The Impact of Land Administration and Common-Pool … · TaSBO Tana Sub-Basin Organisation ... The wetlands of Lake Tana, Ethiopia, harbour a rich biodiversity and provide various

Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald

The Impact of Land Administration and

Common-Pool Resource Management on

Wetland Utilisation along the Eastern Shore of

Lake Tana, Ethiopia

Alteration of Wetlands –

Risk or Chance for Rural Livelihoods?

Diploma thesis

Maxi Springsguth

4th January 2013

Landscape Ecology and Nature Convervation

Matriculation number 115518

Supervisor: Dr. Anne Cristina de la Vega-Leinert, Sustainability Science and

Applied Geography, Institute of Geography and Geology

Co-supervisor: Prof. Dr. Susanne Stoll-Kleemann, Chair of Sustainability Science

and Applied Geography, Institute of Geography and Geology

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Dr. Anne Cristina de la Vega-Leinert and Prof. Dr. Susanne

Stoll-Kleemann for the supervision of my thesis. I am very grateful to Dr. Anne

Cristina de la Vega-Leinert for her comments and the discussion on my work.

I want to thank all the people who took part in Participatory Rural Appraisal

and the interview respondents for their willingness to share their knowledge, for

the discussions and their time.

Very special thanks goes to my counterpart and friend, Babiyew Sibhat.

Thanks to your open mind, your endeavours, critique and experience our work

was successfully accomplished.

I am very happy to have spent my stay in Ethiopia together with Christian

Sefrin, Fanny Mundt, Friedrich zur Heide, Renee Moreaux, Johannes Poetzsch,

the ‘fun-raising group’ and all the other wonderful people we met. Thanks for

sharing a great time and for exchanging ideas.

I further appreciate the assistance of Dr. Ayalew Wondie, Getasew Abebaw of

the Fogera woreda administration, Tigistu Tilahun, the Michael Succow Founda-

tion for the Protection of Nature, the Amhara Bureau of Culture, Tourism and

Parks Development, Woinshet Sibhat as well as captain Gebrie and captain Maru

in my research. Only with your crucial input, the financial support, the transport

facilitation and your care this work became possible.

I am very grateful to Thomas Lotze, Telsche Piechottka, Renee Moreaux and

Stephan Kuberski for the revision of my thesis, their constructive comments and

technical advice.

I am thankful to Jorg Bachmann for his technical support and his patience to

endure my impatience.

I also want to thank my little son, Levi Springsguth, for successfully diverting

my thoughts of the remaining work and for the wonderful, unique time we spend

together.

Last but not least, I want to express my honest gratitude to my family, my

sister Gabi Springsguth, Birgit Springsguth, Dagmar and Conny Springsguth as

well as Christa and Gerhard Kunzel and Karl-Heinz Springsguth (†), who supported

me throughout this work and my life.

Contents

Abbreviations ix

Abstract 1

Zusammenfassung 3

1 Introduction 5

1.1 Rationale and Research Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.2 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 The Study Area 9

2.1 Ethiopia: Social-Economic Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.2 The Amhara Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.3 The Research Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.4 Wetlands between Conservation and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2.5 Land Policy in Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3 Theoretical Background and Framework 21

3.1 Common-Property Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3.2 Resilience Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

3.3 Political Ecology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.4 Theoretical Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3.5 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

4 Methodology and Methods 31

4.1 Research Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

i

ii CONTENTS

4.2 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

4.2.1 Participatory Rural Appraisal and Group Discussions . . . 32

4.2.2 Problem-Centred Expert Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

4.3 Data Preparation and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

5 Results 45

5.1 Values of Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

5.2 Perceptions on Well-being and People’s Objectives . . . . . . . . 47

5.3 Environmental and Land Use Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

5.3.1 Flooding and Sedimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

5.3.2 Rice Cultivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

5.3.3 Conversion of Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5.3.4 Fishery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5.4 Impact on Rural Livelihoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

5.4.1 Impact on Crop Production and Livestock Rearing . . . . 53

5.4.2 Impact on Social Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

5.4.3 Impact on Food Security and Income Generation . . . . . 55

5.5 Conflicts over Wetlands and Associated Resources . . . . . . . . 56

5.5.1 Conflicts Related to Encroachment . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

5.5.2 Conflicts over Grazing Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.5.3 Cropland Boundary Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.5.4 Conflicts between Tana Kirkos Monasteries and the Com-

munity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.5.5 Conflicts between Wetland Conservation and Use in Agid

Kirigna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.5.6 Conflicts Related to Fishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

5.5.7 Conflicts Arising from Stakeholders’ Perceptions on Gov-

ernment Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

5.5.8 The Consequences of Conflicts for Communal Life . . . . 60

5.6 Land Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

5.6.1 Land Registration and Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

5.6.2 Constraints to the Land Registration and Certification

Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

CONTENTS iii

5.6.3 Land Use Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

5.7 Common-Pool Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

5.7.1 Local Resource Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 66

5.7.2 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

5.7.3 Federal and Regional Policies with Implications for Wetland

Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

5.7.4 Constraints to and Recommendations for Common-Pool

Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

5.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6 Analysis 77

6.1 The Cyclical Process of Environmental Entitlements . . . . . . . 77

6.2 Mapping Endowments: Access to Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

6.2.1 Rights-Based Access to Wetland Resources . . . . . . . . 79

6.2.2 Structural and Relational Mechanisms of Access . . . . . 81

6.2.3 Property Rights to Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

6.3 Power Relations and the Question of Who Benefits . . . . . . . . 86

6.4 The Complexity of Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

6.5 Institutions Shaping Wetland Use and Management . . . . . . . 93

6.5.1 Land Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

6.5.2 Common-Pool Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . 95

6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

7 Discussion 111

7.1 The Institutional Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

7.1.1 A National Wetland Policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

7.1.2 Signing the Ramsar Convention? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

7.1.3 Property Rights to Wetlands – A Critical Issue . . . . . . 114

7.1.4 Land Administration and Conservation . . . . . . . . . . 115

7.1.5 Land Use Planning and Conservation . . . . . . . . . . . 117

7.1.6 Environmental Impact Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

7.2 Governance of Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

7.2.1 The Role of Social Actors in Wetland Management . . . . 119

iv CONTENTS

7.2.2 Drawing on Conditions Facilitating the Governance of

Wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

7.2.3 Unequal Power Relations and Empowerment . . . . . . . 122

7.2.4 Building Trust and Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

7.2.5 Ensuring Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

7.2.6 Collaboration and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

7.2.7 Recognising Legal Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

7.2.8 Establishing, Implementing and Enforcing Regulations . . 125

7.2.9 Monitoring User Behaviour and Ecological Conditions . . 126

7.2.10 Resolving Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

7.2.11 Integrating Knowledge Pluralism and Ensuring Information

Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

7.2.12 Understanding Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

7.2.13 Large or Small? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

7.2.14 Delineating Wetland Boundaries: Remarks on a Zonation

Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

7.2.15 Providing Incentives and Livelihood Opportunities . . . . 132

7.3 Alteration of Wetlands – Risk or Chance? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

References 137

Appendices I

Appendix 1: Methods of Participatory Rural Appraisal . . . . . . . . . I

Appendix 2: Interview Catalogue of Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

Appendix 3: Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XVIII

Appendix 4: Well-Being Ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XVIII

Appendix 5: Responses to Livelihood Insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIX

Appendix 6: Land Use/Cover Changes in the Research Area . . . . . . XXIV

Appendix 7: Overview of the Impact of Anthropogenic Activities on

Wetland Ecosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVIII

Appendix 8: Biosphere Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIX

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX

List of Tables

2.1 Research sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3.1 Bundles of property rights associated with positions . . . . . . . 28

4.1 Methods of PRA and group discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

4.2 Overview of Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of rice production . . . . . . . . . 55

5.2 Social actors involved in conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.3 Recommendations for the governance of wetlands . . . . . . . . 73

6.1 Property rights to wetlands associated with positions . . . . . . . 86

6.2 Beneficiaries, social actors and access mechanisms . . . . . . . . 89

8.1 List of codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XVIII

8.2 Responses of social actors to livelihood insecurity . . . . . . . . . XXI

v

vi LIST OF TABLES

List of Figures

2.1 Regions of Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2.2 Map of the research site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.3 Wetlands around Lake Tana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.4 Mean annual isohyets in the Lake Tana watershed . . . . . . . . 15

2.5 Altitudinal range in the Lake Tana watershed . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.6 Organogram of land administration in ANRS . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.1 Three complementary bodies of scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

3.2 Environmental entitlements framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

3.3 Integrating theory and research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

4.1 Trend analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

4.2 Cause-effect diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

4.3 Impact diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4.4 Well-being ranking with youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4.5 Well-being ranking with women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4.6 Pair-wise ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5.1 Ecosystem services of wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

5.2 Rice cultivation in Agid Kirigna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5.3 Cattle grazing in a wetland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5.4 Wetland conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

5.5 Fishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

5.6 Drivers of environmental and land use change . . . . . . . . . . . 53

5.7 Flooded rice field in Wagetera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

vii

viii LIST OF FIGURES

5.8 Flooded settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

5.9 Tana Kirkos Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.10 Wetland of Tana Kirkos Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5.11 Land Registry Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

5.12 Land administration, land use changes and wetland system . . . . 66

5.13 Cut and carry system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

5.14 Fishermen’s association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

5.15 Fishermen in the morning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

5.16 Main causal chains of wetland alteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

6.1 ‘Entitlement chains’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

6.2 Mapping endowments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

6.3 Conflicts over wetlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

6.4 Institutions conditioning resource subtraction . . . . . . . . . . . 103

6.5 Conditions facilitating wetland management . . . . . . . . . . . 107

6.6 Conditions constraining wetland management . . . . . . . . . . . 108

6.7 Environmental entitlements analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

7.1 Institutional framework for wetland conservation . . . . . . . . . 118

7.2 Zonation proposal for a Lake Tana Biosphere Reserve . . . . . . 131

7.3 Features and conditions for a successful common-pool resource

management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

8.1 Matrix of a well-being ranking (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIX

8.2 Matrix of a well-being ranking (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XX

8.3 Land use/cover in 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXV

8.4 Land use/cover in 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVI

8.5 Land use/cover in 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVII

Abbreviations

ADLI Agriculture Development-Led Industrialisation

AECID Spanish International Development Cooperation

Agency

ANRS Amhara National Regional State

ARARI Amhara Regional Agricultural Research Institute

BDU Bahir Dar University

BoARD Bureau of Agricultural and Rural Development

BoCTPD Bureau of Culture, Tourism and Parks Development

BR Biosphere reserve

CBD Convention on Biological Diversity

CBINReMP Community-based Integrated Natural Resource Man-

agement Programme

DA Development agent

EIA Environmental impact assessment

EPA Environmental Protection Authority

EPLAUA Environmental Protection Land Administration and

Use Authority

ETB Ethiopian Birr

EWNRA Ethio Wetlands and Natural Resources Association

EWRDM Early warning and risk disaster management processes

coordinator

EWRP Ethiopian Wetlands Research Programme

FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

GDP Gross Domestic Product

ix

x ABBREVIATIONS

GEF Global Environment Facility

GTP Growth and Transformation Plan

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

LAC Kebele land administration (and use) committee

MoARD Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development

MoWE Ministry of Water and Energy

MSF Michael Succow Foundation for the Protection of

Nature

PIF Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework

PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal

TaSBO Tana Sub-Basin Organisation

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization

WoARD Woreda Agricultural and Rural Development office

WoEPLAU Woreda Environmental Protection Land Administra-

tion and Use office

WoWE Woreda Water and Energy office

Abstract

The wetlands of Lake Tana, Ethiopia, harbour a rich biodiversity and provide

various ecosystem services to humans. However they have been subject to resource

overuse and degradation. The continuous conversion of these ecosystems is driven

by an ever increasing population, targeted agricultural development and the open

unregulated access to wetland resources. Attempts to conserve the biodiversity and

the cultural landscape have resulted in a feasibility study for a Lake Tana biosphere

reserve and baseline surveys on wetlands for the establishment of a Community-

Based Integrated Natural Resource Management Project (CBINReMP).

Against this background, the present work aims at analysing the decisive condi-

tions that determine an effective management and a sustainable resource utilisation

of the wetlands east of Lake Tana. For analytical purposes, the environmental

entitlements framework by Leach et al. (1999), as the theoretical framework, is

chosen incorporating insights from common-property theory, resilience thinking

and political ecology.

Research findings show that local institutions tackling urgent problems of mis-

management and overexploitation of wetland resources were recently established.

The management systems vary in regard to the elaboration of their institutional

arrangements. Their ability to conserve the resource system is often restricted

due to a complex of internal and external factors. These include among others

the not manageable size of wetlands and user groups, the heterogeneity of social

actors concerning their objectives and resource use priorities, and the unequal

power realtions that influence the distribution of benefits obtained from wetland

resources. Furthermore, the lack of participation in decision-making over wetland

utilisation and management render management efforts ineffective. Flooding

events increase pressures on resources through an increased utilisation an impede

1

2 ABSTRACT

a sustainable resource subtraction. A plurality of rights and regulations pertaining

to wetland utilisation, overlapping management jurisdictions and an ambiguous

property rights system complicate wetland management.

Based on these findings, recommendations are provided and objections raised

regarding the establishment and functioning of the planned CBINReMP and the

Lake Tana biosphere reserve.

Zusammenfassung

Die Feuchtgebiete am Tana See Athiopiens beherbergen eine hohe Biodiversitat

und erbringen verschiedene Okosystemdientsleistungen. Sie unterliegen jedoch der

Ressourcenubernutzung und Degradierung. Eine stets wachsende Bevolkerung,

die angestrebte landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung und der freie unregulierte Zugang

zu den Ressourcen sind treibende Krafte fur die fortlaufende Konvertierung dieser

Okosysteme. Bestrebungen, die Biodiversitat und Kulturlandschaft zu schutzen,

mundeten in einer Machbarkeitsstudie zum Tana See Biospharenreservat und in

Grundlagenstudien uber die Feuchtgebiete, die dem Aufbau eines gemeinschafts-

gestutzen integrierten Projekts zum Management der naturlichen Ressourcen

dienen sollen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es Ziel dieser Forschungsarbeit, die Bedingun-

gen zu untersuchen, die ein erfolgreiches Management und eine nachhaltige

Ressourcennutzung der Feuchtgebiete am Ostufer des Tana Sees bestimmen. Zu

Analysezwecken wird der Environmental Entitlements Framework von Leach et al.

(1999) als theoretischer Rahmen gewahlt und Erkenntnisse aus der Theorie uber

Gemeinguter, dem Resilienzansatz und der Politischen Okologie eingebunden.

Die Forschungsergebnisse zeigen, dass lokale Institutionen, die sich den Prob-

lemen des Missmanagements und der Ubernutzung der Feuchtgebietsressourcen

widmen, unlangst etabliert wurden. Die Managementsysteme unterscheiden sich

hinsichtlich der Ausgestaltung ihrer institutionellen Regelungen. Ihre Fahigkeit,

das Ressourcensystem zu schutzen, wird oft durch einen Komplex an inter-

nen und externen Faktoren eingeschrankt. Diese Faktoren umfassen u. a. die

unuberschaubare Große der Feuchtgebiete und der Nutzergruppen, die Hetero-

genitat der Akteure bezuglich ihrer Ziele und Ressourcennutzungsprioritaten sowie

3

4 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

ungleiche Machtverhaltnisse, die die Nutzenverteilung der Ressourcen beeinflussen.

Desweiteren machen eine mangelnde Partizipation in Entscheidungsprozessen zur

Nutzung und der Bewirtschaftung von Feuchtgebieten Managementbestrebungen

unwirksam. Uberflutungsereignisse erhohen den Nutzungsdruck auf Ressourcen

und behindern eine nachhaltige Ressourcennutzung. Eine Vielzahl von Rechten und

Regulierungen bezuglich der Feuchtgebietsnutzung, sich uberschneidende Man-

agementkompetenzen und das uneindeutige System der Besitzrechte erschweren

das Feuchtgebietsmanagement.

Auf Grundlage dieser Ergebnisse werden Empfehlungen und Bedenken

bezuglich des Aufbaus und der Arbeitsweise des angedachten gemeinschafts-

gestutzen Ressourcenmanagementprojekts und des Tana See Biospharenreservats

ausgesprochen.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Wetland ecosystems are essential in conserving wetland-dependent biodiversity

and in delivering important and vital services for human well-being. The wetlands

of Lake Tana in the northern highlands of Ethiopia in the Amhara National

Regional State (ANRS) (figure 2.2, p. 13) critically contribute to local people’s

livelihoods, e. g. through the provision of food and building materials, water supply

or flood control (Amsalu 2006: 17; IFAD 2007: 15). The continuous conversion of

wetlands into crop and grazing land, overfishing, drainage, eutrophication, sand

mining or siltation due to erosion in the upper watersheds threaten biodiversity,

impair environmental functions of the lake and its wetlands and affect people’s

livelihoods (Gebrekidan 2006 b: 47; IFAD 2007: 30–31).

The alteration of wetlands is driven by a complex of interacting factors. These

include population growth, unsustainable use practices and intensification of

agriculture (Amsalu 2006: 19), ambiguous property-rights regimes of and open

access to wetlands that are communally used but state-owned (Gebrekidan 2006

b: 38), missing appropriate legal frameworks and strategic management plans for

the protection of wetlands (Abunie 2003: 16; Wood 2000: 20) and sectoral policy

thinking (Abbot et al. 2000: 20).

To tackle the problems of mismanagement and overuse, several attempts

have been made and projects initiated, aiming at conserving wetlands in the

Lake Tana region (see e. g. IFAD 2007; Hailu & Gebrekidan 2006; Gebrekidan &

Teka 2006 a, 2006 b). After discussing various options for the most appropriate

5

6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

management approach to conserve biodiversity and the resource base for local

people simultaneously, the establishment of a biosphere reserve (BR) has proven

most feasible and suitable (e. g. Gebrekidan & Teka 2006 b: 23–24; IFAD 2007:

15). BRs are protected areas seeking to harmonise nature conservation and human

development (UNESCO 1996). Until recently, the further initiation of the BR

designation has been reluctant due to lack of awareness, cooperation, and political

commitment (IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b; zur Heide 2012: 10).

In 2011, a feasibility study for a Lake Tana BR was conducted by the Michael

Succow Foundation for the Protection of Nature (MSF), Germany, supported

by the ANRS Bureau of Culture, Tourism and Parks Development (BoCTPD),

reviving the attempt of conserving the important and unique biodiversity and the

cultural landscape (zur Heide 2012). Based on existing research and expertise,

the feasibility study has identified wetlands along the lake shore as important

ecosystems in terms of biodiversity conservation (zur Heide 2012: 27–30, 39–41;

see Gebrekidan 2006 b: 40–46). They therefore constitute an important pillar for

planning and management in the Lake Tana BR (zur Heide 2012: 128).

This research work was conducted as part of the feasibility study for a Lake

Tana BR. Preliminary results of this work have already been integrated into and

complemented the feasibility study (zur Heide 2012).

1.1 Rationale and Research Objective

The main objective of this research study is to identify the contextual conditions

that facilitate or constrain an effective management and a wise use of wetlands

along the eastern shore of Lake Tana. Effectiveness in this regard refers to the

degree to which management systems are capable of sustaining wetland resources

and human livelihoods. To sustain wetland resources, further research on the

contextual conditions could “provide answers for future management action”

(Abunie 2003: 16).

Being motivated to fill some of the existent research gaps, this work seeks to

distinguish the incentives and perceptions of wetland users on resource use and

management as well as the values they ascribe to wetlands. This is important

since the interests of different social actors shape wetland use and management

1.1. RATIONALE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 7

in various ways (see Abbot et al. 2000; Wood 2003). Second, changes in wetland

use and their implications for local wetland users should be assessed. Thirdly, this

work seeks to better comprehend the effect of land administration on wetlands.

Therefore the impact of the land registration and certification process in Amhara

(see Adenew & Abdi 2005: supra note 23, 25) and land use planning on wetland

management are reconstructed. Property rights and property regimes of wetlands

are analysed. Fourthly, conflicts over wetlands (see Hailu & Gebrekidan 2006;

Taffa 2005; Wood 2003) should be addressed. Fifthly, local management systems

should be analysed in terms of their effectiveness to sustain human-wetland

systems.

The outcomes can then be harnessed to contribute to discussions on the

designation of the Lake Tana BR by providing useful insights on the management

of wetlands along the eastern lake shore. The results can be integrated into further

BR planning processes.

Besides, recommendations and objections deduced from the findings substan-

tiate socio-economic baseline surveys on wetlands around Lake Tana that have

been undertaken by an expert team of various ANRS authorities and research

institutes1. These baseline surveys are part of the Community-Based Integrated

Natural Resource Management Project (CBINReMP) of the Amhara regional

government that aims at establishing a participatory integrated wetland ecosystem

management (personal communication: BDU).

In line with the objective and deduced from the outcomes that should be

achieved, the main research question is the following: What are the decisive

structural and relational conditions that determine an effective management and

a sustainable resource utilisation of the wetlands along the eastern shore of Lake

Tana? The following subquestions help answering the main question:

1. In what way do land use changes and land administration affect wetland

use and management?

2. Which conflicts over wetlands and associated resources arise between the

1Bureau of Agricultural and Rural Development (BoARD), Environmental Protection LandAdministration and Use Authority (EPLAUA), Bureau of Water and Energy (BoWE), BoCTPA,Bahir Dar/Gondar University, Amhara Regional Agricultural Research Institute (personal com-munication: BoARD)

8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

various social actors, what are their causes and consequences?

3. What are the mechanisms and means local actors draw on to benefit from

the utilisation and management of wetlands?

4. Which specific factors positively or negatively influence the ability of local

management institutions to effectively conserve wetland resources?

1.2 Structure

Before answering these questions, the study area is introduced in chapter 2. The

theoretical background and framework that underlie analysis is outlined in chapter

3. Chapter 4 sets out the research methodology and the applied methods. The

research findings are then presented in chapter 5 (Results) and analysed in chapter

6 (Analysis). They form the basis of discussion in chapter 7.

Chapter 2

The Study Area

This chapter provides a description of the study area, background information

on the status of wetlands in the broader political, economic context and an

introduction to the national and regional land tenure policy.

2.1 Ethiopia: Social-Economic Background

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries worldwide. Even though a continuously

high economic growth has been achieved in the past years, poverty and food

insecurity are still serious problems. Most of the almost 84.8 million Ethiopians

live in rural areas (MoARD 2010: 2; UNEP 2011). 85% of the rural population

is engaged in small-holder agriculture that significantly contributes to the gross

domestic product (GDP) (MoARD 2010: 3). Consequently, agriculture is seen

to be the mainstay of economic growth and development as proclaimed by the

Agriculture Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI) strategy that has been

implemented since 1991 and which is a central pillar for Ethiopia’s development

policies (MoARD 2010: 5).

2.2 The Amhara Region

The Amhara region (figure 2.1, p. 10, see also figure 2.2, p. 13) in which research

was conducted lies in the northern part of Ethiopia. With a total of 17,214,056

9

http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH.html

10 CHAPTER 2. THE STUDY AREA

inhabitants and a size of approximately 156,960 km2, the Amhara region is the

second most populous regional state in Ethiopia (Population Census Commission

2008: 10).

Figure 2.1: Regions of Ethiopia. Source: USAID/MoARD 2010: 2

Most people are employed in agricultural activities. The high agricultural po-

tential (resulting from suitable climatic conditions) and the availability of water re-

sources are important preconditions for agricultural development (IFAD/EPLAUA

2007 c: 4–5). Located in the region and being the country’s largest freshwater

reservoir, Lake Tana significantly contributes to national economic growth through

the generation of hydropower and the supply of irrigation water (Amsalu 2006:

16). The four major permanent inflowing rivers, Gilgel Abay, Gumara, Ribb and

Megech are part of planned large-scale irrigation schemes (MoWE 2010: 6-8;

figure 7.2, p. 131).

Amhara is mainly characterised by a mountainous terrain. The major land

cover/land use types that occur in ANRS are: cultivated land (35%), grazing land

(18%) and woodlands (7%). Forests cover only 1.4% of the surface, marshland less

than 0.2% and water bodies 2% (DSA/SCI 2006: 71–74, percentages are rounded

2.3. THE RESEARCH SITE 11

by the author). During seasonal flooding extensive wetlands1 form in the plains

around Lake Tana, e. g. Kunzila in the southwest, Fogera in the east and Dembia in

the north (figure 2.3, p. 14) (Amsalu 2006: 16). Seasonal flooding is an important

feature of Lake Tana and its associated wetlands creating diverse wetland habitats

(Gebrekidan 2006 b: 51). These harbour a rich flora and fauna, including endemic

fish species of Labeobarbus and Barbus, endemic amphibians, globally threatened

waterfowl, (ibid.: 40–41), large mammals such as Hippopotamus amphibius or

critically endangered papyrus populations (ibid.: 45–46).

2.3 The Research Site

Field research was undertaken along the eastern shore of Lake Tana in three

woredas (districts) of the South Gondar Zone in ANRS: Dera, Fogera and Libo

Kemkem. According to the 2007 population census, 246,351, 226,595 and 198,374

people lived in Dera, Fogera and Libo Kemkem woredas, respectively (Population

Census Commission 2008: 60). In the three woredas, population densities with

189.9 persons/km2 in Dera, 246.8 persons/km2 in Fogera and 205 persons/km2

in Libo Kemkem are higher than the regional average of 109.7 persons/km2

(Demographic data).

The kebeles2 and villages/communities which were part of the investigation

are listed in table 2.1, p. 12.

1 The large literature in Ethiopia defines wetlands in accordance with the Convention onWetlands of International Importance (shortly Ramsar Convention, 1987): “wetlands are areasof marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, withwater that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water the depthof which at low tide does not exceed six metres” (Article 1(1)).

2The kebele is a lower administrative unit, comparable to a municipality, followed by thelowest unit, the sub-kebele.

http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/Amhara.html


Table 2.1: Research sites

Woreda Kebele Village/Community

Dera Tanametsele Ahun Wota, Gulash, Sedechila Maryam, Sewtiye

Fogera Nabega Bobatie, Luhawit, Tigremender

Shina Angurbad, Girbisha

Wagetera Amana, Barye, Sela, Sindeye, Wagetera

Libo Kemkem Agid Kirigna/Kirnya Bahir Mender, Fota Mender, Guwala, Qurtbahir

Kab Lamgie, Koker

Tez Amba Daga

All of the kebeles, apart from Shina, border Lake Tana (figure 2.2, p. 13).

A significant share of this border is made up of permanently or seasonally

flooded wetlands (Gebrekidan 2006 b: 45; figure 2.3, p. 14)3. People living

along the shores and in the fertile plains have used the lake’s resources and

the associated wetlands for several hundreds of years (ibid.: 38) as (recession)

farmlands4, grazing lands, for fishing, handicraft making, the construction of small

fishing boats (tanquas), or as building materials (Amsalu 2006: 17; Gebrekidan

2006 b: 47). These wetlands are held under different property regimes and are

often subject to an open access (Gebrekidan 2006 b: 38).

Local communities mainly depend on small-holder crop production for their

subsistence (Mulatu 2006: 26). Cattle rearing (traditionally, the Fogera breed

(IFAD 2007: 16)), fishing and apiculture significantly contribute to rural livelihoods

(Mulatu 2006: 27).

The woredas lie within the tepid moist agro-ecological zone (Woina Dega,

traditional classification) (DSA/SCI 2006: 13, 41–51). This corresponds to a

mean annual temperature of 18.5◦C in Lake Tana watershed (IFAD/EPLAUA

2007 a: 3) and one main rainy season (kiremt) between June to September,

contributing to more than 70% of the mean annual rainfall (Ayalew et al. 2012:

3Two out of five main wetland types recognised by the Ramsar Convention occur along theeastern shore of Lake Tana, i. e. lacustrine and palustrine wetlands (Gebrekidan 2006 b: 45).Lacustrine wetlands are areas of permanent water with little flow (wetlands associated withlakes). Palustrine wetlands have more or less permanent water (papyrus swamps, marshes, fens,bogs) (Barbier et al. 1997: 2; Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2011: 7).

4Recession farmland is land of the lake shore zone cultivated during the dry season with theretreating water (recession cropping).


WageteraNabega

Tez AmbaKab

Agid Kirigna

Shina

Tanametsele

Tana KirkosIsland

Figure 2.2: Right: Geographic location of the research area. Source: modified after Busse, MSF(2011, design, in zur Heide 2012: 152). Left: Administrative boundaries of woredas in the LakeTana watershed. Highlighted are the three woredas (black rectangles) and the seven kebeles(black circles) included in the research study. Source: GIS Team of ANRS BoFED, modifiedafter Busse, MSF (2011, design, in zur Heide 2012: 152)

1480; IFPRI/CSA/EDRI 2006: 20). The average annual rainfall is about 1,200 mm

(SMEC 2008: 7; figure 2.4, p. 15). The study sites are located at an elevation

between 1,781 m to 1,850 m a. s. l. (MoWE 2010: 4-5; figure 2.5, p. 15). The

Woina Dega zone is very suitable for the cultivation of different crops, e. g. teff

(Eragrostis teff ), maize (Zea mays), wheat (Triticum spp.) or pulses (DSA/SCI

2006: 108). The area is moderately to intensely cultivated (ibid.: 67–82).

Vertisols (black, heavy clay soils) are the dominant soil types in the research

sites. The development of wide and deep cracks during the dry season and swelling

during rainy season make Vertisols difficult to plough and susceptible to erosion


AKK

TA

N

WS

TM

Figure 2.3: Wetlands around Lake Tana. Kebeles within the research site are indicated withblack circles. TM Tanametsele, W Wagetera, N Nabega, TA Tez Amba, K Kab, AK AgidKirigna, S Shina. Source: modified after Busse, MSF (2011, design, in zur Heide 2012: 32)

(MoWE 2010: 4-13) and water logging. Traditionally, Vertisols were used for

teff production, as pastures or hay meadows. Nowadays, the cultivation of water

logging tolerant rice (Oryza spp.) and residual moisture crops such as grass pea

(Lathyrus sativus) and chickpea (Cicer arietinum) are important (IFAD/EPLAUA

2007 a: 5; Mulatu 2006: 26).

Droughts triggered by sporadic fluctuations of dry and wet years occur fre-

quently (Ayalew 2012: 1481), as well as flooding of the kebeles. Flooding is

caused by persistent rainfalls in combination with the Vertisols and poor water

infiltration rates. Another causal factor is bank overflow from the Gumara and

Ribb rivers (which mark the borders between Dera and Fogera, and Fogera and

Libo Kemkem, respectively, figure 2.2, p. 13). Sediment depositions at the outlets

of the rivers accelerate the overflow by reducing the rivers’ conveyance capacities.


Figure 2.4: Mean annual isohyets in theLake Tana watershed in mm. Kebeles inthe research site are indicated with blackcircles. Source: ANRS BoARD (2011 in zurHeide 2012: 22)

Figure 2.5: Altitudinal range in the LakeTana watershed in m. Kebeles in the re-search site are indicated with black circles.Source: MoWE (2009 in zur Heide 2012:22)

Flooding is further triggered by the runoff from other local rivers and high water

levels of Lake Tana with backwater effects inland (MoWE 2010: 4-9; SMEC 2008:

30–31). Annual lake level fluctuations in the range of 3.55 m (1,784.26 m a. s. l.

to 1,787.81 m a. s. l.) have occurred historically (MoWE 2010: 4-9) but have been

influenced due to the artificial regulation for hydropower generation (SMEC 2008;

Tessema 2006: 12–14).


2.4 Wetlands between Conservation and

Development for Growth

Development projects such as the planned irrigation schemes and hydropower

plants often sharply contrast with biodiversity conservation goals (see e. g. MoWE

2010). Federal policies and development strategies critically and indirectly impact

on wetland ecosystems (Wood 2000). As a result, conservation efforts are often

discounted in the light of attempts to ensure economic growth and food security

(Mesfin 2003: 84).

The Ethiopian Water Sector Strategy (2001) states that by using appropriate

mechanisms such as drainage, existing wetlands should be reclaimed and the

formation of new ones should be prevented (MoWR 2001: 4). The Water Sector

strategy translates the Water Resources Management Policy into action (MoWE:

2010: 3-7). By contrast, the Water Resource Management Policy, only indirectly

referring to wetlands, calls for the conservation, protection and enhancement of

water resources and the aquatic environment to assure sustainability (Fisseha

2003: 77; MoWR 1999).

The federal Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) and Ethiopia’s Agri-

cultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) aim at transforming

subsistence agriculture to a more market-led, commercialised production (MoARD

2010: 18–19; MoFED 2010: 45). A high GDP growth of at least 10% per annum

is envisaged by the GTP (MoARD 2010: 2). With the agricultural sector being

the main source of growth, a shift to and an intensification of the production of

marketable crops such as rice is essential (MoFED 2010: 22–23, 46).

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD, undated)

announced the area east of Lake Tana as suitable for rain-fed rice production.

Rice is considered to be the “millenium crop” (BoARD 2011 b: 1), valued for its

high potential of securing food, generating income and provisioning employment

(BoARD 2011 b: 2; MoARD undated: 22–23).

In order to increase productivity in areas where moisture is adequate, modern

drainage methods are required to gain maximal benefit from Vertisol soils (MoARD

2010: 50). The need for an increased productivity is justified by a rising demand

2.5. LAND POLICY IN ETHIOPIA 17

for products due to population and GDP growth5, and the growing demand of

international markets (MoARD 2010: 45).

The Environmental Policy states that “wetlands [. . . ] are fundamental in

regulating water quality and quantity” (EPA/MoEDC 1997: 11) and “their

rehabilitation and protection [are essential for] the conservation, development and

management of water resources” (ibid.: 11). Wetland conservation constitutes

an integral part of water resource development and management (Fisseha 2003:

77). But similar to the Water Resource Management Policy, the Environmental

Policy is rather functionalist in its approach to wetland conservation, disregarding

the broad spectrum of environmental services that wetlands provide (Wood 2000:

10).

Ethiopia ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1994 and

prepared a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan in 2005 (IFAD 2007:

8) indicating the importance of wetlands for biodiversity conservation and the

threats for their preservation (Institute of Biodiversity Conservation 2005: 16–18).

The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance has not yet been signed

(zur Heide 2012: 121).

So far, agricultural development often remains the antagonist of wetland

protection. After outlining the status of wetlands in the political, economic

context, a short introduction to the land administration system in Ethiopia and

ANRS follows, providing information to allow for a better understanding of the

effect of land administration on wetland management.

2.5 Land Policy in Ethiopia

“The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources,

is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a

common property of the Nations, Nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and shall

not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange” (Federal Constitution

1994: Article 40(3)). Article 40(3) of the Federal Constitution announced the

continuation of state ownership of land after the fall of the socialist regime (1975–

5Hence agricultural growth becomes an itself accelerating process.


1991). The nationalisation of land has not been discussed without controversies.

The government builds its arguments for nationalisation on the principles of

egalitarianism and equity: Any farmer should have an equal right to access of land.

Tenure security should be accomplished by preventing land grabbing. Landholders

are granted only usufruct rights excluding the rights to sell or mortgage land. The

advocates of the privatisation of land ownership stress the increased efficiency

of production on privatised land through encouraging land investments and

sustainable land use practices that are lacking under state ownership (Crewett et

al. 2008: 1–2; Crewett & Korf 2008: 203–207; Miller & Tolina 2008: 367–369).

To ensure that each farmer had access to land, land redistribution during the

socialist regime and under the current government became frequent. Redistribution

resulted in the continuous fragmentation of land and an increased tenure insecurity

since land could be taken from the farmers at any time for the purpose of allocation

(Miller & Tolina 2008: 363–366; see Pausewang (undated); Rahmato 1993). In

ANRS, the last major legally permitted land redistribution was carried out in 1997

(Deininger et al. 2007: 5). Land redistribution has yet not completely been banned

(Miller & Tolina 2008: 365). The legislation allows for a local redistribution

procedure that requires the consent of the majority of landholders (Regulation

No. 51/2007: §6).

With the objective to improve tenure security and to address environmental

degradation related to this insecurity, land registration and certification pro-

grammes were introduced in several regions of Ethiopia. The beginning of registra-

tion and certification in Amhara in 2003 marked the first attempt to systematically

register rural land (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 8, 10; SARDP/BoEPLAU/ORGUT

2010: 9)6. The Environmental Protection Land Administration and Use Authority

(EPLAUA), established in 2000, is responsible for land administration, including

the coordination of the registration process (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 12).

Land registration and certification is designed as a participatory process,

democratic, transparent, seeking the involvement of the farmers in land survey and

registration and the election of Kebele Land Administration (and Use) Committees

(LAC) (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 16; Deininger et al. 2007: 13; Regulation No.

6A brief overview of the steps of land registration and certification is provided bySARDP/BoEPLAU/ORGUT (2010) and Deininger et al. (2006).

2.5. LAND POLICY IN ETHIOPIA 19

51/2007: §§19, 24(3), 26, 27, 28).

The duties and responsibilities of the kebele and sub-kebele LAC members

include: undertaking registration activities (Deininger et al. 2006: 8–9), adminis-

tering communal holdings, managing unused land and planning for its utilisation

or keeping documents (Regulation No. 51/2007: §§27, 28). LAC members are

elected for a period of three years (ibid.: §26(1)).

In Amhara, survey teams and land administration experts of the Woreda

Environmental Protection and Land Administration and Use office (WoEPLAU)

are involved in and supervise land registration (Deininger 2007: 7, 16–17). The

duties and responsibilities of the woreda authorities involve among others the

administration and management of state holding, training of LACs, supervision

of the fulfilment of farmers’ obligations regarding resource use and management

(Regulation No. 51/2007: §25). Figure 2.6, p. 19 shows the organogram of land

administration in ANRS.

Region: Environmental Protection Land Administration and Use Authority (EPLAUA)

Zone: Zonal Environmental Protection Land Administration and Use

Woreda: Woreda Environmental and Land Administration and Use office (WoEPLAU)

Kebele: Kebele Land Administration Committee (LAC)

Sub–kebele: Sub-Kebele Land Administration Committee

Figure 2.6: Organisation of land administration in ANRS. Source: modified after Adenew &Abdi 2005: 12

The following chapter presents the theoretical background and framework of

this study.


Chapter 3

Theoretical Background and

Framework

Wetlands are open linked human-nature systems. In order to get a thorough

understanding of how system interlinkages influence the effectiveness of wetland

management, this work seeks to “integrate insights from three bodies of schol-

arship” (Armitage 2008: 8): common property theory, resilience and political

ecology.

Wetland resources are common-property resources owned by the state but

used by local people as well as non-residents. Common-property theory provides

useful insights into the problems but likewise opportunities of common-pool

resource governance. Resilience thinking then contributes significant implications

for an adaptive and multi-level governance of wetlands (Armitage 2008: 15; Folke

2006: 262). Political ecology unveils the socio-political processes that underlie

wetland utilisation and management. The theoretical framework, which guides the

present work’s analysis and will be presented later on, incorporates these three

complementary bodies of scholarship (figure 3.1, p. 24).

3.1 Common-Property Theory

Common-pool or common-property resources are characterised by the difficulty

of exclusion and the subtractability of benefits (Becker & Ostrom 1995: 115). To

21

22 CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK

manage common-pool resources sustainably, users must solve a collective action

problem. A collective action problem arises out of a social dilemma in which the

outcomes of individual rationality of resource appropriation (overuse, degradation)

conflict with optimal outcomes for a group (Agrawal 2001: note 6, 1666; Ostrom

2009 b: 30). In the 1990s, Ostrom identified design principles of robust property

rights institutions1 (Becker & Ostrom 1995: 118–122; Ostrom 2009 b) “that help

to account for the success of these institutions in sustaining the [common-pool

resources]” (Ostrom 1990: 90 in Agrawal 2001: 1652) and to overcome collective

action problems. “Robustness [. . . ] focuses on adaptability to disturbance: ‘the

maintenance of some desired system characteristics despite fluctuations in the

behaviour of its component parts or its environment’”(Carlson and Doyle 2002 in

Ostrom 2009 b: 31).

3.2 Resilience Thinking

Resilience thinking enriches this concept of robust institutions. As an important

component of social-ecological systems, robust institutions (Folke 2006) may not

only be characterised by the capacity to sustain the system and adapt to change,

but also to develop and transform the system (ibid.: 254, 262). Social-ecological

resilience includes “(1) the ability of a system to absorb or buffer disturbances and

still maintain its core attributes; (2) the ability of the system to self-organise; and

(3) the capacity of learning and adaptation in the context of change” (Armitage

2008: 15; see Folke 2006: 259–260). Uncertainty and system change require an

understanding of both the ecological and social dimensions of resilience (Folke

2006: 260). A comprehension of the role of social capital and conflicts and a

recognition of the flexibility of organisations and institutions are important to

understand social system features (ibid.: 261).

Resilience thinking provides four essential norms for multi-level governance2

(also termed adaptive co-management) of common-property resources: (1) to

1For a definition of institutions, see p. 29.2In general, governance of natural resources can be defined as “[. . . ] the whole of public as

well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities”and includes “[. . . ] the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions andcare for institutions that enable them” (Kooiman & Bavinck 2007: 17 in Armitage 2008: 9).

3.3. POLITICAL ECOLOGY 23

“learn to live which change and uncertainty” (Armitage 2008: 16) (2) by integrating

different knowledge systems, (3) to cherish diversity to allow for the re-organisation

and renewal of the system and (4) to facilitate self-organisation to enhance the

sustainability of the social-ecological system (ibid.: 16).

3.3 Political Ecology

Political ecology can help to understand the social processes and values shaping

commons governance (Armitage 2008: 8, 19). With Bryant (1991), political

ecology “may be defined as an inquiry into the political sources, conditions,

and ramifications of environmental change” (p. 165). In political ecology (1)

the context of environmental change, i. e. the impact of state and policies on

changes, is approached, (2) location-specific aspects of environmental change are

investigated, e. g. the conflict over access, and (3) the effects such changes have

on social, economic and political relationships are assessed (Bryant 1991: 165). A

core theme is the role of power that conditions relationships between social actors

as well as human-environment links (Armitage 2008: 21; Bryant 1997: 10). The

concept of power can be understood as “the capacity of some actors to affect

the practices and ideas of others” (Weber 1978: 53; Lukas 1986: 3 both in Ribot

& Peluso 2003: 155–156) or as the control actors exercise over the environment

of other actors (Bryant 1997: 11). Armitage (2008) points to the intersections of

political ecology and resilience thinking, e. g. nested hierarchies, multiple scales,

and the self-organisation of complex systems.

3.4 Theoretical Assumptions

Based on these insights, the following theoretical assumptions which are of

relevance to this work can be made. (1) The alteration of wetlands is driven by

social, economic, political and ecological factors, at the same time influences

these contextual factors, and is shaped by various social actors, organisations and

institutions. (2) Wetland use changes involve conflicts over access to and use of

common-pool resources. (3) Conflicts affect people’s livelihoods and the resource


POLITICALECOLOGY

COMMON PROPERTY

THEORY

RESILIENCE

Property rights

InstitutionsCollective action

Change

Adaptabtability

Transformability

Self-organisation

Influence of policies

Power relations

Conflicts

Social processes

Figure 3.1: Three complementary bodies of scholarship. Source: modified after Armitage 2008:10

base. (4) The access to and use of common-property resources is mediated by

social relations and underlying power relations. (5) The unregulated utilisation of

common-property resources often entails degradation and overexploitation of these

resources (e. g. Ostrom 2009 b: 30). (6) The resilience of the social-ecological

system depends, inter alia, upon the robustness and effectiveness of resource

management institutions.

“Governance of the commons is a complex systems problem [drawing] attention

to social and ecological system properties” (Armitage 2008: 8). The theoretical

framework, as described below, helps to unravel, structure and deconstruct the

complexity of the social-ecological system under consideration.

3.5 Theoretical Framework

The environmental entitlements approach (Leach et al. 1999) provides a useful

entree into the analysis of complex human-wetland systems by focusing on the role

of institutions and their cross-scale interactions in shaping system components.

The entitlements analysis emphasises the structural and relational mechanisms

3.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 25

social actors draw on to benefit from wetland resources that likely influence

system properties. Furthermore, the social-ecological, political and economic

ramifications of wetland use changes, including conflicts over wetland resources,

can be adequately depicted.

To understand which actors use what wetland resources with what intention

and to subsequently address the social implications of wetland alteration, this

section commences with a basic introduction to environmental entitlements. In

their approach, Leach et al. (1999) refer to endowments as the rights and resources

(i. e. capitals or assets, see DFID 1999 a) social actors3 have. Endowments can

be obtained from environmental goods and services, e. g. wetland resources and

provided ecosystem services. Environmental entitlements are “alternative sets of

utilities derived from environmental goods and services over which social actors

have legitimate effective command4 and which are instrumental in achieving

well-being” (Leach et al. 1999: 233), i. e. what people can have (de Haan and

Zoomers 2005: 35). Capabilities are seen with Sen as what people can do or be

with their entitlements (Leach et al. 1999: 233) including non-material aspects

(Scoones 1998: 6) such as information and knowledge, relationships, reputation

or acquisition of skills (see the ‘endowment-entitlements-capabilities chains’ in

figure 3.2, p. 28).

In a cyclical process, the practices of wetland users, directed towards the

maintenance or enhancement of capabilities, are able to transform wetland compo-

nents in various ways (see Leach et al. 1999: 239). These practices are performed

within an institutional setting and a broader context5 (see the arrows emanating

from the ‘capabilities/well-being’ box and the ‘context’ in figure 3.2, p. 28).

Thereby ‘endowment-entitlements-capabilities chains’ of resource users are altered

to their advantage or disadvantage. Importantly, in social-ecological systems, the

sustainability of livelihoods is closely tied to the ecological resilience of the system

3Following Leach et al. 1999, ‘social actor’ refers to (1) individuals and (2) a group havingcommon characteristics, like social status or ethnicity.

4A ‘legitimate command’ is a command that is socially sanctioned either by formal orinformal rights. (Leach et al. 1999: 233).

5Environmental entitlements are embedded in a social, political, economic and ecologicalcontext which shapes livelihoods, defined as people’s “capabilities, assets (material and socialresources) and activities required for a means of living” (Chambers & Conway 1992 in DFID1999 b).


(Folke 2006)6.

How people gain endowments from wetlands and how these are transformed

into entitlements are questions addressed through endowment and entitlement

mapping, respectively (Leach et al. 1999: 232–233). The mapping processes

are essential to an entitlements analysis, for this is where underlying aspects

concerning power within social relations and access to resources emerge (ibid.:

233). Here, the environmental entitlements approach is complemented with the

theory of access by Ribot & Peluso (2003). Unlike in property theory, Ribot &

Peluso (2003) define access “as the ability to benefit from things” (p. 153), e. g.

from wetland resources. Access is more related to a “bundle of powers” than

a “bundle of rights” (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 153; see Ostrom 2009 b: 27–29),

and “focusing on ability, rather than rights [. . . ] brings attention to a wider

range of social relationships that can constrain or enable people to benefit from

resources without focusing on property relations alone” (Ribot & Peluso 2003:

154). Ribot & Peluso (2003) define access control as “the ability to mediate

others’ access” (p. 158), and access maintenance as keeping access. Actors

mediate (or determine) and keep access through means of power and resource

expenditure. Gaining access refers to a “more general process by which access is

established” (ibid.: p. 159). Access analysis comprises the identification (1) of a

particular benefit flow of interest to social actors (comparable to the identification

of endowments, entitlements, capabilities), (2) the mechanisms through which

people gain, control and maintain access to benefits, and (3) an analysis of power

relations which determine whether, how and to which extent social actors gain

access to resources (ibid.: 160–161). Mechanisms of access can be categorised into

(1) rights-based mechanisms, and (2) structural and relational access mechanisms

(Leach et al. 1999: 233; Ribot & Peluso 2003: 161–172; see horizontal arrows in

figure 3.2, p. 28).

“When the ability to benefit from [wetland resources and services] derives

6“A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocksand maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while notundermining the natural resource base” (Chambers & Conway 1992 in DFID 1999 b). Livelihoodsustainability comprises social and ecological resilience. Ecological or ecosystem resilience meansthe “capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and re-organise while undergoing change so asto still retain [. . . ] function, structure, identity and feedbacks” (Walker et al. 2004 in Folke2006: 259).


from rights attributed by law, custom, or convention” (Ribot & Peluso 2003:

162), the benefited person may then have a property right, i. e. an endowment,

to benefit from these resources and services (ibid.: 162). At this junction, the

theory of access encounters the concept of property rights (Schlager & Ostrom

1992 in Ostrom 2003: 249–252 and Ostrom 2009 b: 27–29). The supplement of

a property rights perspective to the theoretical framework is useful for identifying

the differently positioned social actors and their property rights over wetlands,

and for understanding the way different bundles of property rights affect wetland

management.

Schlager & Ostrom 1992 (in Ostrom 2009 b: 27–29) proposed thinking of

property rights systems not as a single right but rather in terms of bundles of

rights. They defined the following five rights which are “most relevant for the use

of common-pool resources” (Ostrom 2003: 249):

1. Access: the right to enter a defined area and enjoy non-subtractive benefits,

2. Withdrawal: the right to obtain resource units or products of a resource

system,

3. Management: the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the

resource by making improvements,

4. Exclusion: the right to determine who will have an access right, and how

that right may be transferred,

5. Alienation: the right to sell or lease exclusion, management or withdrawal

rights

(Ostrom 2003: 249–250). In a later work Ostrom & Schlager (1996 in Ostrom

2003: 250–252) associate bundles of rights with positions, i. e. property-rights

holders (table 3.1, p. 28).


Table 3.1: Bundles of property rights associated with positions. Source:

Ostrom & Schlager (1996) in Ostrom 2003: 251

Full

owner

Proprietor Authorised

claimant

Authorised

user

Authorised

entrant

Access + + + + +

Withdrawal + + + + –

Management + + + – –

Exclusion + + – – –

Alienation + – – – –

The way people gain endowments and entitlements is mediated by various

interacting institutions that manage wetland resources and work on different

scales (micro, meso, macro; see the blue boxes appearing to the right in figure

3.2, p. 28).

Context(social, ecological, political, economic)

MacroMeso

MicroInstitutions

MacroMeso

MicroInstitutions

MECHANISMSOF ACCESS

*

Endowment mapping

Entitlement mapping

SOCIAL & POWERRELATIONS

Endowments(capital & rights)

Entitlements

Social actors

Capabilities/well-being

Environmental goods & services

MacroMeso

MicroInstitutions

Figure 3.2: Environmental entitlements framework. * It was not part of this investigation toanalyse according to which concrete mechanisms and arrangements entitlements are transformedinto capabilities at the household level. Source: modified after Leach et al. 1999: 234


The focus of this work is on local management systems but considers local

institutions as being nested inside and interacting with larger ones. The large

literature defines institutions as sets of formal and informal rules and conventions,

shaping behaviour and interactions (e. g. Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 637, note

46, 644; but cf. Leach et al. 1999: 237). Rules are made and remade through

regularised practices and patterns of behaviour and may be challenged in the

course of institutional change (Leach et al. 1999: 237, 238). Institutions impinge

on access to resources, influence the use and management of resources, shape

and transform wetland ecosystems (Leach et al. 1999: 234, see also 238–240),

and by so doing affect the resilience of social-ecological systems. The analysis of

institutions pertaining to wetland management further draws on insights from

the research on governance of common-property resources and community-based

natural resource management by Agrawal (2001), Agrawal & Gibson (1999),

Becker & Ostrom (1995), Ostrom (2003, 2009 a, 2009 b), Ostrom et al. (1999)

and others. Comprehensive studies on these topics provide useful knowledge of

the conditions that strengthen or weaken local wetland management institutions.

To conclude this chapter, figure 3.3, p. 30 simplistically depicts how common-

property theory, resilience thinking and political ecology as well as the research

questions (p. 7) fit in the theoretical framework.

The methodology and methods applied for the present research work are

elaborated in the next chapter.


ContextWhat are the decisive structural and relationalconditions that determinean effective wetland management and a sustainable resource utilisation?

MacroMeso

MicroInstitutions

Endowment mapping

Entitlement mapping

PE: SOCIAL & POWERRELATIONS

In what way does land administration affect wetland useand management?

What are the mechanismsand means local actorsdraw on to benefit from wetlands?

SER

CPT PE

Which conflicts over wetlands arise?

Which factors influence the ability of local management institutions to effectively conservewetland resources?

In what way do land use changes affect wetland use and management?

Endowments(capital & rights)

Entitlements

Social actors


Wetland resources &

services

Figure 3.3: Integrating theory and research questions. The emergence of the three complementarybodies of scholarship and research questions within the theoretical framework. CPT common-property theory, PE political ecology, SER social-ecological resilience (the focus here is on thequestion of why social-ecological resilience is or is not achieved). Source: modified after Leachet al. 1999: 234

Chapter 4

Methodology and Methods

This chapter provides a short introduction to the research approach of this study

and further describes the methods applied and procedures for data collection. An

outline on data preparation and analysis adjoins.

4.1 Research Approach

This research study follows a qualitative research approach. Qualitative research

seeks to describe social realities through an internal perspective of the actor(s)

(Flick et al. 2009: 14). People act according to their subjective intentions and the

meanings they ascribe to phenomena within a historical and situational context

(Flick et al. 2009: 20; Mayring 2002: 22–23). To understand these actions and

their outcomes, subjective perspectives and intentions need to be reconstructed

and interpreted (Flick et al. 2009: 20; Mayring 2002: 22).

Qualitative research concentrates on theory generation on the basis of em-

pirical data and employs an inductive approach (without questioning deductive

approaches per se) (Lamnek 2010: 222). Theories are generated in the course

of the entire research process rather than verified by means of the research

entity (Mayring 2002: 36–37). The inductive approach allows the researcher to

continuously develop, verify, reject, modify and integrate hypotheses forming

the basis of the theoretical framework (Lamnek 2010: 98). Theory generation is

not a linear but a cyclical process. Data collection and data analysis thus take

31

32 CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

place simultaneously and are mutually supportive (ibid.: 97). Grounded theory,

developed by B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss in the 1950s and 60s (Mayring 2002:

103), is a methodology to generate theories which was applied for data collection

and analysis of the present research study. Grounded means anchored in empirical

evidence (Lamnek 2010: 90, 91).

A qualitative approach is considered suitable for this study. In order to gain

insights on the decisive conditions for an effective wetland management, it was

indispensable to understand actors’ perceptions and incentives on wetland use

and management and their attitudes towards conservation. Further on, though

the kebeles do not extend over a large geographical area (figure 2.2, p. 13) it

could neither be assumed that local conditions are the same everywhere, nor that

they are distinct. Developing a definite theory before visiting the kebeles was

therefore unfeasible. Likewise, it was unreasonable to create fixed hypotheses,

given the assumed heterogeneity of local communities and even more importantly

the lack of information on local management systems and influencing factors. The

methods for collecting empirical data on the research topic are elaborated below.

4.2 Data Collection

This section presents the research designs of the applied data collection methods,

namely Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and problem-centred interview meth-

ods. All PRA discussions and interviews were held and conducted from September

to November 2011.

4.2.1 Participatory Rural Appraisal and Group Discussions

In order to get an understanding of the complex structural and relational conditions

that determine the effectiveness of wetland management, the participation of

relevant actors is crucial. Since dialogues with responsible stakeholders and

communication with local communities on wetland resource management have

been rare (Gebrekidan 2006 b: 38), this work is especially motivated to ask

and involve relevant social actors to understand their internal perspectives. PRA

comprises suitable methods motivating people to become involved, and can be

4.2. DATA COLLECTION 33

defined as “a family of approaches and methods to enable rural people to share,

enhance, and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act”

(Chambers 1994 b: 953). “PRA is thus designed to empower” (Chambers 1994 a:

1266) local people1.

4.2.1.1 Selection of the Research Sites

Wetlands of the study area were considered to be potentially relevant to both the

Lake Tana biosphere reserve and the CPINReMP (personal communication: BDU;

BoCTPD; zur Heide) due to their importance for biodiversity conservation and

concurrent critical linkages with exploitative human activities. The insufficiency in

available social-ecological data motivated the site selection. Rather pragmatical

criteria were the proximity to the regional capital, Bahir Dar which was the base

camp (figure 2.2, p. 13), and the accessibility of the villages. Due to flooding,

the kebeles along the shore of Lake Tana could only be accessed by boat or car

using ‘rocky’ roads. Travelling was costly in terms of money and time.

4.2.1.2 Group Size, Composition and Selection of the Participants

PRA is a group activity. The group size ranged from two to many, usually five to

eight participants. Occasionally, interested persons joined the discussions during

the process. Discussions were thus generally open to all, except during discussions

with women and fishermen of the Woito tribe when explicitly unwelcome.

Local participants should live close to a wetland or use the wetland resources

(theoretical relevance, Glaser & Strauss 2010: 65–66). The persons should have

time and interest in discussing the relevant topic. Locally and especially on working

and conference days, it was difficult to find people who had enough time to take

part in PRA (timing bias, see Kumar 2002: 37). Thus the few ones present were

asked to participate. (Due to the lack of people’s time some PRA processes were

rushed and interrupted.) At central locations (e. g. village centres where many

people gathered), there was a possibility to ‘pick out’ PRA participants which

1Note that the objective of this research work and the expected outcomes justify a rather‘extractive’ data mining, i. e. local people were asked to share their knowledge about thehuman-wetland system.


were otherwise difficult to reach (e. g. development agents, kebele leaders, LAC

members or people trained in wetland management).

PRA sessions were also held with woreda officials. Their official duties or their

expertise in the relevant topic were seen to be of interest for this study.

PRA groups were either homogeneous (e. g. women, Woito fishermen, young-

sters) or heterogeneous (e. g. landless and livestock farmers, farmers and kebele

leaders) (see Glaser & Strauss 2010: 70–71). Group composition, important to

make people feel easy during the discussions, was mainly chosen intentionally and

sometimes randomly depending on the situation. In very heterogeneous groups,

marginalised people (e. g. poor and young) were at times incapable of freely

expressing their views (elite bias, see Kumar 2002: 35). Efforts were made to

address them directly and provide them a chance to talk. Women and Woito

fishermen felt easier and were more open when discussions were held separate

from men or members of other communities, respectively. Generally, women

infrequently participated in PRA. Their perceptions and knowledge is therefore

inadequately represented (male bias, see Kumar 2002: 36).

4.2.1.3 General Procedure

After selecting the PRA participants a suitable, often shadowy location was

chosen. Each PRA session began with an introduction of the research team. The

purpose of the discussion and the procedure was explained. Mostly, the names,

age, occupation, official duties and partly endowments of the participants were

registered.

The process was initiated by a general question, e. g.: ‘Which services does the

wetland provide to you?’ or ‘Have you perceived any changes in your environment

or the way the land is used?’. Further questions went along with the visualisation

of the answers (maps, diagrams, matrices etc.) using paper and pen. Some

participants were unfamiliar utilising pens and paper, and felt shy or uneasy

drawing. Utilisation of other (natural) materials would have been a solution but

was often unfeasible. Due to the lack of time or spontaneously arising opportunities

of conducting discussions, visualisation was occasionally omitted.

Subsequent to visualisation, the discussion, i. e. the interview about the visual


output, helped clarifying questions and understanding complex issues and problems

that emerged (see Chambers 1994 a: 1263; Kumar 2002: 44). Very often, the

discussion itself revealed additional interesting facts. Occasionally, participants

were highly suspicious when asked sensitive questions, e. g. about land tenure and

conflicts (diplomatic bias; see Kumar 2002: 37), and the discussion had to be

shifted into ‘calm water’. At the end of the PRA session, participants were asked

whether they wanted to give additional comments and recommendations or to

make some statements. Each session took approximately one to two and a half

hours.

With the help of my colleague, Babiyew Sibhat, the PRA sessions were directly

translated from Amharic to English and vice versa. Of course, research that is not

conducted in the researcher’s mother tongue makes an entire understanding of

social realities even more difficult. Subsequent reflections on the processes helped

to adequately understand people’s ‘words between the lines’ and the hidden social

relations.

During the PRA sessions, participants’ contributions to discussions were noted

as precisely as possible. Sketches of the maps, diagrams etc. were made to add

personal comments and memos. These scripts, sketches and photographs of the

maps, diagrams etc. form the basis of data analysis (see p. 42).

The sampling of further data on the research subject usually terminated when,

apparently, no additional information and issues emerged (theoretical saturation,

see Glaser & Strauss 2010: 77). Due to the inaccessibility of Agid Kirigna kebele,

sampling did not reach its theoretical saturation, making further research necessary.

Despite constraints to data collection, most of the participants vigilantly

observed the gradual development of maps and diagrams and vitally discussed

the emerging issues. PRA was a welcome variation of everyday life and a method

perceived as positive to ask people about their views and ideas (personal commu-

nication: farmers in Agid Kirigna). Appendix 1, p. I lists the concrete application

procedure of each PRA method.


4.2.1.4 Methods of Participatory Rural Appraisal

Table 4.1, p. 36 provides an overview of the applied PRA methods and their

intended use. For a general description of the PRA methods and their application

see Kumar (2002).

Table 4.1: Methods of PRA and group discussions. The identification

numbers (ID No.) follow the numbering used in the field. Group

discussions indicated with the abbreviation ‘BS’ were held by Babiyew

Sibhat. Numbers in brackets indicate primary document (P) numbering

in ATLAS.ti. * Discussions without visualisation

Purpose ID No. Participants Location2

Resource map

Depiction of wetland uses and

management, land tenure, re-

source use conflicts; get an idea

about the broader landscape,

locate relevant communities for

further PRA sessions

2 (P2) Farmers, landless,

priest

Sedechila

Mariam,

Sewtiye

6 (P6) Farmers, priest, DA,

health extension expert

Wagetera

14 (P15) Landless, farmers Luhawit

18 (P21) Farmers, kebele leader,

WoEPLAU representa-

tive, health extension

expert

Guwala

Trend Analysis

Get a historical perspective of

change of land/wetland use, how

it is perceived and influences

livelihoods (figure 4.1, p. 38)

1 (P1) Farmers, nuns Ahun Wota

7 (P7) Farmers, nun Amana

13 (P14) Farmers Tigremender

19 (P22)* WoEPLAU (environ-

mental impact assess-

ment expert, envi-

ronmental education

expert, land use expert,

environmental impact

assessment expert)

Addis Zemen

2See p. 12


Purpose ID No. Participants Location

Cause-effect diagram

Analyse environmental/land

use changes, drivers and social-

ecological ramifications (figure

4.2, p. 38)

3 (P3) Farmers Sedechila

Mariam

4 (P4) Male and female farm-

ers

Woreta (par-

ticipants are

from Angur-

bad)

10 (P10,

P11)

DAs (natural resource

management, animal

science)

Wagetera

Impact diagram

(1) Perceptions on wetland con-

servation, management scenarios,

possible effects of these scenarios

on livelihoods; (2) livelihood

strategies, land use change (fig-

ure 4.3, p. 39)

5 (P5) Farmers and three nuns Woreta (par-

ticipants are

from Gir-

basha)

11 (P12) Farmers, two priests Sela

22 (P25) N/A (farmers) Fota Mender

23 (P26) Farmers Gulash

Well-being ranking

Identify well-being groups3; study

conceptions of well-being, de-

velopment, livelihood strategies

(figure 4.4, p. 39, figure 4.5,

p. 39)

8 (P8) Women Sindeye

15 (P16) Landless, youngsters Bobatie

Venn diagram

Study the importance of services,

administrative bodies, other or-

ganisations for local people, and

their cooperation

12 (P13)* Farmers, priest Barye

21 (P24)* Farmers Bahir

Mender

28 (P27) WoARD, WoEPLAU,

WoWE

Woreta

3The identification of well-being groups by local people includes the mapping of in-/tangible

assets and their accessibility to different well-being groups.


Purpose ID No. Participants Location

Pair-wise ranking

Detect resource use conflicts,

conflicts between wetland con-

servation and use; causes and

consequences of these conflicts

(figure 4.6, p. 39)

9 (P9) Farmers Sindeye

16 (P18) Farmers, LAC/elder

court, model farmer,

police man, wetland

trainee

Daga

20 (P23) Fishermen of the Woito

tribe

Qurtbahir

Group discussions

Fishery management and conser-

vation

17 (P20)* Members of the fisher-

men’s association

Daga

Land/wetland use change; impli-

cations on livelihoods

BS4

(P54)*

Kebele leaders Addis Zemen

(participants

are from

Lamgie and

Koker)

BS5

(P56)*

Kebele leaders Addis Zemen

(participants

are from

Daga)

Figure 4.1: Trend analysis in Amana,Wagetera. Photograph: Springsguth, M.

Figure 4.2: Cause-effect diagram drawn bydevelopment agents in Wagetera. Photo-graph: Springsguth, M.


Figure 4.3: Impact diagram: Livelihoodstrategies, Sela, Wagetera. Photograph:Springsguth, M.

Figure 4.4: Well-being ranking withyouth in Bobatie, Nabega. Photograph:Springsguth, M.

Figure 4.5: Well-being ranking withwomen in Sindeye, Wagetera. Photograph:Springsguth, M.

Figure 4.6: Pair-wise ranking with Woitofishermen in Qurtbahir, Agid Kirigna. Pho-tograph: Springsguth, M.

4.2.1.5 Testing the Methods

At least two application procedures of PRA methods were tested in a PRA work-

shop preliminary to their application. Though ‘PRA participants’ were almost

unexceptionally experts and scientists, their comments on how to best communi-

cate with farmers in the field helped to improve the PRA design. PRA procedures

were continuously revised and improved to adequately respond to farmers and to

enhance the data validity.

Hereinafter, the second data collection method is explained.


4.2.2 Problem-Centred Expert Interviews

Experts, woreda and regional officials and key informants were interviewed using

the problem-centred interview method. The interviews were semi-structured, the

questions open. A catalogue of research question was compiled and used as an

interview guideline (see Appendix 2, p. XI).

This method was applied to (1) verify hypotheses which were developed in the

field (theory-driven method, see Mayring 2002: 70), (2) validate information and

resolve questions, (3) apprehend complex human-wetland linkages by drawing on

expertise and (4) arrive at the subject perspectives, interpretations and opinions

of the respondent.

4.2.2.1 Selection of the Respondents

Respondents were selected according to their specialised knowledge or their official

mandates which were seen to be associated with the research subject. Fairly

frequently, potential further informants were filtered from previous interviews.

4.2.2.2 Interview Procedure

Each interview commenced with a personal introduction and explanation of the

interview purpose. Subsequently, the respondent was asked to introduce himself

(educational background, field of research, project work etc.). This intended

short warm-up phase helped to choose pertinent questions from the catalogue.

Introductory questions were asked followed by an open interview conversation.

Spontaneously emerging issues of concern were addressed. The interviews were

mainly conducted in English, a familiar language to me, and were noted in

manuscript form.

4.2.2.3 Overview of the Interviews

Table 4.2, p. 41 provides an overview of the interviews conducted.


Table 4.2: Overview of Interviews. The identification numbers (ID

No.) follow the numbering used in the field. Interviews marked ‘BS’

were held by Babiyew Sibhat. Numbers in brackets indicate primary

document (P) numbering in ATLAS.ti.

Subject area ID No. Respondent Location

Wetland

management

institutions;

human-

wetland

system

1 (P28) EWNRA Addis Ababa

2 (P29) EWNRA Addis Ababa

5 (P32) BoARD Bahir Dar

6 (P33) EPLAUA (Department of Environmental Pro-

tection)

Bahir Dar

13 (P40) BDU Bahir Dar

Human-

wetland

system

4 (P31) BoWE Bahir Dar

7 (P34) BoWE Bahir Dar

8 (P35) WoARD (water harvesting expert, irrigation

expert, rural road construction)

Addis Zemen

9 (P36) ARARI Bahir Dar

11 (P38) TaSBO Bahir Dar

12 (P39) Ethiopian Nile Irrigation and Drainage Project Bahir Dar

BS2

(P55)

Early warning and risk disaster management

processes coordinator (EWRDM)

Addis Zemen

BS3

(P52)

Kebele leader Wagetera

Land adminis-

tration

3 (P30) Institute of Land Administration BDU (ILA) Bahir Dar

10 (P37) EPLAUA Bahir Dar

17 (P42) WoEPLAU Woreta

18 (P43) WoEPLAU Addis Zemen

Fisheries 14 (P41) Bahir Dar Fisheries and other Aquatic Life

Research Centre (ARARI)

Bahir Dar

BS1

(P53)

WoARD (fish resources development expert) Addis Zemen


4.3 Data Preparation and Analysis

Primary data (PRA, group discussions, interviews, own observations) were available

in manuscript notes. The preparation of primary data before analysis comprised

summarising and selecting the relevant data material (see Mayring 2002: 94–99).

The analysis of the processed primary data and secondary data (two group

discussions and three interviews conducted by Babiyew Sibhat) was done us-

ing ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis software that helps organising data

and facilitates the conceptualisation and categorisation of research data and

the development of hypotheses (see Friese 2012: 9–10). In grounded theory,

coding/conceptualisation is a fundamental method which aims at developing

categories (Glaser & Strauss 2010: 119–120). Concepts can be defined as con-

cise designations which can be attributed to events, phenomena, occurrences

etc. (Muckel 2007: 216–217), and are “relevant theoretical abstractions of what

happens in the analysed field” (Glaser & Strauss 2010: 41). Categories can be

created by classifying concepts which refer to similar phenomena. Hypotheses

are generalised relations between categories (Glaser & Strauss 2010: 56–57).

Conceptualisation and categorisation already take place during data collection.

The processed primary and secondary data material was stored as primary

documents in one hermeneutic unit of ATLAS.ti, i. e. the “container” for each

project that includes all primary documents (Friese 2012: 13–14). Open coding in

ATLAS.ti marked the beginning of data analysis. The data material was freely

associated with codes (see Appendix 3, p. XVIII) and accurately analysed for

already assigned or new codes. Questions and memos were written (see Muckel

2007: 221; Strauss 1994: 57–62). The writing of memos is a central element of

Grounded Theory and aims at clarifying, combining and differentiating aspects

and concepts to finally integrate them to form a theoretical construct. Memos

are essential during data collection and analysis (see Friese 2012: 18; Mayring

2002: 105). PRA sessions, group discussions and interviews were screened for the

same codes. In this way, the different data sets could be analysed for conformity

and consistency and for variety and differences to make them comparable.

Axial and selective coding in ATLAS.ti was mainly done with the help of the

query tool and the co-occurrence table explorer (see Friese 2012: 251–267, 285–

4.3. DATA PREPARATION AND ANALYSIS 43

287), by linking of quotations and drawing networks on paper (since it was not

possible to create ‘sub-networks’ in ATLAS.ti). Axial coding aims at developing

and consolidating categories and helps to structure a theory. A provisional concept

is analysed according to the coding paradigm, i. e. a code is tested for its conditions,

interactions, strategies and consequences (Muckel 2007: 224). Selective coding

means to systematically relate various categories to key categories. The further

analysis of this relation according to the coding paradigm, and writing of focused

memos can finally be integrated into a grounded theory (Strauss 1994: 63–64).

The output of each query result was stored as a super code (see Friese 2012:

267–271).

Analysis itself was a gradual and cyclical process: codes and memos were

developed according to the material, completed, complemented, revised, compared

and linked (see Mayring 2002: 106, 145–146). ATLAS.ti very well supported this

open, flexible, dynamic and reflective analytical process.

Data was validated by triangulation. Triangulation offsets the weaknesses of

one way to access data with the strengths of another (Lamnek 2010: 141–142).

Sources of primary, secondary and tertiary data (e. g. paper, legal documents) were

combined to validate information and findings, and to clarify uncertainties (data

triangulation). PRA sessions and interviews were discussed and analysed with

my research colleague so that misconceptions could be resolved and subjective

influences could be corrected (investigator triangulation). Different PRA methods,

and PRA with problem-centred interviews were combined for methodological

triangulation (see Denzin 1978, in Lamnek 2002: 142).

In order to allow for the comparison of research data, the following comparison

groups were identified and categorised:

• Social actors in different research sites: Distinctions and similarities between

comparison groups are determined by the locality, local conditions, ecological

conditions or social processes.

• Social actors of different well-being groups, social status, ethnicity: Distinc-

tions and similarities between comparison groups are determined by their

membership of well-being groups (landless, lower, middle, upper), social

status (kebele leaders/administration, LAC members, rich people, nuns,


priests) and ethnicity (Woito tribe).

• Social actors distinguished by their values, objectives and priorities. (This

category is often linked to the former.)

The manuscript notes of primary and secondary data sources are quoted

using the quotations assigned to the notes in ATLAS.ti. A quotation, e. g. 2:34,

indicates the number of the primary document (2) and the consecutive quotation

number within the primary document (34). Names of the institutes of interview

respondents are indicated.

The results that were obtained by the above mentioned methods are presented

in the following chapter.

Chapter 5

Results

The results presented in this chapter provide insights into environmental and land

use changes, and the consequences of these changes on rural livelihoods. Further

on, the conflicts over wetlands and their associated resources, and the effects of

land administration on wetland utilisation are addressed. Finally, common-pool

resource management institutions and the conditions that constrain an effective

management are presented. But first of all, this chapter provides an introduction to

the values of wetlands, perceptions of well-being and people’s objectives regarding

their lives. These are fundamental in understanding wetland utilisation.

5.1 Values of Wetlands

Wetlands provide various tangible assets to local people:

• fodder and hay for livestock (e. g. 6:1; 7:25; 9:4; 14:13; 24:17)

• crops (due to high wetland soil fertility) (e. g. 6:1; 9:4; 14:11; 25:3; 26:4)

• water for domestic supply, animal drinking (e. g. 7:25; 9:4; 14:13)

• irrigation water (using water pumps, canisters, by wetland drainage) (e. g.

6:1; 9:4; 21:7)

• fish (especially valued by the Woito tribe, whose livelihoods depend upon

fishery) (e. g. 7:25; 9:4; 23:3)

45

46 CHAPTER 5. RESULTS

• plant species for roof thatching, handicraft making, protection against flood,

ornamental purposes or tanqua building (e. g. 8:16; 9:4; 21:10; 52:19).

Wetlands are further valued for their social and cultural importance (15:13;

25:15). Rather seldom the regulating (2:17; 7:25; 9:4; 15:3; 24:31) and the habitat

function of wetlands are acknowledged (e. g. 7:25; 14:13; 18:10). The instrumental

(direct use) value of wetlands for humans is given high priority.

The socio-economic contribution of wetlands is recognised by officials (crop

production, irrigation water supply, addressing landlessness) (BoWE: 31:5; BoWE:

34:1; TaSBO: 38:1; WoARD: 35:1). The Ethiopian government recognises the

ability of wetlands to store carbon as a contribution to mitigate climate change

(EWNRA: 29:1; see MoARD 2010: 15). Scientists and conservationists generally

emphasise the ecological functions of wetlands (ARARI: 36:26; EPLAUA: 33:1;

figure 5.1, p. 46).

Provisioning

Animal feed,productive arable land,domestic water supply,irrigation water supply,fish,plants for handicrafts, roof thatching etc.,habitats for fauna and flora

Regulating

Sediment trapping,temperature regulation,ground water retention,flood control,buffer zone

Cultural

Recreation (refreshment),ornamental purposes,ceremonies,distribution as a solution tosocio-economic problems

Supporting

Carbon sequestration

Figure 5.1: Ecosystem services of wetlands as perceived by various stakeholders. Ecosystemservices, providing benefits to humans, can be classified into: provisioning, regulating, supportingand cultural (MA 2005: v-vi). Source: compiled from own results

The values people ascribe to wetlands are reflected in personal objectives set

to enhance well-being and shaping wetland use.

5.2. PERCEPTIONS ON WELL-BEING AND PEOPLE’S OBJECTIVES 47

5.2 Perceptions on Well-being and People’s

Objectives

Though wetlands fulfil important functions, local people perceive them to be

unproductive, useless wastelands (4:38; 5:8; 7:25; 25:6; EWNRA: 32:3). One

official formulated this exaggeratedly: “Wetlands are like the flesh of a monkey,

people do not eat it so they do not use it” (BoWE: 31:10).

Intrinsically unimportant, wetlands instrumentally contribute to people’s well-

being (4:24; cf. 15:34). The natural resource endowments of the kebeles (soil

fertility, water availability) are seen to be sufficient to secure and support livelihoods

(8:11; 12:40; 15:10, 23:38, 56:17). “Around Lake Tana in central Amhara, [. . . ]

landholdings are limited, but good rainfall, high fertility and the sales value of

the abundant mix of crops (including some paddy rice) and livestock and butter

make this one of the country’s wealthiest areas” (USAID/MoARD 2010: 67, see

also 63–75).

However, well-being ranking (see p. 37) revealed a varied picture of wealth.

Local people identified four well-being groups (8:5; 16:1) which were classified on

the basis of landholding size and livestock numbers as indicators of wealth1: (1)

landless people: no land, (2) lower well-being group: 0.25 ha to 0.5 ha land, no or

1 ox and a few cows, (3) middle well-being group: 0.75 ha to 1.0 ha land, 1 ox and

a few cows, (4) upper well-being group: more than 1.25 ha land, 2 oxen, a few to

many cows, 1 horse or donkey. The four well-being groups are differently endowed

with tangible and intangible assets such as health, education, authority, social

status, food or clothes (see Appendix 4, p. XVIII). The application of livelihood

strategies to respond to insecurities and enhance well-being varies between these

groups (see 8; 16; see Appendix 5, p. XIX).

For the participants (landless and members of the lower and middle well-being

groups; see 8; 16), ‘development’ aims at attaining prosperity and establishing

1This classification was verified by indications of farmers’ assets (6:23; 8:35; 9:1; 15:29;16:2; 52:2). Though de Haan and Zoomers (2005) suggest “characterising [farmers] in terms oftheir objectives and priorities” (p. 40), it seemed to be appropriate to classify well-being groupsin terms of tangible assets due to the importance people ascribe to them (see 8:27). Woitopeople whose livelihoods depend rather on fish resources than on agriculture are not classifieddue to insufficient data.


social status. A good life encompasses education, employment, health, reputation,

respect, reduced workload and material goods such as quality and balanced

food, clothing, household items, farm inputs, livestock or landholding (8:24; 16:7,

16:9). By hard work a good life can be achieved (8:22; 16:4). Giving birth to

many children earns respect, helps to better represent own interests within the

community and reduces workload for household individuals (8:17). Whereas poor

peasants strive to accumulate wealth for a good life, richer peasants are interested

in the consolidation of wealth (see p. 56).

The values actors ascribe to wetlands, people’s perceptions on well-being

and their objectives shape wetland resource appropriation. Different well-being

groups utilise and manage wetland resources in different ways (e. g. 7:48; 8:20;

23:24; 43:16; see p. 56). The next section addresses changes in wetland resource

utilisation and use regimes, which is necessary to understand the effects of land

use changes on wetland management.

5.3 Environmental and Land Use Changes

Land use changes in the wetlands around Lake Tana have significantly increased

and become a threat to the integrity of the ecological system (Amsalu 2006: 19).

The major environmental and land use changes in the wetlands east of the lake

as perceived by local people are: unusual flooding events, sedimentation, changes

in the cropping pattern (including the conversion of wetlands especially for rice

cultivation, resulting in a continuous loss of wetlands) and increasing fishing

activities (e. g. 1:18; 3:6; 4:30; 7:52; 14:23; 23:10; 54:8, 54:12; ARARI: 36:3;

EWNRA: 29:4). These changes and their drivers are shortly described below. Other

changes detected by farmers are the increase in area of settlements (Appendix 6,

p. XXIV) and Eucalyptus plantations (1:38; 4:30).

5.3.1 Flooding and Sedimentation

The “flooding era” began around 1996 (9:9). Despite the natural occurrence of

flooding events, it is stressed that the floods in 2010 and 2011 have been more

severe than in the past, with inundations lasting until the dry season (April/May)

5.3. ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE CHANGES 49

and lake levels exceeding the annual average (52:4; ARARI: 36:8; BDU: 40:7;

WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 22:1).

Assumptions are made that flooding might be caused by the artificial regulation

of the lake level for hydropower generation (e. g. 3:4; 6:13; 11:3; WoEPLAU Addis

Zemen: 22:4). Due to inconclusive correlations between water level and rainfall

(3:3) as well as the artificial regulation, it is difficult for farmers to forecast the

severity of flooding (1:22; 18:13; ARARI: 36:8; EWRDM: 55:6). A few farmers

in Tanametsele kebele related flooding to catchment degradation in the upper

watershed resulting in depositions of sediment at the river mouth of Gumara

(3:4). Officials argued that flooding was also caused by the degradation of

wetlands through farmers ‘capturing’ the lake shore and thereby impairing the

flood regulating function of wetlands (TaSBO: 38:3; cf. BoWE: 34:3; Bakema &

Mafabi 2003: 101).

Sedimentation is recognised by farmers (3:4; 4:3; 14:3; personal communi-

cation: farmers in Daga). Sediment depositions are seen to improve soil fertility,

increase crop production at least for a short period and make the application of

fertilisers dispensable (15:10; 52:33; 56:4; personal communication: farmers in

Sedechila Mariam). According to SMEC (2008) the total annual sediment load

from the upper catchments into Lake Tana is estimated to be 9.6 million tons.

Thereof 8.6 million tons (equivalent to 1 to 2 mm of sediment per year) settle in

the lake basin, mainly near the outlets of the rivers.

5.3.2 Rice Cultivation

Rice cultivation was promoted by the Derg (socialist regime) (7:3) and introduced

by North Korea in 1978 (BoARD 2011 b: 1; cf. 52:9). Initially, rice cultivation was

less accepted and its expansion failed due to difficulties regarding the threshing

and pealing of rice grains (lack of dehiscent mills), and the absence of markets

during the communist regime (1:39; ARARI: 36:2; Gebrekidan & Teka 2006 a: 45).

Since the reintroduction of rice in the 1990s by the former Bureau of Agriculture

(today BoARD), rice cultivation has kept expanding (1:39; 7:3; 14:23; ARARI:

36:2; Gebrekidan & Teka 2006 a: 45; figure 5.2, p. 50).

When asked about the trends of rice cultivation, farmers argued that rice


cultivation would further increase but rice productivity would decrease. Thus the

application of fertilisers and additional crop land would be necessary to maintain

high yields (7:39). BoARD (2011 b) projects an increasing demand for rice seeds

in the Amhara region and will further on promote rice production and research

(see p. 16).

Figure 5.2: Vast rice fields in Agid Kirigna.Photograph: Springsguth, M.

Figure 5.3: Cattle grazing in a wetland. Pho-tograph: Springsguth, M.

Rice tolerates water logging (1:18; 4:7; 7:3) and is a very productive crop.

Rice yields are around five to seven times higher than teff2 yields (12:51; cf. 4:7;

Teshome et al. 2009: 24). Besides, harvesting teff was tiresome (4:34). Rice is a

multi-purpose crop used for food production (bread, injera, the traditional pita)

and the brewing of beer. Its straw serves as fodder for livestock and thatching

(1:18; 12:27; 52:44).

Due to the introduction of rice, crops such as teff, maize, finger millet (Eleusine

coracana), safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) and pulses were continually replaced

in all kebeles (1:25; 7:1; 56:3). Whereas formerly three to four harvests per year

could be obtained (7:53; 8:9), one to two are common today with the second

harvest being maize, pulses or marketable horticulture crops, e. g. potatoes and

tomatoes (1:24; 5:17; 6: 4; 7:3; 12:13; 21:8; Teshome et al. 2009: 18). Fallowing

was abandoned due to land scarcity and the changed cropping pattern resulting

from the introduction of rice cultivation (5:4; 5:19; 7:1; 12:5, 12:10; 52:30).

2Teff is an old cereal crop, traditionally cultivated in Ethiopia.

5.3. ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE CHANGES 51

5.3.3 Conversion of Wetlands

The encroachment of crop and grazing land into wetlands (figure 5.3, p. 50)

is one of the most critical land use changes (see p. 56). Whereas before 1990

wetlands were almost exclusively used as pastures and small-scale cultivation

of pulses, the conversion of these wetlands has tremendously increased (7:52;

WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:39), particularly during the last five to six years (ARARI:

36:3). In Wagetera, Nabega and Tanametsele, wetlands have been converted for

rice production (e. g. 2:18; 7:12; 14:10; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:24). Increasingly,

wetlands have been changed to recession farmlands (15:17; 24:23; 26:13; ARARI:

36:7) for the cultivation of maize, teff, barley, oats, finger millet, potato, pepper

lentils, grass pea or chickpea, using residual moisture (15:13; 52:8). It was stated

that in 1982 around 85% of the Fogera floodplain had been covered by grass. In

2003 an estimated 80% of these grasslands were already converted into crop land

(ARARI: 36:6; see Appendix 6, p. XXIV). Wetlands in Agid Kirigna kebele were

less encroached than elsewhere in the research area (40:6; own observation).

The high population growth in the kebeles entailing an increased need for

land results in the encroachment of non-cultivated, fertile wetlands (e. g. 2:18;

3:19; 4:14; 7:12; 14:10; figure 5.4, p. 52).

Since lack of land entails food insecurity, the enhancement of food security

is a fundamental aspect involving conversion (2:18; see table 5.1, p. 55). In a

study on sustainable wetland management in Illubabor (southwestern Ethiopia),

Dixon & Wood (2001) found that “wetland drainage and cultivation was originally

initiated in response to food shortages” (p. 7).

5.3.4 Fishery

“Fishing has never been an important activity historically” (Dejen 2005: 41).

Commercial gillnet fishery of Lake Tana was introduced in 1986 (cf. 52:40; 54:7)

to meet the increasing demand from the capital, Addis Ababa (Dejen 2005: 41)

and today also from the regional capital Bahir Dar (9:13; ARARI: 41:10). Only

the Woito fishermen have been completely dependent on the lake’s resources

(23:3, 23:4; Gebrekidan & Teka 2006: 45).

Nowadays fishing has become an increasingly important practice (12:37; 15:45;


23:35; figure 5.5, p. 52). This phenomenon can be explained with (1) population

growth, land scarcity and unemployment, urging young and landless3 to search

for alternative livelihood options (e. g. 2:6; 8:38; 16:12; 20:2; 23:10; 26:8) and

(2) the occurrence of flooding in the last years, leading to crop losses and urging

affected people to draw on fish resources (e. g. 9:6; 12:46; 26:8). During flooding,

fishing activities take place in the wetlands and rice fields (9:6; 52:12).

Figure 5.4: Wetland conversion. Photo-graph: Moreaux, R.

Figure 5.5: Children and their catch:African Catfish, locally called Ambaza(Clarias gariepinus). At present, this speciesis being increasingly consumed (23:18;52:41). Photograph: Springsguth, M.

Figure 5.6, p. 53 depicts the drivers of change. The next section addresses

the impact of environmental and land use changes on rural livelihoods which is

useful to apprehend the broader context of wetland management.

5.4 Impact of Environmental and Land Use

Changes on Rural Livelihoods

Environmental and land use changes do often have two faces and the potential

to positively or adversely affect people’s livelihoods.

3The category of landless mainly comprises young adults and families. They are often moreformally educated than their parents (MoARD 2009: 19.)

5.4. IMPACT ON RURAL LIVELIHOODS 53

Conversion of wetlands

Structural and functional changes*

Loss of genetic and species diversity*

Increasing overexploitation

WETLAND

Economic growth

Economic incentives

Degradation of theupper watershed

Population growth

External shocks(e.g. flooding)

Land scarcity

Unemployment

attenuating effect

amplifying effect

Vulnerability/livelihood insecurity

?

Figure 5.6: Drivers of environmental and land use change. Simplified scheme. For a definitionof vulnerability, see supra note 9, p. 134. * See Appendix 7, p. XXVIII. Source: compiled fromown results

5.4.1 Impact on Crop Production and Livestock Rearing

Due to the unusually high flooding, crop production and productivity has decreased,

in some villages drastically (e. g. 6:21; 12:10; 14:6; EWRDM: 55:19; figure 5.7,

p. 54). Mango, coffee and gesho (Rhamnus prinoides, ‘local hop’) production,

formerly an additional income source to buy clothes, salt or oil, has ceased (1:25;

7:19; 12:15). Rice production is said to have declined, partially because of declining

soil fertility (12:51). Useful trees such as eucalyptus (Eucalyptus spp.) and wanza

(Cordia africana) have died due to water stress (12:15). Recession farming is

impossible or delayed (e. g. 6:12; 12:51; 15:15; EWRDM: 55:3, 55:7).

Flooding and encroachment, exacerbating overgrazing (Mulatu 2006: 27)

and degradation of wetlands (Amsalu 2006: 19), engender fodder shortages for


Figure 5.7: Flooded rice field in Wagetera.Photograph: Sibhat, B.

Figure 5.8: Flooded settlements in AhunWota at the Gumara river mouth: Photo-graph: Springsguth, M.

livestock (e. g. 3:4; 14:9, 14:14; 18:40; 24:8) and a reduction in quantity and

quality of animal produce as a consequence (7:6; 11:6; 24:14; 26:20). “Water fire

burns the grass”, one farmer said (14:9). Cattle suffer from diseases, and medical

treatment requires additional expenses (11:6; 12:26; 14:7;).

5.4.2 Impact on Social Life

Most evidently, flooding puts people’s lives at risk by destroying their settlements

(figure 5.8, p. 54) and in the worst case claiming victims among humans and

animals (3:4; 4:11; cf. EWRDM: 55:5). Severe flooding is an obstacle to devel-

opment and reduces well-being (8:23; 12:40; 15:34; 16:4). Malaria, water-born

diseases and diarrhoeal disorder spread (15:20; EWRDM: 55:6). Physical and

thus communication barriers during flooding adversely affect social networks, the

access to social services (e. g. health centres, family planning trainings), schools,

churches and markets (8:18; 13:7; 15:20; 52:6; EWRDM: 55:12; 55:13). Searching

for additional sources of fodder due to shortages increases workload (18:39).

Flooding and encroachment of cultivated land into wetlands involve land and

resource use conflicts (e. g. 9:20; 18:22: EWNRA: 28:6) which are dealt with in

detail below (see p. 56).

5.4. IMPACT ON RURAL LIVELIHOODS 55

5.4.3 Impact on Food Security and Income Generation

During flooding, residents of the lakeside communities are subject to an insecure

food situation (3:4; 6:9; 15:23). To ensure food security wetlands are cultivated

in compensation for as yet flooded recession farmland which is important for dry

season food production (14:18; 52:8; see Dixon & Wood 2001: 9).

Rice production has an ambivalent impact on food and income security (table

5.1, p. 55).

Table 5.1: Advantages and disadvantages of rice production for local

people

Advantages Disadvantages

• Staple food (food security) (4:14;

5:2; 12:29)

• Income generation (4:14; 12:29)

• Investments, e. g. house thatching

with corrugated iron roofs (4:10;

52:44)

• Sold in exchange for other crops,

fuel, cloths, berbere, oil or medicine

(6:11; 8:3; 12:29)

• Losses of income for livestock farm-

ers (4:14; 4:19; 12:48; 52:44)

• Loss of variation in cultivated crops

(4:18; 7:2; 56:3) and a healthy and

balanced nutrition (7:29; cf. 12:30)

• Unsustainability of long-term wet-

land cultivation: nutrient depletion,

loss of soil quality and productiv-

ity (EWNRA: 28:8; Tegene & Hunt

2000: 25; Wood 2000: 10)

By tendency, and especially during flooding, fishing serves as a source of

food and income (12:36; 15:30; 20:2; 26:8; ARARI: 41:37), but often leads to an

overexploitation of fish resources (e. g. 9:11; 15:30; 23:10). Due to increasing prices

(25:22; but cf. 9:37; ARARI: 41:12), the fish market has become very attractive

(ARARI: 41:7, 41:13; Getahun et al. 2008: 51). However, the transportation of

fresh fish to the market (Woreta, Yifag, Hamusit) is no option due to long travel

times (24:12; 41:10; see IFPRI/CSA/EDRI 2006: 27) and the absence of portable

cooling boxes (23:18). Generally, prices for fresh fish are higher than for dried

ones (41:12). For the Woito, though flooding is perceived as positive (23:30), the


fishing activities of the other communities led to a reduction of their income and

contribute to poverty (23:31, 23:36).

It must be noted that both the advantages land use changes entail for local

people (rice cultivation) and the disadvantages evoked by flooding, encroachment

and overfishing involve the degradation of wetland resources (see Appendix 7,

p. XXVIII).

As mentioned earlier, changes in wetland use are accompanied by conflicts

over wetland resources. The life objectives (see p. 47) and priorities of the different

wetland users underlying resource appropriation are a crucial source of conflict,

as will be shown in the next section.

5.5 Conflicts over Wetlands and Associated

Resources

To better understand the conditions that determine the effectiveness of wetland

management, this section addresses the conflicts that arise over wetlands and

their resources, the social actors involved, and the consequences of conflicts for

local communities.

5.5.1 Conflicts Related to Encroachment

The conversion of wetland pastures into cultivated land engenders conflicts

between livestock and crop farmers expanding their private landholding (e. g. 1:37;

18:27; 21:16). Encroachment dynamics do not simply follow a certain principle.

The cultivation at the edges of wetlands by farmers with plots adjacent to the

wetland (e. g. 2:28; 3:13; 15:17) seems to be a more silent form of continuous

encroachment. The conversion may be more obvious when “jumpers” (18:23)

encroach parts of formerly uncultivated wetland. Due to land scarcity, all eyes

focus on the redistribution of wetlands for cultivation (e. g. 2:10; WoARD: 35:5)4.

Consequently, conflicts occur between various parties (table 5.2, p. 57).

The conflicts are reinforced when herds of cattle browse the rice fields (9:20).

4Redistribution is expected with fear due to decreasing landholding sizes (5:3; 7:59; 22:9;ILA: 30:3; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:31), and perceived to be unjust (2:8).

5.5. CONFLICTS OVER WETLANDS AND ASSOCIATED RESOURCES 57

Table 5.2: Parties of actors involved in conflicts related to encroachment

Party A Party B

Landless interested in wetland cultivation

(inter alia collective cultivation in groups

(54:13)) and

Livestock farmers, kebele administration

(mostly elderly of the upper well-being

group): preserve pastures for livestock

rearing (2:21, 2:23, 2:28, 2:29; 14:14; cf.

DSA/SCI 2006: 98)

Landless interested in wetland cultivation

and

Other community residents interested in

wetland cultivation (7:56; 24:22)

Landless claiming wetlands and recession

farmland for fishing during the rainy sea-

son (2:30) and cultivation during the dry

season and

Farmers unwilling to allot their recession

land and waive customary rights (24:22;

see EPLAUA 37:15)

Community interested in redistribution

and

Kebele administration interested in wet-

land preservation for livestock rearing

(14:14; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:10)

Rich farmers interested in wetland cultiva-

tion and

Poorer community members interested in

wetland cultivation (8:34)

Households with young people (lower,

middle well-being group) interested in re-

distribution and less/no land to bequeath

to their offspring and

Households of the upper well-being group

with no interest in redistribution and

enough land to bequeath to their offspring

(5:3; 7:31; 15:37; 25:14; see 8:34)

5.5.2 Conflicts over Grazing Land

Traditionally, the number of livestock owned by one person is not limited (IFAD

2007: 17). Along with an increase in livestock numbers (ibid.: 17; cf. 24:8)

and encroachment, this entails overstocking of communal pastures which aggra-

vates overgrazing. Consequently, competition over fodder sources arises between

livestock farmers (9:20; 18:26).

5.5.3 Cropland Boundary Conflicts

Boundary conflicts, though rarely noted (DSA/SCI 2006: 98–99), occur among

rice farmers and among farmers practising recession agriculture (9:23; 18:32).

The reasons for such boundary conflicts are elaborated below (p. 61).


5.5.4 Conflicts between Tana Kirkos Monasteries and the

Community

A near-natural wetland with patches of remnant populations of Cyperus papyrus

lies at the foot of the rocky Tana Kirkos Island, inhabited by orthodox monks

(figure 2.2, p. 13, figure 5.9, p. 58, figure 5.10, p. 58). The Derg regime promoted

coffee production in farmers’ cooperatives on one of the four islands. After the

subversion of the socialist regime, land use rights were transferred back to the

monasteries. Farmers complained, land was redistributed in favour of the already

rich monastery (2:31; personal communication: 1:23, expert, institute unknown).

The boundary between the community and monastic land is questioned by local

people. Today the conflict is latent, but becomes manifest with the encroachment

into this near-natural wetland (personal communication: expert BDU; but cf.

26:19), and more overt by the theft of coffee from monastic plantations (personal

communication: 1:23, monk, Tana Kirkos).

Figure 5.9: Tana Kirkos Island. Photograph:Moreaux, R.

Figure 5.10: Papyrus swamp, Tana Kirkos.Background: Settlements and the Gumarariver mouth. Photograph: Springsguth, M.

5.5.5 Conflicts between Wetland Conservation and Use in

Agid Kirigna

In Agid Kirigna, the conservation efforts of local people (25:14; see p. 67) conflict

with the need of others to raise crops and to feed their cattle. Farmers whose

5.5. CONFLICTS OVER WETLANDS AND ASSOCIATED RESOURCES 59

landholding does not have the capacity to feed their livestock herd it into the

wetlands (25:17, 25:23).

Besides, there is a conflict between sand mining activities at the lake shore and

agriculture. Vehicles extracting the sand partly destroy wetland pastures resulting

in a loss of livestock fodder and arable land (21:15).

5.5.6 Conflicts Related to Fishing

In Tanametsele, conflicts arise over the use of wetlands as fishing and grazing

grounds: Whereas mostly elderly people prioritise grazing, the youth association

of Aheyasat support young people to make a living of fishery. Youths of Sedechila

Mariam and Sewtiye compete over fishing grounds (2:30). The increasing fishing

practices of communities in Agid Kirigna conflict with the activities of the fisheries-

dependant Woito (23:36; 24:21; but cf. 21:16).

Stealing of fisher nets is a general problem and causes conflicts between the

fishermen (9:14; 18:43; WoARD: 53:7), particularly in the months of August to

October (9:39). Nets were even stolen by people from Dembia woreda, north of

Lake Tana (23:36). Due to thieving and cutting of nets by motorised boats, small-

scale fishery becomes economically unviable (12:32; 20:6). Fishermen who manage

fishery resources more sustainably conflict with fishermen whose fishing practices

are unsustainable and aggravate overfishing (18:30; 24:21; ARARI: 41:17). Stealing

of fisher nets favours these unsustainable but more effective practices (41:16).

Conflicts further arise over the amount of fish caught by individual persons (8:31;

20:9; 23:24).

5.5.7 Conflicts Arising from Stakeholders’ Perceptions on

Government Plans

Statements on government plans for the use and management of wetland resources

are diverse.

At the local level, the government is said to have an interest in (1) distributing

wetlands to landless (without a legal basis) (2:29; 7:37), (2) promoting drainage

of wetlands (9:30) and (3) encroachment through community members (25:24)


as well as (4) supporting youth using wetland resources as an alternative income

source (e. g. collecting plants) (22:15). It is further said to (5) not consider

wetland management at all (2:20; 9:29) and (6) support the conservation of

wetlands and ecotourism in Tana Kirkos (2:5).

Woreda and regional officials stated BoARD advocated wetland cultivation

and recession farming (WoARD: 35:3; BoWE: 31:5). By contrast, EPLAUA

(33:4) pointed out the woreda government falsely associated the government’s

promotion of agricultural modernisation and technological progress with the

conversion of wetlands. Recession agriculture is generally prohibited (ARARI:

36:11). The conflicting interests of wetland use between BoARD and EPLAUA5

become most evident during the implementation of regulations at the woreda and

kebele levels (33:4).

The variety of these statements reflects the conflicting opinions about and

interests in wetland use and management across levels and sectors and their partly

incompatible strategies or plans (cf. EWNRA: 28:6)6.

5.5.8 The Consequences of Conflicts for Communal Life

Land and resource use conflicts divide the local society. Distrust and resentments

prevail and compromise communal life. Cases of corruption and suppression by

powerful people create fear (16:16; 18:34). Richer households argue with poorer

ones about the legitimacy of their actions, kebele leaders with the community and

lobby groups (2:21), fisherman with fisherman. Even among relatives there are

disputes, dividing the family unit. Enemies within the community stir up hostility

(9:28). But more often than open disputes, there is silence. And distrust and

resentments are hidden (EWNRA: 29:8; cf. 18:34; own observations).

The next section draws to a distinct but related topic: the land administration

system.

5The Department of Land Use had been under BoARD and later was assigned to EPLAUA(EPLAUA: 37:12; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:32).

6See Wondefrash (2003) for a very provocative short overview of the conflicting sectoralinterests.

5.6. LAND ADMINISTRATION 61

5.6 Land Administration

This section generally introduces the land titling process (see p. 17) and land use

planning in the study sites and draws to the constraints to land registration. This

contributes to an understanding of the effects of the land administration system

on wetland use and management.

5.6.1 Land Registration and Certification

In Fogera and Libo Kemkem7 the land registration process began in 2003/2004

using traditional ways of measurement (45:15; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:3;

WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:43). The land border demarcation of the last land re-

distribution which took place in 1997 (January/February) in the two woredas

(7:59; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:30, 42:31; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:1) is set

as a benchmark for the land registration and certification programme (54:16;

WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:31). In 1997 boundaries were inadequately documented

and pertinent documents got lost (18:37, 18:38; ILA: 30:6; WoEPLAU Addis Ze-

men: 43:3, 43:15). Not surprisingly the disputed land records and the subsequent

certification process are less accepted (Deininger et al. 2006: 9; Deininger et al.

2007: supra note 16, 11; see p. 64).

Since 2003/2004 private landholdings8 and communal lands9 have been reg-

istered (WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:47). Wetlands and recession farmlands, often

held and used according to customary right (EPLAUA: 37:5), tend to have

been registered as (1) communal or (2) private landholding (26:15; EPLAUA:

37:16; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:17; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:1, 42:22, 42:52).

Commonly, wetlands are subsumed under communal lands (EPLAUA: 37:17;

WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:8). In Libo Kemkem, the attempt to demarcate

wetlands from communal lands failed (WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:7). Occasion-

ally, wetlands have not been registered, e. g. in Agid Kirigna (24:27; WoEPLAU

7Data for Dera is not available.8Private holding is defined as a land which is in the possession of a farmer (or other body)

having a withdrawal right and a certificate (Proclamation No. 133/2006: §2(9)).9Communal holding is defined as rural land which is neither owned by the government nor

individually, but rather commonly used by local people, e. g. for grazing (Proclamation No.133/2006: §2(5)).


Woreta: 42:1, 42:12). Deficiencies in registering wetlands and recession farmlands

are seen to result in a continuous open access situation (24:19).

Both Fogera and Libo Kemkem have not yet completed registration (WoE-

PLAU Addis Zemen: 43:22; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:44) and missed the ambitious

target to finalise this process by mid-2006 (see Adenew & Abdi 2005: 15, 18). The

certification process includes the issuance of a temporary certificate to the farmer

ensuring tenure rights at an early stage of registration. After a verification and

entry of the contained data into the Land Registry Book (figure 5.11, p. 62) the

temporary certificate is upgraded to an official primary certificate (Green Book of

Holding). The secondary certificates are the permanent documents that contain

the exact geographical coordinates of the parcel (SARDEP/EPLAUA/ORGUT

2010: 14). So far, no secondary certificates have been issued ( WoEPLAU Woreta:

42:10 and Addis Zemen: 43:14). The registration of communal lands is mainly

undertaken by kebele chairmen (members of the kebele administration committee)

(WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:13). Certificates for communal lands are partially issued

and kept with the kebele leaders (3:9; 9:32; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:4).

Figure 5.11: The Land Registry Book. Photograph: Springsguth, M.

It is assumed that land titling ensures tenure security and results in land

resource protection (3:9; cf. WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:26). Being issued a

certificate, farmers would feel to be the owners of their holding (ILA: 30:4).

5.6. LAND ADMINISTRATION 63

5.6.2 Constraints to the Land Registration and

Certification Process

Shortcomings in land registration and certification occurred at all stages and

levels.

Lack of Good Governance LAC elections could have been corrupted (WoE-

PLAU Woreta: 42:2) and biased towards an election of the elite. Deininger et al.

(2007) found that many studied LACs “included at least one person in a leadership

position” (p. 10; cf. 18:10). Criteria perceived to be most important for the LAC

election are: being educated, being a member of the kebele administration, being

rich and having knowledge about land registration (Adenew and Abdi 2007: 22).

During registration, farmers tried to register encroached communal land as

private holding (WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:10; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:6). People

also tried to hide illegal land occupations and leave them unregistered (WoEPLAU:

42:5).

LAC members, often elders knowing the community (personal communication:

WoEPLAU Woreta), might have “turned a blind eye” (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 24)

on this and other issues to the benefit of their relatives or friends (27:8; WoEPLAU

Woreta: 42:4). Besides, working on a voluntary basis and with considerable

workload (Deininger et al. 2006: 4, 9), LAC members “compensated themselves”

(ibid.: 11) or were seen “sitting in the shadow” (54:15) under a tree instead of

registering fields on-farm. Moreover, double counting of land occurred (27:8).

Lack of capacity LAC members have poor access to additional written materi-

als, e. g. the proclamation (Deininger et al. 2007: 10). Misinformation of the public

could therefore be unintentional, though it is often intentional (27:8). Woreda

and regional land administration departments face lack of staff, trained personnel

and financial resources for trainings, awareness-raising, upgrading certificates10,

equipment and vehicles (EPLAUA: 37:3). Authorities thus lack the capacity to

10Cadastral surveys with modern surveying techniques for the issuance of secondary certificateshave been accomplished in the priority kebeles of Fogera and Libo Kemkem which are part ofthe Ribb Irrigation and Drainage Project (WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:18; WoEPLAU Woreta:42:27; see MoWE 2010).


adequately administer the responsibilities which have been imposed on them with

the land administration decentralisation process (Miller & Tolina 2008: 372).

Landholders complained that the support by the woreda administration depart-

ment was insufficient and the upgrade of certificates dragging (13:6). Cases were

reported where land was redistributed by communities without the acceptance

of WoEPLAU which may retard the certification process (WoEPLAU Woreta:

42:25).

Documentation and Boundary Disputes Problems concerning the registra-

tion of transferred land occur when the transaction was inadequately documented,

e. g. when landless claim inherited wetland parcels (WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:5,

42:6). Loss of landholding documents from 1997 leads to disputes over hold-

ing and use rights (see 18:37). Counterfeiting documents even exacerbates the

conflicts (WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:11). Only about one third of plots have

again been measured after 1997 (Deininger et al. 2007: supra note 16, 11). Thus

unresolved disputes related to boundary demarcation and encroachment further

retard the registration process (54:15; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:13; 43:37;

WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:5). The inaccessibility of land holding due to flooding

makes registration impossible (WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:5).

Lack of a Guideline for Wetland Registration Land administration desks

have neither agreed whether wetlands and recession farmlands are to be subsumed

under state, communal or perhaps even private holding, nor is there a clear

definition for ‘wetland’ (see 9:2; 14:2; 24:19; EPLAUA: 37:5; WoEPLAU: 42:1,

42:21, 42:22, 42:45; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:8). Mandates between the

department of environmental protection and the department of land administration

within WoEPLAU concerning the registration and utilisation of wetlands often

remain ill-defined (EPLAUA: 37:4; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:53, 42:54). A guideline

for wetlands, whether and how they are to be registered is missing or inadequately

considered.

5.7. COMMON-POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 65

5.6.3 Land Use Planning

“The outcome of certification should be used as a base for land use planning

and sustainable land management” (Deininger et al. 2006: 12). Land use plans,

stipulated by Proclamation No. 133/2006: §13(1) and Regulation No.51/2007:

§16(1)A, have not been formulated yet as certification processes have not been

accomplished (WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:40; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:27). Ac-

cordingly, landholders can use their land as needed and wanted (EPLAUA: 37:9;

Proclamation No. 133/2006: §13 (5); Regulation No. 51/2007: §9(1)). Farmers

related land use changes to inadequate land use planning (21:12). To tackle

urgent problems of mismanagement, land degradation and illegal settlement, land

use plans based on simple physical observations, incorporating existing regulations,

should be designed at kebele level in 2012 (EPLAUA: 37:10). Land use plans

would increase tenure security and consequently investments in landholdings

(WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:31).

Figure 5.12, p. 66 depicts the relation between the land administration system,

land use changes, occurring conflicts and the wetland system. To avoid the

overuse and mismanagement of wetland resources, management systems have

been established.

5.7 Common-Pool Resource Management

The management of common-pool resources (wetlands, communal lands, fishery)

is generally perceived to be difficult if not impossible due to the large number

and size of user groups, the unlimited appropriation of open access resources and

open boundaries of the resource system (e. g. 9:50; 11:1; 23:23; 26:7; BoWE:

31:3; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:15). Even though non-residents may sometimes

be excluded from accessing and using wetlands (4:32), their management still

often remains ineffectively regulated, entailing resentment and dissatisfaction

among local people and officials (own observations; see p. 60). The following

sections provide an overview of existent local management systems and the

broader political context affecting wetland management, and draws on the factors

that influence the ability of local institutions to manage wetlands.


WETLANDLand use change

Land administration system

Conflicts

FloodingSedimentationRice cultivationEncroachmentFishery

Disputed land records of 1997Inadequate documentationLack of good governanceLack of government capacityCorruptionMissing guideline for the registration of wetlandsMissing land use plan

Reg

istra

tion

of w

etla

nds?

HUMAN SYSTEM

Ope

n ac

cess

Figure 5.12: Land administration and land use changes often adversely affect the wetlandsystem. Source: compiled from own results

5.7.1 Local Resource Management Systems

Management systems target a restricted use of wetland resources, allowing for

hay-making (figure 5.13, p. 67), grazing and other sound uses but prohibiting

cultivation (25:12; 26:9). Wetland closure, i. e. conservation without any use, is

infeasible (18:21; 25:13; 26:9).

Most communities recently enacted by-laws to manage encroachment (2:34; cf.

15:18). Commonly, wetland cultivation is punished by grazing cattle destroying the

yield (e. g. 2:35; 3:11; 14:19). In Agid Kirigna, trees planted on communal lands

are cut (24:8). In Wagetera, the income from the crop yield of an encroached plot

is used for undertaking communal investments (school construction, repair works)

(15:18). At least locally, regulations resulted in improved resource management

and decreasing incidences of encroachment (2:14, 2:35).

More sophisticated management systems which are not only based on sanctions

were established in Gulash (Wagetera), Tana Kirkos (Tanametsele) and Agid


Figure 5.13: Sustainable harvesting of wetland grasses: cut-and-carry system, Wagetera. Photo-graph: Springsguth, M.

Kirigna. To regulate encroachment in Gulash five trustworthy persons were elected

consensually by the community. They oversee communal land management,

denounce those who do not comply to the consensus and create awareness of the

problem. Illegal encroachment is fined 50 ETB. The five monitors are paid from

the fines (26:9).

Monks of the Tana Kirkos Island harvest and sell matured papyrus, e. g. to the

neighbouring communities (2:31). The wetland is used in cut-and-carry system

(1:28). Grazing is allowed during the dry season. To prevent wetland degradation,

monks monitor the borders (personal communication: monk, Tana Kirkos Island).

In Agid Kirigna, after public discussions an agreement on wetland management

was signed. Grazing in the wetland is merely allowed during the dry season. The

cut-and-carry system allows plant regeneration during the rainy season. Moreover,

livestock should be fed with rice residuals and graze on private fallowed land to

reduce pressure on the wetland. Landless people were asked to buy residuals or to

rent land. A reduction of the number of cattle is envisaged. Guards were elected

who oversee wetland use (25:12).

In Amana village, Wagetera, no by-laws have been enacted, but PRA partici-

pants see the need to regulate wetland use (7:34).

Fish resource use has been mostly unregulated (9:44) with two exceptions. In

Tez Amba, an informal fishermen’s association (figure 5.14, p. 68) was established

in 2007 aiming at supporting and advising fishermen, creating awareness of

sustainable fishing practices, to better control the stealing of fisher nets and to


reduce attacks by hippopotamus (20:3). Regulations include the prohibition of

fishery from June to September and stipulate using nets with a mesh width of

more than eight centimetres to allow regeneration of fish stocks, entering to

and returning from the lake at the same time to prevent thieving, and fishing of

maximum three kilogramme per day and capita (20:4; WoARD: 53:3; figure 5.15,

p. 68).

Figure 5.14: Fishermen of the association inDaga, Tez Amba. Photograph: Springsguth,M.

Figure 5.15: Fishermen in Tez Amba en-ter Lake Tana in the morning with theirtanquas. Photograph: Springsguth, M.

In Agid Kirigna, an informal joint fishermen’s association was established in

2011 between the Woito and fishermen of other communities (21:22; 23:37).

Regulations are similar. Non-compliance with the rules is fined 100 ETB. Besides,

it was proposed punishing offences in church and to reduce the number of fisher

nets owned by richer persons (23:24; 23:27). The effectiveness of these fishing

management regulations appears to be dubious (23:28).

Conflicting wetland uses and non-compliance to regulations are dealt with

drawing on existing multi-level conflict resolution mechanisms.

5.7.2 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The first instances in resolving land and resource use and management conflicts

are the kebele administration, the elder court and the LAC (5:13; 13:10; 18:33;

27:5 WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:8; Regulation No. 51/2007: §§19(5), 35). Discussions

with the concerned parties are held and finally an agreement is negotiated and


formulated (Regulation No. 51/2007: §35(1)). But many cases of conflicts over

common-pool resources cannot be resolved locally and go beyond the kebele’s

capabilities (7:44; 13:10; 24:8).

Traditionally, discussions are also held at church (3:11; 13:12, 13:31; 18:18),

a respected institution with the power to influence people. Where kebele adminis-

trations were incapable to resolve disputes, public assemblies take place in church

and priests act as counsellors (27:3). The confidence in God’s judgement of sins

occasionally serves as a punishment of offences (20:4; 23:27).

Higher-level instances comprise government bodies (e. g. woreda experts)

(13:6) and woreda courts (Regulation No. 51/2007: §35(4)) that receive reports

of law cases from kebele administrations (2:13; 5:13; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:8).

Recently, the Book of Holding serves as a basis for neutral judicial decisions

shifting the burden of proof from young people to the powerful elders (WoEPLAU

Addis Zemen: 43:27; Deininger et al. 2006: 13). Policemen also intervene in

disputes (13:11).

By tendency, problems are preferably resolved by the community without

the involvement of third instances (13:13). Trustworthy persons are elected by

the community, said to be unbiased, respected, morally good and able to take

just decisions (13:12; see Regulation No. 51/2007 §35, selection of arbitrators).

Occasionally, local people have asked for appropriate government support to settle

yet unsolved conflicts (13:6).

The next section shifts the focus from local to regional and federal institutions

pertaining to wetland management.

5.7.3 Federal and Regional Policies with Implications for

Wetland Management

With the aim to better represent wetlands in the national law, clarify property

rights and management responsibilities, a National Wetland Policy has been

developed by the Ethio Wetlands and Natural Resources Association (EWNRA)

in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) since 2003

(EWNRA: 28:3, 28:4). The wetland policy has yet not been ratified, but has been

submitted to EPA for clarification and needs to be forwarded to the parliament


for final approval (personal communication: zur Heide).

The broader policy context has mainly a negative impact on sustainable

wetland management. Responsibilities for wetland management within land tenure

policies are ill-defined (EWNRA: 28:4). The Water Resource Management Policy

(see p. 16) and agricultural development policies (see p. 16) rather discourage

a functioning wetland management by promoting the drainage and conversion

of wetlands for agricultural production, hereby preventing the formation of new

wetlands (EWNRA: 28:5, 29:3). EWNRA (29:8) predicated government policies

were constructed as if the respective authorities had a mandate to access and

manage wetland resources.

To complement the section on common-property resource management, the

conditions that influence the effectiveness of local management systems are

outlined.

5.7.4 Constraints to and Recommendations for

Common-Pool Resource Management

Constraints to common-pool resource management are diverse and identified at

different management levels.

Attitudes Cultural attitudes towards the adoption of new farming techniques

(11:7; BoARD: 32:7) and farmers’ short-term views (EPLAUA: 33:1) constrain a

sustainable wetland management.

Participation and Knowledge Exchange People complain about insufficient

participation in decision-making procedures of the kebele administration (13:23).

Elders are not invited to conferences (13:18). Information and knowledge of

wetland management is rarely disseminated by participants of wetland management

workshops11 which leads to the assumption that they are only interested in the per

diems received for participation (24:6). The kebele administration is appointed

11 Proving the opposite a kebele leader of Wagetera exchanged knowledge of common-poolresource management with the public at church (52:15).


by the woreda authority rather than by the community, as were participants of

wetland workshops (13:18; 24:6).

Arrangements and Conflict Resolution Sanctions and regulations are en-

forced inconsistently and lack implementation (15:18). Fraudulent or unlawful

conducts are not (adequately) prosecuted by kebele administrations or woreda

authorities and courts (7:32; WoEPLAU Woreta: 42:26). Police support to settle

conflicts is inadequate due to understaffing (13:11). Legal decisions of court cases

are pending (7:32; 52:29). Wetland management is thus nearly impossible con-

sidering all the unresolved cases of conflicts (56:14). Withal, cases of corruption

(bribery, intimidation, drawing on beneficial relations) impede conflict resolution

processes (7:32; 15:19; 18:34) and complicate wetland management (2:22; 13:14).

Kebeles are too large to be governed efficiently and the kebele administration

office is too far away (2:2; 13:21).

Who holds the Stick? To local people it remains unclear whether solutions

to wetland management should be worked out by themselves or government

authorities (13:24). A feeling of powerlessness to tackle the mismanagement of

common-pool resources makes local actors hand over the stick to government

bodies who ‘should do something about it’ (7:36, 13:26; 23:23, 23:25).

Monitoring The responsible bodies have not evaluated the effectiveness of

management trainings and awareness creation campaigns (22:14; 52:16)12. They

have also failed to monitor the performance of land users’ obligations of land

management (EPLAUA: 37:11; WoEPLAU Addis Zemen: 43:26; Adenew & Abdi

2005: supra note 8, 7; see Regulation No. 51/2007: §16) 13.

Recognition Government bodies do not favour local by-laws (37:7) and have

a limited perspective of wetland conservation (EWNRA: 29:5).

12A few farmers have already been trained in wetland management and resource conservationand participated in awareness creation workshops (22:21; 53:12; but cf. 24:6).

13According to §25(5, 7) of the Regulation No. 51/2007, the woreda department of landadministration is responsible to “follow up whether or not landholders and users discharge theobligation legally entrusted upon them”, and to administer and manage state holding.


Fish Resource Management The implementation of the national and regional

Fisheries Proclamation, developed in 2003 and providing guidelines on resource

conservation (Gebrekidan 2006 b: 49), lacks substantiation (11:1; ARARI: 41:3,

41:17). Profit-oriented fishermen use illegal fishing equipment such as non-selective

mono-filament gill nets with narrow mesh widths and unsustainable fishing prac-

tices (e. g. fishing in spawning sites, fish poisoning) and thereby violate regional

and local regulations (11:1; ARARI: 41:1). A gap between people’s and scientists’

understanding of fish resource management and conservation widens the problem.

As long as disputes over fishing are not resolved, overuse continues (ARARI: 41:3).

Fishing licences have not been issued so far and local fishermen’s associations

are not legally recognised (ARARI: 41:20; BoARD: 53:3). More efficient fish

production techniques and storage (e. g. more hygienic and faster drying methods

and cooling boxes) add value to the fish produce and possibly reduce catches but

are also costly (ARARI: 41:10).

In Agid Kirigna, Woito fishermen expressed their preference for a separate

association (23:27). Communication between the Woito and other communities

was limited due to negative attitudes of the groups towards each other (cf. 21:18;

23:39). Discussions on fish resource management are sporadic (23:24).

To counter the constraints of commons governance, local people, officials

and experts expressed their ideas about a more sustainable and functioning

wetland management. Their recommendations are summarised in table 5.3, p. 73.

Remarkable are the similarities of recommendations across the scales with reference

to stakeholders’ involvement in wetland management, the delineation of wetlands,

or the monitoring and evaluation measures.


Table 5.3: Measures recommended by local people, officials and experts

for a sustainable wetland management

Governance

of wetlands

Recommendations of local

people

Recommendations of govern-

ment officials and experts

Stakeholder

involvement

Participation of all kebele resi-

dents in all kebele issues (13:25)

Community-based management

(ARARI: 41:18; BDU: 40:11)

and elaboration of rules and

regulations by the government

(ARARI: 36:27)

Wetland delin-

eation

Register and demarcate commu-

nal lands so as to reduce conflicts

(15:38; 18:35)

Designation of a buffer zone

(BoARD: 32:5; EPLAUA: 37:4),

including wetlands along rivers

(Gumara, Ribb, Gilgel, Megech)

to reduce sedimentation of the

lake basin (ARARI: 36:18)

Contextual

Factors

• Decentralisation of the ad-

ministration of large kebele

sizes, administration left with

sub-kebeles (see Regulation No.

51/2007: §28), or division of ke-

beles (13:21) • Better adjustment

of market prices to fish resource

scarcity and the quality of the

fish produce (23:19)

• Reduce pressure on wetlands

through agricultural modernisa-

tion (BoWE: 31:9) and increase

in productivity (EWNRA: 29:6) •Integrate options for alternative

wetland uses, livelihood diver-

sification (e. g. fishing, forage

production using the cut-and-

carry system, collecting plants,

tourism) and agricultural speciali-

sation (e. g. 22:13; BoARD: 32:2;

EWNRA: 29:6).

Regulations Equitable but possibly unequal

distribution of resources, e. g. fish-

ing restriction for richer farmers

(23:24)

Seasonal area closure to allow

for regeneration of fish species

(ARARI: 41:3)

Landscape

approach

Consider wetlands as a section of

the larger watershed (EWNRA:

28:9)


Governance

of wetlands

Recommendations of local

people

Recommendations of govern-

ment officials and experts

Measures to be

taken

• Advocacy for the rights of

landless people by the kebele ad-

ministration (2:22) • Ensure that

information on relevant subjects,

such as wetland management,

is adequately disseminated by

selecting people who participate

in trainings and workshops on

wetland management through the

community itself (24:6)

• Present and transfer the ac-

quired knowledge during kebele

conferences held at church (24:6)

• Create management plans

(BDU: 40:14; BoWE: 31:4)

• Overcome constraints to

change through additional train-

ing, awareness creation and

model farming (22:13)

• Adopt improved techniques

(e. g. for high-quality fish produc-

tion) (ARARI: 41:10)

• Assist farmers financially

(ARARI: 41:11)

• Monitoring and evaluation of

outcomes, assessment of and

research on wetlands (22:13)

• Draw on traditional knowledge

to develop tourism in wetlands

(BoARD: 32:6)

5.8 Summary

Social actors mainly value wetlands for their instrumental purposes. These values

as well as perceptions on living conditions and natural capital influence the way

wetlands are used and managed.

Wetland use changes (e. g. rice cultivation, fishery) are driven by internal

but likewise external factors (e. g. population growth, unemployment, livelihood

insecurity, economic incentives, flooding, sedimentation) and involve conflicts over

the utilisation of wetland resources (figure 5.16, p. 75). The different priorities of

social actors on wetland resource appropriation become manifest in these conflicts,

adversely affecting communal life.

The land administration system of the Amhara region contributes to the

alteration of wetlands. Failures to register and clarify boundaries of landholding

and lack of land use planning result in a continuous open access situation and

mismanagement of wetlands.

5.8. SUMMARY 75

To tackle the unregulated resource utilisation, local management institutions

were established in varying degrees of sophistication. Their functioning is con-

strained by multi-level factors, such as the attitude of wetland users and a lack of

participation in decision-making, further by failures to implement and enforce rules,

and to monitor management outcomes. Local conflict resolution mechanisms

should support an effective management but often remain ineffective.

Government bodies are said to dislike local by-laws. Besides, their policies often

negatively affect the sustainable use of wetlands and provide multiple authorities

with a mandate to manage wetland resources (figure 5.16, p. 75).

Conversion of wetlands

Structural and functional changes*

Loss of genetic and species diversity*

Increasing overexploitation

WETLAND

Economic growth

Economic incentives

Vulnerability/livelihood insecurity

Degradation of theupper watershed

Population growth

Policies

Local institutions

External shocks(e.g. flooding)

Land scarcity

Unemployment

Conflicts

attenuating effect

amplifying effect

?

?

?

Figure 5.16: Main causal chains of wetland alteration and the effects of institutions on wetlandmanagement. * See Appendix 7, p. XXVIII. Source: compiled from own results

The research findings provide a basic insight on the distinct research topics

(land use changes, conflicts over wetlands and associated resources, land adminis-

tration and common-pool resource management). The subsequent analysis seeks

to comprehensively combine the findings to illustrate the decisive conditions that

determine an effective management and a sustainable resource utilisation of the


wetlands.

Chapter 6

Analysis

Assessing the conditions that facilitate or constrain an effective wetland manage-

ment involves several analytical steps (see p. 24): To put wetland management

in a broader context, environmental entitlements and their feedback to wetland

systems are analysed first. Subsequently, the mechanisms of access to wetland

resources and services, and the institutions that impinge on these mechanisms

are identified. These determine who can benefit from wetland management. Prop-

erty rights to wetlands as essential endowments for common-property resource

management are addressed. Further on, the power relations that underlie the

mechanisms of access and wetland management as well as conflicts over wetlands

are dissected. An institutional analysis on land administration and its effect on

wetland management then follows. The chapter is closed by a comprehensive

integration of the conditions that determine the effectiveness of common-pool

resource management systems to conserve wetland resources.

6.1 The Cyclical Process of Environmental

Entitlements

Wetlands provide various assets to local people. The set of entitlements directly

derived from these endowments includes food for own consumption, income from

selling produce to markets, construction materials, flood protection and recreation.

77

78 CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS

These utilities enhance people’s capabilities, e. g. by contributing to food and

income security particularly at the end of the dry season when food and income

become otherwise scarce. The income can be deployed to purchase other cash-

dependent items and farm inputs, for children’s education or medical treatment.

Benefits gained from wetland resources and services thus contribute to well-being,

may increase social status and improve advocacy within the community. Enhanced

capabilities may then be utilised to harness wetland resources more efficiently, draw

on more advanced and unexploited assets, or access new opportunities regarding

livelihood diversification, social relations, rights etc. (“the transformative role and

potential of new capital”, Agrawal 2001: 1565; see the two shorter, curved arrows

in figure 6.1, p. 79).

Livelihood outcomes (e. g. capabilities, well-being) of people’s actions feed

back to the ecological conditions and natural capital provided by wetlands (see

Scoones 1998: 4–7; figure 6.1, p. 79). The activities of local actors (see p. 48)

often involve the overuse and degradation of wetland resources, thereby eroding

the resource base and the resilience of the ecosystem (see Appendix 7, p. XXVIII).

It was shown (see p. 56) that local communities are not “homogeneous entities”

(Leach et al. 1999: 229). Instead, social actors have different and often conflicting

objectives and priorities regarding resource use and management. This implies

that the configurations of the ‘endowments-entitlements-capabilities chains’ of

social actors are quite diverse and that trade-offs between such ‘chains’ occur

(for an example see figure 6.1, p. 79).

In order to maintain or enhance capabilities and well-being, access to benefit

from wetlands is essential. But how do people gain access to wetland resources

and services in the first place?

6.2 Mapping Endowments: Access to Wetlands

Wetlands are communally used but state-owned (see p. 84). Exclusion of local

communities or strangers is difficult and subtractability of benefits high, i. e.

resources which are extracted by one person cannot be used by another person.

These characteristics mostly lead to open access situations since wetlands are

“owned by no one or paradoxically by ‘everyone’, [. . . ] used [. . . ] by whomever can

6.2. MAPPING ENDOWMENTS: ACCESS TO WETLANDS 79


Trade-offs, conflicts

Res

ilien

ce?

Res

ilien

ce?

Pasture, hay

Food, cash income from selling meat

Livestock farmer

Livelihood secu-rity, accumula-tion of wealth

Wetlandresources &

services

Arable land

Food, (income)

Poor/Mid-richfarmer

Livelihood security

Wetland resources &

services

Figure 6.1: Exemplary ‘entitlement chains’. Source: modified after Leach et al. 1999: 234

gain access” (Ostrom 2003: 249). This creates common-pool resource dilemmas

in which people’s “short-term interests produce outcomes that are not in anyone’s

long-term interest” (Ostrom et al. 1999: 279). The following sections describe

the mechanisms of access and the institutions that mediate access to wetland

resources.

6.2.1 Rights-Based Access to Wetland Resources

Rights-based access to resources and services includes (1) legal and (2) illegal

mechanisms (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 162–164). Legal mechanisms refer to rights

attributed by law and socially accepted customs or conventions (ibid.: 162). Illegal

access means access that is not socially sanctioned by society or state (ibid.: 164).


6.2.1.1 Legal Mechanisms

In accordance with customary rights of access, wetlands have been used as

communal pastures (see Taffa 2005: 61). Pastoralists particularly of the upper

well-being group and members of the kebele administration rely on customary and

statutory rights to preserve communal grazing lands. §16(1)F of the Regulation

No. 51/2007 on rural land administration and use states that landholders or those

being granted land use rights shall “not [. . . ] cross the borderlines of communal

land”. By referring to these rights, livestock farmers and kebele leaders control

the access of other users to wetland resources and maintain their own access.

To gain or maintain access to wetland resources for agricultural production,

poorer persons also draw on the land administration and use legislation. Landless

who wish to engage in agricultural activities appeal to their right to acquire

landholding (Proclamation No. 133/2006: §6(1)). Young people as the eligible

heirs claim their fathers’ land (Regulation No. 51/2007: §11, bequeath land

holding rights). Questions of inheritance may be hard to comprehend being

exacerbated by inheritance disputes (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 25, 26). In some cases

the Land Registry Book, indicating children’s names, may help mediating disputes

(personal communication: WoEPLAU Addis Zemen). Conversion of communal

lands, i. e. land (re)distribution to landless or poor, which “at least 80% of the

kebele inhabitants have consented on” (Regulation No. 51/2007: §6(1)) complies

with the law, provided that the request for land (re)distribution is accepted by

WoEPLAU (ibid.: §6(1, 4)) and plot size is larger than the defined minimum

(ibid.: §7). (See the right of figure 6.2, p. 91 for the institutions that mediate

access.)

6.2.1.2 Illegal Mechanisms

Though wetlands might have been converted to cultivated land in the course of

history (see p. 51), encroachment as a means to gain access to and use the fertile

land is deemed illegal. This applies to anybody who converts communal land

whether rich or poor. Illegal mechanisms to which mostly richer persons revert in

order to gain, control and maintain access to wetlands include corruption, bribery

at local and woreda levels, counterfeit of documents, suppression and intimidation.


Farmers also illegally gain access to communal lands either by registering this land

as their private holding or by trying to leave this land unregistered to continue

tilling it silently.

Allocation of land to landless without the consent of WoEPLAU is in breach

of the statutory regulations (see p. 64). Grazing in Agid Kirigna’s wetlands during

the rainy season contravenes local by-laws.

Concerning fishery, stealing of nets is a way to prevent other fishermen from

pursuing their activities, i. e. controlling access to the thieves’ benefit.

6.2.2 Structural and Relational Mechanisms of Access

Political-economic and cultural aspects may “influence who has resource access

priority” (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 164–165) and mediate the ability to benefit from

resources and services (ibid.: 164).

Access to capital influences who is able to benefit from resources and services

(Ribot & Peluso 2003: 165–166). A farmer who has the financial means to draw

on labour, farm equipment and farm inputs may decide to encroach into wetland

(Wood 2003: 59). Fishermen who are better off have the means to invest in a

number of fisher nets and thereby increase their catch. Propertied social actors

may also use their money to bribe courts, governmental bodies and other people

into silence.

Access to knowledge can be another crucial factor to benefit from resources

and services (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 168–169). Non-transfer of knowledge of

wetland management may influence whether or how others are able to gain access

to wetland resources and services. Further, education can be a criterion for the

election of kebele administration and LAC members (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 22).

Political elections can have implications for communal land administration.

Lack of access to knowledge and misinformation similarly shapes resource

access. If legal documents and other materials are unknown or inaccessible to

an ordinary person or a LAC member, then access to wetlands may be gained,

controlled or maintained by actors who then benefit from this lack of knowledge


or misinformation.

Access to participation is important to benefit from resources and services

through negotiation and decision-making processes. §34 of Regulation No. 51/2007

calls for the involvement of the public to deliberate and decide on issues concerning

communal land use. Where participation is not promoted, the kebele administration

overrides community interests, preferences and concerns related to access, use

and management of common-pool resources and in so doing controls access.

Access to authority shapes a person’s ability to benefit from wetland resources

and services (see Ribot & Peluso 2003: 170). Ribot & Peluso (2003) emphasise

the role of authority as “an important juncture in the web of powers [where]

multiple access mechanisms or strands are bundled together in one person or

institution” (p. 170). Through those juncture, people are able to access beneficial

wetland resources.

“With the authority to [. . . ] implement laws” (ibid.: 170), the LAC in con-

sultation with the kebele administration and the woreda land administration

department can decide upon the administration and development of communal

lands (Regulation No.51/2007: §27(6)). “With the authority to make [. . . ] laws”

(Ribot & Peluso 2003: 170), the kebele administration can establish rules and

regulations concerning the management of communal lands (Taffa 2005: 61) and

hence influence the ability to gain access and benefit. Together with the authority

to resolve disputes (Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 638), the LAC, elders and the kebele

administration hold a powerful instrument in their hands which can be used to

shape the ability of others to access and use common-pool resources (see figure

6.2, p. 91).

Failure to exercise legal authority to enforce regulations and impose sanctions

upon delinquents favours illegal resource access. For example, the incapacity of

WoEPLAU offices to monitor landholders’ compliance with land use obligations

may result in continuous encroachment.

Access to authority is also vested in community members through the ‘80%

rule’ (see p. 80) which enables people, especially landless and young, to benefit

from access to distributed land.


“Overlapping systems of legitimacy” (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 163), where claims

are made on the basis of a plurality of formal and informal rights, encourage people

to acquire resources “using different notions of legitimate or authoritative access”

(ibid.: 170). There is a plurality of federal and regional policies and strategies (see

p. 69; figure 6.2, p. 91) formulated as if related government bodies had legitimate

command over wetland resources. This plurality is reflected in the diversity of

people’s perceptions on and reactions to government plans and policies pertaining

to wetland management (see p. 59). Resource use claims are further asserted

through local by-laws and customary rights regulating and granting access to

wetlands. The different institutional settings can essentially influence people’s

decisions on resource utilisation (Henrich 2003: 320).

Access through social identity “profoundly affects the distribution of benefits

from things” (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 170). The membership in a group or organi-

sation mediates the ability to benefit from resources and services. Identity-based

access conditions many other forms of access (ibid.: 172).

Wealth is associated with reputation and respect. Members of the upper

well-being group can more easily advocate their interests within the community

and gain access to wetlands. LAC members being in a special position and kebele

leaders enjoying a high regard can allocate and control access to land and other

resources, and in so doing selectively give people advantages.

Complaints of the Woito about the unlimited access of community members

to fish resources imply a claim to access to fishing grounds, a traditional claim

which can be hardly asserted today.

The young landless gain access to wetlands and other communal lands by

joining a youth association which advocates the interests of their members or

by forming groups willing to jointly manage and use land then distributed to

them (see Proclamation No. 133/2006: §2(19), §10). Established fishermen’s

associations ensure that each member maintains access to fish resources.

Scientists and conservationists focusing on wetland protection may wittingly

or unwittingly control the ability of local people to benefit from resources and

services, e. g. by prohibiting use or prescribing use regimes (see zur Heide: 136).

The institutions which social actors draw on to gain, control or maintain


access to wetland resources and services are indicated in figure 6.2, p. 91.

6.2.3 Property Rights to Wetlands

The ability to access benefits from wetland resources and services can be derived

from a statutory, customary or conventional right to access (see p. 80). The

right to access, i. e. a property right (Ostrom 2003: 249), constitutes a person’s

endowment which cannot directly be derived from wetland goods and services

(figure 6.2, p. 91). Ribot & Peluso (2003) remark that “the distinction between

rights-based ‘property’ approaches and illegal forms of access [. . . ] is predicated

on notions of morality and legitimacy” (supra note 20, p. 164). Hence, what

one considers to be a legal right may be questioned by another on moral and

legitimate grounds (ibid.: supra note 20, 164). Moral claims such as basic need

claims by landless or poor may often conflict with legal claims, e. g. preventing

wetland encroachment. Legitimacy may often be challenged considering the partly

incompatible rules of land administration and use policies and between customary

and statutory law, e. g. where wetland and recession agriculture is allowed by the

former but not by the latter.

Property rights to wetlands are more complex than they appear at a first

glance. This is due to the fact that practically, no distinction is made between

state and common property (Pausewang undated; see p. 17), i. e. the property

regime (Ostrom 2003: 249; see p. 93) and holding rights for wetlands are vague.

The bundles of rights approach by Schlager & Ostrom (1992, 1996 in Ostrom

2003: 249–252 and Ostrom 2009 b: 28–29; see p. 26) helps analysing the complex

property rights system of wetlands.

Local people subtracting wetland resources are the authorised users. Since

property regimes of wetlands are often ill-defined, it remains unclear whether these

rights are de jure rights (compliant with customary or statutory law) or de facto

property rights (see Ostrom 2003: 253). Social actors deciding on management

regulations become authorised claimants (e. g. fishermen’s associations). They

are then authorised to limit the withdrawal of resources by other users (ibid.:

250–251). If communities develop a management system determining access and

harvesting conditions, proprietorship is established. The prohibition to cultivating


wetlands is an example. In contrast to de jure owners of wetland plots, de facto

owners illegally cultivate wetland parcels when their claims to those parcels are

not sanctioned by community members or government authorities (see p. 80).

LAC members may be regarded as proprietors in their double role: They are

attributed de jure rights to manage, administer and develop communal lands

(see p. 82) and, as members of the community, also have access and withdrawal

rights.

The woreda land administration and use authorities can influence the man-

agement of communal lands. In cases of non-performance of land use obligations,

the woreda authorities have the right to exclude users through deprivation of a

holder’s right to use communal land ( Proclamation No. 133/2006: §21(3, 4);

Regulation No. 51/2007: §§ 17(3, 4), 25(5), 27(6)). The departments are not

the proprietors of wetlands anyway, since they lack the rights to withdrawal and

access.

The state, represented by the kebele administration at the lowest administrative

level, is the owner of all land in Ethiopia (Constitution 1994: Article 40(3); see

p. 17), holding all five property rights. Land can be expropriated for public use by

paying compensation (Proclamation No. 133/2006: §28; Regulation No. 51/2007:

§29; see also Proclamation No. 455/2005).

Table 6.1, p. 86 summarises the property rights to wetlands associated with

different social actors and indicates actors’ holding positions.


Table 6.1: Bundles of property rights to wetland resources associated

with various social actors and positions (de facto and de jure situation).

S State; KA Kebele administration; WoA Woreda land and use admin-

istration authorities; LAC Land Administration and Use Committee;

WeC Wetland cultivators; U1 Wetland users managing resource access;

U2 Wetland users managing resource withdrawal; U3 Wetland users:

no management. Source: modified after Ostrom & Schlager (1996) in

Ostrom 2003: 251

S/KA WoA LAC WeC U1 U2 U3

Access + – + + + + +

Withdrawal + – + + + + +

Managem. + + + + + + –

Exclusion + + + + + – –

Alienation + – – (+)1 – – –

Position owner – proprietor owner2 proprietor authorised

claimants

authorised

users

The institutions that ascribe property rights to social actors are also indicated

in figure 6.2, p. 91. The next section identifies the power relations that underlie

both the mechanisms of access and the way wetlands are used and managed.

6.3 Power Relations and the Question of Who

Benefits

Power, conditioning social relationships (Bryant 1997: 10), is a crucial element

of access (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 44). Power is often distributed unequally

among different social actors whereas the more powerful have better capabilities

to control the environment of others (Bryant 1997: 10–11). People can “exert

different claims to power” (Armitage 2008: 23).

1Rights holders are allowed to bequeath (Regulation No. 51/2007: §11), rent (§12) and

exchange landholding (§8).2In the Ethiopian context, the term ‘holder’ may be more appropriate (see Proclamation No.

133/2005).

6.3. POWER RELATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF WHO BENEFITS 87

Powers of the Wealthier In many cases, the elite, i. e. richer farmers and

people holding a public office, dominates and controls local resources. Richer

livestock farmers try to control and maintain their access to traditional communal

grazing lands, hereby preventing cultivation, and to condition resource withdrawal.

More frequently than richer farmers, peasants of the middle and lower well-being

groups may be involved in the conversion of wetlands (see Wood 2003: 62) for

asset stabilisation and maintaining or enhancing well-being. Kebele leaders having

the authority to administer and decide upon development of communal lands

and to sanction or not sanction non-conformance to regulations, may suppress

different opinions on and opposition to (Pausewang undated) the management of

wetlands to the detriment of poor and landless.

Powers of Weaker Actors Though poor and landless may often be incapable

of “making claims ‘stick’ against those of more powerful actors in the context

of resource struggles” (Leach et al. 1999: 241), they are not entirely powerless.

De Haan and Zoomers (2005) stress “the active or even proactive role played

by the poor” (p. 28) to make a living and Bryant (1997) recognises the capabil-

ity of weaker actors to resist the powerful. Legal mechanisms and drawing on

social identity to gain access to and use wetland resources can become forceful

instruments for poor. For example, land titling possibly redirects power from

richer persons to younger and poor involved in land and resource related disputes.

However, where middle-rich or poor farmers feel powerless to assert their claims,

illegal mechanisms to exploit wetland resources (Bryant 1997: 13), e. g. illegal

encroachment or fishing practices, may be deployed. Weaker actors employ a

rather subtle way of protest which has certain advantages such as the avoidance

of direct confrontation with the more powerful as well as the provision and bene-

fit of endowments. Acts of illegal resource appropriation are a form of implicit

resistance, mainly motivated by securing and stabilising livelihoods (see Holmes

2007: 185–186, 189, 193).

Woito fishermen, belonging to an ethnic minority group and often negatively

perceived by other communities, find it difficult to claim power in decision-making

processes. Small-sized groups may be incapable to defend resources when external

pressures increase (Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 636). In this regard, the Woito are


often unable to defend fish resources given such pressures as flooding, land scarcity

and unemployment that affect other communities.

Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Usually, policy formulation, development and

implementation are top-down (Abbot et al. 2000: 20) and government bodies

dislike local by-laws. By-laws emanate from the power to make decisions at

local levels. Where local people feel incapable of tackling the mismanagement of

common-pool resources, they surrender power to state agencies.

Power Relations between Governance Bodies Power relations also condi-

tion interactions between various government sectors and levels. These claim

power by appealing to their mandates and the “common good” (Bryant 1997:

12) of their interests. Mandates, often not clearly set, compete, for example

between woreda land administration departments and LACs (Adenew & Abdi

2005: 18, 24) or between BoARD and EPLAUA. Arguing and convincing with

the common good is a powerful strategy to “win the battle of ideas” (Bryant

1997: 12) over utilisation of common-pool resources. Growth as targeted by the

GTP and PIF should eradicate poverty (MoFED 2010: 32; MoARD 2010), a goal

to which the Food Security Strategy substantially contributes (MoARD 2009).

The Environmental Policy underlines the ecological function value of wetlands

(EPA/MoEDC 1997: 11) upon which basic-needs or health arguments could be

predicated (see p. 16). All of these policies certainly have their justification and

their stake in arguing for or against wetland conservation.

The Power of Knowledge Knowledge is a powerful instrument to influence

access to and use of resources. Scientific understanding is not always approved

by local people, possibly resulting in the continuation of access and use practices.

Similarly, scientific resource management approaches are less accepted by local

people but more accepted by official bodies.

Beneficiaries of Land Registration Since 2001, the decentralisation policy

of land administration (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 12) has transferred the govern-

ment’s administrative power to the regions (Miller & Tolina 2008: 372). The


certification process has been “the most promising development from delegation

of administrative power” (ibid.: 373). Nevertheless, this power now rests with

the lower administrative levels: As Adenew & Abdi (2005) note, woreda and

kebele administrations reckoned that land certification reduced their control over

smallholders “who then may become less loyal, less willing to attend meetings or

accept orders” (p. 24). In Ethiopia’s land tenure history, land has always been

used as “a means to control peasants” (Pausewang undated; see also Miller &

Tolina 2008). Rich are believed to benefit from land titling, e. g. due to their

capability to bribe (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 31), and consequently shape wetland

utilisation according to their interest.

Table 6.2, p. 89 presents the analytical findings about the beneficiaries, their

mechanisms to gain access to and the outcomes they achieve from harnessing

wetland resources, including the actors involved in controlling the access of wetland

users. See also figure 6.2, p. 91 for the power relations that condition resource

access and use.

Table 6.2: The beneficiaries of wetland utilisation, their mechanisms to

gain access to and the outcomes achieved from withdrawing wetland

resources. In the lower part of the table: social actors involved in

wetland management, the mechanisms to and outcomes of controlling

access. Source: own compilation

Benefit Beneficiary,

-ies/Actors

Mechanisms of access Outcomes

Grazing House-

holds with

livestock

(mainly

wealthier)

Control access through legal

mechanisms, capital, authority,

social identity

Accumulation of

wealth

Cultivation Richer farm-

ers

Gain access through illegal mech-

anisms, capital, authority, social

identity

Accumulation of

wealth

Mid-rich,

poor farmers

Gain access through legal, illegal

mechanisms, implicit resistance,

capital, participation

Asset stabilisation,

food security



-ies/Actors


Cultivation Landless Gain access through legal, illegal

mechanisms, implicit resistance,

social identity, capital, participa-

tion

Livelihood security

Fishing Richer fisher-

men

Gain access through capital, use

of illegal means (?)

Food secu-

rity, accumula-

tion/stabilisation

of wealth

Middle-

rich, poor

fishermen

Gain access through capital, use

of illegal means, implicit resis-

tance (?)

Food security, em-

ployment

Landless Gain access through capital, use

of illegal means, implicit resis-

tance (?)

Livelihood security,

employment

Woito Gain access through capital, so-

cial identity, use of illegal means,

implicit resistance (?)

Asset stabilisation

and accumulation

Grazing, cut-

and-carry,

papyrus

harvesting

Monks of

Tana Kirkos


mechanisms, social identity

Asset stabilisation

and accumulation

Depending

on actor’s

priorities

Farmers

trained in

wetland

management

Control access through knowl-

edge

?

LAC mem-

bers


mechanisms, authority, knowledge

Personal or commu-

nal well-being

Kebele Ad-

ministration


mechanisms, authority, knowledge

Personal or com-

munal well-being,

keeping control over

kebele residents

Elders Control access through legal

mechanisms, identity, authority

(disciplinary power3?)

(Personal or) com-

munal well-being

3The unquestioningly accepted power by elders that makes people accept their situation,



-ies/Actors


Public pur-

poses/agric.

development

Government

agencies

Control access and use through

legal mechanisms and authority

‘Common good’

Wetland

conservation

Scientific

community

Control access through authority,

knowledge, identity

(Social-) ecological

resilience enhanced


Land administration & use proclamation & regulation; regional

policies; conflict resolution mechanisms

Meso

Customary rights; by-laws & regulations; conflict resolution mechanisms

Micro

Constitution; federal policiesMacro

Endowment mapping

Entitlement mapping

Res

ilien

ce?

Endowments(capital & property

rights)

Entitlements

Social actors


Legal, illegal, structural & relational

mechanisms of access

Social status, political office, mandates, cultural

identity, organisations,resistance, corruption…

Wetlandresources &

services


Figure 6.2: Mapping endowments: the mechanisms of access, power and social relations andthe institutions mediating access to wetlands. (Federal and regional policies include water andagricultural development policies.) Source: modified after Leach et al. 1999: 234

As shown, the different mechanisms and means social actors draw on to

benefit from wetland resources are not all considered legitimate, implying conflicts

over wetlands.

subservience and powerlessness (de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 36–37; Ribot & Peluso 2003: 156).


6.4 The Complexity of Conflicts

Conflicts over wetlands and their associated resources involve (1) conflicts over

access, including (a) conflicts related to legally claimed property rights to wetlands

(cultivation, grazing) and (b) conflicts related to illegal access (gained through

means of power or implicit resistance), and (2) conflicts related to the use of

resources and conditions of their appropriation (e. g. unsustainable fishing practices

contrary to regulations, the amount of daily catch, seasonal grazing restraints;

figure 6.4, p. 103). Conflicts related to the violation of rules tend to involve

disputes about the illegality of resource harvesting. Conflicts within or between

social communities appear to be specific to a certain local context.

Disputes over wetlands are caused by a complex interplay of internal and

external factors which are summarised in figure 6.3, p. 92.

Conflicts over wetlands

Different values, needs, interests or incentives

of social actors

Contested resource use claims(Leach et al. 1999: 233)

Power relations (Bryant 1998: 85)

Inequalities of access(Leach et al. 1999: 233)

Property rights system:legitimacy of access to wetlands,withdrawal of resources, e. g. approved by customary but not statutory law, or by inconclusive statutory rules, management rights(see Becker & Ostrom 1995:115; Bryant 1992: 22)

Changes in wetland use

Societal & economic trend; environmental changes

Conflicting & inconsistentsectoral policies

(see IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b: 76)

Sectoral thinking,overlapping jurisdiction

& ambiguity over mandates

Different degrees oflivelihood dependence on resources between

social actors

Exposure to flooding

Unequal capacity of social actors to cope with shocks

Figure 6.3: The casual factors for the occurrence of conflicts over wetlands. Source: owncompilation

The previous sections briefly described how assets wetlands provide to local

6.5. INSTITUTIONS SHAPING WETLAND USE AND MANAGEMENT 93

people are deployed to enhance well-being and capabilities and the mechanisms

of access. An attempt was made to unravel property rights to wetlands. A section

was dedicated to the power relations that condition the way endowments and

entitlements are gained. The complexity of conflicts which often emerge when

gaining endowments and entitlements was addressed. Hereafter an analysis on the

institutions which impinge on the way utilities are derived from wetland resources

follows.

6.5 Institutions Shaping Wetland Use and

Management

Relevant institutions have already been analysed in relation to their function

of impinging on resource access and local interactions (figure 6.2, p. 91). The

institutional analysis in this section concentrates on the influence of rules and

regulations on wetland use and management, i. e. on how endowments can be

transformed into entitlements.

6.5.1 Land Administration

This section refers to the property regimes of wetlands and the effects of land

titling and land use planning on the governance of wetland resources.

6.5.1.1 Property Regimes of Wetlands

Ostrom (2003) distinguishes between the type of good (property) and the property

regime4. “Common-pool resources [cannot] automatically [be] associated with

common-property regimes” (Ostrom 2003: 249). As mentioned above, peasants

make no difference between state property and common-property regimes as long

as land is administered by the state (Pausewang undated) and in a decentralised

manner by lower level authorities. The problem is that de jure state property is

often treated as de facto open access (see Berkes et al. 1989: 92). Since land is

4Berkes et al. (1989) distinguish between four basic property regimes under which common-pool resources are held: (1) open access, (2) private property, (3) communal property and (4)state property.


the property of the state, incentives to invest in (communal) holdings (Miller &

Tolina 2008: 367–368) and the sense of responsibility to these lands are often low

(Abbot et al. 2000: 21).

Wetlands lie in a legal grey area between state holding “for [. . . ] area devel-

opment and growth” (Proclamation No. 133/2005: §2(7)), communal holding

“used [emphasis of the author] by local people in common for grazing [. . . ] and

other social services” (ibid.: §2(5)), and private holding. This grey area in the land

administration and use legislation leads to confusion and discrepancies regarding

wetland registration (see p. 61), and impinges on wetland use and management

(see p. 95; figure 6.4, p. 103).

6.5.1.2 The Impact of Land Registration and Certification, and Land

Use Planning on Wetland Management

In general, land registration and certification processes were “focused on mapping

of agricultural holdings to the detriment of common property resources” (Deininger

et al. 2007: 10). Failures to register common property resources result in a

continuous crossing of communal borders and leave property issues unclear. Local

registration processes have occasionally fostered and have at the same time been

delayed by cases of encroachment and conflicts. Wetland management efforts

are easily frustrated due to intransparencies during registration but likewise legal

redistribution of communal lands if communally agreed.

Registration activities are usually undertaken in the dry season when the area

is accessible for woreda survey and administration teams and agricultural activities

do not compete with registration activities for LACs (Deininger et al. 2007: 7).

Being grazing or crop lands in the dry season, seasonal wetlands are difficult to

identify, are consequently not demarcated and registered with respect to their

actual use5.

These shortcomings and power relations underlying the registration and certifi-

cation process complicate local management attempts. On the other hand, studies

(Adenew & Abdi 2005; Deininger et al. 2006, 2007; SARDP/EPLAUA/ORGUT

2010) and own findings show that certification is perceived to have a positive

5For example, in their land cover and use survey, DSA/SCI (2006) partially mappedmarshlands together with intensively cultivated land.


effect on resource management and conservation if registration was undertaken

properly. For example, communal investments are said to increase (Deininger

et al. 2006: 13), common property resources to be managed more sustainably

and encroachments on communal lands to be reduced (Deininger et al. 2007:

15, 27). These positive effects on resource management and conservation can

be associated with an increased “subjective tenure security” (Crewett & Korf

2008: 209, 212–213) through certification. The clarification of boundaries through

registration reduces conflicts (Deininger et al. 2006: 13; Deininger et al. 2007:

27) and may result in more sustainable wetland management.

Unlike farmers stressing the importance of land use planning to avoid the

mismanagement of natural resources, Mesfin (2003) points out that land use

planning often fosters conversion of and sacrifices wetlands for other use purposes.

The land administration system may thus have a double-edged effect on natural

resource management (figure 6.4, p. 103).

The further institutional analysis comprehensively addresses the conditions de-

termining an effective wetland management. Attributes of common-pool resources

(Becker & Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 2003) are identified and local management insti-

tutions analysed regarding the design principles of robust common-pool resource

management systems (Becker & Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 2009 b). The chapter

concludes with an analysis of the effectiveness of institutions to conserve wetlands.

6.5.2 Common-Pool Resource Management

A collective action problem of the common-pool resource type is characterised

by costly exclusion and subtractive consumption (Ostrom 2003: 241–243, 248).

Generally, the probability that users organise is higher when expected benefits

of collective resource management exceed the costs for investing in establishing

institutional arrangements (Ostrom 2009 a: 420). Attributes of (1) the resource,

(2) users, (3) the structure of the situation, i. e. contextual factors, and (4) the

institutional arrangements (Agrawal 2001: 1653; Ostrom: 2003: 252–259) affect

the likelihood of self-organisation of people (Ostrom 2009 a: 240–241) and a

successful collective action as well as the feasibility of establishing a communal

property regime for wetlands (Ostrom 2003: 243). These variables facilitate the


emergence and the functioning of institutions to effectively manage wetlands

(Agrawal 2001: 1658).

6.5.2.1 Attributes of Wetlands and Associated Resources

Characteristics of wetlands may determine the effectiveness of institutional ar-

rangements to sustain associated resources (Agrawal 2001: 1655). The size of a

wetland can be a challenge to devising workable rules for its management (Ostrom

et al. 1999: 279). The large wetland extending over the two Fogera kebeles may

be more difficult to managed by a collective than the smaller ones in Tana Kirkos

and Agid Kirigna (figure 2.3, p. 14).

Low levels of resource mobility have been identified as enabling conditions

for an effective community-based management (Agrawal 2001: 1655). Wetlands

themselves are stationary resource systems, except some fish species, e. g. migra-

tory fishes. The possibility to store endowments obtained from wetland resources

(pastures, fish) for direct use is relatively low. Especially fish resource manage-

ment is associated with higher costs of gaining reliable information on mobile fish

species and constrained by an increasing pressure on the resource due to lower

storage degrees.

Besides, when harvesting biological resources, users need to preconceive various

ecological aspects including the type of resource appropriated (e. g. only matured

fish species or papyrus plants), the time (e. g. rejuvenation), or the extent of

harvest (e. g. a certain amount of fish daily, restricted grazing). Considering

these aspects is important in terms of possible ecological trade-offs and related

economic ramifications (Becker & Ostrom 1995: 118, 124).

Carrying capacity and time required for a resource to regenerate are further

important attributes that need to be considered in common-property resource

management (Ostrom et al. 1999: 279). Wetlands may not be able to sustain a

continuously increasing livestock population, or may more easily re-organise from

seasonal grazing than from cultivation (see Appendix 7, p. XXVIII).

Netting (1976, 1981 in Ostrom 2003: 254) found that a low production value

per unit area is conducive to the development of common-property rights. Initial

high production values of wetlands provide incentives (high returns) to peasants


to individually cultivate plots.

6.5.2.2 Attributes of Wetland Users

Whether wetland users successfully solve collective action problems is determined

by the size and heterogeneity of groups (Ostrom 2003: 257). The large size

of resource user groups and the heterogeneity between and within groups may

obstruct organisation for communal resource management.

Given this heterogeneity, reaching a common understanding of the most

beneficial, suitable land use regime (considering the objections and risks associated

with different use regimes), and the institutional setting of a use regime (ibid.:

257) is awkward. Inaccurate information (ibid.: 257) and incomplete knowledge

about sustainable wetland use and management as well as the importance of

wetlands in terms of their regulating and supporting ecosystem functions hamper

the creation of such a common understanding.

The variation of interests in wetland use involve conflicts over the resources.

Fabricius & Collins (2007) stress the negative effect conflicts have on community-

based resource management. Reciprocity and trust in social relations “can be

used as initial social capital” (Ostrom 2003: 257) to enhance the performance

of common-pool resource management systems, the capacity of social-ecological

systems and the ability to adapt to and shape system change (Folke 2006: 261).

Conflicts over land issues, unequal power distributions, illegal acts and experiences

related to Ethiopia’s tenure system are unconducive to building trust in local

communities.

The way wetland users are linked is important to consider when promoting

collective action (Ostrom 2009 b: 30). Accentuating vertical linkages of authority

between wetland users at community level may avert participation and display

manifestations of power rather than equality. Where leadership and knowledge are

actively invested in discussions on management they might positively influence

the establishment of organisation (Ostrom 2009 a: 421). Inasmuch as local

elites are powerful, they might also encourage collective wetland management

by teaching people, strengthening institutional implementation or facilitating

traditional conflict resolution (IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b: 62; see supra note 11,


p. 70). Power relations can significantly influence the emergence and sustenance

of institutional settings.

Since natural endowments of the research area facilitate livelihoods, most

peasants may seek to permanently live and work in their village6. Management

thus has a stable component (Ostrom 2003: 257). Ostrom (2003) states that

permanent residence and employment in one area reduced discounting the future.

But due to historical experiences, e. g. frequent land redistribution or land sale

to foreigners (personal communication: farmers in Tanametsele), and livelihood

insecurity, farmers may still discount future resource use, consequently exacerbating

degradation.

People’s lack of confidence in their capabilities and powers to build their own

future constrains collective action by inhibiting self-organisation and initiatives at

the local level (see Fabricius & Collins 2007: 92).

When resource users value solving common-pool resource dilemmas (Ostrom

2009 b: 30–31) and when the resource is of importance to them (Ostrom 2009 a:

421), collective action can be successful. All in all, there are many indications

that people value solving problems of wetland degradation. The appreciation of

the instrumental functions of wetlands to people’s livelihoods is further a good

basis for self-organisation.

6.5.2.3 Structural Attributes – The Social, Political, Economic and

Ecological Context

Collective action can stem from increasing pressures on common-pool resources

(Abbot et al. 2000: 8; Ostrom 2003: 253; Wood 2000: 8), such as land scarcity,

driven by demographic growth. Where livestock farmers see wetland pastures being

converted into arable land, more or less sophisticated management systems have

been developed to protect wetlands. Likewise, overexploitation of fish resources

has locally been tackled by stipulating the amount and time of harvest.

Large kebele sizes can be associated with increased transaction costs of

communal wetland management. With the incorporation of kebeles into larger

government units, the number of stakeholders and administrative expenses in-

6Moreover, absence from the residing locality and engagement in non-agricultural activitiesis otherwise prosecuted with the deprivation of landholding (Regulation No. 51/2007: §14).


crease, and conflict resolution consumes more time and costs. Besides, the

enlargement of kebeles complicates overseeing resources. Moreover the capacity

of kebele leaders to govern such a large area is exhausted (Abbot et al. 2000: 22).

Local communities are nested into governance and other organisational struc-

tures (Ostrom 2003: 256). Being the “guarantor of property rights arrangements”

(Agrawal 2001: 1656), the state has a central stake in the management of

wetlands (see p. 84 and p. 93). Governance structures, i. e. sectoral approaches,

decentralised land administration, organisation across levels and top-down decision-

making affect local management. Government bodies and other organisations

create awareness on and complement local knowledge about sustainable wetland

use and management through workshops, trainings etc. On the other hand, gaps

between different knowledge systems are unconducive to joint action across various

levels.

Economic incentives such as the cultivation of cash crops stimulate wetland

agriculture (see Wood 2000: 13), encouraged by the initial high productivity,

and wetland alteration. Consequently, the (short-term) benefits obtained through

individual decision-making outweigh the alternative benefits gained through making

collective choices. Lower fish prices increase pressure on fish stocks and “reduce

the incentive to organise and assure future availability” (Ostrom et al. 1999: 281).

Markets and new technologies may affect resource management regimes (Agrawal

2001: 1656). New incentives for production, created by market demands and

technical innovations (e. g. mono-filament gill net, dehiscent mills), have resulted

in a change of cropping patterns and resource harvesting methods in the research

sites.

Flooding, as a natural characteristic of the resource system but also human-

induced (see p. 11), hampers an organisation for collective action due to the

inaccessibility of infrastructure and by rendering management ineffective in times

of increased risks. Responses to severe flooding events include the cultivation of

wetlands and fishing to cope with livelihood insecurities (see Appendix 5, p. XIX).

The unpredictability of social-ecological system dynamics (e. g. occurrence of

flooding) may complicate arriving at use and management agreements (Agrawal

2001: 1655; Ostrom 2009 a: 421).

Structural attributes (appearing as the ‘context’ in figure 6.4, p. 103) are


rather incompletely listed, yet sufficiently for the present work. Although an

attempt is made to list the different attributes separately, they cannot be clearly

distinguished from one another due to interlinkages and intersections.

6.5.2.4 Institutional Arrangements and Design Principles for

Governing Wetland Resources

Becker & Ostrom (1995) “stress the importance of design principles rather than

institutional solutions to common-pool resource problems” (p. 122), i. e. the

design principles should be considered when establishing specific institutional

arrangements. Robust institutions tend to incorporate most design principles

(Becker & Ostrom 1995: 118; see p. 21).

The first of Ostrom’s design principles is that of clearly defined boundaries of a

resource system, and the individuals and households with property rights (Ostrom

2009 b: 32–33). There are several aspects here which obstruct the clarification of

boundaries: (1) ill-defined property rights to wetlands and property regimes, (2)

continuing conflicts over resource access and use, (3) boundary conflicts, (4) lack

of communal land registration and (5) seasonal changes of wetland boundaries.

Two implications can be made: both the boundaries of who is authorised to use

the resource and the physical boundaries are fuzzy and changing. Despite this,

concepts of wetland boundary demarcation exist where access to the resources is

managed, e. g. in Agid Kirigna or where sanctions are imposed on illegal wetland

cultivators. The definition of a boundary inevitably asks for a definition of wetland.

Defining ‘seasonal wetland’ may raise many questions, e. g. on seasonal changes

in land use and cover, the definition of ‘seasonal’, how to deal with dynamics and

uncertainties (prolonged flooding, drought).

The second principle says that benefits need to be allocated proportional to

costs of management system operation (ibid.: 33–34). In Agid Kirigna and Tez

Amba, rules regulate use conditions, i. e. the amount of resources harvested, the

time of their utilisation, and harvesting practices. Inequities in the allocation of

benefits and costs occur when users, including non-residents, subtract resources

without contributing to resource management, e. g. using unsustainable fishing

practices or ignoring seasonal closure of wetlands for grazing. The fairness of


the allocation of benefits is also relevant (Agrawal 2001: 1660). Evidence shows

that in some cases the allocation is not fair, e. g. where wealthier fishermen gain

proportionally higher catches. A subpart of this principle includes the congruence

of resource appropriation and local ecology (Ostrom 2009 b: 40), i. e. the resilience

of social-ecological systems. In the two cases mentioned above, this congruence

is partly considered (seasonal closure for resource regeneration).

The third design principle is that of a collective choice arrangement. Collective

choices are made through the participation of most resource users in establishing

and modifying rules which may then be considered fair (ibid.: 34). Such arrange-

ments should include simple and easily understandable rules about access to and

management of wetlands (Agrawal 2001: 1659). With the authority to make and

implement laws, the power to suppress opinions and participation, primarily local

elites can be expected to benefit from institutional settings. For example, wetlands

are preferably managed as pastures rather than cultivated by landless and poor.

Regulations on grazing regimes in Agid Kirigna do not sufficiently enough con-

sider the dependence of poorer livestock farmers on communal feeding resources.

Apparently, collective choice arrangements made by fishing resource management

organisations are perceived to be more fair. The voluntary membership in such an

organisation is important in this respect. In the case of involuntary membership

of the Woito in Agid Kirigna, agreements are rather perceived to be unjust.

The principle of monitoring resource conditions, and more often, user be-

haviour to enforce rules (Ostrom 2009 b: 34–35) is one of the more elaborated

principles at the local level. In Gulash, Tana Kirkos and Agid Kirigna, guards

were selected to oversee resource appropriation (see p. 66). Most of the simpler

management systems may rely on a mutual monitoring system: everyone in the

community monitors the behaviour of other users. Fishermen mutually monitor

their practices by entering and returning from Lake Tana at the same time. As

opposed to this, responsible woreda government bodies fail to evaluate resource

conditions and patterns of appropriation.

Monitoring is related to the fifth design principle, using graduated sanctions.

Graduated sanctions range from informing people about an offence to more

stringent punishments (ibid.: 35). Whereas Regulation No. 51/2007 at least men-

tions graduated punishments in cases of non-performance of land use obligations


(§§17, 18), locally graduated sanctions are less well stipulated. When the costs

of breaking regulations are still low compared to the benefits achieved when not

being caught, it is difficult to achieve collective action (see Ostrom 2009 b: 35).

This is the case in the study sites. For example, the possibly obtained yields

on encroached land are still lucrative enough to risk the destruction of those

yields or a moderate fine when encroachment is discovered. The same is true for

using resources in times of seasonal closure or illicit fishing practices. The ease

with which sanctions are enforced is crucial for a joint management (Agrawal

2001: 1659). In the research sites, the enforcement of sanctions and rules is often

difficult.

The existence of rapid, low cost and local conflict resolution mechanisms is the

sixth principle (Ostrom 2009 b: 35). People’s preference to solve conflicts locally

is to be considered positive in this regard. Resolution mechanisms are known by

community members and can be applied according to customary law (Regulation

No. 51/2007: §§35, 37). But especially communal land conflicts cannot be solved

at the local level. The arbitration of disputes by “distant government agencies”

(Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 638) such as woreda courts and administrations then

involves an increase in costs of and time for resolution. Structural attributes of

the specific situation likewise influence conflict resolution.

The socio-political context is crucial to the seventh principle of minimal

recognition of rights to organise by external authorities (Ostrom 2009 b: 36).

Local self-organisation is undermined if government authorities do not recognise

that principle.

Various management tasks and activities, e. g. monitoring, conflict resolution,

enforcement of rules or resource appropriation, are organised in a decentralised

manner with smaller institutions being nested in larger systems (ibid.: 36, 43).

Problematic are the interrelations between those nested hierarchies determined by

differences in levels of legal recognition, in priorities across layers, or by the lack

of interest and capabilities at state levels to govern resource use and management

and to deal with local problems.

The pertinent institutional arrangements setting the conditions of wetland

resource subtraction and governance and accounting for the functioning of man-

agement are outlined in figure 6.4, p. 103.


Land administration & use proclamation & regulation; fishery

proclamation; regional policies; conflict resolution mechanisms

Meso

Customary rights; by-laws & regulations, incl. regulations on fishery;

conflict resolution mechanisms

Micro

Federal policiesMacro

Resource use conditions& sanctions

Context(demographic growth, governance structure& unit, economicincentives, ecologicalsystem dynamics,risk, uncertainty…)

Res

ilien

ce?

Constitution; federal policies



Meso


Micro

Macro


Endowment mapping

Entitlement mapping

Entitlements

Social actors






Wetlandresources &

services


rights)

Figure 6.4: The multi-level institutions conditioning wetland resource subtraction. Source:modified after Leach et al. 1999: 234

The following remarks combine the insights from the previous sections to

provide a comprehensive picture of the conditions that determine an effective

wetland management and sustainable resource utilisation.

6.5.2.5 Robustness and Effectiveness of Wetland Management

Institutions

Rural livelihoods maintain and enhance their capabilities and well-being by har-

nessing wetland resources. Institutions are essential to manage wetland utilisation

and to maintain ecosystem resilience. The sustainability of the social-ecological

system is thus dependent on the robustness and effectiveness of established rules

and regulations, their congruence with local conditions, their interaction with the

ecosystem and their fit with the resilience of wetlands (Agrawal 2001: 1659; Folke

2006: 262; Ostrom 2009 a: 421).


The current institutional wetland management systems evolved just recently as

a response to multi-level policies, socio-economic and related ecological processes

and changes. Local communities can be seen as being in the process of developing

adapted institutions which may be contested, tested and transformed over time

(see Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 639). Yet, their management systems must be

considered less robust and only partially effective in sustainably utilising and

conserving wetlands.

In most study sites, including Wagetera and Nabega and partly Tanametsele

and Tez Amba, wetlands are poorly managed. The large size of the main wetland

spanning four kebeles (figure 2.3, p. 14) and the high efforts that need to be

undertaken for its management are probable explanations for this. The (seasonal)

inaccessibility of administration offices, churches, services and organisations due

to flooding, large distances or the remoteness of villages increase transaction

costs of collective action. Deficiencies of stakeholder participation narrow the

collective choice arrangements to arrangements made by elites and thus possibly

make regulations and benefit allocations unacceptable. Inadequate information

and knowledge of wetland management and conservation obstruct the evolution

of a common understanding of wetland-related issues and contribute to wetland

degradation. Management regulations through which proprietorship is established

are restricted to mostly non-graduated sanctions against illegal access to wetlands

without considering the specific characteristics of biological and physical resources.

Mutual monitoring is not necessarily per se ineffective. Yet power relations may

distort the mutuality.

In Gulash village, wetlands are monitored by trustworthy and independent

persons. Moderate sanctions are imposed on delinquents. Since the kebele admin-

istration office of Wagetera is just nearby, transaction costs for village residents

are presumably low.

Wetlands of good management and better conservation status are those

in Agid Kirigna and Tana Kirkos. They are much smaller in size. The monks,

exercising the rights of proprietors over the wetland, are a relatively homogeneous

group with common ideas on wetland use and management. In Agid Kirigna, intra-

community differences (as in most study sites) exist, but also inter-community

heterogeneity, i. e. between the Woito tribe and the other communities. According


to personal information, a total of 69 families of the Woito are supposed to

live in one village and one sub-kebele (personal communication: Sibhat). Their

presence might influence the degree of pressure on the wetland since they are

rarely engaged in agricultural activities and livestock rearing. The office of the

kebele administration is located around the centre of Agid Kirigna, in the vicinity

of the villages with shares of wetland. A joint agreement on wetland management

was reached through discussion. Ostrom (2003, 2009 b) stresses the importance

of communication to develop effective management rules and to build assurance

of wetland users about the behaviour of other users. The institutional setting

considers biological and physical resource properties, different use regimes and

alternatives to compensate for the use of wetland resources. A monitoring system

is established.

The management of mobile resources is often complicated and requires

information that is mostly difficult to obtain (e. g. pregnancy of female fishes,

regeneration rates; see p. 96). In most cases, fisheries are not organised and

fishermen are the authorised users of a resource withdrawn by all. Livelihood

insecurity due to flooding that requires seasonally and temporally limited rapid

action, unemployment and lack of land has recently led to both commercial and

non-commercial fishery. Potentially, more time and dedication are required to

establish effective management systems.

The two fishermen’s associations established in Tez Amba and Agid Kirigna

share the rights of authorised claimants. The established collective choice ar-

rangements, incorporating aspects of a sustainable fish resource utilisation on the

basis of fish resource attributes, and monitoring systems are promising. So far,

the exclusion of fishermen is unfeasible which, despite regulations, still entails

overexploitation. The effectiveness of institutions is further eroded by inequities

in the allocation of benefits and costs and a high tolerance of breaking rules due

to the absence or the relative low severity of sanctions. Ethnic differences are a

challenge to fish resource management in Agid Kirigna.

Bundles of property rights play a key role in the management and use of

wetlands. Ostrom (2003, 2009) points out that proprietorship, i. e. exercising

collective-choice rights of management and exclusion, can be effective enough

to manage common-property resources (see table 6.1, p. 86). Yet, communal


proprietorship to wetlands is often questioned, lacks recognition and endorsement

by local community members as well as government bodies. Frequently, the

establishment of rights of proprietors or even authorised claimants is impaired by

prevailing contextual conditions, characteristics of the resource system and its

users. Power relations (see p. 86) shape communal property rights in two ways:

First, power and resistance to power can be exercised to actively counteract rules

of access and management. Second, wielding of power and resistance can ensure

claims to bundles of rights (right to manage or exclude) for one or more user

groups.

The incapability of institutions to “structure the interactions that take place

around [wetland] resources” (Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 637) ensues from failure

to consider the design principles in making institutional arrangements. Common-

property resource dilemmas probably persist and depletion continues. Institutional

effectiveness depends upon the involvement and consideration of all relevant

stakeholders, including landless, poor or Woito people whose interests and needs

are currently mainly underrepresented. In many cases of encroachment and

boundary disputes the “solution was leaving things for later” (Deininger et al.

2007: 23), rendering institutional settings ineffective. Ineffectiveness of institutions

results from a lack of assurance that participants comply with the rules and that

sanctions are consistently enforced. Though rules are compiled in a relatively

simple way and appear to be comprehensible to many users, their enforcement

proves rather difficult. Further on, external authorities who fail to monitor and

enforce the implementation of regulations (e. g. on land administration and use

or fisheries) insufficiently support and complement local management systems.

Being nested in larger units, local institutions must consider conditions per-

taining to wetland resource use and management, prescribed by federal policies,

to work effectively (Ostrom et al. 1999: 281). In some cases, government plans

for land development (e. g. cash crop cultivation) conflict with the interests of

local communities in using common-pool resources more sustainably (cf. Abbot

et al. 2000: 23). Overlapping management responsibilities of government bodies,

emanating from various policies (see p. 16), are quite counterproductive to an

effective local management. By claiming their mandates, external authorities

allocate different rights to the same resource and shape the face of wetlands

6.6. SUMMARY 107

through different utilisation concepts, development and management approaches.

Besides, sectoral top-down policy formulation and implementation with “a narrow

technocratic perspective” (Abbot et al. 2000: 20) impede local initiatives for a

more appropriate wetland management (ibid.: 20–21).

Figure 6.5, p. 107 and figure 6.6, p. 108 summarise the structural and relational

conditions that facilitate and constrain an effective wetland management.

Attributes of wetlands & associated resources

– Small size of the wetland (Agid Kirigna, Tana Kirkos)

Attributes of wetland users

– Small-sized and homogeneous wetland user group in Tana Kirkos– Less dependence of the Woito people on the cultivation of wetlands in Agid Kirigna

Structural attributes (external environment)

– External bodies create awareness and complement local knowledge on wetlands

Institutional arrangements

– Communication and discussions on wetland management– Rules and regulations appear to be easily understandable– Consideration of wetland resource properties– Alternative solutions to wetland use are provided– Mutual monitoring of user behaviour and selection of guards to oversee resource appropriation

Figure 6.5: Conditions facilitating an effective wetland management. Arrows indicate theinteractions between the different management variables. Source: own compilation

6.6 Summary

Wetland resources and services contribute to the maintenance and enhancement

of people’s capabilities and well-being. Access to these resources and services

determines whether resources can become endowments. Whereas legal and illegal

mechanisms of access are applied by all people, richer mainly draw on capital,

knowledge or authority and poorer on social identity (structural and relational

mechanisms) to gain, maintain or control access.

The conditions for resource subtraction (e. g. harvesting time, amount, method,


Attributes of wetlands & associated resources

– Large size of the wetland (esp. Wagetera and Nabega)– Fuzzy and changing wetland boundaries– Initial high production value of wetlands– Fish resource mobility & low degrees of storage

Attributes of wetland users

– Large size of wetland user groups (often undefined boundary, non-exclusion)– Intra- and inter-community heterogeneity– Inaccurate information and incomplete knowledge about the resource system– Lack of trust and assurance– Livelihood dependence on resource system– Lack of confidence in own powers– Unequal power distribution and implicit resistance – Unpredictability of social-ecological system dynamics and risk Structural attributes (external environment)

– Increasing pressure on common-pool resources (demographic growth, unemployment)– Large government units (kebele size)– Economic incentives– Failure of exteral authorities to monitor user behaviour and the implementation of regulations– Local management systems lack legal recognition by government authorities– Ill-defined property rights and regimes– Lack of land registration and missing land use planning– Overlapping management responsibilities– Sectoral top-down policy-making– Flooding

Institutional arrangements

– Inequities in the allocation of benefits and costs of wetland management– Lack of participation in collective choice arrangements– Inconsistently enforced and implemented rules– Lack of graduated sanctions– Increased efforts and costs in solving communal conflicts, lack of effective resolution mechanisms– Problematic interactions between nested systems (e.g. different resoure use priorities, gap between knowledge systems)

Figure 6.6: Conditions constraining an effective wetland management. Arrows indicate theinteractions between the different management variables. Source: own compilation

prescribed practices) regulate whether and how endowments can be transformed

into entitlements. These resource use conditions and likewise the access to

wetlands is mediated by various customary, statutory and conventional rights and

regulations. The plurality of and the inconsistency between these rights often

raise questions about their legitimacy and consequently about the legitimacy of

wetland management attempts. Power relations within and between communities,

manifested in corruption, resistance, advocacy etc., influence endowment and

entitlement mapping, and in so doing structure most of the efforts undertaken to

manage wetland resources.

A complex of interlinked internal and external factors affects the ability of local

resource management systems to conserve wetlands (figure 6.5, p. 107; figure 6.6,

p. 108). Internal factors comprise the characteristics of the resource system, the

6.6. SUMMARY 109

user group and the institutional arrangements. Contextual external factors include

the higher-level institutions that interact with the resource system and local

management institutions (figure 6.7, p. 109). The size of the resource system and

wetland users is often not manageable and boundaries are fuzzy. The management

is made more complicated by the heterogeneity of social actors and unequally

distributed powers, benefits and costs of wetland management. Many of the design

principles that most likely determine the success of institutions to conserve wetland

resources are not sufficiently considered or cannot be implemented adequately.

Grey areas of the property rights system which are reflected in failures to register

wetlands and ill-defined management responsibilities render wetland management

ineffective. Further on, economic incentives for the conversion of wetlands and

external shocks often constrain a functioning wetland management.

These findings are discussed in the following chapter.

Customary rights; by-laws & regulations, incl. regulations on fishery;

conflict resolution mechanisms

Micro

Land administration & use proclamation & regulation; fishery proclamation; regional policies; conflict resolution mechanisms

Meso

Federal policiesMacro

Resource use conditions& sanctions

Context(demographic growth, governance structure& unit, economicincentives, ecologicalsystem dynamics,risk, uncertainty…)

Res

ilien

ce?


Micro



Meso

Constitution; federal policiesMacro


Endowment mapping

Entitlement mapping

Entitlements

Social actors






Wetlandresources &

services


rights)

Figure 6.7: Environmental entitlements analysis: Institutions mediating access to wetlands,conditioning resource subtraction, and institutional interactions. Source: modified after Leachet al. 1999: 234


Chapter 7

Discussion

This section seeks to provide recommendations and raise objections regarding a

sustainable wetland management, and the establishment and functioning of the

CBINReMP and Lake Tana biosphere reserve (BR)1, particularly. In this regard,

the institutional framework for the conservation of wetlands as well as governance

features and conditions facilitating the effective and sound management of

common-pool resources are discussed. Concluding remarks on social-ecological

resilience are made.

7.1 The Institutional Framework for the

Conservation of Wetlands

Zur Heide (2012) states that “the general policy framework in the Amhara Region

is conducive to the establishment of a biosphere reserve” (p. 119). Scaling up to

wetlands as a landscape section of the BR, it is debatable whether institutional

conditions enable the conservation of wetland ecosystems.

1See Appendix 8, p. XXIX for a description of the concept of BRs.

111

112 CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION

7.1.1 A National Wetland Policy?

There has been controversy about the adequate representation and consideration

of wetlands in existing policy documents (Abbot et al. 2000; Fisseha 2003; Mesfin

2003; Wood 2000). Whereas Mesfin (2003) argues that wetlands are sufficiently

represented in national policies and legislation (see p. 69), and that only synergies

between those have to be better exploited, Fisseha (2003) calls for a National

Wetland Policy. With their technical approach and sectoral thinking, the existing

policies fail to adequately consider the role of wetlands for biodiversity conservation

and people’s livelihoods. Thus, a rather holistic understanding of wetlands is

required that emphasises the multiple functions of and benefits obtained from

wetlands (Abbot et al. 2000: 20; Fisseha 2003: 79; Wood 2000: 10) or that even

acknowledges their intrinsic value (Wood 2000: 10). It can be assumed and hoped

that the as yet unratified Ethiopian National Wetland Policy comprises such a

holistic approach.

A National Wetland Policy as an overarching document should provide objec-

tives, guidelines and orientation for management and conservation. In the case

of Uganda, the Wetland Policy is not a legally binding document but wetland

clauses are incorporated into legislation (Bakema & Mafabi 2003: 104). Fisseha

(2003) proposes integrating the Ethiopian Wetland Policy into the land admin-

istration and use proclamation and regulation. Likewise, other legislation such

as the Environmental Policy, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan

or the Water Resource Management Policy as well as development plans could

be amended by clauses specifically related to wetlands. In this way it could be

ensured that wetlands are concordantly represented within different policy sectors.

At the regional level, provisions and goals need to be specified. Mesfin (2003)

suggests the formulation of regional wetland policies to better address the specific

local conditions and problems (see also Abbot 2000: 21; Wood 2000: 8). As part

of the CBINReMP2 a policy document for Amhara is planned including strategies

2The CBINReMP is financed and technically supported by the International Fund for Agricul-tural Development (IFAD), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Spanish InternationalDevelopment Cooperation Agency (AECID) (see BoARD 2011 a: 7). The programme includesthe establishment of wetland user associations as well as local by-laws and management plansfor single wetlands. It also envisages trainings and wetland policy awareness creation workshops,the provision of alternative diversified livelihood options and the integration of traditional knowl-

7.1. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 113

and regulations on wetland use and management (personal communication: BDU).

At the woreda and local level, wetland management strategies have to be

drafted in accordance to the social-ecological conditions and requirements together

with all identified stakeholders and community representatives. Already existing

management institutions need to be integrated. National and regional wetland

policies have to be flexible and have to relinquish responsibility to allow local

management systems to adequately adapt their management criteria to the

peculiarities of the environment as well as to appropriately respond to changes

and uncertainties. This research study and insights from wetland management

in the Illubabor zone show that local people are capable of self-organising and

adjusting to changes (see Abbot et al. 2000: 21). Hence, flexibility and learning

from variation should not be undermined by another rigid or rigidly interpreted

top-down policy.

7.1.2 Signing the Ramsar Convention?

For several years there have been cooperative efforts that have targeted the signing

of the Ramsar Convention by Ethiopia (e. g. Abebe 2004; MoWE 2010: 3-17; zur

Heide 2012). This convention urges its contracting parties to develop national

wetland policies to better address the utilisation and management of wetlands

(Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2010 a: 7). After the ratification of Ethiopia’s

National Wetland Policy, a joining of the Ramsar Convention is envisaged (personal

communication: EWNRA). Wetlands south and east of Lake Tana, including the

Fogera plains, that fulfil the Ramsar selection criteria for wetland sites have

already been identified (Abebe 2004). Signing the Ramsar Convention could

possibly increase the success of wetland conservation (see zur Heide 2012: 121).

Besides, the zonation concept for Ramsar sites is compatible with the zonation

concept of BRs (Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2010 b: 30–31).

Returning to the national level, the next section discusses property rights

issues of wetlands.

edge. Financial constraints hamper the programme’s implementation (personal communication:BDU).


7.1.3 Property Rights to Wetlands – A Critical Issue

Property Rights to common-pool resources are a critical issue. Failures to address

them comprehensively will render any conservation effort ineffective. A with-

drawal of the property rights of local people may give rise to severe community

resentments and resistance, e. g. if recession farming and wetland cultivation are

prohibited for conservation purposes (cf. zur Heide 2012: 136). On the other

hand, the conservation of wetland resources may be bound to management and

exclusion rights exercised by local people. Where the government does not recog-

nise these rights, the protection of wetlands cannot be guaranteed. Discrepancies

between customary and statutory regulations on access to and management of

wetlands (and recession farmlands) as well as between local and government

interests on wetland use have to be resolved. In this way conflicts arising during

the establishment of conservation projects and resistance to conservation can be

averted.

Gebrekidan (2009 b) argues that the state ownership of wetlands and the use

rights of local people provide an “ideal case” (p. 49) for the establishment of

protected areas. But the mere right to withdraw resources from the lake and its as-

sociated wetlands is not sufficient and does not encourage users to self-organise for

community-based management, but rather stimulates continuous overexploitation

and keeps wetlands exposed to open access. Consequently, communal propri-

etorship of wetlands (and of defined boundaries of fishing grounds3) has to be

more explicitly legally recognised and approved. Case studies on common-property

management in the highlands of Ethiopia show that communal proprietorship of

pastures has effectively been established under state ownership. These manage-

ment systems have been legally recognised and characterised by most of Ostrom’s

design principles (see Adenew & Abdi 2005: 18–20; Ashenafi & Leader-Williams

2005).

But there have been more forceful voices calling for an alternative to state

ownership or the privatisation of land (see p. 17). Rahmato (1994, 2004 in Crewett

& Korf 2008: 206) and Pausewang (undated), for example, stress the importance

3Defining fishing zones and exclusion of non-registered fishermen within these zones areprobably very ambitious and difficult tasks.


of associative collective ownership rights of communities as a third way. Granting

of community ownership rights involves the transfer of control over land use and

management to the community. This is supposed to establish democracy at the

local level and to have a positive effect on resource conservation and livelihood

security.

Though the third alternative looks very attractive in terms of biodiversity and

resource conservation, it is actually not viable. Instead, a combination of property

regimes may be very convenient to wetland conservation (Berkes et al. 1989: 93).

The UNESCO (1996) acknowledges a broad spectrum of property regimes within

a BR. This is very suitable for the wetlands east of Lake Tana which are held under

several property regimes constituted of varying bundles of rights. Proclamation

No. 133/2006 grants landholding rights to groups (common holding, §2(10))

and communities (communal holding, §2(5)). Drawing on these rights is crucial

to the establishment of common or communal proprietorship. A combination of

property regimes could lead to common-pool resource co-management systems,

provided that powers between government bodies and local communities are

shared, property rights of various social actors are non-ambiguously assigned and

responsibilities clarified to avert further resource mismanagement.

Which further conditions does the existing land administration and use legis-

lation provide to enable a sound and effective wetland management?

7.1.4 Land Administration and Conservation

With the decentralisation of land administration local people have gained power

in an area which affects their livelihoods most: land and resources (Miller &

Tolina 2008: 372). Regulation No. 51/2007 provides enabling conditions for the

involvement of the public in communal resource management, for the application

of local conflict resolution measures and customary rules. Currently, more emphasis

needs to be put on public participation and horizontal decision-making in the

administration of communal lands.

An “ownership mentality” (Regulation No. 51/2007, preamble) of farmers

regarding their landholding has been partly created by land titling. Still, communal

lands have to be registered in order to reduce conflicts. Certificates need to be


upgraded and safely kept with the LAC. Interestingly, Crewett & Korf (2008) in

their study on land administration in Oromia and Adenew & Abdi (2005) in their

report on land registration in Amhara found that lack of tenure security is not

the major concern, at least for those peasants possessing land. Land scarcity and

poverty are probably the more important constraints to people’s livelihoods and a

sustainable natural resource management.

The regulation stipulates land use obligations. If properly implemented and

enforced, these obligations represent a good starting point for sustainable wetland

management. But being kept very general, they need to be specified through by-

laws and locally appropriate wetland management plans. Rights and obligations of

wetland users and seasonally changing wetland utilisation could be indicated in the

certificate issued for communal landholdings (see Regulation No. 51/2007: §21).

In so doing local institutional settings could be legally approved and recognised

by the woreda authority.

Whereas conservationists are familiar with the definition and classification of

wetlands (see supra note 1, p. 11), the land administration staff faces difficulties in

identifying wetlands. Therefore, it is a challenge to register or explicitly not register

wetlands. Wetlands are most often simply subsumed under communal lands but

should possibly be considered a specific sub-division due to their distinct ecological

characteristics. This could contribute to a more adequate protection of the resource

system. A guideline for the delineation of wetlands is required, including practical

definitions and easily recognisable dry and rainy season wetland indicators in the

field4. When registering wetlands, the survey and land administration teams need

to be accompanied by an environmental protection expert. Registration should

possibly be undertaken twice, during both the dry and the rainy season, to avoid

boundary conflicts.

The legislation considers integrating environmental protection into land use

practices. Though generally welcome, the mixing of environmental issues and land

administration has been criticised (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 12; Miller & Tolina 2008:

372). Land administration should rather focus strictly on land registration and

certification (Adenew & Abdi 2005: 12). At regional and woreda levels, EPLAUA

4Indicators can be identified drawing on local knowledge about wetland plant species (seeDixon & Wood 2001: 8).


and WoEPLAU are sectioned into the department of environmental protection,

the department of land administration and the department of land use. The

mandates of these sections need to be clarified and cooperation enhanced to

ensure the protection of resources and biodiversity. In terms of the conservation

of (wetland-dependant) biodiversity, the role of the environmental protection

department in assessing environmental impacts, evaluating land use practices and

co-deciding on land use planning needs to be strengthened.

The next two sections address the importance of land use planning and

environmental impact assessments for wetland conservation.

7.1.5 Land Use Planning and Conservation

Rural land should be managed according to a land use plan. The Environmental

Policy states that a strategic land use plan should “define broad land use and land

user categories together with generalised resource management recommendations”

(EPA/MoEDC 1997: 20) at the federal, regional and community level. Based on

these plans, individuals and communities will be able to formulate detailed local

resource use and management plans. Besides, strategic land use plans should

integrate aspects of biodiversity conservation (ibid.: 10, 20).

Plans and strategies are required to effectively manage a BR. The UNESCO

(1996) underlines that BRs are to be included in regional development and

land use planning projects. Community level land use planning approaches are

flexible and allow for adequate considerations of and adaptations to local social-

ecological conditions (Abbot et al. 2000: 22, 26). Further land distributions should

be undertaken in compliance with land use and management plans. Land use

planning is an important instrument to avoid mismanagement and to conserve

wetlands. It possibly results in a reduction of conflicts over wetlands and therefore

positively contributes to a resilient community-based management. However, land

use plans have yet to be prepared urgently.

7.1.6 Environmental Impact Assessment

Sectoral policy approaches often fail to integrate aspects of wetland conservation.

Policies pertaining to wetland management and development projects thus need


to be reviewed and their impact on wetland use and management evaluated (e. g.

Fisseha 2003: 79; Tekaligne 2003: 90; see also Ramsar Convention Secretariat

2010 a). The Environmental Policy conceives environmental impact assessments

(EIAs) holistically by addressing biological and physical as well as social, economic,

political and cultural conditions (EPA/MoEDC 1997: 23). Proclamation No.

299/2002 provides an instrument to assess environmental impacts involving public

consultations (§15). An EIA is a suitable mechanism to identify incompatibilities

between conservation, sustainable resource appropriation and projects or policies

at different levels. It may be very useful to effectively incorporate the conservation,

development and logistic support functions of a biosphere reserve (see p. XXVIII)

in the context of change and ongoing development. Furthermore, Wood (2003)

suggests undertaking community-level EIAs to identify the impact of various

wetland management options on the social-ecological system, taking into account

the heterogeneity of social actors.

Figure 7.1, p. 118 illustrates the aspects of the discussion on the institutional

framework for the conservation of wetlands.

WETLAND

Ramsar Convention, CBD

(Community-level)environmental impact

assessments

Regional wetland policy Meso

Local wetland management strategies & plans

Micro

National Wetland PolicyMacro

Multi-sectoral policies

Incorporate policy clauses of

Enabling conditions:– Public participation in communal resource management– Application of local conflict resolution mechanisms & customary rules– Land use obligations expanded by local by-laws and management plans– Registration & certification of wetlands, considering seasonality of wetland use Clarify: – Property rights and regimesProvide: – Guideline for the registration of wetlands– Land use plans

Land administration & use legislation

Figure 7.1: The institutional framework for the conservation of wetlands. Source: own compilation

7.2. GOVERNANCE OF WETLANDS 119

7.2 Governance of Wetlands

The sustainable management of wetlands requires a governance system that

is adaptive, flexible and multi-level. This section lists and discusses some of

the features of adaptive, multi-level governance (see Armitage 2008) and the

conditions that enable successful common-property resource management (see

Agrawal 2001; Ostrom 2009 a) and reverts to the design principles of robust

management institutions (see Ostrom 2009 b) with regard to the establishment

and functioning of the CBINReMP and Lake Tana BR.

7.2.1 The Role of Social Actors in Wetland Management

The establishment and functioning of the CBINReMP and BR requires networking

across scales, ranging from international to local, and the cooperation of very

different stakeholders (UNESCO, 1996, 2008). Zur Heide (2012) has already

identified relevant stakeholders and their potential participation in and contribution

to the Lake Tana BR. This section adds to the list of local stakeholders5 which

have to be involved in wetland management and whose management roles need

to be explored.

7.2.1.1 Kebele Administration and Elders

Since kebele leaders perform official duties and are often in a privileged position,

they play an important role for networking actors across scales, e. g. local users

with woreda and regional administrations or organisations. By following the formal

procedures, external instances and organisations often contact local leaders first

to grant permission for their projects. Leaders are in the position to express

views, create awareness, propagate ideas and deliver useful input to matters

of communal interest. Elders are respected people and, just like the kebele

administration, involved in local settling of conflicts.

5Since gender issues were not included in the research, the role of women in community-basedmanagement is not mentioned specifically. But refer to Sibhat (2012).


7.2.1.2 Kebele Land Administration and Use Committee

At the local level, LACs are the highest legal decision-making instances concern-

ing land administration and resource appropriation. Thus decisions on wetland

conservation are taken at this hierarchical level (IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b: 64). The

influence of kebele and sub-kebele LACs on wetland management and resource

utilisation is high. Consequently, these administrative bodies need to be involved

in the establishment of a BR and the CBINReMP.

7.2.1.3 Development Agents

Four development agents (DAs) are assigned to every kebele by the woreda

Agricultural and Rural Development office with responsibilities for crop production,

livestock production, natural resource management and home economics (Abbot

et al. 2000: 16; MoARD 2010: 8). They are the link between woreda authorities

and local communities as well as ex-officio members of the kebele administrative

committee. Being responsible for the implementation of agricultural policies, DAs

communicate higher-level objectives down to the farmers (Abbot et al. 2000: 16,

19).

In Illubabor zone, woreda experts who were granted responsibilities for wetlands

have been trained in wetland management by the staff of the Ethiopian Wetlands

Research Programme (EWRP). Information and extension materials on wetland

management have been disseminated to DAs who have used them to train farmers

(Hailu & Wood 2000: 19). Annually, DAs have also recorded data on wetlands,

such as size (Hailu et al. 2000: 4). DAs could therefore play a key role in the

management of wetlands within the BR.

7.2.1.4 Fishermen and Fishermen’s Associations

Fishermen have been identified as the most important stakeholders for a sus-

tainable management and utilisation of fish resources (IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b:

66; Gebrekidan & Teka 2006 a: 53). With the formulation of regulations and

local by-laws, fishermen’s associations in Tez Amba and Agid Kirigna showed ac-

countability for a joint management. This is a good basis for further conservation

action.


Woito Tribe Though being a rather under-represented group, the Woito could

have a strong stake in the conservation of fish stocks. The Woito, traditionally tied

to the lake and its fish resources, have acquired knowledge and fishing skills that

need to be considered and possibly integrated into management and monitoring

plans.

7.2.1.5 Poor and Landless

Very often unheeded, the interests of poor and landless should not be ignored

though they might often conflict with conservation interests. Instead, increased

attention has to be paid to the issues of more constrained groups.

Youth associations are important stakeholders in so far as they advocate

the interests of landless youth and assert claims to the utilisation of wetlands.

7.2.1.6 Community-Based Organisations

Local organisations are described to be the foundation for local development, for

the enactment of institutions for wetland management, and controlling natural

resource use (IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b: 70). Conservationists should refer to the

community-based institutional organisations found in the research area with an

open mind and from a critical perspective. Conservation initiatives should draw on

existing organisational structures by involving arbitrators for conflict settling, as

well as wetland monitors. Both of these are selected using commonly shared and

approved criteria. Persons have to be identified that are perceived to be neutral,

unbiased, morally good and just. Their role as mediators and facilitators in the

establishment of wetland management institutions needs to be strengthened.

7.2.1.7 Religious Leaders

Zur Heide (2012) and IFAD/EPLAUA (2007 b) underline the importance of

respected and influential religious leaders for community-based resource man-

agement. Churches offer a public arena for discussions and open expressions of

concerns.


7.2.2 Drawing on Conditions Facilitating the Governance

of Wetlands

The capability of local communities to respond to and self-organise in the face of

changes depends upon the characteristics of the resource system, the communities

themselves and external contextual factors. Taking into account the abilities of

some local groups to self-organise, to develop rules and to adapt in the context of

change, it can be assumed that established institutions can have a considerable

potential to contribute to a resilient social-ecological system. These abilities can

have important implications for the development and successful functioning of the

CBINReMP and the BR. Conservationists can build on positive examples of wetland

and fishery resource management in the region. In addition, local people who

ascribe meaning and values to wetland resources in terms of livelihood security

are motivated to preserve the resource base. Their strong ties to customary

mechanisms and procedures provide a good basis for local management and

conservation efforts. Charismatic leaders and thoughtful, knowledgeable persons

could facilitate collective action as well as the establishment and management of

a BR. They are vocal persons for two-way communication and networking.

7.2.3 Unequal Power Relations and Empowerment

Institutions are a reflection of the prevailing power relations within or between

communities (Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 637). Since powers are distributed un-

equally, the powerless often remain under-represented. Therefore, collective choice

arrangements need not necessarily be congruent with the local context and possi-

bly disregard critical conditions which eventually render management ineffective.

Unequal power distribution fosters implicit resistance of the more constrained

groups, which can in fact weaken and undo conservation efforts (see Holmes

2007).

Community-based management is all about empowerment. People sometimes

lack confidence in their capabilities and the “power within” them, i. e. a kind of

people’s self-understanding to shape their livelihoods. But “power within” is the

precondition for the “power to” actively transform and improve lives. Collective


action, i. e. the power exercised with other actors, potentially contributes to

the maintenance and enhancement of well-being ensuing from the utilisation

of wetlands. Collective action thus can lead to “power over” a resource and its

management (Rowlands 1997 in de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 37). Considering

these layers of power is essential for the empowerment of local people to manage

resources.

Power relations across and within different levels may often remain obscure in

their complexity. Efforts need to be undertaken to untangle this web of power.

Conservationists and political decision-makers need to respond to unequal power

distributions by facilitating the empowerment of (1) the weaker and under-

represented actors within communities and (2) local communities when asserting

claims against government agencies and other external actors. Challenging the

inequality of powers involves a willingness to share powers. Corruption which

erodes empowerment and joint action has to be curtailed.

7.2.4 Building Trust and Assurance

Trust is the cornerstone for collective action, partnership and collaborative manage-

ment. Groups and individuals who do not trust each other often fail to effectively

communicate and develop agreements (Agrawal 2001: note 14, 1666; Armitage

2008: 17). Thus community-based management and conservation projects require

trust-building. Confidence is based on people’s initial willingness to reinforce posi-

tive attitudes towards each other. It further originates from reciprocity, honesty

and the accountability of social actors, including project managers and conserva-

tionists. Trust-building involves open discourse and deliberation about equality,

equity, social issues and power distribution as well as the recognition of the value

of all actors and their perspectives.

Communication builds assurance about the willingness of wetland users to

contribute to the public good (Ostrom 2003: 247). Once this contribution is

warranted, accountability can be increased through joint and fair agreements.


7.2.5 Ensuring Participation

Arriving at collective choice arrangements requires the participation or repre-

sentation of all relevant stakeholders. The UNESCO (1996, 2008) calls for a

participatory management approach to involve local communities in the planning

and implementation of management procedures of BRs. Where participation is not

promoted internally, thoughtful external mediation is necessary, bringing actors

together to sit at one table. Participation should seek an active involvement of the

concerned stakeholders and a “self-initiated mobilisation” (Kumar 2002: 25) of

local people. It should emphasise the dialogue, the concertation of management

objectives and actions as well as negotiation (zur Heide 2012: 111).

7.2.6 Collaboration and Coordination

An integration of sectoral thinking through legislation, binding commitments for

cooperation and the signing of memoranda of understanding between various polit-

ical levels is essential to adopting standard guidelines for the use and management

of wetlands. Mandates for the management of and development interventions

in wetlands need to be clearly set. An overall responsibility should possibly be

assigned to EPA (Mesfin 2003: 84), EPLAUA and WoEPLAU, respectively.

An integration of the local and the external broader perspective on wetland

use and management could generate important synergies in terms of a successfully

functioning governance of wetland resources (see table 5.3, p. 73). Appropriate

mechanisms and methods (e. g. PRA, focus group discussions) have to be de-

veloped to identify and consider local people’s interests and needs concerning

wetland use and management, and to enhance the exchange between internal

and external management systems. An equal cooperation accrues from a full

recognition of local people as competent partners, as capable analysts of their

own situation and as agents of change.

Fabricius & Collins (2007) stress the importance of a “trialogue” (p. 94)

between local communities, scientists and government to the promotion of good

common-pool resource governance. The knowledge bridges between government

agencies and local people built by scientists could help to overcome the existing

knowledge gaps.


7.2.7 Recognising Legal Rights

Biosphere reserve vocal persons, project initiators and environmentalists need to

focus on and promote the legal recognition of local people’s rights to self-organise.

The legal recognition of collectively established local institutions should involve

the recognition of communal proprietorship to wetlands to ensure an effective

wetland management (especially within the BR buffer zone).

Berkes et al. (1989) and IFAD/EPLAUA (2007 b) state that customary reg-

ulations and local by-laws are often more effective to conserve common–pool

resources than governmental laws. Government agencies should acknowledge

the effectiveness of local regulations as well as their suitability and flexibility

to adapt to local conditions and changes. Occasionally, informal institutional

mechanisms reflect social actors’ interests better and thus need to be consid-

ered and incorporated into cross-scale management attempts (IFAD/EPLAUA

2007 b: 76). The importance of local institutions in controlling resource harvest

and management within the BR buffer zone has already been recognised by

conservationists (Gebrekidan & Teka 2006 a: 55).

Licencing of fishermen’s associations and the legal organisation into fishermen’s

cooperatives is believed to improve the control over illegal fishing and facilitates

the implementation of regulations and by-laws on fish resource conservation

(Gebrekidan & Teka 2006 a: 53).

7.2.8 Establishing, Implementing and Enforcing

Regulations

There are problems at various levels concerning the implementation and enforce-

ment of regulations. The top-down national and regional legislation is often not

properly implemented and enforced at the local level (IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b:

77). The formulation, implementation and enforcement of policies pertaining to

wetlands should therefore embrace bottom-up and top-down approaches and an

evaluation of the compatibility between government and community regulations.

Besides, national and regional policies with implications for the use and preser-

vation of wetlands need to be clearly communicated to woreda officials, kebele


leaders and local people to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

At the local level, by-laws and regulations need to be consistently implemented

and enforced. To this end, prevailing unequal power relations must be denoted

and more transparent and neutral decision-making structures introduced.

7.2.9 Monitoring User Behaviour and Ecological

Conditions

Failures and the incapability of WoEPLAU to monitor landholders’ compliance

with the land use obligations need to be addressed. In this regard, an increase in

trained personnel, financial means and equipment is necessary.

The more elaborated monitoring systems in Agid Kirigna and Gulash can

serve as examples for an organised community-based wetland management. Their

potentials regarding the management of the BR as well as the applicability and

transferability of their operating principles need to be explored.

In the future, more emphasis should possibly be placed on the monitoring

of biological and physical wetland conditions undertaken by scientists in co-

operation with local communities within the community-managed area or the

buffer zone. This could support the identification of sustainability indicators for

wetland management in the BR (see UNESCO 1996: 9–10). Local monitors

could also safeguard the core zone or seasonal area closures from illegal resource

appropriation.

7.2.10 Resolving Conflicts

Existing conflicts should be of particular concern and specifically managed. Other-

wise conservation attempts may be frustrated at their initial stages. The resolution

of conflicts becomes especially important when approaching the zonation of the

Lake Tana BR (p. 130). Adenew & Abdi (2005) recommend a clear guideline for

dispute resolution. Such a guideline could help to prevent and resolve conflicts over

access to and use of wetland resources. Given that local resolution mechanisms

are often ineffective, adequate (external) support needs to be provided. Capacity

building of local mediators and arbitrators could nip emergent conflicts in the


bud and improve the effectiveness of dispute resolution (Adenew & Abdi 2005:

27; Fabricius & Collins: 2007: 93). Besides, accurate information and provision of

legal documents and additional materials to arbitrators could help to adjudicate

on conflicts on a legal and transparent basis.

Conflicting interests between various sectors are to be addressed by enhancing

cooperation to harmonise objectives and strategies as well as by reducing overlaps

in jurisdiction.

7.2.11 Integrating Knowledge Pluralism and Ensuring

Information Exchange

Wetland management profits from innovation and dissemination of wetland

knowledge (Dixon & Wood 2001: 10–11). Knowledge that is collectively and

mutually developed and shared encourages an iterative learning process (Armitage

2008: 17) and therefore a management that is flexible and adaptive. Multi-level

governance of wetlands thus requires an integration of formal science and local

or traditional knowledge.

Mechanisms to better communicate acquired knowledge and to reach many

people need to be developed (see p. 74 in table 5.3, p. 73). The UNESCO

(1996) explicitly calls for on-site trainings and seminars for local people and

other stakeholders to allow for full participation in the planning, management

and monitoring of the processes that take place within the BR. Workshops and

trainings with mixed or individual wetland user groups could be undertaken

on-site to enhance understanding and raise awareness of the human-wetland

interdependence, to analyse different resource use regimes and to combine different

knowledge systems.

In the Illubabor zone, three methods of information exchange on wetland

management have been proven suitable by the staff of EWRP: First, PRA methods

have been applied, empowering local people to critically analyse their situation

and develop solutions to their wetland management problems. Information flow

has been three-directional: from farmers-to-farmers, from farmers to scientists and

from scientists to farmers. Second, farmer to farmer facilitated demonstrations of

sustainable wetland management have promoted the sharing of knowledge, the


exchange of information on project findings, the demonstration of appropriate

management techniques and the adoption of management recommendations.

Thirdly, the training-of-trainers method has enabled officials and experts to better

understand the ecology of wetlands, to identify proper use and management

practices and to prepare (draft) management plans (Hailu & Wood 2000: 14–17).

The training-of-trainers method has already been applied in the woredas under

investigation (personal communication: Sibhat). But it could be extended, even to

the regional governance level, thereby drawing on experiences from EWNRA and

EWRP. In order to continuously promote wise wetland management, follow-up

workshops and trainings need to be carried out.

With the provision of adequate support, concepts for environmental education

on wetlands for local school children, interested persons and other actors could be

created. Wetland days, excursions or workshops (on medicinal and useful plants,

birds etc.) could be accomplished by knowledgeable local people (see UNESCO

1996: 10).

7.2.12 Understanding Heterogeneity

Understanding “patterns of difference within communities [and] that actors within

communities seek their own interests in conservation programmes” (Agrawal &

Gibson 1999: 637) is demanding but immensely important and can decide over

the functioning of community-based management plans. Differences between

communities or ethnic groups determine the likelihood of collective action and

the establishment of effective institutions. However, the “concept of community

as shared norms and common interests” (Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 635) is still

present in the relevant literature (see IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b: 51)6.

In the case of Agid Kirigna, rather than integrating the Woito people in

collective fishery management, disintegration may be the more satisfactory solution.

The self-determination of the Woito fishermen and the confidence in their powers

6IFAD/EPLAUA (2007 b) define their concept of community as follows: “[A] community[. . . ] has common interests and pays unreserved efforts mutually to meet [its] communalneeds (p. 51).” Compared with the interests of other stakeholders, e. g. government bodies orconservationists, a community may appear as a homogeneous entity. At the intra-communitylevel, communities are rather heterogeneous (Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2010 c: 6).


could be enhanced by establishing an autonomous association. Collaboration,

negotiation and agreements about management between the Woito’s and the

community’s associations would still remain indispensable and fishery activities

would need to be coordinated. As can be seen here, wetland management requires

approaches that take account of the specific socio-cultural context.

7.2.13 Large or Small?

There is no straightforward answer whether a larger or smaller group of wetland

users is more conducive to successful collective action. The relationship between

group size and collective action likely depends upon many variables such as

the degree of excludibility, the interdependence among a wetland user group

or the heterogeneity of the group (Agrawal 2001: 1657–1658). Small groups

that are probably more homogeneous are often considered to be more successful

in natural resource management (IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b: 71). Given the large

extent of connected wetlands along the eastern lake side, a management approach

integrating a nested system of wetland user groups may be the most functional,

with the smallest units (village user groups or even sub-groups within villages)

being embedded in ever larger units (sub-kebeles, kebeles, possibly woredas).

Cross-level interactions and an efficient information system then have to be

developed to ensure collaboration.

The Ramsar Convention Secretariat (2010 b) suggests dividing large wetlands

into contiguous zones. Each zone is managed according to a separate management

plan that complies with the overall plan. The concept of nested systems is

applicable to this zoning approach. Ostrom (2009 a) proposes that a “moderate

territorial size is most conducive to self-organisation” (p. 420) since large territories

increase management costs and smaller ones do not produce substantial resource

flows. The most appropriate size of user groups and wetland zones is likely found

through trial and error and further social-ecological research.


7.2.14 Delineating Wetland Boundaries: Remarks on a

Zonation Proposition

A first draft of a zonation concept for the Lake Tana BR was proposed based

on the expertise of scientists and the opinions of other relevant stakeholders

(zur Heide 2012: 130). This concept suggests including primary wetlands and

river mouths into the core zone and secondary wetlands (i. e. seasonally flooded

agricultural land and wetlands of the Fogera floodplain) into the buffer zone

(figure 7.2, p. 131). River mouths must be closed during the spawning season

(July to October) to allow for the reproduction of fish species (ibid.: 134–135).

Declaring the primary wetland in Tana Kirkos, the Gumara and Ribb river

mouths a core zone will require strenuous efforts to strictly protect these areas

(see EPLAUA 2007: 60 in zur Heide 2012: 130) given the high external pressure,

unsolved boundary disputes and unregulated resource access. Besides, the river

mouths, being the entry to the lake, serve as an infrastructural connection.

It is proposed that the whole periphery of Lake Tana, i. e. 500 m from the

lake shore outwards, should be protected. “To the minimum farming practices

within this [zone] must be prohibited” (zur Heide 2012: 136). Since recession

farming and wetland cultivation in the lake’s periphery contribute to food security

and small-holders’ well-being, resistance to conservation can be anticipated. This

prohibition may further raise discussions between various stakeholders about the

question of where the ‘shore’ of the lake begins. Given that resentments and

resistance are likely, a deliberate and prudent proceeding by conservationists

and officials is highly important. Furthermore, agricultural growth and water

development projects in the region (see figure 7.2, p. 131), market developments

and related land use and environmental changes increase pressure on wetland

ecosystems. Multi-sectoral and cross-scale cooperation is significant to reducing

adverse ecological ramifications. Likewise, alternative livelihood options which

are compatible with the management objectives of the buffer zone have to be

provided for local communities (see p. 132).

Ideally, the registered wetland boundary matches with the outer border of

the buffer zone. This would reduce confusion about different zones. Besides,

communal land boundaries may be more clearly identifiable by local people (cf.


FogeraFloodplains

Figure 7.2: Zonation Proposal for a Lake Tana Biosphere Reserve. Primary wetlands and rivermouths within the research area are indicated with red circles and kebeles included in theresearch study with black circles. Source: modified after zur Heide 2012: 133


Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2010 b: 33). During registration of wetlands and

demarcation of the buffer zone, the participation of local stakeholders should be

sought to reduce conflicts.

7.2.15 Providing Incentives and Livelihood Opportunities

Creating incentives for continuous sustainable wetland management and con-

servation is essential (Fabricius & Collins 2007: 90; UNESCO 1996: 8). This

includes incentives to act in favour of an optimal collective outcome of resource

appropriation rather than to maximise individual benefits.

Sustainably managed and conserved, wetland ecosystems contribute to the

protection of ecosystem services, locally and globally, and thus to biodiversity

conservation (and hereby to the objectives of the CBD), retention of water

resources or mitigation of climate change (and hereby to the objectives of the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). Lasting incentives

for the conservation of the wetlands east of Lake Tana could be provided through

the payment for ecosystem services (see Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2010 d:

39; UNESCO 2008: 26), notably for increased carbon sequestration (see Fabricius

& Collins 2007: 86–87), but also sediment and nutrient retention (Barbier et

al.: 1997). Long-term attempts to register these wetlands as recognised carbon

offsetting projects should also be taken into consideration. A condition is that

benefits be equitably shared among local people.

Furthermore, potentials for the regional or international certification of organic

agriculture, fisheries or organic honey production should be explored (see IFAD

2007: 42, 45). Developing a regional certificate label for the Lake Tana BR could

serve as an identification mark, support product marketing and raise the degree

of public recognition. Organic produce could be sold to the tourist destination

centres like Bahir Dar at the southern tip of Lake Tana or Gonder in the north

(see figure 7.2, p. 131).

The land administration and use legislation speaks about “granting encourag-

ing reward[s]” (Regulation No. 51/2007: §38) and a “motivating prize for the

landholders and users who perform exemplary activities in land conservation and

environmental protection” (Proclamation No. 133/2006: 20(4)). The lack of the


capacity of the respective woreda administration offices might not have permitted

awarding good agricultural and best practices. It could be very encouraging for

farmers to reinforce this mechanism in future.

To raise commitment of LAC members to their voluntary work and to en-

sure that land registration is undertaken properly, rewards should be introduced

(IFAD/EPLAUA 2007 b: 65).

The restriction or prohibition of resource utilisation within the BR needs to

be compensated by developing alternative means of livelihood for local people

(see UNESCO 1996: 8). Options and opportunities have to be created, addressing

the various stakeholder groups individually (e. g. women, young, landless, poorer

households). Generally, the diversification of livelihoods as well as the modernisa-

tion and specialisation of agriculture is hoped to result in declining pressures on

wetland ecosystems (see p. 73). Sound tourism along the eastern lake side (see

zur Heide 2012: 88–89), combined with the marketing of traditional handicrafts

and organic food production can provide lasting livelihood opportunities for local

people7.

Compensation payments should at least be taken into consideration by woreda

authorities and the conservation community in case wetland protection requires

the expropriation of farmland (see Proclamation No. 455/2005). This of course

may involve controversies about the legitimacy of customary laws on access to

wetlands and recession farmlands.

Figure 7.3, p. 134 provides an overview of the important features and enabling

conditions of an effective common-pool resource management. Though listed

separately, the features and conditions are mutually dependent.

The last section of this chapter makes concluding remarks on the resilience of

human-wetland systems.

7Tourism is already an important sector in Amhara. Most of the tourist destinations arecultural attractions. Wetlands are identified as potential natural tourists attractions (zur Heide2012: 88–89). Through an integration of natural sites, local communities could benefit fromthe existing tourism.


Networking across scales

Ensure local participationCommunity-

based wetland & buffer zone

management

Untangle the web of powers

Recognise & enhance the abilities of local people to self-organise

Empowerment

Building trust and assurance

Merge sectoral thinking

Combine local and external perspectives and knowledge

of wetland management

Cooperative monitoring of BR zones and outcomes of

the CBINReMP

Clear guideline forconflict resolution

Vertical & horizontal information exchange

Consider group heterogeneity

Manageable wetland anduser group size

Provide incentives &livelihood opportunities

Integrate all relevant stakeholders in management

Take account of the interests of the more constrained groups

Explore the applicability of existing monitoring systems

to BR management

Willingness to share power

Figure 7.3: Features of adaptive, multi-level governance, conditions enabling a successfulcommon-property resource management and recommendations that should be considered whenestablishing the BR and the CBINReMP. Source: own compilation

7.3 Alteration of Wetlands – Risk or Chance for

Rural Livelihoods?

Resource overuse and continuous degradation have often curtailed the abilities

of wetlands to absorb disturbances and to retain their structure and functions.

This has entailed severe implications for biodiversity (see Appendix 6, p. XXIV)

and human livelihoods. Degraded wetlands are no longer capable of providing

ecosystem services. On the other hand, these services are instrumental to achieve

well-being and to maintain and enhance the capabilities of local communities.

The loss of resilience increases people’s vulnerability8 to external shocks and

trends such as flooding, land scarcity or unemployment by reducing their ability

8 With Chambers (1989 in Devereux 2001: 508–509) “vulnerability [. . . ] refers to exposureto contingencies and stress, and difficulty in coping with them. Vulnerability has thus two sides:an external side of risks, shocks and stress to which an individual or household is subject; andan internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damagingloss”.

7.3. ALTERATION OF WETLANDS – RISK OR CHANCE? 135

to cope with or adapt to these changes, shocks or stress. Vulnerability can be

reduced by preserving wetlands to maintain people’s capabilities to mitigate, cope

with or adapt to adverse impact. These capabilities include the cultivation of

wetlands in times of risk, dry season wetland grazing, the water availability during

drought years, income generation or the prevention and mitigation of flooding

damage.

To ensure benefits in the future, wetland resources need to be used and

managed wisely. Sustainable wetland management involves an assessment of the

carrying capacity of the respective wetland and an examination of the current

institutional systems for their compatibility with the resource system characteristics

(Abbot et al. 2000: 28–29).

What has to be kept in mind is that different use regimes and approaches of

conservation management may sustain the livelihoods of the different wetland

users for different time periods. The question whether the alteration of wetlands

poses a risk to rural livelihoods or rather enhances well-being can likewise be

transformed into the question: Is the conservation of wetlands a risk to or a

chance for local people?

Dixon & Wood (2001) and Wood (2003) raise concerns that the conservation

and designation of wetlands as protected areas result in increased food insecurity

and poverty. The promotion of sustainable wetland use practices and restrictions

on access to wetlands may benefit the privileged and better-off community

members. Inasmuch as wetland users are unequally susceptible to changes, they

might also be unequally susceptible to use restrictions and prohibitions. I. e. the

heterogeneous users differ in their ability to buffer shifts in use regimes and to

re-organise themselves in accordance with conservation objectives. Landless and

poorer people are the most vulnerable stakeholders and less capable of a flexible

response to conservation measures and use restraints.

It becomes an indispensable prerequisite for any conservation attempt to re-

spond to poverty, marginalisation and unequal power distribution as components

of the social and political dimensions of sustainability. Inescapable questions per-

taining to the equality and equity of conservation measures have to be addressed,

e. g.: Who can assert which claims based on what legal and moral grounds? How to

allocate benefits? How to distribute costs and risks associated with conservation?


An integrated, multi-level, adaptive and flexible wetland management approach

can help answering these questions and pave the road to successful wetland

management. If the CBINReMP and the Lake Tana BR embrace such an approach,

they can become a chance for the local people whose livelihoods depend upon

wetland resources.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Methods of Participatory Rural

Appraisal, Group Discussions

The following overview presents the application purposes of the PRA methods, the

relevant PRA participants and the application procedure. These procedures are a

manual to the application of the PRA methods. Changes of the implementation as

well as omissions of single steps and questions were occasionally made in adaption

to the situation in the field. Additional questions arising during the discussions

are not part of the manual. Action guidelines, instructions or personal leaflets are

indicated in italics.

Resource Map

Purpose Land/wetland use/cover, wetland use change, wetland management,

food security, constraints to resource use, land tenure, resource use conflicts

Participants Men, women, kebele leaders, DAs

Procedure

1. Could you please show/draw your village and the surrounding? [Drawing of

the map]

2. What are the major resources and where are they to be found? [Show major

resources in the map]

I

II APPENDICES

3. Can you show me: soil type and fertility, vegetation, wetlands, water, water

bodies, rivers, irrigation sources, irrigation and drainage channels, cropping

pattern (fallowing, crop rotation, kinds of crop), productivity, land uses and

ownership, seasonal changes in land use, agricultural development measures

(soil and water conservation), markets, towns, bigger villages

4. Discussion

(a) How did you make use of the land in the past?

(b) How will you probably make use of the land in future? Will there be

significant changes? What will these changes be?

(c) Do you think you use the resources of your land efficiently?

(d) What hinders you from using the resources efficiently?

(e) Do you think that the resources of this land will last for a long time?

(f) What could be done to enhance food production?

(g) Are there any conflicts in the way you make use of the land?

Trend Analysis

Purpose Land/wetland use change/history, impact on livelihoods, perception

of change

Participants Community members, kebele leaders, woreda officials

Procedure

1. Have you perceived any changes of your environment?/Has the land on/in

which you live changed over time?

2. What has changed? [Initial discussion, followed by detailed mapping. Write

the landmarks and aspects on cards and arrange them in a matrix on the

ground]

3. What are the major changes? [Scoring/scaling using numbers or seeds

placed below the table rows]

APPENDIX 1 III

4. Which change has the greatest/least, a positive/negative impact on your

livelihood? [Scoring/scaling using numbers or different seeds placed below

the table rows]

5. Discussion

(a) What are the causes for the major changes?

(b) Who will be affected by wetland use changes?

(c) Who benefits from these changes?

(d) Why do some people benefit? Why do others not benefit?

(e) Will your children benefit from the land use changes?

(f) Do you see the future trend positive or negative? Why?

(g) What do you think, which impact does the changes have on wetlands?

(ecology: plants, animals, soil moisture)

Cause Effect Diagram

Purpose Land/wetland use change and its drivers, effects of wetland alteration

Participants Male/female groups

Procedure

1. Have you perceived any changes of your environment during the last

years?/You are living near this wetland. Have you perceived any changes in

the way the wetland looks like?/ In what way did you make use of the land

in the past and how do you make use of it today?

2. What has changed? [Listing changes on cards. Interview relevant cards

specifically]

(a) Is the land use change a positive or negative change? [Listing land

use changes on cards using different colours]

IV APPENDICES

(b) What are major/minor land use changes? [Ranking of land use

changes]

3. What are the causes for the land use change? [ Choose the two or three

major changes. Write the causes for the major changes on cards. Ask par-

ticipants to show linkages and interplay of drivers]

(a) Which cause is the most/least serious? [Scoring/scaling with numbers

or seeds etc.]

(b) Why is this cause the most/least serious one?

4. Which effects do these land use changes have on

(a) your livelihood? [Write the effects on cards]

(b) wetlands/communal land (ecology: plants, animals, soil moisture. . . )

[Write the effects on cards. Ask the participants to link the effects]

(c) Which effect is the most/least serious one? [Scoring/scaling with

numbers or seeds etc.]

(d) Why is this effect the most/least serious one? [Impact chain]

5. Discussion

(a) Who benefits from the changes?

(b) Why do some people benefit? Why do others not benefit?

(c) Will the causes in future become more or less severe? What are the

reasons for this?

(d) Will your children benefit from the (land use) changes?

(e) Do you think that the resources of this land will sufficient in the

future?

(f) How could negative land use changes be prevented?

(g) How could positive land use changes be promoted?

(h) How could negative impacts of land use change on your livelihood

more adequately be addressed?

APPENDIX 1 V

(i) What do you do in order to cope with changes? [Livelihood strategies]

(j) What do think about wetland conservation? How could it affect your

life? Which effect could it have on the wetland ecosystem?

Impact Diagram

Purpose 1 Perception of wetland conservation and management, values of

wetlands, impact of wetland conservation and management on livelihoods

Participants community members

Procedure

1. Which services does the wetland provide to you? [List services/uses on

cards]

2. Now imagine, the wetland would be closed or the use restricted. Would it

still provide services to you? Would you still value the wetland? [Draw a

card with ‘area closure’ and ‘restricted use’]

3. How would the way the wetland is used today change? Which activities

would be restricted and prohibited? [Link the cards ‘area closure’ and

‘restricted use’ to the cards ‘services/uses’ if services can still be provided

and activities undertaken]

4. Which impact would area closure or restricted use of wetland resources

have on

(a) your livelihood?

(b) the wetland ecosystem?

5. Discussion

(a) Would a life be possible without using wetland resources?

(b) Which assets wetlands provide to you could not be obtained any

longer?

VI APPENDICES

(c) For the sake of wetland conservation, could you imagine to use the

resources in a restricted manner and according to agreed rules and

regulations (e. g. seasonal area closure, restricted harvest of resources,

using only certain wetland species)?

Purpose 2 Livelihood strategies, land use change

Participants Women, men separately, woreda officials, DAs

Procedure

1. Have you perceived any changes of your environment during the last years?

2. What has changed? [List changes]

3. In what way did you make use of the land in the past and how do make

use of it today?

(a) Is the land use change a positive or a negative one? [Listing land use

changes on cards using different colours]

(b) Do the changes of your environment have any impact on the way you

make use of the land today? [Linking changes adding + or – above

the arrows]

4. What impact do the (land use/environmental) changes have on your life?

[Listing impacts]

(a) Is it a positive or negative impact? [Write the impacts on cards of dif-

ferent colour. Put the cards on the floor. Ask the participants whether

they see any connections or linkages. Ask for impact chains if the par-

ticipants do not come up with it]

(b) Which impact on your life is the most serious one? [Ranking the

impacts on livelihood]

5. How do you cope with this change? [Put the most serious changes in the

middle. List the strategies on cards]

APPENDIX 1 VII

(a) What is the most/least important/effective livelihood strategy that

you apply? [Arrange the cards around the card ‘change’ and rank the

strategies according to their importance]

6. Discussion

(a) Why do you apply the mentioned strategies?

(b) Why is strategy x the most/least important/effective one?

(c) What happens if people in the community cannot afford the means

necessary for adaptation/coping?

(d) Is it easy for you to cope with these changes in your life?

(e) Why is it (not) easy?

(f) Do you think that environmental and land use changes will occur in

future?

(g) Considering future trends of environmental change, will it be easy for

you to cope with these changes? Why or why not?

Well-Being Ranking

Purpose Identification of well-being groups, conceptions of well-being, good

life and development, visions, livelihood strategies

Participants community members, young people separately

Procedure

1. Do you think, you live a ‘good life’?

2. If you say, you live a good life, then what is good in your life?/ If you say,

you do not live such a good life, then what is not good? [List]

3. Think about a life which is good for you. How does a good life look like?

[List]

VIII APPENDICES

4. Are there people within your village that use smaller or larger sizes of land?

How huge is their land? [Name the well-being categories (groups) in terms

of landholding size]

5. On which assets and strategies does the well-being of all groups depend?

(E.g. land holding, quality of land, availability of water for irrigation, livestock

ownership, quality of food, availability of labour, dependence on other

income sources, kinds of the produced crops, production of cash crops,

quality of house (roof, floor, construction material), children attending

school, quality of clothes, health status, social status, reputation within the

community) [List the assets and strategies (criteria). Ask the participants

whether they want to add other criteria]

6. To which assets/capitals do the different well-being groups have access

and upon which strategies do they depend most/least? [Circles of different

shapes. The larger the circle, the better the well-being group has access

to an asset or the more the livelihood of a well-being group depends upon

the strategy.]

7. Discussion

(a) How do you wish to live?

(b) Do you believe that your wishes and visions become true?

(c) What are the constraints which hinder you from fulfilling your wishes

and visions?

(d) What does ‘development’ mean to you?

(e) What should be developed?

(f) Which livelihood strategies do you apply?

Venn Diagram

Purpose Perception of organisations, programmes, projects, government bodies

etc.

APPENDIX 1 IX

Participants Community members (women and men), kebele leaders, woreda

officials

Procedure

1. Are there organisations, programmes, projects etc. which you perceive as

positive?

2. What are they? [List them on cards]

(a) Can you put the organisations etc. in an order? Those perceived as

positive on top and those perceived as less positive below. [Arrange

the cards in an order (the organisations perceived as most positive

on top). Write the organisations etc. on circular papers (the bigger

the circle, the higher the rank, i. e. the more positive the experience).

Place them around a centre (community/village/office)]

3. What are the positive/negative experiences you made with the organisations

etc.?

4. Is the cooperation between you and the organisations etc. good/successful?

[Rank according to the success of the cooperation. Place the organisations

with that a more fruitful cooperation exists closer to the centre circle and

the ones with a less successful cooperation further away from the centre]

(a) Why is the cooperation between you and the organisations etc. (not)

good/successful?

5. Which organisations etc. do closely work together? [Place these organi-

sations etc. that work closely together near to each other. The degree of

overlap indicates the degree of interaction]

6. Discussion

(a) How could cooperation between you and organisations and among

organisations etc. be improved?

(b) What do you think about self-organising community issues?

X APPENDICES

(c) Do local organisations exist which manage wetland resources?

(d) Which regulations (by-laws, prohibition, permission, restriction. . . ) for

the management of wetlands do exist?

Pair-Wise Ranking and Seasonal Diagram9

Purpose Values of wetlands, conflict (wetland conservation vs. use), causes

and consequences of these conflicts, livelihood options

Participants Community members, young people separately, kebele leaders,

DAs, woreda officials

Procedure

1. Which services do wetlands/communal land provide to you/the people?/How

do you/people make use of the land? [List services/uses on cards (2x).

Arrange them in a matrix]

2. Which service is the most beneficial to you? [Discussion on this is-

sue/ranking possible with heterogeneous group?]

3. Do the ways you make use of the land conflict with each other? [Compare

the various aspects in the matrix with one another]

4. During which months of the year do the conflicts arise? [Prepare a time

line with 13 months. Depict the conflicts and their durations]

(a) What are the causes of the conflicts?

(b) Will the particular cause x continue to exist in the future?

5. Discussion

(a) Do the conflicts influence your life?

(b) How do you respond to the conflicts?

9The seasonal diagram was applied only once and was then omitted due to the enormousexpenditure of time. It is not listed under the PRA methods in chapter 4.

APPENDIX 2 XI

(c) Do you try to solve the conflicts? How?

(d) What do think about wetland conservation (e. g. area closure, restricted

use of resources)? Would conflicts arise? How would it affect your

life? Which effect would it have on the wetland ecosystem?

Group Discussion with the Fishermen’s Association in Daga

1. Why do you fish?

2. When and for what purpose was the fishermen’s association established?

Who can become a member of the association?

3. Which fishery rules and regulations have been established?

4. Which fishing practices/techniques do you apply?

5. Which problems occur related to fishing?

Appendix 2: Catalogue of Interview Questions

The following catalogue of interview questions was used as a guideline through

various interviews. The catalogue was subdivided in several topics of research

interest. The respondents that were considered to be of relevance are listed.

Questions which spontaneously emerged during the conversations are not included.

Land Administration

Respondents BDU, EPLAUA, WoEPLAU (Dera, Fogera, Libo Kemkem),

EWNRA

1. Could you provide me with a short overview of Ethiopia’s land tenure

history?

2. Land (re)distribution:

(a) Which effect does (re)distribution of land have on (1) rural livelihoods

and (2) the use and management of natural resources?

XII APPENDICES

(b) How do people perceive frequent land (re)distribution?

(c) Is the (re)distribution a potential source of conflict within the com-

munity, between different resource user groups?

3. Land registration and certification:

(a) Have registration and certification been accomplished in ANRS and

the research sites, specifically?

(b) Have temporary/primary/secondary certificates been issued? How

many?

(c) When was registration undertaken?

(d) Which land surveying techniques were applied?

(e) Have communal lands/wetlands/recession farmland been registered

and certificates been issued?

(f) Who keeps the certificates of communal land?

(g) Have wetlands/recession farmlands been registered as communal or

private holding?

(h) Is there any difference between wetlands and communal lands?

(i) Which problems occurred during registration?

(j) Which factors constrain the registration and certification of wetlands?

(k) Which effects does certification have on (1) tenure security, (2) natural

resource conservation, (3) communal lands, (4) wetlands?

(l) How do farmers perceive land titling?

4. Conflicts:

(a) What are the conflicts about? (Land and resources use, access con-

flicts)

(b) Who are the social actors involved in these conflicts? Who is affected?

(c) What are the consequences of the conflicts for the social-ecological

system?

APPENDIX 2 XIII

(d) How to manage these conflicts? What has been done to settle the

conflicts?

5. Land use obligations:

(a) Are landholders aware of land use obligations?

(b) Have land use obligations been effectively implemented?

(c) Has the implementation been enforced and evaluated by responsible

administrative bodies?

6. Does the government permit recession agriculture?

7. Have land use plans been developed? If not, what constrains the development

of land use plans?

8. Buffer zone:

(a) Have buffer zones been designated along the lake side?

(b) Who is responsible for the designation of buffer zones?

(c) For what purpose are buffer zones delineated?

(d) Which habitats/ecosystems/areas of high conservation value should

be part of the buffer zone?

9. Landless:

(a) In which way do woreda/regional governments address the problem of

landless people?

(b) Which role do group rights play?

(c) Which role do youth associations play?

10. Has there been a discussion on community or associative ownership of land?

11. “Reclaim existing wetlands” (Water Sector Strategy, MoWR 2001: 4).

“From an environmental point of view, it is interesting that the Strategy in-

cluded a call to ‘reclaim existing wetlands’ by drainage and other means, but

not for their conservation or the protection of wetland values” (MoWE 2010:

3-8). Are wetlands considered a source of productive land for distribution?

XIV APPENDICES

12. How much tax is paid for landholding (annual rural land use payment)?

Wetland Management Institutions

Respondents Wetland experts (BDU), youth association members, DAs, re-

gional/woreda officials (WoEPLAU), fishery expert, EWNRA

1. Are there any local institutions (especially east of the lake) that regulate

wetland resource use and management around Lake Tana?

(a) Which specific regulations and by-laws have been enacted locally?

(b) Do these local institutions effectively conserve wetland resources?

(c) What can be done to strengthen local institutions?

(d) What can be done to facilitate the establishment of local institutions?

(e) Are there any plans to facilitate the establishment of local institutions?

2. National/regional policies with implications for wetland management:

(a) Which national/regional policies affect wetland use and management?

(b) In what way do they affect wetland management?

(c) Is there any wetland policy?

3. Wetland management plan:

(a) Is there any wetland management plan?

(b) How is/will the management plan (be) designed? (plans for specific

wetlands, by-laws enacted, community-based, alternative livelihood

options. . . )

(c) Should local/traditional knowledge be integrated into wetland man-

agement projects?

(d) Which steps have to be taken to create wetland management plans?

(e) How to deal with cultural and behavioural constraints to change when

adopting a wetland management plan?

APPENDIX 2 XV

Human-Wetland System: Changes, Drivers, Ramifications

Respondents Wetland experts (BDU), fishery experts, EPLAUA, WoEPLAU,

ARARI, BoCTPD, BoARD, WoARD, BoWE, WoWE, EWNRA, Rural Road Office

Libo Kemkem, TaSBO

1. [Generally: ask for social-ecological information about wetlands in the re-

search sites.]

2. Which land use changes have been detected around Lake Tana, specifically

along the eastern lakeside?

3. Which implications does wetland conservation have for the livelihoods of

local people?

4. Which role do wetlands and recession farmlands play for food security?

5. Have wetlands and recession farmlands been managed according to custom-

ary law?

6. Conflicts:

(a) Which conflicts arise over wetland resources, their appropriation and

management?

(b) Who are the actors involved in these conflicts?

(c) Which stakeholders assert claims to wetland resources and manage-

ment?

(d) Which consequences do these conflicts have for (1) people’s livelihoods,

(2) wetland ecosystems, (3) future management options?

(e) How could conflicts be resolved?

7. Which are the wetland species indicating different use regimes and anthro-

pogenic influences?

8. Are wetlands used as a source of water for irrigation?

XVI APPENDICES

9. Does sedimentation encourage recession farming and wetland conversion

more than wetland grazing?

10. “From an environmental point of view, it is interesting that the Strategy

included a call to ‘reclaim existing wetlands’ by drainage and other means,

but not for their conservation or the protection of wetland values” (MoWE

2010: 3-8). Does the government promote the cultivation of wetlands?

What are the governments’ perceptions on wetlands?

11. Impact of human activities on wetlands:

(a) Flooding:

i. Which impact does flooding have on wetlands?

ii. What are the causes of flooding?

iii. In which way does hydropower generation influence the flooding

regime of Lake Tana?

(b) Which impact do grazing and wetland cultivation have on the ecosys-

tem?

(c) Water development projects:

i. Which impact do the large-scale irrigation and drainage projects

(Megech, Jamma, especially Ribb and Gumara) and other water

development projects have on wetlands?

ii. Which projects have been accomplished/are under plan-

ning/construction?

(d) Rice cultivation:

i. When was rice introduced in the kebeles of the research site?

ii. Which impact does rice cultivation have on wetlands?

iii. Which factors have constrained rice cultivation?

(e) Which impact does sand mining in Agid Kirigna have on wetlands?

i. Is sand mining legal (licensed) or illegal in Agid Kirigna?

ii. In how far is the rural roads office engaged in these activities?

APPENDIX 2 XVII

Fisheries

Respondents Fishery experts (ARARI, woreda officials)

1. Bahir Dar Number One Fishermen’s Association:

(a) What is the Bahir Dar Number One Fishermen’s Association?

(b) How is the association organised?

2. Have local fishermen’s associations been licensed, legally recognised or

supported by the government?

3. Do you know something about the joint fishermen’s association in Agid

Kirigna (between the Woito and other communities)?

4. Fisheries regulation:

(a) Are there legal/local regulations for the utilisation and conservation

of fish resources?

(b) What are the instructions, restrictions, prohibitions etc. of these rules

and regulations?

(c) Are local people aware of the regulations?

(d) Which factors constrain an effective implementation and enforcement

of the regulations?

(e) Is fishing prohibited during the spawning season?

5. Fish species:

(a) Which species are most commonly caught?

(b) What are their characteristics (habitat, feed, spawning time etc.)?

6. Are market conditions favourable for fishermen?

7. Which measures need to be taken to enhance the conservation of fishes?

8. Is there any correlation between the intensity of fishing and flooding?

XVIII APPENDICES

Appendix 3: Codes

The codes that were used for analysis in ATLAS.ti are presented in table 8.1,

p. XVIII.

Table 8.1: List of codes used for analysis

General codes

“Numbers”; Access; Cause; Constraints; Definition; Government; Location; Perception;

Policy; Power; Trends; Values

Wetland use/land use and environmental change

Crop production; Encroachment; Fishing; Flood; Land use/ environmental change; Recession

Farming; Rice cultivation

Land administration

Land (re)distribution; Land registration and certification; Land tenure; Land use planning;

Tenure security

Conflict

Conflict; Conflict Resolution

Management and conservation

Conservation; Management; WL/CL10 conservation; WL/CL management

Impact on livelihood

Adverse impact on livelihood; Positive impact on livelihood

Livelihood

Endowment; Food security; Livelihood strategies; Income source; Vision

Actors

Landless; Social actors

Recommendation

Recommendation; Recommendation deduced; Recommendation from expert; Recommenda-

tion from within

Appendix 4: Well-Being Ranking

Figure 8.1, p. XIX and figure 8.2, p. XX depict the matrices of two well-being

ranking sessions. The sizes of the circles indicate (1) the well-being groups (large

10WL wetland, CL communal land

APPENDIX 5 XIX

circle: upper well-being group, medium circle: middle well-being group, small

circle: lower well-being group, smallest circle or cross: landless) and (2) the degree

to which well-being groups have access to capitals or depend upon livelihood

strategies (larger circles indicate better access to capitals or greater dependence

on livelihood strategies).

Assets/LivelihoodStrategies

Soi

l fer

tility

Cro

p va

rietie

s

Clo

ths

Hea

lth

Qua

lity/

quan

titly

of

hou

ses

Chi

ldre

n at

tend

ing

scho

ol

Mig

ratio

n

Inco

me

from

Euc

alyp

tus

Dep

enda

nce

on o

ther

in

com

e so

urce

s

No.

of c

hild

ren

Siz

e of

land

hold

ing

Well-being groups

Upper

Middle

Lower

Landless

Figure 8.1: The matrix drawn during a well-being ranking with women of the lower and middlewell-being group. Photograph: Springsguth, M.

Appendix 5: Responses to Livelihood Insecurity

Devereux (2001) makes a distinction between the following responses to livelihood

insecurity: (1) ex-ante risk mitigation and (2) ex-post coping strategies including

XX APPENDICES

Upper

Middle

Lower

Landless

Well-being groups

Assets/Livelihood Strategies C

loth

s

Hea

lth

Mig

ratio

n

No.

of c

hild

ren

Qua

lity

food

Fish

ing

Res

pect

& re

puta

tion

with

in th

e co

mm

unity

Figure 8.2: The matrix drawn during a well-being ranking with (landless) youth. Photograph:Springsguth, M.

coping with and adaption to risk. Mitigation aims at reducing risks in advance,

e. g. through choosing certain agricultural techniques or crop varieties. Coping

strategies are short-term responses to a risk. Adaptation refers to strategies which

have been incorporated into the normal behaviour (Devereux 2001: 511–512). He

further points to the importance of social networks “for assistance in times of

need” (Devereux 2003: 513).

Zoomers (1999, in de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 39–40) distinguishes four

categories of livelihood strategies11: (1) Accumulation strategies involve the

11Zoomers (1999, in de Haan & Zoomers 2005: 39–40) does not simply call these strategiesintentional or unintentional. Rather she found that the success of farmers is not so muchdetermined by strategic actions than by structural components, such as location, seasonality or

APPENDIX 5 XXI

establishment of “a minimum resource base” (p. 39) and a preparation for the

expansion in future. (2) Consolidation strategies are applied to stabilise well-being

and for short-term quality improvement. (3) Compensatory strategies serve the

survival in cases of sudden shocks. (4) Security strategies include e. g. livelihood

diversification and off-farm employment.

Table 8.2, p. XXI below provides an overview of the responses to livelihood

insecurity, tries to categorise the strategies and social groups as far as possible and

indicates the outcomes for rural livelihoods. Strategies are classified according to

(1) Devereux (2001) and (2) Zoomers (1999, in de Haan & Zoomers 2005). This

has pragmatic reasons: The literature on vulnerability, resilience and sustainable

livelihoods is more often familiar with the terms used by Devereux. However,

Zoomers’ approach is very well applicable to this research work.

Table 8.2: The responses of different social actors to livelihood insecurity

Response Strategies Social Actors12 Outcome

Rice cultivation Adaptation; accu-

mulation, consoli-

dation

All well-being

groups (8:8)

Food security, in-

come (also when

faced with flooding)

increased

Apply fertiliser, com-

post, herbicides, irriga-

tion (4:42)

Adaptation; con-

solidation

N/A Increase productivity,

food security

Fishing Adaptation; se-

curity, accumula-

tion

Landless, Woito

(26:17; 53:9;

54:9)

Food security, in-

come maintained or

increased

Coping; compen-

satory, security

All local residents

(8:38; 12:46;

15:45)

Food security, in-

come during flood-

ing ensured

Bying fodder (18:54) Coping, adap-

tation; compen-

satory, consolida-

tion

N/A Investment to keep

livestock (also dur-

ing flood)

household characteristics. Her categorisation comprises both intentional and structural elements.12For the classification of well-being groups, see p. 47.

XXII APPENDICES

Response Strategies Social Actors Outcome

Leaving livestock with

relatives for payment

(6:16; 15:26)

Coping, adap-

tation; compen-

satory

Livestock farm-

ers with social

networks

Secure household

savings (during

flooding)

Selling of cattle (15:26) Coping; compen-

satory

Livestock farmers Reduce expenses

for fodder, income

obtained

Change cattle breed

(56:12)

Adaptation; accu-

mulation

Livestock farmers Reduce expenses for

fodder

Protect settlement

(house construction on

hills, elevating house-

hold items with poles,

pile leaves) (12:34;

EWRDM: 55:21)

Coping, adap-

tation; compen-

satory

All flood-prone

households

Securing tangible

goods during flood-

ing

Food rationing (12:39) Coping; compen-

satory

All local residents Survival in times of

flooding and during

the dry season

Displacement Coping; compen-

satory

Flood-prone

households,

woreda officials

(12:18; 18:19;

EWRDM: 55:9)

Maintaining liveli-

hood, survival

Using Tanqua, con-

tainer, swimming

(12:34; EWRDM:

55:21)

Coping; compen-

satory

All flood-prone

households

Movement during

flooding ensured

Using a boat (15:31;

EWRDM: 55:21)

Coping; compen-

satory

Upper well-being

group

Movement during

flooding ensured,

receive payments

from people without

a boat, e. g. for the

transportation of

sick persons

Wooden bridge con-

struction (EWRDM:

55:21)

Coping; compen-

satory

Communities Movement during

flooding ensured

APPENDIX 5 XXIII


Informing regional level

(EWRDM: 55:8)

Coping; compen-

satory, security

Woreda officials Disaster risk man-

agement

[Supporting measures

(e. g. granting contin-

gency funds)]

Coping; compen-

satory

Woreda officials Disaster risk man-

agement (55:11)

Children living with rel-

atives to attend nearby

school (13:19)

Adaptation; con-

solidation

Middle to upper

well-being groups

with social net-

works

Education ensured

Alternative income

sources (beer brewing,

handicrafts, cloth de-

signing)

adaptation; se-

curity, accumula-

tion

Landless

(women), lower

well-being group

(women) (8:15)

Income ensured,

maintained or in-

creased

Rent land from rich

(upper well-being group,

Woito)/sharecropping

(23:6) 13

Coping, adap-

tation; security,

accumulation

Landless, lower

well-being group

(8:8)

Crop production,

food security en-

sured

Lend money from rich Coping, adap-

tation; security,

accumulation

Landless, lower

well-being group

(8:15; 16:8)

Investments

Migration (Bahir Dar,

Hamusit, Humera in

Tigray) (2:7)

Adaptation; se-

curity, accumula-

tion

Landless, lower

well-being groups

(8:6), youth

(15:26, 15:46),

Woito (23:31)

Income and food

security ensured,

increased

Day labour/employed

by richer farmers (2:7;

7:33)

Adaptation; se-

curity, accumula-

tion

Landless, lower

well-being group

(16:8)

Income ensured

Sand mining Adaptation; se-

curity, accumula-

tion

People in Agid

Kirigna, church

(21:13)

Income during the

dry season ensured

13According to IFPRI/CSA/EDRI (2006), the proportion of small-holder landholdings that is

rented in the kebeles of the research area is one of the highest in Ethiopia, ranging from 16%

to more than 20%.

XXIV APPENDICES


Assigning group rights

for land use 14

Adaptation; accu-

mulation

Groups of land-

less and young

(> 18 years)

(54:13)

Food security and

income ensured

Association/group

membership

Adaptation;

accumulation,

consolidation

Fishermen in

Tez Amba, Agid

Kirigna

Resource manage-

ment

Farmers Purchase of costly

goods such as water

pumps (6:22)

Adaptation; se-

curity, accumula-

tion

Landless Representation in

land issues and ac-

cess to resources

Appendix 6: Land Use/Cover Changes in the

Research Area

The land use/cover maps are based on satellite images of February 1986 and

2001, and January 2011 (dry season). Remarkable are the decline in wetland and

grassland in favour of cultivated land/settlements, and the land use dynamics

along the littoral zone.

14According to Proclamation No. 133/2006 §2(19) and §10 landholders can be groups. In

Kab kebele, for example, communal lands were distributed to groups of landless and young

older than 18 years with the consent of the communities. These groups comprise 30 to 73

members, and collectively cultivate rice (54:13). Assigning groups rights is a strategy reducing

land fragmentation and resource degradation (Deininger et al. 2007: 20).

APPENDIX 6 XXV

TM

W

N

TA

K

Figure 8.3: Land use/cover in 1986 in the research area. TM Tanametsele, W Wagetera, NNabega, TA Tez Amba, K Kab. Source: modified after Sibhat, B. (2012)

XXVI APPENDICES

TM

W

N

TA

K


APPENDIX 6 XXVII

TM

W

N

TA

K


XXVIII APPENDICES

Appendix 7: Overview of the Impact of

Anthropogenic Activities on Wetland Ecosystems

According to Gebrekidan (2006 b), “major threats to the long-term ecological

integrity of Lake Tana and its associated wetlands [can be] summarised into

four main categories” (p. 47): (1) alteration of ecosystems leading to habitat

fragmentation and loss, (2) species loss, (3) loss of genetic diversity and (4) intro-

duction/invasion of exotic species. Anthropogenic activities immensely contribute

to these processes.

The conversion and long-term cultivation of wetlands is seen to be the most

destructive interference with the ecosystem. It results in a complete destruction

of vegetation (ARARI: 41:24), in biodiversity and habitat loss as well as habitat

fragmentation (see Institute of Biodiversity Conservation 2005: 18). Drained

wetland soils lose their capacity to reabsorb water (Tekaligne 2003: 8). They are

exposed to rapid decomposition and mineralisation (Tegene & Hunt 2000: 25).

The increase in numbers of fishermen, more efficient methods and fishing

in times of reproduction and migration result in a decline of fish populations

(11:1; 52:10; ARARI: 41:7, 41:17, 41:29; BoARD: 32:4; Getahun et al. 2008:

3). Flooding events, in part human-induced, increase pressures on fish stocks

and wetlands (9:11; 18:12; ARARI: 41:33), inhibit vegetation growth and lead to

habitat loss (Tekaligne 2003: 87).

Livestock grazing is associated with the destruction of vegetation, a shift

in species composition, soil compaction and erosion (Hailu 2003: 46). Wetland

vegetation is also cut and trampled by cattle in order to disturb breeding grounds

for disease vectors and pathogenic agents (6:17; Wondefrash 2003: 28).

Sand mining activities in Agid Kirigna result in the degradation of the lake shore

(Gebrekidan & Teka 2006 a: 26–27). Local people mentioned that larger-scale

sand mining activities destroyed arable land and wetland pastures (21:15).

An increased sediment load of wetlands “reduces the penetration of light and

hence primary productivity [and] can have abrasive effects on aquatic organisms,

especially fish” (Tekaligne 2003: 88).

The release of chemicals and fertiliser into Lake Tana may result in eutroph-

APPENDIX 8 XXIX

ication and, consequently, in algal bloom and loss of biodiversity (ibid.: 88).

Development projects in the “Growth Corridor” (MoARD 2010: 7) of Amhara

such as the Ribb Irrigation and Drainage Project aim at an intensification of

agriculture. The targeted growth of the agricultural sector involves the application

of fertilisers, pesticides and other chemicals and may adversely affect water quality

(ibid.: 10, 17; MoWE 2010: 5-37) and wetland ecosystems (BDU: 40:10; EWNRA:

28:8; cf. 22:10). It is further assumed that water development measures (e. g.

dam construction, hydropwer generation) alter the water balance of Lake Tana

(MoWE 2010: 6-23–6-24) and thereby of wetland ecosystems.

Appendix 8: Biosphere Reserves

The Sevilla Strategy states that a BR should include areas in which human-

environment interactions are critical, e. g. (degraded) wetlands (UNESCO 1996:

7). BRs are established within and recognised by the UNESCO Man and the

Biosphere Programme (ibid.: 16). The Statutory Framework of the World Network

of Biosphere Reserves defines BRs as areas of terrestrial and/or coastal/marine

ecosystems (ibid.: 16, Article 1), designed as places for the reconciliation of

social and economic development with the conservation of natural and cultural

landscapes.

This reconciliation is achieved by combining the three functions BRs should

meet, i. e. the conservation of biodiversity, sustainable development and logistic

support (learning, research and demonstration) (ibid.: 16, Article 3). An integrated

zoning approach tends to link the three functions to each of the three zones

that a BR should contain (UNESCO 2008: 16). The core zone(s) of a BR

serves protecting biodiversity, non-destructive research and indirect uses (such as

education). The clearly defined buffer zone(s) is contiguous to or surrounds the

core zone. Within the buffer zone only those human practices are allowed which are

in line with conservation objectives (like environmental education or ecotourism).

The transition zone is characterised by sustainable resource appropriation and

management (e.g. agriculture, industry, settlement) (ibid.: 4, 17, Article 4(5)).

XXX GLOSSARY

Glossary

Berbere Mixed spices traditionally used in the Ethiopian

cuisine

Cut-and-carry system The making of hay by cutting (wetland) plant

species and carrying the hay to the homestead

Derg The military socialist regime in Ethiopia ruling from

1975 to 1991

ETB e 1 = 24.09 ETB (Ethiopian Birr), as of 29th De-

cember 2012

Gesho Rhamnus prinoides, a kind of “local hop” used to

brew beer

(Green) Book of Hold-

ing or Land Holding

Certificate Book

Certificate issued to the farmer indicating his/her

landholding, fertility, present use of the parcels

and the responsibilities of the land holder(s)

(SARDP/EPLAUA/ORGUT 2010: 6–7; Regula-

tion No. 51/2007: §21)

Injera The traditional pita, originally produced from teff

flour

Kebele/sub-kebele The lowest administrative units. The kebele admin-

istrative committee consists of a chairman, vice

chairman, economic head, judicial head and a sec-

retary (Abbot et al. 2000: 14).

Kiremt The main rainy season between June to September

Land Registry Book Contains all the data of a landholding and is kept

with the woreda land administration and LAC of-

fices

Recession agriculture The cultivation of the shore zone of Lake Tana

during the dry season

Tanqua Small fishing boat made from papyrus

Woito An ethnicity that has traditionally been living from

the lake’s resources

GLOSSARY XXXI

Woreda A lower administrative unit, comparable to a dis-

trict

Selbststandigkeitserklarung

Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich die anliegende Diplomarbeit mit dem Thema:

“The Impact of Land Administration and Common-Pool Resource Management on

Wetland Utilisation along the Eastern Shore of Lake Tana, Ethiopia. Alteration of

Wetlands – Risk or Chance for Rural Livelihoods?” selbststandig verfasst habe und

keine anderen Hilfsmittel als die angegebenen verwendet habe. Die Stellen, die

anderen Werken dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinne nach entnommen sind, habe ich in

jedem Fall durch Angabe der Quelle, auch der Sekundarliteratur, als Entlehnung

kenntlich gemacht.

Berlin, den Maxi Springsguth

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