional accommodation, which could includemany recent asylum seekers, who (for this or other reasons) may be missed.As we have seen, these are no longer a large element in the inflow and doap pe ar to g et c overed in large numb ers afte r a de lay o f 2 or 3 yea rs.

The b roa d charac teristics of the imm igrant inflow c an be m ost p rec iselyme asured in te rms of d a ta from a single quarte r of this survey on a rrivals in themo st recent year. From this it is evident tha t, as with imm igrants elsew here,those arriving in London from overseas are a young group, with half agedbetwe en 20 and 30, and only 5% over 45. Just 20% we re child ren, and ha lf ofthe a dults we re neither ma rried nor c oha b iting. Just ove r half were fromwhite ethnic origins, and 20% had non-Christian religious affiliations (half ofthese being Muslim).

For a closer look at the make-up of Londons migrant population we need alarger sample, and so will pool all those who respondents who have been inthe country for less than 3 years, while looking also at the group of moreestablished migrants (the foreign-born population resident in the UK for moretha n 3 yea rs).


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In te rms of p lac es of o rigin, we c ontinue to distinguish betw een those c om ingfrom relatively ric h a nd rela tively p oo r c ountries13. Asylum seekers/refugeesc annot b e sep ara tely identified from the LFS, but fo r an ind ica tion ofparticular characteristics which may differentiate them from other poorcountry migrants, we have distinguished a set of asylum countries, from

which asylum seekers represent a large proportion of migrants arriving in theUK14. This will exc lude many asylum see kers c om ing from c ountries whichgenerate large numbers of other kinds of migrant, as well as including thesmaller proportion of migrants from the asylum countries who are notthemselves refug ees.

Finally, though the numbers in the sample are small, we have occasionallydistinguished migrants from the A8 countries (and/or Poland as much thelargest of the se). This group ing by area s of origin overlaps with ethnic a ndreligious classifications, in the sense that 75% of those from rich countries arewhite, compared with a quarter of those from poor countries; while one-third

of tho se from poo r c ountries a re M uslim, exc ep t a mongst the rec ently arrived ,where the Muslim proportion is diluted by a similar-sized contingent of (white,Christian) A8 migrants.

One key characteristic of migrants coming to London could be expected tobe their level of education, given the citys increasing specialization infunc tions requiring g rad ua te leve l skills. This is not entirely straight forwa rd toassess, given d ifferences in the type s of qua lific at ion tha t m igrants ma y have,and it is perhaps not surprising that the LFS, which has a particular interest inqualifications, assigns the majority of migrants to a miscellaneous group as faras highest qualification is concerned 15. For one-yea r migrants, the 2001

Census provides an alternative, less sensitive measure in terms of 5 levels onwhich mo st migrants do g et c lassified , whic h Ma nacorda et a l (2006) show tobe consistent both with the distribution of ages of completing education, andwith c od es g iven in other wa ves of the LFS to som e ind ividua ls elsew hereassigned to the o ther g roup . At the nationa l sc ale, they conc lude tha tother qualifications are more likely to equate to degree standards than tominima l leve l assumed b y those group ing othe r w ith none . Ove rall, theyindicate that the general level of qualifications among migrants is definitelyabove that of the native labour force, implying that migrants make aqualita tive as we ll as quantita tive c ontribution to the UK labo ur supp ly.

For London on its own, the 2001 Census (SAR) data show the same contrastthatMa nacorda et a l (2006) rep ort for the UK as a w hole. Even tho ugh theproportion with level 4/5 (degree equivalent) qualifications was much higheramong the London population (in the 16-74 age range), at 30%, than for therest of England and Wales/the UK, at 18%, it was even higher among therecent migrants, at 61% (compared with 45% for migrants elsewhere in the

13 The fo rmer group a re here de fined to inc lude the EU15, the Old C om mo nwe alth, the US,Jap an a nd Korea.14 The c ount ries p lac ed in this group were Alba nia, Alge ria, Bosnia, Croa tia, Ethiop ia, Iran, Iraq ,Leb anon, Mac ed onia , Rom an ia, Sierra Leo ne, Som a lia, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe a nd two othe r

Yugoslavia and other Middle East groups.15 Ma nac orda et a l. (2006) sugg est tha t this is partly a result of d eliberate policy b y ONS, notsimply a result of difficulties in cod ing ind ividua l cases.


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c ountry). The p rop ortion with no qua lific a tions (i.e. below leve l 1) wa s a lsodramatically lower among migrants to London (just 7% compared with 24%am ong the Lond on population).

It is clear then that there is a particularly high level of selection by

qualification (and presumably also ability) among those migrating to London,given the lower incidenc e o f higher ed uca tion in many o f the c ountries fromwhich m igrants a re d rawn. What is less c lear is, firstly, whether the c om parisonalso holds on an age for age basis, given that migrants are more likely to becompeting against their younger peers than those from earlier generationswhere educational opportunities were more limited and secondly, whetherthere are big differences between migrants coming from relatively rich ascompared to relatively poor countries.

To address the first o f these questions we have foc used spec ifica lly on 20-30yea r olds, as the c ore g roup of m igrants. As fa r as the C ensus me asure of

qualifications among one-year migrants is concerned, this does tend tona rrow the d ifferenc es, but only to a limited extent . 61% of migrants in thisage group had high level qualifications, against 36% among their Londonc oeva ls; and 7% had no q ua lific a tions, aga inst 13%. To examine how thisvaries across migrants from different origins, and those who have stayedlong er in the c ountry, we turn to the APS, using age of c om pleting full-timeed uc at ion as the indica tor of the leve l likely to have been ac hieved . Themain results a re shown in Tab le 3.4.

Tab le 3.4: Age of completing full-time e duc ation by origin and length of stay

in the UK: Lond on residents aged 25-44

Rich c ountry

migrant

Asylum origins Other po or

countries

Age ofcompletingeducation

InUK 3years

InUK 3years

InUK 3years

UK-born

3 years 2,000; Asylum origins 3 ye ars 1,000; Othe r po or c oun tries < 3 yea rs 800; Othe r po or c ount ries > 3 yea rs 4,200.Ap proxima tely half of these we re in the ag e range c ove red by this tab le. In tota l there we re 20,000 UK

bo rn respo nde nts, of whom a bo ut one qua rter were in this ag e range .

In terms of those staying in education until at least 20, who are very likely tobe graduates, it appears that all groups of migrants have higher proportionsthan the na tive born, with the po ssible excep tion of those from asylum o rigins

who have b een in the UK for seve ra l yea rs. The m ost recent group of m igrantsfrom rich country origins are distinguished by having a quarter of them


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ed uc a ted beyond age 24, p resuma b ly to postg raduate leve l. This sugg eststhat the most highly qualified are among those staying in the UK for relativelyshort p eriod s, ra the r than set tling here.

Overall, it seems that migrants coming from rich country backgrounds are

likely to be better qualified than the average migrant from poorer countries.There is, howeve r, a very la rge ove rlap betw een the two d istributions, andmigrants from p oo rer countries a re likely to possess qua lifica tions which are a tlea st c om parab le to those of the UK born within this age g roup . Relative tothe London labour force as a whole (or to the London-born within this agegroup), they will have had significantly more education and higher levelqualifications.

There a re, of c ourse, some q uestions to be a sked ab out the effec tiveequivalence of qualifications obtained in different countries in absoluteterms as measures of knowledge attainment but also relative to the

requirements of UK-based firms, and also in relation to theunde rstand ing/ app rec iation of Lond on emp loyers. In particular, the find ingsof MGI (2005) about the limited suitability of the great majority of university-educated professionals in low-wage countries for employment inmultinational businesses may also have some relevance at least to newlyarrived m igrants with simila r kinds of qua lific a tion. It c erta inly should not b epresumed tha t any of the m a jor stream s of inward m igrat ion into Lond on overthe past 10-20 years have low skills or limited potential, by the standards ofLondons own workforce.

3.5 The longer term demographic impac t of international migration

to LondonThe long -term effec ts of o versea s migration on the Lond on po pula tion,dep end s on three ma in fac to rs. The first and m ost basic o f these is the e xtentto w hich migrants ac tua lly sta y, rather than returning to the ir hom e c ountry ormo ving on to another destinat ion. The sec ond issue involves the extent towhich immigrants from abroad effectively displace some of the localpopulation, thus diluting their impact on population growth within the area ofmigrant settlement. The third fac tor involves the imp ac t of migrat ion onnatural change in an area, specifically through the children born to migrantparents.

Return and onward movesOne very important influence on the dynamics of international migration intoand out of London is the timing of return or onward migration among those immigrants w hose sta y in the UK turns out to b e temp orary. This furthe rmovement may have been planned from the outset when migrants cometo fulfil a spe c ific assignment, to ga in experienc e, to ac c umulate c ap ital, orsimply for the pleasure of travel or it may be unexpected with a furthermove stimulated by ano ther opp ortunity, a d evelopm ent requiring/ pe rmittingreturn home, or dissatisfaction with how the migrant experience has turnedout ( failed migrat ion ). Alternatively, and q uite co mmonly am ong pastimmigrant groups, expected return moves may fail to materialise, because

new attachments develop, connections with home weaken, or target ratesof saving p rove ha rde r to a c hieve in prac tic e.


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In fact, though the preconception about migrants is that they are peoplewho intend ma king a pe rma nent move to a new c ountry, the norm seem s tobe quite d ifferent. Almost half of imm igrants (whether from rich or po orcountries) declare an intention on arrival of coming for 1-2 years, with lessthan a third e xpec ting to stay more than 4 yea rs. On exit, three -quarters of

foreign migrants leaving the UK dec la re sta ys of b etwe en 1 and 4 yea rs. Thisseems reasonably consistent with the stated intentions of immigrants, exceptthat the much lower level of recorded emigration than of immigration byforeigners makes it clear that a very large number actually end up stayingsemi-permanently.

Hard data on durations of stay and their variation across migrant groups aresom ewhat e lusive (whether at UK sc a le or for migrants to Lond on) b ec ause ofthe limitat ions of a dministrat ive rec ords/ offic ial surveys of those lea ving thecountry (since such moves are hardly subject to control, while the vastma jority of those leaving a re travellers not e mig rants). Furthe r, in do me stic

surveys, even designedly longitudinal ones, emigrants tend to figure only as(one type o f) unexplained a bsenc e.

The b est ava ilab le source a ppea rs to b e the Qua rte rly Labour Force Survey(QLFS). This survey regularly provid es estima tes of the numbers of (past)imm igrants by the ir yea r of a rriva l into the UK, with the ra te of a ttrition a mo nga partic ula r co hort in succ essive yea rs (in tho se age bands with low morta lityra tes) p roviding a rea sona b le proxy mea sure of the likely rate of re-migrationout of the UK. This is sub jec t to significant sampling e rror where migrantgroups a re sma ll (sinc e annual samp les are very la rge ly independ ent16), whilethe re is a lso a significant q uestion on w hich, as we sha ll see , the survey itself

c asts some light abo ut the likelihood of recent immigrants being found andrespond ing to the QLFS.

To exp lore the imp ortanc e o f return move s for pa rticular ca teg ories ofimmigrant group, we ha ve ta ken the co horts of pe op le who d ec lared a rrivaldates in the years 1986-2006 and tracked the successive estimates of theirnum bers in sp ring qua rters of the Q LFS from 1999 to 2006. As the LFS is no tsupposed to survey recent arrivals, we have taken the number recorded asarriving in the preceding calendar year as a baseline estimate of the inflow.We have then tracked how numbers in a particular cohort change oversuc cessive waves of the survey, to estima te probabilities of surviva l/sta ying in

Lond on from the 1st to 2nd yea r, 2nd to 3rd and so o n17

.

With the exception of migrants coming from the asylum countries (whoserec orded numbers increa se fo r the first 3 years), the p a tte rn is one either of nosignificant changes in numbers or of red uc tion. We take this as som ereassurance that, apart from asylum seekers, who are clearly less likely to becounted (for both formal and informal reasons) that immigrants are being

16 By design individuals stay in the sample for 5 quarters, so that in comparisons between onequarterly survey and that 12 months later, at least 80% of the sample members will havechanged.

17 Given the extrem e youth o f the g rea t b ulk of migrants, we ha ve e ffectively assumed that a llexits from the sample are by migration (whether out of London, or more likely out of thecountry).


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c overed by the LFS. Initia lly we e xplored this issue on a q uite d isaggreg a tedbasis, but the one significant pattern of variation turned out to be betweenthe three broad groups already discussed, namely migrants from richcountries, from asylum o rigins and from other po or countries.

In the first c ase, there seems to be a c ontinuous de c line, a t a bout 15% p .a. forthe first 6 yea rs, and ha lf tha t ra te therea fter. In the sec ond c ase, there is awindow some 5-8 years after arrival in which numbers do appear to reducesignificantly (by a round 20%), but d o sta b ilise from then o n. Afte r 10 yea rs, thenumb ers we re d ow n by 80%, imp lying tha t this g roup is on the w hole ma de upof temp orary migrants to Lond on. Amo ng the third group , i.e. a ll othe rs frompoor countries, we found no significant evidence of a downward trend innumbers over the years after arrival, suggesting a very high propensity doset tle more o r less perma nently in London18.

This signific ant d ifferenc e in the ac tua l pa tte rn of beha viour of m igrants (as

distinct from their originally stated intentions) from poor as against rich originshas important implications for the effects of their arrival on the growth andc omposition o f the Lond on p op ula tion. Basic a lly, it sugg ests tha t a c onstantstream of in-migrants from rich countries is likely to cause something like aonc e-for-all inc rea se in the Lond on pop ulat ion (and a onc e for all effec t on itsdiversity), whereas a similar stream from poor countries will produce more orless c ontinuous grow th (a nd shifts in population c om position).

DisplacementOver decades a pattern of population decentralisation from core areas ofthe London region followed from increasing aspirations of Londoners to spend

part of their rising incomes in acquiring access to more space, inside andoutside their dwellings, whether by finding larger dwellings, reducing theirhousehold sizes, or find ing area s with more exte rnal spac e. Suc c ess inachieving lower residential d ensities in this wa y inevitab ly mea nt a c ontinuoustend enc y for fewer peop le to live inside the fixed a rea of Grea ter Lond on.

18 An actual tendency for London-based migrants to return home could, in principle, beob sc ured by a drift into Lond on b y migrants originally co unted elsewhe re. We have noevidenc e of this being a signific ant fa c tor.


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Figure 3.4: Trends in do mestic versus internationa l net mig ration Greater

London, 1981-2005 (000s)

Sourc e: Offic e fo r Nationa l Sta tistics.

Immigration can change this pattern, by bringing in a population with agrea ter p referenc e for acc ess ove r spac e and / or less resource s (espe c ially intheir early years) to afford the densities on which established Londoners haveset tled . This me ans tha t they do not nec essarily d isp lac e an eq uivalentnumber of Londoners, but they are still likely to displace some, thus boostingthe rate of net migration out of London to other parts of (mostly) southernEngland.

Inspection of simple charts of net international and domestic migrationinto/ out of Lond on tends to support this pic ture, with the sc a le of net outwa rdmigration from London to the rest of the UK being more or less doubled inrecent years, alongside the growth of the positive net balance frominternat iona l migration (see Figure 3.4). Mo re systematic sta tistica l ana lysis ofthe pattern of movements across the set of southern regions by Hatton (2006)suggests, that the current measure of displacement is in the range 40-50%,implying that for each additional 1 thousand international migrants intoLond on, we m ight expec t the Lond on p op ula tion to go up by just 500-60019. Ifthe housing preferences and resources of long-term migrants (particularlythose from poor countries) converge toward those of the home population,

we should expec t the long-run disp lac ement e ffec t to b e signific antly highe r.

Natural c hange

The imp ac t o f migration on na tura l cha nge is p rima rily throug h its effec t onenlarg ing the size of the c hild -bearing ag e group s. Its sc a le is a littlecomplicated to gauge because births may be spread over a long perioda fter migrants arriva l in Lond on. In fac t, da ta on the young

Documents

The Impact of Recent Immigration on the London Economy, LSE, 2007