The Historian 2009(1)

The HistorianVOLUME 7 JANUARY-JUNE 2009 NUMBER 1

Department of History

GC University, Lahore

The HistorianVolume 7 (January-June 2009) Number1

© The Historian is published by the Department of History, GC

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Associate Editors: Tahir Jamil, Hussain Ahmad Khan, Noor Rehman

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Editorial Advisory Board

David Gilmartin – Department of History, North Carolina State University, USA

FarhatMahmud - Department of History, GC University, Lahore, Pakistan

Francis Robinson – Department of History, Royal Holloway, University of London,

UK

Gyanesh Kudaisya – South Asian Studies Programme, National University of

Singapore, Singapore

Ian Talbot- Department of History, University of Southampton, UK

IftikharHaiderMalik - Department of History, University College of Newton Park,

UK

Kathrine Adeney - Department of Political Science, University of Sheffield, UK

MohammadWaseem – Department of Social Sciences, Lahore University of

Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan

MridulaMukherjee - Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India

Pippa Virdee- Department of Historical and Social Sciences, De Montfort

University, Leicester, UK

Qalb-i-Abid – Department of History, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan

Sharif-ul-Mujahid – Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan

ShinderS. Thandi - Department of Economics, Coventry University , UK

ShuanGregory – Peace Studies, Bradford University, UK

SurrinderSingh - Department of History, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India

Tariq Rahman – National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University,

Islamabad, Pakistan

VirinderKalra - Department of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK

THEHISTORIANJANUARY-JUNE 2009 (VOLUME 7, NUMBER 1)

ARTICLES

RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES IN THE PUNJAB: THE ‘APOSTASY’ OF GHAZIMEHMUD DHARAMPAL…. ALIUSMANQASMI 05

BLEEDINGWOUND: ANALYZING PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY

(1989-95) .… IRFANWAHEED USMANI 25

THE GROUND OF HISTORY: A RELATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF HEGELAND HEIDEGGER…. UMBERBIN IBAD 63

RATIONALIZING THEMYSTICAL RELATIONSHIP OF ARTWITH ARTIST: ARTDISCOURSES IN ENGLAND AND FORMATIVE YEARS OFMAYO SCHOOL OF

ARTS, LAHORE (1875-1895) .…HUSSAIN AHMADKHAN 89

BOOKREVIEWS

MUNIR AHMED MUNIR AND FE CHAUDHRY, AB WO LAHORE KAHAN(LAHORE: MAHANAMAATISH FISHAAN, 2009) 113

AZIZ UD DIN AHMAD, PUNJAB AUR IS KEY BERUNI HAMLA AWAR (PUNJABAND ITS FOREIGN INVADERS) (LAHORE: BOOK HOMES, 2007) 117

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS AND REVIEWERS

Ali Usman Qasmi: Religious Controversies

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RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES IN THE PUNJAB: THE ‘APOSTASY’ OF GHAZI MEHMUD DHARAMPAL

ALI USMAN QASMI UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG

GERMANY ABSTRACT

This article looks at the contours of the identity formations in Punjab in the context of British colonialism and the apparatuses of administration and patronage, among other tools of modernity, appended to it. The pervasive influence of print medium and discursive ‘pigeon-holing’ of subject population by administrators, orientalists and missionaries alike has also been taken into cognizance while explaining these processes. Special emphasis, however, is laid on the question of Muslim identity formation which has been brought forth and compared with similar processes at operation among the Hindus and the Sikhs. With emphasis on the particular case of Ghazi Mehmud Dharampal’s ‘apostasy’, the imperative towards the need felt in the Muslim community for cohesive action in protection of religious ideals and projection of Islam suited to the dictates of modern times and amiable to the concerns of ‘college graduates’, has been highlighted.

KEY WORDS: Ghazi Mehmud Dharampal, British Punjab, Orientalists, Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, Christian Missionaries. With the annexation of Punjab in 1849 the British proceeded, in accordance with the votaries of selective benevolence espoused by the ‘Lawrence school’ of colonial administrators of Punjab, to lay down a purportedly paternalistic colonial regime supplemented with an impersonal law system. It was accompanied with the assumption of the responsibility for administering both the civil and criminal justice and a policy of bestowing political favors and economic opportunities on the basis of relative strength of a particular group or community. For this elaborate colonial enterprise to function, the British deemed it mandatory to know their subjects. The newly introduced practice of


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‘stock-taking’ of the subjects by means of census served as an index of the populace defined within the constraining ambit of essentalized categories with ensuing ambiguities sliced off and calcified in the cauldron of Colonialist-Orientalist knowledge archive so as to ensure an abridged understanding – overlooking the complexities of South Asian population and vagaries of its different lifestyles – for the benefit of British administrators entrusted with policy-making and smooth functioning of the empire.1

This consideration was even more important for an area like the Punjab marked with plural coexistence. A precarious population balance existed between Muslims and Hindus while Sikhs basked nostalgically in their recently lost glory as the rulers of Punjab and Christians strove hard on the margins to ‘claim’ this land for Jesus. The strategic significance of Punjab as the single most important recruiting ground of ‘martial races’ for the Imperial army and its fertile agricultural land with feasible potentialities for an expansion of revenue base, further served to highlight the importance of a stable colonial order and administrative set up in Punjab. These re-arrangements opened up a whole new range of opportunities and at the same time posed fresh challenges to communities populating Punjab. The ushering in of a new economic-administrative order with British ascendancy concomitantly gave rise to a broad new associational patterning and organizational structuring in realms of social interaction, self-perception and group feeling among the communities. Old modes of interaction crumbled under the weight of socio-political workings of the colonial regime. Alternatively, the British ‘offering’ of a ‘neutral’ public space was conceived by them as a competing arena in which communities – constellated on the basis of religion, caste, profession and so on – would vie with each other for prominence while remaining subject to rules of the game specified by the colonial authority. In this way, the colonized were impressed upon with the potential power of the colonizer – both real and perceived but never, in Ranajit Guha’s words, hegemonic2 – to allocate resources, extend patronage and administer law. As the British were trying to identify their subjects and determine their approximate numbers, it became important for the communities under scrutiny to evolve effective methods of association and organization to reach out to the colonial distributors of resources by capturing a noticeable niche in the public space in order to preclude rival communities from making similar gains.3 In line with the British mapping of these communities, the members themselves felt entrusted with the task of wearing a uniform outlook by rounding off variances and arbitrarily subsuming otherwise mutable or ‘fuzzy’4 peripheral groups under its fold. This concern for appropriation of identities in a community gave further impetus to the establishment of new groups and guilds on the basis of religion, kinship, caste or other such interests


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and considerations. An additional source of inspiration was provided by the so-called ‘Dalhousian Revolution’ whereby emergence of community representative groups not only became possible but was also deemed to be desirable. A better communication infrastructure in the form of well connected railways and efficient postal system could facilitate assemblage of group members and maintenance of regular contacts. The advent of print afforded a new way of broadcasting one’s views to a wider audience. Accompanying these developments was the invasive influence of the Western education system ‘proselytized’ through government run schools and colleges, which propounded a vague concept of ‘rationality’ in challenging the tenets of prevalent religious traditions. A perceived threat from the Christian missionaries, operating allegedly in collusion with the British officials at some level, further heightened the mistrust of Punjabis in matters of religion. These Euro-centric canons of rationality and Judeo-Christian forms of ‘higher religion’ appeared two pronged threats undermining the cohesiveness of a community eventually diminishing its numbers and so bearing an impact on its socio-economic status and political relevance. A cumulative effect of these factors led to a mushrooming of a number of religion-based community groups, especially among the Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab, with a concern for revision of certain aspects of faith for those among their clientele desirous of a more rational interpretation of religion to be self-assured of the superiority of their dogma above that of the others. There was also a pressing need for appropriation of identities so as to forge unity among the community members and swell its ranks in comparison to others. In doing so, these communities were simultaneously being abetted and limited by colonial structures of power and knowledge in place and their actions engendered intertwined chains of reactions from rival communities, hence embroiling them further in competition with one another. THE BEGINNINGS OF RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES IN PUNJAB Other than the direct take over of Punjab by the British in 1849, a tangible aspect of the colonial polity was witnessed by the Punjabis in the shape of an enhanced missionary activity since the first launching of proselytizing mission in 1834 in Ludhiana by the American Presbyterians and later by Church Mission Society, Methodist Episcopal Missionaries and others. Within a few decades following the annexation of Punjab, these missions had expanded their work to emerging canal colonies and urban centers of Punjab like Sialkot, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Jehlum and Lyallpur among other areas. The setting up of a printing press in Ludhiana in 1836 by American Presbyterian Mission introduced an alternative and more effective mean of mass dissemination of Christian scriptures printed in


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vernaculars throughout Punjab. Between 1861 and 1871 alone the Ludhiana press had published 31 editions of Christian scriptures in Urdu, Hindi and Punjabi numbering 188,000 copies in total, along with 286 tracts and books with a total print numbering 1,346,675 copies.5 Other than that, the missionaries established a number of educational institutes and hospitals in Punjab. The earliest missionary educational institution for boys was opened at Kotgarh near Simla in 1843 by Church Missionary Society. The American Mission followed by establishing its first English medium school at Jallandur in 1848 and in Lahore the next year.6 Forman Christian College Lahore (formerly Lahore Mission College) and Murray College Sialkot emerged as two important centers for western learning in Punjab during the late nineteenth century run by the Christian Missions. Mission schools and hospitals, along with freely available missionary literature in vernaculars, facilitated the missionary activity in Punjab and allowed reaching out to especially those among the local communities condemned as outcastes – most importantly the Chūhŕās or the sweepers in the context of mission influence in Punjab – for the menial and lowly occupations they were associated with.7 The results were startling for the missionaries themselves: a 410% increase in Christian population of Punjab was witnessed as their total numbers swelled to 19,750 in 1891. By 1911, their population had risen up to 163,994.8 The conversion of even outcaste ‘members’ of a religious community was significant in over all impact since it diminished the total numbers of a community in the census reports, and suggested a lack of egalitarian-rational spirit in their religious doctrines and absence of organizational apparatuses to prevent the conversions from taking place. Successful missionary attempts to prey upon learned and influential members of the communities was a further source of embarrassment as the local religious traditions in their existing forms appeared unable to rationally satisfy the concerns of western educated ‘graduates’. Events like the attempted en masse conversion of Sikh students of Amritsar Mission School in 1873 or baptism in 1894 of Maulvī Hāfiz Nabī Bakhsh of Muslim High School Amritsar, were of even more significance than the decennial publication of census reports. These cases helped to generate a lot of debate in the local press and added to the intensity of polemical disputations taking place throughout Punjab between the clerics of different faiths. The high-profile converts helped project the image of Christian successes in establishing itself as a viable alternative in Punjab and, more importantly, a form of ‘higher’ religion more suitable to the concerns of a humane and informed believer. The challenge posed by Christianity to local religious traditions of Punjab clearly demanded similar organizational responses along with modifications in some matters of faith to chalk out a


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successful counter-strategy for proselytization. In the context of Punjab, establishment of Āryā Samāj in 1875 by Svāmī Dayānand (d. 1883) was indicative of a significant development in the religious traditions, especially Hinduism, as believed and practiced in Punjab. Dayānand tried to configure Hinduism closely to the dictates of a colonized polity and socio-religious traditions espoused by the missionary groups. The key point in Dayānand’s idea of a reformed Hinduism under the auspices of Āryā Samāj was an emphasis on the Vedas as the bearer of central authority and authentic source of guidance for Hindu religion. This assertion in the centrality of Vedas served as Dayānand’s vision of a standardized Hindu belief system and canonized ritual practices – in comparison to and a complete disregard for the hoary sets of disparate beliefs and diverse practices of Hindus in the vast stretches of South Asia – to which one could refer to or proselytize to add new converts into its fold. In doing so Dayānand was cognizant of the need to rely on Vedas as an authentic textual representation of the Hindu religion as a counter to the established scriptural representation of religions like Islam and Christianity.9 In Dayānand’s opinion,

The Vedic truth as it existed in its pure form in the ancient past, unadulterated by latter day indigenous or foreign influences, was to be retrieved and emphasized as true Hindu faith. All must read the truth in its pure Vedic form and should the Vedas prove difficult to comprehend then Arya literature stood ready to explain and interpret them.10

Other than complying with the tradition of textual representation as in Semitic religions, Svāmī Dayānand went further to rid Hinduism of its ‘polytheistic’ aspects targeted by the missionaries by arguing for an adherence to a rather monotheistic concept of a single, all-powerful deity.11 An additional pressure emanating from the missionaries and other rival religious communities with which Āryā Samāj had to cope with were certain ‘objectionable’ teachings and ideas which were being attributed to Hinduism. Earlier Ram Mohan Roy had sorted a way out by distinguishing between “real Hindooism” and the superstitious practices that deformed the “Hindoo religion” and had nothing to do with the “pure spirit of its dictates.” In his quest for a more reasonable alternative to superstitious and Brahnamic dominated, ritualized Hinduism, Ram Mohan Roy ended up scrapping everything except Vedas and Upanishads, which he decreed to be the core of Hindu tradition, which in turn created a precedent for a later foregrounding of the Vedas by Svāmī Dayānand.12 But Ram Mohan Roy’s successor Dēvendrānāth Tagore found the ‘idolatrous teachings’ of Vedas incongruent with his own perceptions of a Supreme Being or Deity and


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abandoned it as the basis of religious authority for members of Tattvabodhini Sabha and Brāhmo Samāj, to be replaced by reason and nature.13 On the other extreme were Sanātan Dharmī groups who accorded canonical stature not only to Vedas but also Purānās, Tāntras and a host of other Hindu devotional literature to argue in favor of more traditional form of Hinduism. Svāmī Dayānand’s belief in the Vedas as the eternal and infallible word of God as true representation of Hinduism required that all additional Hindu scriptures or devotional literatures should be summarily dismissed insofar as they contradicted the teachings of Vedas, and thus remove any vulnerability to scathing criticism of missionaries, non-Āryā Hindus and other religious groups. As for the alleged polytheism, brahmanized rituals and traces of an asymmetrical caste society envisaged in Vedic texts, Svāmī Dayānand resorted to a revisionist reading of these texts to make them conform to his scheme of a monotheistic and de-brahmanized Hindu religion with an egalitarian outlook. In this endeavor a reinterpretation of certain Vedic passages was as important as questioning the scriptural authority of Purānās and other such texts.14

After having established Hinduism as derived from the teachings of Vedas, it became possible to proselytize it as a distinct religion as Āryā Samāj’s arbitrarily constructed uniform Hindu dogma and reductive understanding of its various aspects narrowed down the definition of a Hindu to a person believing in the teachings of Vedas. The undertaking of evangelical missions was not just to apprise the Hindus about ‘true doctrines' of their faith but was also demanded by political expediencies and economic compulsions. There was a growing anxiety among the Āryā Samājīs – and most of the other Hindu groups or movements that cropped up during this period – about dwindling numbers of the Hindus as suggested by census reports. The weakening of ‘Hindu race’ and decline in its numbers was understood as a phenomenon that had been in progress since the advent of Muslim rule in South Asia and speeded up under the British. With the teachings of Svāmī Dayānand serving as a rallying cry for a reformed, Vedic-only Hinduism and Āryā Samāj being used as a platform and representative Hindu organization to propagate this new form of Hindu faith – a reversal of the conversion process was sought by targeting an audience comprising mainly of non-Ārya Samājī Hindus or those who had converted to other religions, along with Muslims and Christians.15 That the proselytizing of Hindu religion was a pioneering accomplishment on the part of Svāmī Dayānand and Āryā Samāj is evident from the fact that traditionally Hinduism had lacked a conversion ritual but the perception of a decline in the numbers of Hindus in Punjab was a stimulus powerful enough to allow for novel methods of initiating new members into the fold of Hinduism. One such ritual was Shuddhī or purification. One of the first reported


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Shuddhī was performed by Svāmī Dayānand in 1877 to a Hindu of Jallundar who had converted to Christianity.16 The earliest known Shuddhī of a Muslim dates back to the same year. A Muslim from Dehra Dun was administered with conversion rites by Dayānand and given a Hindu name of Alakhdhārī.17 On the whole, Āryā Samāj’s efforts met with moderate success as their numbers grew steadily to reach 92,419 in 190118 though it fell drastically short of a figure desired by them. The organizational expansion of Āryā Samāj was, however, more impressive as their affiliated branches spread widely to different parts of India It was able to establish schools and colleges imparting Vedic and modern education. One of the communities most affected by the religious controversies plaguing Punjab, especially the ones waged by Āryā Samāj, was that of Sikhs. They not only had to cope with their recent loss of political authority in Punjab but also negotiate with threats to their existence as a separate religious entity. The Sikhs, like others, were being beset by the efforts of missionaries aimed at bringing about large scale conversions, and, in addition, faced an increasingly offensive challenge from the Āryā Samājīs to subsume them under the category of Hinduism for religious and numerical purposes. The Āryā Samājī literature was critical of revered Sikh figures including Baba Guru Nanak but at the same time emphasized the mutual religio-spiritual ancestry of the two religions in various tracts published and public disputations held. Further encroachments were made by Āryā Samājis during the Shuddhī campaign of 1890’s when Sikhs, mostly from the lower-castes, were converted to Hinduism in public ceremonies of conversion with rituals involving cutting of hairs – a sacrilegious act in Sikhism. A similar effort, albeit at a much lesser scale and mostly as an exercise in academics, was made by individual Muslims who tried to present Baba Guru Nanak as a Muslim by citing ‘credible historical evidences’ in this regard. In response to their opponent’s exploitation of vaguely defined contours of Sikh religion and certain aspects of its teachings, there were varied interpretations of Sikh religious traditions by its adherents. In pre-1849 Punjab, there had already started a process of religious reform among the Sikhs as groups such as the Nirankārīs and Namdhārīs strove to revitalize Sikhism’s devotional spirit among the believers in their own different ways.19 But it was the post -1849 period that witnessed a rapid growth of Sikh organizations named as Singh Sabhās which dealt with various questions facing the community by providing infrastructural groundings to promote a Sikh identity in accordance with their respective differentiated understandings of the Sikh tradition. The first Sabhā was established in Amritsar in 1873. The purported aim of the organization was to restore the purity and glory of Sikhism by bringing about awareness among the Sikhs with the publication of books, tracts and journals. The Lahore Singh Sabhā


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which held its first meeting in 1879 had a similar agenda but with a more reformist and egalitarian outlook. The Lahore and Amritsar sabhās, along with dozens of such organizations established in most parts of Punjab, briefly allowed themselves to be jointly overseen by a larger central body of Khālsa Dīvān established in 1883 to be replaced by Chief Khalsa Diwan in 1902. By 1900 there were more than one hundred Singh Sabhas in Punjab and neighboring areas without there being unanimity among them on the question of defining a Sikh and determining Sikh religious traditions. They approached questions regarding idolatry, female education and caste system in accordance with their readings of the Sikh scriptures. The issue of Sikhism’s relation to Hinduism clearly seemed to be settling in favor of those championing a distinct Sikh identity to the loss of those who concurred with Āryā Samājīs and other Hindus in seeing Sikhism as an offshoot of a broadly defined Hinduism and derived from commonly respected scriptural sources. This was made possible by organizations a Tract Society founded in 1894 which regularly publishedsuch as Khāls didactic and polemical literature, evidenced by references from Sikh scriptures, to emphasize the non-Hindu nature of Sikhism.20 Moreover, the efforts undertaken by Professor Gurmukh Singh (d. 1898) and Bhā’ī Kahām Singh (d. 1938) in locating and publishing old texts, exploring hitherto unknown local biographies of Guru Nanak (Janam Sakhīs) and ascertaining the relative credibility of these sources helped add to the confidence of the Sikhs in the veracity and richness of their religious literature and textually recorded documentation of its history. Research and publication bodies affiliated with Singh Sabhās ensured that authentic editions of Janam Sakhīs and Adī Granth were brought out.21 In this way Singh Sabhā led initiatives for Sikhs resulted in the sharpening of a recognizable Sikh identity, afforded an organizational framework leading to the establishment of a number of schools and colleges for Sikhs, and opened up debate on various aspects of Sikh traditions in order to render it dogmatically compatible with the socio-religious milieu of colonial Punjab and shrug off attempts by rival communities to undermine the belief system and practices of Sikhism. From the plurality of views that emerged from these discourses on Sikhism, the British, however, gave credence and extended a Sikhs – who tallied withpatronage to a rather militaristic variant of Khāls projected image of the Sikhs as one of the ‘martial races’ of Punjab – for their own administrative conveniences and fulfillment of colonialist objectives. MUSLIM REACTION TO RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES IN PUNJAB The Muslim reaction to the religious controversies in Punjab was different insofar as it did not involve a significant effort to resolve the problematic of their distinct religious identity vis-à-vis Hindus and


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Sikhs. This does not, however, suggest that the Muslims of Punjab constituted a monolithic community or that religion alone defined their identity or determined the contours of community consciousness. Muslims too were a religious group constructed or perceived in the colonial logbooks as a community shot through with class, regional, linguistic, sectarian and individual differences.22 Therefore, Muslims too were similarly cognizant of the dilemmas and challenges posed by colonial polity and socio-economic changes accompanying it, and faced the brunt of opposition from rival religious communities, especially Āryā Samājīs. The dynamics of their politics and discourse on the idea of ‘reform’ in religion was not so dissimilar from the rest. A number of voluntary organizations patronized by Muslim nobility and professionals came into existence to support modern and religious education of Muslims by building schools and colleges.23 They also became actively involved in religious disputations and wrote polemical tracts24 in order to forestall sporadic encroaching attempts to baptize the Muslims or to cajole them back to their ‘original’ Hindu roots. Apart from missionaries who posed a ‘common’ threat to the local religious traditions of Punjab, Muslim religious rhetoric with regard to Hindus was noticeably more strained. A number of mutually acrimonious tracts were exchanged after the publication of Maulvī Ismā‘īl’s Radd-i Hunūd from Bombay followed by Maulvī ‘Ubaydullāh, a Hindu convert to Islam, who wrote Tuhfa tul-Hind in 1874.25 It was responded to by Munshī Indarman in his tract Tuhfa tul-Islām published from Muradabad. A total of at least 15 tracts were exchanged between the contesting sides.26 As this trend flourished, Svāmī Dayānand joined the fray by writing Satyārath Parkāsh whose contents were considered potentially offensive to Muslim sensitivities regarding their religion. The fourteenth chapter of Dayānand’s book focusing on the Quran and some aspects of Islamic teachings was meant as an academic exercise in belittling the genuineness of non-Hindu religions to underline their untenability as a universal religion so as to reiterate the credibility of Vedas as divine scriptures relevant to the dictates of modern times. In case of the Quran, Dayānand criticized its teachings which allegedly sanction violence, killing of non-believers, sexual promiscuity, moral laxities, and encourage a certain kind of idolatry by centralizing the importance of the Ka‘ba in prayer and pilgrimage performances. He concludes his criticism by saying that Quran is neither the Book of God nor does it even qualify as the work of an erudite scholar.27 Muslim scholars responded in kind by raising objections against Vedas and drawing ‘evidence’ from its text to prove that the charges leveled against Quran can more appropriately be leveled against Vedas for its treatment of the same issues in an even more inhumane and irrational manner.28 Dayānand’s Vedic solution of Niyoga (levirate) to the question of widow remarriage was, in particular, repeatedly exploited by his opponents, often with ridicule


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and satire, as an example of Veda’s crass sexuality and hence a valid proof of its un-divine nature. The religious debate had, hence, boiled down to an enumeration of scriptural authorities of competing religions on the basis of their historical veracity, rational compatibility and universal appeal. This trend invited fiery responses from competing religions. Lēkh Rām (d. 1897), an Āryā Samājī proselytizer, aggravated the religious controversies by penning provocative literature against Islam and its Prophet. In doing so he was mad – the founderresponding to a spate of similar writings by Mirzā Ghulām Ah madīya movement generally denounced by rest of the Muslims asof messianic Ah heretical – and other Muslim polemicists. In dealings with his Muslim rivals, Lēkh Rām was concerned less about proving Vedas as the central exponent of Hinduism than to disqualify the Quran as a divine text in accordance with criterion laid down by him. According to that criterion a Book had to be devoid of supernatural events contrary to human reason and partiality towards any particular community or group of followers in order to qualify the status of divinity.29 In addition to lacking a rational and universalistic spirit, Quran was considered by Lēkh Rām as historically less credible than the Vedas. Lēkh Rām built this argument on the basis of reports found in both Sunnī and Shī‘a Ahādīth to the effect that parts of Quranic text had been lost. In the same vein Lēkh Rām’s portrayal of Islam as a religion of murder, theft, slavery and perverse sexual acts30 is derived from traditionally revered Muslim texts of classical exegesis and other juridical-theological writings. When reminded by his Muslim counterparts of sexual indulgences of Krishan with gopīs and vanities of various Hindu rituals, Lēkh Rām discounted the criticism by reemphasizing the Āryā doctrine of dissociation from non-Vedic Hindu texts. THE ‘APOSTASY’ OF GHĀZĪ MEHMŪD DHARAMPĀL (D. 1960) In order for newly emerged groups to claim credence as true representatives of their respective religions and boost the confidence of their followers in the articles of faith expounded by them, it was necessary to make efforts – other than just arguing in terms of historicity of the sacred text or its rational-universalistic teachings – for mass conversions into the fold of one’s religion or to strive for cases of high-profile conversions. In the latter case such individuals could then be taken around and presented during religious disputations and publicized through journals and newspapers as living examples of the successful efforts made by the group for the promotion of religion and in establishing its genuineness. One such case of high-profile conversion, which in case of Āryā Samāj considerably substantiated their credibility and exemplified the success of their proselytizing efforts in favor of Hindu religion, was


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that of Ghāzī Meh mūd Dharampāl’s adoption of Hinduism. Ghāzī Mehmūd’s original name was ‘Abdul Ghafūr. He was born in Hoshiarpur in 1882. During his formative years he developed a skeptical outlook regarding Islam and undertook a comparative study of religions to arrive at the true one. What weakened his previously staunch belief in Islam was an incident during the early years of his life. According to Ghāzī Mehmūd, he once listened to a Friday prayer sermon in which the speaker said that true believers are blessed with a magnificent vision in the last days of the Muslim holy month of Ramażān. Ghāzī Meh mūd studiously observed his prayers and spent sleepless night in the hope of receiving such a vision. Failing to receive one, he became skeptical and as a way of soul searching he started reading the biographies and teachings of reformers, saints and prophets.31 This religious introspection brought him closer, at first, to Dēv Samājīs.32 They, in turn, supported Ghāzī Meh mūd by financing his academic pursuits as well. By 1899, Ghāzī Meh mūd had ceased to be a practicing Muslim as shown by his letters in which he wrote Dharampāl with his name and greeted his brother with a namastē.33 He remained a Dēv Samājī, and registered himself as one in the census, at least till 1901 before shunning contact with them on the account of their alleged malpractices and false beliefs. His opponents, however, accused him of making the switch for he had lost ground both among the Muslims and Dēv Samājīs, and needed financial support for himself.34 When Ghāzī Mehmūd came into contact with Āryā Samājīs while he was serving as a school teacher in Gujranwala, he showed his inclination towards embracing Hinduism after being convinced of the truthfulness of the Aryan principles of religion. By 1903, Ghāzī Mehmūd had turned twenty-one and so there could be no legal bar on him to formally declare his renunciation of Islam and initiation into Hinduism, and change his name from ‘Abdul Ghafūr to Dharampāl. But Ghāzī Mehmūd objected to the term Shuddhī being used for his conversion to Hinduism because it implied that he was being transformed from a ritual state of impurity to that of purity. With some reluctance the Āryā Samājī organizers of the event acquiesced to his demands and a mutually acceptable term of pardēsh (entry) was adopted. Also, Ghāzī Mehmūd did not want to allow shaving of his head as part of the conversion ritual. A failure to do that would have embarrassed the Āryā Samājis in the eyes of their rival Hindu sects. A compromise was reached whereby Ghāzī Meh mūd was to wear a turban in order to cover his hair.35 The whole event was publicized well in advance so as to attract maximum attention and continued to be trumpeted in the press as the living example of Āryā Samāj’s successful representation of Hinduism. It was a rather theatrical display of ritual performances orchestrated by Āryā Samājīs with Ghāzī Meh mūd playing his part of the script by reading out a lengthy lecture against the teachings of Islam.


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Ghāzī Mehmūd’s charge sheet against Islam in his lecture titled Tark-i Islām (Renunciation of Islam)36 was a reiteration of the critique made by Svāmī Dayānand. It followed Dayānand’s format of quoting a Quranic verse and criticizing the content or injunction of that verse with satirical comments. His main thrust of argument against Quran rested mostly on the concepts regarding God, cosmology, supernaturalism, rights of women, Jihad and the Hereafter described in its text. In addition to that he wrote a number of other monographs criticizing the life and teachings of Prophet Muhammad, especially his private life, along with numerous other aspects of Islam. In his writings, Ghāzī Meh mūd does not figure as an astute scholar of Islam or that of its classical texts. In many instances his understanding of the Quran is either simplistic or out rightly flawed though still effective in raising doubts among the believers with limited knowledge of the scripture. His works were equally important for those among the Āryā Samāj who sought reaffirmation of the superiority of their own faith with the testimony of a former Muslim. In consequence, despite the evidently flawed reasoning and deficient knowledge in Ghāzī Mehmūd’s works, they were widely challenged by numerous Muslim scholars. In all, no less than thirty books were written in response to different works of Ghāzī Mehmūd.37 Most prominent among them were the monographs penned by Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī, the fiery Ahl-i Hadīth polemicist and editor of weekly Ahl-i H adīth, and Hakīm Nūr ud-Dīn, the leader of Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad’s Ahmadīya Jamā‘t after his death. Both were trained religious scholars with years of experience in polemical disputations with rival Muslims sects as well as the Hindus. Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī, especially, had a thorough understanding of the Hindu scriptures as well.38 Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī rebutted Ghāzī Mehmūd’s objections by two means: First, he pointed out the flaws in his counterpart’s understanding of the Quranic text by citing the rules of Arabic grammar and other lexicographical references;39 second, Thanā’ullāh compared the Quranic verses deemed objectionable by Ghāzī Mehmūd with corresponding references from Vedas to either emphasize the similarity between the two regarding a particular injunction or to justify the excellence and practicality of former’s ruling over and above that of latter’s in dealing with some issue discussed by both.40 The same was done by Hakim Nūr ud-Dīn in his treatise against Ghāzī Mehmūd Dharampāl. Ghāzī Mehmūd remained actively involved in the activities of Āryā Samāj and regularly visited the religious gatherings and polemics organized by them. He even published his own journal Indar to propagate Āryā Samājī Hinduism. His association with Āryā Samāj gradually came to an end after his marriage to a Brahman widow Gayān Dēvī. The marriage raised opposition for it was concluded between a non-Brahman with a widow senior to him in age. Since his


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marriage with Gayān Dēvī was not sanctioned by Āryā Samāj nor was there an assurance of respectable status for his children borne by her, Ghāzī Mehmūd published and widely circulated an appeal to scholars of all religions asking if their religion could guarantee the rights of his wife and children without discrimination.41 In response, Qāżī Sulaymān Mans ūrpūrī (d. 1930) – a learned Ahl-i Hadīth scholar and a session judge in the princely state of Patiala – wrote back to him declaring that the couple was lawfully wedded and their children had equal rights in every aspect even if their mother chose to remain Hindu. Such a positive response prompted Ghāzī Meh mūd to visit Qażī Sulaymān and reembrace Islam in 1914.42 From 1914 onwards Ghāzī Mehmūd Dharampāl took out a number of journals and was actively involved against the Āryā Samājīs during the Shuddhī campaigns of 1920’s. But even though he became a Muslim, his understanding of the religion remained unconventional as he tilted toward the Ahl al-Qur’ān – especially in his views on Ahādīth which are denounced by him for depicting Prophet’s sexual life with graphic details.43 He also found fault with the approach of ‘Ulāmā’ in insisting on a strict adherence to minute details prescribed by Sunnat for ritual observances of Islam. He considered it unnecessary to perform ablution or follow any schematic ritual order for the offering of prayers. The Quran, according to him, allowed a believer to offer prayer at any appointed time and in any order deemed fit by him. That Allah Himself had refrained from specifying the details of Namāz was taken by him as evidence of their insignificance.44 This clearly shows proximity of his new ideas about Islam with those of some Ahl al-Qur’ān groups, especially the one founded by Khvāja Ahmad ud-Dīn Amritsarī. It is no wonder then that Ahl al-Qur’ān groups claimed Ghāzī Mehmūd Dharampāl as one of their members and that his ‘apostasy’ came to an end because of a monograph45 written by Maulvī ‘Abdullāh Chakŕālavī (d. 1916) – the founder of Ahl al-Qur’ān movement in Lahore and the first person in modern Muslim history to denounce the Hadīth literature in total. CONCLUSION The present article has been an attempt to introduce the figure of Ghazi Mehmud Dharampal and underscore the importance of his act of apostasy in the context of Colonial Punjab’s raging religious polemics and controversies. After his re-admission to Islam, Dharampal’s career as a polemicist took a new turn as he assumed for himself the duty of responding to the challenge of Hindu extremist groups that cropped up in the 1920’s calling for the mass re-conversion of Muslims into Hinduism or the outright expulsion of its population from the Indian soil. In the differentiated socio-economic context of the 1920’s, Dharampal’s prolific corpus of writings – including both monographs


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and pamphlets – assumed considerable significance in meeting the proselytizing challenge of Hinduism and adding to the simmering communal tensions of that period. This, however, demands a whole different study altogether. It is hoped that the present article would arouse enough curiosity for further research in the person of Ghazi Mehmud and his writings and enlarge upon our understanding of the discourses of communalism and religious polemics of 20th century Punjab.


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END-NOTES

1 Kenneth W. Jones has described the census as providing “a new conceptualization of religion as a community, an aggregate of individuals united by a formal definition and given characteristics based on qualified data. Religions became communities mapped, counted, and above all compared with other religious communities.” Kenneth W. Jones, “Religious Identity and the Indian Census” in Gerald Barrier, ed. Census in British India: New Perspectives (New Delhi, 1981). p, 84. 2 Ranajit Guha, Dominance Without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge: Harvard university Press: 1998) 3 Guha’s critiques such an overarching, all-pervasive conceptualization of colonial power structure as an elitist, neo-colonialist ‘Cambridge School’ of historiography since it reduces history to the study of native responses to Imperialist stimuli. It endows the imperial government alone with the initiative that defines the structure and movement of politics while the colonized are denied having any will of their own. They are simply described as slotting into a framework made for them by their rulers by replicating their institutional patterns to benefit, as clients, from their patrons in the form of jobs, titles, agricultural land and canal water. Ibid. p, 85. Even though Guha is rightly critical of the underlying assumptions of such an approach to history, its usefulness, nevertheless, in the understanding of colonial set up as envisioned by its framers and its reception by the traditional landed aristocracy, newly emerging elite groups, members of services sector and those from trading classes co-opted into a symbiotic relationship with the empire – cannot be set aside. In other words, the purpose is to outline the conceptual framework of British Colonialism’s paternalism in Punjab without denying agency or initiative to various sections of the Punjabi population. Events, figures, political and religious groups – whether bourgeoisie or subaltern – resisting British colonialism and operating beyond the immediacy of patron-client relationship on their own initiative, are too numerous, mass-based and influential in disrupting the homogenizing tendencies of this narrative that they cannot be subdued, silenced, ignored or overlooked. Studies concerned with the dynamics of identity formation in colonial Punjab, while giving primacy to the role played by colonialism and its apparatuses, have nevertheless located these processes in pre-Colonial history and have invested the agency in the communities themselves as makers of their own identity. Two important studies in this regard are: Harjot Oberoi, The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition (New Delhi, 1994); Nonica Datta, Forming an Identity: A Social History of the Jats (New Delhi, 1999) 4 For further elaboration of the concept of ‘fuzzy’ communities, cf. Sudipta Kaviraj, “The Imaginary Institution of India”, in Partha Chatterjee, and Gyanendra Pandey, eds. Subaltern Studies VII. Writings on South Asian History and Society (New Delhi, 1993), pp. 20-6. Kaviraj does not deny the existence of communities based on an idea of identity in pre-modern social forms. On the contrary, he argues that the sense of community feeling was usually more intense than those of modern societies. Yet he justifies the description of these communities as ‘fuzzy’ because they had vague boundaries and, unlike modern communities, were not enumerated. The enumeration of fuzzy communities, by


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census and other means along with the imperative of ‘nation-formation’, transformed these identities into choate, focused and organized entities during the colonial period. Scholars like Sumit Sarkar, Gyanendra Pandey and Sandria Freitag, arguing from their respective perspectives, have offered similar explanations for the process of identity formation during the colonial period. C. A. Bayly, on the other hand, has traced the historical formation of religious identities from the pre-colonial period. Cited in Datta, Social History of the Jats (New Delhi, 1999), p.3. 5 Jeffery Cox, Imperial Fault Lines: Christianity and Colonial Power in India (Stanford, 2002) p, 56. Overall in Punjab the number of printing press increased by over 70% between 1864 and 1883 with a five fold cumulative increase in the number of books published between 1875 and 1880. Ian Talbot, India and Pakistan (London, 2000), p. 60. 6 Om Parkash Kaushal, The Radha Soami Movement: 1891-1997 (Jalandhar, 1998), p.12. The zenana or female wing of the Christian missions made available similar opportunities for western learning to the women of Punjab by opening a number of schools. 7 The Church Mission Society first reported the spread of Chūhŕā conversion movement into the area they ‘occupied’ in 1884-85. From their main centre of activity in Sialkot, it reached south to Narowal and from Gurdaspur south into the Batala Tehsil. Cf. John C. B. Webster, “Christian Conversion in Punjab: What has Changed?” in Rowena Robinson and Sathianathan Clarke (eds.), Religious Conversion in India: Modes, Motivations, and Meanings (New Delhi, 2003), p.363. 8 Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharm: The Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth-Century Punjab (New Delhi, 1989), p.10. 9 What facilitated such an approach was the publication of an ‘authentic’ edition of Vedas edited by Max Müller and later by other of his colleagues in Germany as part of modernity’s project to textually represent the ‘East’ in correct texts and exact translations, and a matching desire on the part of Hindu scholars to have scripturally authoritative texts like Islam and Christianity. As Peter van der Veer notes: “If ‘history’ and ‘nation’ are only possible in the presence of the written printed word, then it is quite understandable that the orality of Hindu traditions was a ‘national’ embarrassment for Indian scholars who were confronted with the comparison with the West.” Peter Van der Veer, Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain (Princeton, 2001), pp.119-20. 10 Jones, Arya Dharm, p. 33. 11 Ibid., p. 27. 12 Uma Chakaravati, “Whatever happened to the Vedic Dasi? Orientalism, Nationalism and a Script for the Past” in Zoya Hasan (ed.), Forging Identities: Gender, Communities and the State (New Delhi, 1994), p. 34. 13 Geoffery A. Oddie, “Constructing ‘Hinduism’: the Impact of Protestant Missionary Movement on Hindu Self-Understanding” in Robert Eric Frykenberg, ed. Christians and Missionaries in India: Cross-Cultural Communication since 1500 (London, 2003), p.176. A similar approach was adopted by Pandit Shiv Narayan Agnihotri when he founded Dev Samaj in 1887. But soon he deviated from these doctrines to introduce a dual worship of himself and God in 1892. Three years later the worship of God was dispensed


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with. Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India (New Delhi, repr. 2003), p. 105. 14 This technique was carried forward by his disciples, most notably Svāmi Sharaddhānand kī Nāpāk Ta‘līm sē Bacho’ (Save Yourself From(d. 1926). In his book ‘Purānon the Unholy Teachings of Purānās), Sharaddhānand deals with the issue of true sources of Hinduism by questioning the validity of Purānās. In his method of quellenkritik Sharaddhānand discredits a particular Purānā – for example Bhavishya – with the historical proof for its very recent composition. He argues that far from being the work of the ancient rishī Vyāsā, it was written in the middle of the 17th century as shown by its material which he found to be offensive to reason and morality. For more details about the life and works of Swami Sharaddhānand, cf. J.T.F. Jordens, Swami Sharaddhananda, his Life and Causes (New Delhi, 1981), p. 61. 15 Other than publishing journals and newspapers, and translating Sanskrit text into vernaculars, Āryā Samājīs also developed a system of paid missionaries called Updēshaks. Kenneth W. Jones, “The Arya Samaj in British India, 1857-1947” in Robert D. Baird (ed.), Religion in Modern India. p.33. 16 J.T.F. Jorden, “Reconversion to Hinduism: the Shuddhī of the Arya Samaj”, in G. A. Oddie (ed.), Religion in South Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia in Medieval and Modern Times (New Delhi, 1991), p. 216. 17 There were attempts to target not just individuals but groups of Muslims to bring about mass conversions – especially among ‘Neo-Muslims’. The first actual attempt of mass Shuddhī of Muslim converts is said to have been made at Deeg in the Bharatpur state in eastern Rajputana. Yoginder Sikand, “Arya Shuddhī and Muslim Tabligh: Muslim Reactions to Arya Samaj Proselytization (1923-30)” in Rowena Robinson and Sathianathan Clarke (eds.), Religious Conversion, pp.101-02. 18 Jones, “The Arya Samaj in British India”, p.35. 19 For these reasons, Harjot Oberoi, in his study of Sikh identity formation, does not “single out the colonial state as an instrument for stamping Sikhism with a new consciousness and altered symbolic universe”. But he does admit that the Sikh identity was gradually crystallized into an impermeable one during the colonial period only. Oberoi, Construction of Religious Boundaries, pp. 371-2. 20 Norman Gerald Barrier, “The Singh Sabhas and the Evolution of Modern Sikhism, 1875-1925” in Robert D. Baird, ed. Religion in Modern India, p. 204. One of the classic expositions of distinct Sikh identity was Bhā’ī Kāhn Singh’s best known works titled ‘ HaynHum Hindū Nahīn’ (We are not Hindus). A conscious effort was made by Singh Sabha movements to dissociate themselves from Muslims – with whom they shared a monotheistic concept of God and much of Punjab’s Sufi poetry – by supporting such acts as purposefully slaughtering the animals in a way different to that of the Muslims. 21 Norman G. Barrier, The Sikhs and their Literature: A Guide to Tracts, Books and Periodicals, 1849-1919 (Delhi, 1970), p. xxi. 22 Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in Islam since 1850 (London, 2000), p. 41.


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23 For details about these organizations and mad Sa‘īd,associations, cf. Ahmad Saeed, Musalmanān-i Panjāb kī Samājī aur Falāhi Anjumanayn : Ēk Tajziyātī Mutala (Lahore, 2004). 24 Of 70-80,000 books and pamphlets published in Punjab between 1867-1914, 25-30,000 were written by Muslims or published by them to meet the needs of the community in defending or proselytizing its religion. Edward Churchill, “Printed Literature of the Punjabi Muslims, 1860-1900” in W. Eric Gustafson and Kenneth W. Jones, eds. Sources on Punjab History (New Delhi, 1975) p, 257. These also included books with intra-religious debates among the Muslims – especially between Ahl-i Hadith and Hanafis. 25 Maulāna ‘Ubayd Ullāh Sindhī (d. 1945) – a noted Deobandī cleric – is reported to have accepted Islam after reading this tract. He was born as a Sikh. 26 Lēkh Rām, Kulīyāt-i Āryā Musāfir (Lahore, 1897), p. 626. For details, Cf. Gustafson and Jones (eds.), Punjab History. 27 Svāmī Dayānand, Satyārath Parkāsh, trans. Vandematharam Ramachandra Rao as Spot-Light on Truth: Swami Dayanand’s Satyaratha Parkash in English with Comments (Hyderabad, 1988), p. 78. 28 Though written much after Svāmī Dayānand’s death, Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī’s Haqq Parkāsh bajavāb Satyārath Parkāsh (Lahore, repr. 2001) published in 1900 can be cited as one of the most important anti-Āryā Samājī work that continued to be relevant in the Hindu-Muslim debates, especially during the Shuddhī movement of 1920’s. 29 Lēkh Rām, Kulīyāt, p. 636. 30 This description of Islam by Lēkh Rām is to be found in his most controversial tract published in 1892 titled Risāla-i Jihād ya‘nī Dīn-i Muhammadī kī Bunyād (Lahore, 1892). Even missionary newspaper Nūr Afshān commented disfavourably about it due to the apprehension that it could further heighten the feelings of hostility between the members of the two communities. Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective (New Delhi, 1974), p.76. This prediction of worsening of communal harmony and the ‘prophecy’ about Lēkh Rām’s disgraceful death was materialized made by Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad when Lēkh Rām was assassinated by some unknown assailant in 1897. 31 Ghāzī Mehmūd Dharampāl, Dāstān-i Gham (Lahore, 1954), pp. II, 85. 32 Dēv Samāj was started by a former Brahmo Samāj activist of Punjab, Pandit Shiv Narā’in Agnīhotrī, who described his religious doctrines as “in Harmony with Facts and Laws of Nature and based on the Evolution or Dissolution of Man’s Life-Power.” Dēv Samāj “combined positivist ideas of the evolution of society and knowledge in stages with a deep veneration and worship of Pandit Agnihotri.” Gyan Parkash, “Science Between the Lines” in Shahid Amin and Dipesh Chakrabarty, eds. Subaltern Studies IX (New Delhi, 1996), p. 73. 33 Muh ammad Ishāq Bhaṫṫī, “Ghāzī Mehmūd Dharampāl“ in Al-Ay‘tasām (Lahore) pp,55, 23( June 2003), pp, 28-9. 34 Such accusations were made against him by Dēv Ratnā in a tract titled Dēv Samāj kā ‘Abdul Ghafūr aur Āryā Samāj kā Dharampāl and Lālā Lachman Dās’s Dharampāl kī Khudkushī. Cited in Qāsim ‘Alī Ah madī, Shuddhī kī Ashuddhī (Delhi, 1909), pp. 4 - 64. 35 Bhaṫṫī, al-Ay‘tasām pp, 55, 25 (June 2003), p.14. With communal tension running high, a precautionary measure was taken by the Āryā Samājīs to send


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Ghāzī Mehmūd to a secure Vedic Āshram to avoid any unpleasant incident. Dharampāl, Dāstān-i Gham, pp. II- 165. 36 Dharampāl, Tark-i Islām (Gujranwala, 1903) 37 Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī, Turk-i Islām, (Amritsar, repr. 1918), p. 6. 38 As noted earlier, Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī had responded to Svāmī Dayānnad’s work as well and had alluded to various Hindu scriptures in his response. Ghāzī Mehmūd too, in his late writings, acknowledged that he found it impossible to counter the arguments put forward by Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī. 39 An interesting example of that is found in the discussion of term makar which has been understood by Ghāzī Mehmūd as implying that God is deceitful in His dealings with the enemies. According to Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī, it is improper to equate the term makar with deceit. The meanings described by him are that of a politician or statesman like Gladstone and Bismarck were. Amritsarī, Turk-i Islām, p.18. 40 A good example of that can be seen in Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī’s treatment of the issue of Jihad. According to Thanā’ullāh, Quran sanctions Jihad only in peculiar set of conditions. The Vedas on the other hand allow a free license to kill one’s enemy. Hence, Quranic concept of war is more humane and reasonable. Ibid.. pp.156-7. 41 This appeal was titled as Gayān Parkāsh and published in April 1914. Cf. Al-Muslim, 1915, pp.544-45. 42 Muhammad Ishaq Bhaṫṫī, Qāżī Muh ammad Sulaymān Munsūrpūrī, (Lahore, 2007), pp.201-24. His new Muslim name was proposed as Ghāzī Meh mūd and he was allowed to retain Dharampāl as part of his name since its meaning did not suggest any Hindu-specific connotation. 43 Cited in Ahl-i Hadīth (Amritsar), 1st October 1915, p. 2. 44 Cited in Ahl-i Hadīth, 13th February 1925, pp.1-2. 45 Hujjat ul-Islām (Lahore, n.d.) by Maulvi ‘Abdullāh Chakŕālavī was one of the many books written against Ghazi Mehmūd Dharampāl. Some of the works written in response to Dharampāl and his works were: Hakīm Nūr ud-Dīn, Nūr ud-Dīn bajavāb Tark-i Islām (Amritsar, n.d.); Qāsim ‘Alī Ahmadī, Sā‘iqa-i Dhuljalāl bar Nakhal-i Dharampāl (Delhi, 1909); Maulvī Nabī Bakhsh, Tuzk-i Islām ba tardīd Tark-i Islām (Wazirabad, ca. 1903); Maulvī Muh ammad Hużūrul Hasnayn, Risāla Takzīb-i Vēd va Tasdīq-i Qur’ān bajavāb Tark-i Islām Dharampāl (Muradabad, ca. 1904); Thanā’ullāh Amritsarī, Risāla Taghlīb ul-Islām bar Tehzīb ul-Islām (Amritsar, 1905).

Irfan Waheed Usmani: Bleeding Wound

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BLEEDING WOUND: ANALYZING PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY (1989-95)

IRFAN WAHEED USMANI GC UNIVERSITY, LAHORE

PAKISTAN ABSTRACT

This article analyses Pakistan’s Kashmir policy from 1989 to 1995. This period constitutes a new phase in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy as it was synchronized with the resurgence of Kashmiri resistance movement. During the previous two decades Kashmir issue was overlooked because Pakistan was entangled with many other problems, ranging from crisis in East Pakistan to the problems arising from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan was providing only lip service by placing rhetorical emphasis on the UN’s resolution concerning Kashmir. During 1989-95, Pakistani governments tried to align themselves with the ‘Kashmir cause’ because not only it was in tune with the ‘popular sentiments’ but also it was crucial for the very survival of these civilian regimes. The entry of civilian forces in the post-Zia political arena under certain checks and balances of the military elites and non-political actors who kept themselves away from power but not the politics, therefore, the civilian political forces found not other alternative but to tip-toe the agenda scripted by these non-political actors which pulled the strings from behind. In this backdrop, it becomes quite convenient to develop the hypothesis that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy remained consistent, i.e., it stressed on the solution of Kashmir dispute on the basis of the UN resolutions. Though this objective remained the same yet the strategy to pursue it somewhat underwent an insidious change as Pakistani authorities through overt and covert support to the Jehadi elements, tried to engage India in a low intensity conflict so as to increase the cost of the Indian occupation. Pakistani authorities also found it an effective tool to internationalize the


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Kashmir dispute. This paper also highlights the main trajectories of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy like Pakistan’s leadership posturing on Kashmir, efforts for public mobilization, Pakistan’s quest for internationalization of Kashmir dispute and endeavors of governments to negotiate with international pressures. Besides this, it also analyses the successes and failures of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy between the years 1989 to 1995 along with examining the role of forces of status-quo (primarily military establishment, jingoistic press and rightists and religious parties) and forces of change (extraneous pressures) in defining the dynamics of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

KEY WORDS: Jehadi organizations, Kashmir, India, Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif. The changing geo-political situation in the late 1980s and internal developments in Kashmir provided Pakistan with a new opportunity to pursue its policy on its own terms. It began to provide material support and training and used some of the militant groups to pursue its foreign policy objectives in Kashmir.1 Pakistan’s strategy was to engage India through jehadi outfits in a low-intensity conflict in Kashmir with favourable results. These jehadi outfits were armed with sophisticated weapons, motivated through religious indoctrination and were convinced about their ultimate victory.2 Several elements in Pakistan especially the right wing religious parties discovered an opportunity opening up in Kashmir to avenge India’s bifurcation of Pakistan.3 Pakistan’s civil and military authorities began to view India as “a state on the verge of the early throes of a process of disintegration”, as they believed that “the world history was marching against world’s remaining conglomerate or “imperial state such as India”.4 Like the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, they believed that “Kashmir… was likely to be one of these breakaway segments”.5 These convictions were further accentuated by the rise of an intifada-type movement in Kashmir that began “to look like perhaps the early stage of what happened in Afghanistan”. 6 Other main planks of the Pakistan’s Kashmir policy which were mutually inclusive were: the internationalization of Kashmir dispute on the basis of the UN resolutions and the “bleeding of Indian resources” 7 to increase its occupation cost to pressurize India to concede to a compromise. These very convictions of librating Kashmir from India defined the contours of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy from 1989 to 1995. This article analyzes the operationalization of such convictions in the Pakistan’s domestic


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and foreign policies. The article is divided into three parts: first portion explores various diamensions of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy pursued by various civilian governments; second part highlights the successes and failures of the Kashmir policy; whereas the third part analyzes various pressures which put weighty constrains on the Pakistani policy makers to pursue their agenda.

(I) During 1989-95, Pakistani governments took various initiatives to project the Kashmir cause intentionally and demonstrate Pakistan’s unflinching support for Kashmir’s right for self-determination. These initiatives were translated into the following policies: (i) show of solidarity and moral support for Kashmiris in strongly worded speeches and policy statements as well as public posturing of Pakistan’s ruling hierarchy; (ii) public mobilization to elicit popular support for the Kashmir cause; (iii) internationalization of Kashmir dispute through diplomatic initiatives to draw world’s attention towards Kashmir problem; (iv) countering diplomatic pressure against Pakistan which were directed towards dissuading it from its traditional stance on Kashmir.

The most recurring theme of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy was the rhetorical emphasis on the solution of Kashmir dispute according to the UN resolutions. All those leaders which were at the helm of affairs during 1988-95 such as president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, President Farooq Leghari and Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan and Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali, showed very strong commitment towards Kashmir cause and stressed the need to resolve Kashmir dispute as per UN resolutions.

Initially, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto took a cautious and low profile stand on the deteriorating situation.8 She only became more vocal when the uprising became visibly explicit in 1989.9 Ahmed Rashid, a renowned Pakistani journalist on regional affairs claimed that when the Kashmir insurgency erupted in late 1989, it took Pakistan’s government and military completely by surprise and even the Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) was ill-prepared to take advantage of the situation.10 This observation was also corroborated by Robert Oukely (then US Ambassador in Pakistan) who believed that the initial popular uprising in Kashmir was “primarily spontaneous”.11 President Ghulam Ishaque Khan was the first leader to re-invoke the slogan of Kashmir as the “unfinished agenda of partition”.12 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in an interview with the “United News of India” on February 8, 1989 stated that:


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Our position is based on the UN resolutions according to which the question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India is to be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.13

While addressing the Joint session of Parliament on 2nd December 1989, President Ghulam Ishaque Khan maintained that:

Pakistan shall not waver in its support for the exercise by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of their right of self-determination through a free and impartial plebiscite.14

Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan categorically stated before the Senate that:

Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir remained steadfast and undiluted as it was committed to a fair and free plebiscite on the basis of the United Nation’s resolutions for the solution of this problem.15

It would not be out of place to mention here that by early 1990s when the resistance movement was in full swing, a conscious policy decision was made by Islamabad, i.e., “to curb the independence sentiment” that “clearly lay at the foundation of this movement”.16 According to Robert. G. Wirsing, Benazir Bhutto, then the Prime Minister, held a meeting in Islamabad in early February. It was also attended by Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg and President and Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir. The participants were apprehensive of the possibility that the “uprising could boom-rang on Pakistan, and that Pakistan could loose not only Jammu and Kashmir but the northern areas as well”, therefore, “they decided to curb the Azadi forces”.17 It became a key feature of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy to discourage those elements involved in Kashmiri resistance movement who were vying for an independent Kashmir. On 24 May 1990, Benazir Bhutto rejected the idea of independent Kashmir by describing it dangerous for the region.18

After the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto’s government an interim government was formed under the Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. His government also remained steadfast to Pakistan’s avowed stance on Kashmir. He assured the Kashmiris that Pakistan would continue its moral, political and diplomatic support to their just cause:19 On 24 September, Prime Minister Jatoi stated:


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Present Freedom Movement was an important milestone in the history of freedom struggle and formed part of principles and spirit of Pakistan movement.20

After the October 1990 elections Nawaz Sharif was elected as

Prime Minister. Pakistan’s official policy on Kashmir during his tenure remained unchanged.21 Nawaz Sharif announced that the IJI government with the full backing of the people would go all out to support and assist the on-going Kashmiri Liberation Movement across the border. He maintained that India should respect the aspiration for freedom in wake of worldwide sweeping wave of independence.22

During her second stint as Prime Minister, Benazir’s stance on Kashmir became more though as she vigorously pursued Pakistan’s traditional Kashmir policy. In response to a message of facilitation by the Indian Prime Minister, she explicitly stated:

Jammu and Kashmir issue is the main obstacle in the way of better relations between the two countries and that its solution must be based on the aspirations and the legitimate rights of the Kashmiri people. 23

In her address to the National Assembly on 27th October, 1993, after obtaining the vote of confidence she made an impassionate “appeal to the UN and the international community to take notice of the grave situation in the occupied Kashmir before it deteriorates further and take steps for the solution of the problem at the earliest”.24

Next two years saw Pakistan’s Kashmir policy becoming more and more inflexible. As could be gauged from the Pakistan’s foreign minister, Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali’s tone while addressing a press conference in Islamabad: “we are not ready to talk to India on its agenda”. 25 On 24 May 1995, President Farooq Leghari visited Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir, and became the first Pakistani President to address a Joint Session of the Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly and Council. He maintained that “India had lost the battle of Kashmir and that Pakistan could return any Indian aggression”.26 He declared that:

I today announce that Pakistan would extend all out political diplomatic and moral support to Kashmir as Kashmir is the life-line of Pakistan.27

Public mobilization may also be described as a conspicuous plank of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy during this period. The Pakistani governments took many initiatives ranging from evolving consensus


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among political forces in Pakistan on Kashmir cause to the observance of country wide strikes. The political forces also evoked public support in favor of Kashmir through their rhetoric.

Prime Minister Benazir called a conference of the political leaders of Pakistan on 4th February 1990 and took them in to confidence on the Kashmir dispute. Benazir Bhutto also gave a call to the people of Pakistan to observe a country-wide-strike on 5th February 1990 to express solidarity with people of Jammu and Kashmir.28 As a manifestation of Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir, a unanimous resolution was adopted on 10th February in a Joint sitting of the parliament of Pakistan”.29 In order to demonstrate solidarity with the people of Jammu and Kashmir and to give encouragement to the freedom fighters across the boarder, the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto also visited Muzaffarabad on 13th March 1990 where she addressed a big gathering and challenged her Indian counter-part to visit Srinagar.30 During her speech she promised a “thousand year war” in support of militants and announced the creation of a four million fund to support the “freedom fighters” across Line of Control.31 She also addressed a joint session of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Assembly and the Council. In her public address she declared ‘We have supported the Kashmir’s struggle for right of self-determination in the past. We support them today and will continue to support them till death. And even if we die our last words will be: “fight for humanity, fight for right of self-determination, fight for Kashmir.”32 She raised further public euphoria over Kashmir by making another belligerent speech to an over-charged crowd in Lahore on 23rd March, 1990.33

The Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, Mumtaz Rathore, durng this very period also tried to mobilize public support in Azad Kashmir. In this connection he took number of steps. He held four public rallies at four strategic locations in order to electrify the people. He also announced imparting military training at school and college level in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. He also established publicity centres at each district headquarter in Azad Jammu and Kashmir to keep alive the Kashmir issue.34

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in his first stint as Prime Minister also tried to mobilize public opinion for the Kashmir cause. During the summer of 1992 he addressed a series of public gatherings where he chanted the slogan Kashmir banye ga Pakistan (Kashmir will become Pakistan). An Indian newspaper Tribune Chandigarh, blamed Nawaz Sharif of “creating hysteria in his country over Kashmir cause.”35

The most conspicuous feature of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy during this period was the incessant efforts on the part of various Pakistani governments to internationalize the Kashmir issue. As Pakistani policy makers deemed it necessary in order to internationalize


31

Kashmir dispute to divert world attention towards Kashmiris’ cause of self-determination. Perhaps they might be encouraged by the world’s response towards the issues of self-determination and human rights in Eastern Europe.

Benazir government during her first stint took the number of major initiatives to internationalize the Kashmir depute. The most important of these was the convening of Pakistan’s envoy conference in Islamabad in March 1990. This conference was held from 25 March to 2 April 1990. In her inaugural address the Prime Minister impressed upon the participants to direct their efforts to secure support from brotherly Muslim countries particularly the Arab countries.36

In the concluding address at the Envoy’s conference at the foreign office on April 2, 1990, she highlighted:

The two issues are immediate, and indeed urgent concern for Pakistan, mainly Kashmir and Afghanistan, would require your particular attention in your capitals…And effective strategies must be devised to project these issues in the international media, opinion making circles and governments in such a manner that they are persuaded of the righteousness and principled nature of our cause.37

Another major initiative taken by the Benazir’s Government was to give a serious consideration to the possibility of raising Kashmir issue at United Nations. This fact is corroborated by policy statements of senior members of ruling hierarchy. Senior Federal Minister, Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto stated: ‘Kashmir issue could be taken to the UN along with Diplomatic offensive.’38 On March 11, 1990, Prime Minister said that ‘Pakistan reserved the right to take the issue to the United Nations”.39 Iqbal A Khund, Advisor on Foreign Affairs revealed that ‘Pakistan would take the Kashmir issue to the Security Council at the proper time.’40

The Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in her bid to internationalize Kashmir issue personally visited 14 Arab Islamic countries, where she raised this issue to the highest level.41 Her Government also moved a resolution on Kashmir in 19th OIC Foreign Minister’s Conference at Cairo in the beginning of August.42

After the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto Government an interim government was installed for holding elections. This government was headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who in his brief tenure also tried to internationalize the Kashmir issue. Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan, the Foreign Minister, raised the Kashmir issue at a thirty minutes meeting with UN Secretary General Perez de Cullear on 25 September, 1990.43


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During Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s first government the internationalization of Kashmir dispute also remained the focal point of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. In December 1990, Pakistan’s delegate at the UN, told the special session of General Assembly:

Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory and we have always maintained that this problem needs to be resolved in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and in the spirit of Simla Agreement.44

On 25 March 1991, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif while addressing Pakistani nation urged international action on Kashmir.45 During his first stint as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had the opportunity to frequently deliberate with his Indian counterpart Mr. P.K. Narshima Rao during various conferences and moots. Pakistani government used these opportunities to internationalize Kashmir issue. From October 1991 to September 1992, the two Prime Ministers met for five times.46 During these meetings Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif raised the question of Kashmir and informed the Indian Prime Minister about Pakistan’s position on the issue. But these meetings failed to yield results as the both sides stuck to their traditional stances. During this period Pakistan also tried to raise Kashmir issue at various International forums such as United Nations, OIC, Saarc and NAM.47 The efforts led India to concede that Pakistan is “hell bent on internationalizing the Kashmir issue to ease the increasing global pressure on it”.48

Another initiative taken by Pakistan’s Government was to engage India in a dialogue over Kashmir. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif addressed a letter to Indian Prime Minister Narsima Rao in early 1992, proposing a dialogue at the level of heads of government in accordance with Article 6 of the Simla Agreement.49 In September 1992 Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Mr. Sheryar Khan delivered another letter of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narsimaha Rao, formally invoking para 6 of the Simla accord, to call for Indo-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir.50 This initiative failed to bring any change in Indian stance over Kashmir and the Indian response was “couched in terms that virtually shut the order on the possibility of a dialogue of the Kashmir dispute.”51

In 1992 Pakistan government made concerted efforts to internationalize the Kashmir dispute. Chairman Senate Wasim Sajjad was sent to US on 10 days visit, as Prime Minister’s special envoy on Kashmir. During his visit he met UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali and also discussed the Kashmir issue with the Senior Bush Administration officials. During his thirty minutes meeting with UN Secretary General Wasim Sajjad urged Secretary General to use his good offices to end the human rights violations in Indian-occupied


33

Kashmir and to resolve this dispute on the basis of UNSC resolutions.52 Prime Minister of Pakistan also made a personal appeal to United Nations Secretary General Boutros Ghali to persuade India to respond to Pakistan’s efforts.53 Pakistan also tried to draw maximum mileage out of Indo-Pakistan Foreign Secretaries level talks, the final round of these talks was concluded in November 1992.54 With respect to the core issue of Kashmir, the two sides restated their conflicting positions. Some agreements regarding confidence-building measures were reached during the meetings. Even India’s premier newspaper commented that Pakistan successfully thwarted Indian bid to side track Kashmir disputes.55

After taking the oath of Prime Minister during her second stint as Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto once more strived for the internationalization of the Kashmir dispute systematically. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto attended the Common Wealth Heads of Government meeting held in Cyprus. She expressed grave concern over the human rights situation in the Indian held Kashmir. She said that the policy of double standards should be discarded with a view to seek peaceful settlement of international disputes.56 She stressed that:

Kashmir had a special importance and symbolism for Pakistan and its people. We believe that such disputes must be settled through peaceful negotiations.57

She also wrote to UN Sectary General on 6th November 1993 and drew his attention to the serious situation in the valley of Kashmir.58 In her meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State, Mrs. Robin Raphel, on 7th November 1993, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto discussed the Kashmir situation and ‘retreated Pakistan’s position of the urgent need to find a negotiated peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the UN resolutions and in the spirit of the Simla agreement”.59

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto also urged the world leaders to use their influence to persuade India to end its repression in occupied Kashmir and engage in a substantive dialogue with Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute in accordance with UN resolutions. In this connection, special messages were addressed to the leaders of a number of friendly countries, included the Heads of government of Bangladesh, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Turkey, UK, USA and the UN Secretary General.60

The most concrete measure to institutionalize Pakistan’s commitment towards internationalization of this dispute was the establishment of Kashmir Committee of National Assembly.61 This


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committee was headed by veteran politician Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. The first step taken by the committee was to give a call for a general strike in Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and occupied Kashmir. Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed the nation on T.V and Radio. Nawabazada Nasurllah Khan enticed opposition support. The members of the Kashmir committee went to the four-provincial capitals and held meeting with provincial chief ministers and opposition leaders. The strike called invited unprecedented public response. As Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan acknowledged himself that “he had never seen such a successful strike. There was not a single city, town or village in Pakistan where complete strike was not observed. BBC had to acknowledge that even in those remote parts of occupied Kashmir where the movement was not so intense, there too strike was complete”.62

The next step which the Kashmir Committee took was to form five delegations to tour different regions of the world. One delegation was sent to Middle East, the other delegation headed by Nawabzada Nasrulalh Khan went to Western Europe. It met a cross section of members of parliament belonging to the conservative, the labour and social democratic parties, particularly those members who belonged to human right organizations.63 It also held meetings with the Foreign Relations Committees of Belgium, Holland, France, Sweden, Spain, Austria and Egypt.64 The delegation also talked to human rights organization in France headed by Madamme Mitterrand wife of the French President. The committee also visited Sweden to express gratitude to the Swedish parliament, which had passed a resolution condemning human rights violations by India in Kashmir.65 The delegation of committee also visited Austria, Turkey and Spain. In Austria it also met Austrian president besides holding talks with the members of Foreign Relations Committee. In Spain it held talks with foreign relations committee and the chairman of the Senate. In Turkey the Committee members called on Ismet Inonu’s son who was the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. It also met Turkish President Suleman Demirel and the speaker of the Grand National Assembly. It also held meeting with Ne Jmettin Erbakan President of Mili Refah Party.66 The Committee under Nasrullah played a crucial role to bring a consensus between opposition and the government, raise funds for Kashmiris and project Pakistan’s stance abroad.67

As result of these initiatives India came under tremendous pressure for instance the US President Bill Clinton, while addressing the UN General Assembly in 1993 recognized that Kashmir was a disputed area. Furthermore, Mrs. Robin Raphel’s stated that “US did not recognize the instrument of accession, as meaning that Kashmir was an integral part of India.”68 The US pronouncement of challenging the legal status of Kashmir and condemning India for human rights


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abuses angered New Delhi and jubilated Islamabad. Pakistan reacted by enhancing its attempt to internationalize the issue and decided to put the question of human rights abuses in the valley before the 48th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1993. To counter such moves India offered Pakistan dialogue over Kashmir as a separate agenda item. The offer made Pakistan defer the proposed resolution.69 This indicated a change in Indian attitude as the Indian Minister for External Affairs proposed a dialogue with Pakistan to promote a climate of stability in the region.70 Hence after a lapse of seventeen months, foreign secretary level talks between Pakistan and India were held in January 1994. Kashmir was included as an exclusive agenda for the first time in almost thirty years.71 This offer was termed as a great success of Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir by various observers.72

During these talks Pakistan demanded that India should reduce the number of its troops in the valley and release all political prisoners in the Indian-held Kashmir Pakistan also urged upon India to remove such draconian laws as the public Safety Act, Disturbed Areas Act and Armed forces Special Act etc.73 Pakistan also suggested that India should allow the international media and human rights organizations to visit the valley. On the other hand, India blamed Pakistan for supporting terrorism in Kashmir and Pakistan denied the charges.74 The talks failed to resolve the dispute as the two sides remained stuck to their respective positions on Kashmir.75 Though the two countries failed to make progress on Kashmir issue, it marked a significant achievement in this context that Kashmir was at least discussed as an exclusive agenda during Pakistan India talks it further implied that India had accepted Kashmir as a dispute between the two countries.76

As the bilateral talks failed to break the impasse over the Kashmir issue, Pakistan decided to approach international forums. In this regard, Pakistan decided to table a resolution at the 50th session of Human Rights Commission on 25 February 1994, which expressed grave concern over the human rights violations in the Indian held Kashmir and asked the commission to send a fact finding mission to investigate the situation in the valley.77 In order to counter Pakistan’s move Indian government resorted to extensive lobbying against Pakistan’s resolution. India sent a large delegation of top-ranking diplomats to Geneva to lobby against the Pakistan’s move. Even Indian external affairs Minister Dinesh Singh visited Iran to seek its support for India.78

Pakistan was scheduled to table resolution on violation of human rights in the state of Jammu and Kashmir at the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), on 9th March 1994. But Pakistan withdrew on the persuasion of China and Iran.79 According to one account, Iran played a mediatory role and dissuaded Pakistan from insisting on voting. In return Iran assured Pakistan that it would exert


36

pressure on India to improve human rights situation in Kashmir and to allow a fact-finding mission comprising the ambassadors of Muslim countries to visit Kashmir. Iran’s proposal was supported by fifteen other countries including China.80 India agreed to allow the Muslim ambassadors to visit the valley.81 The government of Pakistan came under severe criticism with in the country against the withdrawal of the resolution. There was general skepticism in Pakistan that withdrawal of resolution did not achieve what it was expected to. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s government claimed that despite withdrawal of the resolution “it was a great victory and we have achieved our purpose of internationalizing the Kashmir issue.” 82 While the main opposition party PML (N), described it as the “biggest foreign policy fiasco.”83 Saeed Shafqat a perceptive analyst on Pakistan affair does not seem to accord too much value to claims and counters claims concerning who won who lost over withdrawal of Pakistan Resolution. In his estimation this episode certainly led to “globalization of Kashmir”.84

During her interviews given to various foreign newspapers and magazine in July 1994 Pakistani premier Benazir Bhutto further highlighted Kashmir dispute for instance, in an interview published in “Khaleej Times” she maintained that she was leaving the door open for talks with India on Kashmir. Similarly in an other interview with French Weekly Globe she stated that the “apathy and indifference towards the plight of the Kashmiris is comparable to the attitude towards the tragic situations in Bosnia Herzegovina”.85 While giving an interview to French Journalist in Islamabad during the same month the Prime Minister said “that Pakistan was determined to help the Kashmiris to get their rights under the aegis of the UN, which should intervene as it did in Kuwait and Somalia”.86

Pakistan government took quite unambiguous stance on Kashmir dispute during a conference of newly restored democracies which was held in Nicaragua on July 7 1994. It maintained that “a delay in granting the right of self-determination to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, constituted a threat not only to the security of the region, but also to democracy”.87Benazir Bhutto vigorously raised the Kashmir issue during her US visit. The recurrent theme of her stance on Kashmir during her visit was to ask the US “to mediate on Kashmir” her massage to US media was that “some body has got to step in and try and find a solution, either it has to be the UN or the US”.88In May 1995, President Farooq Leghari represented Pakistan in New Delhi at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit. Although bilateral and political issues cannot be raised in SAARC summit, he nevertheless used the opportunity to defend vociferously the Kashmir cause. He also warned about the dangers of missile race in the region and insisted that India should come to the negotiated table.89On October 25, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto


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antagonized Indian delegation in New York by suggesting the UN Secretary General to set up an “international criminal court” to try perpetrators of atrocities in Rawanda, Bosnia and Kashmir.90

Pakistani government attempted to counter all diplomatic pressure aimed at dissuading Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir. In its bid to keep Kashmir policy consistent, Pakistan’s leadership resisted international pressure, however, it had to bear the brunt of advocating a very aggressive policy on Kashmir. The Kashmir issue had greatly affected India-Pakistan relations tenures of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan and V.P. Singh in India. When the special envoy of the Pakistani Prime Minister, Abdus Sattar went to Delhi Indian media reported about V.P. Singh’s “warning regarding alleged Pakistani support to the Kashmir struggle”, however, it was denied by Sattar and other Pakistani officials.91

After Sattar’s mission, Shabzada Yaqoob Khan, the Foreign Minister Pakistan was directed by the defence committee of the cabinet to convey a “tough message” regarding Kashmir.92 Yaqoob communicated Pakistan’s concern to the Indian leaders. While expressing the strong sentiments prevailing in Pakistan, he projected Kashmir was an “emotional issue”.93 Three meetings were held between Yaqoob Khan and the Indian leaders. In the his first meeting with the Indian foreign minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, Yaqoob conveyed a “hard” message suggesting that India needs to resolve the Kashmir problem by according a free choice to the Kashmiris.94 At a dinner, just after the meeting, both leaders read Faiz Ahmed Faiz’s couplets. Those by Gujral referred to “lover who had lost each other” but those recited by Yaqoob were about “lovers being separated by objective circumstances”. It created an impression in India that Pakistan was conveying an implicit warning.95 Indian cabinet decided to reciprocate by warning Pakistan to “keep off Kashmir”.96 This warning was given by Gujral to Yaqoob in their third meeting,97 however, the later told former that if New Delhi did not meet a certain “dead line” then the “subcontinent would be set on fire”.98

Yaqoob Khan also held meeting with Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh. In this meeting he tried to impress upon the Indian leader about Pakistan’s compulsions concerning Kashmir but Singh maintained that the domestic politics of Pakistan was its internal matter and India had nothing to do with it.99 Yaqoob Khan’s tough posture regarding Kashmir resulted into the hardening of Indian stance. After the emergency meeting of his cabinet V.P. Singh declared that India would “retaliate even it meant war”.100 Upon his return to Pakistan Yaqoob Khan in his unprecedented address on national television reiterated Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir in a very “clear, forceful and unambiguous manner. It appeared to further exacerbate, the increasingly hawkish Pakistani mood on Kashmir”.101


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These developments caused certain dip in India-Pakistan relations, and brought these two states on the brink of war, it is also known as the crisis of 1990s. The situation led to the reconciliatory efforts of the US. On May 16, the White House announced that a special envoy Robert Gates, the Deputy National Security advisor, would be sent to South Asia. The Gates mission visited India and Pakistan between 19-21 May 1990.102 At the time of the mission’s arrival Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was on the tour of Middle East to elicit Arab support for Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir. As Gates mission tried to approach Benazir, she apparently tried to avoid the Gates mission.103 As one member of the mission revealed that “we tried to meet her on three places in the Middle East, but she never showed up”.104

The Gates mission, upon its arrival, on May 20, held meetings with President Ghulam Ishaque Khan and Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg. General Beg and President Ghulam Ishaque Khan responded defensively, claiming that India was using terrorist tactics in Kashmir, that Pakistan public statements had been moderate, and that Pakistani military movements had been less aggressive than India’s. 105 During its visit Gates mission also met Iqbal Akhund prime minister’s advisor on national security and Foreign Relations. Akhund reiterated Pakistani efforts to reduce tension and resolve the ongoing Kashmir dispute.106 Publicly the Gates mission statement declared that “our major objective is to help both sides avoid a conflict over Kashmir, which would entail great loss of life, and damage to both countries, and to begin the sort of political dialogue which would not only reduce tension but could lead to a peaceful and permanent resolution of the Kashmir problem, as called for under the Simla Agreement”.107 During its visit the mission communicated the following message to the Pakistan Government:

(i) Washington had thoroughly war-gamed a potential India Pakistan military conflict and Pakistan was a loser in every scenario. This exercise had been carried out by its Joint Chiefs of Staff. (ii) In the event of a war, Islamabad could expect no assistance from Washington. (iii) Pakistan must refrain from supporting terrorism in Indian occupied Kashmir. (iv) Both sides need to adopt CBMS…. so that this crisis would be more speedily defused and future ones prevented. (v) Gates offered US intelligence support—based on its own “national technical means” to verify a confidence building regime involving limitations on


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the deployment near the border. If both India and Pakistan concluded such an agreement and were (supposed) to withdraw their forces from the near boarder.108

Chari, Cheema and Cohen believed that the mission never received a positive response from Pakistan regarding intelligence sharing. Though this mission failed to break the deadlock yet it was instrumental in de-escalating the looming threat of war.109 After the departure of the Gates mission, both countries took three significant steps to defuse the crises:

(i) Indian government announced the withdrawal of its armed forces from the boarders. (ii) It also proposed a package of military/non-military confidence building measures to Pakistan.110 (iii) In response, Pakistan agreed to explore the expansion of old CBMs and the establishment of new ones. It further suggested of holding foreign secretary level talks to resolve all the issues between the two countries.111

Despite these reconciliatory efforts made by the US government, Pakistan-India relations continued to deteriorate, for instance, India complained that Pakistan and Afghan Mujahiddin were involved in “terrorist activities” in Kashmir. These accusations were lent further credence when US put Pakistan on the terrorist watch list in order to pressurize its government so as to dissuade it from any kind of assistance to Kashmiri freedom fighters.112 In 1992 the US State department came very close to declare Pakistan a “terrorist state”.113 But the damage control actions by the Benazir Bhutto government got Pakistan off the hook next year.114

Pressure began to mount gradually on Pakistan regarding its Kashmir policy. The tension between Pakistan and India over Kashmir coupled with the rising specter of nuclear proliferation in South Asia further accentuated the US apprehensions.115 With the coming of Clinton administration to power another dimension into US perception regarding Kashmir was added, i.e., Kashmir now began to be viewed in context of human rights violations and nuclear proliferation.116 Particularly the issue of nuclear non-proliferation appeared to dominate the Clinton administration’s policy in South Asia. This policy was mainly based on the idea of capping and then eliminating “the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery”. It primarily aimed at nuclear free South Asia.117 For a very brief period in 1993 US appeared to pressurize India in context of its dismal human rights record but with the passage of time this policy


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under went a complete change. Now Washington developed a strategy which revolved around appeasing India, while on the other hand it began to pressurize Pakistan to cap its nuclear programme.118 This reversal not only led to the softening of the US criticism of Indian repressive policies in Kashmir but it also delinked the problem of nuclear proliferation from the Kashmir issue.119 Robin Raphel, the US Assistant Secretary of State, explained this policy as:

We are working very hard right now with Pakistan to persuade them to cap their programme. We have realized to try to get Pakistan and India to move simultaneously did not seem to be working, so we are trying a new tactic. If we can get Pakistan to cap their programme, it’s very much in the interest of everybody in the region, including India.120

In November 1993, Raphel held detailed discussions with Pakistani leadership on nuclear non-proliferation, Kashmir and drug trafficking. She particularly insisted that Pakistan should sign Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) so that the Pressler Amendment could be modified in Pakistan’s favour.121 However, Pakistan maintained that it could not unilaterally sign NPT or give up its nuclear programme as it was closely linked with the situation in Kashmir. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto refused to roll back Pakistan’s nuclear programme, and termed this demand as unfair in view of the regional situation.122

Strobe Talbatt, the US Deputy Secretary of State, paid an important visit to Pakistan in April 1994 to discuss the nuclear non-proliferation. He insisted that Pakistan should cap its nuclear programme alongwith further reduction and elimination of the weapons of mass destruction. He also asked Pakistan not to link the Kashmir issue with nuclear as nuclear non-proliferation was so important that it should not be linked with any other issue and that dialogue on the issue would continue through secret diplomacy.123 But Benazir’s government remained stuck to its stance that the nuclear issue could not be deliberated unless Kashmir issue was linked with it.

In early 1995, western powers made a determined bid to persuade Pakistan to support India’s attempt to hold elections in Kashmir. Elections had not been taken place since 1987 and the western powers hoped that the process of elections would expedite the pace of dialogue between the Indian government and the Kashmiri militants.124 US ambassador in India Frank G. Wisner floated the idea of election and began a campaign in its favour. He personally met with the several Hurriyat Conference leaders to convince them to participate in elections.125 Not only Wisner but US Senator Hank Brown, who proposed the Brown Amendment, also visited Srinagar and urged


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Kashmiri activists not to boycott the elections.126 Pakistan considered such moves detrimental to its traditional stance, therefore, it out rightly rejected it. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto condemned it as “sham” and immediately requested the UN to convene a multilateral conference (involving India, Pakistan and the five members of security council as well as Germany and Japan) to resolve Kashmir issue and establish a regional security system in South Asia.127

It would not be out of place to mention the stance of Britain regarding the issue of elections in Kashmir, the Britain fully trusted India’s intentions. For instance, the British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd (who arrived in Pakistan on a two day visit on 8 January), publicly stated British position on Kashmir:

Two things are necessary to find an answer to the problem of Kashmir one is direct discussions between Pakistan and India. The second is a political process in Kashmir which is credible, so that the Kashmiris feel they can elect people who can genuinely represent them.128

Hurd was harshly criticized by the Benazir’s government and was diplomatically snubbed. Sharply reacting to the allegations that Pakistan was helping the Kashmiris Pakistanis official replied, “this position is at variance with history, law and the reality in Kashmir”.129 Pakistan’s though stance on the issue of holding elections in Indian held Kashmir was vindicated as India was forced to postpone these elections.130

(III)

This portion of the article discusses the successes and failures of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy from 1989 to 1995. This policy may be termed as successful because it substantially led to the internationalization of the Kashmir dispute, drew world’s attention towards “miserable plights of Kashmiris”, elicited support of various forums (like OIC, PLO, EU, Swedish Parliament, and various human rights organizations) as well as distinguished statesmen (like few members of British House of Lords, US senators, UN secretary-general). he 19th OIC Foreign Minister Conference on 4 August 1990 in Cairo, unanimously adopted a resolution on Jammu and Kashmir calling for a peaceful settlement of the issue in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and the Simla agreement. The resolution also expressed deep concern over the violation of human rights in the Indian held Kashmir and mandated the chairman of the conference to send a


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good office mission to Pakistan and India to defuse tensions and find a way out for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute.131 Another resolution was adopted at the 20th OIC Foreign Minister Conference held in Islamabad on 10 August 1991 which condemned the massive violation of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir and called for supporting the cause of Kashmiris for self-determination. The conference also called upon India to allow human rights groups and humanitarian organizations to visit the Indian-held Kashmir.132 In September 1994, the 7th extra-ordinary session of Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was convened in Islamabad and a strong resolution was adopted which condemned the gross violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir and called for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. It also unanimously decided to establish an OIC contact group on Jammu and Kashmir to coordinate the effort of member countries for promoting the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir.133 In 1994, India for the first time allowed Kashmiri resistance leaders to meet Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and other Muslim head of states at the summit of the organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Casablanca in December 1994.134

n December 1990, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) for the first time openly supported the cause of Kashmiris. Its ambassador to Pakistan, Ahmed Abdur Razzaq, traveled to Azad Kashmir and participated in a rally organized by Azad Kashmir’s Prime Minister, Mumtaz Hussain Rathore. The Palestinian Ambassador expressed his unequivocal support to Kashmiris in their just struggle. He said that there was a great similarly between the struggle of Palestine people for freedom and struggle of Kashmir for independence.135 On 12 March 1992, European community passed a resolution supported the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination and urged the United Nations Security Council to re-examine the issue.136 In May 1992, the Swedish parliament expressed its “deepest concern” on the violation of human rights in Kashmir by India. The situation in the Indian held Kashmir was described as “chaotic” and “terrible” with eye witness accounts of torture, arson, gang rape, imprisonment without trial. The debate on Kashmir in the Swedish parliament was initiated by Margereta Vikluna, a Member of Parliament from KDs party and also a member of the standing committee of foreign affairs. The Minister for International Development (Foreign Aid) and Human Right issues Alf Svensson briefly traced the historic background of the issue. Reflecting on the contents of UN resolution “that final accession should be decided by a referendum” the Minister underlined the Swedish position by stating that:


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This is a method, which the Swedish government also recommends.” The debate made clear that the Swedish Government recommended implementation of the UN resolutions on referendum for accession to Pakistan or India as a “method” to resolve the Kashmir issue, while no other option, including autonomy contained in the resolutions.137

Another success of Pakistan’s efforts for internationalizing Kashmir issue manifested from the renewed focus of international human rights groups and organization in various parts of the world which is evident from their extensive documentation of the atrocities by Indian forces in Kashmir. These organizations included Amnesty International, Asia Watch, even the Indian Human Rights Organizations such a Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, (PUCL), Peoples Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and Citizen’s Forum for Democracy (CFD) raised their dissenting voices over the issue.138

Pakistani officials were able to draw support from many British parliamentarians. For instance, in May 1992, the British member of the House of Lords, Lord Avebury vociferously advocated the cause of self-determination of Kashmiris. From 1994 to 1996, the members Labour Party also supported Pakistan’s stance. Even, the British parliament established a Kashmir committee. In his Pakistan’s visit, Lord Avebury suggested that similar Kashmir Committees should also be formed in parliaments of other democratic countries, and they should work in coordination with the Kashmir committee in Pakistan.139 Nearly about sixty members of the British parliament condemned the large-scale Indian violation of human rights in Indian held Kashmir, when Indian Prime Minister Narsima Rao, was about to meet the British Prime Minister. They presented a memorandum to John Major, demanding that during negotiations India’s attention should be drawn to its atrocities in the valley and should be asked to put an end to such atrocities and allow Human Rights Organizations to visit the valley and have a first hand knowledge of the conditions there and that the Kashmir people should be given the right of self-determination according to the intentionally recognized principles.140 In 1995 Roy Hattersley, a Labour ideologue supported Pakistan stance on Kashmir and had it known through the NEC statement of October 1995. According to Wajid Shams-ul-Hasan, Robin Cook one of the most influential British statesmen of his generation moved this NEC resolution on Kashmir as a shadow foreign secretary.141

Lke the British parliamentarians the US officials also expressed their deep concern over the critical situation in Kashmir. On December 15, 1990 the US Ambassador to India Frank Weisner reiterated that Kashmir was a dispute between India and Pakistan and


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maintained that his country favoured a dialogue between the two countries for resolving the dispute.142 In May 1992, the US senator, Dan Steven, also supported Kashmiris right of self determination. In the same month, the Chairman of House Committee and of US Congress Mr. Dante Fascell, and the Chairman of the sub-committee on Human Rights sent joint letters to the US Secretary of State James Baker and the Indian Ambassador in the United States condemning India’s violation of Human Rights. They complained, “we can only conclude that torture committed by government authorities is taking place in India on regular and systematic basis”.143 With the coming of President Bill Clinton to power, the US Kashmir policy took a new turn. Due to its emphasis on human rights, the US government increasingly began to focus on the Kashmir issue. It established a Bureau of South Asian Affairs. The American academia and think-tank also narrowed down their focus on Kashmir. From September to December 1993, about a dozen seminars were sponsored by the Asia Foundation, Stimson Centre, Woodrow Wilson Centre, Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Carnegie Institute of Peace.144 In his address to the UN General Assembly, President Bill Clinton recognized the disputed of Kashmir as being “a trouble spot where bloody, ethnic religious war ranges”.145 A strong US policy statement on Kashmir appeared in October 1993, when the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Robin Raphel made a statement that:

We view Kashmir as a disputed territory and that means we do not recognize that instrument of accession as meaning that Kashmir is forever more an integral part of India.146

On March 15, 1992, Madame Lirin Belgium’s Secretary of State for foreign trade said that Belgium supported the idea of implementing UN resolution to right for self-determination.147 In May 1992, the United Nations, Secretary General, Mr. Botrus Ghali expressed his concern over the situation in Kashmir. Ghali urged the both parties India and Pakistan to approach the United Nations before moving to resolve the conflict.148

Despite these successes Pakistan’s Kashmir policy also received certain set backs which in turn contributed towards the inconsistencies of the Kashmir policy witnessed during the subsequent period (1996-99). Among these set backs were the inability of Pakistan’s government to counter poise campaign launched by Indian government which projected Kashmiri resistance movement as a state sponsored terrorism. This campaign went a long way towards changing western perception regarding this movement. Moreover, Pakistani


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authorities could not muster requisite international support from its friends like US, China and Iran for the internationalization of Kashmir dispute in the world forums particularly in the United Nations in terms of getting favorable resolutions for the expeditious solution of Kashmir dispute on the basis of UN resolution. In addition to that, Pakistani government could not prevent US tilt towards India, which, not only enhanced Indian clout in the region but also contributed towards corresponding decline in Pakistan’s clout.

In June 1990 Stephen Solarz warned Pakistan that all American assistance to Pakistan would be suspended unless Islamabad stopped its support to militants in Kashmir.149 A campaign against Pakistan’s nuclear programme was also launched and a concern for the alleged role of Pakistan in Kashmir conflict became the more explicit in the US policy. In 1992 the US placed Pakistan on the watch list of the countries promoting terrorism.150 Even before his inauguration US President Bill Clinton sent a message to the Pakistani government with the warning that Pakistan was being placed on a “watch list” of nations suspected of abetting international terrorism. It would be given four to six months to refute Indian charges about sponsoring separatist insurgencies in the Indian Punjab and Kashmir.151 After Charar-e-Sharif incident, India made strong accusations that Pakistan encouraged Afghan and Arab mujahideen to join the Kashmiri resistance and that “Afghans” were responsible for burning the shrine.152 In March 1993, India accused Pakistan of carrying out bomb blasts in Bombay that killed 300 people and injured more than 1,000.153 Although Pakistan denied these charges yet the western diplomats were quite skeptical of Pakistan’s clarification. They apprehended that the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination may become an international jihad like that in Afghanistan. Such apprehensions lent further credence when an Afghan led militant group kidnapped five western tourists in Kashmir in July 1993.154

The most conspicuous failure of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy was that despite all the efforts for internationalization Pakistani governments failed to get requisite support from UN or to convince the UN the desirability of implementation of UNSC resolutions. In March 1994 at the UN Human Rights Conference in Geneva, Pakistan had to withdraw a resolution condemning the human rights violation in Kashmir due to the lack of international support. The critics of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy at home and abroad termed it as a failure. Even China and Iran, the two closed allies of Pakistan as well as most other Muslim states were reluctant to support the resolution.155 Similarly, in November 1994 at the UN General Assembly, Pakistan failed to table a Resolution against India causing further embarrassment for the Pakistani policy makers.156


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The ambivalent US policy also point towards the failure of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. This ambivalence can partially be attributed to US tilt towards India which became more explicit by the end of 1993. During the period, the tone of US officials suggested insidious shift in their strategy concerning India. For instance, in February 1994, the address of US Assistant Secretary of State, Robin Raphel, at the Asian Society in Washington dealt with the Human Rights issue in very general terms by over looking the Kashmir issue.157 At another occasion, she referred to the uprising in Kashmir as an insurgency and avoided any mention of the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir.158 Right after the UNHRC’s sessions in Geneva, she visited New Delhi and tried to address India apprehensions regarding her statements on Kashmir. She retracted her earlier statements on the issue by declaring that she had been quoted out of context. She also denied having challenged Kashmir’s instrument of accession.159 She stressed upon the need to resolve the dispute through a bilateral framework while referring to the Simla Agreement.160 Farzana Shakoor argues that “Robin Raphel’s visit was aimed at dispelling the Indian impression that the US had titled towards Pakistan on Kashmir”.161

During Narsimha Rao’s visit to the US in May 1994, the issue of human rights violations in Kashmir was almost shelved as it was not mentioned in the joint communiqué. By excluding a reference to the people of Kashmir, it simply vindicated the Indian stance.162 It was the US new approach towards India, the bottom line of which was not to push the issues like human rights which could prove detrimental to US economic interests in India in one way or the other.163 Diluting its traditional position on the Kashmir dispute “US advised Pakistan to forget about history and see ahead”.164 Perhaps the main reason behind this new approach was the changing US perception concerning Kashmir dispute as it now began to view Kashmir resistance as a militant Islamic movement which could prove detrimental to its interests in the region.165 This changed US attitude towards Kashmir found its visible expression in the language of US State Department annual report. This report also held militants responsible for human rights. With this new found phrase US started to encourage political process in the Indian held Kashmir. US almost stopped criticizing New Delhi and started to appreciate it for taking different steps to improve the ground situation.166

(IV)

A cursory analysis of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy during 1989-90 shows that right from the very outset Pakistan’ Kashmir policy was caught up in a dilemma. Forces of status quo such as military, jehadi organizations which had formulated and conditioned our Kashmir


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policy tended to keep it inconsonance with ideological underpinnings of our traditional stance on Kashmir. The UN resolutions remained the focal point of this Kashmir policy, these resolution had increasingly become irrelevant during cold war due to international apathy, ineffectiveness of the UN and vested interests of global and regional powers. The resurgence of Kashmir resistance movement provided Pakistan with an opportunity to internationalize the Kashmir dispute and impress upon the international community the relevance and viability of the UN resolutions for just and honourable solution of Kashmir dispute. During this period the governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were able to demonstrate their unflinching commitment to Kashmir cause by pursuing a very aggressive policy on Kashmir dispute. From early 1990s another main plank was added to this traditional Kashmir policy i.e. Pakistan also began to pursue a low cost strategy to engage India in low intensity conflict in order to make it relent to UN resolutions. But the operationalization of this policy proved exceedingly tenuous with the passage of time as the other factors such as the western apprehensions of the rising specter of militancy, clash of civilization scenario, the growing Chinese concerns regarding dominant Islamic trait of the resistance movement in Kashmir and the US tilt towards India in context of its political and economic clout adversely affected Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and pushed it towards the opposite direction. Till mid 1990s Kashmir policy had been virtually bogged downed in contrasting pulls and strains, its contradictions were now fully exposed which became more explicit between 1996-99.

The forces of status quo were represented by military, Jehadi organizations and jingoistic press. The military in Pakistan viewed itself as the last bastion of stability and security:

As an institution…the army remained the ultimate guarantor of a non-compromise inflexible policy towards India unless Delhi is prepared to concede the Kashmir issue.167

According to Ahmed Rashid, the military had accepted Benazir Bhutto’s installation with reluctance and remained hostile towards her government.168 When she assumed the office of Prime Minister, there was a general perception that she would operate with in the foreign policy framework of the previous military regime.169 After assuming power, Benazir Bhutto quickly conceded herself as not a “free-agent” on Pakistan’s political scene and had to make major compromises to form the government.170 She was left with a few alternatives but to appease military. Therefore, she agreed to let General Aslam Beg to continue as a Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) and to allow military a


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pro-active role in the foreign policy, as is evident from the appointment of Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan as Foreign Minister, who was considered as a representative of establishment and was elected on the ticket of IJI.171 She remained nominal head of the defence committee and did not interfere in the internal affairs of the military. She allocated a large budget for the armed forces, and gave military a free-hand in Afghan policy. She also agreed to support the candidacy of Ghulam Ishaque Khan as president.172 On the other hand, Ghulam Ishaque Khan and Aslam Beg, the other two members of the ruling troika were contented to “let the popular and populist” Benazir Bhutto to represent Pakistan. However, president and the army chief remained dominant in formulating Pakistan’s policies concerning nuclear programme and relations with India.173

The dominance of forces of status quo in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy cannot be fully comprehended without taking into account the functioning of the whole mechanism responsible for the formulation, execution and implementation of Kashmir policy: (a)The higher military command set the direction of Kashmir policy; (b) The role of the ISI was to assess intelligence from India and Kashmir, to plan secret intelligence operations, their operationalization as well as conducting counter intelligence. In this manner it often played the role of what Ahemd Rasid calls “the conceptualiser and agent of operation”.174 It was also assigned the task of directing public relations campaign;175 (c) The civil bureaucracy represented by the ministry of Foreign Affairs was primarily responsible for implementing Kashmir policy at diplomatic level. In case of difference between civil and military bureaucracy over the direction of the foreign policy, the military and ISI views prevailed.176 Thus in this whole mechanism from formulation to the execution of Kashmir policy the civilian leadership had absolutely no say.

Moreover, the involvement of troika in Pakistan’s political structure, “where the president and the army chief worked in tandem made the prime minister the executor of the policy rather the formulator”.177 The Kashmir policy continued to be formulated and executed in the same fashion throughout the decade of 1990s. During this period the army and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) executed the Kashmir policy whereas the civilian government was allowed “to keep the façade of diplomacy alive” in order to provide “diplomatic cushion to the military led foreign policy”.178

There are numerous instances to show the limitations of the elected government in executing the Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Chari, Cheema and Cohen note that the ISI nominally reported to the prime minister, it did not brief her about details of its operation in Kashmir or in Afghanistan. “Kashmir was not an issue for Benazir Bhutto”.179 The Kashmir policy was continued to be administered in the same pattern


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during Nawaz Sharif’s first stint as prime minister (1990-1993). During Benazir Bhutto’s second stint as prime minister she systematically tried to a smooth working relationship with the ISI and the GHQ. The ISI chief from 1993 to August 1995, Lt. General Javed Ashraf Qazi was considered as one of her closest foreign and diplomatic policy advisors. According to Ahmed Rashid, by 1995, “the ISI was the major provider of intelligence and most important advisor to both the army and the civilian government, giving it a formidable power in policy-making towards India. Correspondingly, the role of foreign ministry in decision making was weakened”.180

The other significant features of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy directed by the military establishment were: (i) The army executed the Kashmir policy, the civilian government’s foreign policy agenda was to keep it in tandem with the military approach. (ii) The military elite wanted civilian government to support the uprising in Kashmir much vigorously so as to internationalize the dispute. For instance, Lt. General K.M. Arif writes:

To keep the issue alive Kashmir must hit the headlines in the press and electronic media in the West…My suggestion is that we should project India as a usurper of Human Rights…India should be portrayed as an occupation force, a country which is holding the Kashmiris against their will. We should portray India hurting minorities. Kashmiris are suffering because they happen to be Muslims in a Hindu state.181

(iii) The military encouraged by the Afghan experience wanted to engage India in Kashmir to make it “vulnerable”.182 This strategy was employed by Zia regime to provide some support to Sikh separatist after 1984 to engage India in East Punjab during Pakistan’s involvement in Afghan crisis 1979-88.183 It was the part of military establishment’s belief that a dominant India needed to be balanced against a dominant Pakistan for a peaceful South Asia and to resolve the Kashmir issue.184 This policy was “camouflaged under the guise of the Pakistan’s official stance that Pakistan was only providing diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmir freedom fighters”. (iv) Another main plank of this policy was that Pakistan Army developed a low cost strategy to engage India in low intensity conflict without evoking a general war in Kashmir. (v) Down playing bi-lateralism also constituted main plank of this strategy.185 Subsequently the significance of the Simla accord as a reference point to bilateral ties became irrelevant. (vi) This policy was directed towards extending moral support to those elements of Kashmiri resistance movement


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who supported the slogan “Kashmir baney ga Pakistan (Kashmir will become integral part of Pakistan) at the expense of “Azadi element” vying for the third option. However, the forces of change were causing a drift in Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy. Incompatibility of these two forces (status-quo and change) was mainly responsible for the dilemma faced by Pakistan’s Kashmir policy during the mid 90s. For instance, the U-turn in the US Kashmir policy put Pakistan at a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis India.186 Pakistan’s position became further vulnerable on account of following discernable shifts in the US policy: (i) The US policy favoured dialogue which focused on economic rather than the political aspect of bilateral relationship. (ii) This urge for a dialogue on part of the US was more in tuned with the Indian line as it pressed Pakistan to create conducive environment which implied that Pakistan should help India in suppressing the resistance movement in Kashmir. However, from Pakistan’s point of view, it was tantamount to resolve the Kashmir issue as per Indian desires.

Not only did the US Kashmir policy underwent complete change but also Chinese Kashmir perception of Kashmir also showed discernable shift. Chinese authorities were apprehensive about spill over effects of the uprising in Kashmir in its two border provinces, Tibet and Sinkiang. China implicitly complained of foreign interference.187 The dominant fundamentalist trait of resistance movement further arose Chinese concerns. This proved to be the main cause behind Chinese reluctance to provide all out support to Kashmiris. This also provides also plausible explanation behind Chinese role in dissuading Pakistan to withdraw its resolution at UNHRC. During the same period, China also began working towards improved relations with India. In 1993, the two countries had singed a peace agreement to reduce tensions along the disputed Sino-Indian border. China also hinted that Pakistan should consider accepting the LoC as permanent border.188

This analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy presents quite a muddled picture. Though this policy was apparently premised upon the support of Kashmiris right of self-determination yet ostensibly it was used as a smoke screen to camouflage its new trajectories which were added under the influence of forces of status quo, i.e., engagement of India in a low intensity conflict by increasing its occupation cost. Perhaps, Pakistan’s military establishment was encouraged by its experience in the Afghan jihad. A plausible explanation to this question as why this policy failed to achieve dividend may be that the Pakistan’s policy makers failed to take into account the changed geo-political situation in which this policy was to be operationalized. Thus, this policy was designed with a cold war mind set without taking cognizance of the dynamics of changing regional and world situation.


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In the final analysis this proved to be the main factor behind the undoing of the whole policy.


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END-NOTES

1 Smruti S. Partanaik, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: Objectives and Approaches”, Stratagic Analysis, vol 26(11) (April- June 2002), p. 202. 2 Ibid. The involvement of these radical Islamic groups had two objectives. First it would not only save Pakistan from a direct military involvement but at the same time would achieve Pakistan’s objective to inflict damage to India. Second, according to a Pakistan strategy, it would pressurize India to concede some sort of compromise on the Kashmir issue. 3 P.R. Chari, P.I. Cheema and S.P. Cohen, Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 69. 4 Ibid., p.121. 5 Ibid.

6 Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruquee (eds.), “Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis:” Occasional Paper No.17 (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994), p.6 cited in Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p. 67. Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan was an apprenticeship for its low intensity conflict in Kashmir. According to this newly found belief Pakistan’s ability to control violence could give Pakistan the capability and influence to dictate peace in the valley. 7 Ibid. 8 India Today (28 February, 1990) 9 According to observers she adopted more hawkish policy as a result domestic political pressures as her government increasingly came under attack by opposition which enjoyed tacit support of hawkish elements in the establishment. Her stance towards India became more tough after she barely survived a no-confidence vote on October, 31, 1989. According to an informed Indian observer the then High Commission J. N. Dixit. “One of the sticks used by the opposition to beat her was the so-called compromising attitude towards India and her having failed to extract any compromise form Rajiv Gandhi despite the alleged softness which he had shown towards Pakistan”.J.N. Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed inheritance: India Pakistan Relations, 1970-1994 (New Delhi: Konark, 1995),pp.124-5. 10 At the time, ISI was deeply involved in Afghanistan the last soviet troops had left Afghanistan in February, 1989 and the ISI was pre-occupied in trying to organize the Afghan Mujahideen to seize Kabul. Ahmed Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, in Saeed Shafqat (ed), Contemporary Issues in Pakistan Studies (Lahore: Vanguard, 1999), p.158. 11 Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruquee, “The 1990 Crisis”. 6 cited in Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p. 67. 12 Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p.153. 13 Ijaz Ahmed (ed.), Benazir Bhutto’s Foreign Policies: A study of Pakistan’s Relations with Major Powers (Lahore: Classic, 1993), p.148. 14 Ibid, pp.149-50. 15The Nation (5 January, 1990) 16 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan India and Kashmir Dispute, On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.122. 17 Ibid.


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18 Monis Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2000), p.45. 19 Jatoi’s statement on 23 September 1990 cited in Ibid., p.53. 20 Ibid. 21 Khan Zaman Mirza, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s”, South Asian Studies, vol. 11 (July 1994) p. 75. 22 Nawaz Sharif’s statement on Kashmir, cited in Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.45. 23 The Muslim (21 October, 1993) 24 The Muslim (26 October, 1993) 25 Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.45. 26 Khalid Qayyum, “India has lost the battle for Kashmir says Leghari”, The Nation (24 May, 1995). 27 Ibid. 28 Government of Pakistan, Speeches and statements of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, vol 3. (Islamabad, Directorate of Films and Publications Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1990), p. 37. 29 The Muslim (11 February, 1990). 30 Mirza, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s”, p. 75. 31 Raja Asghar, “Bhutto predicts victory for Kashmir Independence Campaign”, Reuters Library Report (13 March, 1990). The speech invited the attention of the press and its certain sections were video taped and widely distributed. “Jag-Jag, mo-mo, han-han” she proclaimed implying that she wanted to chop up the Indian governor in Kashmir likes the syllables of his name. 32 Government of Pakistan, Speeches and Statements of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, p. 57. 33 Frontier Post (23 March, 1990) 34 Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, “Azad Kashmir as base camp for Freedom Struggle”, The Muslim (12 January, 1991) 35 The Tribune (7 July, 1992) 36 Government of Pakistan, Speeches and Statements of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, p.107. 37 Mirza, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s”, p. 78. 38 Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto’s statement, cited in Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p. 45. 39 Jang (11 March, 1990) 40 Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.47. These efforts could not make any head way on account of Benazir Bhutto’s dismissal. 41 Tanveer Ahmed Khan, “Pakistan’s Regional Policy with Special Reference to India and Afghanistan”, Pakistan Horizon, vol. 43 (4), (October 1990), p.22. 42 The Muslim (5 August, 1990). 43 Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.53. 44 Ahmed Ijaz (ed.), Benazir Bhutto’s Foreign Policies: A Study of Pakistan’s Relations with Major Powers (Lahore: Classic, 1993), p.150. 45 “Prime Minister’s Address” (Text of Radio Pakistan Islamabad, Home service in Urdu 0200 gmt, 25 March 1991). Cited in The Kashmir Resistance Movement: World Press on Kashmir Jan, 1991-June 17, 1991 (Rawalpindi, n.p, 1991), pp.17-18.


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46 The two Prime Ministers had their first meeting at Harare on October 17, 1991, where the two leader attended Common Wealth summit. The second meeting took place at beautiful tourist resort of Ginavaru at Male on 23 November, 1991. The two Prime Ministers also held one talks at the Congress hall of World Economic Forum. The fifth meeting took place at Jakarta during the NAM summit. For details see, Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, pp.56-57. The Muslim (23 November, 1990). Hindustan Times (4 September, 1992). Tribune (Chandigarh, 5 September, 1992) 47 Pakistan Times (9 January, 1991) 48 A.G. Noorani, “Kashmir Issue: Challenges ahead for New Delhi”, The Statesman (New Delhi, 10 September, 1992) 49 K.M. Arif, “Kashmir Problem Over View”, in Ghulam Sarwar (ed.), Kashmir Problem: Challenge and Response, (Islamabad: Institute for Policy Studies, 1990), p. 67. 50 Ibid. 51 ibid. 52 Kashmir Calling (1st May to 25th May 1992), p.1. 53 Kashmir Calling (25th May to 15th June), p.1. 54 Arif, “Kashmir Problem Over View”, p. 67. 55 Hindustan Times (Editorial), (13 August and 3 September, 1992). Tribune (Chandigarh, 3 September 1992) 56 Pakistan Times (24 October, 1993) 57 The Frontier Post (23 October, 1993), The Muslim (23 October, 1993) 58 Pakistan Times (8 November, 1993) 59 Ibid. 60 The Muslim (10 December, 1993), Pakistan Times (10 December, 1993) 61 The Muslim (23 December, 1993) 62 Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, “The Kashmir Issue”, Pakistan Horizon, vol.47 (3), (July 1994), p.21. 63 Ibid., p.27. 64 Ibid, p.28. 65 Ibid., p.29. 66 Ibid., pp.29-31. 67 Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p. 157. 68 Tehmina Mehmood, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policies: Post Cold War Period”, Pakistan Horizon, vol. 50(3), (July, 1997), p.114. 69 Farzana Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global objectives”, Pakistan Horizon, vol 47 (3) (July, 1994), p. 77. 70 Dawn (1st October, 1993) 71 Pakistan Horizon, vol. 47(2), (April 1994), pp.1-2. According to Wirsing, Indian Prime Minister Rao had suggested resumption of the talks in a letter of congratulation to Benazir Bhutto when she became the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the second time in October 1993. In an unprecedented gesture his letters had offered a comprehensive dialogue on Kashmir—apparently with out pre-conditions. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and Kashmir Dispute, p.194. 72 See Mahmud, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policies: Post Cold War Period”; Wirsing, India, Pakistan and Kashmir Dispute, p. 194.


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73 Pakistan Horizon, vol. 47(2), (April 1994), pp.1-2. These laws provided the Indian Security Forces absolute discretionary powers to crush the Kashmiris movement. 74 Ibid. 75 Mehmood, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policies: Post Cold War Period”. p 110. That it used the diplomatic exercise to buy time and engage Pakistan in a meaningless dialogue. The motive was to exclude a possible US mediation or influence over the issue. Also see, Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global objectives”. According to a report published in India Today: “The invitation to Benazir Bhutto for the summit was borne out of this new calculation. Once India invites Pakistan it would be impossible for the US to claim a locus standi or seek a mediating role or participation of the Kashmiri people…The immediate gain of the summit’s move was to render irrelevant Pakistan’s attempt to raise Kashmir issue at the UN, demanding an inquiry by the Human Rights Commission”. India Today (15 December 1993) 76 Ibid., p.115. According to some analysts India’s offer to Pakistan for a dialogue over Kashmir was a calculated maneuver on the part of India to deflect the international pressure on India to negotiate on Kashmir. The Indian rigidity throughout the talks suggested 77 Dawn (26 February, 1994). The resolution did not mention India and the matter of right of self-determination; it simply focused on human rights abuses in Kashmir for this, two reasons were given; first to preempt a no action resolution by India against Pakistan’s move and second the Human Rights Commission dealt exclusively with the protection and promotion of human rights as enshrined in the charter of the UN. Pakistan Horizon, vol. 47 (2) (April 1994), p.3. 78 Saeed Shafqat, “Kashmir Issue: Review of Recent Research Proposals for the Resolution of the Conflict”, in Saeed Shafqat (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Pakistan Studies (Lahore: Vanguard, 1999), p.189. 79 Pakistan Horizon, vol. 47(2) (April 1994), p.4. 80 Ibid. 81 Mehmood, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policies: Post Cold War Period”, p. 111. Various reasons have been attributed to the withdrawal of resolution by Pakistan at UN Human Rights Commission these include: (i) Iran and China obliged India for reasons of their own by persuading Pakistan to withdraw its resolution on the eve of the voting. For China it was time to return the favour, which India did her in November 1993, when it voted against a resolution at UN General Assembly regarding the human rights abuses in India. The Iranian support was won by offering the technology if needed for its defence equipment. (ii) The US also showed unwillingness to support Pakistan on proposed resolution as was indicated by a lack of reference to human rights abuses in Kashmir in the US delegate’s speech at UN Human Rights Commission who otherwise condemned many other countries for human rights violations. The US decision to abstain on the proposed resolution left Pakistan with little choice but to withdraw it. (iii) Another reason behind lack of support on the part of some Muslim countries and Pakistan’s other friends was that their own record of human rights was not praise worthy. For details see: India Today (31 March, 1994). Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global Objectives”. p.78. Mirza, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s”, p.85.


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82 Shafqat, “Kashmir Issue: Review of Recent Research Proposals for the Resolution of the Conflict”, p. 190. Defending the withdrawal of the resolution, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali said that many countries had deplored the human rights situation in the Indian-held Kashmir and asked India to open it for the fact-finding missions which was the main objective of the resolution. He pointed out that as India had agreed to allow two delegations to visit the Indian-held Kashmir, the main purpose of the resolution had been achieved. He further said that if was for the first time that after twenty nine years Kashmir problem had been internationalized at a global forum. The Nation (10 March, 1994). According to Tehmina Mehmood, “From government’s point of view, its main objective was to draw world’s attention to the Kashmir issue”. Mehmood, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policies: Post Cold War Period”, p.111. Naseem Zohra, “A Damocles sword over India”, The Nation (Lahore, March 10, 1994). Abbas Rashid, “Learning from Geneva”, The Frontier Post (Lahore, 11 March, 1994). Even an Indian observer acknowledged that Pakistan has internationalized the Kashmir issue. He wrote that “Despite claims of India’s diplomatic victory, India has come out considerably bruised having to affect morally unjustifiable deals with several countries around the world with dubious human rights records. Pakistan, too, has achieved at least at par to fit its objective by internationalizing the issue”. See “Triumph of Diplomacy”, India Today (11 March, 1994). 83 Shafqat, “Kashmir Issue: Review of Recent Research Proposals for the Resolution of the Conflict”, p.189. 84 Ibid. 85 Kashmir News (July 1994), p.3. 86 Ibid., p.6. 87 Ibid. 88 Shaheen Sehbai, “Benazir Bhutto calls for US Mediation on Kashmir”, Dawn (11April, 1995) 89 Khalid Qayyum, “India has lost the battle for Kashmir says Leghari”, The Nation (24 May, 1995) 90 Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.72. 91 Khalid Akhtar, “Kashmir Issue: Pakistan Diplomacy on Test”, The Muslim (Islamabad, 28 January 1990). Indian Foreign Minister warned Pakistan of dire consequences if it did not cease its “wanton and uncalled for interference in the India’s affairs”. Air Marshal (Retd) Ayaz A. Khan, “The War in Kashmir, (27 January 1990) 92 Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p.72. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. In this meeting the Indian Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral seemed to show some understanding of Pakistani domestic political necessity to express sympathy for the militants. 95 Ibid., pp.71-72. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid., p.72. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 The Frontier Post (21 January, 1990). On February 21, V.P. Singh stated that “India would have to review its peaceful nuclear policy if Pakistan


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employed its nuclear power for militancy purposes”. The Xinhua General Overseas News Agency (21 February, 1990), cited in Chari, Cheema and Cohen, Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p.73. Singh continued the take this belligerent posture afterwards In May 1990, in his interview with Far Eastern Economic Review, He stated that “we want to avoid conflict, but if it comes we have nothing to fear”. Far Eastern Economic Review (May 17, 1990), p.11. 101 “Policy on Kashmir”, Editorial, The Muslim (1st February, 1990) 102 The Muslim (22 May, 1990) 103 Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p.102. Though Benazir Bhutto later asserted that she had never been contacted by Americans. But the US account has it that she was indeed contacted directly in various countries. Observers have identified various reasons behind Benazir Bhutto’s elusiveness. These include: (i) It is unclear whether her caution stemmed from pride and haughtier. (ii) Whether she feared a confrontation over Pakistan’s actions and its covert nuclear program of which she later, improbably denied knowledge. (iii) It is possible that she wanted the President and Army Chief to bear responsibility for yielding to US pressure. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid., p.102. 106 Ibid., p.104. 107 Ibid., p.103. 108 Ibid., p.104. The American’s believed, however, that Pakistan would shut down training camps for Kashmiri militants and that Islamabad welcomed US efforts to prevent a war between India and Pakistan. 109 The Seymour M. Hersh in his article entitled “On the Nuclear Edge”, New York (29 March, 1993) and Burrows and Winderm, Critical Mass, pp-16-17 cited in Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p.110. Characterize it as an unqualified success. Barrows and Windrem maintain that “Gates quietly defused a situation on the sub-continent that was threatening to go out of control with horrendous consequences”. Times of India (8 June, 1990). 110 The proposed package contained the following CBMS: (i) Further information sharing on military exercise. (ii) Information sharing on filed firing to avoid civilian causalities across the border. (iii) Communication being increased between local commanders. (iii) Joint border patrolling. (iv) Exchange of delegations to re-affirm these arrangements. See Xinhua General News Service (3 June, 1990) cited in Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p.108. 111 Times of India (8 June, 1990). For further details of Gates mission’s visit to Pakistan John F. Burns urges Pakistan to settle fund with India over Kashmir”, New York Times (21 May, 1990) 112 Tensions arouse further in 1992 as both countries expelled each other’s diplomats for spying and Kashmiris in Pakistan marched to LOC and had to be stopped forcibly from crossing it by Pakistan Security Forces. On 6th December 1992 relations took an even more violent turn when Hindu fundamentalists stoned the Babri Mosque at Ayodhia. Riots in Pakistan led to the death of some 25 Hindus and the destruction of 61 Hindu temples. More than 800 people were killed in India as a result of Hindu-Muslim riots.


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113 Mujeeb Afzal, “Pakistan-US Relations Post Cold War Phase”, Pakistan Journal of American Studies, vol.14 (1 & 2) (Spring and Fall 1996), p.78. 114 Rais Ahmed Khan, “Fifty years of Pakistan-US Relations”, Pakistan Journal of American Studies, vol.16(1) (Spring 1998), p.11. 115 Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global objectives”, p.78. Also see Pakistan Horizon, vol.47(3) (July 1994), p.73. 116 Ibid. 117 For Eastern Economic Review (23 December, 1993) 118 Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global Objectives”, p.80. 119 Ibid., p.83. 120 India Today (15 April, 1994). The main features of this strategy were as follows: (i) It overlooked the link between the nuclear programmes of Pakistan and India abandoned the regional approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation South Asia. (ii) It delinked the issue of nuclear proliferation from the conflict in Kashmir and tried to address it in isolation. (iii) It accepted India as a proven nuclear power but coerced Pakistan to enter into commitments which envisaged a verifiable cap to the country’s nuclear programme. The strategy was in definite contrast to the one pursued by Clinton administration during 1993. Throughout that year the link between the Kashmir conflict and nuclear proliferation was acknowledged whenever the two issues came up for discussion between Pakistan and US. Similarly pressure was put on both Pakistan and India to accede to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan and India, however, have different perceptions on the issue, remained unresponsive to the US demand. See for details, Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global Objectives”, pp. 80-81. 121 Pakistan Horizon, vol.47(1) (Jan. 1994), p.4. 122 Ibid. 123 The Muslim (Islamabad, 16 April, 1994) 124 Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p.162. 125 Ershad Mehmood, “Post-Cold War US Kashmir Policy” in Policy Perspectives, p. 91. 126 “Washington stance on Kashmiris”, Dawn (18 August, 1996). Pakistan and the Kashmiris sharply denounced Wisner’s pro-election campaign and the people boycotted the elections. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Asif Ahmed Ali commented on Wisner’s remarks in a very critical manner “Wisner is acting as a devil’s advocate”. He said Wisner ignored the ground realities and his statements did not reflect US official policy. See Saheen Sehbai, “US owns Wisner’s Views on Kashmir”, Dawn (6 August, 1996) 127 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: Pakistan and Unfinished War (London: IB Tauris, 2001), p.194. 128 Daily Telegraph (9 January, 1995) 129 Ibid. 130 Ahmed Rashid is of the view that Pakistan’s success in forcing India to postpone its elections plan in Kashmir was not the result of Pakistan’s diplomacy, initiative, or new proposals, but because of the blunder committed by Indian army and the escalation by the Kashmiris in their struggle for self-determination. Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, pp.166-167. 131 The Muslim (5 August, 1990)


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132 Ibid., p.69. 133 Government of Pakistan, Achievement of the Present Government in the sphere of Foreign Affairs during the last two years (1994-95), (Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Planning Division, n.d.) 134 Dawn (31 December, 1994) 135 The Muslim (Islamabad, 12 January 1991) 136 Kashmir Calling (16-31 May, 1992) 137 Kashmir Calling (1-15 May, 1992) 138 Shaheena Akhtar, “Human Rights Violations in Indian-Held Kashmir” in K.F. Yousaf (ed.), Perspective on Kashmir (Islamabad: Pakistan Forum, 1994), p.160. 139 Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, “The Kashmir Issue”, Pakistan Horizon, vol.47(3) (July 1994), p.21. 140 Ibid., p.28. 141 Wajid Shamsul Hassan, “Matters of Movement: Kashmir – Why not induct Benazir Bhutto”, Dawn (18 July, 1998) 142 Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.54. 143 Kashmir Calling (16-31 May, 1992). 144 Shafqat, “Kashmir Issue: Review of Recent Research Proposals for the Resolution of the Conflict”, p.190. 145 Dawn (27 September, 1993) 146 Nation (3 April, 1995) 147 Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.47. 148 Kashmir Calling (1-15 May, 1992) 149 Solarz’s statement on 22, June 1990, cited in Ahmer, Middle East and South Asia, p.45. 150 Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global Objectives”, p.27. 151 Kathy Gannon, “Pakistan”, Associated Press Wire Service (9 January, 1993) 152 During that period, Pakistan took a number of steps allegedly including the shutting down of training camps to convince Washington that it was not guilty of the terrorism charges. Its efforts ultimately paid off. At the end of April 1993, the State Department’s annual report Patterns of Global Terrorism made little mention of Pakistan. Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), pp. 374-75. After the dismissal of the Nawaz Sharif government in July the US threat was withdraw after a major reshuffle in the ISI, in which same 60 officers from Zia era were dismissed. Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p.160. 153 Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p. 160. 154 Ibid., p.166. 155 Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p.161. 156 Ibid. 157 Dawn (12 February, 1994) 158 Ibid. 159 India Today (15 April 1994) 160 Ibid. 161 Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global Objectives”, p.79. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid.


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164 Shabana Fayyaz, “Kashmir Conflict US Post Cold War Perspective” in Pakistan Journal of American Studies, vol.15 (Spring/Fall 1997), p.76. 165 For instance, in one congressional testimony Raphel cited the formation of a national Human Rights Commission in India, as well as the Indian Army’s crackdown on its own soldiers as the steps “in the right direction”. Mahmud, “Post-Cold War US Kashmir Policy”, p.90. While giving briefly to House International Relations sub-committee on Asia and Pacific Ms. Raphel observed “to be fair, I think it is a bit more complicated… The difficulty is that a lot of history has gone by since that time, number one, number two, the government of India at this time does not share the view that those resolutions are still relevant. And third, in practical terms, as I said in my statement, it is time to move forward, not to look at past prescriptions but to come put with a prescription that fits the situation on the ground and current reality”. A local newspaper observed. “There may be a slight shift in US position on Kashmir”. The Nation (December 8, 1995) 166 Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global Objectives”, p.29. 167 “Survey: India and Pakistan”, The Economist (22 May, 1999) 168 Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p.153. 169 Shafqat, “Kashmir Issue: Review of Recent Research Proposals for the Resolution of the Conflict”, pp. 243-44. 170 Ibid. 171 Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p.28. Yaqoob was not Benazir Bhutto’s choice as Foreign Minister, as having been Zia’s Foreign Minister. When Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister on December 1, 1988. In a deal brokered by the US Embassy, Yaqoob’s continuation as Foreign Minister was part of the package she had to accept. This was to ensure the “continuity in the Foreign Policy” according to one of her supporters, it meant that she would show a willingness not to consciously attempt to break with the “Ziast” World view. Sayid Rifaat Hussain, “Benazir Bhutto’s Downfall: The International Dimension”, The News (10 August 1991) 172 Shafqat, “Kashmir Issue: Review of Recent Research Proposals for the Resolution of the Conflict”, pp. 243-44. 173 Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p. 28. 174 Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p.154. 175 Suba Chandran, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: A Critique of ICJ Report”, website: www.ipcs.org/Pak_Pub_03-PakKashmirPolicyCritique.pdf, p.2. 176 Ibid. 177 Partanaik, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: Objectives and Approaches”, p.203. 178 Ibid., 203-04. 179 Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p.31. Pakistani Intelligence agencies and several private organizations supported Kashmiri militants. There were three different ways of support ways of support: (i) Some groups were supported by Pakistan. (ii) Certain groups were support by private groups. (iii) Some of these were officially sponsored to undertone unregulated cover operations. There is evidence of all three. In February 1990, Indian intelligence had disclosed over 46 camps throughout Azad Kashmir which they described as “safe houses” where militant were given weapons and explosives training. In 1990s the Kashmiri Jehadi Organization which continued to predominate include: Laskhar-e-Tayyaba (the Army of the pure), Hakat-ul-

http://www.ipcs.org/Pak_Pub_03-PakKashmirPolicyCritique.pdf


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Ansar and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, established in 1989, had most of the adherents. The United Jihad Council led by Syed Salah-ud-din was the umbrella of organizations for fourteen smaller groups, operating out of Muzaffarabad which included Al-badar, and Tehrik-e-Jihad. In June 1990 financial times journalist David House go traveled throughout Azad Kashmir and was shown Jamat-I-Islami refugee camps. The Pakistani and the Azad Kashmir governments denied that they were giving any material support to the militants. But the activists of the Janat-i-Islami and other militants sympathizers were obviously not restricted. “there are no training camps in Pakistan, of course, but in So far as Kashmir is concerned, this is part and parcel of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. We can establish military training camps there and we have been doing it”. Victoria Schofield’s interview with Azam Inquilabi, Islamabad 25 March 1994, cited in Schofield, Kashmir at Crossroads, p.155. 180 Rashid, “Decision Making Process: Pakistan India Relations”, p.57. 181 Arif, “Kashmir Problem over View”, p.67. 182 Chari, et.al., Perceptions Politics and Security in South Asia, p. 29. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid; 205. 185 Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.173. 186 Farzana Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global objectives”, p.78. With the pull out of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 Pakistan was relegated from the status of a front line state to a category of “unfavourable nations” with a tendency towards hostility for US and its interest. After the collapse of Soviet Union US now began to review its policy towards South Asia without the constraints of cold war. It attempted to develop US relations with India and Pakistan on the basis of their respective economic strategy potential. Therefore, the effect on the part of the US to recast Pakistan-India relationship in the post-cold war era, it on the one hand, reflected the significance it attached to India as the regional power, on the other brought into focus its willingness to acknowledge India as the regional power. The growing US economic interests in India virtually rendered ineffective its drive for Human Rights and nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. With India emerging as one of the top ten markets for the US, economic interests took precedence over the priorities such as Human Rights and nuclear non-proliferation in US foreign policy. Consequently, the US objectives like human rights and nuclear non-proliferation lost their universal appeal and remained confined to the framework of a growing Indo-US slowly but surely Washington put Kashmir and human issues on backburner and gave preference to the economic relations. According to one report US investment in India during 1993 was estimated to be Rs.3,2000 crore. Moreover, the American viewpoint regarding the validity of Pakistan as a state underwent transformation. Its perception that threat to Pakistan security does not stem from any external sources particularly from India, rather it lies somewhere in the internal fabric of Pakistan. These were very meaningful references to Pakistan’s political and economic situation besides unlike Pakistan India was not dependent on the world leading lending institutions like the IMF or World Bank for any economic or financial assistance. It, therefore, could offend to be very obdurate on its Kashmir stance.


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For details see, Afzal, “Pakistan-US Relations Post Cold War Phase”, p.30. India Today (15 April, 1994), Dawn (21 February, 1991). 187 Shakoor, “Kashmir Issue and US Global Objectives”, p.79. 188 Shafqat, “Kashmir Issue: Review of Recent Research Proposals for the Resolution of the Conflict”, p.194.

Umber Bin Ibad: The Ground of History

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THE GROUND OF HISTORY: A STUDY INTO THE RELATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF HEGEL AND

HEIDEGGER

UMBER BIN IBAD GC UNIVERSITY, LAHORE

PAKISTAN ABSTRACT

To accept certain conception of history depends upon the ground that let that conception comes out. For both Hegel and Heidegger, their understanding of history depends upon their self-reflective understanding of ground of history. One needs to go into the philosophical writings of Hegel for understanding his conception of the ground of history. His conception of ground appears synonym with the “Causality principle” in his Logic, helping grouping together the triadic form of knowledge. His showing Cartesian principle as founding the ground of modern philosophy betrays his established prejudices. Heidegger locates Hegel’s conception of ground in Leibnizian principle of Reason letting accepting the mode of truth only as propositional assertions. Heidegger brings forth critically that grounding is establishing and giving basis like that of Hegel, but the critically engaged existence, also struggles to place itself at a distance from established prejudices of tradition.

KEY WORDS: Hegel, Heidegger, Causality principle, Authentic, Ground, Reason, Being, Essents, History. For Hegel, the very acceptance of the understanding of history lies in owning the idea of Reason. This very en-owning directs each student of history, for Hegel, to understand any happening in the past as connected in the already prevailed Universal structure of Reason. And only through such placing within Reason, the particular instance finds its very sense. If it does not find its sense being subservient to Universal, the particular instance is not an instance at all. This particular is now part of the very un-differentiated world yet to be


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scrutinized through the categories of Reason. The prevalence and acceptance of Reason, therefore, becomes the very ground of the existence of Reality. History is real, for Hegel, largely because it is Rational. History, in both of its senses, that is “historiography” and the “understanding of past-ness,” is Rational and therefore Real. Only through this rational reality can history acquire a force and owns that teleological dynamism that for Hegel is a hallmark of the Universal world history.1 This Universal World history, if it is to be grasped and understood in its totality, has to be philosophical. The ground of history, or the Reason of history, as understood by Hegel, lies not in history but in philosophy; “The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process. This conviction and intuition is a hypothesis in the domain of history as such.”2 Hegel presents this recommendation as a hypothesis for a student of history, yet he claims it is ‘no’ hypothesis for a student of philosophy: “In that of Philosophy it is no hypothesis. It is there proved by speculative cognition, that Reason — and this term may here suffice us, without investigating the relation sustained by the Universe to the Divine Being — is Substance, as well as Infinite Power; its own Infinite Material underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also the Infinite Form — that which sets this Material in motion.”3

This very thesis that has been proved in philosophy provides the justifying ground to the very conception of history for Hegel. To find out the proof of the ground of history, therefore, one has to go into the complex systems of Hegelian philosophy. To venture into the depths of Hegelian philosophical construction is a task only a giant can venture. Instead, to take a humbler position, one can dare to understand the very concept of ‘Ground’ itself as he himself brings forward. And even that with the emphasis upon only two of the Hegelian writings: first his Logic, where one finds Hegel’s engagement with the concept of Ground; and second, his History of Philosophy, where one can trace that very moment when the conception of Ground appears through the writings of Descartes.

For Heidegger, however, this concept of Ground, as such and as the ground of history, remains problematic through out his life-long research. To accept the meaning of ground as self-evident, for him, is not an authentic living for Da-sein4. For him Dasein is essentially historical, that is embedded in tradition and prejudices of They. However, the historicality of Dasein emerges out of its finitude and thrown-ness.5 The coming out of its being gives Dasein the insight of its own being that is temporal and therefore historical. Dasein’s


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constitution as They let it move and construct itself upon the already established ground/s. For Heidegger, however, it is the very point where long stay is essential with that very distance that let its view make clear.

Heidegger understands the history of human-beings as Geschishk, depth-tradition. He avoids entangling within the World-history, like that of Hegel, and engages himself instead with western history, from within. In this history, the very principle of understanding and history, that is Reason, understood and owned through the very determining of Being in different epochs. This determining of Being provides the very fateful direction of the Western history immersing at the same time into the obliviousness of Being. The very belonging of Being attains the relational direction through Essents6. It is the movement, from Essents to Being, that brings out the picture of Being itself. But this picture, for Heidegger, is always incomplete because it is capturing Being from already immersed and engaged life with Essents already grasped through their unique ways of being.

The Heideggerian position gradually opens itself towards the possibilities of the manifestation of Being. Locating the history of Western civilization into the metaphysical en-owning of different epochs he distinguishes their manifold characteristics. Different epochs, while holding different but correlating metaphysical positions, manifest their belongingness with Being, manifesting thematic philosophical constructions. He, however, finds himself at the significant point in the history of metaphysical ideas. Instead of building system while being immersed into a metaphysical position, he gradually moves beyond, not in the sense of overcoming, but in the sense of purifying, toward the engagement with Being; instead of “saying”, towards the patient listening. His position from “things themselves”, takes him to question the very concept of “things” themselves; and even to question “concept” itself. From initial phenomenological critical holding, gives way, though gradually, to the “letting be”. Instead of ‘capturing’ Being through already constructed verbal framework, his persistent ‘caring’ engagement with Being, takes him to the point where he lets ‘Being’ speaks itself. Being appears for him in manifold possibilities through its ‘poietic’ expressions. Yet he reaches this position gradually.

His emphasis upon Authentic existence over against living as idle chatters, his focus upon the compulsion of making choices over against the moving in the directions of They and his stress upon understanding the attunement towards the attuned being-present-at-hand as ready-to-hand against living in the abstract ideals unable to bring forth Dasein’s true historical but finitude existence, gives Heidegger his early popularity through Being and Time (1927). His ideas soon, however, merged with the call to join National Socialistic agenda, as reanimating the destructed German spiritual existence7. Heidegger however soon started reinterpreting his position and


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gradually secured the distance from the ideologue of National Socialism. His reinterpretation of early ideas, Being and Time (1927), let him move away from his stress upon Authentic existence as a political ideal to the origin of aesthetic expression, to the occurrence of truth. The change of ‘stress’ let his understanding of truth appears visibly within the opening up of the very openness of a caring being8. The struggle of authentic existence for establishing ground gives way to the struggle of caring being let see the groundlessness of each establishing ground.

Heidegger’s critical understanding of the concept of Ground as “the principle of Reason”, in an essay, comes as early as 1929. It shows his intention to question the very basis of Western Reason even as an “Early Heidegger” of Being and Time (1927) where methodological effort of Fundamental Ontology and the critical project of “De-structuring” of the Western metaphysics were still under the Hermeneutical Phenomenology,9 thus projecting authentic foundational self. Even in the principle of Reason, the transcendental projective understanding prevails with the emphasis upon authentic existence. However, the ground of truth in this essay appears as grounding the possibility of truth out of many other possibilities. It’s appearing in the freedom of Dasein entails not only the establishing of truth but also shows the clear signs of opening up the very openness within which truth is to appear. In what follows, in this chapter, I’ll trace the concept of Ground, as it is understood and explained in the writings of both Hegel and Heidegger. This understanding will give us closer look how these two philosophers understand the concept of ‘Ground’ ‘themselves’. This activity of understanding is itself critical and interpretive, thus giving us a relational understanding of both points of views. For this I divide this article into two major parts: first part deals with Hegelian conception of Ground and the second describes Heideggerian conception of Ground. The first section is further divided into two parts: one focuses Hegel’s conception of Ground while reading through his Logic; the other brings out Hegel’s understanding of Ground when it initiates in History of Philosophy. The second section let Heidegger engages critically with the Hegel’s conception of Ground by locating it in the Leibnizian principle of truth. This second section is further divided into three sub-sections: first section deals with grounding “appears as establishing”; the second explains grounding “as taking up basis”; the third describes grounding “as grounding of something”. HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF GROUND IN LOGIC In Hegel’s science of logic, the category of Ground appears as a full chapter comprising of triply divided sub-divisions. Hegel brings out his understanding in this chapter that traditional metaphysical


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understanding treats “Causality Principle” as the ground of rational happening. But, Hegel takes causation as one mode of Ground: “Since the category of causation is a special case of Ground, Hegel offers many examples that come from the field of Causation. But the notion of Ground is wider than that of notion of Causation: it covers any case in which a reason might be offered or applying some concept.”10 ABSOLUTE GROUND The first main division of the Category of Ground comes under the title Absolute Ground. This title is further constituted of three other supporting subtitles:

I) Form and Essence II) Form and Matter III) Form and Content

These subtitles suggest that Hegel is, here, importing the Aristotelian conception of “Form” & “Matter” to bring out the nature of existence. “It seems plain that Hegel has pushed the Dialectic in the present direction in order to take in the Aristotelian concepts of matter.”11 I) FORM AND ESSENCE Like Aristotle, for Hegel form appears as a movement providing specific shape to what is, that I being. It is like making ‘Essential’ of ‘that is’. “By the formal aspect of Essence Hegel seems to be conceiving of Essence as active, as grounding or determining whatever flows from it, and as embodying itself an passing away in what it grounds. It is an account of, by virtue of the Ground the Grounded must be posited, and as so grounding what follows from it, Essence is considered as active and formative.”12 This activity, however, can’t take place until the activity takes place upon some passive being, that is, being that let itself be shaped as the active Essence intends it to be. “But grounding or determining involves also a being grounded or a being determined, and that this means that the Essence can also be conceived in an inactive undetermined material aspect, as providing a basis or Grundlage which is to undergo various determinations.”13 This position, however, soon dissolves itself by showing the very insubstantiality as in this general form being can take any form and it is difficult to distinguish between active and inactive position of Ground and Grounded. “Since the Form itself is absolute identity with self, and so contains the ‘Matter’ in itself, and since the Matter similarly in its pure abstraction and absolute negativity contains the Form in itself, the activity of the Form on the Matter, and the latter’s determination by the former, is rather the removal of the appearance of their indifference and


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of their difference. This relation of determination is accordingly the mediation of either with self through its own non-being-but these two mediations constitute one movement and the restoration of their original identity—the remembering of their dismembering.”14

II) FORM AND MATTER As above, this time dialectic moves in that very fashion, but opposite in direction. Previously Essence was all active and grounding, while, here it is Matter, that is the underlying substance upon which Form acts, that is active but in as general a way as that of above. For Hegel: “Form, in so far as it presupposes a matter as its other, is finite. It is not ground but only the active principle. Similarly, matter, in so far as it presupposes form as its non-being, is finite matter; just as little is it ground of its unity with form, but only the basis for form. But this finite matter as well as the finite form has no truth; each relates itself to the other, in other words, only their unity is their truth. Into this unity both these determinations withdraw and therein sublate their self-subsistence: this unity thus demonstrates it-self to be their ground. Matter is therefore ground of its form-determination only in so far as it is not matter as matter, but the absolute unity of essence and form; similarly, form is ground of the subsistence of its determinations only in so far as it is the same one unity. But this one unity as absolute negativity, and more specifically, as exclusive unity is, in its reflection, presupposing; or, there is but a single activity: form in its positing both preserves itself, as posited, in the unity, and also repels itself from itself; it is related to itself as itself and also to itself as an other. Or, the process by which matter is determined by form is the mediation of essence as ground with itself in a unity, through its own self and through the negation of itself.”15 III) FORM AND CONTENT The generality of above position gives rise to the notion of Content which can indifferently be taken to represent Materialized Form or Formed Matter. This position is like considering ground in action, annulling itself and yet preserving itself in whiat it grounds. “Hegel is eager to distinguish the notion of Content from the common notion which makes Content indifferent to the Form in which it is expressed…The Content of a thing in the sense used by Hegel is inseparably one with its form: Romeo and Juliet could not have had the same Content if produced in prose or some non-verbal medium.”16

The content of the ground is, therefore, the ground that has returned into its unity with itself; ground is at first the essence that in its positedness is self-


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identical; as different from and indifferent to its positedness it is indeterminate matter; but as content it is also formed identity and this form becomes ground relation because the determinations of its opposition are also posited as negated in the content. Further, the content is determinate in its own self; not merely like matter as the indifferent in general but as formed matter, so that the determinations of form have a material indifferent subsistence. On the one hand, content is the essential identity of ground with itself in its positedness; on the other hand, it is the posited identity over against the ground relation; this positedness, which is present in this identity as a form-determination, stands over against the free positedness, that is to say, over against the form as a whole relation of ground and grounded; this form is the total positedness that has returned into itself, and the former is therefore only positedness as immediate, determinateness as such.17

The ground has thereby simply converted itself into determinate ground, and the determinateness itself is twofold: first, that of form, and secondly, that of content. The former is its determinateness of being external to the content as such which is indifferent to this relation. The latter is the determinateness of the content possessed by the ground. DETERMINATE GROUND The determinate ground appears, following Hegelian triadic logic, in three elements:

A) Formal Ground B) Real Ground C) Complete Ground

A) FORMAL GROUND This position is again generalized mode of Determined Ground. In this way the similarity between grounded and the Ground are so general that it is difficult to distinguish whether it is only verbal displacement of naming one from the other. Hegel gives as examples of such a merely formal-ground relation from physical sciences:

The sciences, especially the physical sciences, are full of tautologies of this kind which constitute as it were a prerogative of science. For example, the


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ground of the movement of the planets round the sun is said to be the attractive force of the earth and sun on one another. As regards content, this expresses nothing other than what is contained in the phenomenon, namely the relation of these bodies to one another, only in the form of a determination reflected into itself, the form of force. If one asks what kind of a force the attractive force is, the answer is that it is the force that makes the earth move round the sun; that is, it has precisely the same content as the phenomenon of which it is supposed to be the ground; the relation of the earth and sun in respect of motion is the identical substrate of the ground and the grounded.18

B) REAL GROUND The movement of explaining Formal Ground reduces itself to the insufficiency of its presence. Its neglect of ‘differences’ makes it unwanted concept for the category of Ground. This movement now takes the direction of un-like-nesses between Ground and Grounded. “There must, it seems, be additional features in the Ground, features unessential to its grounding function, and merely accompanying it in the same “something,” which will serve to differentiate it from what it grounds. A Ground so embellished by unessential additions, whose presence is nonetheless essential to its being a Ground, is called by Hegel a Real Ground.”19

The concept of real ground appears to reduce the generality of Formal Ground, but it also loses its force by un-abling to differentiate among externalities and thus appearing as arbitrary. Formal Grounding appears as a tautology while Real Ground disperses itself into externality and arbitrariness.20 Hegel sees this arbitrariness in multiple social, educational and ethical modes of existence.

The search for and assignment of grounds, in which argumentation mainly consists, is accordingly an endless pursuit which does not reach a final determination; for any and every thing one or more good grounds can be given, and also for its opposite; and a host of grounds can exist without anything following from them. What Socrates and Plato call sophistry is nothing else but argumentation from grounds; to this, Plato opposes the contemplation of the Idea, that is, of the subject matter in and for itself or in its Notion. Grounds are taken only from essential determinations of a content, essential


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relationships and aspects, and of these every subject matter, just like its opposite, possesses several; in their form of essentiality, one is as valid as another; because it does not embrace the whole extent of the subject matter, each is a one-sided ground, the other particular sides having on their part particular grounds, and none of them exhausts the subject matter which constitutes their togetherness [Verknüpfung] and contains them all; none is a sufficient ground, that is, the Notion.21

C) COMPLETE GROUND

The incompleteness of formal and Real Ground gives way to another position that may bring out the concept of Complete Ground. This position requires previous positions to get assimilated into each other towards the very direction of completion of the Ground itself. It means “the Formal Ground for anything must be such as to complete itself by one or other out of an indefinite range of additional cirumstances or conditions, and the character of what is grounded will depend, likewise, not merely on the formal character of the Ground as such, but on the particular conditions and circumstances which go with it.”22 We can see, through the examples of Hegel, as when “attractive force,” that is otherwise a formal ground, turns into the complete ground after getting employed in the collocation of the gravitating bodies; or when general ethical principles, being formal grounds, are seen into particular circumstances, only then the ground gets completed. “Hegel seems to suggest that while there is arbitrariness and Contingency in the completion of the ‘formal’ element by the real element both in the Ground itself and in what is grounded. We can’t say a-priori how the ground will be circumstantially completed, not just what outcome it will have if so completed. Yet the completion is in this sense necessary and essential, that there could be no Ground-relation without it.”23

From here onward, another concept that comes to fore for the completion of Ground is Condition. The stress on conditions provides the Hegelian emphasis upon the historical moments necessary for the completing Ground. Following the triadic line the concept of Conditions split itself into three divisions. First two among them stand against each other as opposites. The third element or moment in triadic transition appears as assimilating sameness and rejecting arbitrariness from the contradictory identities. In this way the passage towards the concept of complete ground or Un-conditioned ground gets prepared.


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CONDITIONS

I. The Relatively Unconditioned II. Absolutely Unconditioned III. Matter of Fact as Existence

I. THE RELATIVELY UNCONDITIONED The condition appears, initially, as the immediate indeterminacy. “The immediate to which the ground is related as to its essential presupposition is condition; real ground is therefore essentially conditioned. The determinateness which it contains is the otherness of itself.”24 The condition appears in its immediate indeterminacy as a being but this immediacy remains indifferent to other relations. “Through its immediacy it is indifferent to this relation; but, in so far as it enters into this relation, it constitutes the in-itself of the ground and is for the latter the unconditioned. In order to be condition, it has in the ground its presupposition and is itself conditioned; but this determination is external to it.”25

The condition comes out as immediate, as being merely there, but because of its indifference to other relations seems to remain ungrounded. It appears as the condition is indifferent to the ground’s existence though at the same there to be included as the ‘material’ of the ground. “The two sides of the whole, condition and ground, are, then, on the one hand, indifferent and unconditioned in relation to each other; the one, as the unrelated, to which the relation in which it is condition is external, the other as the relation or form, for which the determinate being of the condition exists only as material, as something passive, whose form, which it possesses on its own account, is unessential. But further, the two sides are also mediated. Condition is the in-itself of the ground; so much is it an essential moment of the ground-relation, that it is the simple self-identity of the ground. But this, too, is sublated; this in-itself is only a positedness; the immediate determinate being is indifferent to the fact that it is condition. The fact, therefore, that the condition is an in-itself for the ground constitutes that side of it which makes it mediated. Similarly, the ground-relation, in its self-subsistence, also has a presupposition, and has its in-itself outside it. Thus each of the two sides is the contradiction of indifferent immediacy and essential mediation, both in a single relation-or the contradiction of self subsistent existence and the determination of being only a moment.”26

II. THE ABSOLUTELY UNCONDITIONED The indifference being of Relative Unconditioned Condition that may relate with other relations to turn into a material of ground remain there


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but not in interlocked condition. “At first, each of the two relatively unconditioned sides is reflected into the other; condition, as an immediate, into the form relation of the ground, and the latter into the immediate determinate being as its positedness; but each, apart from this reflected being of its other in it, is self-subsistent and has its own peculiar content.”27

This position calls for the other side of this position and condition appears as absolutely unconditioned. “The two sides of the whole, condition and ground, are therefore one essential unity, equally as content and as form. They spontaneously pass over into one another or, since they are reflections, they posit themselves as sublated, relate themselves to this their negation and reciprocally presuppose one another. But at the same time this is only a single reflection of both and therefore their presupposing is also only one; or rather this reciprocal presupposing becomes a presupposing of their one identity as their subsistence and substrate. This identity of their common content and unity of form is the truly unconditioned, the fact in its own self. As we saw above, condition is only the relatively unconditioned. It is therefore usually regarded as itself conditioned and a fresh condition is asked for, and thus the usual infinite progress from condition to condition is introduced. Now why does a condition prompt us to ask for a fresh condition, that is, why does a condition regarded as a conditioned? Because, it is a finite determinate being. But this is a further determination, which is not contained in its Notion. Condition as such is conditioned, solely because it is a posited in-itself; it is therefore sublated in the absolutely unconditioned.”28

III. EMERGENCE OF THE FACT [SACHE] INTO EXISTENCE The relative unconditioned condition gives way to its other, for its complete understanding, that appears as the absolute condition. Both appear as indifferent to each other yet they stand into the unity. The first position sublates itself to the other position and the absolute ground finds its existence in the Matter of Fact. “The absolutely unconditioned is the absolute ground that is identical with its condition, the immediate fact in its truly essential nature. As ground, it relates itself negatively to itself, makes itself into a positedness; but this positedness is a reflection that is complete in both its aspects and a form-relation that is self-identical in them as we have seen from their Notion. This positedness is accordingly, first, the sublated ground, the fact as the reflectionless immediate-the side of conditions. This is the totality of the determinations of the fact-the fact itself, but cast out into the externality of being, the restored sphere of being. The other side of this reflective movement [Scheinen] of the unconditioned is the ground-relation as such, determined as form over against the immediacy of the


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conditions and the content. But it is the form of the absolute fact, and it possesses within itself the unity of its form with itself, or its content; and in the very act of determining this content to be condition it sublates the diversity of the content and reduces it to a moment, just as, conversely, as essenceless form it gives itself the immediacy of a subsistence in this self-identity. The reflection of the ground sublates the immediacy of the conditions and relates them, so making them moments in the unity of the fact; but the conditions are presupposed by the unconditioned fact itself, which thus sublates its own positing, or its positing directly converts itself equally into a becoming. The two are therefore one unity; the immanent movement of the conditions is a becoming, a withdrawal into ground to the positing of ground; but the ground as posited, that is to say, as sublated, is the immediate. The ground relates itself negatively to itself, makes itself into a positedness and grounds the conditions; but in thus determining immediate determinate being as a posited, the ground sublates it and thereby first constitutes itself ground. This reflection is accordingly the mediation of the unconditioned fact with itself through its negation.”29

The internal movement of reflection, into relative unconditioned condition and the groundless absolute becoming, disappears mediation and brings out fact into Existence. The fact in this sense appears as it is related with manifold conditions that enable this fact to exist. These manifold conditions may be the universe of relations. For Hegel, “the reflection of the unconditioned is at first a presupposing-but this sublating of itself is immediately a positing which determines; secondly, in this presupposing, reflection is immediately a sublating of what is presupposed and a determining from within itself; thus this determining is again a sublating of the positing and is in its own self a becoming. In this, the mediation as a return-to-self through negation has vanished; it is the simple, internal movement of reflection [einfache, in sich scheinende Reflexion] and groundless absolute becoming. The movement of the fact to become posited, on the one hand through its conditions, and on the other through its ground, is merely the vanishing of the illusion of mediation. The process by which the fact is posited is accordingly an emergence, the simple entry of the fact into Existence, the pure movement of the fact to itself.”30

GROUND AS IN THE HEGEL’S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY It was Descartes with which Hegel thinks, in the history of philosophy, a new beginning took place. This beginning was heralding a new ground upon which the upcoming age has to stand its world. This ground was not the reflection of abstract universality but a concrete reflection of popular spirit emerging to construct a modern world. “In Philosophy Descartes struck out quite original lines; with him the new


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epoch in Philosophy begins, whereby it was permitted to culture to grasp in the form of universality the principle of its higher spirit in thought.” 31

Hegel initiates his description of Descartes, in the history of philosophy, with the praise of his boldness. Hegel thinks Descartes gives birth to those principles that remained concealed within the debris of time. He unearth them and let the other knows them well. Hegel thinks that to find out the new ground and to make it public both required boldness. Hegel, perhaps, while signaling towards the ecclesiastical condition of the time, trying to bring out the needed personal trait for bringing out the new ground. Yet what was that ground for which this praise was given and what did that ground do. Descartes initiated a new way of doing philosophy. This way gives skepticism a full reign to move till the self-supporting is achieved. It is to doubt every determinate principle or the presuppositions adopted on behalf of religious authority. The determinate point that is to reach would be a self-supporting point that is to unify both thought and being. This point would achieve that certainty that, otherwise, could only be achieved through the subjugation of authority. The moment of certainty would be a moment of joy; and it was the joyous moment. For Hegel, “With him (namely, with Descartes), we properly enter upon a self-supporting philosophy. Here, we can say that we are home and, like the sailor who has journeyed on the stormy sea for a long time, cry: ‘Land ho.’”32

This very ground, that is even understood through the imagery of land itself, gives individual not only the strength to think itself, but also to think from a point that can not be doubted, from a subjective view point. This commencement of thought from ones own-self opened up the way to refuse the authority of the church with the certainty of ones own belonging to truth. This moment of certainty is not only an inception of a philosophical movement but also the beginning of modern times. This very moment of certainty comes out in the thinking mode as: cogito ergo sum, I think, therefore, I am.33

For Descartes, it is this ‘I’ that becomes a point of foundation on which one can stand and encounter the flow of doubting. One can doubt on this moment of consciousness also, but this doubting would entail the very moment of consciousness. To doubt further becomes impossible, the certainty is achieved and a new foundation takes place. With this certainty ‘I’ transforms as subjectum; etymologically meaning that which already lies before. To the philosophical tradition ensued thereby, it means, the authoritative position of thinking individual can belong with truth and assert this truth in public.34


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HEIDEGGER’S UNDERSTANDING OF GROUND For Heidegger, like that of Hegel, ground becomes a problem. But unlike Hegel, Heidegger engages with it deeply, that is going into the presuppositions of the holding of ground. For him, the importance lies in “destructuring” the accepted mode of reasoning, instead of moving forward like Hegel, while constructing and expanding system of knowledge. It is important for him to start understanding from a distance. His engagement with Hegel reveals the ground of Hegel’s Reason quite clearly. This engagement also provides him opportunity to bring forth his own understanding of ground. GROUND AS LEIBNIZIAN PRINCIPLE OF REASON Heidegger locates the Hegelian understanding of Ground as embedded into the Leibnizian principle of reason. The Leibnizian argument, that appears in his “Primae Veritates” (1686) presents this point as: Thus a predicate, or consequent, is always present in a subject, or antecedent: and in this fact consists the universal nature of truth, or the connection between the terms of the assertion, as Aristotle has also observed. This connection and inclusion of the predicate in the subject is explicit in the relations of identity. In all other relations it is implicit and is revealed through an analysis of notions, upon which a priori of demonstration is possible.35

The above holds true for every affirmative truth, whether universal or singular, necessary or contingent, as well as for both intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. This wondrous secret goes unnoticed, this secret that reveals the nature of contingency, or the essential distinction between necessary and contingent truths, and which even removes the difficulty regarding the inevitable necessity of free beings.

From these things, which have not been adequately considered due to their great simplicity, there follow many other things of great importance. Indeed, from them there at once arises the familiar axiom: “Nothing is without reason,” “or there is no effect without a cause.” If the axiom didn’t hold, there might be a truth that could not be proved a priori, i.e., which could not be resolved into relations of identity; and this is contrary to the nature of truth, which is identical, whether explicitly or implicitly.”36 Leibniz brings out this point, and Hegel follows it too, that it is absurd to think that identities carry on presencing without being resolved as identities. It appears as “there would be true things that would resist being resolved into identities, there would be truths that would contravene the “nature” of truth in general.”37 This is, however, impossible to have truth and don’t have identity at the same time. For Leibniz, the principle of reason, or the ground of reason, as “principium


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rationim,” arises from the essence of truth. The essence of truth, however, Leibniz locates in the proposition as “the connection of subject and predicate.” Leibniz, in this way, conceives of truth in the assertion of truth. “He determines the nexus as the inesse 38of P in S, and the inesse as idem esse39. Identity as the essence of propositional truth here evidently does not mean the empty sameness of something with itself, but unity in the sense of the original unitary agreement of that which belongs together. Truth thus means a unitary accord which for its part can be such only as an overarching accordance with whatever is announced as unitary in the identity. In keeping with their nature, “truths” – true assertions- assume a relation to something on whose grounds they are able to be in accord. That linking which is a taking apart within every truth in each case always is what it is on the grounds of …, that is, as self-grounding. In its very essence, truth thus houses a relation to something like ground.”40

For Leibniz, and also for Hegel, each proposition, while bringing out its truth needs truth as already being understood. “The overarching accordance of the nexus with beings, and their consequent accord, do not as such primarily make beings accessible. Rather beings, as the concern of any predicative determination, must already be manifest before such predication and for it.”41 The discussion regarding Leibnizian principle shows that “propositional truth always needs ‘grounding’ and … the concept of truth is intrinsically linked up with that of ground.”42 The truth, as it is linked with the connection of subject and predicate, makes Leibniz and Hegel see the truth through Being of essents. “A consideration of truth in the ontic sense (the pre-predicative manifest-ness of essents, in which propositional truth is rooted) as well as in the ontological (the overtness of Being which renders ontic truth itself possible) sows the same inner connection and suggests, further, that basic to both Truth and Ground is Dasein’s transcendence, which also renders these possible.”43 HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF GROUND The relationship between Being and beings or Being and essents, as they are employed in the ground of truth, becomes the point of critique of Heidegger to launch his project. Heidegger brings out the point that history of philosophy, especially the history of western philosophy remains engaged with the conception of truth moving from essents to its being. Heidegger makes ground synonym with arche, that is, origin or the moment of beginning. Heidegger thinks the Leibnizian understanding of truth goes back to the works of Aristotle where the concept of ground arises in threefold mode. The ground of truth is linked with:


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a) The ground of the what b) Of the ‘that’ and c) Of the truth of anything.

The principle of ground or principle of reason as brought out by Leibniz, Heidegger thinks does not bring out the understanding of ground itself. Hegel who follows Leibniz in this matter also becomes the victim of the critique of Heidegger in this sense. Heidegger brings out the point that “in its positive formulation (everything has a ground), it speaks of the essent, saying that everything that is must have a ground but says nothing of the nature of ground as such.”44

Heidegger makes his point further clear regarding the relationship between essents and Being, and bringing out the point that truth can be obtained either from essents or through Being. “They are intrinsically bound up with each other because of their relationship with the distinction between Being and beings (Ontological difference). Along with the emergence of this distinction, and based on it, there appears truth in this bifurcated form.” For Heidegger the truth comes out through ignoring the difference that ignores essentially the ground of truth. Instead of appearing with the difference, the truth appears as a propositional truth, that is, as presenting. The very rootedness, however, of propositional truth from where the truth appears primordially and more originary, remain oblivious. “Propositional truth is rooted in a more originary truth (unconcealment), in the pre-predicative manifestness of beings, which may be called ontic truth. In keeping with the different kinds and domains of beings, the character of their possible manifestness and of the accompanying ways of interpretively determining them changes.”45

For Heidegger, the propositional truth presupposes the world of beings, or the world in which we live in. “Ontic manifestation, however, occurs in our finding ourselves, in accordance with our attunement and drives, in the midst of beings and in those ways of comporting ourselves toward beings in accordance with our striving and willing that also grounded therein. Yet even such kinds of comportment, whether they are interpreted as pre-predicative or as predicative, would be incapable of making beings accessible in themselves if their making manifest were not always illuminated and guided in advance by an understanding of being… of beings.”46

From Leibniz this point comes out clearly that there is relatedness between the problem of “ground” and that of being. The essence of truth means already in the truth as in the form of idea of essence. “For Leibniz, however, verum esse - being true, at the same time means being “in truth” – esse pure and simple. What constitutes an ens as an ens is ‘identity,’ unity correctly understood that, as simple unity, originarily unifies and simultaneously individuates in such unifying. That unifying, however, that individuates originarily (in


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advance) and simply; and which constitutes the essence of beings as such, is the essence of the ‘subjectivity’ of the subjectum (substantiality of substance) understood monadologically. Leibniz’s derivation of the principium rationis from the essence of propositional truth tells us that it is grounded upon a quite specific idea of being in general, an idea in whose light alone that ‘deduction’ becomes possible.”47 Through presenting the point of view of Leibnizian derivation of the principle of reason from the essence of truth, Heidegger clarifies “the connection between the problem of ground and the question concerning the inner possibility of ontological truth, i.e., ultimately the more originary and accordingly more comprehensive question concerning the essence of transcendence. Transcendence is thus the domain within which the problem of ground must allow itself to be encountered.”48 With an interesting move Heidegger moves to that point of origin or arche to the truth of the ground from where the truth is taken as self-evident. Heidegger manifests that self-evident-ness and instead places “surpassing” or “going beyond” or “transcendence” as the essence of ground. This transcending, for him, is presupposed by each propositional truth assertion. Without incorporating that initial leap no explanation can be accepted satisfactorily. But what is this transcendence? Before answering Heidegger gives few instances what this transcendence is not. He emphasizes that “transcendence may also no longer be determined as a ‘subject-object relation.’ In that case, transcendent Dasein surpasses neither a boundary placed before the subject, forcing it in advance to remain inside (immanence), nor a gap separating it from the object. Yet nor are objects-the beings that are objectified-that toward which a surpassing occurs.”49 For Heidegger, it is the transcendence that makes object and subject first of all possible. In transcendence an occurring takes place that moves Dasein toward which that transcending occurs. “What is surpassed is precisely and solely beings themselves, indeed every being that can be or become unconcealed for Dasein, thus including precisely that being as which it itself is.”50 For Heidegger, the selfhood can only arise out of the occurrence of transcendence. “In this surpassing Dasein for the first time comes toward that being that it is, and comes toward it as it ‘itself.’ Transcendence constitutes selfhood. Yet once again, it never in the first instance constitutes only selfhood; rather, the surpassing in each case intrinsically concerns also beings that Dasein ‘itself’ is not…in and through this surpassing it first becomes possible to distinguish among beings and to decide who and in what way a ‘self’ is, and what I not a ‘self.’ Yet in so far and only in-so-far as Dasein exists as a self, it can comport ‘itself’ toward beings, which prior to this must have been surpassed. Although it exists in the midst of beings and embraced by them, Dasein as existing has always already surpassed nature.” 51


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For Heidegger, Dasein discloses itself within world, that is, being-in-the-world. The world is, then, the term for everything that is, for totality as the unity that determines “everything” only in terms of its being taken together, and no further. If we take this world as underlying the talk of being-in-the-world, then we must indeed ascribe “transcendence” to everything as present at hand.52 Yet this present at hand, within which transcendence takes place, is not being itself. The “world as a wholeness is not a being, but that from out of which Dasein gives itself the signification of whatever beings it is able to comport itself in whatever way. The Dasein gives itself such signification from out of its world then means: In this coming toward itself from out of the world Dasein gives rise to itself as a self, i.e., as a being entrusted with having to be. In the being of this being what is at issue is its potentiality for being. Dasein is in such a way that it exists for the sake of itself. If, however, it is a surpassing in the direction of the world that first gives rise to selfhood, then world shows itself to be that for the sake of which Dasein exists. World has the fundamental character of the “for the sake of…,” and indeed in the originary sense that it first provides the intrinsic possibility for every factically self-determining “for your sake,” “for his sake,” “for the sake of that,” etc. Yet that for the sake of which Dasein exists is it itself. To selfhood there belongs world; world is essentially related to Dasein.” 53

The surpassing that occurs ‘for the sake of,’ it occurs in the will that “projects itself upon possibilities of itself. This will that essentially casts the “for the sake of itself” over and thereby before Dasein cannot therefore be a particular willing, an act of will as distinct from other forms of comportment (such as representing, judging or enjoyment). All forms of comportment are rooted in transcendence. The will in question, however, must first form the “for-the-sake-of” itself as and in a surpassing. Yet whatever, in accordance with its essence, casts something like the ‘for the sake of’ projectively before it, rather than simply producing it as an occasional and additional accomplishment, is that which we call freedom. Surpassing in the direction of world is freedom itself. Accordingly, transcendence does not merely come upon the ‘for the sake of’ toward itself, and does so as freedom. In this transcending that holds the ‘for the sake of’ toward itself there occurs the Dasein in human beings, such that in the essence of their existence they can be obligated to themselves, i.e., be free selves. In this, however, freedom simultaneously unveils itself as making possible something binding, indeed obligation in general. Freedom alone can let a world prevail and let it world for Dasein.”54 Heidegger names the originary relation of freedom to ground “a grounding.” For him its freedom that takes and gives grounding through transcending. Heidegger locates this transcending in three ways.55


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A) grounding appears as establishing B) grounding appears as taking up basis C) grounding as grounding of something A) GROUNDING APPEARS AS ESTABLISHING This first form of grounding appears first, not because establishing takes primacy in grounding, but because it is with which the other two groundings make possible. In this sense only it has primacy. This grounding appears with the projective surpassing of Dasein ‘for the sake of’. It is only through this grounding, beings come back to Dasein in the first place. It is through it beings appear as beings and Dasein appears ‘in the midst of.’ The grounding as projective transcending becomes the possibility of the unveiling of beings in the first place. “The ‘for the sake of’ that is projectively cast before us points back to the entirety of those beings that can be unveiled within this horizon of the world…Yet in the projection of world, such beings are not yet manifest in themselves. Indeed, they would have to remain concealed, were it not for the fact that Dasein in its projecting is, as projecting, also already in the midst of such beings…this being in the midst of …belongs to transcendence. That which surpasses, in passing over and beyond and thus elevating itself, must find it-self as such among beings. As finding itself, Dasein is absorbed by beings in such a way that, in its belonging to beings, it is thoroughly attuned by them.”56

B) GROUNDING APPEARS AS TAKING UP BASIS The projective transcendence of Dasein makes possible the appearance of beings first of all. This appearance, though, comes as establishing the ground of beings within the projective living, yet the basis becomes the way this establishing takes place. Dasein projects the world through its absorption as beings are already attuned through the very attunement of Dasein. “Transcendence means projection of world in such a way that those beings that are surpassed also already pervade and attune that which projects. With this absorption by beings that belongs to transcendence, Dasein has taken up a basis within beings, gained ground.”57

The unity of projective understanding and the attuned absorption within beings and through beings, the ground appears as establishing the possibilities of being of beings. The possibilities, however, remain manifold until the potentiality of actual realizes itself through the assertive projection of beings. This assertive projection through the comportment of Dasein becomes manifest through bringing out the associative relation of being with beings, that is, become ground of something.


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C) GROUNDING AS GROUNDING OF SOMETHING The manifestation of the unity of projective absorption of Dasein makes ontic truth appear as the grounding of something. “In this form of grounding, the transcendence of Dasein assumes the role of making possible the manifestation of beings in them-selves, the possibility of ontic truth.”58 The ontic truth, thus, assumes the character of bringing out acquaintance of being of beings. The truth of being arises by taking determined direction through the absorbing projectiveness. The truth of being appears but in the direction of manifesting beings within which the projective transcendence of Dasein is absorbed through its facticity. Heidegger makes it clear at this point that he is not interested in proving certain propositional mode of truth. His concern lies with bringing out the originary relation erupts with the question of why. This very eruption conceals within it the moment of originary truth that otherwise conceals itself within the assertive mode of Dasein’s living. “The why even becomes manifold at its very origin. Its fundamental forms are: why in this way and not otherwise? Why this and not that? Why something at all and not nothing? In this ‘why,’ in whatever manner it is expressed, there also lies already a pre-understanding, albeit a pre-conceptual one, of what being, how-being and being in general. This understanding of being first makes possible the why.”59 The ground, as grounding, for Heidegger, appears as a whole, in all three modes and co-temporally. It is not the case that one appears in the absence of others. It is through whole of Dasein’s living as in the condition of certain comportment toward beings with the projective transcendence that the essence of ground resides. “The essence of ground is the transcendental springing forth of grounding, strewn threefold into projection of world, absorption within beings, and ontological grounding of beings.”60 Moving against the Leibnizian, and therefore, the Hegelian position and understanding of ground, Heidegger locates the essence of ground within the wholeness of the Dasein’s constitutive world.61 Taking the essence of truth from the principle of reason, for Heidegger is to move from a cut off point. “For even declaring this principle to be a grounding principle, and for instance placing it together with the principle of identity and contradiction, or even deriving it from these, does not lead us into the origin, but is equivalent to cutting off all further questioning.”62 His constitutive understanding of ground gives Heidegger the threefold strewn division of ground. But all three modes of ground are linked with each other through the general sameness with each other. This general sameness that keeps all the three divisions into the generality of ground, that is as the essence of ground, comes out for Heidegger as the freedom. “The ground that springs forth in


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transcending folds back upon freedom itself, and freedom as origin itself becomes ground. Freedom is the ground of ground.”63

The understanding of ground that appears through Hegel’s writings is located in the principle of reason. This very principle of reason is the cornerstone of the Leibizian understanding of truth and his metaphysical positions. The engagement of Heidegger with this position brings out the “cut off” point into the relief through his insistence that the essence of ground lies in the wholeness of Dasein’s living. This living takes place through the concern for the three-fold divisions of ground: “establishing, taking up a basis, and legitimation each in their own way spring forth from a care for steadfastness and subsistence, a care that in turn is itself possible only as temporality.”64 Moving backward to the originary position gives Heidegger the nearness of the very absence that is forcefully kept as absence through the Leibnizian and/or Hegelian understanding of ground. That absence appears for Heidegger as the non-essence of ground that gives beings their understanding of being. The non-essence of ground, like the essence of ground presupposes transcendence as surpassing, as the essence of ground. The non-essence, however, remains concealed within the truth coming out through the essence of ground. For Heidegger the very concealment of the essence of ground brings out the problem of congealing the appearance of possibilities. The congealing of possibilities takes place due to the non-acknowledgment of the distance between the unity of subject-predicate and the assertiveness of truth grounding it. Instead of looking the distance between the principle of reason and the propositional statement, the Hegeialin and Leibnizian position moves to understand ground as grounding of statements corresponding reality, whether objectively or subjectively. However, the human being is a creature of distance; “And so the human being, existing as a transcendence that exceeds in the direction of possibilities, is a creature of distance. Only through originary distances that he forms for himself in his transcendence with respect to all beings does a true nearness to things begin to arise in him. And only being able to listen into the distance awakens Dasein as a self to the response of the other Dasein in whose company it can surrender its I-ness so as to attain itself as authentic being.”65 CONCLUSION For Hegel, the movement of Reason is essentially dialectical. The dialectical movement, however, arises out of immersing into the already established propositional assertions triggered to bring forth identity of subject-predicate. Each time a propositional assertion arises in its immediacy, its incompleteness, instantly, betrays its meditational existence, thus its positional status against its other. The movement of Reason, however, keeps its journey as grouping-together of opposing


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“propositional assertions”, or popularly stated, as synthesis of thesis and anti-thesis. This dialectical journey keeps building knowledge as grouping-together of identities, and let it move towards completion. The ground as ground of history remains embedded in Philosophy and Logic for Hegel. His description of Ground brings forth the mode of completion of knowledge. His conception of Ground, in Logic, shows the triadic movement completing structure of knowledge. The ground of Ground, however, remains concealed and remained embedded within the accepted tradition of sciences. For Hegel to doubt this tradition is not acceptable and to grow knowledge following the dynamism of traditional prejudices is the best suitable task. Hegel’s reference to Descartes as a moment of modern thinking, with the imagery of land, shows clearly his conscious preference for the accepted tradition. This imagery gives him that very ground whose self-conscious awareness only increases his entrenching in this tradition. The ground of Ground, or the presupposition of Ground, for Hegel, remains dyadic: the desire to move forward; and the direction to construct unitary structures. Both these positions, though doesn’t remain concealed, yet appeared as the justified mode of being. Hegel seems to be sharing the general prejudice of his time or the spirit of his unique age and accepted moving further without any hesitation. To question them is not that important for him, instead to follow them while being immersed remains important. For Heidegger, however, this is not the case. Heidegger’s position brings forth the need for consistent reflective thinking. The consistent thinking arises out of consistent questioning. Each time the moment of questioning arises it opens up many other possibilities. Each reflective moment is also a moment of Freedom and brings with it the field in which truth has to encounter. It is the engaged human existence with its critical directedness towards presuppositions of accepted knowledge position that provides truth to its own self. Heidegger locates the authentic existence by going back to the originary position or living in a distance. For him the authentic living is still a living entails primacy and the self-sameness of subjectivity. Re-energizing the self-sameness through residing in distancing removes the incompleteness of the understanding of Hegelian ground. This residing in the distance will enable Dasein to bring out the possibilities, so far remains congealed due to the initial suppression of the principle of reason. He, however, ignores the point that the opening up of the possibilities would ward off another possibility of linking or connecting with being as such. What comes out through the suppression of non-essence makes rationality autonomous. The autonomy of reason from the non-essence, gives reason the separate existence. This separate existence keeps on living as the dwelling of truth, as the only dwelling of truth. It


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conceals that energetic comportment and the will to engage with beings through the already directed being. It gives logic the very superiority it enjoys abstractly and truth the status of staying independently of being living in the world. It gives that perspective primacy, out of many others, that let the understanding of Hegelian history enjoys the status of truth through its grounding upon the very reason itself grounded upon the abstract principle of reason.


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END-NOTES

1 For Hegel History-proper can only be understood as falling within World History. See Introduction of GWF Hegel, Philosophy of History (New York: Dover publications, 1996) 2 Ibid., p.9. 3 Ibid. 4 Dasein means “being-there”, this is a special Heideggerian concept connoting human-being. 5 David Farrell Krell, “General Introduction: The Question of Being”, in David Farrell Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (San Francisco: Harpers, 1992), p.21. 6 Essents can be understood as the “owned understanding of beings”, even as “beings”. 7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy in Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. by David E. Linge (London: University of California Press, 1977), pp.214-215. 8 Ibid., pp.225,224. 9 Ibid., p.215. 10 J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p.197. 11 Ibid., p.198. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 GWF Hegel, Science of Logic, see website: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/index.htm. 15 Ibid. 16 Findley, Hegel, p.198. 17 Hegel, Science of Logic. 18 Ibid. 19 Findley, Hegel, p.200. 20 Ibid. 21 Hegel, Science of Logic. 22 Findley, Hegel, p.200. 23 Ibid., p.201. 24 Hegel, Science of Logic. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 GWF Hegel, History of Philosophy. See website: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpdescar.htm, accessed on May 11, 2008. 32Martin Heidegger, Hegel and Greeks. William McNeill (ed.), (Melbourn:Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 325. 33 Hegel, The History of Philosophy. 34 Ibid.

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35 Martin Heidegger, On the Essence of Ground. William McNeill (ed.), (Melbourn: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.101. 36 Ibid., p.102. 37 Ibid. 38 “It means ‘the accidental existence.’” 39 “It means ‘identity of what is’.” 40 Heidegger, On the Essence of Ground, p.102. 41 Ibid, p.103. 42 J.L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1971),p.89. 43 Heidegger, On the Essence of Ground. P.102. 44 Ibid., p.89. 45 Ibid., p.103. 46 Ibid., p.102. 47 Ibid., p.106. 48 Ibid., p.107. 49 Ibid., p.108. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., p.110. 53 Ibid., p.122. 54 Ibid., p.126. 55 Ibid., p.127. 56 Ibid., p.128. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., p.129. 59 Ibid., p.130. 60 Ibid., p.132. 61 Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, p.92. 62 Heidegger, On the Essence of Ground, p.133. 63 Ibid., p.134. 64 Ibid., p.132. 65 Ibid., p.135.

Hussain Ahmad Khan: Rationalizing the Relationship

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RATIONALIZING THE MYSTICAL RELATIONSHIP OF ART WITH ARTIST: ART DISCOURSES IN

ENGLAND AND FORMATIVE YEARS OF MAYO SCHOOL OF ARTS, LAHORE (1875-1895)

HUSSAIN AHMAD KHAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE,

SINGAPORE ABSTRACT

GWF Hegel (1770-1831) was not alone who termed Indian civilization as a mystical one. There were several others like Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), James Fergusson (1808-1886) and James Mill (1773-1836) who held the same opinion about the Indian civilization. Such sensibility came to the forefront with the Great Exhibition, held in 1851. Literature on the Great Exhibition suggests multiple views on Indian art; a few art critics termed it as barbaric, some romanticized it as the European past, and the rest believed that the Europeans can learn artistic skills from the Indians. The exhibition also generated a design discourse which formalized a “mystical relationship” of Indian craftsman with his product. This article studies how did the British rationalize the presumably mystical or non-rational relationship of craftsman with his craft through education in the later half of the 19th century colonial Punjab? It also highlights the cognitive failures of the British art administrators to understand the context and dynamics of the province. These cognitive failures were due to the problems faced by the British in the colonies, and due to some preconceived notions developed over a period of time in the metropolitan. Different dynamics, new challenges and crisis not only altered the preconceived notions of the British art administrators but also made them aware of that rationalization might not work in the colony. In other words, the British art administrators realized that the modernity


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of metropolitan could not work in the colony and a different rationality was required to work in the subcontinent.

KEY WORDS: Colonial Art, Subcontinent, JL Kipling, Punjab, Rationality, Craftsmen, Mayo School of Arts, Mystical. Many noted historians and art critics, such as Partha Mitter1 and Tapati Thakurta2 argue that Europeans looked upon the oriental art with a clear-cut distinction or the binary(ies) of barbarian and civilized. Oriental civilization was used by deploying Hegelian terms like ‘conscious’ symbolism of the West and ‘unconscious’ symbolism of the East. Regarding art schools in India, Partha Mitter agrees that the intention of art schools in India was different in various official circles but these schools played an important part in disseminating western discourses in the public sphere.3 Tapati Thakurta identifies the problems of “in-built notion of great art” and the artistic excellence, as the “sacrosanct standards of histories of art and culture”. Arguing ideological motives behind the establishment of art instruction in India, she writes, (in the art instruction) “Britain’s growing appreciation of Indian-art ware could be contained within the dominance of western aesthetic norms and the westernized art establishment of the Empire”.4 Her analysis also underlines the articulation of colonial discourses through art instruction inspired by a monolithic western art establishment. Similarly, Arindam Dutta argues that it was the colonial strategy to incorporate native agency in the art domain. He traces this strategy within the larger context of “dual rationale” or “two-tiered policy where customary jurisprudence devolved to native authorities and the colonial administration retained control over political, criminal, and economic policy”.5 Dutta understands the development of the Mayo School of Arts, Lahore and the Lahore Museum within this context. Taking a different point of view from these art historians, this article argues that the cognitive failure of the British art administrators to grasp ‘the forces at work’ made it impossible for the modernity to work in the colony exactly like in the metropolitan. This approach precisely points out the limitations of the British empire whose role in the art domain is over-exaggerated by developing the argument within the parameters set forth by Edward Said’s Orientalism. By highlighting the limitations of British empire, this article indirectly creates a niche for the subaltern classes which were dominant in the public sphere of the 19th century colonial Punjab and are over looked or treated as ‘subjects’ (rather than an instrument of change) in the post-colonial histories. The article also suggests that in the nineteenth century art


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domain, neither the British art administrators nor their trained artisans could penetrate in the public sphere. In fact, the British had to re-define their role to establish the negotiating grounds with the locals. British agenda of introducing theoretical instruction in art education primarily remained a futile attempt to rationalize the works of art in the nineteenth century colonial Punjab. This article is divided into three parts: first part discusses the nineteenth century debates concerning art in the British empire which later on also influenced the understanding of Indian art; second part highlights the deliberations within the colonial state regarding art instruction in India. This portion also gives a brief over view of colonial strategy to rationalize the local art by adopting theoretical teaching. The third part of this article explains the problems faced by the Mayo School of Arts which, to a great extend, altered the modernity or rationality of the colonial state and highlights the cognitive failure of the colonial art administrators to understand the situational circumstances.

(I)

In the middle of the nineteenth century, contemporary literature6 and the Great Exhibition presented India as a mystical civilization. George Christopher Molesworth Birdwood (1832-1917), an Anglo-Indian officer, naturalist and an art critic, termed India a “living force” of “antiquity survived into modernity” which was “predestined to prove a commanding exemplar in the revival of all the sumptuary arts of life in Aryan Europe”.7 He further substantiates his point of view in his book, The Industrial Art of India: “Indian Art, in every decorative detail, Aryans or Turanian, bears witness to the universal conviction that the character of man’s being and destiny is supernatural; and that human duty, and all that gives to daily intercourse the charm of art and grace of culture, possess their reality and true meaning only in the purposes of a life beyond life”.8 Similarly, Moncure Daniel Conway (1832-1907), an American writer, in his book Travels in South Kensington published in 1882, mentioned the awe-aspiring beauty of the goods of Indian courts as “its Muslim temple photographs, Hindu jewellery, and Buddhist gates provided a spiritual biography of the subcontinent while offering transcendent lessons that surpassed the particularity of place”.9 To Owen Jones (1809 –1874), an architect and designer of Welsh descent and famous for his studies of Alhamra Palace and drawing publications, “Indian design arose from instinct. It evinced the very faith that the people brought to their religion, habits, and modes of thought”.10 Such effusion elevates the position of the Indian art to the status of mystical heights.

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Not all the commentators termed Indian art as mystical and romantic, there were many others who saw Indian art as un-aesthetic and worthless. From an English architect, Digby Wyatt’s11 label of “rude instruments” for the Indian tools12 to the accusation of Indian art as a wasteful labour,13 many discussions aimed at denigration of oriental art and resentment towards its primitive and barbaric nature.14 For instance, the Westminster Review sees “the ornate daggers, arrows, and guns in the Indian collection” as “the work of an idle people who indulged in cruel and morbid fancies”.15 John Cassell (1871-65), a British tea and coffee merchant and publisher of magazines for the middle class, showed his disdain for the Indian craftsmen by portraying them as “a lean, starved-out regiment of squalid beggars, half naked, or with scanty folds of coarsest cotton flung around their wasted limbs”.16 Similarly, John Tallis, (1815/16 –1876), an English cartographic publisher who published maps and atlases, called the Indian efforts as “misplaced” and a “waste of human labour”.17 By viewing Indian art as mystical, romantic and decadent, the art critics termed it irrational because it lacked conceptualization. There was no relation between the art and the artist, the craft and the craft-person. It was one of the major objectives of establishing art schools in India to introduce a rational relationship between the art and the artist or craft person and craft. Such process of rationalizing the relationship of labour and product had its context in the larger developments taking place in the nineteenth century England and the role of radical intellectuals involved in the debates on aesthetics, mechanization and hand-made products. In the development of visual culture and art education in the nineteenth century England, Henry Cole’s circle played an important part. Henry Cole (1808-1882), a son of a Dragoon officer, was introduced to a circle of radical intellectuals by Thomas Love Peacock when Cole was working under Francis Palgrave at the Record Commission in the 1820s. The circle of radical intellectuals comprised John Stuart Mill (1806 –1873), an influential liberal thinker, political economist, civil servant and parliamentarian, Horace Grant, who wrote drawing manuals for educational purposes, Edward Chadwick, Charles Buller, and others.18 Many of them were impressed by Jermy Benthem’s utilitarian Philosophy, especially Stuart Mill who acted as Cole’s mentor during the initial career of his life.19 Their discussion largely revolved around the reforms concerning adult suffrage and secret ballot in the 1820s and 30s. To some extent, the events and political atmosphere of the 1830s, like the Reform Bill of 1832 which considerably increased the role of English middle class within the power structure, developed the tastes of the Englishmen. Arts and education became the increasing concern of policy makers and

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intelligentsia. Since 1832, British museum was also under construction and in 1836, the new building of British parliament was completed. Prospects of trade in the global market further stimulated the official interests in the arts of the East. The Parliamentary Committee was established in 1835 to explore the possibilities of extending art knowledge and principles of design to the manufacturing population of the country.20 Henry Cole played an important role in the nineteenth century art discourses developed through his publications, and also by organizing the Great Exhibition. His publications focussed on thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’ political history of England, architectural designs and art of Westminster Abbey. To allure the tourists, he had also published Railway Charts describing the main architectural buildings, monuments, and important places around the railway track. These writings bring to the fore his views about aesthetics. He actively engaged himself in the debates regarding the role of state to direct the course of art instruction, protection of crafts against the mechanical mass production, and the significance of utilitarian arts against the decorative beauty. Such considerations led to the formulation of binaries of art as ‘Fine’ and ‘Applied’.21 For the first time Cole used the term ‘Art Manufacture’ in 1845, which stood for “Fine art applied to mechanical production” which was meant to improve the industrial products by influencing public tastes.22 By that time the meaning of ‘Fine Art’ was specifically attached with the Greco-Roman sculpture and the art of high Renaissance. It was on Cole’s persuasion that Prince Albert, German husband of Queen Victoria, decided to organize Great Exhibition by displaying the art and industry of all nations. Now, Cole engaged himself with manufacturers, railway companies, committees at local levels, and with various governments which helped him to disseminate his ideas on art and industry. Whether it was a new beginning or a continuation of previous tradition,23 the Great Exhibition did address “the artisanal skills” that had always been a focal point in the “preceding efforts at design reform”.24 The offshoot literature25 of the Great Exhibition and the lectures delivered by architects, Digby Wyatt and Owen Jones,26 during the 1850s incorporated various art theories into the codified body of systematized knowledge which also extended its critique on Indian arts and formed the integral part of British understanding of the complexities of design art.27 The British art critics concluded that “ancient art should be studied, but not indiscriminately imitated; nature was to be a source of inspiration; and ornament must suit the material and function of the object for which it is intended”.28 For art critics, problems in the British designs were due to the ignorance and lack of training of the British artisans29 in comparison to the Indian artisans


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who according to them were better equipped than the former. In this sense, the Exhibition glorified labour and labourer, and the critics called it a “festival of working man”.30 The Great Exhibition called for reforms in art instruction, as the art critics were not satisfied with the British displays. For this purpose, a Department of Practical Art (renamed as Department of Science and Art in 1855) was established in Marlborough House, and Henry Cole was its General Superintendent, Richard Redgrave (1804-1888), painter, etcher and art administrator, was appointed as Art Superintendent, while Owen Jones became Redgrave’s assistant. Cole, Redgrave and William Dyce (1806-1864) a renowned Scottish art-educationist, prepared a report which recommended the control of the department over sixteen art schools (by 1850). It was suggested that the department would guide school administration in developing curriculum and training of the students in design education. Cole and Redgrave were also members of a committee appointed by the Government to select the objects for instruction in the schools of design. Cole termed the Indian display at the Great Exhibition as the “highest instructional value to students in design”,31 and therefore, the committee purchased nearly 200 articles for instruction in England which included ornaments and utensils made of horn, shell, ivory and sandal wood, textile products, inlaid metals, and locally made arms. The impact of these developments can be seen by a sudden rise in art schools throughout the country. By 1855, over one thousand teachers were trained in drawing at these art schools. In 1857, the Department’s headquarter was established at South Kensington and its control was transferred from the Board of Trustees to the Council of Education. In the same year, South Kensington Museum was established largely by the efforts of Cole who was also made its first director. Along with it, the Royal School of Art was set up in 1859. This school was to guide other art schools in England and to “supply art teachers to all places which seek to establish art schools”.32 It was from here that the art instructors were sent to the Punjab and elsewhere in India to promote the discourse of aesthetics and design developed at South Kensington. The South Kensington Museum became a beacon house of enlightenment with its cultural legacy accessible to all. The Department of Science and Art arranged lectures for the craftsmen by arranging ‘penny seats’ in its lecture theatre. For the first time the working men began to see their entrance in the existing public sphere. Cole realized the relevance of culture in the arena of politics “as the Art Journal noted Cole recorded the numbers of visitors to South Kensington as assiduously as a politician might count votes at an election”.33 Henry Cole’s South Kensington Art School catered to the needs of the artisan and art pupils. But still, “for designs featuring the


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human figure, manufacturers had to look to the continent even as late as the 1880s”.34 By 1860s the South Kensington became more inflexible and adopted a bureaucratic apparatus when Henry Cole became increasingly stringent confining himself to the administrative matters only, thus, “the guidance of public taste was left …to manufacturers who sought their inspiration increasingly in Museum display”.35 There were also some dissenting voices critiquing Cole’s theoretical and administrative measures like John Ruskin (1819 –1900), a British artist, art critic and social thinker, and William Morris (1834 –1896), an English architect, furniture and textile designer, writer, and founding father of Art and Craft Movement. Ruskin criticized Cole who had “corrupted the system of art teaching all over England into a state of abortion and falsehood from which it will take twenty years to recover”.36 During the same period, art and craft movement also projected the need of awareness among the craftpersons about their craft. Following Ruskin, William Morris, Walter Crane and Lawrence Alma Tadema were the leading figures in this movement which brought up the issues of craft culture. The movement was especially known for its patronage of the “lesser arts” and the socialist views “which sought to reform the arts and redesign the world for all, not just those who were able to purchase its works”.37 The art and craft movement followers discussed the individuality in art “whether in painting, architecture or applied design”.38 They resented the direct imitation of medieval paintings. Inspired by Ruskin’s socialist views, Morris thought “the greed of capitalism” and “commercial tyranny oppressed the lives”39 and deteriorate art. He emphasized that the artists/architects should have command over the manual skills or applied arts. They should possess the knowledge about the materials used in the design formation. It would give more satisfaction to the artists which they could not attain by merely copying the natural landscapes.40 The arts and crafts movement offered a well-argued critique on industrialization, alienation, and mechanization which was missing in the doctrine of Cole and his circle. However, Cole and his circle addressed the larger audience which included all “artisans throughout the nation”.41 The arts and crafts movement limited itself to the middle class artists. Its idea of unity of art was not a novel contribution as it was the legacy of Pre-Raphaelite theorists.42 A few British art critics most prominent among them was George Birdwood found this division of art and craft irrelevant to the Indian context because products in India were made by hand which could be called art.43 John Lockwood Kipling (1837-1911), father of Rudyard Kipling and first principal of Mayo School of Arts, Lahore, also adopted the same argument and



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insisted on preserving the lesser art and making artisans aware of their work. The clamouring of radical reforms in England also largely influenced many intellectuals to address the issues of education, art, aesthetics and governance in the subcontinent. For instance, James Mill’s History of British India (1817) measured India on the “scale of civilization” and questioned the “structure and purpose of imperial rule in India”.44 Mill advocated the radical reforms in the subcontinent many of which were, later on, incorporated by Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay, a British Poet, historian and Whig politician, in his Minute on Education (1834). Some of these reforms were the introduction of western education, free press, and application of utilitarian principles in law and administration. Most of these reforms were implemented during Bentinck’s Governor-Generalship of India. Macaulay’s Minute somewhat settled down the long controversy between ‘Anglicists’ vs ‘Orientalists’. “There are no books”, argued Macaulay, “on any subject which deserve to be compared to our own; whether45, when we can teach European science, we shall teach systems which by universal confession whenever they differ from that of Europe differ for the worse…”.46 Macaulay’s Minute on Indian education may be termed as a most significant development in the course of colonial Indian history primarily for two reasons: first, it laid down the future directions for the education system in India; secondly, it formulated or set new standards of elitism in India which were to dominate in the coming centuries. People who came from England were influenced by Utilitarianism and Evangelism. Their prime objective was to rebuild the society which was, in Macaulay’s words, “sunk (to) the lowest depths of slavery and superstition”. Krishna Kumar, an Indian scholar on colonial education, conceptualizes it as adult-child relationship. According to him, “the colonizer took the role of the adult, and the native became the child” and this very relationship defined the educational and academic landscape of the colonial India.47 Apart from reformist or imperialist tendencies, the British products flooded markets in the subcontinent which taxed the local industry and threatened the existence of craftsmanship in India. It resulted in desperate attempts by British Indian officials to re-capture the market for Indian products. Charles Edward Trevelyan (1807-1886), a British Civil Servant and Governor of Madras, in 1853 suggested to the Select Committee, House of Lords, to establish art schools in India:

“….to give the natives of India all the advantage in the cultivation of the arts which it is in our power to give, for in order to favour our own manufactures


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imported into India and partly by levying a heavy duty upon Indian manufactures imported into England, in addition to the natural manufacturing superiority of England, we have by these means swept away great branches of manufacture and have caused great distress in India. Consequently, I consider that we owe a great debt to India in this respect and it is specially our duty to give our Indian fellow subjects every possible aid in cultivating those branches of art that still remain to them”.48

Inspired by economic considerations and Henry Cole’s ventures, Trevelyan’s proposal was meant to Europeanize the art of locals and to “modify existing designs in the light of British tastes”49 (to make them suitable for export) through education which was to be devised on the lines of Macaulay’s Minute. Trevelyan’s policy was almost identical to that of Macaulay. In 1853, he said:

“The only means at our disposal for preventing revolution is to set the natives on a process of European improvement. They will then cease to desire and aim at independence on the old Indian footing. The national activity will be fully and harmlessly employed in acquiring and diffusing European knowledge and naturalizing European constitutions…in following this course we should be trying no experiment. The Romans at once civilized the nations of Europe and attached them to their rule by Romanizing them; or, in other words, by educating them in the Roman literature and arts and teaching them to emulate their conquerors instead of opposing them. The Indians will, I hope, soon stand in the same position towards us in which we once stood towards the Roman”.50

Art schools at Madras, Bombay, Calcutta and Lahore were set up on these conflicting principles,51 which on one hand meant to revive the local arts by using European/Indian principles and, on the other hand, to incorporate Indian artisans within the metropolitan economy by sensitizing them about the possibilities of markets in Europe. All these conflicting interests reflected in the debates of British art administrators. In 1875, the Mayo School of Industrial Art was established in Lahore and J L Kipling, who spent much of his time at South Kensington, was appointed its first principal. Highlighting the


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objectives of the school, Kipling termed (it) “the most important of local educational institutions.... the object of the Lahore School (later Mayo School) is to revive crafts now half forgotten, and to discourage as much as possible the crude attempts at reproduction of the worst features of Birmingham and Manchester work now (so) much common among natives”.52 Here Kipling explicitly articulates the intention of colonial state to make artisan aware of the importance of their work. This could only be done by teaching locals the theoretical basis of their own art to enable them to understand the rationality of their own product. How did the British art administrators plan this relationship of rationality with the craft-person and craft, makes the next part of this article.

(II)

The main actors behind devising a policy for art instruction in the colonial Punjab were Baden Powell (1841-1901), British Civil Servant, writer and art critic, Richard Temple (1826-1902), art critic and English Civil Servant, H H Locke (d.1885), first Principal of Calcutta School of Arts, J L Kipling, and Dr De Fabeck, Principal, Jeypore School of Arts. They deliberated on the location of art schools, theoretical instruction and training of teachers. Most of the British officials in India like J L Kipling, HH Lock and De Fabeck favoured the establishment of art schools in provincial capitals and big cities. Kipling suggested Dehli, Agra, Allahabad while De Fabeck favoured Bengal Presidency, Allahabad and Ajmer.53 This strategy of establishing schools “under the eyes of government”54 was: first to attract local princes, chiefs and elites in order “to mould (their) character and tastes, and to improve the intelligence”;55 second, to establish the schools which were well-equipped in order to achieve the objectives.56 However, Temple pointed out that people from villages would not be interested in taking admission in these schools. Conscious of this apprehension, the British government decided to establish these schools in the administrative centres away from craft-centres. Possible intention was to attract “native aristocracy” and to make them as a role model for the rest of locals. The British art administrators like Richard Temple and Baden Powell believed that the Indian art was “wholly empirical” and lacked theoretical basis. Such theoretical insensibility emptied the Indian art from systematization and rationalization. Indians have instinctive sympathy with nature, but they do not posses reasoning to explain their art. Lack of theoretical insight made Indian art stagnant, substandard and reduced Indian arts and craftspersons to merely copyist. Indians


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even imitate European art without acquiring its sensibility. This theoretical problem could be resolved in three ways; first, by introducing sciences57; second, by introducing drawing58 and third, by giving some examples of good work in museums59. Baden Powel suggested that a separate chair of Applied Art should be established under the director of the school of arts. Students should be taught physical sciences, principles of machinery, and elementary chemistry.60 The British laid special emphasis on drawing61 because it was a skill which reflected the intelligence of observation through a co-ordination of eye, mind and hand. By acquiring this skill, one would be able to enhance his faculties of perception and precision, discrimination and classification. The nineteenth century drawing manuals suggest five major objectives: “Firstly, that drawing is important as a source of useful knowledge and moral edification, especially for the lower classes of the society; secondly, that the exercise of drawing is particularly suited to training eye and hand, thereby perfecting their manual operation; thirdly, that drawing and writing are fundamentally related as forms of visual and manual expression, making it advantageous to learn them in tandem; fourthly, that drawing is a universal language, comprehensible to people of all races and nationalities; and lastly, that drawing provides a means of intellectual and moral refinement, exercising an elevating influence capable of raising the mind above sensual or material pursuits”.62 Temple believed that “theoretical instruction which we as Europeans are best qualified to supply”.63 Others like Locke, Kipling, Powell held the same view. Temple was of the opinion that to ensure the proper functioning of the school “I would suggest that picked men be sent out through the Secretary of State to be Principals and Professors and Assistant Masters in our art schools, just as picked men are secured and sent out to us for our Telegraph Department, our Forest Department, our Educational Department, and for other services wherein it is now admitted that a special and technical education is indispensable. If this were done for our art schools, I have little doubt but that the improvement in their organization and system would be most immediately discernible in its results, and would increase as time went on”.64 However, Kipling was in favour of training some locals to assist in teaching and other projects like making a new building of museum. He found youths of the mistree, and rungsas class most suitable for this job in designing the museum which would become “a comprehensive object book of reference”.65 Theoretically, the purpose of art instruction in India was to disseminate ‘general art culture’, so that at least as the future deputy magistrate or government clerk must know about Chaucer, Edwardian glories in the stone building, Elizabethian literature, etc. 66 It was also


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intended to revive old art and craft and to address elite class to formulate the local aesthetics. JL Kipling in one of his reports argued that “an art school cannot well be conducted like a factory or jail”.67 He was right. The plans made for the instruction could not have been materialized in the educational centre. The reason was obvious. These plans were insensitive to the forces at work. It makes the last part of this article.

(III) From the very beginning, Kipling realized the problems and these problems exceeded to his anticipation, which altered the colonial agenda of changing local aesthetics.68 The main problems were different classes of students, pre-colonial traditions of craftmanship, lack of funds, lack of trained staff, and problem of language. These problems and crisis changed, in one way or the other, the colonial agenda of making artisans aware of what is beautiful and what is not. The art schools were established in the capitals and big cities to attract local elites. However, in Mayo School of Arts, the local elite did not take interest. The students from lower strata took admission. Many even did not complete their period and left the school due to different reasons. Those students, who could not get admission in institutions like Aitcheson College, Government College Lahore, Punjab University, Lahore, took admission in this school and they had no passion for art. Apart from drop-out, many students did not bother to attend the schools. But it was the school’s policy that they did not refuse any admission which was free of cost.69 Kipling complains that “...low level of intelligence is our worst drawback. It is comparatively easy to get a geometrical problem understood or a perspective diagram drawn, but most difficult is to secure an intelligent appreciation of real delicacy and truth in free hand drawing or of an idea outside an ordinary practice. There may be less to observe in an Indian town than in the European one, but the neglect of the faculty of observation by Punjab youths has other causes than the blankness of their surroundings. I am afraid it may justly be said that the care and pains have only half the effect that might be produced on better material”.70 Many of the students entered in the school were more interested in getting government jobs rather than learning art. However, on regularly attending the class, they quickly realize that it was not the place for them, so they leave the school as soon as possible.71

Students who were not from any artisan family preferred drawing and refused to do any manual work like woodwork, etc.72 The Director Public Instructions and Kipling repeatedly mentioned in their reports that the school would not be able to achieve its objectives


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because of the students who neither had any enthusiasm of art nor had necessary understanding of the aims of school.73 Kipling’s reports mentioned that students from artisan families did take admission in the school. To name a few, these students were Bhai Ram Singh, Miran Bakhsh. It seems that the pre-colonial structure of Gharana art/craft remained intact even after the establishment of this modern institution. It might look modern, but in a sense it carried tradition by imparting training to the artisans and craft persons. Many of these artisans and craft persons were later hired in the school as assistant teachers, and teachers. Bhai Ram Singh’s example may be quoted here. Even after acquiring some certificates, these people continued with their family profession. For instance, the report of 1875-76 mentions few promising students of the school. They were Bhai Ram Singh who was a carpenter, Muhammad Din, who was engraver, and Sher Muhammad who was a ‘luhar’ by profession.74 Kipling mentions that only the sons of artisans are performing well in the school and they possess natural talent in doing so.75

With the passage of time, the school administration appreciated that the industrial side was “fully developed” because of the interest of artisan families,76 and this interest could be promoted by offering more scholarships. Kipling also realized that the families would be more useful institution in teaching than school in India because “an honest blacksmith’s shop would be a more useful institution than a school in India that sets out to teach a theory and principles of art pur et simple”.77 Kipling’s effort to teach drawing to the artisans was not very successful, because they thought it more slavish rather than means of learning.78 They believed it as a “mechanical and thoughtless work”.79 It is not to suggest that no artisan learnt drawing and decorative art, for instance, Sher Muhammad “one of the very few natives with a strongly marked vocation for pictorial art, and a love of work for its own sake” learnt drawing and was invited by Major Biddulph who was posted in Gilgit to prepare “illustrations of the people and domestic life of that region”.80 Few instances also suggest that the school administration attached as much importance to the works of artisans who were not even trained in the newly established art schools. For example, in 1879-80, woodcarvers from Amritsar were involved to make wood carvan show for the Melbourn Exhibition because of the shortage of time. Artisans in the school were not interested in the theoretical works, and Kipling was happy to see them excelling in practical art.81 Another important problem which the Mayo School of Arts faced was that of funds. Because of insufficient funds, neither the trained staff from Europe could be hired, nor the students could be offered luxurious scholarships. Similarly, building could not be


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extended. Problems emanating from the paucity of funds exposed students to the market. They had to accept outside assignments in order to meet their own as well as school’s expenses. Sometimes, even classes could not be held regularly because of these assignments. These assignments essentially represented non-Europeanized version of art/craft. Most of them were traditional and indigenously designed. Many writings especially that of Thomas Metcalf, suggest, the British used Indo-Saracenic architecture as a mean of glorifying the empire. The students of the Mayo School of Arts were trained to design such buildings. In Colonial Punjab, a number of buildings were constructed in this style like Lahore Museum, Mayo School of Arts, Atchison College and Lahore Railway Station. However, a close reading of many official reports reveal that these buildings were not a mean of celebrating empire, but a way of using space to serve the purpose. These buildings were constructed under limited budget and decoration was avoided to minimize the expenses.82 Kipling admitted in his reports that the school was misguided because the draughtsmen were not trained in the local architecture. Official buildings in indo-saracenic style may badly affect the public taste as local elite would copy such a style for their own buildings. However, it was also a question of crucial importance for them whether talented youth could be attracted and trained in local architecture?83 As Thomas Metcalf points out that in British buildings in India, Indian/Saracanic elements of design like arches, dome, brackets, etc. could be variously used in any spatial location,84 Kipling too had had the same understanding of Indian architecture. It is precisely because of this reason that not all the buildings of British empire were built in indo-saracenic style. High British officials in Punjab preferred pre-colonial buildings for residential purposes. For instance, Governor House in Lahore, offices in civil secretariat were constructed in traditional pattern. Students of Mayo school of Arts were trained to design buildings within a limited budget. They were not trained to build the monuments of empire, in fact, their training was meant to realize under-funded projects. Since the school was not exactly in tune with the European aesthetics, the European community therefore did not take interest in the school’s work. Only European students of Eastern art appreciated the works of staff and students.85 From 1884-85 onwards, principal and then vice principal began to visit the local market and industry to acquaint themselves with the contemporary trends. Besides, the school staff was engaged by the private artisans for advice and guidance.86 However, many students who completed their courses from the school were later on involved in the Public Works Department (PWD) and did not have any direct contact with the people, therefore, could not impinge upon the public taste directly.87 The PWD was the “biggest


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building monopoly” in the nineteenth century, however, it was essentially Indian in character as it hired artisans in constructing official buildings.88 Due to the inadequate funds and lack of interest, the school could not hire European teachers in a sufficient number. Hence, the administration had to hire locals in the school; to run workshop, so-called ‘illiterate’ artists and craft persons were employed. This tradition persists to date. It was apprehended by the Director Public Instruction that the school would not be able to perform well, if natives were not trained to oversee the affairs of school in Kipling’s absence.89 In 1884-85, the number of teaching staff in the school was five in which three were locals (Ram Singh, Sher Muhammad and Lala Dhanpat Rai) while two were foreigners (J L Kipling and Gervaise P Pinto).90 Language was emphasized in the theoretical art training. Kipling complained, the students who were talented artists did not posses good language skills and were at disadvantage as compared to those who had good command over language but lacked talent for art. However, the school administration preferred students who had talent in art and craft. This leads us to believe that the students deficient in language skills were not aware of the theoretical debates in Europe, but still school administration patronized them. In 1885-86, Arabic language and other vernaculars were used as technical language and English was ignored. Director and principal regretted its use, but they had no other option.91 English was offered, but as an optional subject. To guide the students, Burchett’s Practical Geometry was taught in vernacular in which terms of Arabic, Urdu and English were used.92 The Director Public Instructions and Kipling realized that the artisans and other students were not well-versed in English which impeded their understanding of the theoretical aspects. It was suggested that more general education was required to orientate them in theory.93 Owing to the above mentioned reasons, the colonial art administrators appeared to be disdainful, and dissatisfied in their reports. For instance, the officiating director Public Instruction Punjab, while reporting about the working of the school in 1883-84 described it as a “superior sort of workshop”, and the school should “exercise a general influence over the artistic industries of the Province, by acting as aesthetic centre, a school of design, and the source of enlightened criticism and advice”94 which it failed to become. Andrew, Principal, Mayo School of Arts noted that the school “gave all knowledge of what the province produces”.95 The Indian schools, as interpreted by Partha Mitter, Thakurta, and others, disarticulated the very artistic values of the subcontinent. However, the case of Mayo School of Arts demonstrates a comparatively different view. Pre-colonial structure of artisan Gharana (family) remained active in the developments in the


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domain of arts and crafts apparently dominated by the colonial state. Language, drawing techniques could not be properly introduced in the later half of the nineteenth century Punjab. By comparing, the debates and reports, cognitive failure of the British art administrators becomes quite obvious. In most of the reports, they acknowledged their limitations and re-defined their strategy of educating locals by appropriating or accepting local norms.


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END-NOTES

1 Parha Mitter, Art and Nationalism in Colonial India, 1850-1922: Occidental Orientations (Cambridge & NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Also see Partha Mitter, Much Maligned Monsters : History of European Reactions to Indian Art (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1977)2 Tapati Guha-Thakurta, The Making of a New "Indian" Art: Artists, Aesthetics, and Nationalism in Bengal, c. 1850-1920 (Cambridge & NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Also see Tapati Guha-Thakurta, Monuments, Objects, Histories: Institutions of Art in Colonial and Postcolonial India (New York : Columbia University Press, 2004)3 See for discussion, Partha Mitter, “Status and Patronage of Artists During British Rule in India (c. 1850-1900)” in Barbara Stoler Miller (ed.), The Powers of Art: Patronage in Indian Culture (Dehli: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.277-230. 4 Thakurta, The Making of a New "Indian" Art.5 Arindam Dutta, “Infinite Justice: An Architectural Coda”, Grey Room, No.07, On 9/11 (Spring, 2002), p.44. 6 For instance, Illustrations of Ancient Architecture in Hindustan (1840) by James Fergusson, True Principles of Pointed or Christian Architecture (1841) by Welby Pugin, Modern Painters (1843) by John Ruskin, Nineveh and its Remains (1848) and Nineveh and Babylon (1853) both by Layard. 7 Mahrukh Keki Tarapor, Art and Design: The Discovery of India in Art and Literature, 1851-1947 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, July 1977), p.8. 8 George C. M. Birdwood, The Industrial Arts of India (London: Committee of Council on Education, 1880), p. 344. 9Lara Kriegel, Grand Designs: Labor, Empire, and the Museum in Victorian Culture (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2007), p.192. 10 Ibid., p.142. 11 Matthew Digby Wyatt (1820 –1877) was a British architect and an art historian. He also worked as secretary of the Great Exhibition, Surveyor of the East India Company and the Slade Professor of Fine Art at the University of Cambridge. 12 Kriegel, Grand Designs, p.116. 13 Ibid., p.120. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p.117. 17 Ibid., p.120-21. 18 See for Henry Cole’s career as an art administrator with particular reference to the Department of Science and Art Arindam Dutta, The Bureaucracy of Beauty: Design in the Age of its Global Reproducibility (NY & London: Routledge, 2007). 19 Ibid., p.17. 20 Tarapor, Art and Design, p.6. 21 Ibid., p.7.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slade_Professor_of_Fine_Art

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Cambridge

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Cambridge


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22 Ibid. 23 Daniel Conway in Travels in South Kensington paid tribute to Henry Cole’s efforts that awakened the Victorian taste towards art. However, Lara Kriegal discards this notion of Conway as an imperial piece of writing. Kriegal addresses the continuities rather than the breaks that the Great Exhibition brought into central position. 24 Kriegel, Grand Designs, p.197. 25 For instance price winning essay of Ralph Nicholson, “The Exhibition as a Lesson in Taste”, and Redgrave’s Supplementary Report on Design. In his report, Redgrave states, ‘to this day, Indian ornament is composed of the same form as it was in the earliest known works’. Cole and his colleagues advocated the fundamentals of design in the Journal of Design and exemplified the Indian products. Tarapor, Art and Design, p.8. 26 Like “An Attempt to Define the Principles which should determine Form in the Decorative Arts”, “An attempt to define Principles which should regulate the Employment of Colour in the Decorative Arts” to name a few. Ibid. 27 Digby Wyatt’s folio on Industrial Arts of the Nineteenth Century (1851) and then Metal-Work, Wornum’s Analysis of Ornament (1856), Redgrave’s Manual of Design, Owen Jones’s Grammer of Ornament (1856). This grammar comprised various articles written on the principles of design which ‘presented final codification of the principles of design as these had been evolved over the past twenty years by the South Kensington theorists’. Ibid., p. 17. 28 Ibid. 29 See for details N.W. Senior, et. al., On the Improvement of Designs and Patterns, and the Extension of Copyright (London, 1841) 30 Kriegel, Grand Designs, p.165. 31 Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge, 1986) p. 34. 32 Tim Barringer and Tom Flynn, Colonialism and the Object: Empire, Material Culture and the Museum (NY, 1998), p. 49. 33 Kriegel, Grand Designs, p.180. 34 Ibid., p.199. 35 Dutta, The Bureaucracy of Beauty. 36 Ibid. 37 Kriegel, Grand Designs, p.201. 38 Gillian Naylor, The Arts and Crafts Movement: A Study of its Sources, Ideals and Influence on Design Theory (London: Trefoil Publications, 1990), p.101. 39 Art and Its Producers, Collected works of William Morris, vol. Xxii (London, 1914), p.352. 40 Naylor, The Arts and Crafts Movement, p.104. 41 Kriegel, Grand Designs. 42 Naylor, The Arts and Crafts Movement, p.101. 43 Samual K Parker, “Artistic Practice and Education in India: A Historical View” in Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 21, No. 04 (Winter, 1987), p.132.


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44 James Mill, The History of British India (London, 1817). Also see Karuna Mantena, “The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism” in Ducan Bell, Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought (NY & London: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.116. 45 Krishna Kumar, “Colonial Citizen as an Educational Ideal” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24, No. 04 (Jan 28, 1989), p. PE-45. Also see a more detailed account Krishna Kumar, Political Agenda of Education: A Study of Colonialist and Nationalist Ideas (New Delhi: Sage Publisher, 2005). 46 Macaulay’s Minute on Education. 47 Kumar, “Colonial Citizen as an Educational Ideal”, p. PE-45. 48 Tarapor, Art and Design, p. 55. 49 Ibid., p. 57. 50 WG Archer, India and Modern Art (London, 1959) pp. 18-19. 51 Mitter, “Status and Patronage of Artists During British Rule in India (c. 1850-1900)”, pp.277, 281, 289. 52 J L Kipling and T H Thronton, Lahore As It Was (Lahore: National College of Arts, reprinted in 2001) p. 49. 53 “Memorandum on the formation of Mayo School of Art by Dr De Fabeck, Principle Jeypore School of Art (1874)” in Samina Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art: Formative Years under JL Kipling (1874-94) (Lahore: National College of Arts, 2003), p.157. 54 “Memorandum on the formation of Mayo School of Art by Henry Hoover Lock, Principal of Calcutta School of Art (dated 26 July 1873)” in Ibid. 55 “Memorandum on the formation of Mayo School of Art by Dr De Fabeck, Principle Jeypore School of Art (1874)” in Ibid. 56 Although Henry Hoover Locke who was another main actor behind the Indian art education suggested that two or three well-equipped schools could serve art than a dozens ill-equipped but Temple disagreed and opined that the natives would not travel too long to take admission in such schools and the school would only ‘increase the artistic culture’ of the town where it was located and the other places would not be influenced by it. See for decussion Memorandum on the formation of Mayo School of Art by HH Lock and by Sir Richard Temple in Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art. 57 “Memorandum on the the Formation of Mayo School of Art by Baden Powell (Dated 31 May 1872)” in Ibid., p. 137. 58 Memoranda on the formation of Mayo School of Art by Baden Powell, Henry Hoover Locke and Richard Temple in Ibid.. 59 Memoranda on the formation of Mayo School of Art by JL Kipling, Richard Temple and HH Locke in Ibid. 60 “Memorandum on the formation of Mayo School of Art by Baden Powell” in Ibid., p.137. 61 See for the discussion on drawing in education in the 19th century Britain, Mervyn Romans, “A Question of Taste: Re-examining the Rationale for the Introduction of Public Art and Design Education to Britain in the Early


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Nineteenth Century” in Mervyn Romans (ed), Histories of Art and Design Education: Collected Essays (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2005). 62 Rafael Cardoso, “A Preliminary Survey of Drawing Manuals in Britain c. 1825-1875 in Ibid., p.30. 63“Memorandum on the formation of Mayo School of Art by Richard Temple”, in Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art, p. 143. 64Ibid., p.143. 65“Memorandum on the formation of Mayo School of Art by JL Kipling” in Ibid. 66“Memorandum on the formation of Mayo School of Art by Henry Hoover Locke” in Ibid., p.155. 67“JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1886-87” in Ibid., p.74. 68“Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1876-77”, p. 38. “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1877-78”, p. 39, in Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art. 69“Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1886-87” in Ibid., p.72. 70 “JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1886-87” in Ibid., p.73. 71 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1876-77” in Ibid., p.36. 72 Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art, p.38. 73 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1879-80”, p.41. “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1881-82”, p. 43. “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1882-83”, p. 45. “JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1884-85”, p.59. “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1886-87”, p.72. “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1889-90”, p. 81, in Ibid. 74 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1875-76”, p.33 in Ibid. 75 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1876-77” in Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., p. 37. 79 “JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1883-84” in Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art, p. 52. 80 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1879-80” in Ibid.,p. 40. 81 “JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1886-87” in Ibid., p.73.


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82 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1876-77”, p. 38. Government buildings were also constructed by keeping in view the limitation of funds. “JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1884-85”, p. 61 in Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art. 83 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1879-80”, p. 41, in Ibid. 84 Thomas R Metcalf, “Past and Present: Toward an Aesthetic of Colonialism” in GHR Tillotson (ed.), Paradigms of Indian Architecture: Space and Time in Representation and Design (Great Britain: Curzon Press, 1998), p.17. 85 “JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1882-83” in Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art, p.49. 86 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1881-82”, p. 43. Also see “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1883-84”, p. 50. in Ibid. 87 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1891-92”, p. 87. “JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1892-93”, p. 93 in Ibid. 88 Arindam Dutta argues that “Foucault’s critiques of power/knowledge have proved all too convenient in identifying the PWD’s systematizing strategy as a rationalist teleology”. See Arindam Dutta, “Strangers within the Gate: Public Works and Industrial Art Reform” in Peter Scriver and Vikramaditya Prakash (eds.), Colonial Modernities: Building, Dwelling and Architecture in British India and Ceylon (London & NY: Routledge, 2007). 89 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1883-84” in Choonara (ed), “Official” Chronicle of the Mayo School of Art, p. 51. 90 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1884-85” in Ibid. 91 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1885-86” in Ibid. 92 “JL Kipling’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1885-86” in Ibid., p. 69. 93 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1891-92” in Ibid., p. 81. 94 “Director Public Instruction’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1883-84” in Ibid. 95 “Andrew’s Report on the Mayo School of Art, Lahore, for 1893-94”, in Ibid., p. 96.

BOOK REVIEWS

Shifa Ahmed: Book Review

MUNIR AHMED MUNIR & FE CHAUDHERY, AB WO LAHORE KAHAN, (LAHORE: MAHANAMA ATISH FISHAAN, 2009) His camera that continued clicking on every historic moment, 'Chacha' F.E. Chaudhry (affectionately called Chacha by Lahore pressmen), the oldest and the most decorated photographer is a living album on Lahore's life during the past many decades. For those who do not know him, he is among the first ones who stomping around the city with a camera slingling down his shoulders ready to capture shots of anything seemed interesting for a news picture in Pakistan Times. Now he is one hundred years old but the zest is still effervescent. He remembers with extraordinary fondness Lahore of yester years with a population of under 300,000, when only three cars rolled majestically up the heavily tree-lined 30-ft.-wide Mall. The draw bridge near Mori Gate was still intact. A green belt encircled the Walled City where 'pehalwaans' could be seen exercising and practicing their art. And a whiff of jasmine was the only smell to be found in streets of Lahore. When the light began to fade, ‘Mora’, the lantern wala, would appear and light the oil lanterns on the streets and then disappear. How much change Lahore has gone through over the decades can only be seen by a person like F.E. Chaudhry. Faustin Elmer Chaudhry was born on March 15, 1909 in a Christian family of Saharanpur, Uttar Paradesh, India. His parents moved to Dhalwal, Jhelum district while he was still a boy. Later, a Jhelum girl was to become his wife with whom he has been happily married for well over half a century. Although he is 100 years old, there is something in his personality that makes one realize that time has been benevolent to him. He still is quite energetic and zestfully vivacious. The book under review entitled ‘Ab Wo Lahore Kahan’, is based on a detailed interview conducted by Munir Ahmed Munir, one of the aficionados of F.E. Chaudhry. Munir presented this book as gift to Mr. F.E. Chaudhry at the celebrations of his 100 birthday. Memoirs of F.E. Chaudhry about old Lahore is the principal theme in this book as he was talking at the time of interview i.e. ‘Lahore main pehle itni “Abaadi Uboodi” nahin hoti thi’. Without editing, this book is a primary source of knowledge about life of the old city. One can see the real Lahore through the kaleidoscopic viewfinder as Mr. F.E.Chaudhry is. Mr. Chaudhry's contribution for Pakistan Movement has been quite tangible in its own way. He covered various functions, meetings, processions and demonstrations of the Muslim League. The photographs he took got published in newspapers all over the

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subcontinent. In 1938 when Raja Mohammad Afzal Khan of Dhalwal District, Jhelum, formed a Muslim League of the Salt Rang, Mr. Chaudhry toured the whole area with him on a horseback. He went from village to village and took many photographs of historical importance. Always on the lookout for new topics and subjects he was the first one to introduce photographic coverage of a village life in the Punjab, which subsequently became a regular feature in the Statesman under the caption of "Up Country". When Pakistan came into being Mr. Chaudhry was working as a freelance. He was running a studio of his own and doing extra ordinary good business as a photographer. At that time the Pakistan Times was on a look out for a staff photographer. Since, the paltry salary of Rs. 250 which they offered held no attraction for Mr. Chaudhry. Therefore, idea of applying for this post never entered his mind, One day, he reminisces, he received a message from the editor none other than the famous poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz. At that time Mr. Chaudhry hardly knew him, he presented himself promptly before Faiz Sahib. In his typical soft spoken tone he asked Mr. Chaudhry’ a photograph of the Civil and Military Gazzett (CMG) building, in which at that time the offices of both the Pakistan Times and Imroze were housed. However, he wanted Mr. Chaudhry to take a picture showing depth. As there was no depth in the building, Mr. Chaudhry refused point-blank. However Faiz Sahib was able to convince him to at least give it a try. Reaching the spot he meticulously studied the building from all angles. Finally he could produce desired results. The quality of his work and his quickness impressed Faiz Sahib and he asked him to join the Pakistan Times. Finally a salary of Rs. 350 was negotiated and Mr. Chaudhry joined the Times in 1949, working there till his retirement in 1973. When F E Chaudhry recalls those days, 1936 sticks out in his memory as the year he took his first exclusive of the Quaid, MuhammadAli Jinnah who had come to address a crowd on the Shaheed Ganj Masjid issue in Lahore and F E Chaudhry was quick to judge the news potential of the event. The other two freelance photographers did not have news sense and stayed away. With pride F .E. Chaudhry recollects, how did he angle and maneuver to photograph Quaid as he sat on a dais, which was put up on a water tank along with Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Editor of the Daily, Zamindar. The exclusive snap was carried by all the Lahore newspapers and many other Indian papers. By 1940, the number of freelance photographers had swelled to eight. One would think that competition may have lowered the remunerations, but some publications like the ‘Illustrated Weekly’ of India were paying a reasonable sum of Rs. 7.50 per piece and F.E. Chaudhry had concluded a lucrative contract with the National 114


Geographic magazine. In those days when the rent for his flat on Beadon Road was Rs. 16 per month and a roll of film cost 12 annas, photography was becoming a lucrative profession. By 1947, with the Independence tempo on the rise, F. E. Chaudhry recalls, processions had become so commonplace that they had lost their news value. At one point Mr. Chaudhry thought that the 24th January Civil Liberty March was too mundane for the newspapers. He decided to join the protest instead. He was arrested and unloaded hours later at deserted outskirts of Lahore - the Cantonment area. Quite unwittingly he was now contributing more than his photography to the independence struggle, and recording it as he went along. Not one to be modest about his achievements, he says without batting an eyelid. "The importance of news photography in Lahore began with me." To his credit, he introduced creative photography with series such as "The first dawn of the new year' expose photos such as LMC 'plague spots,' and an educative 'trade' series on craftsmen at work. Besides the creative and news side in photography F .E. Chaudhry began to make several technological breakthroughs. He improvised new lens for his camera and developed the technique of taking T.V. photographs, now in popular use in print journalism. He continued taking news photographs till the day of his retirement in 1973. "I took the last photograph of the former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as he came out of the Lahore High Court after being convicted" despite warnings from the police. F .E. Chaudhry certainly has proved his mettle by winning several national awards for dedicated services, including the Tamgha-e-Khidmat in 1970, the President's Pride of Performance Award in 1987' and the highest award in the minority scheme. F .E. Chaudhry's, contribution in photo' journalism will be the source of enthusiasm and inspiration for posterity. At hundred, his experience increased with every crease on his face. The lens before the retina of F E Chaudhry is now clearer and sharper to see the frames of life. How erroneous would it be, to say that a photographer can be retired.

SHIFA AHMAD

GC UNIVERSITY, LAHORE

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Saeed Ahmad Butt: Book Review

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AZIZ UD DIN AHMAD, PUNJAB AUR IS KEY BERUNI HAMLA AWAR (PUNJAB AND ITS FOREIGN INVADERS) (LAHORE: BOOK HOMES, 2007) The book under review is written by a renowned scholar of leftist leaning, Aziz ud din Ahmad. This book consists of eight parts, in which he undertakes to unravel the controversies that had plagued the history and culture of the Punjab, with particular respect to the Punjab’s role against the invaders including the British. Besides, he criticizes somewhat trenchantly, such ‘text-book’ historians, who portray expansionist invaders in India as Islamic heroes. There is no gainsaying the fact that a class of beneficiaries flourished in the Punjab, after the 1857 war of independence and served the British interest. Some historians do emphasize this fact that the annexation of the Punjab by the British in 1849 brought not only material benefits to Muslims but it also restored their erstwhile status, reminiscent of the Mughal era. Having said all that British also drove a communal wedge into the demography of the Punjab thereby deployed the divide and rule policy, which remained a very effective instrument of colonial control. As a consequence Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were driven apart into antagonistic religious communities. Aziz ud Din Ahmed has tried to vindicate the role of Punjabis against the rule of the British thus rectified the distorted image of Punjabis etched out by the prejudiced historians. Those historians have laid all the blame on to the door step of the Punjabi folks without even bothering to look at the resistant movements launched by the residents of the Punjab against the British. The British occupation of the Punjab, according to Hamza Alvi facilitated the transfer of wealth and raw material, particularly cotton from India (Punjab) to England, so that British need for the raw material in the wake of industrial revolution could be fulfilled. Concurrently Punjab s potential as the military recruitment area enhanced its importance even more. As it has been exhibited by Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Tan Tai Yong and Rajit Mauzumdar, from 1880s onwards most of the military personnel used to be recruited from the Punjab. The military recruits from the Punjab served with utmost zeal and zest the British interests during the Boer War and subsequently during the two world wars. Those recruited belonged to the rural areas of the province. The feudal lords played a vital role in that process of military recruitment. Thus, jagirdars (feudal lords), a class of beneficiaries won the British patronage in return. The construction of roads, railway lines, digging up of the canals and establishment of modern educational institutions brought the social changes in India. The progress was limited only to those areas, which were considered important by the British. But the far flung areas in the Seraiki belt in


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the south or districts like Mianwali in the north remained underdeveloped with no traces of the industrial growth and development because these areas had just marginal significance for the British. The social changes like educational expansion, introduction of industry and communication network etc played important role in undermining British rule in India. Following the Divide and Rule policy, British adopted such measures which precluded the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh unity. They on the one hand showed benefaction to the Muslims and on the other hand made Hindus and Sikhs realize that they had put a permanent check on the invaders from Afghanistan. So in order to strengthen their position they must join British army. To counter the influence of the urban based reform-movement of the three communities, British helped its own cronies to establish the Unionist Party in 1923. Hence the rural urban divide which had already been created by promulgating the Land Alienation Act in 1900-01 was further accentuated. That policy went a long way in creating dissentions among Punjabi populace which proved one of the major reasons for the partition of the Punjab in 1947. Aziz ud Din Ahmad devotes a substantial part of the book in explicating the motives of the invaders in the Punjab. He gives primacy to the economic determinant of invasions. Most of the invaders came to India, plundered its wealth and returned to their native countries, leaving behind the devastated India. Even the Muslim conquerors including Mahmud of Ghazna, Ahmad Shah Abdali, Nadir shah etc. looted the Indian wealth, though used Islam for their selfish motives. According to the author, they had no concern for the Islamic practices. They preferred their native cultural practices in India and put aside the true Islamic values. As the Turkish conquerors patronized the Turkish customs and traditions in India, which left indelible imprints on the Indian life during the Sultanate period. Similarly we find profound Persian cultural influence on Indian society during the Mughal period. The author, therefore, describes them as expansionists, who expanded their empire to fulfill their selfish motives. The author laments that the prejudiced historians portray such invaders as the champions of Islam. They tend to forget the services of the Sufis for spread of Islam in India. The author also sheds light on the role of those Sufis, who practically condemned the caste system and the religious division and tried to bind people from different castes, creeds and kinships in a bond of humanity. They preached and professed the ideology of Sulah-I- kul. Sufis like Khawaja Moeen ud din Ajmari, Bahao ud Din Zikrya Multani, Sheikh Rukn-i-Alam , Sakhi Sarwar , Baba Farid Ganj Shakar, Hazarat Mian Mir, shah Hussain, Amir kabir Syed Hamdani and Noor kutb ul Alim disseminated the message of toleration and peace among the people of different religious denominations and castes and creeds. Not only Muslims, but the Hindus and more specifically Sikhs also were influenced by the Sufis. Sufis lit the light of friendship, peace and


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harmony in otherwise socially and religiously divided social formation. Hence, Sufis, according to the author represented the true essence of Islam. The author also underscored the importance of the reforms introduced by the ‘invaders’ in India. But the real motive of those reforms was to achieve their selfish interest. Like Grand Trunk Road was built by Sher Shah Suri, but this provided a save passage to Afghan conquerors to India. Though building roads, forts, beautiful forests, and palaces provided employment to thousands, however it did not change the life pattern of common folks. Similarly British also paid attention to social and economic progress in India, but destroyed the textile industry of Bengal in order to facilitate its own cronies and more importantly to fulfill the economic interests of Great Britain in the post Industrial Revolution era. Author maintains quite categorically that the conquerors of India altered native industry at the expense of their interests. On the contrary, the author tries to remove misconceptions about Ranjit Singh. Sadly enough Ranjit Singh has been subjected to the historical erasure as allusions about his persona or reign are conspicuously absent from Pakistani historiography. If he is at all referred to, in any history book, Ranjit Singh appears to be an epitome of villainous, anti-Muslim character. Objective assessment is in short supply. Objectivity calls for setting the record straight. Punjab was not clearly demarcated province before Ranjit Singh had established his sway over the region. During his rule, Punjab became an autonomous region, because Ranjit Singh united and strengthened it. He organized army on modern lines under the supervision of western generals. He also put in place a judicial system here. Aziz ud Din Ahmad also reflects on the state of the Punjab in the pre-Ranjit Singh era when the region was undergoing anarchy and disorder. He contends Punjab as the only region whose strategic location had tangible impact on the historical process, because the Turko Afghan conquerors ruined the economic life of Punjab every now and then, but sagacious Rangit Singh, with his formidable Khalsa army made that region quite impregnable. The demise of Ranjit Singh in 1839 provided a safe passage to British to conquer Punjab. The author throws light on the role of Punjabis against the coercive rule of British. He also dispels the false impression spawned by the historians with anti-Punjabi bias, who implicate Punjabis as collaborators of the British Raj and did not offer any resistance during the 1857 war of independence. In order to prove his point, the author quotes various examples of insurgency against British in the Punjab. He eulogized the gallantry of Rai Ahmad Khan Kharal from Gogera in this regard. Similarly Colonization Bill of Punjab in 1907 made the embers of discontentment smoulder and then conflagrated among Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims against British. That discontentment led to the Pagri Sambhal Jatta movement in Punjab, which eventually forced the British to withdraw the controversial Bill.


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He opines that canal colonization in Punjab disturbed the time honoured social fabric, which led to joint resistance of Muslims, Hindus and Sikh against the British rule. The deployment of divide and rule policy by British in India had its manifestation in 1883 when British promulgated the formula of separate electorate in the local board elections which subverted Hindu, Muslims and Sikh unity in the Punjab. Aziz ud Din Ahmed also sheds light on the objectives of Ghaddar Party, founded in California in 1913. He explains how that party saw the domestic politics of the Punjab in international perspective. Ghaddar party accorded a lot of importance to agitational politics in India to achieve its objectives. While the author exposes diplomatic deficiencies of the principal exponents of Hijrat movement. These movements amply demonstrate the anti-imperial role of the Punjab. The scions of the land of five rivers like Bhagat Singh, Ajit Singh and Ahmed Khan Kharral testify to the fact that Punjab was at par with the other regions in the movement for freedom. Baghat Singh became inspiration for the young generation of not only the Punjabis but of the whole India of 1930s. All said and done that book is a masterpiece of progress analysis of history of the Punjab which merits a place in every library of Pakistan. For the young students of not only history but all the disciplines, that book is highly recommended. It is written in simple and accessible style which indeed is a pleasure for any one interested in the history of the Punjab.

SAEED AHMAD BUTT GC UNIVERSITY LAHORE

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NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS & REVIEWERS

1. Research papers, notes, review articles, comments, rejoinders and book reviews-in English only should be sent in duplicate together with floppy in MS-Word to: Dr Tahir Kamran, The Editor, The Historian, Department of History, GC University, Lahore (e-mail: [email protected], [email protected]). 2. Papers will be accepted for consideration on the understanding that they are original contributions to the existing knowledge in the fields of History, International Relations, International Political Economy, Current Affairs, Strategic Studies, Women Studies, Sociology Journalism, Political Science, Statistics, Psychology, Philosophy, etc. 3. Each paper should be typed and should carry a margin of an inch and a half on the left-hand side of the typed page. 4. The first page of the research article should contain the title of the paper, the name(s), abstract and any acknowledgements. 5. Tables for the main text and each of its appendices should be numbered serially and separately. The title of each table should be given in a footnote immediately below the line at the bottom of the table. 6. Endnotes should be numbered consecutively. 7. All references used in the text should be listed in alphabetical order of the author's surnames at the end of the text. References in the text should include the name(s) of author(s) with the year of publication in parentheses. Attempt should be made to conform to the style of the Journal. Further information on questions of style may be obtained from the Editor of this Journal. 8. Each author will receive one copy of The Historian. 9. Book Reviews should give a description of the contents of the volume and a critical evaluation of the book. It should not exceed 05 or 06 typewritten pages. Each request for a book review in the journal must be accompanied by one copy of the book concerned.

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Documents

The Historian 2009(1)