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By: Dr John Dennis (Project lead) and Dr Simon Kelly
The identification of sources of information concerning food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (Q01R0025)
Report to Defra, Food Authenticity Branch
March 2013
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Contents
Page 2
About the Authors Author 1 details Dr John Dennis worked for the MAFF Food Science Laboratory, The Central Science laboratory and Fera for 35 years. He was formerly the Head of the Food Science Group and a founder member of the FSA‟s Working Party on Food Authenticity and is currently Chairman of its Methods Sub-Group within Defra. He gained his degree in Biological Science and PhD in Chemical Science at the University of East Anglia. Dr Dennis is a Chartered Fellow of the Royal Society and has been a member of a number of National and European Committees and advisory groups. Author 2 details Dr Simon Kelly is a research leader in stable isotope analysis and food authentication within the Food and Environmental Safety Programme at Fera. He gained his degree in Chemistry from Anglia Polytechnic in 1992 and completed his PhD in the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia in 2002, where he now holds an honorary lectureship. Dr Kelly is a Chartered member of the Royal Society of Chemistry and member of the Editorial Board of the journal „Food Chemistry‟. He has acted as a consultant to the joint Food and Agriculture Organisation/International Atomic Energy Agency‟s Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture. Simon has been involved in applying isotope ratio mass spectrometry to Food Authentication since 1992.
Table of Contents Executive Summary .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
1 Background to project......................................................................................................9
1.1 Definitions and legal framework ......................................................................................................................... 9 1.2 Categories of fraud .......................................................................................................................................... 10
1.2.1 Smuggling ............................................................................................................................................. 10 1.2.2 Deliberate mislabelling ........................................................................................................................... 10 1.2.3 Substitution ............................................................................................................................................ 10 1.2.4 Adulteration ........................................................................................................................................... 11 1.2.5 Tipping................................................................................................................................................... 11
1.3 Social and economic context ........................................................................................................................... 11 1.4 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 12
2 The challenge of gathering information on the incidence of food fraud at national, European and
international levels ........................................................................................................ 13
2.1 Context ............................................................................................................................................................ 13 2.2 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 16
3 Methods for gathering data .......................................................................................... 17
3.1 Direct contact with local and central Government agencies in the UK, Europe and Internationally ................... 17 3.1.1 UK Food Standards Agency - Food Fraud Task Force ........................................................................... 17 3.1.2 The UK Food Surveillance system (UKFSS) .......................................................................................... 17 3.1.3 European Institutions ............................................................................................................................. 19 3.1.4 International Institutions ......................................................................................................................... 19
3.2 Media .............................................................................................................................................................. 19 3.3 Retailers .......................................................................................................................................................... 18 3.4 Other food authenticity and quality laboratories in the public and private sector............................................... 19
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Contents
Page 3
3.5 Consumer groups ............................................................................................................................................ 19
4 Levels and trends in food and beverage fraud ........................................................... 20
4.1 National information ........................................................................................................................................ 20 4.1.1 Data from the FSA‟s Food Fraud Task Force ......................................................................................... 20 4.1.2 The UK Food Surveillance system (UKFSS) .......................................................................................... 21
4.2 Information from the European Union .............................................................................................................. 22 4.2.1 Information from EU customs seizures ................................................................................................... 23 4.2.2 European Anti-Fraud office (OLAF) ........................................................................................................ 24 4.2.3 Origin of counterfeit food and drinks products entering the EU ............................................................... 25 4.2.4 Directorate General for Competition policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). ............... 26 4.2.5 Eurostats Comext database ................................................................................................................... 26 4.2.6 European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) ................................................................... 29 4.2.7 Categories of food and beverage products seized by EU customs ......................................................... 28 4.2.8 European Union‟s Joint Research Centre (DG- JRC, Ispra, Italy) ........................................................... 28 4.2.9 European Food control laboratories ....................................................................................................... 29
4.3 Information from International sources ............................................................................................................. 31 4.3.1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)...................................................... 31 4.3.2 Greg Noonan (Food and Drug Administration, USA) - Authenticity in Food, US Perspective .................. 32 4.3.3 The Anti-Counterfeiting and Product Protection Program (A-CAPPP) Michigan State University (USA) 32 4.3.4 Stan Bacler (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, CFIA) - Food Authenticity Testing Programmes ......... 33
4.3.5 Dr Paul Dansted (New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry NZ-MAF) - Food Assurance .......... 33
4.3.6 Shirley Abrantes (Brazilian National Institute of Quality Control in Health, INCQS) - Authenticity in food – what does this
mean to Brazil? ..................................................................................................................................................... 33
4.3.7 Veronica Torres Leedham (National Health Service and Agri-Food Quality, SENASA) - Authenticity in food – what does this
mean to Argentina? ............................................................................................................................................... 33
4.3.8 Wongkwan Jitnupong (Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Khonkaen University, Thailand, FVM-KU) - Authenticity in Food –
what does this mean in regional perspective?..................................................................34
4.3.9 Isoforensics (USA)...............................................................................................................................37
4.4 Media .............................................................................................................................................................. 34 4.4.1 Television broadcasts ............................................................................................................................ 34 4.4.2 Internet .................................................................................................................................................. 34
4.5 Trade press ..................................................................................................................................................... 34 4.6 Consumer groups ............................................................................................................................................ 39
4.6.1 Which? .................................................................................................................................................. 39 4.7 Trade Associations .......................................................................................................................................... 39
4.7.1 Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) ............................................................................................ 39 4.8 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 36
5 Other areas ..................................................................................................................... 37
5.1 Categories of food and beverage products identified from other sources ......................................................... 37 5.2 Health effects relating to counterfeit food and beverages................................................................................. 37 5.3 Estimates of Economic Effects of food and beverages fraud ........................................................................... 38
5.4 References.....................................................................................................................................................44
6 Horizon Scanning – Continued and emerging food authenticity issues ................. 40
6.1 Counterfeit spirits and illicit spirit drink production ....................................................................................... 40 6.2 Counterfeit wine ......................................................................................................................................... 40 6.3 Meat and Bone Meal/ Processed Animal Protein (MBM/PAP) ..................................................................... 41 6.4 Pineapple and pomegranate juice ............................................................................................................... 41 6.5 The declared geographical origin of meat ................................................................................................... 41 6.6 Manuka honey and other honey authenticity issues .................................................................................... 42 6.7 Sustainable palm oil origin .......................................................................................................................... 42 6.8 Illegal fishing and fraud along the fish supply chain. ................................................................................... 42 6.9 Vanilla and other food flavours ................................................................................................................... 43 6.10 Spices (e.g. mustard and saffron) ............................................................................................................... 43 6.11 Botanical source of acetic acid in Balsamic vinegar .................................................................................... 43 6.12 Melamine alternatives giving a high „apparent‟ protein content in foods ...................................................... 44
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Contents
Page 4
6.13 Hydrolysed leather protein in milk ............................................................................................................... 44 6.14 Palm sugar authenticity .............................................................................................................................. 44 6.15 Authenticity of Halal food products .............................................................................................................. 45 6.16 Organic food authenticity ............................................................................................................................ 45 6.17 Internet purchasing of speciality foods ........................................................................................................ 46 6.18 Gross crude adulteration ............................................................................................................................ 46 6.19 Food irradiation .......................................................................................................................................... 46 6.20 References ................................................................................................................................................. 48
7 Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................... 49
7.1 References ................................................................................................................................................. 50
8 Other sources cited ....................................................................................................... 58
8.1 Additional sources consulted.....................................................................................................................59
9 Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 59
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Executive Summary
Page 5
Executive Summary
1. This project was undertaken in response to a Food Standards Agency Research Requirement to identify
sources of information on food fraud (Requirement Reference: Q01R0025; RRD31: programme Q01 – Food
Authenticity; Issued: Wednesday 30 June 2010). During the assessment and commissioning phase of the
proposals the Food Authenticity Branch (FAB) moved to Defra and the research was subsequently
commissioned as Defra project FA0104.
2. This project identified 35 principal sources of information ranging from individual companies, trade
associations, consumer groups, and private-sector laboratories, enforcement agencies through to inter-
governmental bodies such as the EU, OECD and the FAO. Some information sources contained multiple
point sources of information such as private sector laboratories. The information was gathered by direct
communication with these organisations or through publicly available data provided on web-sites or
databases. There were several organisations that did not respond to our enquires.
3. The challenge of detecting and assessing the risk of food fraud and adulteration is that it ranges from the
very real threat of international commodity issues to bogus „locally produced‟ claims at a farmer‟s market.
The size and breadth of the potential issues means that identifying a single source of information is
extremely challenging.
4. The scale of global trade in counterfeit products was estimated at 5-7% by the World Customs Organisation
(WCO) in 2004. Of this approximately $49 billion was accounted for by counterfeit food and beverages. By
comparison, the size of the counterfeit food market in the UK was estimated at £7 billion per annum by the
consumer group Which? in 2008. They suggested as much as 10% of the food on sale in retail markets and
foodservice was not as described.
5. In the UK, the Food Standards Agency‟s Food Fraud team provides a coherent and well established route to
the reporting and collation of incidences of food fraud, on their National Food fraud database, through
various different information sources, such as Trading Standards, the Police and other government
departments such as Defra FAB. Dissemination through „FSA Intelligence briefs‟ is also highly effective
dissemination route for stakeholders.
6. The UK Food Surveillance system (UKFSS) is a national database that records results of all food and feed
samples, submitted for analysis and/or examination by official control laboratories on behalf of UK local
authorities and port health authorities. Closer examination of the database revealed that there is the
possibility for Government to run a search report that could be used on a frequent basis to monitor LA
enforcement activity in the Food Authenticity area.
7. The collation and dissemination of food fraud information on a European and international level is not well
defined. There are several players at this level including OLAF, DG TAXUD, JRC, OECD, DG
ENVIRONMENT, FAO, WCO and so on. However, the European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed
(RASFF) can be readily searched on categories such as „adulteration‟ and „fraud‟ to obtain information
entered by the relevant National competent authorities.
Key messages
There is a clear difference between the number and type of food authenticity and food fraud
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Executive Summary
Page 6
cases detected and reported by the enforcement community in the UK and the frequency
and breadth of issues investigated by private sector laboratories around Europe. There is a
significant information and intelligence gap in this area that is derived from insufficient
information sharing between the food industry and the enforcement community leading to
undetected food fraud in the UK.
There is also a technology gap between the methodologies made available through the LA
Public Analyst and the leading analytical food authenticity research establishments. This
means the most up to date methods are not always available and/or LAs are not aware of
the techniques on offer in the fight against food fraud and food adulteration.
The adulteration of food is driven by economic incentives and is not malicious in the vast
majority of cases. However, the associated risks to public health should not be overlooked.
Recommendations
1. Put in place a system to make UK Enforcement Officers aware of the latest technology to fight food fraud
(e.g. FSA/Defra workshop on recent advances in food authentication at TSO and EHO annual conferences).
2. Establish a European network of competence for analytical techniques in food authentication, on a
commodity basis, so that the latest technology and appropriate expertise can be readily accessed. This
would be analogous to the appointment of National Reference Laboratories for food authentication as with
for example pesticide, veterinary drug, dioxin, and heavy metal analysis. The appointed food authenticity
NRL could also train PAs in the relevant technology when appropriate.
3. Seek funding from the Commission‟s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation for a COST action
(European Cooperation in Science and Technology) to initiate an anti-food fraud intelligence network, at the
European level. Once established this AFFI network could seek to establish international links at all levels
between enforcers, practitioners, government bodies and consumer protection organisations. Its aim would
be to disseminate information through a specific food fraud alerting service to all relevant international
stakeholders and could be linked into existing systems such as RASFF.
4. The FSA‟s Food Fraud Team and Defra‟s Food Authenticity Branch should forge links with the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration‟s „Pathway to Global Product Safety and Quality‟. The FDA, in close partnership
with its foreign counterparts, plans to assemble global coalitions of regulators dedicated to building and
strengthening the product safety net around the world. With these coalitions, FDA intends to develop a
global data information system and network in which regulators worldwide can regularly and proactively
share real-time information and resources across the global market place.
Key messages
The key to consumer protection is the rapid sharing of information and intelligence about
suspected and actual incidence of food fraud and adulteration between the food industry and
the enforcement community, without prejudice. Partnerships between government and trade
associations should facilitate information sharing and enforce laws and regulations.
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Executive Summary
Page 7
Introduce a system of „horizon scanning‟ of emerging food fraud issues by examining
correlations between commodity prices and links with levels of fraud and differences between
production and traded volumes. This would be a move towards a proactive rather than
reactive intelligence led system of detection of food fraud and would be highly desirable. This
links with recommendations for the requirements of a system covering EFSA’s mandate for
automatic scanning of the Eurostat Comext database. Such a system should provide alerts to
the users, indicating for example i) significant increase of the volume of a given product over
time to a specific MS or EU in total ii) new trade partners iii) new food or feed commodities
entering the EU.
Whilst commodity adulterant or commodity specific analytical tests are useful, high
throughput non-targeted screening methods are the key to moving towards a proactive rather
than reactive national analytical food authentication system and have implications for food
defence.
Recent opinion suggests that organised crime syndicates are increasingly behind cases of
food fraud and adulteration. Consequently, the detection and prevention of food fraud
requires strategic planning and investment within both local and central government with an
appropriate and sustainable budget.
Frequently identified issues
1. Illegal imports of meat
2. Counterfeit spirit drinks
3. Illegal re-dating of food
4. Missing health declaration certificates
5. Counterfeit alcoholic spirits
6. White fish substitution
7. Fruit juice extended with added water and sugar, especially pineapple and pomegranate
8. Addition of nitrogen rich chemicals to food to increase the apparent protein content
9. Addition of cheap sources of sugar to honey
10. Mis-description of meat origin
11. Free range egg mis-description
12. Industrially produced vanillin described as natural vanilla from beans in ice cream and dairy
products such as yoghurt
13. Extra virgin olive oil quality and origin
Emerging food fraud and authenticity issues
1. Geographical origin of liquid egg
2. Meat from animals fed on meat and bone meal/processed animal protein (MBM/PAP)
3. Fruit juice authenticity
4. Counterfeit wines
5. The declared geographical origin of meat e.g venison
6. Fish species mis-description
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Executive Summary
Page 8
7. Illegal fishing and fraud along the fish supply chain.
8. Manuka honey and other honey authenticity issues
9. Sustainable palm oil origin
10. Extra virgin olive oil and other speciality single seed vegetable oils
11. Vanilla and other food flavours
12. Origin and quality of spices (e.g. mustard and saffron)
13. Botanical source of acetic acid in Balsamic vinegar
14. Melamine alternatives giving a high „apparent‟ protein content in foods
15. Hydrolysed leather protein in milk
16. Palm oil authenticity
17. Palm sugar authenticity
18. Authenticity of Halal and Kosher food products
19. Organic food authenticity
20. Internet purchasing of speciality foods
21. Gross crude adulteration
22. Food irradiation
23. Counterfeit spirits and illicit spirit drink production
24. Counterfeit wine produced from cane and maize alcohol
25. Coffee and chocolate origin
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Section 1: Background to project
Page 9
1 BACKGROUND TO PROJECT
Food fraud and mis-description has been an important issue for the Food Standards Agency since
its inception and has been a key issue for public protection since historical times. The Strategic Plan to
2010 had a specific aim to “improve consumer protection from food fraud and illegal practices”. To meet
this objective a Task Force was set up to identify key priorities. The Task Force identified that improved
intelligence gathering and better sharing of information between food enforcement agencies is a vital
element in the control of food fraud.
The challenge of detecting and assessing the risk of food fraud is that it ranges from the very real
threat of international commodity issues such as melamine in Chinese formula milk to a bogus organic
claim on a greengrocer's blackboard. The size and breadth of the potential issues means that identifying
a single source of information is extremely difficult. The sources of information may stretch from
individual companies or trade associations through to inter-governmental bodies such as the EU.
1.1 Definitions and legal framework
The Overarching EC requirements intended to ensure consumers are not misled are the Food
Labelling Directive 2000/13, Article 2, which requires that food labelling must not mislead the purchaser
to a material degree, particularly:
(i) as to the characteristics of the foodstuff and, in particular, as to its nature,
identity, properties, composition, quantity, durability, origin or provenance,
method of manufacture or production.
Furthermore, information provided on the label or in presentation of a food must not be false or
misleading, under Article 16 of Regulation (EC) 178/2002 and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,
2005/29/EC.
In the United Kingdom these provisions are currently implemented by the general requirements of
the Food Safety Act 1990 and the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. The Food Safety Act 1990 makes it an
offence for anyone to:
(i) sell, to the purchaser‟s prejudice, any food which is not of the nature,
substance or quality demanded (section 14);
(ii) give or display a label1 with any food sold, or publish or be party to the
publication of an advertisement, which falsely describes the food or which is
likely to mislead as to the nature, substance or quality of the food (section 15);
(iii) sell, offer or expose for sale, or have in possession for the purpose of sale any
food the presentation2 of which is likely to mislead as to its nature, substance
or quality (section 15).
The terms “nature”, “substance” and “quality” are not defined in the Food Safety Act 1990. It is
considered that the origin of a food could, in certain circumstances, be relevant to its nature, substance
or quality and will therefore be relevant to the offences described above. Origin is defined in Codex and
WTO rules as the „place of last substantial change‟. Furthermore, Labels must be clearly worded to
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Section 1: Background to project
Page 10
avoid contravening laws on false and misleading labelling and voluntary information on origin may be
displayed providing that it is accurate or not misleading.
The UK Food Standards Agency states food fraud has occurred “..when food is deliberately placed
on the market, for financial gain, with the intention of deceiving the consumer”.
UK Food Standards Agency
www.food.gov.uk/enforcement/workwithenforcers/foodfraud/
The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) defines economically motivated
adulteration (EMA) as “the fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a product for
the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost of its production”.
1.2 Categories of fraud
Counterfeiting and fraud in the food and beverages sectors can be characterised in a number of
ways, including the following:
• Smuggling
• Deliberate mislabelling
• Substitution (i.e. of product or ingredient)
• Adulteration (e.g. Addition of water to meat products to increase weight)
• „Tipping‟ Refilling branded spirit bottles with inferior products
1.2.1 Smuggling
Smuggling becomes attractive when price differentials are large across national boundaries
caused by different currency valuations or tax policies. This is most common in relation to high value
spirits but also occurs with any category of food or drink where price differentials occur.
1.2.2 Deliberate mislabelling
Deliberate mislabelling is possibly the commonest method to misrepresent a product. It is much
simpler to reproduce packaging, labelling, the trademark and general appearance of a product being
substituted than to physically reproduce the product as the latter procedure requires much greater
sophistication and specialist equipment for production.
Deliberate mislabelling is used to defraud the consumer by imparting the impression that the
product is of higher quality/nutritional value than is the case. A higher price can thus be charged than
would otherwise be possible. Mislabelling is involved in all categories of fraud in which counterfeiting is
involved.
1.2.3 Substitution
Substitution refers to the replacement of a product ingredient by another cheaper ingredient that
may or may not reduce the overall quality of the product. It may also involve the substitution of one
product for a cheaper product. The motive is to increase the apparent value of the product or reduce its
cost of production. Products most amenable to counterfeiting are those that are simplest to replace with
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Section 1: Background to project
Page 11
passable substitutes not easily detectable by the consumer. Common examples include substitution of
cheap bulk tea for prime quality leaf tea, low quality cheap rice for basmati rice substitution of cheaper
fish (bonito for tuna) or animal species for more expensive ones, battery eggs for free range eggs,
traditionally grown produce for organic and illegally brewed white spirits in place of vodka. It is associated
with mislabelling and allows a higher price to be charged than would be possible without the substitution.
It is carried out either by the producer of the genuine product or during counterfeiting operations.
1.2.4 Adulteration
Adulteration means different things in different countries. In EU countries it means the deliberate
addition of an ingredient to deceive the consumer into thinking that they are purchasing a better quality
product than is actually the case. In the US, adulteration can mean this, but also refers to accidental
contamination by dirt, unwanted animal products or prohibited antibiotics intended to improve the health
of livestock or fish being reared for market.
Adulteration is probably the most common area of food and drinks fraud carried out either during
processing or manufacturer of the product or by intermediaries or retailers. Examples include adding
water to increase the weight of meat products to obtain a higher price, addition of prohibited colouring
agents to either give the impression of greater freshness of meat products or increase the attractiveness
of other products. In other cases, meat and fish products may be contaminated with prohibited antibiotics
such as chloramphenicol deliberately added to feedstuffs to prevent infection and increase the product
weight.
1.2.5 Tipping
Tipping refers to the refilling of branded drinks bottles with inferior substitutes. It is most common
with white spirits where the fake product is virtually indistinguishable in appearance from the genuine
product. It is also referred to as refreshing which includes all forms of repackaging and replacement of
labels to deliberately mislead the consumer into believing that a genuine product is being sold. In a
survey of 10000 of public houses in the UK in 1999 8% of the premises visited were refilling or
substituting their spirits at an annual cost of £43 million before tighter enforcement activities reduced the
level to 2 in 2007, reducing annual losses to around £13 million.
1.3 Social and economic context
It is anticipated that increasing oil prices and competition for water and land will limit agricultural
production worldwide. While increasing populations and rising consumer incomes in emerging
economies such as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) will increase demand for
premium foods (OECD/FAO, 2011). The joint report, from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) and the United Nation‟s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) contains
food price increase projections, which discount the impact of inflation (Figure 5.1, below). The
OECD/FAO estimates the price of maize will be 20% higher than in the previous 10 years over the
coming decade. It goes on to state that the price of poultry will be even more expensive, averaging 30pc
more and butter will be even higher, costing on average more than 45pc more over the next decade than
in the last.
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Section 1: Background to project
Page 12
Figure 5.1: Source: OECD and FAO; SMP: Skim milk powder; WMP: Whole milk powder reproduced from figure http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36774715_36775671_1_1_1_1_1,00.html accessed 18
th June, 2011
Rising prices and scarcity of raw ingredients means there is a pressure to use „alternative‟
materials in food production. Whilst counterfeiters are seeking not to harm but to hide the act for profit
there is a real public health risk associated with food fraud exemplified by the case of milk and pet food
adulterated with melamine to increase the apparent protein content. The melamine incident is by no
means the only example where counterfeiters‟ lack of food chemistry knowledge has had a serious effect
on public health. In 1981 an attempt to produce non-authentic olive oil with rapeseed oil, which was
denatured with 2% aniline (Del Pozo et al., 1997), affected more than 20,000 Spanish people and
tragically resulted in 300 deaths. However, in the vast majority of cases the issue is one of detecting
economic fraud. When an inferior product is passed off as a superior one or a premium product is
extended with cheaper ingredients,
Counterfeiting is a major problem in the global food and drink industry with the level of fraud
estimated at around $50bn a year in 2009 by John Spink, director of the Packaging for Food and Product
Protection (P-FAPP) initiative at Michigan State University (Food Quality News, 2009).
1.4 References
Del Pozo, V., De Andres, B., Gallardo, S., Cardaba, B., De Arruda Chaves, E., Cortegano, M.I., Jurado, A., Palomino, P., Oliva, H., Aguilera, B., Posada, M. and Lahoz, C.; Toxicol 118 (1997) 61-70
EUROPEAN COMMISSION; Brussels, 6 May 1998; COM(98) 276 final, PROTECTION OF THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITIES, FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD, Annual Report 1997, 2.1.2.4. Infringement of the embargo on British beef
The Food Safety Act 1990 (c. 16), Her Majesty's Stationery Office Ltd, London, UK
Food Quality News (2009) “More food fraud expected as prices rise” Jane Byrne, 17-Feb-2009. http://www.foodqualitynews.com/Public-Concerns/More-food-fraud-expected-as-prices-rise Accessed 10/02/11
Ladona, M.G., Izquierdo-Martinez, M., De la Paz, M.P., De la Torre, R., Ampurdanes, C., Segura, J. and Sanz, E.J.; Environ. Health Pers. 109 (2001) 369-375
OECD/FAO (2011) OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2011-2020, OECD Publishing and FAO http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2011-en http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/agriculture-and-food/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2011_agr_outlook-2011-en accessed June 18
th 2011
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (Q01R0025) – Final Report
Section 2: The challenge of
Page 13
2 THE CHALLENGE OF GATHERING INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENCE OF FOOD FRAUD AT
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS
2.1 Context
Fraud in the food and beverages sector, whilst perceived to have a major and increasing impact
during the global economic downturn, is almost impossible to quantify with any degree of accuracy. The
level and impact of fraud is often not documented systematically in national databases whilst local
records are difficult to access and verify. With the exception of the UK‟s Food Fraud Database, no
coherent method of recording incidents of food fraud has been adopted across all European National
enforcement agencies with the result that where figures do exist, reliable comparisons are not possible
and annual trends cannot be easily determined.
The estimated levels of counterfeiting derived from local reports and Custom statistics suggest that
the problem of counterfeiting and fraud in the food and beverages sectors is insignificant compared with
levels observed in the high value durable goods (e.g. TVs, computer monitors etc) and clothing and
shoes sectors. This is likely to be due to the low profit margins and greater logistical problems associated
with production, handling, transport and distribution of most food products (OECD, 2008). However, the
inherent safety risk associated with economic adulteration of food should not be overlooked. This can
have an enormous and long lasting social and economic impact on industry and consumers as in the
case of melamine in Chinese milk powder, which caused six infant deaths in 2008 and was estimated to
have made 300,000 babies ill (Financial Times, 2010) and cost billions of dollars in lost revenue and
recalls (AFP, 2008).
Statistics for Custom‟s seizures for food and beverages do not necessarily appear in records as
separate categories. This is the case even in some large economies, including the USA, where statistics
for seizures of food and drink are combined with other categories of goods, making it difficult to obtain
definitive figures of both volume and value in the trade of counterfeit food and beverages. The Pie-chart
below demonstrates this point as it displays the figures for food and drink combined with frauds relating
to tobacco in Europe (Figure 1, OLAF 2010)
Figure 2.1: Fraud and irregularities breakdown by good in 2009 (in million EUR) [reproduced from reference OLAF (2010)]
However, Custom‟s agencies within the European Union (EU) do record interceptions of
counterfeit and smuggled food and drink as a separate category but occasional misallocation of goods
from other sectors within this sector means that figures may be inaccurate. Furthermore, within the EU,
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (Q01R0025) – Final Report
Section 2: The challenge of
Page 14
seizures of goods in this sector represent less than 1% of the total of cases/seizures and a single large
seizure in any single year will be likely to distort the figures (OLAF, 2010).
Despite this drawback, the accumulation of annual statistics over a number of years can allow
some inferences to be drawn on the main food and beverage products subject to fraudulent practices,
the extent of fraud within these products and the countries of origin of the counterfeit goods. This
information can lead to targeted interventions to eliminate or control the levels of food and drink‟s fraud in
these countries.
Whist relatively crude statistics are available for the EU, and to a lesser extent the USA, these are
among only a few economies where national statistics are both collected for these product categories
and accessible. Other countries either do not have the resources to devote to controlling crime in this
area, or consider the problem to be minor (and externalised) compared to other problems impacting on
their economies, which have higher priority for both police and customs agencies. Nevertheless, these
represent the two largest world economies and consequently data on food fraud collected in the EU and
USA can be extrapolated to provide rough estimates of the global extent of the problem. However, some
overview information was obtained directly from Government representatives in Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, Brazil and Thailand
Most incidences of food fraud are localised within national boundaries. This is especially so for
fresh foodstuffs which are often perishable and generally of low value compared to other counterfeited
goods and which must, therefore, be sold in relatively large volumes to make counterfeiting worthwhile.
They must also be sold quickly to minimise losses due to deterioration. Examples, could be the miss-
description of imported vegetables as „locally produced‟ or conventionally cultivated crops as „organic‟ to
obtain the premium prices associated with these food categories. Refrigerated fresh meat and fish,
processed foods and bottled drinks have a longer shelf life and, particularly in the case of alcoholic
drinks, a high value and profit margin, making it feasible to transport these goods across national
borders. Consequently, wines and spirits do attract highly sophisticated and organised counterfeiting as
recently demonstrated with fake Jacob‟s Creek wines entering the UK market place (FSA, 2011a) and a
Nationwide counterfeit vodka scam (FSA, 2011b).
Detection of fraud in the food and drinks industry at the local level often results from consumer
complaints regarding quality or poisoning of consumers as a result of adulteration with toxic ingredients
during manufacture or processing (e.g. methanol in spirit drinks, melamine in milk products). At national
borders, detection of fraudulent food and drink by customs‟ agencies in both the exporting and importing
countries often results from intelligence provided by the owner of patent or other rights to the products. At
EU borders, customs authorities can only take action after receiving a complaint from a right‟s holder and
even if they detect counterfeit goods independently, must locate the right‟s holder, who must then issue a
complaint within three working days for action to be taken by customs authorities.
Customs authorities are able to detect counterfeit food and beverages largely as a result of
intelligence gathered by the often large multinational food and drinks companies holding patents or
intellectual rights to the product brands being counterfeited. Thus names such as Nestle, Coca cola and
the brand names of a large variety of alcoholic products recur regularly in statistics on food and drinks‟
fraud. It is only these organisations acting alone or as members of consortia, such as the British Retail
Consortium, that have the financial capability of mounting intelligence gathering operations to identify
which of their products are being counterfeited and where the production of counterfeit products is taking
place. A recent OECD report (OECD, 2008) cited a multinational spirit producer who identified 30
economies in both developed and developing countries where customs seizures of counterfeit spirits had
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (Q01R0025) – Final Report
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been made over recent years and who claimed that a global counterfeit recognition programme was
maintained in more than 150 countries by a consortium of multinational spirit producers to deal with the
problem of counterfeit products. These organisations hold statistics on the levels and trends of fraud
affecting their own brands and these statistics comprise a large proportion of global estimates in the food
and beverages sector.
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2.2 References
AFP (2008): „China milk crisis to cost billions, up to a year to restore confidence‟ (AFP) – Oct 6, 2008. Accessed March 2011
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5htzunYYbxFYw-ceVXBWszNhOZVSg
Financial Times (2010): FT.com „China to crack down as tainted milk returns‟ By Patti Waldmeir in Shanghai. Published: February 2 2010.
Accessed Jan 2011 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70158d4e-1012-11df-841f-00144feab49a.html#axzz1KoXC2sVe
FSA (2011a): Food Standards Agency, „Counterfeit Jacob's Creek wines‟ Tuesday 29 March 2011. Accessed April 2011
http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2011/mar/counterfeit
FSA (2011b): Food Standards Agency, FSA e News (the newsletter of the Food Standards Agency) , „Partnership working cracks
counterfeit vodka scam‟, Issue 012, April 2011
OECD (2008a): The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
2008.OECD 2, rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16 France pp 397.
OLAF (2010): European Anti-Fraud Office: Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities- Own Resources, Agriculture, Cohesion Policy, Pre-
Accession Funds and Direct Expenditure -Year 2009. Report from the Commission on the protection of the European Union's financial
interests and the fight against fraud – 2009. Brussels, 14.7.2010, SEC(2010) 898 final
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3 METHODS FOR GATHERING DATA
A list of individuals and institutions contacted for this study is given in Appendix 1. Information was
given under the understanding that in some instances there would be no further disclosure and
respondents were given the option to make Fera aware that the data should not be available through the
Freedom of information Act. The covering letter sent to potential respondents is given in Appendix 2.
Responses that were given in direct correspondence are referred to with the individual‟s organisation and
„private communication‟. More often than not the type of fraud is identified but not its frequency.
The information below is a more detailed breakdown of where information was obtained at
regional, national, European and International levels. In addition, UK, EU and US government websites
related to trade and public health were consulted as well as websites of trade associations, anti-
counterfeiting associations and internet-based food and drink news sites.
3.1 Direct contact with local and central Government agencies in the UK, Europe and Internationally
3.1.1 UK Food Standards Agency - Fraud Team
A meeting was held with the Food Standards Agency Food Fraud Team to discuss the
functionality of the FSA‟s National Food Fraud Database (NFFD) and the reported incidence of food
fraud in the UK in 2010. The NFFD enables collection and analysis of intelligence on food fraud in the
UK. The uses specialist intelligence management software that is also used by leading UK police forces,
the Welsh Food Fraud Co-ordination Unit and a number of other high profile global organisations. This
database is populated with intelligence on known or suspected food fraud supplied by local authorities,
port health authorities, members of the public, industry, other governmental departments and
international contacts of the Food Fraud Team. The intelligence is assessed using the „5x5x5‟
Information/Intelligence report forms, defined by the National Intelligence Model (NIM)1 e.g. reliability of
source, accuracy.
3.1.2 The UK Food Surveillance System (UKFSS)
The Food Standards Agency possesses a number of different databases and the Meat Hygiene
Service retains a separate database for enforcement at slaughterhouses and food businesses. The FSA
is working toward consolidating these separate activities into a single source of all data on a common
system. The UK Food Surveillance system (UKFSS) is a national database to record results of all food
and feed samples, submitted for analysis and/or examination by official control laboratories on behalf of
UK local authorities and port health authorities. The UKFSS database was developed by Health
Protection, Scotland. A Local Authority Enforcement Management System (LAEMS) database was also
developed so that FSA were able to summarise enforcement activities in annual reports to the EU. Work
is ongoing to combine the sampling side of UKFSS and LAEMS because they contained much common
source information. UKFSS stores local authority (LA) sampling data as part of the statutory control
program. Whereas LAEMS stores data on broader enforcement activities and these may include
1 http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/board/fsa070907.pdf
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inspection and sampling. The Meat Hygiene system is similar and includes inspection of dairies/milk
processors. Eventually all these systems will be linked with the expectation that a linked database
system will trigger actions more widely when issues are identified. UKFSS operates in real time whereas
LAEMS tends to be delayed because it focuses on the annual reporting cycle to the EU, but covers the
full range of LA activities. UKFSS contains all information from Northern Ireland and 90% of the
information from Scotland. In England the Public Analysts use the system but the Health Protection
Agency laboratories, that undertake the majority of the microbiological tests of the food supply are only
beginning to take part.
3.1.3 European Institutions
The most accessible databases on food fraud are those relating to customs seizures of counterfeit
goods. However, because the levels of counterfeiting relating to food and beverages are so low
compared to levels in other sectors, data are grouped with statistics from other sectors in many cases
(including US Customs). Data for food and drink seizures are treated as a separate sector by EU
customs (EC TAXUD) and so some information on levels of, and trends in, food fraud are retrievable,
along with information on the sources of counterfeit food and beverages and the main products involved.
3.1.4 International Institutions
In an attempt to find reliable information, searches were conducted on the global websites of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) Infosan food safety database was also inspected for food fraud information.
3.2 Media
A scan of the popular press reveals many reports, anecdotal and otherwise, on incidents relating
to food and beverages fraud mainly relating to effects on health. These generally provide little validated
information on the economic effects of this fraud. More in depth research reveals that there is a paucity
of validated retrievable reports on the incidence and trends in the production and sale of counterfeit food
and drink and the resulting health and economic impacts of such fraud. Occasionally investigative
journalists or programme makers commission food fraud surveillance based on intelligence. Internet sites
such as „YouTube‟ can provide access to international news broadcasts on food fraud.
3.3 Retailers
The British Retail Consortium (BRC) is the lead trade association representing the whole range of
retailers, from the large multiples and department stores through to independents, selling a wide
selection of products through centre of town, out of town, rural and virtual stores. The BRC is the
authoritative voice of retail, recognised for its powerful campaigning and influence within government and
as a provider of excellent retail information. The BRC have the financial capability of mounting
intelligence gathering operations to identify which of their products are being counterfeited and where the
production of counterfeit products is taking place.
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3.4 Other food authenticity and quality laboratories in the public and private sector
There are a significant number of laboratories involved in the detection of food fraud globally. In
the UK, this includes private laboratories, Public Analysts, university departments and government
agencies. As these facilities are commissioned by a wide range of stakeholders in the food sector they
could be utilised as a useful source of information on categories of food fraud being investigated, without
providing specific information about customers that could compromise confidentiality agreements.
3.5 Consumer groups
Which? is Europe‟s largest consumer rights organisation, with over 700,000 members. The
organisation is independent of Government and industry and funded through the sale of magazines,
books and online services. Which? accepts no advertising, payment or samples from any of the
companies whose products or services they test and consequently are highly respected for their
complete impartiality. The organisation focuses on consumer issues ensuring they are provided with
clear and concise information to make informed choices. This is achieved by reviewing products and
providing independent advice.
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4 LEVELS AND TRENDS IN FOOD AND BEVERAGE FRAUD
4.1 National information
4.1.1 Data from the FSA’s Food Fraud Team
Summary information from the FSA‟s National Food Fraud Database (NFFD) and the reported
incidence of food fraud in the UK was extracted and provided for this report. The reported incidence of
food fraud in the UK in between 2007 and 2010, on a monthly basis, is shown in Figure 8.1 below. The
number of incidents is derived from intelligence on known or suspected food fraud supplied by local
authorities, port health authorities, members of the public, industry, other governmental departments and
international contacts of the Food Fraud Team.
Figure 4.1: The reported monthly incidence of food fraud in the UK between 2007 and 2010. The figures are derived from intelligence on known or suspected food fraud supplied by local authorities, port health authorities, members of the public, industry, other governmental departments and international contacts of the Food Fraud Team
The graph appears to show significant increases in food fraud incidence between 2007 and 2010,
but this increase actually reflects the improved reporting of fraud cases and growing awareness of the
FSA‟s food fraud database and its function. In 2009 and 2010 the average levels of reported incidents
are fairly similar and therefore are likely to be a reasonable baseline for reporting subsequent changes in
the incidence of food fraud. The effective capture of food fraud data means that the predicted rise due to
pressure on the food industry brought about by the global economic recession should be evident in 2011
figures and this appears to be the case.
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Figure 4.2: A pie chart depicting the relative proportions of different categories of food fraud reported in 2011.
The pie-chart in Figure 8-2 depicts the relative proportions of different categories of food fraud
reported in 2011. There was a significant increase in the total number of reported incidences of food
fraud in 2011 of 1321 cases compared to 908 cases in 2010. The major non-compliance, at 36% of
recorded cases, is counterfeiting that mainly relates to spirit drinks. The next largest category, at 15%, is
illegal importation mainly relating to meat followed by sale of unfit food at 9%. Counterfeiting of spirit
drinks and wine is of major concern to enforcement agencies and the drinks industry. The selling of
counterfeit spirits has a major impact on sales of genuine products and the tax revenue generated from
them. It also impacts on brand reputation and may cause long-term effects on genuine product sales.
One notable case was the nationwide distribution of the counterfeit Spar Imperial Vodka. Intelligence
produced using the Food Standards Agency‟s national Food Fraud Database, led to the raid of a self-
storage warehouse in the London Borough of Haringey (FSA, 2008). The raid found hundreds of bottles
of counterfeit Spar Imperial Vodka, other illegal wines and spirits, and sheets of counterfeit customs duty
stamps. The Vodka was found to contain potentially harmful levels of methanol. This highlights the
danger of poor quality counterfeit spirits that can lead to serious health effects, including blindness, if
consumed in large quantities. The counterfeit vodka manufacture and distribution was operated by
Sisecam Ltd and run by Mr Ahmet Turgut Oztas. He was sentenced to a 9-month suspended sentence,
with 200 hours unpaid work to be completed within 12 months or he would have to serve his prison
sentence. He was also ordered to pay £2000 by way of forfeiture towards the London Borough of
Haringey for the council‟s investigation work, plus a further £2000 towards legal costs.
4.1.2 The UK Food Surveillance system (UKFSS)
At a high level, the UKFSS splits into several categories such as “Chemical” and “Microbiological”
and by “Country”, and by “satisfactory/unsatisfactory”. The country can then be split into county and
individual cities. Some care had to be taken when using high level summaries. For example, a food that
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had been sampled because of concerns over mycotoxins, might pass the chemical test for mycotoxins
but still fail for because of a labelling issue. The sample would then be recorded at a high level as a
“mycotoxin failure”. However the system permits a review of the original statement which will give full
information about the sample, why it was taken and the results of any findings. Closer examination of the
database therefore allows the reason for failure to be determined via the table of failcodes/outcomes.
The UKFSS contains a standardised list of food categories in “outcomes” tables. Some of these
are clearly of relevance to food authenticity issues e.g. “substitution”, which is further divided into fish,
meat, plant and other. A similar argument applies to the “labelling”. Category and others may be relevant
e.g. “radioactivity”, and “constituents”. Whilst the “fail code” indicates why a sample was found
unsatisfactory, e.g. too much or too little of something, a more valuable approach may be to consider the
“Det” tables. An example for a useful search which could be undertaken is “meat identification” which
gives as an example a lamb curry which actually contained beef. Different “Det” levels are available (1-
4), which provides an ever increasing level of detail. The structure includes setting the type of food, the
place, the food test and the authority.
The Det codes were examined in more detail using fish Identification issues in 2009 as an
example. At a summary level, it was straight forward to determine the number of times a year that fish
identification had been an issue for Local Authority‟s enforcement officers and hence obtain trend
information over time. The reason why there was an increase in fish identification issues in 2009 was
open to speculation – was it number of tests performed? Was there a coordinated surveillance exercise?
was it a result of the availability of easy to use lab-on-chip DNA technology, which has been widely
implemented in public analyst laboratories? Consequently, some background information is required to
interpret trend information recovered from the UKFSS. The exercise demonstrated that the Det tables
were likely to be particularly valuable in identifying “authenticity” issues and trends. The following DET
level 1 categories are relevant to food authenticity and labelling: Fat, fatty acids, Fish identification,
GMO, irradiated foods, labelling, meat content, meat identification and plant identification. Other DET
level 1 categories of possible interest to authenticity/labelling are Carbohydrate, Protein and Sterols.
4.2 Information from the European Union
The EU is the second largest economy (GDP 2009: € 12,256.48 billion) in the world after the US. It
is the only economy where there is some transparency in the statistics relating to food and beverages
fraud for internationally traded goods. Internal food and beverage fraud, where the illegal products do not
cross national boundaries, is much less transparent, and in some EU Member States, invisible. The
official statistics cover detection at EU borders by the customs agencies and so fraud occurring within
national boundaries such as the example of “tipping” above, or home produced alcoholic beverages, will
not be represented in the national statistics and which do not, therefore represent a true picture of the
extent of food and beverage fraud within the EU.
The importance of local production of counterfeit goods was emphasised in an OECD survey
(OECD, 2008). A major spirits producer considered that the distribution and sale of counterfeit branded
spirits was largely localised within national boundaries in which the counterfeiters sell directly to local
liquor outlets and bars. This avoids the problems and risks associated with crossing national borders
where customs authorities would be likely to be more vigilant when dealing with high value spirits subject
to high taxes.
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EU customs statistics also give no information on the value of the fraud which includes loss of
revenue to the brand owner, loss of tax revenue to the state and loss of value and possibly adverse
health effects (with additional financial and social costs) to the consumer. These can be substantial,
particularly when adverse health effects caused by addition of poisonous substances (methanol in
alcoholic drinks, melamine in milk products) or omission of essential nutrients (e.g. substitution of corn
syrup for orange juice), are involved. Local statistics are at best fragmented, may be absent altogether in
some areas and trends cannot be observed due to failure to hold data on local, regional or national
databases.
There are often no uniform methods of counting or recording cases of food fraud and this is
exacerbated by the lack of an agreed terminology for different types of fraud either within the EU or
between the EU and third countries. Thus interceptions of smuggled cigarettes into the EU have
variously been counted on the basis of individual cigarettes, packets of cigarettes or packs containing
multiple boxes of cigarettes. In other cases, the shipping container has been used as a unit for recording
the quantity of counterfeit goods.
4.2.1 Information from EU customs seizures
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 respectively show annual statistics on the number of cases (Figure 8.3) and
number of seizures (Figure 8.4) of food and beverage products at EU borders. The number of cases
represents administrative actions as well as prosecutions resulting from complaints by rights holder for all
categories of fraud relating to food and drink. The number of seizures will be distorted from year to year
by different conventions on counting categories of products both nationally and supra-nationally.
Distortions are also likely when a low number of seizures involve large quantities of a single product in
any one year or when fluctuations in the cross border trade in a particular commodity increase or
decrease the likelihood of detection of counterfeit goods. This is evident in figures 1 and 2.
The number of customs administrative and legal cases relating to food and drinks detentions has
increased progressively from 2000-2008 with an 8-fold increase over the period. It is not clear whether
this is an indication of increased levels of trade in counterfeit food and drink products, an overall increase
in the level of trade within this sector or increased customs or right holder vigilance in identifying
counterfeit products.
Figure 4.3: EU Customs seizures 2000-2008: No. cases (EC Taxud 2000-2008)
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The upward trend in the number of cases is not apparent when the fraudulent activity is expressed
in terms of the number of articles seized (figure 2). The likely reasons for this have been referred to
above.
Difficulty in retrieving information on the total volumes of trade in food and beverages across EU
borders and the value of this trade makes estimating the economic costs of the trade in counterfeit
products problematic.
Figure 4.4: EU Customs seizures 2000-2008: No. articles (millions) (EC Taxud 2000-2008)
Products traded illegally range from high value alcoholic beverages to relatively low value tea and
milk products. It is likely, therefore, that to obtain meaningful figures, it would be necessary to make
estimates of the value of the fraud estimated on a product-by-product basis, with financial information
provided by the rightholders. In this way, it would be possible to clarify trends in trade of counterfeit
products, and the associated costs of this trade for different product categories.
The counterfeit problem in cross border trade in relation to food and beverages is insignificant
when compared with the levels of counterfeiting in other product categories. Thus cases relating to
counterfeit food and drink products in the nine-year period from 2000 to 2008 averaged only 0.2% of the
total caseload of all counterfeit goods, whilst the number of counterfeit food and drinks products seized
represented less than 3% of the total counterfeit products seized.
4.2.2 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
The European Commission publishes a statistical summary of OLAFs activities and the detected
levels of fraud relating to all aspects trade (EC 2010a), which accompanies the Report from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (EC 2010b). The areas of trade most affected
by fraud and irregularities in 2009, as in previous years, were TVs/monitors etc. (CN 85), Clothing (CN
61) and Tobacco products (CN 24). Cars/motors (CN 87) increased in importance when compared to
2008, as did Food (CN 16), Chemical products (CN 29) and Articles of iron and steel (CN 73)29. (See
Table 8.1 below).
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Frauds relating to Meat, vegetables and food were in the „top-ten‟ chapter headings for 2007, 2008
and 2010. In 2009 the number of fraud cases relating to Food (CN16) totalled 86 with a value of
€12,747,855.
Table 4.1: Fraud and irregularities: ‘Top Ten’ chapter headings in 2007, 2008 and 2009 [reproduced from reference EC 2010a]
4.2.3 Origin of counterfeit food and drinks products entering the EU
The report on the Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities in the EU also provides an evaluation of the
geographical origin of ALL goods subject to fraud and irregularity. As in 2008, goods originating from
China, the US, Japan, South Korea and Bangladesh remain highly affected. Furthermore, the number of
fraud cases originating from Hong Kong, Vietnam and Argentina increased.
Table 4.2: Fraud and irregularities: breakdown by origin of goods [reproduced from reference EC 2010a]
.
Information specifically on the geographical origin of counterfeit food and beverages can be
obtained from EC TAXUD annual reports on customs seizures (EC Taxud 2000-2008). These reports
provide data on the basis of number of articles seized but information on the category of food or drink is
not routinely specified. Information on origin is derived from counts on the numbers of articles seized and
will likely be misleading for the same reasons reported for fluctuating annual counts of articles seized.
Nevertheless, some countries appear prominent as sources of counterfeit food and beverages on a
recurring basis. Thus Turkey is reported as the source of the greatest proportion of counterfeit food and
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drink products five times out of the past nine years contributing from 20-46% of all counterfeit food and
drink seized by EU customs in those years. China is the only other country to feature prominently in the
customs figures from 2000-2008, appearing in the top eight sources of counterfeit products six times
over the nine-year period.
Table 4.3: Ranking of countries of origin of counterfeit food and beverages seized at EU borders 2000-2008 (EC Taxud 2000-2008).
4.2.4 Directorate General for Competition policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF).
An overview of the operations of this French Directorate. DG CCRF works closely with the OFT in
the UK. They have a specialist team dedicated to investigating internet trade. They evaluate the impact
of investigations to see if they result in changed behaviours.
4.2.5 Eurostats Comext database
Eurostat‟s Comext database reports trade statistics of product mobility between Member States of
the European Union and between Member States and third countries. At an international level, the
United Nations, through the Comtrade database, reports trade data from its member countries. This
report describes the definitions and the methodology used in these two international trade statistics, with
a view to understanding the reasons for discrepancies. Five case studies of trade data for selected food
commodities (i.e. frozen shrimps and prawns, fresh or chilled mackerel, cereals, live swine and intra-EU
trade) were examined in order to assess the potential of trade data for identifying emerging risks. The
Eurostat Comext database has been found to be a tool that could assist in the identification of emerging
risks in combination with data coming from other sources, including the Comtrade database. Expert
judgment is pivotal for selecting the most appropriate food commodities during a search, interpretation
and evaluation of the weaknesses of trade data, as well as their relevance to data from other sources.
Recommendations are made for the requirements of a system covering EFSA‟s mandate for automatic
scanning of the Eurostat Comext database. Such a system should provide alerts to the users, indicating
for example i) significant increase of the volume of a given product over time to a specific MS or EU in
total ii) new trade partners iii) new food or feed commodities entering the EU.
Source of counterfeit food and beverages (%of total) 2000-2008 Ranking/
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 Turkey
(20%)
Turkey
(33%)
China
(20%)
Chile
(18%)
India
(65%)
Turkey
(16%)
Turkey
(18%)
Turkey
(46%)
Indonesia
(51%)
2 Poland
(20%)
China
(17%)
Thailand
(20%)
Poland
(18%)
Philippines
(21%)
Ukraine
(10%)
Hungary
(7%)
China
(37%)
UAE
(26%)
3 China
(10%)
Africa
(11%)
Chile
(10%)
Turkey
(18%)
Tunisia
(4%)
Russia
(12%)
Tunisia
(6%)
Georgia
(3%)
Turkey
(6%)
4 Czech
Rep.
(10%)
Portugal
(11%)
Greece
(10%)
Ukrain
e
(12%)
Turkey
(3%)
China
(8%)
Singapore
(12%)
Other
(14%)
Morocco
(3%)
5 Japan
(10%)
Thailand
(11%)
Hong
Kong
(10%)
China
(6%) Other (7%)
Indonesia
(6%)
Other
(57%)
Other
(14%)
6 Lithuania
(10%)
Other
(17%)
Indonesia
(10%)
Egypt
(6%)
Other
(34%)
7 Spain
(10%)
Iran
(10%)
Spain
(6%)
8 Other
(10%)
Turkey
(10%)
Other
(16%)
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4.2.6 European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF)2
RASFF is the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed and was implemented to provide Member
State food and feed control authorities, such as the Food Standards Agency in the UK, with an effective
tool to exchange information about measures taken responding to serious risks detected in relation to
food or feed (RASFF 2010). This exchange of information helps Member States to act more rapidly in
response to a health threat caused by food or feed and in a coordinated manner.
Member States are required to inform the Commission if they withdraw or recall food or feed
products from their domestic markets in order to protect consumers‟ health and if rapid action is required.
They also have to notify the Commission if they agreed with a responsible operator that a food or feed
should not be placed on the market if the measure is taken on account of a serious risk to human or
animal health. The Commission immediately transmits the notification to all members of the network.
On a European level the RASFF information is generally derived from food or feed inspectors that
have investigated a product on the market or at the border. If it is found that a product is non-complaint
and needs to be reported inside the national system, the designated National authority decides if the
issue falls under the scope of the RASFF and reports it to the national RASFF contact point. The national
contact point verifies and completes the RASFF notification where necessary and forwards it to the
European Commission. It uses a RASFF notification form to provide details of the findings and measures
taken and adds relevant documents such as bills, lists of companies having received the products,
analytical reports, etc. Templates are used to collect all information on the RASFF notification form. The
diagram below (Figure 8.4) shows the flow of information in the RASFF.
Figure 4.5: EU – a schematic diagram showing the flow of information in the European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (reproduced fron the RASFF website http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/about_rasff_en.htm# accessed January 2011
Searching on subject „fraud‟ produced 100 results, mainly false health declarations, expiry dates
changed, specified risk material, illegal imports (falsified origin) e.g. suspicion of illegal import (possibly
2 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/rasff-window/portal/
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fraudulent CVED documents) of bovine meat allegedly from Argentina and Brazil, via the United States
and via Bulgaria. Searching on subject „adulteration‟ produces 10 hits relating to addition of cheap
sources of sugar to honey, addition of synthetic acetic acid to balsamic vinegar and ammonium sulphate
to increase the apparent protein content of animal feed. Searching on „hazard category‟
adulteration/fraud is also possible but produces the same set of results.
4.2.7 Categories of food and beverage products seized by EU customs
Information from annual customs reports on the type of foods and beverage product seized as a
result of contravening intellectual property rights is fragmentary and incomplete. Product types are not
recorded in reports from 2005 onwards. This probably reflects the relative low levels of food and
beverages seizures compared with seizures of other products which, in turn, reflects the relative low level
of food and beverage fraud relative to fraud in relation to higher value products. Mis categorization is also
apparent in the figure in some years with Nike, Nintendo and Disney products erroneously included in the
data for food and beverage products.
The most commonly seized products are high value alcoholic beverages, particularly vodka and
whisky followed by products from multinationals producing products with well known, highly valued
trademarks.
A sanitised summary of the categories of food and drink products seized retrieved from EU
customs databases are given in Figure 8.4. These are indicative only and incomplete, but provide an
overview of the types of product in this sector which are commonly the object of fraudulent activity.
Table 4.4: Category of product type or producer ranked as percentage of total seizures 2000-2004 (adapted from EC TAXUD 2000-2004)
* Disney and Nintendo products included as categories of food and drink in 2000 and 2001
4.2.8 European Union’s Joint Research Centre (DG- JRC, Ispra, Italy)
The JRC role is to carry out cutting edge research where a high degree of innovation is key
requisite. They are also very active in networking across Europe with other research laboratories and
have a role in disseminating information to member states through various mechanisms‟ (e.g.
publications and conferences). One important mechanism is the network of customs laboratories from
member states and providing advice and support to OLAF when requested.
JRC used to have relatively close links with OLAF but these have not been maintained. JRC has
requested information from OLAF regarding any concerns they have over food fraud so that JRC can
develop relevant methods for enforcers. However, this approach has not produced the required dialogue.
Some of the food fraud issues that OLAF addresses are relatively straightforward, such as evasion of
duty payment on garlic from china by describing them as apples (Operation Wasabi, 2008).
Ranking/
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 Alcohol
(40%)
Guiness
(11%)
Alcohol
(67%)
Alcohol
(74%)
Alcohol
(21%)
2 Coca Cola
(10%)
Azol de
Extremadura
(11%)
BNIC
(17%)
Wrigley’s
gum(15%)
Coca Cola
(13%)
3 Confectionary
(10%)
Ferrero
(6%)
Other
(16%)
Coca Cola
(5%) Nestle (13%)
4 *Other (40%)
Nestle
(6%) Apples (5%)
Confectionary
(6%)
5
*Other (66%)
Other
(1%) Knorr (4%)
6 Other (43%)
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JRC does have a close relationship with EU customs laboratories. An example of their work was
an investigation regarding grape alcohol being sold to the USA. The shipments were regularly diverted
to the Caribbean for „technical reasons‟. Isotopic testing of the alcohol arriving in the U.S.A revealed that
the alcohol was derived from a different source than that leaving Europe. Cane alcohol was being
substituted and shipped from the Caribbean and the original grape alcohol returned to Europe for
reshipment. This 11MEuro fraud was uncovered using isotopic testing.
It is unclear how OLAF identifies which food fraud issues to investigate. However, we can
speculate that it is from import/export statistics. OLAF is good at harmonising common operations but is
very operationally focussed. This enables it to work well with customs laboratories. However, OLAF is
not always fully aware of the latest operational tools. They are not knowledgeable about recent analytical
advance in food fraud detection and tend to choose their support laboratories based on previous
experience as OLAF tend to work on the same issues for a number of years e.g. garlic, honey,
cigarettes.
The JRC has suggested that a network of competence for analytical techniques is required.
Customs laboratories tend to perform routine analysis and need other research laboratories to develop
and validate new methods. They also need others to define the problem and decide what can be done
about it. Dr Claude Guilliou of the JRC chairs a scientific committee for a network of customs
laboratories. The customs laboratories do very little coordinated research and development of methods
but this network provides a structure for cross European coordination of action. Customs laboratories are
useful because they are appointed organisation so it is easy for them to work together but they are also
limited by being tied by National issues. As the network of Customs laboratories is not an „official layer‟,
it is difficult for the European Commission to interact with them. Whereas, for wine, there is a network of
competent labs. It has been suggested that OLAF and JRC should coordinate the identification of which
food fraud questions need to be asked and share with a network of laboratories that can conduct the
necessary research and development to generate relevant methods. In effect the JRC could act as an
interface between research and operational activities within customs. DG JRC are keen to be involved
and perhaps lead an international coordination activity for the dissemination of information concerning
food frauds that are underway and the methods to be used to detect them.
4.2.9 European Food control laboratories
There are a number of government and private laboratories actively involved in the detection of
food adulteration throughout the European Union. The following laboratories have given an indication of
some of the commodities they have been investigating in 2010.
4.2.9.1 Eurofins Scientific (France)
The authenticity of fruit juice continues to be an issue in European and international markets.
Concerns are often associated with juices of high value such as pomegranate because of purported
health benefits. In preliminary laboratory research and clinical trials, juice of the pomegranate may be
effective in reducing heart disease risk factors, including LDL oxidation, macrophage oxidative status,
and foam cell formation (Kaplan et al., 2001; Aviram et al., 2004; Esmaillzadeh et al., 2004). The graph
below (Figure 8.5) represents the percentage of non-compliant juices tested by Eurofins Scientific
(Nantes) in 2010 (Dumoulin, 2011). However, it should be noted that this graph does not represent the
incidence of fraud in the retail market as these results are from samples that were selected for analysis
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because of suspicion about authenticity by traders, retailers etc. A typical non-compliance for
pomegranate would be the undeclared addition of water that has arisen through „washing‟ the pressed
fruits to aid extraction of the juice.
Figure 4.6: Percentage of non-compliant juices tested by Eurofins Scientic (Nantes) in 2010. This graph does not represent the incidence of fraud in the retail market as these results are from samples that were selected for analysis because of suspicion about authenticity by traders, retailers. Data provided by through personal communication - Dumoulin (2011).
4.2.9.2 German authenticity control laboratory (Anon.)
The following is an account of adulteration issues tackled by a leading German food authenticity
control laboratory in 2010. There have been several incidences of adulteration of Eastern European
brandies with ethanol derived from maize and/or cane (C4-plants). These products are sold in Germany
through "Russian" food shops. Adulteration of sweet wines from South-eastern European countries (e.g.
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia) by addition of cane or corn plant sugars. Industrially
produces citric acid has been used to adulterate lemon juice concentrates and water has been added to
exotic fruit juices such as pomegranate juice. The geographical origin of eggs has been mislabelled and
so too has the origin of vegetables and fruits e.g. tomatoes. The production origin of vegetables and
fruits has also been mislabelled e.g. conventionally cultivated described as organic to obtain higher
market prices e.g. sweet peppers, cauliflower and broccoli. Industrially produced vanillin has been used
and described as natural vanilla from beans in ice cream and dairy products such as yoghurt. The
German laboratory anticipates that adulteration of wine will be on the increase again due to poor grape
harvests for the 2010 vintage in Italy and Germany.
4.2.9.3 Fondazione Edmund Mach-Istituto Agrario di San Michele all'Adige (ISMAA, IT)
The Istituto Agrario San Michele promotes and carries out research, scientific experiments,
education and training activities as well as providing technical assistance and services to private
companies. It has an active food research and innovation centre that develops methodology and carries
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out surveillance on food adulteration and mis-description. IASMAA collaborates with the Italian Anti fraud
Department of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry. Their report for 2010 is not available but
the following frauds were detected in 2009. Fifteen separate incidences of wine adulteration were
detected. These wines were declared non-authentic because they contained added sugar, water or
industrial carbon dioxide and the producers were successfully prosecuted. Two samples of fresh passata
(puréed and sieved tomato) were found to be illegally produced from diluted tomato and a PDO olive oil
substituted with an oil of inferior quality from a different Italian region.
4.2.9.4 Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT)
The Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT) is Austria's largest non-university research institute and
an application-oriented research and development company, employing more than 850 people in various
locations across Austria. The centre in Tulln hosts the Health & Environment Department, which
conducts research and surveillance in food authentication. In 2010, they have conducted investigations
into the geographical origin of lemons, eggs, saffron spice, wine, vegetable oil and the adulteration of
honey.
4.3 Information from International sources
Food fraud is a global problem and consequently, is taken seriously by the relevant National
Government Departments and international organisations around the world. The World Customs
Organisation (WCO) estimated 5-7% global trade in counterfeit products in 2004 ($512billion). Of this
figure it was estimated that approximately $49 billion was accounted for by counterfeit food and
beverages. The following sections are a short account of the economic adulteration issues in food
supplies affecting the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand, Brazil, Argentina and Thailand.
4.3.1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
According to a 2007 report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), fruit such as kiwis, conserved vegetables, milk powder, butter, ghee, baby food, instant coffee,
alcohol, drinks, confectionary, and hi-breed corn seeds are some of the most faked food and drink items.
The OECD report found that alcohol products are the prime targets for counterfeiters in the drinks sector,
both because of their brand value and the high tax and excise component of the final price. the OECD
report noted that counterfeiters are becoming more nimble in responding to these technical solutions,
emphasising that counterfeiters were being aided and abetted in this by ever improving and cheaper
manufacturing, computing and printing technology.
4.3.2 Greg Noonan (Food and Drug Administration, USA) - Authenticity in Food, US Perspective3
Enforcement of food authentication in the United States of America is undertaken through the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act, 2005). Adulteration issues which have affected the
U.S are the adulteration (addition of water, exogenous sugars, colours and fruit acids to pomegranate
juice, lemon juice, orange juice and apple juice. The substitution of fin fish with other species is also a
recurring problem. The addition of sweeteners such as high fructose corn syrup and sorghum syrup to
honey and maple syrup is also of on-going concern.
3 IAM/ MoniQA Workshop, Budapest, Hungary, Methods for Food Identification and Authenticity-Characterizing the Unknown, 6 March 2011
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4.3.3 The Anti-Counterfeiting and Product Protection Program (A-CAPPP) Michigan State University
(USA)
Michigan State University created the first academic body focusing upon the complex strategic
global aspects of anti-counterfeiting and product protection of all products, across all industries, in all
markets and strategies to work effectively to detect, deter, and respond to the crime. Their goal is to
serve as an international hub for evidence-based anti-counterfeit and product protection strategy.
In 2009, Dr. John Spink, Associate Director of A-CAPPP and Assistant Professor in the School of
Criminal Justice received a US Department of Homeland Security grant through the National Centre for
Food Protection and Defence (NCFPD) for a project Defining the Public Health Threat of Food Fraud.
This was the first scholarly report to define the term and provide a rigorous review of the public health
threat. The outcome has been well received and has been implemented by agencies. This project
defined food fraud as an autonomous concept to be included with food quality, food safety, and food
defence.
A key of the food risk matrix is shifting a focus to the motivations or causes of the fraud and not
just on intervention and response. The fraudster is a human actor seeking economic gain, which is much
different than countermeasures or motivations in food safety and food defence. The report deconstructs
the food fraud opportunity using the time tested criminology concept of the “crime triangle” which
includes factors of victim, fraudster, and guardian gap. As the causes of the fraud are considered for
each factor, countermeasures can be identified that will not only detect, but deter the fraud vulnerability
in the first place. With his co-author, Douglas C Moyer, the report was published in 2011 by the NCFPD
and in a Journal of Food Safety article (In Press, 2011).
Other objectives and aspects of the A-CAPPP include the provision of scholarly, analytical,
conceptual, and scientific leadership in combating product counterfeiting that impacts public health and
safety, businesses and economies, the environment, and national security. The A-CAPPP has a portfolio
consisting of high-impact research projects defining the dialogue in academic, corporate and policy
circles in areas such as risk, standards, and governance; scale and externalities; consumers;
perpetrators; prevention and enforcement; and processes of anti-counterfeiting and product protection. It
also provides training and technical assistance, learning opportunities, online classes, consultations, and
facilitation of public/private organizational and collaborative interdisciplinary programs in the emerging
area of anti-counterfeiting strategy. The program focuses upon consumer packaged products in a variety
of industries and sectors including, but not limited to, pharmaceutical, healthcare, food, beverage,
automobile, and consumer electronics.
4.3.4 Stan Bacler (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, CFIA) - Food Authenticity Testing Activities4
Canada has a significant commitment to its food authentication programme. CFIA routinely caries
out surveillance of domestic and imported products. Canada is a major producer of Maple syrup and it is
relatively expensive product (£16/kg). Maple syrup has a naturally high sucrose content and so there is
potential for addition of other cheaper sources of sucrose. CFIA routine testing includes sugar profiling
4 IAM/ MoniQA Workshop, Budapest, Hungary, Methods for Food Identification and Authenticity-Characterizing the Unknown, 6 March 2011
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and Isotope Ratio Mass Spectrometry, eg. Detection of cane or corn sugars, retrograde sugar by-
products of refined sugar. In addition CFIA routinely tests imported honey, fruit juices (e.g. orange,
apple, grape, grapefruit, pear, lemon, lime, and pomegranate juice), vegetable oils (olive, pomace,
Sesame, almond, hazelnut, and walnut) and chocolate (for cocoa butter substitutes). Additional, testing
includes spices, flavours (vanilla extract), Tonka beans (contain coumarin, a potential health risk), meat
and fish species. There was also concern in Canada regarding the addition of hydrolysed leather protein
to milk. There is also interest in geographical origin verification interest particularly for Canadian ice wine
exports.
4.3.5 Dr Paul Dansted (New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry NZ-MAF) - Food Assurance
Programmes
Domestic food fair-trading is primarily regulated through civil law and commerce legislation. The
NZ-MAF has an interest in ensuring NZ‟s reputation as a trusted supplier of food is earned and
protected. NZ rely on traceability systems to verify origin, but testing as fallback, with appropriate
sampling plans.
4.3.6 Shirley Abrantes (Brazilian National Institute of Quality Control in Health, INCQS) - Authenticity
in food – what does this mean to Brazil?2
Brazil utilises a number of official methods to monitor the quality of its own food products. For
example, Soybean oil Fatty acid composition (AOCS CE 1-91 GC); added water in meat (EC Official
Journal, 1993); gravimetric Sugar Sucrose content (AOAC 925.46); direct polarimetric determination of
coffee starch granules (AOAC, 98, 16 Vol II, 1995); detection of added cane sugar/corn syrup to orange
juice by carbon isotope analysis (AOAC 982.21); honey hydroxy methylfurfural (IFU method nº 69, 1996)
and milk glycomacropeptide determination by size exclusion HPLC (MAPA Port. 124).
4.3.7 Veronica Torres Leedham (National Health Service and Agri-Food Quality, SENASA) -
Authenticity in food – what does this mean to Argentina?2
SENASA undertakes routine authenticity testing of a number of products, such as the presence of
soy protein in meat products; the identification of species of animal origin in meat products; dextrin in
honey (adulteration with syrup); sucrose in honey, fatty acid profiles in vegetable oil; identity and purity of
food additives. SENASA employs several analytical techniques including microscopy, histology and
immunological techniques, DNA analysis, HPLC and GC.
4.3.8 Wongkwan Jitnupong (National Health Service and Agri-Food Quality, SENASA) - Authenticity
in Food – what does this mean in regional perspective?
FVM-Ku routinely monitors the authenticity of meat species in cooked products using ELISA and
DNA based methods. Although, Islam is a minority faith in Thailand, food products are tested in
accordance with Halaal regulations for the presence of pork.
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4.3.9 Isoforensics (USA)
IsoForensics Inc. of Salt Lake City, Utah, USA (isoforensics.com) is a small analytical services and
region-of-origin modelling company that has primarily been addressing needs in the intelligence and law
enforcement communities. Founded in 2003, the basis of the company is the pioneering research on
stable isotope analyses at natural abundance level in the environment by Professors Thure Cerling and
James Ehleringer at the University of Utah. Some members left the university research environment to
continue application opportunities in a more closed environment. Employees conduct mission-focused
research addressing fundamental questions about authenticity, origins, and quality determination. As part
of this effort, the company analyzes the stable isotope ratios of a variety of materials in order to aid
forensic investigations.
IsoForensics Inc. routinely assists law enforcement agencies and organizations with
determinations of regions-of-origins of unidentified murder victims, with testing adulteration and
substitution in regulated products, and with verifying food and commodity origin claims. The company
currently offers high quality analyses including fruit juice verification, food adulteration testing,
pharmaceutical authentication, and water source and quality testing. IsoForensics Inc. is also actively
involved in determining the local, regional, and imported regions-of-origin of a variety of materials
including waters, juices, milk, and other beverages; meats; wools, cotton, and other fibres; and regulated
animals and animal products. In the past year, the company has analyzed honey and olive oils as well as
several types of not-from-concentrate and reconstituted juices.
4.4 Media
4.4.1 Television broadcasts
In the majority of cases media coverage of food fraud incidents is in response to press releases
from the FSA or local area Trading Standards investigations. Occasionally, investigative programmes do
provide original information about food mis-description, adulteration or substitution. These investigative
pieces may be in response to consumer concerns, industry tip-offs or may be curiosity driven. For
example, In December 2010 the BBC‟s Panorama programme commissioned the analysis of the origin of
pork in sausages that were labelled as British. The investigation revealed that the pork was not British in
one of the retail samples analysed. The results of such investigations could result in further action by
being required by enforcement authorities to assess the extent of the problem.
4.4.2 Internet
Internet sites such as YouTube provide access to international news on food fraud. For example,
American Channel 5 WPTV news details the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Custom‟s and
Border Protection (CBP) activities to control food fraud. Only 1% of the 11 million products imported into
the U.S. every year are routinely tested for economic adulteration (YouTube 2011).
4.5 Trade press
Food Quality News is dedicated to publishing breaking International news on food safety and
quality control and as such provides a useful source of world-wide information that could be used for
horizon scanning. The on-line publication regularly covers food authenticity, origin and fraud cases. For
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Section 4: Levels and trends in food and beverage fraud
Page 35
example, the use of stable isotope data to verify the regional origin of American milk supplies and
differentiate between Organic and conventional milk (Food Quality News, 2010). Food Quality News
accesses published scientific data, communications and interviews from around the world, such as
European Spirits Organisation, concerns over the significant number of fake spirits sold in China posing
a severe risk to the health of the country's consumers as well as the industry's profits (Food Quality
News, 2007).
4.6 Consumer groups
4.6.1 Which?
The consumer rights organisation, “Which?” does not follow a formal strategy to identify sources of
food fraud or mis-description. However, Which? occasionally targets food fraud as a specific area of
concern for its magazine or other reports. It is an issue that Which? regularly identifies as part of their on-
going work. There are several ways that Which? becomes aware of issues of food fraud or mis-
description, including:
- Direct contact with Trading Standards Officers or Public Analysts who alert Which? of issues to
investigate (Which? have held meetings with TSO and PAs specifically for this purpose).
- Contact with counterparts in other countries who may highlight areas that they are working on,
which have implications for UK consumers.
- Investigations or testing projects that that Which? undertake or commission highlighting problems
such as inaccurate or misleading labelling for example.
- Information provided by members who may contact Which? with problems that they have
identified.
- Joint testing projects with other consumer organisations (eg. through International Consumer
Research and Testing who are based at Which?)
4.7 Trade Associations
4.7.1 Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA)
The United State‟s Grocery Manufacturer‟s Association published a report in 2010, in collaboration
with a global consulting firm A T Kearney, entitled “Consumer Product Fraud: Deterrence and Detection”.
The major findings were that greater collaboration and information sharing could help the food industry
tackle food fraud. As a consequence industry could save $50m-$80m a year by sharing supplier audits,
and suggested that although leading companies already share information on an informal basis, they
could collaborate on many more levels.
The report also suggested that the food industry could follow the example of the pharmaceutical
industry in the U.S. for instance, which has a consortium involving biotech and pharmaceutical
manufacturers and suppliers to facilitate information sharing. In the same way, the food industry could
establish a clearinghouse of suppliers, collaborate to create monograph standards for ingredients –
which can be a prohibitively expensive process when companies aim to develop their own set of
ingredient standards – and develop a shared library of reference samples.
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4.8 References
Aviram M, Rosenblat M, Gaitini D, et al. (June 2004). "Pomegranate juice consumption for 3 years by patients with carotid artery stenosis reduces common carotid intima-media thickness, blood pressure and LDL oxidation". Clin Nutr 23 (3): 423–33. doi:10.1016/j.clnu.2003.10.002. PMID 15158307.
Dumoulin Marcel (2011) Results from a presentation made at the IAEA in Vienna, April 2011.
EC 2010a – COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT; “Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities- Own Resources, Agriculture, Cohesion Policy, Pre-Accession Funds and Direct Expenditure -Year 2009”, Brussels, 14.7.2010, SEC(2010) 898 final.
EC2010b – REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT; “Protection of the European Union's financial interests-Fight against fraud-Annual Report 2009”; Brussels, 14.7.2010, COM(2010)382 final.
EC Taxud 2000-2008 - EC Taxation and Customs Union
Esmaillzadeh A, Tahbaz F, Gaieni I, Alavi-Majd H, Azadbakht L (2004). "Concentrated pomegranate juice improves lipid profiles in diabetic patients with hyperlipidemia". J Med Food 7 (3): 305–8. doi:10.1089/1096620041938623. PMID 15383223.
FD&C Act (2205) http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/default.htm Accessed 15
th February 2011
Food Standards Agency (2008) Fraud database leads to vodka raid http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2008/sep/vod Accessed January 2011
Food Quality News (2007) Spirits group calls for Chinese counterfeit crackdown By Neil Merrett, 27-Nov-2007
Food Quality News (2010) Goodbye milk fraud, hello origin tracking by Jane Byrne , 23-Apr-2010
Kaplan M, Hayek T, Raz A, et al. (1 August 2001). "Pomegranate juice supplementation to atherosclerotic mice reduces macrophage lipid peroxidation, cellular cholesterol accumulation and development of atherosclerosis". J Nutr. 131 (8): 2082–9. PMID 11481398. http://jn.nutrition.org/cgi/pmidlookup?view=long&pmid=11481398.
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001R2065:EN:HTML Source: Miller, D.D. & Mariani, S. (2010) Smoke, mirrors, and mislabeled cod: poor transparency in the European seafood industry. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment. 8: 517-521 Accessed 15
th February 2011
Operation Wasabi (2008) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/wasabi/i_en.html accessed March 2011
RASFF 2010 - http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/about_rasff_en.htm# accessed January 2011
YouTube 2011 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpGFfzPvWOU accessed January 2011
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
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5 OTHER AREAS
5.1 Categories of food and beverage products identified from other sources
Information on categories of food and drink from other sources is not easily retrievable because
information on the levels of fraud are combined with other product categories because of the relatively
low incidence and specific food and drink products are not always listed in annual reports of customs and
other government organisations. In addition, the problem of lack of agreement on the definition of
counterfeiting and adulteration between countries referred to earlier makes comparisons difficult. Thus
USA customs include all categories of contamination whether deliberate or otherwise as adulteration.
Reports of fraud are often based on investigations by the industries affected. Thus, there appears to be a
recurring problem with mislabelling of fish and shellfish products with cheaper, more common species
being substituted for scarcer and thus more valuable species. There also appears to be a recurring
problem with contamination of meat and fish products with the prohibited antibiotic chloramphenicol used
during production to reduce infections, as well as with prohibited dye products to enhance the
appearance of the final product. However, there appear to be few definitive studies quantifying the extent
and economic costs of these activities.
A study of the economic effects of counterfeiting carried out in 2007 (OECD, 2008) concluded that
the“OECD survey has shed very little light on the actual magnitude and scope of counterfeiting in the
food and drink sector.”
Nevertheless, the survey did identify alcoholic drinks as the main target for counterfeiters in the
drinks sector because of their brand value and the high tax and excise component of final price. This
observation obtained from industry sources complements and supports information from EU records.
Other frequently counterfeited products according to OECD include: kiwi fruit, conserved vegetables, milk
powder, butter, ghee, baby food, instant coffee, tea, rice, non-alcoholic drinks, confectionary and hi-
breed corn seeds.
5.2 Health effects relating to counterfeit food and beverages
There is a paucity of public health literature relating to counterfeit goods. Data is fragmented and
of variable quality and includes anecdotal evidence, information from media reports, industry and
association bulletins and government reports. In a study in this area, Forzley (2003) concluded that:
“Direct evidence of the costs and public health consequences of counterfeit goods cannot be
found”. Despite this conclusion, food and beverages fraud has a clear human health perspective for
which national and global data is difficult to access because of the lack of national databases. Because
of the paucity of data publicly available in a study of the health and safety implications of the use of
counterfeit goods for a single year (2000), Forzley (2003) had to expand the scope of the study to include
reports covering the period 1995 to 2001.This is despite repeated reports at the local and national levels
of cases of poisoning from the consumption of counterfeit food and drink. The most frequent and
damaging occurrences relate to the consumption of counterfeit and “home-brewed” spirits, particularly
vodka, which appears to be a particular problem in parts of Eastern Europe. But recent cases of the
adulteration of milk products in China with melamine, to simulate higher protein levels, and the
subsequent sale of these products locally and internationally, resulting in the poisoning of large numbers
of people (and animals), emphasises the potential dangers resulting from the consumption of counterfeit
food and drink.
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5.3 Estimates of Economic Effects of food and beverages fraud
It is clear from conclusions from OECD (2008) survey and the study by Forzely (2003) that there
are no firm statistics available on the cost of fraud in the food and beverages industries. In a fact finding
mission in 2007 to obtain information available on fraud in the EU foods and drinks trade the chairman of
the UK independent Food Fraud Task Force concluded that: “The true extent and cost of food fraud is
largely unknown in other Member States”. Information is also difficult to obtain relating to food and drink
counterfeiting in the UK. A widely quoted figure of 10% representing an annual cost of £ 7 billion to the
UK food and drink industry is apparently not based on any published research and is largely anecdotal.
World Customs Organisation (WCO) estimated 5-7% global trade in counterfeit products in 2004
($512billion). Of this ~$49 billion was accounted for by counterfeit food and beverages (Spink, 2009).
Estimates of fraud relating to food and drink are generally derived from surveys carried out or
financed by large generally multinational; producers, industry consortia or anti-counterfeiting bodies.
Many such estimates come from seizures of goods at national borders after intelligence from industry
sources identifies shipments of potentially counterfeited products. Other estimates are based on
anecdotal information or perceptions by the industries affected generally by limited local data
extrapolated to give national, supranational and global estimates.
A wide-ranging survey carried out in 2006 (Gallup, 2007) provided data on perceptions of industry
sources and consumers on the level of counterfeiting of foodstuffs and drink in the former Soviet Union,
Latin America and Asia (table 3) concluded that the sale of counterfeit foodstuffs ranged from an
estimated 4.8% of total sales in Asia to 34.5% in the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Table 5-1: Purchases of known or suspected counterfeit items in 2006 (Anon. 2007)
Comparable estimates for beverages, including both alcoholic and non-alcoholic drink ranged from
2.9% for Latin America to 23.6% in the former Soviet Union. No attempt was made in this survey to
provide an estimate of the monetary value of these levels of counterfeiting in relation to the total level of
economic activity in the food and drink sectors in these regions, although, this would emphasise the
scale of the problem.
Action instigated against counterfeiting of alcoholic drinks by the European Brands Association
resulted in the seizure of more than 1 million items and the closure of 148 counterfeit production sites
with an annual production capacity of 155,000 cases of alcoholic spirits with a potential revenue value of
19 million euro. Estimates from Russia suggested that the levels of counterfeiting of food and alcohol in
Region
Product Former Soviet
Union (FSU)
Latin
America Asia
Alcohol, Soft
drinks, Mineral
water
23.6% 2.9% 3.6%
Food 34.5% 10.2% 4.8%
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
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2003 were 36 and 40% respectively with a combined annual cost of ~USD1 billion (CIPR, 2003). Data
provided by manufacturers and retailers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) suggests that counterfeit
products represent 0.33-5% of the total market of 3.5 billion USD (2005 figure) for food and non-alcoholic
beverages, equalling 10.5-175.0 million USD. Counterfeiting in this sector was thought to represent
around 3.1% of the total of all counterfeit products on sale (KPMG, 2008).
Sources in Italy (Federazione Italiana dell‟Industria Alimentaire) reported sales of EUR 2.6 billion
of counterfeit food products in 2002 (Anon, 2002). This figure includes both clear attempts to defraud but
also include products which had not been counterfeited and were not, therefore, illegal, but in the opinion
of Italian producers carried labels that could have led to the belief that consumers were purchasing a
particular product produced in Italy.
Few attempts have been made to estimate the global costs of food and drinks counterfeiting and it
is difficult to extrapolate data from national estimates and the data available are not sufficiently robust to
provide statistically acceptable estimates.
One widely quoted estimate from the World Customs Organisation (WCO) was that around 5-7%
of global trade in 2004 was in counterfeit products with a value of $512 billion. Of this, counterfeit food
and beverages accounted for approximately $49 billion (Spink, 2009).
Another estimate by the International Chamber of Commerce for 2002 was that on a worldwide
basis almost 5% of all products are counterfeit (Anon. 2002). The proportion of this figure attributable to
food and drink fraud was not stated. The data from which these estimates were made is difficult to
access and evaluate although it presumably derives from industry surveys.
5.4 References
Anon, 2002, Federazione Italiana dell‟Industria Alimentaire (FEDERALIMNETARE0) Viale Pasteur 10, 00144 Roma, www.federalimentare.it , 2002
Forzley, M. (2003). Counterfeit Goods and the Public‟s Health and Safety, 2003. Intellectual Property Institute, 906 Pennsylvania Avenue,
SE Washington, DC 20003. (www.iipi.org).
Gallup, 2007. Global Consumer Awareness, Atitudes and Opinions on Counterfeiting and Piracy. Third Global Congress Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy. 31 January, 2007, Geneva, Switzerland. The Gallup Organization, Princeton, NJ, USA.
KPMG 2008. Economic Impact Study Analyzing Counterfeit Products in the United Arab Emirates. Report of a survey carried out on behalf of the Brand Owners Protection Group (BPG), Jan. 2008, 43 pp.
OECD (2008): The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
2008.OECD 2, rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16 France pp 397.
Spink, J. (2009). Food Profiteering and the counterfeit product threat. In Feeding our Hungry planet Michigan State University Symposium
presentation.
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6 HORIZON SCANNING – CONTINUED AND EMERGING FOOD AUTHENTICITY ISSUES
Commodity prices may be a useful general indicator of the likelihood of economic adulteration.
Scarcity of commodities and basic ingredients may be a result of poor harvest, increasing transportation
costs, increased demand from emerging economies etc. and the overarching burden on food suppliers to
maintain their contractual obligations to large retailers to supply foods at a fixed price mean ther may be
enormous pressures to extend or by cheaper raw materials. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (OECD-FAO) have an
Agricultural Outlook database. This database is available under the „Topics‟ tab and then „Agriculture and
fisheries‟. tab of the OECD website www.oecd.org and contains agricultural commodity data for
production, price, consumption, import and export. The database includes historical data back to 1970,
where available, and projections to 2020. It is possible to browse the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook
database using 3 basic queries sorted by commodity (i.e. agricultural product), country (including
regions e.g. European Union) and variable (e.g. production, price, consumption, import, export). This
system could be used for the basis of a commodity price based system of horizon scanning for food
fraud and adulteration.
6.1 Counterfeit spirits and illicit spirit drink production
Up to a quarter of licensed premises in some parts of the UK have been found to have counterfeit
alcohol for sale. Trading Standards officials, who carry out spot checks, suggest it is a significant and
growing problem. Trade sources say fake alcohol is being made by organised gangs on an industrial
scale. This has been exemplified by the tragic deaths of five mean after an explosion at a suspected
illegal vodka factory in Lincolnshire (BBC 2011a). Furthermore, illegal alcohol stills are often poorly
controlled and may result in spirits that contain toxic concentrations of methanol that can cause blindness
after prolonged consumption. It is estimated that alcohol fraud costs the UK around £1bn a year in lost
revenue. Methods are available to assess spirit brand authenticity and the botanical origin of ethanol
present in wines and spirits, but the development of rapid „through the bottle‟ technologies would be
particularly advantageous to rapidly survey the extent of the problem in the retail market.
6.2 Counterfeit wine
This issue is related to the production of illicit spirits (paragraph 10.1 above). Large numbers of
counterfeit Jacob‟s Creek wine were identified by Trading Standards Officers in April 2011 (BBC, 2011b).
The counterfeit wine labels, whilst highly sophisticated in their artwork, contained two typographical
errors that allowed them to be easily identified. It is likely that other unidentified fraudulent products are
being sold in the UK retail market. If the counterfeiters had produced a label that did not contain any
typographical or grammatical errors this fraud would have been harder to detect. Validated methods to
confirm the authenticity of wine are well established. Using rapid non-targeted proton-NMR screening
techniques and isotopic analysis would allow a survey of wine products to be undertaken to assess the
level of fraudulent wines and spirits on sale in the UK retail market place. Unidentified fraudulent
products can cause long-term damage to brand reputations as some consumers will inevitably choose
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not to buy effected products again rather than question the vendor about the quality of the product they
have purchased.
6.3 Meat and Bone Meal/ Processed Animal Protein (MBM/PAP)
The Agriculture Commissioner for the EU, Mariann Fischer Boel, recently warned at an EU
Commission meeting that a shortage of soybean meal for animal feed could add to financial problems for
EU livestock producers. In addition, animal feed shortages have now hit the United States. Levels of
grain stocks are falling and the outlook for next year has not improved. This is now manifest in the corn-
consuming livestock feed chain, which can no longer sustain affordable supplies for producers of beef,
milk, poultry, and eggs (Executive Intelligence Review, 2011). Pressure will be growing to utilise animal
by-products in the form of Meat and Bone Meal/ Processed Animal Protein (MBM/PAP). There is
anecdotal evidence that feeding of animal protein is already occurring in some domestic and imported
meat and fish production industries. Although methods have been developed to assess whether
MBM/PAP is present in animal feed (SAFEEDPAP, 2011), there is still a requirement to develop methods
to assess whether animals have been feed MBM/PAP during production, when there is no access to the
feed, as is often the case for imported meat and fish. This is especially pertinent since the European
Commission is considering amendments of certain TSE control measures, without endangering
consumer health or the policy of eradicating BSE.
6.4 Pineapple and pomegranate juice
The economic adulteration of premium commodities such as fruit juice has been an ongoing
problem for many years. It has recently come to light through technological advances in isotopic
methods that the adulteration of pineapple juice with cane sugar has been going undetected. The
widespread adulteration of pomegranate juice with added water and sugar continues to be a major
problem due to the high demand and purported health benefits of this juice. Established methods now
exist for both of these juices that could be used to assess the level of fraud in the UK retail market.
6.5 The declared geographical origin of meat
There is general concern in the meat industry regarding the declared geographical origin of meat
when it is sold through restaurant outlets. This authenticity issue is often associated with terms such as
„locally produced‟; „locally produced organic‟ and „home-made‟. Most consumers are coming to realise
the environmental and economic benefits of eating local produce and are prepared to pay a premium for
these foods sourced locally. Consequently, unscrupulous traders have spotted a marketing niche with an
economic incentive to pass off cheaper meat as locally produced (Daily Mail, 2010). The development of
methods to verify the declared origin of uncooked meat are now being established and recognised but
they have not been validated for cooked meats (Defra Report FA0205, 2011). Research is therefore
required to establish the validity of the isotopic fingerprinting of meat geographical origin for cooked
meats.
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6.6 Manuka honey and other honey authenticity issues
There are growing concerns over both the quality and geographical origin of Manuka honey.
Awareness of the basis of the non-peroxide activity test, that gives rise to the Unique Manuka Factor
(UMF) rating, means that there is an increasing likelihood of physical and chemical manipulation of
honey to give a higher apparent UMF rating for inferior Manuka honey. Recent analytical developments
have provided the basis for definitive testing of Manuka honey authenticity (Fera, 2011). However, the
extremely high premium prices associated with Manuka honey mean that the economic incentives still
exist to try and subvert even highly sophisticated authentication techniques.
A recent survey in the United States showed that pollen has frequently been filtered out of
products labelled "honey" (Food Safety News, 2011a) The food safety divisions of the World Health
Organization, the European Commission and other National authorities state that without pollen there is
no way to determine whether the honey came from legitimate and safe sources. A survey of honey on
sale in the UK for pollen content could be conducted by the Public Analyst with further checks on the
botanical source of the sugars using validated techniques (AOAC method 998.12, 1998).
.
6.7 Sustainable palm oil origin
It is known that the traceability of palm oil and its derivatives presents industry with a significant
challenge to ensure their supplies are from sustainable and ethical sources. Palm oil production has
been documented as a cause of substantial and often irreversible damage to the natural environment.
Its impacts include; deforestation, habitat loss of critically endangered species such as the Orangutan
and the Sumatran Tiger and a significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Palm oil producers
have been accused of various human-rights violations, from low pay and poor working conditions to theft
of land and murder. The oleochemical industry modifies palm oil and its fractions using hydrolysis to
produce fatty acids and glycerine, and trans-esterification to produce fatty acid methyl esters (FAMEs) for
biodiesel. These FAMEs are often further modified to give a wider range of derivatives used in the food
and cosmetic industries for example. A pilot study based on the use of stable isotope technology has
been used to differentiate palm oil produced in West Africa, Brazil and South East Asia (Van der Veer et
al, 2011). Genetic methods have also been adapted to oils that have not been heavily processed, such
as extra virgin olive oil, such that PCR and DNA analysis can be performed to identify the species of
olive (Pafundo et al., 2005). It is therefore possible that similar techniques could be applied to palm oil to
identify species and possibly geographical origin. The major challenge is to refine these methods to
obtain a test that will work at a much higher spatial resolution within specific countries and ultimately
down to farm level.
6.8 Illegal fishing and fraud along the fish supply chain.
Eighty percent of marine fish stocks are fully or over exploited and there is also great concern
about the levels of discarded catch. Furthermore, widespread illegal fishing is a known threat to marine
biodiversity & ecosystems, it undermines sustainable stock management and has lead to a significant
social and economic impact on the fishing industry. In addition, the mislabelling of fish species is
widespread and has received a great deal of media attention, which effects consumer confidence and
trust in the fishing industry (TheFishSite, 2011). DNA barcoding is a well established technique for the
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determination of fish species and had been adopted widely by the enforcement community in the UK.
However, new developments have allowed genetic population markers to be used to determine the
geographical origin of fish in some instances (FishPopTrace, 2011). In addition, stable isotope and trace
element analysis of fish otoliths (ear bones) have also been shown to be a reliable tool to distinguish the
origin of fish and in combination with chemical analysis has been used to distinguish between farmed
and wild fish (Martinsohn, 2011).
6.9 Vanilla and other food flavours
Vanilla is one of the most widely used flavours and fragrances in both the food and cosmetic
industries. The demand for nature identical vanillin (the major chemical constituent of vanilla flavour) is
high. Vanillin produced from the bio-fermentation of clove oil (Eugenol) may be described may be
described as nature identical but Eugenol that has undergone synthetic chemical conversion to vanillin
may not. Differentiating the production pathway to confirm claims of „nature identical‟ are challenging
and methods are required to establish the method of production for vanillin and other food additives and
flavours claiming to be „natural‟ or „nature identical‟.
6.10 Spices (e.g. mustard and saffron)
Mustard is obtained by crushing and sifting the seeds of Sinapis nigra and Sinapis alba. The
majority of commercially sourced mustard is cultivated in Canada. The retail product usually sold as
mustard is a mixture of mustard, made with water, and vinegar into a paste and ready for use. There is
concern over the authenticity of mustard and the mis-use of common adulterants such as radish seed
and peasemeal (pea flour). Other prevalent forms of adulteration include partial extraction of oil from
mustard seeds before releasing into the market, addition of cocoa nut shells, Terra alba, „Martius yellow‟
(Potassium dinitro naphthalate). The presence of admixtures can be identified by microscopic
examination of the sample. Wheat flour and starch is readily identified by iodine test. Genuine mustard
contains about 5% of ash of which 1% is soluble in water. In the presence of organic impurities the ash
content increases generally up to about 4%. These simple chemical tests can be used to establish the
authenticity of mustard paste and mustard seeds.
The adulteration of high value spices in general is of concern including products such as saffron,
where geographical origin is also an issue because of cheap non-European imports being used as
substitutes for high value Spanish, Italian and Greek saffron. A recent pilot study has demonstrated the
applicability of chemical and stable isotope fingerprinting to determine the origin of saffron, which could
be developed and applied in a surveillance exercise in the UK (Maggi et al., 2011).
6.11 Botanical source of acetic acid in Balsamic vinegar
Traditional balsamic vinegar (Aceto Balsamico Tradizionale) is aged for a minimum of 12 years.
There have been cases reported in other parts of Europe that identify artificial products derived from a
combination of grape juices, vinegar, and caramel colours or „cooked grape musts‟ that attempt to
replicate balsamic vinegar. Balsamic is a product that is growing in popularity in the UK and does attract
a premium price tag. Validated and collaboratively tested methods exist to identify the botanical source
of the acetic acid in the vinegar and whether the water present is derived from grapes or tap water
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
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(Thomas & Jamin, 2009). These methodologies could be used to undertake a survey of UK retail
balsamic vinegars to verify the source of the acetic acid and water present.
6.12 Melamine alternatives giving a high ‘apparent’ protein content in foods
There is anecdotal evidence that other high nitrogen content organic compounds, that are cheap
and plentiful, are being sourced to increase the value of foods and food ingredients that are sold on the
basis of their apparent nitrogen content. For example the term "biuret" describes a family of organic
compounds with the functional group -(HN-CO-)2N-. Biuret is also used as a non-protein nitrogen source
in ruminant feed where it is converted into protein by gut microorganisms. It is less favoured than urea,
due to its higher cost and lower digestibility, but this characteristic also slows down its digestion and so
decreases the risk of ammonia toxicity.
Development of field based technology such as lateral flow devices may be applicable to the
detection of melamine and its potential alternatives because of the availability of suitable aptamers.
Aptamers are oligonucleic acid or peptide molecules that bind to a specific target molecule such as
melamine or biuret. A simple field based extraction protocol could be developed for products such as
infant formula or milk powder and applied to a lateral flow device containing a melamine or biuret specific
indicating apatamer.
6.13 Hydrolysed leather protein in milk
Media reported the abuse of hydrolysed leather protein in milk products in the Canadian mainland.
Hydrolysed leather protein is reportedly made from hydrolysing scrap leather and added to milk products
by unscrupulous manufacturers to increase protein content. This illegal practice causes food safety
concerns since metallic contaminants used in the manufacturing process of leather might be present in
the milk products. Because chromium III (Cr[III]) is used as a tanning agent in the production of leather,
the hydrolyzed leather protein should contain elevated levels of Cr (with the main species being Cr[III]
and Cr[VI]) even after the Cr removal process. Cr(VI) is a known carcinogen and can irritate or damage
the respiratory tract, gastrointestinal tract, and skin. Inductively coupled – plasma mass spectrometry
could be used to test for the presence of elevated concentrations of different species of chromium in
target commodities such as infant formula and milk powder.
6.14 Palm sugar authenticity
Palm sugar was originally made from the sugary sap of the Palmyra palm or the date palm. Now it
is also made from the sap of the sago and coconut palms and may be sold as "coconut sugar." When the
palms are 15 to 20 years old they start flowering and it is only then that they yield the sap from which
palm sugar is made. Palm sugar is analogous to maple syrup in that it is a premium product derived from
tree sap and has a high sugar content. Consequently, it is potentially subject to adulteration with
cheaper sources of refined sugar such as cane sucrose. Apparently it is common practice to add small
amounts of cane sugar to palm sugar during its production. The cane sugar might be used to „seed‟ the
crystallisation of the palm sugar crystals. The addition of added sugar is declared on some of the retail
products but not all.
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The Association of Official Analytical Chemists method for the determination of C4 sugars in honey
(AOAC method 991.12) was successfully adapted for palm sugar analysis (Defra report FA0207).
Assessment of the carbon stable isotope composition of bulk palm sugar and the extracted protein
fraction showed that significant quantities of exogenous cane or corn derived sugars are being used to
adulterate and extend retail products on sale in the UK. Between 50% to 70% of the sugars present in
the retail samples of palm sugar were derived from cheaper sources of refined sugar such as cane
sucrose or high fructose corn syrup and not from the sap of the Palmyra, Date, Sago or Coconut palms.
A surveillance exercise of retail palm sugar products could be undertaken on the basis of the developed
methodology to assess the extent of palm sugar adulteration in the UK.
6.15 Authenticity of Halal food products
A much greater emphasis is now being placed on the authenticity of Halal foods. Compliance with
Shariah law at the „molecular level‟ is now being recommended by bodies such as JAKIM (Jabatan
Kemajuan Islam Malaysia) that are providing Halal certification worldwide. For the implementation of
Halal product certification and Halal quality assurance in the supply chain, reliable analytical methods are
required. However, established analytical methods for Halal verification of food, cosmetic, and
pharmaceutical products are relatively few. So far the use of conventional GLC and HPLC systems has
been successful in a limited number of cases (Marikkar et al, 2005), and some investigations have also
been carried out on the use of thermo-analytical (Marikkar et al, 2001) and infra-red spectroscopic
(Rohman and Che Man, 2010) techniques. Of particular interest to the Halal Products Research Institute
is the use of stable isotope analysis to differentiate the source of ethanol and acetic acid in vinegar.
Products from petrochemical sources are permitted whereas those derived from the wine or spirit
industries are not. The source of gelatine is also of concern for Halal authentication as methods to verify
the animal source of gelatine are not straightforward due to the lack of DNA. Pork products are not
permitted in Halal food and porcine collagen is the most common and cheapest source of gelatine.
However, recent developments in proteomic analysis permit the source of gelatine to be reliably
determined (Grundy et al, 2009).
6.16 Organic food authenticity
Whilst the founders of the organic farming movement placed considerable value on close links
between producers and consumers, the demand for organic produce has widened this gap. The organic
sector is becoming increasingly dominated by corporate players that may not share some of the less
tangible benefits of the organic philosophy. Notwithstanding the pros and cons of this evolution of the
organic retail sector, the globalisation of organic markets must inevitably place an increased burden on
certification/inspection bodies and traceability systems on which the authenticity of the organic produce
depends. Six years ago, Siderer et al. (2005) proposed the introduction of supplementary analyses and
tests of organic merchandise in order to verify labelling claims. There have been several cases of organic
food fraud in the media (Mail online, 2011) including those relating to organic manures adulterated with
synthetic nitrate fertiliser (Food Safety News, 2011).
There are a range analytical techniques that have been advocated as having the potential to
discriminate between different facets of organic and conventional cultivation to verify labelling claims.
These include; established and validated techniques such as pesticide and veterinary drug residue
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
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analysis, stable nitrogen and oxygen isotope analysis to differentiate between crops grown with the
application of synthetic (inorganic) nitrogen or manure based fertiliser; trace metal analysis to establish
markers for mineral supplementation or the possible effects of arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi association in
organic soils; metabolite profiling, fluorescence microscopy, phosphorus nuclear magnetic resonance
spectroscopy and other potential analytical techniques. Despite the fact that many of these techniques
are not yet definitive, they can still provide useful intelligence on the level of fraud with the caveat that
there may be high rate of false negative results. Nevertheless, no single analytical surveillance exercise
has ever been undertaken to assess the level of Organic food fraud in the UK retail market.
6.17 Internet purchasing of speciality foods
The purchase of medication through the internet is known to be rife with fraudulent activity, such
as the supply of pharmaceuticals without active ingredients. However, the purchase of speciality foods
over the internet, that are difficult to obtain locally, should be done with equal caution if the supplier is
unknown to the purchaser. typically food authenticity surveillance exercises do not monitor boxed food
sales and they should be included in future exercise to assess the potential for food fraud.
6.18 Gross crude adulteration
There is evidence of gross crude adulteration occurring in food products imported into the UK.
The identification of „synthetic milk‟ composed of urea, liquid detergent, sugar, vegetable oil and water
was reported in India (Paradkar et al., 2007). Another example would be spices such as turmeric, which
may be adulterated with, Lead chromate (which adds colour and density to the product); Metanil yellow
dye or any starch based bulking agents such as flour or rice powder or industrial starches. Except flour or
rice powder, the other adulterants are toxic and pose considerable risks to health when eaten at regular
intervals for a long period of time. Whilst methods of detection are relatively straightforward, some types
of crude adulteration have not targeted because they have not been a problem in the UK for decades.
6.19 Food irradiation
If used properly food irradiation offers a safe means of destroying food-bourne bacteria. In the
latest E. coli outbreak, centred in Northern Germany, 26 deaths and over 2,000 infections occurred.
During the outbreak, linked to contaminated bean sprouts, food safety experts discussed the use of food
irradiation in “the battle to destroy illness causing bacteria” (FAO, 2011). Older attitude studies in the
United States demonstrated that given science-based information, from 60% to 90% of consumers prefer
the advantages „irradiation-processing‟ provides. When information is accompanied by samples,
acceptance may increase to 99%. However, in much of Europe (and in contrast with the USA) these
developments have been treated with considerable suspicion by consumers (Dennis, 1998).
However, as with genetically modified foods there is a requirement to provide consumers with
clear and concise information so that they can make informed choices about the food they purchase. If
irradiation of food does become more widely accepted then there will be a requirement for methods to
verify whether food has been irradiated or not as some consumers may choose not to buy these foods
despite the benefits of the decreased risk of bacterial contamination. There are many standardised
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chemical and microbiological methods for detecting irradiated food, many of which have CEN
accreditation (Delincee, 1998).
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6.20 References
Anon, 2002, Federazione Italiana dell‟Industria Alimentaire (FEDERALIMNETARE0) Viale Pasteur 10, 00144 Roma, www.federalimentare.it , 2002
AOAC method 998.12, 1998, C-4 Plant sugars in honey internal standard stable carbon isotope ratio method.
BBC 2011a, „'Growing problem' of illegally distilled alcohol‟, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-14151509 Accessed July 2011.
BBC 2011b, „Fake Jacob's Creek wine seized in off licences‟, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-12992242 Accessed May 2011.
Daily Mail, 2010, „The great local food scam: How restaurants up the price on items actually sourced elsewhere‟, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1315397/Local-food-scam-Restaurants-price-items-sourced-elsewhere.html Accessed January 2011
Defra Report FA0205, 2011, „British Beef Origin Project (BBOP)‟. Report Available at http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Default.aspx?Menu=Menu&Module=More&Location=None&ProjectID=18069&FromSearch=Y&Publisher=1&SearchText=FA0205&SortString=ProjectCode&SortOrder=Asc&Paging=10#Description Accessed October 2011.
Defra Report FA0207, 2011, „Identification of an internal isotopic reference compound in palm sugar to improve the detection of cane sugar addition‟, Report Available at http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Default.aspx?Menu=Menu&Module=More&Location=None&ProjectID=18071&FromSearch=Y&Publisher=1&SearchText=palm&SortString=ProjectCode&SortOrder=Asc&Paging=10#Description Accessed October 2011.
Delincée, H., 1998, „Detection of food treated with ionizing radiation‟, Trends in Food Science & Technology, Volume 9, Issue 2, 73-82
Dennis, M.J., 1998, „Recent developments in food authentication‟, Analyst, 123, 151R–156R
Executive Intelligence Review, 2011, http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2011/3837no_feed_no_food.html Accessed September 2011.
FAO, 2011, Food and Agriculture organisation, „Food Irradiation - a better way to kill microbes associated with food borne illness‟, Available at: http://www.fao.org/ag/portal/ag-archive/detail/en/item/80215/icode/?no_cache=1 Accessed October 2011.
FishPopTrace, 2011, Brochure „Traceability of Fish Populations and Fish Products: Advances and Contribution to Sustainable Fisheries‟ Editors Gary Carvalho, Eoin Mac Aoidh and Jann Martinsohn. Available at: http://fishpoptrace.jrc.ec.europa.eu/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=c21ccbef-029f-43da-b1cd-ade11e743301&groupId=10226 Accessed October 2011.
Fera 2011 – Food & Environment Research Agency, „Manuka honey testing‟, http://fera.defra.gov.uk/foodDrink/foodConfidence/honeyAnalysis.cfm Accessed September 2011.
Food Safety News, 2011a, „Tests Show Most Store Honey Isn't Honey. Ultra-filtering Removes Pollen, Hides Honey Origins‟ by Andrew Schneider, Nov 07, 2011. Available at: http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/11/tests-show-most-store-honey-isnt-honey/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=111107 Accessed October 2011.
Food Safety News, 2011b, „Organic Fertilizer Maker Charged with Fraud‟, available at: http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/03/organic-fertilizer-maker-accused-of-using-chemicals/ Accessed March 2011.
Guardian (2011) Wine alcohol strength 'systematically' understated on labelling http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/05/wine-alcohol-strength-understated Accessed 6
th July 2011
Gallup, 2007. Global Consumer Awareness, Atitudes and Opinions on Counterfeiting and Piracy. Third Global Congress Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy. 31 January, 2007, Geneva, Switzerland. The Gallup Organization, Princeton, NJ, USA.
Grundy et al., 2009, „Proteomic technique for identifying the species origin of gelatines‟, available at: http://thefera.co.uk/showNews.cfm?id=403 Accessed October 2011.
KPMG 2008. Economic Impact Study Analyzing Counterfeit Products in the United Arab Emirates. Report of a survey carried out on behalf of the Brand Owners Protection Group (BPG), Jan. 2008, 43 pp.
Maggi et al., 2011, „Geographical origin differentiation of saffron spice (Crocus sativus L. stigmas) – Preliminary investigation using chemical and multi-element (H, C, N) stable isotope analysis‟, Food Chemistry 128, 543–548
Mail Online, 2011, „Organic food fraud: One in six restaurants lie about the origin of their offerings‟ Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1363664/Organic-food-fraud-One-restaurants-lie-origin-offerings.html Accessed March 2011.
Marikkar, J.M.N., H.M. Ghazali, Y.B. Che Man, T.S.G. Peiris, and O.M. Lai. 2005, „Distinguishing lard from other animal fats in admixtures of some vegetable oils using liquid chromatographic data coupled with multivariate data analysis‟, Food Chem., 91: 5–14.
Marikkar, J.M.N., O. M. Lai, H. M. Ghazali and Y. B. Che Man. 2001, „Detection of lard and randomized lard as adulterants in RBD palm oil by differential scanning calorimetry‟ J. Am. Oil Chem. Soc., 78: 1113–1119.
Martinsohn, J., 2011, presentation at Food Safety and Authenticity 2011, 18-20 October, Crowne Plaza Brussels - Le Palace: „Molecular Technologies to Combat False Labelling – From Ocean to Fork‟
Pafundo, S. et al., 2005, „Traceability of Plant Contribution in Olive Oil by Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphisms‟ J. Agric. Food Chem., 53, 6995-7002
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Section 6: Horizon scanning
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is a clear difference between the number and type of food authenticity and food fraud cases
detected and reported by the enforcement community in the UK and the frequency and breadth of issues
investigated by private sector laboratories around Europe. There is a significant information and intelligence
gap in this area that is derived from insufficient information sharing between the food industry and the
enforcement community leading to undetected food fraud in the UK. The key to consumer protection is the
rapid sharing of information and intelligence, about suspected and actual incidence of food fraud and
adulteration, between the food industry and the enforcement community, without prejudice. Partnerships
between government and trade associations should facilitate information sharing and enforce laws and
regulations.
There is also a technology gap between the methodologies made available through the LA Public Analyst
and the leading analytical food authenticity research establishments. This means the most up to date methods
are not always available and/or LAs are not aware of the techniques on offer in the fight against food fraud and
food adulteration. A forum for enforcement officers to access the latest information on methods to determine
food authenticity is required e.g. workshop at the TSO/EHO‟s annual conference.
It would be appropriate to establish a European network of competence for analytical techniques in food
authentication, on a commodity basis, so that the latest technology and appropriate expertise can be readily
accessed. This would be analogous to the appointment of National Reference Laboratories for food
authentication as with for example pesticide, veterinary drug, dioxin, and heavy metal analysis. The appointed
food authenticity NRL could also train PAs in the relevant technology when appropriate.
Funding from the Commission‟s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation for a COST action
(European Cooperation in Science and Technology) could be sort to initiate an anti-food fraud intelligence
network, at the European level. Once established this AFFI network could seek to establish international links
at all levels between enforcers, practitioners, government bodies and consumer protection organisations. Its
aim would be to disseminate information through a specific food fraud alerting service to all relevant
international stakeholders and could be linked into existing systems such as RASFF.
Food fraud in the UK and elsewhere (FA0104) – Final Report
Section 7: Results and discussion
Page 50
The FSA‟s Food Fraud Team and Defra‟s Food Authenticity Branch could forge links with the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration‟s „Pathway to Global Product Safety and Quality‟ (FDA,2011). The FDA, in close
partnership with its foreign counterparts, plans to assemble global coalitions of regulators dedicated to building
and strengthening the product safety net around the world. With these coalitions, FDA intends to develop a
global data information system and network in which regulators worldwide can regularly and proactively share
real-time information and resources across the global market place.
Introduce a system of „horizon scanning‟ of emerging food fraud issues by examining correlations between
commodity prices and links with levels of fraud and differences between production and traded volumes. This
would be a move towards a proactive rather than reactive intelligence led system of detection of food fraud and
would be highly desirable. This links with recommendations for the requirements of a system covering EFSA‟s
mandate for automatic scanning of the Eurostat Comext database. Such a system should provide alerts to the
users, indicating for example i) significant increase of the volume of a given product over time to a specific MS
or EU in total ii) new trade partners iii) new food or feed commodities entering the EU. Furthermore, whilst
commodity adulterant or commodity specific analytical tests are useful, high throughput non-targeted screening
methods are the key to moving towards a proactive rather than reactive national analytical food authentication
system and have implications for food defence.
Recent opinion suggests that organised crime syndicates are increasingly behind cases of food fraud and
adulteration. Consequently, the detection and prevention of food fraud requires strategic planning and
investment within both local and central government with an proportionate and sustainable budget.
7.1 References
FDA (2011) Pathway to Global Product Safety and Quality http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/GlobalProductPathway/default.htm accessed 11 July 2011
8 OTHER SOURCES CITED
Anon, 2002. Federazione Italiana dell‟Industria Alimentaire (FEDERALIMNETARE0) Viale Pasteur 10, 00144
Roma, www.federalimentare.it , 2002.
Anon. 2003. A Brief Overview of Counterfeiting. International Chamber of Commerce, Jan. 23, 2003
(http://www.iccwbo.org).
Anon. 2007. Purchases of known or suspected counterfeit items in 2006. In: 3rd Global Congress Combatting
Counterfeiting and Piracy 31/01/07. Geneva, Switzerland.
Anon. 2008a. The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) 2008.OECD 2, rue André Pascal 75775 Paris Cedex 16 France pp 397.
Anon. 2008b.Economic impact study analyzing counterfeit products in UAE. pp 42. Brand Owners Protection
Group 2008
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Section 7: Results and discussion
Page 51
BASCAP 2009. The Impact of Counterfeiting on Governments and Consumers. Executive Summary of a report
commissioned by BASCAP: Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy. May 2009.
http://www.iccwbo.org/bascap
CIPR, 2003. Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR); quoted by www.foodanddrinkeurope.com
31/10/03)
EC Taxation and Customs Union (EC Taxud 2000-2008).
Forzley, M. (2003). Counterfeit Goods and the Public‟s Health and Safety, 2003. Intellectual Property Institute,
906 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20003. (www.iipi.org).
Gallup, 2007. Global Consumer Awareness, Atitudes and Opinions on Counterfeiting and Piracy. Third Global
Congress Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy. 31 January, 2007, Geneva, Switzerland. The Gallup
Organization, Princeton, NJ, USA.
KPMG 2008. Economic Impact Study Analyzing Counterfeit Products in the United Arab Emirates. Report of a
survey carried out on behalf of the Brand Owners Protection Group (BPG), Jan. 2008, 43 pp.
Spink, J. (2009). Food Profiteering and the counterfeit product threat. In Feeding our Hungry planet Michigan
State University Symposium presentation.
8.1 Additional sources consulted
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
European Brands association (AIM)
International federation of Spirits Producers (IFSP),
International Security Management Organisation (ISMA), Post Office Box 623 Buffalo, IA 52728
International Trademark Association (INTA), 655 Third Avenue, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10017-5617 USA
INTERPOL General Secretariat200, quai Charles de Gaulle69006 LyonFrance
US Food and Drugs Administration (www.fda.gov)
World Customs Organisation, Rue du Marché, 30 B-1210 Brussels Belgium.
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 34, chemin des Colombettes CH-1211 Geneva 20,
Switzerland.
9 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was financed by the UK‟s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Food Authenticity
Programme as part of their Food Authenticity Programme. The views expressed here are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Defra. The authors would like to thank all those individuals and
organisations that contributed to the information used in this report.