The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental Phenomenology · 10 The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental Phenomenology Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali fenomenologija

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The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental Phenomenology

Žmogaus somatikos mokslas ir transcendentali fenomenologija

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The Human Science of Somatics and Transcendental Phenomenology*


Elizabeth A. BEhNkEStudy Project in Phenomenology of the BodyPo Box 66Ferndale, WA [email protected]

Santrauka

Summary

Straipsnyje pristatomas žmogaus somatikos mokslas, kuris pirmiausia susiejamas su anksty-vaja Husserlio somatologijos samprata, o vėliau pasiūloma transcendentali šio mokslo pagrindinių prielaidų kritika. Kritiškai nagrinėjama psichofizinė apercepcija ir jos nuoroda į išgyvenamą mirties patirtį. Tada kaip alternatyvi somatikos prielaida pateikiama Husserlio kinestetinės sąmonės samprata.

Straipsnnis užbaigiamas fenomenologine kinestetinių sistemų analize susiejant somatikos tyrinėjimus su įsikūnijimo etika bei pagarbos kinestetika.

Esminiai žodžiai: fenomenologija, Husserlis, transcendentalumas, somatika, psichofiziologija, gyvenamas kūnas, kinestetinė sąmonė, kinestetinės sistemos, įsikūnijimo etika.

After introducing the field of somatics as a human science, I first link it with Husserl’s earlier notion of somatology, then offer a transcendental critique of the root assumption of such a science – the psycho-physical apperception – and trace the origin of the latter to the lived experience of death. Next I present Husserl’s notion of kinaesthetic consciousness as an alternative assumption for somatics, concluding

with some contributions to a phenomenology of ki-naesthetic systems as well as some suggestions for approaching somatic work in the spirit of embodied ethics and the kinaesthetics of respect.

Key words: phenomenology, husserl, tran-scendental, somatics, psychophysical, lived body, kinaesthetic consciousness, kinaesthetic systems, embodied ethics

* This essay was initially presented at the Nordic Society for Phenomenology meeting in Kaunas (April 2008); I would like to thank my Lithuanian colleagues for our memorable evenings of conviviality and phenomenological dialogue.

Prelude: The human science of somatics

What is somatics? Although a detailed description of the field is not possible here, I will offer some brief indications by way of orientation.

1) The first-generation pioneers in the field are roughly contemporaneous with the pioneers of the phenomenological tradition;1 as in phenomenology, however, new figures continue to emerge, with some

1 Key somatics pioneers include (among others) F. Matthias Alexander (1869–1955), Elsa Gindler (1885–1961), Heinrich Jacoby (1889–1964), Ida Rolf (1896–1979), Moshe Feldenkrais (1904–1984), Gerda Alexander (1908–1994), and Milton Trager (1908–1997); compare the lifespans of such phenomenologists as Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961). For further parallels between phenomenology and somatics, see Behnke, 1997b.

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carrying on the work of the initial pioneers and oth-ers developing new approaches. 2) Although it does include a theoretical component, somatics is above all a practical discipline, including many kinds of hands-on “body work” approaches in which a prac-titioner touches and moves a client’s body in various ways, as well as many “body awareness” approaches in which, for example, a teacher leads a group of students in experiential experiments focusing on various aspects of movement, breath, sensing, and so on (see, e.g., Johnson, 1995, 1997). 3) Somatic practice is transformative insofar as it can produce “deep change” (Behnke, 1982, 46) in our habitual style of embodiment (and thereby in our corporeal and intercorporeal life as a whole); for example, the Australian F. M. Alexander identified a global bodily pattern that has since come to be termed the “startle response,” teaching himself (and others) not only to be aware of this pattern, but to inhibit it and to reverse its effects, a practice termed the “Alexander Technique” (see, e.g., Alexander, 2001; Tinbergen, 1974). And 4) while transformative somatic practice can indeed be employed as therapy when things go wrong,2 it can also be used by people who are healthy in order to enhance their skills and their quality of life – for example, Gerda Alexander (no relation to F. M. Alexander) worked not only with paralyzed patients, but also with actors, dancers, and the members of Denmark’s Radio Symphony Orchestra (Alexander 1985).

Yet if the field of somatics basically consists of a collection of transformative body-oriented practices, why am I calling it a human science? Although the practices I have alluded to so far have their roots in the late 19th and early 20th century, somatics actu-ally became a “field” in the 1970s, largely through the efforts of two men. Thomas Hanna3 called for a new “somatic viewpoint” in 1970,4 and founded a periodical called Somatics whose first issue appeared in Autumn 1976; a letter to the editor from Don Hanlon Johnson5 published in the Spring 1978 issue

2 Somatic work is not only used to address “bodily” problems such as chronic tensions or postural imbalances, but can also be employed in conjunction with psychological work; see, e.g., Johnson and Grand, 1998.3 Thomas Hanna (1928–1990) was an existential philosopher who became a Feldenkrais practitioner, eventually going on to develop his own “Hanna Somatic Education,” now taught by his widow, Eleanor Criswell Hanna. His other philosophical influences inclu-ded the American pragmatists and the process philosophers—see Hanna, 2007, 5f., and cf. also Hanna, 1969.4 See Hanna, 1970, 73 for a convergence of method with pheno-menology, and 196ff. for Hanna’s remarks on Merleau-Ponty; see also Hanna, 1973, 1975.5 Don Hanlon Johnson (b. 1934) studied Merleau-Ponty with

of Somatics congratulates Hanna on recognizing “a generalized professional field that deals holistically with the body,” beyond the fragmentation of differ-ent schools or approaches. Meanwhile, Johnson’s 1977 book the Protean Body (which I assume was already in production when the first issue of Hanna’s Somatics came out in the fall of 1976) included the following statement:

I envision the development of a new science whose researchers would be educated in both struc-tural anthropology and the sophisticated notions of body structure and kinesiology inspired by the work of Ida Rolf. The goal of this science would be an accurate understanding of the interrelationships between patterns of body structure in a given culture and the larger social forms of the culture. The practi-cal goal would be to provide more clarity and power for those attempting to transform the culture by work on the body …. (Johnson, 1977, 125)

There are currently numerous training programs in somatics (including graduate programs), as well as a growing literature in the field.

But can we speak in any sense of a crisis of this new science – and more specifically, of a crisis to which phenomenology might respond? Hanna defines the “soma” of “somatics” as “the body experienced from within,”6 and in elaborating his “somatology,” he emphasizes the possibility in prin-ciple of a genuine integration of “first person” and “third person” perspectives on the soma, as in, for example, psychoneuroimmunology (see, e.g., Hanna, 1987–88/2004–05). We are nevertheless still living in a culture whose inherited categories leave little room for something that is neither sheerly physical nor sheerly psychological. Perhaps it is symptomatic that Johnson speaks, on the one hand, of physicians referring patients to him for hands-on somatic work because the patients were not responding to medi-cal treatment and “therefore” their problems must be “psychological” rather than “physical,” while on the other hand, he also speaks of psychotherapists referring clients to him for the same hands-on work because psychotherapy – which assumed that the problems were “mental” – was not fully alleviat-ing their condition, and “therefore” there must be

Edward S. Casey at Yale, eventually writing a doctoral dissertation on the relation between the body and the body politic and leaving the Jesuits to become a Rolfer (i.e., a practitioner of the “Structural Integration” developed by Ida Rolf). Johnson has explicitly em-braced a kinship between phenomenology and somatics – cf., e.g., Johnson, 1994, 119, 184; Johnson and Grand, 1998, 3, 10.6 This definition has appeared in Somatics ever since the Au-tumn/Winter 1988–89 issue; see also Hanna, 1970, 35, and cf. the emphasis on awareness in Hanna, 2007–08.

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a problem “in the body” somewhere (Johnson and Grand, 1998, 6f.). It is as if the official map of reality has only two regions, and somatics isn’t even on the map – even though it seems to share a border with each of these regions. Can phenomenology be of any help here? There are at least two ways in which to approach this question within a Husserlian context.

Part One: Husserlian reflections on the theoretical roots of a science of

the soma

A. Saving a space for somatology within the received topology of regional ontology

The theme of somatology appears to have entered Husserl’s repertoire around 1912 (see 5/5ff.),7 but surfaces from time to time, like a recurring Lei-tmotiv, for years to come.8 Somatology first comes to the fore in Husserl’s critique of science in Ideen III, and provides an excellent example of the way in which he appropriates and shifts the terminology of his time. The term “somatology” had already emerged by the late 16th century, when the study of the human being was divided between somatology and psychology; by the time of the positivism of the late 19th century, somatology was itself subdivided into anatomy and physiology. Husserl’s proposed somatology, however, is organized in a radically different way, for although it too has two branches, one is devoted to a material-causal approach to the body as a physical reality, while the other is based on “the direct somatic perception” of one’s own lived body (5/8), including an “aesthesiology” of localized

7 All references to Husserl, 1950ff. will take the form: volume number/page number(s); references to Husserl, 2001ff. will use the abbreviation HM, followed by the volume number/page number(s); Husserl, 1940–41 will be cited as NR/page number(s). My references to these sources are illustrative rather than exhaustive.8 A preliminary survey of materials currently available to me indicates that the term “somatology,” along with the related terms “soma,” “somatic,” and “somatological,” appear in Husserl’s wri-tings from 1912 to 1927. Significant mention occurs in the 1912 draft of Ideen III (5/5–19, and cf. also 4/65); in the Summer Semes-ter 1919 lecture course on “Natur und Geist” (HM4/185, 212, and cf. 217f. on the “aesthesiological”); and in the Summer Semester 1925 lecture course on “Phänomenologische Psychologie” and related materials (see 9/131f., 143, 198, 217, 220, 228, 390, 392f., 501, 505), as well as in the research manuscripts collected in Part One (1905–1920) and Part Two (1921–1928) of the intersubjecti-vity volumes (husserliana 13 and 14), with the earliest of some three dozen instances apparently stemming from 1914 or 1915 and the latest dated 30.I.27. and Jan.-Feb. 1927. However, see also 37/305, 357 (1920); 8/226 (1923); 39/146 (1925); 32/188 (1925 at the earliest – probably 1926); 39/272 (1926).

bodily feelings or sensations (Empfindnisse),9 along with, for example, investigations of such matters as the use of tools to extend the capabilities of free volitional movement (5/5–10, 18f.).10 In other words, Husserl identifies sensing/sensitive, freely moving bodies as a specific region of reality, with a specific science corresponding to this region, and thereby makes space within the received topology for a new region and its a priori (cf. 8/227; 32/225).

And with this, Husserlian somatology carries out a double retrieval. Not only is the experiential retrieved from the naturalized in general, but the specifically lived-bodily experiential register is retrieved in its own right and made available for an eidetic soma-tology (HM4/212) that would complement (but not duplicate) the eidetic psychology that Husserl also calls for (cf., e.g., 9/221). There are several positive points about this move. First of all, the retrieval of the experiential from the hegemony of the naturalistic prejudice (cf., e.g., 9/142f.) opens up the possibility of a new human science that would study the lived body as experienced within the personalistic attitu-de. Moreover, Husserl’s subsequent suggestion of a specifically somatological empathy that is already at work prior to the level of the “psyche” per se has important implications for a phenomenology of interspecies experience encompassing all animate beings (13/70; cf. 13/475, 14/116). And a somatology that embraces first-person experience of the body alongside objective research into “physio-somatic causal relations” (5/18) not only makes genuine

9 Husserl acknowledges that the somatology he proposes had never actually emerged historically, and suggests that the rea-son is because it not only requires “unusual phenomenological analyses” that can consider such somatological sensitivities in abstraction from the “apprehensional texture” into which they are woven (5/10; cf. HM8/134, 207, 352), but also presupposes a radical alteration of “our natural directions of regard” (5/10). However, the 20th century field of somatics provides some excellent resources for these tasks, and the possible connection between Husserlian “somatology” and contemporary “somatics” is indeed recognized by some figures in the latter field – see, e.g., Johnson, 1995, xv; 1997, 10.10 Here it is not possible to trace the vacillation of terminology that led Husserl to speak both of “somatology” and of “aesthe-siology” – see, e.g., HM4/212, and cf. van Kerckhoven, 1980, xvi. Some of the tensions that the terminological variations hint at emerge when Husserl is attempting to reconcile 1) the delineation of a new region that is simply “located,” as it were, between Natur and Geist – a region that is descriptively charac-terized both in terms of sensitivity and in terms of free motility (see, e.g., HM4/186, 212; cf. 30/281), and is the province of “somatology” – with 2) an account that attempts to show how the lived body mediates between “nature” and “spirit,” linking the “aesthesiological” Leib with its natural, “material” basis on the one hand, while on the other hand linking the “freely moving” Leib with the will, i.e., with the “freely active spirit” holding sway in it; see, e.g., 4/284, and cf. 9/131f.


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convergent measures possible, but can also suggest fresh possibilities for rethinking existing disciplines such as psychosomatic medicine (cf. Johnson and Grand, 1998, 9f.).

Yet there are difficulties here as well. First of all, no matter how helpful it is to retrieve “the direct somatic perception” that the experiencing investi-gator can carry out only in the case of his/her own lived body (5/8), we cannot make it the basis of our contemporary discipline of somatics without auto-matically (or inadvertently) accepting the received topology of the pregiven regional ontologies, for although we are indeed free to focus on this particu-lar stratum while disregarding other strata (34/49), the stratum in question is still only an abstract mo-ment of a concrete whole that remains implicitly in play (34/393). But this means that the retrieval of the specifically somatological does nothing to alter the inherited stratification that presupposes the physical body as a thing as the lowest stratum upon which the somatological, the psychological, and the higher, “mental” functions (and cultural achie-vements) are all founded (I will say more about all this below).11 Thus although Husserl enriches the received framework by making room for somatolo-gy, he fails to question the inherited conception of the human-being12 as a psychophysical unity, or the division of the sciences based on this conception. Instead, he continues to rely upon the notion of the psychophysical in spite of the fact that we do not actually have a direct experience of ourselves – or others – as being composed of two separate strata (cf. Landgrebe, 1984, 67ff.). But retaining the category of the “psychophysical” leads to serious difficulties, both in Husserl’s accounts of intersubjectivity and in his theory of phenomenological reduction (issues I cannot go into here). Such difficulties highlight the necessity of supplementing a phenomenological clarification (and enrichment) of a received tradition “as is” with a critique of its deeper, generatively sedimented presuppositions. And this leads to a second way in which Husserlian phenomenology might address the “soma” of somatics.

B. The possibility of a transcendental critique of the psychophysical apperception

11 For a Heideggerian critique of the body-soul-spirit model, see, e.g., Ciocan, 2001a, 64ff., 86 n. 72, 89; 2001b, 154, 156f., 172f., 179ff., 186; 2008, 83f. 12 I am using the hyphenated term “human-being” to highlight Husserl’s distinctive use of the term Mensch, which – especially in his later work – typically connotes a mundane reality constituted through an “anthropological apperception” (34/474f.).

If the theme of somatology entered Husserl’s repertoire around 1912, a new theme – that of the possibility of a transcendental critique of the psy-chophysical apperception – appears to receive its first explicit statement around twenty years later.13 Husserl himself does not develop this theme at length. But there is enough material for us to work it out for ourselves, and I shall sketch one possible line of development here.

One of Husserl’s problems in general is that he cannot clarify everything all at once. Thus he cannot simultaneously carry out a critique of every presup-position, or immediately give voice to each and every moment of the initial and, so to speak, “mute” concre-tion that he is investigating; instead, as he himself points out, we find ourselves explicating this whole step by step and stratum by stratum, guided by this mute horizon even before we know exactly what we are going to say about it.14 For Husserl, then, phenom-enological work on any particular topic presupposes a more encompassing whole. And as he continues to penetrate, year after year, ever more deeply into “the vast system of constitutive subjectivity” (17/277), his methods mature; the terms in which he is conducting the investigations are altered; and the wholes into which the analyses of particular topics fit begin to shift as well.15

For example, taken as a theme for scientific re-search, the world as a whole includes various regions of reality (cf., e.g., 34/266f.); the positive sciences

13 There are nevertheless earlier anticipations of this theme, perhaps beginning in Autumn 1926 – see, e.g., 34/79 – and cf. 9/394 n. 1 (1925), where Husserl indicates that the apperception in question is lacking in the sheerly egological sphere. However, such passages as 8/410 (1924) merely attempt to inhibit the natural apperception of oneself as a “human-being” without questioning the terms in which this apperception is effected, and are ultimately only a matter of carrying out a “psychological reduction” to a pure psychological consciousness (see 8/442f.). 14 “Jede Methode, die erste, sozusagen stumme Konkretion in eine theoretisch ausgelegte zu verwandeln, bewegt sich eben als auslegende und beschreibende in ‘Abstraktionen’; das im Explizieren im Konkreten Herausgefasste hat seinen noch stumm verbleibenden Horizont, von dem nicht eigentlich abstrahiert ist und gegen den man im Willen, die Konkretion auszulegen, nichts weniger als blind ist, von dem man aber noch nichts in Sonderheit hat und weiß, weil man nur in Schritten und in Schichten auslegen und Kenntnis nehmen kann” – 34/296.15 In what follows, I will move from an ontology meant to ground the sciences as a whole to a more explicit consideration of the lifeworld as a whole, and finally to an approach based on the cor-relational a priori as a whole. The order of presentation implies a historical development in Husserl’s thought – but each of these “phases” explicates something already implicit in the Ideen. For the plans and transformation of the latter, see, e.g., Marly Biemel’s editorial introduction to husserliana 4, as well as van Kerckhoven, 1980.

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as a whole will accordingly require the ontological clarification not only of their respective regions, but also of the system of all such ontologies as a whole (cf. 5/104f.; 8/457). Thus the material ontology that Husserl was working on around the time of the Ideen16 is not composed of a set of mutually exclusive regions standing side by side, but is a complex whole consisting of a hierarchy of strata governed by one-sided founding relations.17 Here we may speak of the physical, the psychophysical, and the mental, or in Husserl’s own language, Ding – Leib/Seele – Geist.18 According to this “layered” ontology, higher mental functions are irreducible to but one-sidedly founded in psychophysical existence; within the latter, the psyche is one-sidedly founded in the animate or-ganism, so that everything pertaining to the psyche is provided with a location within the natural, spa-tiotemporal world (cf., e.g., 3-1/116). And because of the psyche that animates it, this organism in turn is irreducible to but inseparable from the sheerly physical thing-stratum furnishing the self-sufficient basis upon which the entire hierarchical formation is founded.19 Thus even if we identify, within the region of the psychophysical, an experiential, first-person somatology, such a science still depends upon a particular abstraction that ultimately keeps a whole of a specific kind in play:

Ein Abstraktes ist von vornherein relativ, sofern die Abstraktion dem Abstrakten Geltungsbeziehung auf den umfassenderen Horizont verleiht, der also, obschon nicht spezial-thematisch, jederzeit in Mit-geltung ist, mitthematisch, und es in der Einstellung auf das entsprechende Konkretum vom thematischen Interesse mitumspannt wird. (34/54)

Somatology accordingly remains nested within the framework of the psychophysical, and the founding premise of the very notion of a region of “psycho-

16 Although Husserl does mention material ontology in Ideen I, at this point he is more concerned to establish the relation between formal ontology and the material ontologies (see, e.g., 3-1/25f., 36f.), and he explicitly defers any further investigation of specific regional ontologies until his projected “next book” of the Ideen (see 3-1/355f.). 17 Here we should recall that the notion of “stratification” plays a key role in Husserl’s static phenomenology in general, such that sheer “sense objects” are taken as the “primal objects” (4/17) founding further strata of valuing and of willing (or carrying out practical actions). However, the stratification model is placed in question by Husserl’s later work; for some indication of an alternative, see Behnke, 2007b. 18 In some writings, Husserl also adds a further stratum of Ge-meinschaften (see 3-1/354, 27/22, 8/446, but cf. also 4/316, 5/20f.) or Gemeingeist (4/199, 243; 30/282ff., and cf. also 14/165ff., 192ff.).19 See, e.g., 5/14; 30/280f.; 37/146, 295f., but cf., e.g., HM8/345.

physical” reality is (as I have indicated) that the body is most fundamentally a thing, even though it is a thing of a very special kind.20

During the ensuing years, Husserl continues to rely upon the notion of the psychophysical while developing a lifeworld ontology whose two main categories are “Natur” and “Geist,”21 each of which can become the province of a science through an abstraction that sets the other out of play: one abstrac-tion yields sheer nature, while the counter-abstraction yields the pure psyche (cf., e.g., 6/229ff.; 34/125ff.). Thus I am free, for example, to direct my interest toward the personal I while setting aside any ques-tions pertaining to naturalistic explanation (see, e.g., 9/227ff.; 32/129, 188). Nevertheless, the abstraction in question still stands on the ground of the pregiven world (cf., e.g., 34/3, 49, 137), which means that the psyche reached in this way (including the mental life of the scientist who is carrying out the abstraction) remains mundane (see, e.g., 8/361; 9/471; 34/465). In other words, even if the corporeality that is necessar-ily united with such a psyche is extra-thematic within the context of a purely psychological investigation, this mundane, natural body is still in co-acceptance in advance: its ontic validity is still tacitly in effect, along with that of the world as the concrete whole sustaining the abstractions.22 Thus even if I set aside both the naturalized body and the pure psyche per se in order to pursue – within the personalistic attitude (cf. 9/228) – an eidetic somatology on the basis of “the direct somatic perception” of my own body, I am ultimately still numbered among the things of the world (cf. 34/434), and I already know, prior to any disciplinary divisions, that my body is simul-taneously a real thing and a lived body with which

20 Cf., e.g., 4/152, 37/296, 39/615.21 See Michael Weiler’s editorial introduction, 32/xviii ff., for a chronological overview of the “Natur und Geist” theme in Husserl, and cf. 32/xxxix on the emergence of the notion of the Lebenswelt from the “Natur und Geist” context. The term Leb-enswelt is usually associated with the crisis (see, e.g., 6/105ff.), but appears in earlier writings as well. See, e.g., 4/375 (late 1916?); HM4/18 n., 187, 223, 227f. (Summer Semester 1919, repeated Winter Semester 1921/22); 37/307 (June 1920); 9/496 (1925); 32/198, 201, 240f., and cf. 277 (Summer Semester 1927). For a detailed account of the development of the concept of the Lebenswelt even prior to the emergence of the term, see Rochus Sowa’s editorial introduction, 39/xxv ff. 22 For a particularly strong statement, see 34/392f., where Husserl concludes (34/393): “Ist Psychisches in seiner Sonderuniversalität Sonderthema, so ist Natur ausgeschlossen – aus der Sonder-thema. Aber in weiterem Sinne ist doch Welt das Totalthema, … so bestimmt sich in allen thematischen Betrachtungen und Erkenntnissen von Weltregionen, von einzelnen Weltobjekten, Objektzusammenhängen etc. immerzu die Welt, die dabei immerzu das sozusagen stillschweigende, aber gemeint Totalsubstrat aller Thematik ist.”


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I am inseparably one.23 I take myself, in short, as a “human-being,” which means that I am pregiven to myself as a psychophysical reality – and this once again entails the root assumption of the body as a thing.

Yet for Husserl, there is also the possibility of approaching these matters in terms of an even more encompassing whole than the lifeworld: namely, constituting transcendental life24 along with its transcendental apperceptive formations, including “body,” “psyche,” “human-being-in-the-world,” and so on.25 Husserl had already recognized as early as June 1920 that the notion of the sheer physical nature that functions as the ultimate self-sufficient stratum within the received topology of the regional ontolo-gies can be seen in generative terms as a historical achievement (37/297; cf. 6/20ff.). And in a key text of July 22, 1932 (34/391–99), he brings the theme of a transcendental critique of the psychophysical ap-perception per se to unequivocal expression. Rather than naively accepting the regional articulation of the pregiven world, Husserl now wants to retrieve the “pregiving” subjective life26 from its anonymity and highlight the performance of the psychophysi-cal apperception itself as an ongoing achievement of this streaming, world-constituting life.27 In this

23 See, e.g., 8/491f.; 9/197, 392; 34/112. 24 Husserl points out (34/446–51) that for me as a human-being, living along in the naiveté of the natural attitude, the world is constantly pregiven as the anonymous substratum and support of all my actions and affections, constantly presupposed and accepted prior to any attempt to determine myself in my being-thus or to thematize the specific ways in which the world holds good for me (or for us). Thus if we reflect on natural mundane life, we are only halfway there (34/450), for the pregivenness of the world is but an abstraction (34/447; cf. 485): the return to the “pregiven” lifeworld must be complemented by an inquiry into the “pregiving” transcen-dental life (see 34/449, 582f.). Hence not only is the transcendental dimension of inquiry “more concrete” than any positive scientific interest (34/121; cf. 459), but the universal a priori of correlation per se (6/161ff.) becomes the most encompassing whole insofar as it is the concretion encompassing both “constituting” and “constituted,” both “pregiving” and “pregiven.” Cf. Kačerauskas, 2007, 345, on the performance of the transcendental reduction as an “act of stepping into a new whole” – one that for Husserl (8/269f.; 15/105) is the truly genuine concretion.25 See, e.g., 8/290, 418, 492; 34/50, 316, 474. 26 For Husserl, the “pregiving” consciousness (37/287) or expe-rience (34/70) ultimately turns out to be that of pregiving trans-cendental life (34/319); when the latter is brought to light, we are accordingly led to a radical shift in our research focus: “Die Vorgegebenheit der Welt ‘wendet sich um’ in die Vorgegebenheit der Konstitution der Welt” (34/452), leading to an epochē of all pregiving acceptances as such (34/483) – including pregiving passivity (1/112) – in order to make them available for radical reflection (34/451; cf. 299f.).27 34/398. Here and elsewhere (see, e.g., 34/290, 399), Husserl is concerned with the mundanization of functioning transcendental life: “Das fungierende Ich [fungierendes Leben] und seine für die

way the psychophysical apperception is seen for what it is, rather than simply being automatically swung into play, and it can now be thematized as a moment within a “hidden apperceptive traditional-ity” (34/363) whose “universal constitutive history” (34/363) can be brought to light.28 In other words, my theoretical interest within the transcendental attitude is directed not only to the world as a phenomenon holding good for me, but also to the history of the acceptances through which this world holds good, in its being and being-thus – which is nothing other than the history of the apperceptive life of generative transcendental intersubjectivity itself.29

Husserl was not able to give a complete historical account of the sedimented “network of appercep-tions” (34/156) whose correlate is the pregiven world. But he does link the psychophysical apperception in particular to the externally experienced body (see 34/79, 185), and even suggests that there may be an instinctual basis for the habitual apperceptive style that focuses on things of the external world,30 leading us to become things for ourselves:

Dabei ist zu bemerken, dass die habituelle thema-tische Richtung auf Gegenstände äußerer Apperzep-tion auch … den Gang weiterer Apperzeptionsbildung bestimmt, derart, dass auch die “bloß subjektiven” Erscheinungsweisen, die subjektiven Tätigkeiten des Denkens, Wertens etc. und ihre Gebilde, objektiv apperzipiert werden, also in der sie umspannenden Apperzeption zu Bestandstücken der Welt, näher zu

‘Verseelung’ sozusagen oder die psychische Realisierung, wie sonstige Realisierung, fungierenden apperzeptiven Erlebnisse sind noch nicht die realisierten, sondern die realisierenden (Reales konstituierenden). … Das Leben, dessen Fungieren Vorgegeben-heit und jede Gegebenheit apperzipierende Erfahrung macht, ist nicht selbst vorgegeben und apperzipiert” (34/251). Husserl goes on (34/252f.) to point out that the reflection disclosing such apperceptive performances can itself undergo a psychologizing apperception—but the latter can always be placed in brackets each time I return to a phenomenological attitude.28 Here Husserl is speaking of “traditionality” in a broadened sense; see, e.g., 34/302, 441ff., and cf. 159f. For a brief example of tracing the psychophysical apperception to an intersubjective experience of “objective” or “external” nature prior to the natu-ral-scientific sense of the “psychophysical,” see, e.g., HM8/14ff., esp. 15 n. 2. 29 See, e.g., 34/476f., 479, and note that the ultimate concretion accordingly turns out to be transcendental life as historical, intersubjective life, rather than the situated life of the individual phenomenologizing researcher (see, e.g., 34/199f.; cf. 15/109f.). 30 Here we might consider Husserl’s notion of an original objec-tivating instinct linked with self-preservation – see, e.g., 39/17; HM8/258, 331, and cf. the treatment of this theme in Lee, 1993. On the ubiquity of the basic category of the “thing,” see, e.g., 22/275; 16/passim; 3-1/25; 4/53f.; 6/141, 145, 383. And on the difficulty of shifting out of an attitude directed to the “external,” cf. 9/193f.

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Psychologischem und Psychophysischem verflochten innerhalb der Welt werden. (34/64f.)

Thus the founding assumption that my own body is a thing may have very deep roots indeed. Can we pursue the archaeology of this assumption further? And can we do so in such a way as to bring to light an alternative apperception that could serve as the founding presupposition31 for the discipline of somat-ics? Let us begin with the question of the Urstiftung of the received assumption. What sort of directly lived experience could motivate the apperception of the body not only as a thing, but as an animated thing? I suggest that the founding experience in this regard is the experience of the freshly dead. And I shall ac-cordingly pause here to consider not the biological fact of death, but the emergence of the very sense, “death” as a lived meaning.32

Interlude: The origin of deathThe notion of “the origin of death” is, of course,

an echo of Husserl’s own approach to a reconstruc-tive generative history in “The Origin of Geometry” (6/365–86; cf. 20). And just as Husserl imagines his way into the “first geometers” (6/383) whose inau-gural labors have come down to us as sedimented acquisitions, I want to trace the psychophysical apperception, as a received formation, back to its inaugural occasion. Where is the first human experi-ence of death to be located?33 Funerary rites in which the dead are honored in some way would seem to provide one clue, and these lie far deeper in the past than do the splendid tombs of kings; when we come upon these earliest burial sites, the flesh and the flowers are gone, but in the conjunction of bones and pollen we find at least some indication of the special recognition shown to the body of the departed. It is true that bones and pollen provide evidence only for archaeological reconstruction, rather than Evidenz in the Husserlian phenomenological sense. Yet Husserl does acknowledge a certain type of reconstruction to

31 Husserl’s detailed discussions in the 1927 Natur und Geist lecture course demonstrate that the celebrated appeal to “pre-suppositionlessness” is most fundamentally a call for critique of presuppositions (cf., e.g., not only the crucial early statement in 19-1/24, but also the later formulations in, e.g., 34/66, 176); in other words, the task of overcoming naive “prejudices” (HM8/41) does not preclude identifying (and justifying) founding “precon-victions” that allow sciences to proceed—see esp. 32/130ff.32 Here I can only make a small start on a very deep question. For a more formal discussion, see, e.g., Nuki, 1989 (and cf. HM8/xvii n. 11 to trace the published version of the texts he draws on).33 A fuller treatment of this theme would have to consider ins-tances of mourning among non-human animals (and presumably pre-human animals as well), something that cannot be undertaken here.

be used in carrying out an archaeology of experience (HM8/356f.), so I will venture some remarks on the inaugural experience of death.

In the first place, what is at stake here is the death of the other: death and the dead are experienced from the standpoint of the living.34 And in the second place, the founding moment sedimented in the “psycho-physical apperception” is the moment when the one who is dying stops breathing: when breath (psychē, anima) leaves, all we have left is the “remains” (which explains the logic of the one-sided founding relation); the person him/herself is out of reach,35 and is nowhere to be found on our shared earth or beneath our common sky. Thus the figure of the “psychophysical” is not first inscribed in the register of human history by Descartes, or by Christianity, or by the Greeks, but appears as soon as “humans” are seen as the ones whose lifeless bodies return to the humus, to the fertile realm of earth nurtured by decay. And if we accept, on the basis of this deeply sedimented sense, the thesis that the essential feature defining the ontological region of the human-being is that we are “psychophysical,” then we are character-ized in advance as what we will become – a lifeless body from which the animating breath or spirit has departed, so that being-a-human-being is being-to-ward-death from the beginning, and our mortality is our defining ontological characteristic.36

But think back to that key moment of experienc-ing the freshly dead: they not only stop breathing, but also stop moving, and breath itself is something we accomplish by moving.37 In other words, what

34 See, e.g., 34/427; cf. 433. Thus the very fact of death is a remar-kable kind of “fact,” since it is not “directly” itself-given for the one most concerned (HM8/427), but is witnessed and confirmed by others: although there is no personal immortality for human and non-human animals (see 9/106; cf. 109), the immortality of the intermonadic community is the presupposition for the lived experience of any personal death (34/471; cf. 473ff.). Husserl does nevertheless offer a description of the effect of one’s own expected death on the lived experience of an open practical ho-rizon – see 8/351f.35 Husserl emphasizes (13/399) that even if the stream of cons-ciousness of the dying person continues after death, the dead are excluded from the world that communicating subjects hold in common; cf. also HM8/102f., 445. 36 On this well-known Heideggerian theme, see, e.g., Ciocan, 2001a, 89ff.; 2001b, 165ff.; 2008, 85. For alternative approaches to mortality, see, e.g., Cohen, 2007; Lingis 1998, 151ff., 159ff.37 For Husserl, the kinaestheses of breathing do indeed belong to the realm of the “I can,” even when I am not voluntarily altering my breathing but simply allowing it to proceed freely (14/447); such “involuntary” kinaestheses thereby belong to the realm of the I in the broad sense even if the active, awake I is not explicitly involved (14/447 n. 1, 450, 452 n. 1; cf. 89, and see also HM8/336, 39/629f.). Note also that the living are warm and the dead grow cold (cf. Two A.8 below).


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is lacking in the dead body is primal motility – the sich bewegen können underlying the many modes of the “ich kann.” Moreover, primal motility is not most originally something that – like death – can be observed only in the case of the other; it is something that we can be directly aware of, in the act, in our own case.38 I accordingly propose that instead of assuming a regional ontology of the “psychophysical” as the theoretical basis of somatology, we can set aside the received topology – along with its root assumption that the body is a thing – and turn instead to the Hus-serlian notion of kinaesthetic consciousness39 as the founding dimension of experience to be addressed by the discipline of somatics in general and by somatic practice in particular.40 The task of Part Two will therefore be to suggest some specific ways in which this dimension of experience can provide a founda-tion for transformative somatic practice.

Part Two: Applying the phenomenological notion of

kinaesthetic consciousness to transformative somatic practice

The main theme to be addressed in Part Two may be stated as follows: what transformative somatic practice works with is not a thing called the “body,” but a living kinaesthetic consciousness. I will offer two sets of variations on this theme. However, I will begin by briefly introducing the Husserlian notion of kinaesthetic consciousness itself,41 even though here it is only possible to identify a few of the most

38 Many accounts of our ability to be aware of our own experience assume a “postfactuality” (Nachträglichkeit) necessarily pertai-ning to reflection: we are aware of our own conscious processes only after the fact, while the current experiencing itself remains anonymous (cf., e.g., HM8/2, 7). Such a model, however, takes what I have termed the “separative” structure of visual experien-ce as its tacit paradigm, and if we shift to a style of kinaesthetic awareness “lucidly lived from within” (see Behnke, 2006), we can indeed appreciate our own motility in the act.39 Here it is important to emphasize that just as the phenomeno-logical notion of “consciousness” cannot be understood either in physical or in psychic terms (24/242), the phenomenological approach to the lived body in general and to its free motility in particular must likewise refrain from thematizing these matters in either psychological or physical terms (35/84). 40 In this way I am attempting to carry out one of the tasks Husserl himself identifies for phenomenology, namely, not merely con-serving the heritage of scientific work as it has been historically handed down to us, but reshaping the sciences themselves, both by offering a radical critique of their existing foundations and by proposing new foundations (see 32/240f.).41 The classic introduction to kinaesthetic consciousness is Cla-esges, 1964; see also Mickunas, 1974.

important motifs characterizing this extraordinarily rich theme.

First of all, kinaesthetic consciousness is not a consciousness that is conscious-of movement of some sort, but a consciousness that is capable of motility. This is a matter of subjective rather than mechanical movement, and – as primal motility – it is not a matter of a change of location within an already-constituted space, but of primal space-constitution. Moreover, ki-naesthetic consciousness cannot be equated with the body as a constituted item in the world, but must be understood in terms of its transcendental constitutive role (15/286); here Husserl typically highlights the kinaesthetic “circumstances” of perception such that appearances are governed by kinaesthetic activity according to a motivational “if-then” logic.42 Under-stood transcendentally, then, kinaesthetic conscious-ness is a capability consciousness (cf. 13/422f.), and this refers to capabilities of the I or ego in a broad sense embracing both “voluntary” and “involuntary” registers.43 This emphasis on the volitional is crucial in distinguishing kinaesthetic consciousness per se from the “feeling” of movement that arises when specific kinaesthetic possibilities are actualized.44 And kinaesthesis as the original form of the “I do” (Cairns, 1976, 73) has its own developmental history, beginning with a global sich bewegen können and gradually acquiring mastery,45 leading to a diverse repertoire of kinaesthetic possibilities that are at my disposal in principle – even if in practice, I tend to reiterate the patterns that have become habitual for me (cf., e.g., 15/203, 290, 330, 661). Nevertheless, this ordered system of the practical possibilities of the “I can” is not only an ideal system irreducible to any momentary actualization of certain possibilities, but is always originally known as a whole, always

42 See, e.g., 16/passim. Note that Husserl even borrows the lan-guage of kinaesthetic “Vordersätze” and “Nachsätze” to express this “if-then” logic – see, e.g., HM8/52 (March 1931); Cairns, 1976, 7 (Aug. 1931); 15/301, 306, 308 (Sept. 1931); 39/634 (Oct., Nov. 1931); 39/617 (Dec. 1932); 15/578 (May 1933); NR/24, 29, 30 (May 1934).43 See n. 38 above, and cf. also, e.g., 13/181, 328, 331, 362; 9/505 n. 1; HM4/184; HM8/53, 258.44 The very term “kinaesthesis” expresses the associational fusion of two moment, kinēsis and aisthēsis. However, what Husserl emphasizes under the title of “kinaesthesis” is the “quasi-voli-tional” moment of sheer motility as a non-hyletic moment that is nevertheless accompanied by certain distinctive sorts of sensations in what I have termed the localization of kinaesthetic capability in somaesthetic sensibility; see HM8/320, 326, and cf. also Cairns, 1976, 7, 64, 73.45 See, e.g., HM8/235, 326ff. Such kinaesthetic mastery is a trans-cendental condition of possibility for the experience of a coherent, explorable world whose emptily predelineated horizons “I can” bring to fulfillment (cf. HM8/443).

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engaged as a whole in some way, and always in play even when we are “at rest.”46 All of this usually remains anonymous for the natural attitude, where we are typically focused on what we want to achieve rather than on the kinaesthetic “how” of achieving it. Like other performances of constituting transcenden-tal subjectivity, however, kinaesthetic consciousness too can be retrieved from its anonymity and described phenomenologically. But just as constituting con-sciousness in general cannot always be properly described in terms drawn from the realm of consti-tuted objects, the mode of givenness of kinaesthetic consciousness itself is radically different from the mode of givenness of externally appearing things: instead of being presented through adumbrations, kinaesthetic consciousness is itself-given, to and for itself, through the actualization of “a” possibil-ity within a more embracing consciousness of other possibilities that are not currently actualized.

Within the kinaesthetic system as a whole, how-ever, there are a number of particular kinaesthetic systems, each consisting of a coherent nexus of possibilities, not all of which can be realized at once (for example, I cannot simultaneously turn my head to the left and to the right). And although individual systems can function relatively independently from one another, they can also combine vectorially (as when, for example, eyes, head, and torso all turn to the left); stand in for one another (for example, holding the door open with my shoulder if my hands are full); enable one another (as when, for example, the arm reaches out to allow the fingers to grasp something); or hinder one another (for example, it is more difficult to run or skip or dance when one’s back is very stiff). Thus what happens in one system affects others, and there can be higher-order patterns governing a number of different kinaesthetic systems at once. But the systems that are at stake here cannot

46 See, e.g., 11/15; 15/304, 621, 652; 6/108, 164. Husserl uses the notion of a kinaesthetic “system”—defined in Claesges, 1964, 72, as “ein System der Vermöglichkeit, das jeweils aktualisiert ist in einer ‘kinästhetischen Situation’”—as early as the 1907 Dingvorlesungen (see, e.g., 16/section IV ff., esp. 200ff., as well as the 1916 elaboration, 297ff.), although the 1907 analyses rest on and carry forward work from 1893–94 (see 22/275ff., 416ff.), which speaks of “circumstances” but not yet of “systems.” The language of “systems” persists into the 1930s—see, e.g., HM8/327ff.; NR/29f., 34f., 222ff.; 6/109. It is of course possible to challenge Husserl’s terminology; however, as with many of his technical locutions, his reference to kinaesthetic systems must be understood in terms of the fulfilling experiential evidence, rather than in terms of the way the word is used in other theoretical contexts, and we should bear in mind that the systematicity in question here is a matter of the coherent horizon of capabilities within which each current kinaesthetic actualization (or complex pattern of actualizations) stands.

be equated with anatomical or physiological systems (as when we speak, for instance, of the “nervous system” or the “circulatory system”): they are not structures of a physical body, but functional ways in which living motility can be organized.47 Moreover, even though these functioning kinaesthetic systems are themselves disclosed by a species of kinaesthetic reduction (Behnke, 1997a, 182) highlighting certain subjective performances that typically remain anony-mous as we go about our business in the ready-made world of things and tasks, the kinaesthetic systems must ultimately be understood in terms of the cor-relational a priori. Thus in my first set of variations I will consider not only eight kinaesthetic systems, but also their correlative fields. And this necessary correlation between constituting and constituted is the theoretical principle accounting for the profound difference that transformative somatic practice can make in our lives as a whole: if somatic practice changes how a kinaesthetic system functions, then the correlative field of lived experience will be al-tered as well.

A. What is transformed in transformative somatic practice? Contributions to a phenomenology of kinaesthetic systems

Transformative somatic practice typically claims to address the body – indeed, the living, moving person – as a whole. And since each particular kinaes-thetic system is geared in with the total kinaesthetic system, then even body work directed toward free-ing a particular area from chronic tension – thereby allowing supple, responsive movement to emerge in place of frozen rigidity – will reverberate throughout the kinaesthetic system as a whole. However, such talk of work on a particular “area” of the body runs the risk of reintroducing the root assumption of the body as a “thing” with various “parts” (head, foot, arm, and so on). My aim in this section is therefore to present an alternative root assumption by offer-ing eight variations on the theme of kinaesthetic consciousness, singling out eight sorts of kinaes-thetic systems whose functioning can be transformed through transformative somatic practice. These are

47 Husserl sometimes addresses kinaesthetic systems in terms of specific lived-bodily “organs,” each of which governs a par-ticular range of kinaesthetic possibilities (see, e.g., 9/197, 390). Elsewhere, however, he questions whether kinaesthetic sequences, considered purely phenomenologically, have to be apperceived as movements of physical “organs” (see 36/165f.; cf. Cairns, 1976, 6f.), and even wonders if kinaesthetic functioning has to be localized in a body at all (14/547; cf., e.g., 13/57, 229, 256, 285, 293).


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nevertheless only distinguishable, not separable, moments in continual mutual interplay, intricately implying and influencing one another within a richly complex whole. Thus enumerating them is merely a theoretical strategy designed to identify certain dimensions along which transformations of our pos-sibilities can take place.

1. Most of Husserl’s own analyses of kinaesthetic systems address perceptual kinaesthetic systems, inquiring, for example, into the way in which the individual kinaesthetic systems of each finger function together in the touching hand, as well as distinguishing the “oculomotoric” and the “cepha-lomotoric” systems (along with the possibilities of rotating the torso) in the case of vision.48 “Seeing,” in other words, involves a lot more than just the eyes. And the difference between anatomical systems and kinaesthetic systems stands out even more clearly when we note the emphasis that Husserl places on locomotor movement – the cyclical movement of the legs in walking – in the constitution of the visual field in terms of inner and outer horizons. On the one hand, the very fact that the “indistinct” features of the façade are given in advance as predelineating the possibility of further clarification has as its con-stitutive condition of possibility my ability to move closer to the building. And on the other hand, that the building I see is not only given as having other sides, but also as standing within surroundings that can be explored in many further directions points back to the full range of locomotor kinaestheses that allow me to function as a moving center of orienta-tion. Thus for Husserl, the legs are effectively part of the kinaesthetic system of vision. Since he himself has already provided numerous descriptions of the role of “kinaesthetic circumstances” in motivating perceptual appearances, I will not go into any further detail here. In general, however, the correlate of each perceptual kinaesthetic system is a sensory field, and our deployment of the kinaesthetic system concerned in each case (or of several systems directed toward the same intersensorial thing) is motivated by the possibility of bringing what is perceived to optimal givenness (see, e.g., 14/235, HM8/52f., 39/204f.).

48 See, e.g., 16/306, 15/296, NR/217; 16/200ff., 309ff. Note that although Landgrebe 1984, 60, defines kinaesthesis as “a movement which is aware of itself in the process of its own execution,” he also acknowledges that we are “generally not even aware of,” e.g., our eye movements, and even suggests that they “are only accessible to us by means of external observation.” However, transformative somatic practice offers many ways in which to cultivate our awareness of the typically unnoticed kinaesthetic “how” of our perceptual commerce with the world.

2. We might also consider, for example, not only the kinaesthetic systems of the touching hands, but also those of the grasping, shaping hands, along with the other kinaesthetic systems whose correlate is the world as a field for practical action.49 The practical kinaesthetic system is goal-directed, realizing its possibilities “in-order-to” do something or other, and the special act of incorporating a tool into my own kinaesthetic system can alter the effects of my actions in very significant ways. Here both the differentiation between and the coordination among kinaesthetic systems can be quite complex (cf. 39/397f.), espe-cially in, for example, music, dance, and sports. But even the performance of a relatively simple practical gesture in one particular kinaesthetic system will require certain precise adjustments in other systems, so that what is enacted “locally” entails the “global” participation of the kinaesthetic system as a whole. (Think, for instance, of what has to happen in the total kinaesthetic system when I am throwing or kicking or catching a ball.) A morphological eidet-ics of practical kinaesthetic systems has yet to be carried out, but might identify, for example, actions carried out by paired systems working symmetrically (as when, for example, we hug someone with both arms, or use two hands to push up a window) in contrast to actions where there is marked asymmetry between two systems, each actualizing very differ-ent kinaesthetic possibilities that must nevertheless be quite precisely coordinated (as in, for instance, playing the violin). Or consider the kinaesthetics of appropriating an object by picking it up and carrying it, along with such variations as maintaining control over an object while touching it only intermittently, as in dribbling a basketball. In general, however, just as perceptual kinaesthetic systems are guided by

49 Cf., e.g., 34/449, 465. For Husserl, perception itself is a primal lived-bodily praxis founding all other forms of praxis (39/383; cf. HM8/238). However, he also distinguishes 1) world-experience as a constant process of affection and apperception, leading to bringing whatever is there to itself-givenness and determining it in more detail, from 2) the life of action that alters what already exists in the world (34/361). He is thereby contrasting 1) kina-estheses whose function is strictly perceptual and 2) practical kinaestheses that intervene in the world in some way (39/396f.). However, he also points out that there are not two different sets of kinaestheses, one for perceiving and one for acting, but rather two intertwined modes of functioning: “Es handelt sich nicht um zwei getrennte Sorten von Kinästhesen, sondern um zweierlei Weisen des Zusammenfungierens der in der Einheit des kinäst-hetischen Systems mannigfach sich gliedernden Kinästhesen” (39/397). Husserl typically mentions pushing, shoving, and lifting as examples of practical action (see, e.g., 9/197, 463; 15/299 n. 1; 39/399, 617), and notes that such practical achievements are correlative to one’s capabilities, e.g., the strength currently at one’s disposal (HM8/227).

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the goal of optimal givenness, practical kinaesthetic systems are guided by the success or failure of the action in question (cf., e.g., HM8/235).

3. But we must also note that practical action typically requires upright posture as its practical presupposition. Achieving and maintaining upright posture is one of the main functions of the kinaes-thetic system of “making a body.” The notion of “making a body” is meant to recall such phrases as “making a face” or “making a fist,” but involves the ongoing (and typically anonymous) kinaesthetic organization of the body as a whole, even prior to carrying out specific acts of external perception or performing any specific practical gestures. Else-where I have specified various dimensions along which making a body proceeds (Behnke, 1997a, 186ff.; 2005, §2). Here, however, I would like to suggest that the correlate of this complex kinaes-thetic system of making a body is not merely the body-as-made at any given moment. Instead, one’s own deeply sedimented style of making a body si-multaneously perpetuates past patterns and shapes future possibilities, opening a relational field of “that to which I respond in a certain way” – think, for example, of a way of making a body in which cringing, or bracing, or enduring, or resisting pre-dominates, or of a body in which the startle response is habitually in play. Such examples remind us that making a body is not merely a matter of the personal history of an isolated individual, but is carried out by a socially shaped kinaesthetic consciousness (Behnke, 2007a; in press).

4. Many transformative somatic practices empha-size our relation to gravity and to the ground. This goes beyond the question of upright posture per se, and involves a kinaesthetic dialogue not only with an abiding up-down axis, but also with a variety of surfaces that invite certain kinaesthetic possibilities and discourage others – think, for example, of how the surfaces on which ice hockey and basketball are played relate to varieties of gliding or sliding on the one hand and jumping (or bouncing) on the other. Such matters can be studied phenomenologically by turning to the kinaesthetic systems of balance and support, whose correlate can accordingly be termed the fields of balance and support (both in order to avoid the naturalistic connotations of the word “gravity,” and to recognize that we may be supported by what we lean back against as well as by the ground under our feet or the surface we are sitting on).50 Since I have addressed these matters

50 For examples of Husserl’s (scarce) comments on the lived experience of being upright in gravity while giving one’s weight

elsewhere (Behnke, 2003, 43ff.), here too I will merely mention that it is not only a question of, for example, the degree to which I am letting my weight settle into the surface that supports me, but also of deploying my own momentum while keeping my balance as I move – something that involves far more than anatomical “organs” of balance in the inner ear. For example, if I am about to fall, the kinaesthetic system involved in regaining my balance may recruit an appropriate kinaesthetic possibility from almost anywhere within the total kinaesthetic system,51 which demonstrates once again that the systems I am describing are functional rather than structural: they are coherent systems of possibilities, not all of which will be actualized at any given moment, rather than extended simultaneous arrays of partes extra partes like the skeleton.

5. Breath is another important focus of many transformative somatic practices, and here too the kinaesthetic system of breathing encompasses more than the “respiratory system” as it is typically treated in anatomy and physiology. Thus it is not merely a matter of passageways and lungs, but of the elasticity with which the torso can respond to the movement of the breath: just as wearing a piece of clothing that is too tight can impede breathing, we can also speak of wearing a body that is too tight,52 and we can work toward gaining more freedom in the kinaesthetic systems concerned, including the sides and the back as well as the chest and the belly. The kinaesthetic system of breathing is particularly interesting, not only because it provides an experiential basis for the psychophysical apperception, but also because it simultaneously grounds our speaking and singing,53 and works in very intimate coordination with the kinaesthetic systems involved in eating and drink-ing, so that we can swallow without choking (and even talk with our mouths full). If we inquire into the correlate of the kinaesthetic system of breathing

to the ground, see 13/284, NR/217.51 Think, for example, of the kinds of arm gestures that may spontaneously arise when you are attempting to keep your balan-ce while walking across an extremely slippery surface. Balance can also involve prosthetic extensions of the body (e.g., the long pole a tightrope walker may use), and there can be intercorporeal balancing acts as well, as when, for instance, a child learning to ride a bicycle is accompanied by an adult steadying the bicycle with one light touch of the finger.52 This example is drawn from Speads, 1992, 68: when the chest or rib cage is too stiff, “the problem is not a piece of clothing you have been wearing too tightly; you have been wearing yourself too tightly, if I may say so!”53 See 14/337 on the role of the kinaesthetics of speaking and singing in the constitution of another lived-bodily subjectivity. For a Merleau-Pontyan approach to a “community of respiration,” see Berndtson, 2007.


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per se, however, we find what may be termed the field of the breathable and the unbreathable. Perhaps the epitome of the breathable would be the fresh air of an invigorating forest; in contrast, unaccustomed altitude may make it harder to breathe. But the unbreathable takes many other forms as well. For example, the room can seem “stuffy”; we may be caught in a dust storm; there may be smoke, or air pollution; or perhaps there is a very bad smell in the air. We also unfortunately have to consider tear gas, as well as poison gas (whether on the battlefields of World War I, in the gas chambers of World War II, or as a terrorist threat today). And since for us the very medium of the breathable is air rather than water, it is imperative that I mention (and condemn) the use by the United States of waterboarding as torture – something that may inscribe no obvious wounds on the victim, but profoundly violates the kinaesthetic system of breathing.

6. Another extremely important kinaesthetic sys-tem may be termed the affective kinaesthetic system as a primal openness to the field of affective salience that is the primal genetic form of the physiognomic world. Since I have discussed this elsewhere as well (Behnke, 2008a, 2008b), here I will merely emphasize that this has to do not with the kinaes-thetics of “doing,” but with the kinaesthetics of “undergoing,” of being-affected by something – for example, by the subtle intercorporeal vectors of the interkinaesthetic field – and allowing ourselves to be moved by it in the manner proper to feeling (cf. HM8/351f.), rather than closing ourselves off and refusing it our complicity. In other words, here it is a matter of appreciating the kinaesthetic dynamics of sensing rather than determining what is sensed in the sensing – a matter of turning to the kinaesthetic “how of the receivingness” rather than focusing solely on the “how of the givenness” of whatever it is that we are experiencing. Thus in a sense this is a meta-system informing the kinaesthetic system as a whole, yet specifying a particular moment in the deep structure of its functioning. And here too such situations as war, foreign occupation, terrorist threat, or ongoing genocide not only leave their hor-rific traces in the visible flesh of their victims, but also inscribe invisible violations at very profound levels, uprooting us from the shared world of safety and trust (cf. Behnke, 2002).

7. Yet another kinaesthetic meta-system might be termed the system of immediate efficacy—of what is immediately possible, kinaesthetically, “from here” (and its important subsystem of “what is needed

next here”54). In other words, any given kinaesthetic constellation has its immediately adjacent “halo”55 of possible directions in which further kinaesthetic movement might proceed, and every other pos-sibility (within the kinaesthetic system as a whole) lying beyond this halo of immediate adjacency can be actualized only through some sort of mediated, path-like adjacency. This is not because I currently lack the technology for teleporting myself from place to place within an already-constituted space and reaching a new location without actually having traversed the intervening trajectory, but because it is once again a matter of primal space-constitution, of a spatialization that proceeds at the leading edge of kinaesthetic enactment as well as at the leading edge of the living present – a matter of the space I originally “make” by moving into it prior to having a ready-made world extended before me. Thus we might refer to the correlate of the kinaesthetic system of immediate efficacy as the primal genetic form of the world as a field of freedom for situated motil-ity. More specifically, however, the leading edge of whatever kinaesthetic constellation is actually realized here and now opens both the field of habit and the field of its possible transformation, for it is only here that I can either proceed with the reitera-tion of a habitual kinaesthetic possibility or allow an alternative possibility to be realized (Behnke, 2004, 35ff.). The implications that all of this might have for transformative somatic practice are yet to be fully worked out. But in order to provide a more concrete example of the application of a phenomenological theory of kinaesthetic systems to transformative somatic practice, I will close this first set of varia-tions with a brief phenomenological description of a complex pair of systems involving all of the systems discussed so far.

8. The twin kinaesthetic systems I want to discuss here might be termed the kinaesthetic systems of coping and recuperation, and their correlates are, respectively, the field of situational demands and the field of replenishment. The system of coping involves mobilizing one’s efforts to meet the needs

54 The notion of allowing “what is needed next here” to emerge is an important principle in both the transformative somatic prac-tice inaugurated by Elsa Gindler, enriched by Heinrich Jacoby, and brought to the United States (where it is known as Sensory Awareness) by Charlotte Selver – cf. Behnke, 2007a, 79ff., 86 n. 6 – and the Focusing practice developed by phenomenologist Eugene T. Gendlin (see www.focusing.org). 55 As Claesges, 1964, 75 n. 1, remarks, “Zu jeder kinästhetischen Situation gehört ein ‘Spielraum von kinästhetischen Bewegungen, die ich von da aus vermöglichen kann’”; the quotation is from Husserl’s Ms. D 12 I (1931), 13. Cf. Behnke, 2005, §5.

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of the occasion, and I shall take an extreme case as my example – one in which “emergency” modes of rising to the occasion and coping with its demands have become part of one’s sedimented style of kinaes-thetic comportment as a whole, leading to a build-up of chronic “holding patterns” in which certain kinaesthetic possibilities are ongoingly actualized without respite. It is as if one is constantly on alert, in anxious anticipation of the next demand, tensed up to cope with whatever comes while tight with worry about not being able to cope, thus continually braced for the worst while trying as hard as one can, giving it one’s best effort without let-up.56 This global or existential kinaesthetic attitude is essentially directed toward the world and toward others, and its correlate is everyday life in our times (graduate school, the job market, productivity in the workplace, meeting the deadlines, and so on).

In contrast, the correlate of the kinaesthetic system of recuperation is one’s own lived body as a flow-ing field of warmth and recovery. The performances serving as the constitutive condition of possibility for this matrix of replenishment might include exercising an effective epochē that deactivates the dynamics of “coping” in order to allow some time to meet the needs of the constitutive kinaesthetic system itself (rather than ignoring these needs completely or sub-ordinating them to the demands of the surrounding situation). Thus, for example, I may place my cur-rent practical projects in brackets; lie down in a safe, warm place and close my eyes; set aside the habitual style of experiencing in which I am directed toward the world rather than my own life; and experiment with a kinaesthetic “openness” toward the affective saliences arising within the somaesthetic field while allowing these saliences to motivate shifts at the leading edge of the current kinaesthetic constellation, perhaps letting my weight settle more fully into the surface that supports me or making room for a fuller, freer breath. In this way I am not only allowing my own way of making a body to come to awareness, but offering an opportunity for the kinaesthetic vec-tors in place to shift and habitual rigidities to melt. In addition, however, I can perform what might be called an inner gesture of hospitality – for example, an inner gesture of “spreading” in the palms of my hands, as one would spread one’s fingers (yet without this gesture actually “going anywhere” in space). Such an inner gesture of easing constriction can allow

56 As Tinbergen 1974, 25, notes, what is at stake here is “culturally determined stress,” including “the cowed posture that one assumes when one feels that one is not quite up to one’s work, when one feels insecure.”

my cold hands to warm up, so that I may feel, for example, an initial tingling, then a pulsing liquidity, a vibrational “glow” of warmth gradually spreading to other kinaesthetic systems, so that my breathing changes and I sense myself in flowing communion with my surroundings, letting things be and simply allowing myself to be replenished and nourished before returning – with more serenity and resilience than before – to the world of “coping.”

Now all of this can also be addressed physiologi-cally, in terms of our bodily response to “stress” (in neuromuscular as well as biochemical terms) and by way of the contrast between “sympathetic” and “parasympathetic” dominance within the autonomic nervous system. Yet current approaches to these matters often assume a psychophysical paradigm in which these sheerly “bodily” processes are beyond direct “conscious” control and can only be affected indirectly – for example, by using relaxation routines involving imagery, or by using biofeedback technol-ogy to bridge the gap between the “voluntary” and the “involuntary.” The advantage of the phenomeno-logical approach lies in bringing the kinaesthetics of coping and recuperation to direct awareness in their own right, including the possibility of learning to perform an inner gesture of easing constriction that allows us to experience our own flesh as a warm and fluid medium through which kinaesthetic impulses are free to move. Such a possibility can thus illustrate the relevance of a phenomenology of kinaesthetic consciousness for awareness practices within the field of somatics in general, and for what I call restora-tive embodiment work in particular. But what about hands-on body work practices?

B. How can hands-on body work address kinaesthetic consciousness?

This question forms the basis for my second, shorter set of variations on the theme of kinaes-thetic consciousness; once again there will be eight variations, this time emphasizing various kinds of counterpoint between two kinaesthetic conscious-nesses. And the principle guiding this counterpoint may be stated as follows: I cannot “grasp” another’s kinaesthetic consciousness as if it were a thing, but once I recognize it, I can partner it in a number of ways. Thus the client is to be taken as a kinaesthetic consciousness (rather than merely as a “body”), and the question guiding the practitioner involves the kinaesthetics of respect for such a consciousness.

1. First of all, in touching the other, we are not making physical contact with an inert mass, but


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touching someone who is thereby touched – and who is kinaesthetically receiving this touch in a particular way (for example, gratefully welcoming it and blos-soming under it, or perhaps flinching away from it, or enduring the fact of it while remaining inwardly barricaded against the feel of it, and so on). Thus the work is not a matter of physical manipulation, but of dialogue between one sentient/sensitive motility and another.57 And the practitioner who approaches his/her work in the spirit of an embodied ethics or “corporeal ‘ethos’” (Mickunas, 1987, 40) must accordingly respect what is going on in the interki-naesthetic field, staying aware of boundaries, zones of permeability and resonance, and so on.

2. We may also want to use our hands to suggest a possible line of movement for the other, perhaps thereby retrieving kinaesthetic possibilities that have been occluded or are seldom used, but can be restored to the repertoire of the other’s I-can. Thus rather than attempting, for example, to apply physical force in order to break down adhesions in the connective tissue and give the physical body a greater range of motion, I gently feel my way into whatever leeway is already there, respecting its limits and proposing (rather than imposing) a possible change.

3. A further variation involves respecting a habitu-al kinaesthetic vector already in place – for example, one curving the shoulder forward – as if it were a gesture that the client was making on purpose, and meeting this gesture halfway, as it were, by resisting it with an equal and opposite gesture of exactly the same strength, thereby retrieving this gesture from its anonymity, restoring its halo of further possibilities “from here” and allowing it to shift.

4. Conversely, I can match the same shoulder-shaping gesture by using my own hands to help maintain this gesture exactly as is; once the kinaes-thetic system in question has been relieved of the task of maintaining the habitual shape, its usual holding patterns are free to move on toward “whatever is needed next here.”

5. A related possibility involves literally sup-porting another’s gesture – for example, by using one’s own hands to take the weight of the other’s outstretched arm – and this can similarly open up further possible ways for the client to accomplish the same gesture alone (for instance, with the shoulder involved in a different way).

57 A similar point can be made about dance technique, which “functions not as a technical device that effects the physiological body …, but as a principle that effects intentionality and remakes the human body like a catalyst”—Karoblis, 2007, 364.

6. An entirely different set of possibilities opens up when the relation is not supporting-supported, but moving-moved. This is not a matter of a displace-ment of a physical body in space, but of establish-ing a shared kinaesthetic system; respecting what is already going on in this new “member” of my own kinaesthetic system; and then informing our shared system with a movement style that is radically dif-ferent from the client’s own. This can then allow the client to have the corresponding experience of “how it feels to move like this” – a feeling that the client can then learn to elicit alone by adopting this new style of movement (cf. Trager, 1987, 98ff.).

7. A further skill on the part of the practitioner may be involved here as well, one that I call “touch-ing-through” (cf. Behnke, 2007a, 75). Of course, we are accustomed to “feeling-through” many surfaces: I feel the texture of the cobblestone street through the soles of my shoes, I feel the strings of the violin through the bow, and so on. We can even feel the movement of the tea or the coffee inside the cup we are carrying when all we are actually touching is the handle of the cup. In somatic practice, however, it is a matter of touching-through to the ongoing ef-ficacy of the other’s kinaesthetic consciousness. In other words, rather than palpating the client’s flesh in order to determine how tense it is, or kneading a tense muscle in order to get it to relax, I touch-through to the ongoingly reiterated kinaesthetic achievement of “tensing up” in just this way. And this is precisely what allows me to respect the other’s kinaesthetic enactments by enabling me to appreci-ate them in the first place. Moreover, I can then adopt an interrogative attitude: instead of placing my touching-through in the service of a project of knowing geared toward a more exact determination of the features of an identical transtemporal unity of a certain type (Behnke, 2005, §6), I can perform a radical reduction to the living present in the spirit of “not-knowing” what will happen next, simply partnering the other’s ongoing kinaesthetic activity by being-there with it. And instead of attempting to produce a particular change that I posit in advance as a goal, I can just allow whatever emerges to emerge, letting it happen without impeding it. Thus rather than involving purposive manipulation on the part of the practitioner toward a known end, such interrogative touch is an open – and open-ended – invitation to the client’s own kinaesthetic system to propose its own subtle and spontaneous shifts as the needs of the moment dictate.

8. Finally, a further variation moves beyond the asymmetry of the practitioner-client model and

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explores interkinaesthetic partnering as a mutual moving-with and being-moved-by the other – for example, in the dance form known as Contact Im-provisation, where participants create conjoined fields of balance and support, or in much simpler practices such as mirroring another’s slow, smooth movement, taking turns leading the movement until it is the unfolding movement itself, rather than either partner, that is leading the kinaesthetic flows. Thus the phenomenological notion of kinaesthetic con-sciousness can be applied not only to transformative somatic practice as something carried out by a prac-titioner in order to benefit a client, but also to forms of restorative embodiment work that are dedicated to reciprocal renewal and empowerment.

Coda

What have we gained by bringing a transcendental attitude to bear on the human science of somatics? On the side of somatics, I hope to have shown that one of the reasons that so-called “body work” ap-proaches can make such a big difference in our lives is that they do not work with a constituted thing called “the body,” but allow “deep change” to occur in a nexus of world-constituting capabilities that I have addressed under the title of “kinaesthetic consciousness.” In addition, however, I hope to have demonstrated that carrying out the celebrated return to the lifeworld is only one of a number of ways in which phenomenology can make a contribution to the human sciences. It is true that a mundane phe-nomenology of lifeworldly experience has much to offer a human science of somatics, providing, for example, descriptive accounts of embodiment as it is lived in the natural attitude, making its tacit structures explicit while focusing above all on the socially shaped and culturally situated body we experience, in the personalistic attitude, within the pregiven world. But a transcendental phenomenology can also carry out an inquiry back into the pregiving performances whose correlate is this pregiven world itself, and exercise a radical transcendental critique of the historically sedimented root assumptions shaping these pregiving performances themselves.58 Moreover, such a phenomenology is capable not only of providing a critique of the presuppositions in place – thereby uncovering untested prejudices governing both the lifeworld and the sciences based on its regions – but also of furnishing alternative, phenomenologically grounded preconvictions that

58 On phenomenology as transcendental critique rather than life-world metaphysics, see Funke, 1987.

can guide these sciences. And finally, the possibility of shifting from thinking, for example, in terms of the “psychophysical apperception” to thinking in terms of “kinaesthetic consciousness” is a possibility that can itself flow back into the lifeworld (cf. 34/475, 6/214), providing not only an altered theoretical framework, but a new style of practical comportment as well (cf. 34/87). Thus transcendental phenomenol-ogy as rigorous science is not only able to thematize the liminal body of transformative somatic practice (as well as the routinized body of the natural attitude), but can function as a species of action research59 whose investigations leave what is being investigated free to move forward in productive ways, blazing a moving trail into an open future.

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