The Hauran Conflicts of the 1860s a Chapter in the Rural History of Modern Syria

The Hauran Conflicts of the 1860s: A Chapter in the Rural History of Modern SyriaAuthor(s): L. Schatkowski SchilcherSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 1981), pp. 159-179Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162818Accessed: 22/03/2010 00:15

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 13 (I98I), 159-I79 Printed in the United States of America

L. Schatkowski Schilcher

THE HAURAN CONFLICTS OF THE I860s: A

CHAPTER IN THE RURAL HISTORY OF MODERN

SYRIA

This paper examines the relatively neglected rural history of Syria. It concen- trates on the Hauran, a dry-farming region of hills and plains south of the Damascene oasis between the northern Jordan's tributaries and the eastern desert. Although the Hauran is today no longer a region of primary economic importance to Syria as it once was, it is of historical interest because it was the very first of greater Syria's outlying rural zones to be integrated into the developing modern Middle Eastern economy.2

The Hauran is, moreover, of comparative interest because it held a position in Syria's political economy then which bears many resemblances to the positions held by younger hinterland regions now. The parallels between the situation of the Hauran then and the Syrian north and northeast now, for example, are indeed many. The Hauran in the nineteenth century and these regions today were and are areas forming important hinterland zones for the sustenance of large urban concentrations; areas primarily devoted to the production of Syria's chief earners of foreign exchange; areas in which an important network of regional trade routes exist; areas attracting the interest of urban- based entrepreneurs; areas of immigration and new settlement to which a variety of mountain, plains, and nomadic peoples are drawn; areas in which development means the integration of the rural zone into, and largely for the benefit of a larger (national) economic entity. Before these considerations can be dealt with, however, it is essential to establish the course of events and the nature and behavior of the factions involved. Using a variety of sources and references, this paper attempts to reconstruct the history of a number of events which occurred in the Hauran in the i86os.3

Up until the middle of the nineteenth century the Hauran received the direct attention of the central Ottoman government only during the season of the pilgrimage to Mecca. During a period of approximately thirty to sixty days annually, the pilgrimage passed through the Hauran. Once the Sultan's obli- gations to organize, provision, and protect this formidable undertaking were fulfilled, however, the Hauran subsided into a condition of near autonomy until the time of the next pilgrimage.

The Ottomans' lack of interest in the Hauran might appear paradoxical insofar as this fertile land actually belonged to the state and the people living there ? Cambridge University Press I981 0020-7438/81/020159-2I $02.50

I60 L. Schatkowski Schilcher

were theoretically obliged to pay taxes and submit themselves to conscription. The Ottoman provincial system of the time, however, functioned on the prem- ise that powerful Damascenes could be relied upon to "govern" the Hauran and, indeed, a number of additional outlying districts of greater Syria. Local chieftains or aghawdt living in Damascus but controlling small and mobile bands of horsemen were permitted to hold positions of economic and political power in the Hauran in return for services to the state such as the performance of police and escort functions and the collection of provisions for the pilgrimage. Because the aghawat were indispensable to the Ottomans, the only real limi- tations on their power and positioning in the Hauran was a function of their political effectiveness amongst the Haurani population itself. This in turn re- quired the capacity to successfully mediate between the settled and migrant groups of the Hauran and between them and all outsiders. This hinterland political system had its own internal checks and, of course, its strains, but it appears to have existed with a fair degree of equilibrium for a very long period of time. The low pressure of population on the land and the natural economies that existed between steppe and cultivated plain and between town and coun- tryside appear to have contributed to this relatively stable situation.

In the first half of the nineteenth century this local equilibrium was disturbed by the impact of three largely external influences. The first was the effect of central government policy.4 The provincial administration was to be reorga- nized and reformed in order to allow a greater degree of central Ottoman control in the rejuvenation of the Empire. According to the administrative imperatives of these reform programs and because of their ever increasing need for revenues, the Ottomans hoped to extend their effective control from the Syrian cities into the hinterland. The Ottomans not only wished to extract more taxes and conscripts for the army from areas like the Hauran, but they believed that civil functionaries and a modern gendarmerie could be based in the hinterlands to carry out these steps. The Ottomans hoped thereby to replace the local aghawat and their bands of irregular troops. They hoped that under a stricter and more centralized administration areas like the Hauran would eventually forward enough revenues not only to pay for these improvements, but also for the cost of the pilgrimage and very possibly a number of budgetary deficits in other parts of the province or even Empire.

Also by the middle of the nineteenth century, a second influence on the Hauran was developing in an important way. England and France as well as other European powers were intensifying their economic and political interests in Syria at this time.5 The Syrian hinterland was important to them because it produced cash crops for export and formed an expanding market for European manufactured and colonial goods. The production was, moreover, a tax-well upon the collateral of which the Ottoman central and provincial governments were raising loans from private European and European protege sources. At a time when European rivalries in the eastern Mediterranean were intense, developing into conflicts like the Crimean War, Syria was also viewed as one of the more important alternative sources of grains should other supplies, no-

tably those of southern Russia, become unobtainable. The economic incentives

The Hauran Conflicts of the I86os 16I

for Europeans were in any case high. While the Haurani producers could, on the one hand, be attracted to bring their grains to the coast by prices only slightly better than those offered in Damascus, their grains continued, nonetheless, to command as much as four times their Syrian level on Western European exchanges. As added incentives for the European trader, Ottoman export tariffs were minimal, and the Syrian grain, harvested in May and June, came onto the world market before its European competitors.

These developments in the grain trade of the Hauran all carried serious implications for Damascus and the Ottomans. The diversion of the surplus grain trade to the coast for export threatened to jeopardize the Damascene and pilgrimage supply and to drive local consumer prices up. Moreover, the Hau- ranis' taste for European manufactured goods and especially textiles had been whetted. For the silver they received on the coast for their grains the Hauranis could buy these goods directly, or they could barter with export-import merchants, exchanging present or the promise of future crops for imported goods. This led to the substitution of locally produced manufactured goods and textiles and - what appeared especially threatening to the economic position of the Damascenes - to the direct introduction of the activities of European banks, shipping lines, and export-import firms into the affairs of the Hauran.

The third external fctor was created by the significantly increased immigration of Lebanese Druzes into the Hauran, especially following the events of I860 in the Lebanon and the subsequent confiscation of Druze lands there. These Druzes settled in the hilly eastern and southeastern edges of the Hauran plain, swelling the numbers of the small Druze settlements existent in the area since the seventeenth century.

Before describing the Hauran episodes which developed in the i86os into an important trend, it might be best to introduce the leading political factions and their leaderships.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Although the central government's reform programs had been launched nearly a generation earlier in Syria, the Hauran had, to a large extent, remained unaffected. As a result of the events in Damascus in July of I860, however, the situation was suddenly altered.

The pressures of European economic penetration and Ottoman reforms had first accumulated in the Syrian coastal areas and in the provincial capitals. These culminated in a series of serious uprisings in Aleppo, the Lebanon and Damascus. In the Damascene uprising thousands of the city's and its vicinity's Christians were massacred by discontented soldiers, Druze warriors, and various elements of the urban Muslim population. The central government took swift and corrective measures. One of the leading figures of the Ottoman reform movement, Fu'ad Pasha, was dispatched to Damascus with extraordinary powers. Fu'ad was at that time the Empire's foreign minister but was to rise after his Syrian sojourn to be one of the most important Ottoman prime ministers of the nineteenth century. His radical views on reform were often disparaged

162 L. Schatkowski Schilcher

by Ottomans as submission to the Europeans - and, indeed, Fu'ad appeared to be so Europeanized, dressing like one and "scattering witty epigrams in French at the lavish balls of the era."6 But Fu'ad's efforts in Syria could also be construed as intended to ward off further European intervention - the French having already occupied Lebanon - and to assert the strong hand of the central government over its province to establish reforms there once and for all. Fu'ad undertook punitive action in Damascus, arresting, executing, and exiling many of those he found guilty of the massacres. He marched off into the army the greater portion of the remaining Muslim youth. He also imposed fines on the non-Christian population and evacuated houses to placate and relieve those who had suffered. Having established control over Damascus, Fu'ad turned his attention in January of I86i to the troubles brewing in the Hauran. Here he launched what were to be the first serious measures to integrate this area into the central government's sphere.

When Fu'ad was called to Istanbul in December of I86i to be prime minister his Hauran policy was assumed by a quick succession of officials including Halim Pasha, Ra'is Pasha, Rushdi Shirwani Pash and As'ad Mukhlis Pasha, all within the space of less then a decade. Few of these had the time, capabilities, or resolution to assert Ottoman policy as forcefully as Fu'ad himself had done. Their efforts were piecemeal, the outcome of which being determined as much by the rivaling participants and external influences as by Ottoman policy. By I866-67 and with the administration of Rashid Pasha, however, a number of important matters related to the Hauran were finally resolved.

THE AGHAWAT

The local aghawat were faced with a manifold challenge of which Ottoman reform was only one facet. Certainly, the threat of a direct intervention by imperial troops was impressive, but only a generation back a much more impressive army - that of the Egyptians of Muhammad 'Ali - had been defeated in their attempts to subdue the Hauran. The aghawat of the i86os were also challenged by the penetration of the Druzes into the Hauran plain and especially by that of European commercial interests. Hardly capable of concerted action, having long since been divided by intrigues with purely local political signifi- cance, the aghawat were to struggle primarily for the preservation of their individual private interests in the face of all these challenges. On occasion, however, the political implications of the changes taking place appear to have been perceived and the struggle for the preservation of the aghawat's insti- tutional role in the Hauran was earnestly joined.

Most prominent amongst the aghawat who recognized the magnitude of the political changes taking place was Ahmad Agha, the sexagenarian head of a Kurdish family which had come to be called the Yusufs. Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf lived in Damascus where he participated in the politics of the provincial capital and was recognized as an important Damascene notable by both the Ottoman authorities and the local population. He had been named a commander of the

The Hauran Conflicts of the i86os 163

pilgrimage relief caravan and was to be appointed district governor in the Hauran. He had been able in the course of his activities to accumulate extensive personal holdings in land and livestock in the Hauran.

Although Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf was the most prominent local chieftain, he was not the only one. There were many others: Rasul Agha, Shamdin Agha, Ahmad Agha Buzu, Muhammad Agha Ajilyaqin, and Haulu Agha al-'Abid. Also to be included in this group was Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, the famous Algerian hero in exile in Damascus since i856 who operated in a manner - at least in matters related to the Hauran - comparable to that of the other chieftains. Like Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf, they all lived in Damascus and were involved in the politics of that city. But the city's politics tended to divide the aghawat into factions. Yusuf, for example, had ties to long-established inner city notables who were usually members of the local Administrative Council, the chief provincial fiscal institution. His family as well as the aghawat Shamdins, Buzus, and Ajelyaqins were all Kurds and lived in the city's northwestern suburbs. They tended, therefore, to be at odds with the 'Abids and other aghawat who lived in the Maydan, the southern-reaching suburban quarter which had a more diversified pattern of social and economic ties with the Hauran. Complicating the picture still further was the fact that the newcomer 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri belonged to neither faction but had ties not only to the French Consulate but also to a new group of notables which had arisen in Damascus as a result of European economic penetration and the Ottoman reform programs.

THE HAURAN'S OWN LEADERSHIP

The Plains Chiefs

The population of the Hauran plain was settled in a number of villages, each of which was surrounded by annually redistributed lands. In each of the villages one or two households usually gained a position of leadership because of their number, family solidarity, productive capacity, and consequent wealth. Fam- ilies like the Mikdats and Hariris of Bosra, the Shuraydas of Kura in 'Ajlun, the Majalis of Kerak, and the Turks were prominent amongst the plainsfolk around the middle of the nineteenth century.

These households often provided the spokesmen for the plainsfolk in their dealings with the outside world. They do not, however, appear to have held much power over their village neighbors or, for that matter, on behalf of their villages when dealing with outsiders.

The Druze Chieftains

In contrast to the apparently pacific plainsfolk leadership, the Druzes of the Hauran were led by decidedly bellicose chieftains. With the exception of a few longer-established Druze families who strove to hold themselves apart from political conflicts in order to preserve economic interests which were very


much similar to those of the Haurani plainsfolk, most Druzes were associated to one or another of the primary Druze clans of the Lebanon and could be counted upon to provide armed support for them in times of conflict.

Prior to I860 the Haurani Druzes had recognized the Hamdan clan as primary amongst them. The migrations and conflicts of the I86os were to bring an end to the Hamdans' preeminence and the rise of the Atrash clan. On one level, therefore, there were the internal political struggles amongst the Druzes at this time as the various clans created or maintained their positions within the Druze colony. In general, and more interesting to us here, however, all the Haurani Druzes were attempting to extend their economic control from the hilly regions into the Hauran plain. They were pressed by the needs of their increased population and wished to be able to farm the fertile plain from their mountain strongholds much as they had been able to do in the Lebanon. Besides fulfilling their own needs they appear to have carried on trade with the Lebanon and with merchants in Damascus to both of whom they were known to have dispatched grain caravans at this time.

The Bedouin Sheikhs

The third rural population grouping in the Hauran were the bedouin. The Hauran plain provided their herds and flocks with grazing land in the summer when vegetation in the desert ceased. Something like Ioo,ooo of these bedouin normally encamped in the Hauran in the spring and remained there until the first rains in autumn. During this time they exchanged animals and meat for grains and purchased other articles from the villagers or the peddlers who brought wares from Damascus or the coast to the Hauran. The bedouin also camped in the Hauran during the pilgrimage season, which, determined by the Muslim lunar calendar, fell at a different time during each agricultural year. The bedouin could make good business out of the pilgrimage - providing meat, transport, logistical support, and protection.

The two most active bedouin tribes in the Hauran around the middle of the nineteenth century were the Awlad 'Ali and the Ruwalla. The Awlad 'Ali had traditionally received the central government's appointment to carry on the pilgrimage business. As the outgroup, the Ruwalla were, of course, likely to cause trouble for the Awlad 'Ali or any and all who collaborated with them, especially in years when the harvest was small and there was pressure on the food supply. The rivalries between these two tribes were kept alive and exploited largely by the aghawat whose position was potentially challenged by all bedouin who, for example, could ally with the Haurani plainsfolk or with the Druzes against them. By dividing the bedouin into conflicting parties, the aghawat also legitimized their own positions as the Hauran's pacifiers before the central government and interests in Damascus. The Awlad 'Ali were led at this time by Shaykh Muhammad (ad-)Dukhi; the Ruwalla by Shaykh Faysal (ash-)Sha'lan.

In addition to the Awlad 'Ali and the Ruwalla, many smaller tribes were to be found in the Hauran at this time. A few that appeared in the events of the

The Hauran Conflicts of the I86os 165

I86os were the Sardiya, the Sirhan, and the Slut. The first two mentioned appear to have been sheep and camel-herding bedouin much the same as the Awlad 'Ali and the Ruwalla. The last, however, remained stationary in the rocky wilderness of the Hauran's Laja region. They were often allied with Druzes for whom they shepherded flocks.

The Europeans

Finally, mention must be made of the Europeans who became involved in the Hauran conflicts of the I86os. They can be grouped under three headings. First, there were the European merchants and the consuls who represented their interests. Showing particularly keen interest in the Hauran was the French consul M. Hecquard. He was anxious to protect the interests of French and French-connected merchants in the export grain trade. The British consul Mr. Rogers and the Austrian consul Herr Weckbecker, though largely preoccupied with the financial difficulties of their government's Damascene proteges who were creditors to the provincial treasury, also showed keen interest in the Hauran and tax collection there at this time. The Prussian consul Herr Wetz- stein reported a good deal on the Hauran and had, as well as Weckbecker, acquired some personal landed interests there.

A second category of Europeans was formed by private persons visiting Syria as travelers, traveling scholars, and missionaries, as well as a few settlers. They visited the Hauran to pursue their "orientalist" or archaeological interests, but on occasion engaged in business transactions or served as informers or agents for their governments. It seems reasonable to assume that the consular reports were often based on information the consuls were able to cull from a comparison of these and their own local sources. Accounts of the Syrian ex- periences of these Europeans were often published and avidly read in Europe.7

In a third category all his own was the Irishman Eugene O'Reilly, a soldier of fortune who - under the pseudonym Hasan Bey - was named to the command of the newly formed Ottoman gendarmerie and was to play a key role in Ottoman efforts to subdue the aghawat.

Let us now turn to the Hauran conflicts of the i86os to follow events as they developed. They can best be described in four phases.

THE HAURAN, 1861-1867

Phase 1: The First Successes of the Central Government in the Hauran

In January of I86I reports reached Damascus that a number of Druze chieftains of the eastern hilly regions had succeeded in expanding their influence into the Hauran plain. In an attempt to prevent further advances by the Druzes, Fu'ad Pasha dispatched 800 troops into the Damascene villages bordering on the Hauran plain. There then followed a number of clashes between Ottomans


and Druzes. In these the Druzes demonstrated that they could easily block an Ottoman advance further to the south into the Hauran.8

As the harvest and the pilgrimage season approached, Fu'ad increased the number of troops thus engaged to 2,000. The Druzes had in the meantime also prepared for more serious encounters. They had sent their stores to the well- defended Laja and were ready, if necessary, to send their families on a two days' march into the desert. For the time being they kept only their flocks which had to be grazed and provisions for their immediate needs.9

With the coming of the dry months and the harvest, an estimated ioo,000 bedouin also moved into the Hauran and camped. Their relations with the Hauran's plainsfolk and the Druzes remained peaceful. In Damascus it was rumored that they had already agreed to ally with the Druzes against the Ot- tomans should there be a campaign into the Hauran. Indeed, a small clash between Druzes and bedouin over pasturage rights was quickly resolved when the Druzes decided to give in to the bedouin.'0

In contrast to the peaceful situation in the Hauran, there was, paradoxically, constant strife in the villages closer to Damascus where the Ottoman troops were camped.1 The troops had first attempted to win the villagers' support by rounding up and returning sheep which had been stolen from them during the upheavals of the preceding months. When they started to collect taxes, however, the disbanded irregular troops of the aghawat harassed the troops and the villagers in the hope of resuming their functions in the area.12

During the course of the summer of I86I, the unfortunate Damascene villagers were relieved of 5,000 purses to the benefit of the Ottoman fisc,'3 while the Hauranis appear to have escaped taxation altogether. Though no doubt incensed by the rise of the Druzes in the Hauran, Fu'ad Pasha hesitated to mount a major campaign against them. It was said that he feared that more conflict in the area would further delay the evacuation of French troops which had remained in the Lebanon since the events of July I860.14 Fu'ad managed instead to obtain a special grant of 7,000 purses from Istanbul.15 This amount and that collected from the Damascene villages sufficed to cover the pilgrimage's expenses, making a tax-collecting campaign into the Hauran unnecessary. The pilgrimage of i86i went and returned without serious incident.

In 1862, however, the situation had deteriorated further for the Ottomans. When Fu'ad left Damascus in December of 186i, Halim Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman troops, was named temporary governor. He had been one of those prone in I861 to undergo a campaign against the Druzes. It seems that in him a number of Damascene parties with threatened interests in the Hauran found a sympathetic hearing. Also pushing the authorities to a more militant stand against the Druzes was the fact that funds were again lacking for the pilgrimage. Repeated attempts to squeeze the necessary revenues from the Damascene villagers proved disappointing, and no special grant was forthcom- ing from Istanbul in 1862. Moreover, since the pilgrimage fell a calendar week earlier, all deliberate dispatch was called for in arranging its provisioning as the new harvest was just being brought in.

At first Halim Pasha demanded conscripts from the Druzes, a step that was

The Hauran Conflicts of the i860s I67

seen as a disguised call for badl, the tax paid in Syria to gain exemption from conscription.'6 In reply, the Druzes immediately made it known that they had again gained the support of the Haurani bedouin and would together resist any attempt to conscript or tax in the Hauran.'7

At this point, Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf, came forward to the governor with a plan.'8 His son Muhammad Agha al-Yusuf would be sent to Bosra, a gathering point of the Haurani plains chiefs, to negotiate a pact between them and the Ottomans. Though Yusuf like all the aghawat had personal interests in land and livestock in the Hauran,'9 more important was - as we have mentioned above - his need to win a success for the Ottomans in the Hauran in order to preserve his own and the political position of all aghawat in Damascus. The Ottomans had in the meantime begun to form a gendarmerie under Hasan Bey (O'Reilly),20 and it was this group which could undermine Yusufs political influence by proving the alleged obsolescence and incompetence of the irregular aghawat troops.

Yusuf's plan was accepted, but when his son was not successful in negotiating with the Haurani plains chiefs, Ahmad Agha himself set out to undertake the task. He succeeded in winning an agreement from the plains chiefs on the following terms:2' The Haurani villagers would supply military conscripts but they could also pay badl amounting to 32,000 measures of wheat.22 They were, in addition, asked to supply the army based in the Hauran with wheat. This second contribution would be counted as part of the annual tithes which all villagers on state lands were obliged to pay. Yusuf suggested that I,OOO aghawat troops and the outgroup Ruwalla bedouin should be camped in the Hauran to protect the villagers from any who might decide to raid them while the har- vesting proceeded and the caravans were loaded. Yusuf received the approval of all twenty-six plains chiefs present. In Damascus, the governor Halim Pasha announced this remarkable success, no doubt with some satisfaction.

Unfortunately for him and for Yusuf, however, the Haurani villagers were not as convinced as their chiefs that this was a suitable arrangement. When the villagers learned what was planned, a most remarkable thing happened. They attacked Yusufs tent and ran him out of Bosra. He escaped slightly wounded to the safety of Muzayrib, the southern Haurani town where the pilgrimage and some imperial troops had already begun to assemble.23

With that setback, the intrigues of Ahmad al-Yusuf proceeded in earnest. He had already suceeded in sowing discontent between the two main bedouin tribes of the Hauran: Yusuf had convinced the Damascene Administrative Council to switch its support from the Awlad 'Ali bedouin led by Muhammad (ad-)Dukhi to the Ruwalla bedouin led by Faysal (ash-)Sha'lan. All the rights which Dukhi had until then held - pasturage in the fertile fields of Mar al- Ghuta in the Damascene oasis, the right to "protect" Haurani villages (and with that the right to extract khuwa, the bedouin's fee for protection) and the lucrative business of escorting the pilgrimage - were formally transferred to Faysal.24 For this arrangement it was said that Yusuf had received twenty fine horses and a large sum of money from Faysal.25 But Yusuf hoped to gain politically as well as materially by supporting Faysal and the Ruwalla in that


this aroused new rivalries and threatened to undermine the coalition the Druzes were forming amongst the Hauran's groups.

For the time being, however, Yusuf was outdone by Isma'il al-Atrash, the Druze chieftain. Atrash succeeded in mediating between the two bedouin chiefs of the Awlad 'Ali and Ruwalla and won from them an agreement that they would stand together at least in the face of an Ottoman campaign into the Hauran.26

By May of 1862, Atrash had aligned virtually all Haurani groups against the Ottomans.27 The bankrupted provincial government could not obtain camels or provisions for the pilgrimage. With draft animals requisitioned by force, the pilgrimage set out from Damascus.28 Not surprisingly, it was attacked as soon as it entered the Hauran. Ahmad at-Turk, an Haurani plains chief and al- Bakratan, the chief of the Atrash-allied Slut bedouin besieged the caravan at the pass of Khan az-Zanun.29 The siege continued into June, and not even the usually effective Algerian irregular troops sent out from Damascus to rescue Yusuf at Muzayrib succeeded in comming through the pass. Other hinterland factions attacked at other points. The Anaza bedouin of the central Syrian desert so severely pillaged the Damascus-to-Baghdad caravan as to serve the final blow to the direct desert trade route.30 Another attack on Damascene merchants returning from the Hauran by the eastern route in order to avoid the Khan az-Zanun pass was the work of Faysal's Ruwalla.31

Working from a difficult position, Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf attempted another intrigue. He succeeded in arousing a dispute between the Atrash supporters in the village of Bakka and the villagers of Bosra. When, however, the newly formed gendarmerie arrived on the scene to exploit the breach, the two villages quickly patched up their differences and fended off the gendarmerie together.32

Finally, not the men of Yusuf, but those of another agha, Rasul Agha, turned the tide in favor of Yusuf and the Ottomans. In late May, Rasul Agha and his men attacked at Khan az-Zanun and succeeded in overcoming the Slut bedouin. They killed the Slut chief Bakratan and carried his head back to Damascus where it was displayed.33 Next, the gendarmerie struck a successful blow by surprising an encampment of Sirhan and Sardiya bedouin who had, it appears, also joined in the Haurani alliance. The gendarmes killed some twenty of the bedouin and carried their heads back to Damascus.34 The pilgrimage caravan was then able to progress to Muzayrib. There, the chastised Druzes offered 2,000 measures of grain35 (a pittance compared to the 32,000 measures originally demanded by Yusuf) with which, we may assume, the pilgrimage of I862 had to manage.

Once Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf returned to Damascus, however, he proposed that the Ottomans mount a full campaign into the Hauran, confident that the Druze-led alliance could be broken for good. His council was heeded. Under the command of the Ottoman commander Ra'is Pasha, an expedition was mounted of Io,000 men including nine battalions of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery, with twenty-four cannons.36 Yusuf planned to deal with the Druzes himself.

The Druzes, however, registered their unwillingness to negotiate and made

The Hauran Conflicts of the i86os I69

a surprise strike on the Ottomans camped at Lajamar and Bosra. These encounters were serious and cannon were used, but the outcome appears to have been indecisive. Ra'is Pasha was nonetheless able to camp his men at Ayra which had been until then a village under Atrash influence.37

The intrigues of Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf finally began to break the fragile alliance between the Awlad 'Ali and the Ruwalla. Before Atrash had a chance to mediate, Dukhi attacked Faysal. Even the troops based in the Hauran did not fight on the side of Dukhi as they would have done in the past. They remained loyal to Faysal, the new Ottoman favorite. The troops also seized some of Dukhi's kinswomen, provoking him to attack, a step he had probably wished to avoid for the sake of preserving some vestige of good will with the central government. Faysal then rebounded from the cover of the Ottoman lines and forced Dukhi to retreat into the Laja.38 Next, a successful attack was made by the gendarmerie on the Druzes.39

As their alliance with other Haurani groups was crumbling under the pressure of so many defeats, the Atrash agreed to negotiations with the central government. The agreement reached between the Ottomans and the Druzes in 1862 was an important watershed in the history of the Hauran. The Atrash Druzes agreed to collect from the Hauranis all arrears of taxes and the extraordinary fine due to the government since the events in Damascus and its vicinity of I860. They also agreed to pay badl instead of permitting conscription.40 It is now known what sum they promised, but 200,000 Turkish piasters and a large amount of wheat and barley arrived in Damascus shortly thereafter with a promise that the remainder of the agreed sum would be sent in two months' time.41 When the Haurani plainsfolk complained in August of the continued presence of regular and irregular troops, Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf arranged their withdrawal on condition that the Atrash send some of their kinsmen to Da- mascus as hostages until all the taxes had been paid.42 It was, moreover, during these arrangements that the gendarmerie successfully attacked a Druze party led by Khattar Bey al-'Imad, the leading opponent to the Atrash within the Haurani Druze colony. Khattar Bey was killed in this encounter,43 a loss which must certainly have eased the ascent of the Atrash.

As for the bedouin, they moved back into the desert with the coming of the autumn rains. Both Faysal, whose son had been killed, and Dukhi, who was hiding out in the Laja, had been broken by the hostilities. The two chieftains remained in the Hauran area but their tribes were obliged to move eastward and southward into the desert to graze their livestock. Barred from Damascus, the chiefs were obliged to wait in the Hauran while the government decided their relative status.44 In the first week of October, though the Atrash had by then succeeded in collecting an estimated quarter of the taxes promised, their ally Dukhi was nevertheless officially declared a rebel.45 Faysal was to remain the new Ottoman favorite. In disbelief Dukhi sent his cousin Sal at-Tayyar to seek the French consul's intervention with the Ottoman authorities in Damas- cus. Though he was granted a temporary reprieve until the spring, during which time he would be allowed to enter Damascus, the government had no intention of reversing its decision.46 Before the Damascene Administrative Council Ah-


mad Agha al-Yusuf derided Dukhi and disclosed that it had been his association with the French which had lost him the government's favor.47 All hope lost, Dukhi then asked the French consul if he should not also prepare a gift of fine horses - his, to be presented to the French empress.48

The arrangement achieved in the Hauran by the end of 1862 during this first phase of conflict was an important landmark in the history of the area. The mutual understanding arrived at by Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf and Isma'il al-Atrash signaled a number of changes. For the first time in a very long time, the Ottomans had succeeded in extracting a considerable amount of taxes not only from the Haurani plainspeople but also from the Druzes and even some of the bedouin. According to a list of tax returns reported by the French consul in 1863, the newly integrated areas south of Damascus (including the districts of the Hauran plain, Jaydur, 'Ajlun, Jabal Druze, and the Laja) brought in over 3,000,000 Turkish piasters.49

While the arrangement did not permit the direct administration of the Haruan, it did end the Hauran's condition of near autonomy. The Atrash clan, which had accepted to champion Ottoman policy in the Hauran, was to build up its influence among the Druzes and among other groups in the Hauran. The central government supported the Atrash and often granted their chiefs the titles and robes of state functionaries. Time and again as the government attempted further steps into the Hauran, they were to turn to the Atrash, sometimes challenging their position, but more often courting them.

Phase 2: The Central Government Attempts To Dispense with the Aghawat

Though Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf was named a pasha and appointed district governor of the Hauran, the Ottomans appear not to have been completely satisfied with his intrigues among the bedouin or with the continued existence of the irregular troops under his and other aghawat's command. In January of 1863 the new governor in Damascus, Rushdi Shirwani Pasha, announced that the irregulars would be replaced by a force to be formed by Hasan Bey (O'Reilly).50 The latter's gendarmerie had been active, usually but not always on the side of the government, in the conflicts of I861-62, but had come into financial difficulties in the meantime. Now, O'Reilly was to form a complete modern police force and gendarmerie, drawing on the personnel of the aghawat. The aghawat themselves were to serve as his captains.5'

Ahmad Pasha al-Yusuf immediately resigned from his post as district governor of the Hauran. He held that without the irregulars under his command he could not possibly maintain control. Yusuf also strongly rejected the sug- gestion that a new gendarmerie could police the pasturage agreements with the bedouin without causing enormous unnecessary expense to the treasury.52 As if to demonstrate Yusuf's case, the Ruwalla bedouin suddenly appeared in the Hauran despite the fact that neither the summer nor the pilgrimage season had arrived. The rival Awlad 'Ali bedouin naturally followed suit.53

As long as the aghawat troops remained disbanded, trouble with the bedouin continued. The authorities summoned Dukhi to Damascus, but he refused to

The Hauran Conflicts of the i86os I7I

come without the guarantee of a safe passage. This was arranged by the French consul. But when Dukhi arrived with what was alleged to be more than an appropriately sized escort, the authorities stood by while Yusuf arrested Dukhi and imprisoned him.54 Though Dukhi was released shortly thereafter, he was ordered to remove his tribe from the Hauran immediately. Incensed, Dukhi took his men far to the south into the Balqa where they planned to blockade the passage of the pilgrimage caravan.55 The government's attempts to con- ciliate Dukhi were thwarted when the aghawat troops killed a messenger (a close kinsman of Dukhi) who was bringing him a safe passage.56 In Muzayrib in the Hauran no camels and no escort materialized for the pilgrimage. The number of pilgrims dwindled to under 200, and though these may have gotten through, the bedouin attacked the relief caravan sent out to provision them upon their return.57 The bedouin and a number of other rural chieftains remained in open rebellion into the winter of 1863-64.

The government's attempts to create a new local police force and gendarmerie were also thwarted by a number of other problems, all of which might well have been the work of Yusuf. Hasan Bey (O'Reilly) received no pay from the local treasury for his soldiers and had to pay the men from his own pocket for many months while he awaited funds.58 Then, two of his best squadrons were transferred to the command of 'Ali Bey, a man whom Hasan Bey considered "an incompetent Turk."59 And finally, in September of 1863, Hasan Bey was summoned to Istanbul to answer to charges that he was party to a conspiracy to oust the Ottomans.60 With that, Hasan Bey and the modern gendarmerie disappeared from the scene for a number of years. (When O'Reilly returned to Syria in I868 at the head of a group of armed men whom he had hired in connection with the intrigues of Mustafa Fazil Pasha, pretender to the Egyptian throne,6' his opponent Ahmad Pasha al-Yusuf was no longer alive to raise the now more substantial charges of treason which were made against him.)

Thus, while the successful arrangement with the Druzes of 1862 continued to hold, the bedouin and especially the aghawat remained a problem for the central government into 1864. The Ottomans were obliged to assume a con- ciliatory stance owing to their lack of funds and their sheer lack of power. Though the elderly Ahmad Pasha al-Yusuf died in 1864, his sons and other aghawat continued to raise opposition to their political dissolution.

As for the pilgrimage of I864, thanks to the presence of 'Abd al-Qadir al- Jaza'iri, who made the pilgrimage with a sizable armed contingent of his own men, the government suffered no embarrassing raids.62

A cholera epidemic, a plague of locusts, and a cattle disease hampered activity of any sort whatsoever in Syria of 865. Only in I866 did the old conflicts over the Hauran reemerge.

Phase 3: Open Confrontation between Local and European Interests

In December 1865, As'ad Mukhlis Pasha replaced Rushdi Shirwani Pasha as Ottoman governor in Damascus. The British consul Mr. Rogers found As'ad Mukhlis and his policies especially distasteful. With typical consular disdain


he wrote that it "would be difficult for the Porte to choose even from the inferior men at her disposal, one more unfit for, and . . . more dangerous in the post of governor general."63 What bothered Rogers most was that the new governor placed taxation in Damascus and its near vicinity again into the hands of "corrupt" local tax-farmers (i.e., through the local Administrative Council), and arrangements in the Hauran were again to be handled by the aghawat. Though it was never explicitly stated in the consular reports, one might well see in Rogers's remarks evidence of the conflict of interests which existed between European traders and the local tax-collecting officials and notables. Both were interested in controlling the Hauran's surplus production.

Though Ahmad Pasha al-Yusuf's son Muhammad Agha was not named district governor of the Hauran as might have been expected, Muhammad's father- in-law, Muhammad Sa'id Agha Shamdin, another Damascene agha, was given the post.64 Shamdin carried on in much the same way as Yusuf had done. He too had considerable influence on policy made in Damascus, and especially on that of the Administrative Council. Thus the Ruwalla bedouin were once again given the government's blessing, and the Awlad 'Ali were expelled from their grazing areas.65 Aghawat troops were sent into the Hauran to collect livestock taxes, and the Druze chieftains were called upon merely to aid in keeping the peace while these operations were carried out.66

In the meantime, however, many commercial contracts in the Hauran dating from the previous autumn were coming to fruition. These had been made when Rushdi Shirwani Pasha was still governor, and the troops present in the Hauran had assured the safe circulation of European merchants and European-connected contractors. As the contract had been made at a time when the plainsfolk were badly in need of credit owing to the failure of their summer crops, the devastations of the epidemic and the loss of many draught animals, terms were especially advantageous for the creditors.67 Moreover, good winter rains and no natural catastrophes had as yet threatened the coming harvest. The ex- pectant grain exporters were in the meantime cheering the rise of wheat prices on world markets. While wheat could be bought for as cheaply as ?2.50/ton in the Hauran,68 prices in London, for example, rose to well over ?Io.oo/ton.69

To the exporters' consternation, however, the governor As'ad Mukhlis Pasha took a most remarkable step. He announced that all previously agreed contracts were officially canceled and that the Haurani harvest would be brought to government-designated warehouses.70 The French consul reported that the thousand or so persons in Damascus involved in the grain trade would be ruined by this measure. The European consuls met and formulated a protest to the governor: "We will not permit the imposition of an order effecting the goods destined to our nationals in the grain trade which under such conditions makes it [the trade] impossible."71 This protest was relayed through diplomatic chan- nels to the central government in Istanbul. There, the decision was taken to immediately recall the governor of Damascus, As'ad Mukhlis Pasha. Muham- mad Rashid Pasha was sent at his replacement.72 Such was the extent of Eu-

ropean influence on the Ottoman state of the i86os! Muhammad Rashid Pasha was one of the pillars of reformed administration.


As long as he remained governor in Damascus, the Hauran was tightly under central government control and the pilgrimage was performed without serious incident. Upon his arrival in Damascus, Rashid Pasha set about to reestablish direct Ottoman control. Not surprisingly, he began by arresting Muhammad Sa'id Agha Shamdin.73 He then undertook to personally mediate the balance of power in the Hauran. He called a number of chiefs of the Haurani bedouin and Druzes to Damascus and negotiated an acceptable division of privileges and functions.74 Henceforth, both the Awlad 'Ali and the Ruwalla were to have adequate grazing lands. As for the Atrash, they were designated to official administrative functions in various key Haurani districts. Rashid sent Kamil Pasha, a Turkish Ottoman official with no previous ties in Damascus, to be district governor in the Hauran supported by considerable regular troops.75 To end the embargo the Hauranis had started under As'ad Mukhlis Pasha in protest of the government monopolies and continued into November to protest the presence of government troops, Rashid Pasha offered to make tax concessions; but the troops remained.76

As for the thorny issue of European trade interests in Syria, the central government was obliged by its heavy financial indebtedness to Europeans to avoid an outright confrontation on this score. As long as there were good profits to be made in the trade of Syria, Europeans would be involved, and there was not much either the central government, Damascenes, or Hauranis could do about it.

Phase 4: Implanting an "Enlightened" National Policy among the Local Factions

Rashid Pasha knew that the central government's direct control in the Hauran would not hold once he and his troops withdrew - an inevitability given the Empire's problems elsewhere. The local factions would continue to battle over the Hauran and delay this area's integration into the rejuvenated nation. It appears, therefore, to have been his policy to win the local factions' support by reasoning something like this: Need we bicker over control of Syria's hinterlands when there are so many resources to be exploited? Let us set about to master this land together. And if you have been annoyed by the interference of the Europeans, certainly together we can stand them off better than divided. As the contemporary British consul Mr. Richard Wood put it:

Rashid Basha, knowing that his government is looked upon as an alien by the inhabitants of Syria, is endeavoring to attract them by its rule, by removing the impression that they are governed for the purpose merely of increasing the revenue and of filling the ranks of the army, without a thought being bestowed for conferring on them those benefits which they are taught to expect from a government. His Excellency has done much towards repressing corruption and injustice, but there is still a vast field for improvement. ... If the local authorities were to persevere in their ameliorations but with increased energy, they will not fail to induce into the population a sense of community of material, social and political interests - a national spirit, in fact, of which the government will be regarded as the highest expression.77


Rashid Pasha inaugurated a new Administrative Council and a Municipal Council as well.78 To demonstrate good faith to powerful and influential Da- mascenes, he appointed many of them to these councils and other important administrative posts.79 He also created a new salaried post for the commander of the pilgrimage and guaranteed that this post would always be reserved for a Damascene.

As compensation to the aghawat Rashid Pasha offered them a new field of activity by using the more powerful of them to push government control further south into the Balqa where taxes were assessed for the first time in the summer of 1867, though probably never collected. Rashid permitted Muhammad Sa'id Agha Shamdin to direct this particular project.80 Other aghawat such as Mah- mud Agha Ajilyaqin and Ahma Agha Buzu were employed in these plans and also as pilgrimage commanders.81 Later Rashid entrusted the administration of the Hauran to yet another Damascene agha, Haulu Agha al-'Abid.82 Yet, despite Rashid's use of these aghawat, he remained firmly in control, carrying out most operations personally, leading his men on excursions through the Hauran, the Balqa, or into the regions around Homs and Hama.

At the same time, Rashid Pasha encouraged what private local capital that existed into investment in land in line with the implementation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. Vast tracts of state land in the Biqa' and in the Hauran were put up for auction, and steps were taken to push ahead with registering landholdings and creating some order in the "chaos" of rural land tenure.83 In many cases Rashid Pasha promoted urban capitalists' interests to the obvious detriment of the interests of the peasantry.84 But more research would be necessary to be able to generalize on the overall extent of large landholding at this time.

Of course not every Damascene was in a position to grasp the opportunities Rashid presented. There was the question of adequate funds. The trend was accelerated, therefore, when the trade depression of the I870s turned more mercantile capital into land investment. The hardships of the I870s for the peasantry when drought, plague, and pestilence seriously reduced their bar- gaining position was, however, probably the most decisive factor in the formation of a great number of large, private landholdings.85 For its part the government undertook to preserve law and order in the hinterland in order to insure investments there.

The newly reconstituted Damascene Administrative Council began discus- sions on the possibilities of constructing new roads and bridges to assure access to rural areas and of encouraging the extension of agriculture. A group of urban notables including Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri and a number of Muslim figures and Christian leaders86 approached the British consul and, as he reported it, "earnestly requested me to interest the English public in forming a company for making railroads through Syria as being the sole means of bringing about the civilisation of their country."87

Thus, it appears that the Damascenes were carried on the crest of Rashid Pasha's expansionist schemes. In fact, the central government's two-edged

The Hauran Conflicts of the I86os 175

policy - presentation of opportunities for economic recovery and advancement and defense against further European intervention in Syria - had the effect of consolidating some Damascene political factions into a landholding, bureau- cratic Ottoman elite in the course of the I870s. Later, broader support for the Ottoman government was won by the addition of educational reform and the restoration of religious institutions to the central government's program.

The Ottomans' defense against European economic penetration was, however, obviously weak. The Empire was declared bankrupt before its European creditors in 1875 and the Ottoman North African provinces fell to Britain and France in the I88os. It would have been very difficult to reverse the process by which the Syrian economy fell further into dependence on European capital and market conditions. As world grain prices fell in the i88os and I89os and interest in Syrian grain dwindled, the powerful and influential both in Damascus and in the Hauran were ill-prepared to relieve the chronic sufferings of the Haurani cultivators. On the contrary, though the latter had courageously re- sisted the loss of rural autonomy, they had been undermined as the central government exploited the cleavage created by economic change between the people and some of their leaders. The natural and public health catastrophes in the Hauran of the I87os further reduced the cultivators' ability to resist economic and political subjugation. Given the magnitude of the external pressures and the lack of local sovereignty or even autonomy, it would be naive to imagine that things could have been otherwise. It should be remembered that conditions for the cultivators in many rural areas of the Ottoman Empire or even of parts of Europe and America at this time were rarely much better than those in the Hauran.

With that, however, an appraisal of the Hauran's history can of course not be concluded. Developments did not stop in the I870s. The Hauranis continued to harass and often concertedly attack the community of interests formed by the central government, European commerical interests, Damascenes, and some Druze, bedouin, and village chiefs during the late nineteenth and well into the twentieth century. The peasant commune formed in 1889 at Suwayda' is one of the more dramatic examples of this concerted action.88 But facets of the Syrian revolt against the French mandatory government in the Hauran of the I920S may also be interpreted within this framework.

It will only be possible to make an appraisal of the Hauran's history when more research has been done on the nature of the conflicts arising there. It seems clear, however, that during the last century, the Hauran's history was not marginal or episodal but clearly a proving ground of national integration. While the Hauran today is fully integrated into the Syrian national political economy, at some point during this process a fundamental reversal occurred. The Haurani cultivators have begun to participate in the formation, initiation, and promotion of central government policy on their own territory despite a history of resistance. Was this important change due to a weltanschauliche transformation such as nationalism, pan-Arabism, or Ba'athism? Was it the only option left to the Hauranis given their region's decline in Syria's political


economy relative to other more recently developed hinterlands? Or was it merely the logical progression of events as we have seen them developing in their earliest stages here?

JOHANNES GUTENBERG UNIVERSITAT MAINZ

NOTES

Author's note: I am grateful to the Volkswagen Foundation for its support during the completion of this paper.

'This area includes, in addition to the Hauran plain itself, areas bordering on it such as Jabal al-'Arab (or as it may also be called, Jabal Hauran or Jabal ad-Druz), Safa, Laja, Jaidur, Jaulan, and to some extent the Balqa' of transjordan which were all drawn into developments in the nineteenth century.

2Through the Hauran still "feeds" Damascus, its importance to the national economy has been surpassed by more recently developed areas, first in the vicinity of Hama, Homs, and Aleppo and now by the vast regions in Syria's northeast. The Hauran's potential for further economic development in twentieth-century Syria has been limited by its continued dependence on rain and subsoil water resources. It has also suffered economically by the placement of international borders through its interdependent districts, the loss of Palestine as an alternative market to Damascus, and the loss of Haifa as its most economic outlet to the Mediterranean. The Hauran like all regions of southern Syria and Lebanon suffer from the generally insecure political situation as a consequence of the Middle East conflict.

3The Hauran and its surrounding districts have drawn the interest of several commentators, travelers, and historians of the later Ottoman period, but none has dealt in depth with the events of the i86os nor considered the important roles played both by European economic interests and Damascenes at that time. Reference could be made to the following: Hanna Abu Rashid, Hauran ad-Damiyya (Cairo, 1926) and Jabal ad-Druz (Beirut, 1961); Shibli al-'Aysami, Da' ud Nimr, and Hamud ash-Shufi, Muhafaza as-Suwayda' (Damascus, I962); Gertrude Bell, Syria: The Desert and the Sown (London, 1907); Lady Ann Blunt, The Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates (New York, 1879); R. E. Brinnow and A. Von Domaszewski, Die Provincia Arabia, Bd. 3, Der westliche Hauran (Strassburg, I909); Richard F. Burton and F. Trywitt Drake, Unexplored Syria (London, 1872); E. M. Delbet, "Paysans en communaut6 et en polygamie de Bousrah," in Le Play, Les Ouvriers de l'Orient (Tours, 1877), pp. 304-397; Ya' akov Firestone, "Production and Trade in an Islamic Context: Sharika Contracts in the Transitional Economy of Northern Samaria," Inter- national Journal of Middle East Studies, 6 (I975) I85-209, 308-325; 'Abdullah Hanna, al-Qadiya az-Zira'iyya wa'l-Harakat al-Falahiyya fi Suriyya wa Lubnan, 1820-1920 (Beirut, I975); 'Umar Rida Kahhala, Mu'jam Qaba'il al-'Arab al-Qadima wa'l-Haditha (Beirut, I968); Safuh Khayr, Iqlim Jaulan (Damascus, 1976); G.R. Lees, "Across Southern Bashan," Geographical Journal, 5 (I895) 1-27; David McDowell, "The Druze Revolt of 1925 and Its Background in the Late Ottoman Period," unpublished B.Litt. Thesis (Oxford, I972); Joyce Laverty Miller, "The Syrian Revolt of 1925," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 8 (I977) 545-563; Ihsanl an- Nimr, Tarikh Jabal Nablus wa'l-Balqa' (Nablus, I96I); Jean-Paul Pascual, "Environnement et alimentation dans la Hawran au XIXeme siele," unpublished French version now available in Arabic translation in al-Mu' tamar ad-Dauli ath-Thani li Tarikh Bilad ash-Sham, Vol. I (Damascus, 1980) 415-428; J. L. Porter, The Giant Cities of Bashan (London, 1867); Max von Oppenheim, Die Beduinnen (Leipzig, 1943) and his Vom Mittelmeer zum persischen Golf (Berlin, I899); Anon., Rambles in the Deserts of Syria (London, I864); Emanuel Guillaume Rey, Voyage dans le Hauran et aux Bords de la Mer Morte (Paris, I860); G. Schumacher, The Jaulan (London, I888); J.G. Wetzstein, Reisebericht uber den Hauran und die Trachonen (Berlin, i86o).

4For more on Ottoman policy wltn special reterence to Syria see: 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Awad, al-Idaru al'Uthmaniyyafi Wilayat Suriya (Cairo, I964); Butrus Abu Manneh, "Some Aspects of Ottoman Rule in Syria in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: Reforms, Islam and Caliphate,"


unpublished D.Phil Thesis (Oxford, 1971); Moshe Ma' oz, Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, I840-1861 (Oxford, 1968).

5See also: Muhammad Said Kalla, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Syria 1831-1914," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (American University, Washington, 1969); L. Schatkowski-Schilcher, "Ein Modellfall indirekter wirtschaftlicher Durchdringung: Das Beispiel Syrien," Geschichte und Gesellschaft, I (I975), 482-505; Badr ad-Din as-Siba'i, Adwa' 'ala al- rasmal al-ajnabifi suriyah 1850-1958, (Damascus, 1967).

6;erif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, 1962), p. 3. 7For reference to a number of these travelers' reports, see n. 3 above. 8Wrench, 2, Jan. io, I86I, FOI95/677; 3, Jan. 24, 186I, FOI95/677; 7, Feb. 25, 1861, FI095/

677. (European archival materials used here have been drawn from the Consular dispatches from Damascus now available in the British Public Record Office, Series F.O. 195 (cited here as F0195) and in the Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Correspondance Politique et Commer- ciale du Consulat de Damas (cited here as AEPol and AECom, respectively) and in the Archives Rdint6gr6es de Constantinople (AEARC). The references to these archives give the name of the reporting consul, the number and date of his dispatch, and the British or French archival reference.)

9Wrench, xo, Apr. 4, i86i, FOI95/677. 'OIbid. "Ottoman troops were camped at Ayn Tayba, Jdayda, Ashrafiya, Hajani, Harjalla, Artuz, Dayr

al-Kabiya, Bayt Sadar, Kaswa and Qatana (Outrey, 29, Jan. 30, i86i, AEARC/I3/4). '2Wrench, 9, Mar. 20, i86i, FOI95/677. The aghawat troops are often referred to by the European

consuls as "bashi bozuks," the pejorative the Ottoman irregular forces acquired during the Crimean War. On the whole, the consuls referred to the aghawat troops in a disparaging manner. For example, Rogers wrote: "The officers in command of these troops are generally disreputable military adventurers or warlike chiefs of districts who have - by inheritance or by personal intim- idation - obtained a reputation for bravery in the district to which they belong. The Boshi Bozuk Officer has his partisans amongst the Arab tribes, declares war or makes peace with them as he may conceive it to be more conductive to his interest or to his personal aggrandisement, and is only ostensibly subject to local authority," (Rogers, 37, Aug. 20, i861, F0195/677).

"Wrench, 9, Mar. 20, i86i, F0I95/677, and 12, Apr. 9, i86i, F0195/677. '4Outrey, 129, Jan. 30, i86i, AEARC/93/4. "5Wrench, 12, Apr. 19, i86i, FO195/677. '6Lanusse, 3, Mar. 27, i862, AEARC/93/5. 7Rogers, 23, July 31, F0195/677. "For material on Ahmad Agha al-Yusuf and his family, see 'Abd al-Qadir Badran, al-Kawakib

adh-Dhurriyya fi Ta'rikh 'Abd al-Rahman Basha al-Yusuf (Damascus, 1920); Qustantin al-Basha, ed., Mudhakkirat Ta' rikhiya (Harisa, n.d.), pp. I77n, 235-236, 240; Muhammad Al Taqi ad-Din, Kitab Muntakhabat at-Tawarikh li Dimashq (Damascus, 1927), pp. 851-853; Muhammad Jamil ash-Shatti, Tarajim a'yan Dimashqfi Nisf al-Qarn ar-Rabi' 'Ashar al-Hijri, 1301-I350 (Damascus, 1948), pp. 59-61; R. Tresse, Le Pelerinage Syrien (Paris, 1937), pp. 85-86.

"9Hecquard, i, Jan. 4, I863, AEPol/7. 2?See above pp. 3-7. "Hecquard, i, Apr. IO, I862, AEARC/93/5; 3, Apr. I7, I862, AEARC/93/5; 2, Apr. 21, 1862,

AEPol/6. 22Hecquard, 7, June I5, 1862, AEPol/7. If a "measure" here means a "kile de Constantinople,"

the usual measure at this time, this would have been equivalent to io,ooo metric tons, a considerable amount when one considers that the average export for the entire Syrian coast in the i860os stood at io,ooo tons.

23Ibid., 2, Apr. 21, I862, AEPol/6. 24Ibid., 8, June 30, 1862, AEPol/7; 9, July IO, 1862, AEPol/7; II, June ii, 1862, AEARC/93/5;

I, Jan. 4, 1863, AEPol/7. "Ibid., 7, Mar. 19, I863, AEPol/7. 26Ibid., 7, June 15, 1862, AEPol/7; 4, May 6, I862, AEPol/7. 27Ibid. 28Ibid., 2, Apr. 21, 1862, AEPol/7.


29Ibid., 2, Apr. 21, 1862, AEPol/7; 6, May 3I, 1862, AEPol/7. 30Ibid. 31Ibid., 6, May 31, 1862, AEPol/7. 32Ibid. 33Ibid. 34Ibid., 7, June 15, 1862, AEPol/7. 35Ibid., 14, July 3, 1862, AEARC/93/5. 36Rogers, 7, July io, 1862, FOI95/727; Hecquard, 9, July io, 1862, AEPol/7; Io, July 24, 1862,

AEPol/7; II, July 27, 1862, AEPol/7. 37Hecquard, io, July 24, 1862, AEPol/7. 38Ibid., 7, June 15, i862; ii, July 27, 1862, AEPol/7. 39Sandwith, 13, June 12, 1862, FOI95/727; Rogers, 19, July 28, 1862, FOI95/727. 4Sandwith, 12, May 29, 1862; 13, June 12, 1862, FOI95/727; Hecquard, 16, Aug. 25, 1862,

AEPol/7. 41Rogers, 19, July 28, 1862, FOI95/727; Hecquard, I6, Aug. 25, I862, AEPol/7. 42Hecquard, 16, Aug. 25, 1862, AEPol/7. 4Ibid., 20, Nov. I8, I862, AEPol/7. 4Rogers, 26, Oct. 6, 1862, FOI95/727; Hecquard, 21, Oct. 20, 1862, AEPol/7; Rogers, 22, Nov.

4, 1862, FOI95/727. 45Hecquard, 21, Oct. 20, i862; 24, Nov. 24, 1862, AEPol/7. 46Ibid., 23, Nov. io, 1862, AEPol/7. 47Ibid., 24, Nov. 24, 1862, AEPol/7. 48Ibid. 49Ibid., 23, Oct. 26, 1863, AECom/4. On Atrash tax-collection see Rogers, 26, Oct. 6, 1862,

FOI95/727; Hecquard, 21, Oct. 20, 1862, AEPol/7. 50Hecquard, i, Jan. 4, I863, AEPol/7. 5'Rogers, Jan. 15, 1863, FOI95/76o; Hecquard, i, Jan. 4, 1862, AEPol/4. 52Hecquard, i, Jan. 4, I862, AEPol/4. 53Ibid., 6, Nov. 16, 1863, AEPol/7. 54Ibid. 55Ibid. 56Ibid., 9, Apr. 27, I863, AEPol/7. 57Ibid., I7, Aug. 5, 1863, AEPol/8; 21, Aug. 21, 1863, AECom/4. 58Rogers, Jan. I5, 1863; 34, June 24, I863, FOI95/76o. 59Hecquard, 12, May 25, 1863, AEPol/7. 6Ibid., 20, Sept. 4, 1863, AEPol/8. 6'For the intrigues of Mustafa Fazil Pasha in which O'Reilly confessed his involvement, see

O'Reilly's statement enclosed (but not bound) in FOI95/806; and in Gay de Tunis Sept. 20, I868, AEPol/Io.

62Hecquard, I4, June 24, 1864, AEPol/8. 63Rogers, II, Mar. 21, i866, F0195/8o6. 64Hecquard, July 20, 1866, AEPol/9. 65Rogers, 33, June 22, 1863, FOI95/76o. 6Hecquard, I5, June I , 1866, AEPol/9. 67Ibid., 22, Oct. 5, 1863, AEPol/8; Eldridge, 52, Sept. 28, 1864, FOI95/787. 6Rousseau, 34, Feb. 27, i860, AECom/4. 69Syrian grain prices were reported regularly in the consular reports. For European prices see

Die Getreidepreise im Deutschland seit dem Ausgang des I8. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, I935). 70Hecquard, June 1, 1866, AECom/4 and I9, June ii, 1866, AEPol/9. 7'Ibid. 72Ibid., I7, Oct. ii, i866, AECom/4. 73Ibid., 17, July 20, 1866 and 19, Sept. i, 1866, AEPol/9. 74Ibid., 20, Sept. ii, 1866, AEPol/9. 75Bertrand, i, Nov. 21, i866, AEPol/9. 76Ibid., 2, Dec. i, 1866, AEPol/9.

The Hauran Conflicts of the i86os I79

77Wood, Oct. 26, 1869, FOI95/927. 78Hecquard, 19, Sept. i, I866, AEPol/9. 79Wrench, Jan. 1864, FOI95/8o6. "ORoustan, 7, Mar. 1869, AEPol/io. 8'Rousseau, 15, Sept. 28, 1867, AEPol/9; Wood, 15, Sept. 28, 1869, F095/927. 82Bertrand, 5, Jan. 21, 1867, AEPol/9; Roustan, 8, Mar. 20, 1969. 83Hecquard, 17, July 20, I866, AEPol/9; Rogers, 27, May 7, 1867 F0195/8o6; Eldridge, 64 (from

Beirut), Sept. 30, i868, FOI95/903. 84Eldridge, 64, Sept. 30, i868, F0O95/903, and his (from Beirut) 29, Aug. 2, 1869; 30, Aug. 2,

1869, FO095/927; Wood, 5, Apr. o1, 1869, FOI95/927; Eldridge (from Beirut) 7, Apr. 5, 1870; 17, May 21, 1870; 27, Aug. Ii, 1870; 30, Aug. 27, 1870; 41, Nov. 5, 1870; 49, Dec. 16, 1870, FOI95/ 965; Green, 59, Dec. 12, 1873, FOI95/Io27; Eldridge, i8, May 4, 1874, FOI95/Io47 and 31, June 20, 1874, FOI95/Io47; Robin, I, Apr. i8, 1872, AECom/5.

"5See sources cited in nn 78 and 79 above. 86Wood, 20, Oct. 26, 1869, F0195/927. The consul named among these visitors the contemporary

Mufti of Damascus and some of the notables who had been exiled following the events of 1860 but who were now again in Damascus.

87Ibid. 8See Shibli al-'Aysami et al., Muhafaza as-Suwayda', pp. 65-74; 'Abdullah Hanna, al-Qadiyya

az-Zira'iyya, pp. 175-183; David McDowell, The Druze Revolt, pp. 61-69.

Documents

The Hauran Conflicts of the 1860s a Chapter in the Rural History of Modern Syria