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The Impact of Audit Quality on Firm
Performance: Evidence from Malaysia
Hamed Sayyar
International Business School
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia
June 2015
Background
• FP-> Stakeholders (Harrison and Wicks, 2013)
• FP-> Crisis and Scandals (Yap et al., 2014)
Crisis,
Scandals
Stakeholders,
Investors,
Users
Firm
Performance
Hypothesis Development
H1: There is a significant relationship between audit fees
and firm performance.
H2: There is a significant relationship between audit firm
rotation and firm performance.
Methodology
Initial population (companies) 980
Financial industries (40)
uncompleted data (398)
Total sample 542
Research Model
� (Eq.1) FP = β0 + β1LNAFEE + β2LEV+ β3LNASSET +
β4SG + B+ ε
�(Eq.2) FP = β0 + β1AUDROT+ β2LEV+ β3LNASSET +
β4SG + B+ ε
� (Alali, 2011; Brooks et al., 2013; Fooladi and Shukor, 2012; Stanley,
2011; Wang and Huang, 2014).
Results
variable mean median min max Skewness kurtosis
AFEE (RM) 43949.610 26000 500 1900000 10.731 176.195
LNAFEE 10.240 10.166 6.215 14.457 0.362 4.502
AUDROT 0.063 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.594 13.915
ROA 0.024 0.031 -1.758 1.272 -4.507 61.579
TQ 0.636 0.426 0.005 8.589 4.588 32.531
LEV 0.393 0.385 0.004 0.975 0.237 2.405
LNASSET 12.741 12.591 0.046 18.452 0.044 7.581
SG 0.106 0.070 -0.991 1.976 1.318 7.583
B 1.012 0.985 -2.585 3.987 0.371 4.401
DE 0.946 0.627 0.004 8.959 3.033 15.676
Descriptive statistics
Results
Variable LNAFEE AUDROT ROA TQ LEV LNASSET SG B
LNAFEE 1
AUDROT -0.035** 1
ROA 0.091*** -0.059*** 1
TQ 0.005 -0.007 0.276*** 1
LEV 0.17*** 0.0127 -0.097*** -0.212*** 1
LNASSET 0.578*** -0.082*** 0.218*** -0.021 0.239*** 1
SG -0.005 -0.007 0.161*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 1
B 0.090*** -0.003 -0.089*** -0.113*** 0.095*** 0.144*** 0.006 1
correlation matrix
Results
Variable
ROA TQ
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Intercept-0.170 0.583
(-8.78)*** (4.78)***
LNAFEE-0.005 0.037
(-2.1)*** (2.57)***
LEV-0.094 -0.810
(-11.75)*** (-16.03)***
LNASSET0.023 0.009
(17.32)*** (1.01)
SG0.052 0.150
(11.68)*** (5.33)***
B-0.024 -0.131
(-8.61)*** (-7.41)***
N 5420 5420
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.107 0.062
Adj R-squared 0.106 0.061
Multivariate regression for audit fee and ROA model
Results
Variable
ROA TQ
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Intercept-0.194 0.802
(-13.9)*** (9.11)***
AUDROT-0.018 -0.002
(-2.71)*** (-0.05)
LEV-0.094 -0.804
(-11.75)*** (-15.91)***
LNASSET0.022 0.021
(19.19)*** (2.94)***
SG0.053 0.146
(11.82)*** (5.19)***
B-0.024 -0.131
(-8.61)*** (-7.39)***
N 5420 5420
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.108 0.060
Adj R-squared 0.107 0.059
Multivariate regression for audit firm rotation and ROA model
Results
AFEE AUDROT
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF
LNASSET 1.58 0.634 LNASSET 1.09 0.917
LNAFEE 1.51 0.662 LEV 1.07 0.936
LEV 1.07 0.936 B 1.03 0.975
B 1.03 0.975 AUDROT 1.01 0.992
SG 1.01 0.99 SG 1.01 0.993
Mean VIF 1.24 Mean VIF 1.04
Multicollinearity test for firm performance model
Results
Breusch-Pagan or Cook-Weisberg test
Ho: Constant variance
Reject H0 if p-value is significant
ROA TQ
LNAFEE
chi2(1) 2247.65 27.74
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
AUDROT
chi2(1) 2258.93 19.22
Prob > chi3 0.000 0.000
Heteroskedasticity test
Results
Wooldridge test
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation
Reject H0 if p-value is significant
ROA TQ
LNAFEEF( 1, 541) 17.897 31.873
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
AUDROTF( 1, 541) 17.676 32.318
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Serial correlation
Results
Variable LAGROA LAGTQ Variable LAGROA LAGTQ
Intercept-0.113 0.287
Intercept-0.106 0.618***
(-5.69)*** (2.34)** (-7.36)*** -6.96
LNAFEE0.001 0.0572
AUDROT0.002 0.038
-0.57 (3.97)*** -0.27 -0.91
LEV-0.0683 -0.679
LEV-0.0682 -0.672***
(-8.27)*** (-13.36)*** (-8.26)*** (-13.21)
LNASSET0.0132 0.015
LNASSET0.0137 0.0344***
(9.48)*** (1.71)* (11.81)*** -4.8
SG0.0401 0.048
SG0.04 0.041
(8.7)*** (1.69)* (8.68)*** -1.46
B-0.0216 -0.161
B-0.0216 -0.161***
(-7.48)*** (-9.04)*** (-7.48)*** (-9.01)
Adj R2 0.0515 0.0497 Adj R2 0.0514 0.0471
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and * are significant at p<0.10.
Endogeneity
Results
ROA TQ
Variable
OLS Robust GLS OLS Robust GLS
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(z-statistics)
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(z-statistics)
Intercept-0.170 -0.170 -0.170 0.583 0.583 0.583
(-8.78)*** (-7.720)*** (-8.78)*** (4.780)*** (4.210)*** (4.780)***
LNAFEE-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.037 0.037 0.037
(-2.100)** (-2.050)** (-2.10)** (2.570)*** (2.430)** (2.5700)**
LEV-0.094 -0.094 -0.094 -0.810 -0.810 -0.810
(-11.75)*** (-8.610)*** (-11.75)*** (-16.03)*** (-13.6)*** (-16.01)***
LNASSET0.023 0.023 0.023 0.009 0.009 0.009
(17.32)*** (9.260)*** (17.33)*** (1.010) (0.700) (1.010)
SG0.052 0.052 0.052 0.150 0.150 0.150
(11.68)*** (7.080)*** (11.69)*** (5.330)*** (5.070)*** (5.330)***
B-0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.131 -0.131 -0.131
(-8.61)*** (-6.370)*** (-8.62)*** (-7.410)*** (-5.71)*** (-7.41)***
Adj R2 0.106 0.11 - 0.061 0.062 -
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and * are significant at p<0.10.
Additional regression estimators for Audit fees and firm performance model
Results
ROA TQ
Variable
OLS Robust GLS OLS Robust GLS
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(z-statistics)
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(t-statistics)
Coefficient
(z-statistics)
Intercept-0.194 -0.194 -0.194 0.802 0.802 0.802
(-13.90)*** (-7.71)*** (-13.91)*** (9.110)*** (6.750)*** (9.110)***
AUDROT-0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-2.710)*** (-1.72)* (-2.710)*** (-0.050) (-0.060) (-0.050)
LEV-0.094 -0.094 -0.094 -0.804 -0.804 -0.804
(-11.75)*** (-8.55)*** (-11.76)*** (-15.91)*** (-13.34)*** (-15.92)***
LNASSET0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021
(19.190)*** (10.47)*** (19.20)*** (2.940)*** (2.020)** (2.940)***
SG0.053 0.053 0.053 0.146 0.146 0.146
(11.820)*** (7.170)*** (11.830)*** (5.190)*** (4.950)*** (5.190)***
B-0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.131 -0.131 -0.131
(-8.610)*** (-6.35)*** (-8.620)*** (-7.390)*** (-5.690)*** (-7.390)***
N 5420 5420 5420 5420 5420 5420
Adj R2 0.107 0.11 - 0.059 0.060 -
*** are significant at p<0.01, ** are significant at p<0.05 and * are significant at p<0.10.
Additional regression estimators for audit firm rotation and firm performance
Implications�In a relation to audit quality the findings of
this study provide a guideline for companies
in terms of the extent to which the rotation
of audit firm can affect firm performance.
The result of this research also can be useful
for regulators to consider to issuing
mandatory audit firm rotation to enhance
auditors independence
Conclusion
Recommendation
�This research recommended for future
studies investigate other proxies of audit
quality and examine that how firm
performance can be influences by other
proxies of audit quality such as industry
specialist auditors and type of audit firm.
Conclusion