The Hard Problems of

Consciousness and Music

Eugene MontagueUniversity of Central Florida

emontagu@mail.ucf.edu

Chalmers on the “Hard Problem”The Conscious Mind (Oxford University Press, 1996)

The hard problem is: How to explain consciousness within the framework of contemporary cognitive theory?

A reassessment of an old problem. Chalmers’ novelty lay in:

1.Catching onto and generating contemporary interest in phenomenality in cognitive science

2.Concise formulation

Music’s “Hard Problem”

Words, and concepts, are often deemed inapplicable to music

For many, the experience of music is not captured by theoretical concepts and writing

Music’s hard problem: How to explain common modes of musical experience within the context of theory and analysis

Two Problems Compared

The problem of consciousness is structurally similar to that of music

Both problems come about through an emphasis on empirical objectivity

Both involve an explanatory gap between empirical theory and subjective experience

These similarities suggest that solutions can be shared and that these solutions might be mutually illuminating

Cognitive Science and Phenomenology

Empirical scientists and philosophers have developed considerable interest in phenomenality over the previous decade

Responding to this, many phenomenologists have sought to bring phenomenology and cognitive science closer

Naturalizing Phenomenology (Stanford UP, 1999), a touchstone for this project. Includes phenomenologists of many various strands, but all draw on the legacy of Husserl, itself constantly re-appraised

Music and Phenomenology

Phenomenology has had a somewhat muted influence on Anglo-American musical scholarship. Emphasis has been placed on the idealistic and anti-naturalist strains of Husserl’s thought, away from central currents in music theory

Phenomenologists of music might learn from the “naturalizing phenomenology” project

This entails adopting a perspective wherein phenomenology works side by side with empirical research, whether cognitive or more traditional music theory

Phenomenology, Music and AnalysisWhat can phenomenology bring to questions of music and musical meaning?

1.Emphasis on intentionality in creating meaning

2.A consequent highlighting of musical perspectives, including differences between composers, performers, and listeners

3.Rehabilitation of subjective experience, within an established method

4.Analysis of time-consciousness and musical temporality

Analysing Time-Consciousness in

MusicAnalysis of prelude draws on Husserl’s notion of time-consciousness, poised between retention and protention

This basis in phenomenological theory is linked to considerations of practical music-making, and cognitive constraints

The topic of temporality is central to both consciousness and music

Example 1: Husserl’s diagram of the structure of temporal consciousness from the Bernauer MSS. (after Rodemeyer, “Developments in the Theory of Time-Consciousness.” Donn Welton (ed.) The New Husserl, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003.)

Husserl on Time-Consciousness

J. S. Bach, Prelude in D major, WTC Bk. 1

Example 2: Following “x” at the start of Bach’s prelude (metrical projection).

Determining a Temporal Unit

Example 3: Mapping protention and retention onto the prelude’s opening bar.

Protention and Retention

Example 4: Developing “y” from “x” at the start of the prelude

Changing Boundaries of Time-Consciousness

Example 5: The temporal unit outlined by “z” at the start of bar 3.

Extending Temporal Consciousness

Example 6: Narrowing the temporal fringes as “z” fails in bar 3

Re-adjusting the Temporal Horizon

Consciousness and Music

By incorporating phenomenological approaches, music can address its “hard problem” while retaining approaches based in empiricism and cognitive science

Such studies in music foreground its status as an intentional object, and therefore provide opportunities to investigate consciousness in relation to the world, especially in its temporal aspects

Selected Works Cited• Berthoz, A. (2000). The Brain's Sense of Movement. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.• Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York, Oxford

University Press.• Chalmers, D. (1997). "Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness." Journal of

Consciousness Studies 4(1): 3-46.• Clifton, T. (1983). Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology. New Haven, Yale

University Press.• Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of

Consciousness. New York, Harcourt.• Gallagher, S. (1998). The Inordinance of Time. Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press.• Gallagher, S. (2003). "Sync-Ing in the Stream of Consciousness." Psyche 9(10).• Gallagher, S. and F. Varela (2003). Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology

and the Cognitive Sciences. The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. E. Thompson. Calgary, Alberta, University of Alberta Press: 93-132.

• Lewin, D. (1986). "Music theory, phenomenology, and modes of perception." Music Perception III(4 (summer 1986)): 327-392.

• Lochhead, J. (1989). Temporal Structure in Recent Music. Understanding the Musical Experience. J. Smith. New York, Gordon and Breach: 121-165.

• Nagel, T. (1974). "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review 4: 435-450.• O'Shaughnessy, B. (2000). Consciousness and the World. Oxford, Clarendon Press.• Rodemeyer, L. (2003). Developments in the Theory of Time-Consciousness: An Analysis of

Protention. The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. D. Welton. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press: 125-156.

• Roy, J.-M., J. Petitot, et al. (1999). Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology. Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. J.-M. Roy, J. Petitot, B. Pachoud and F. Varela. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press: 1-83.

• Searle, J. (2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York, Oxford University press.• Smith, J. (1973). "Musical Sound as a model for Husserlian intuition and time-consciousness."

Journal of Phenomenological psychology IV(1): 271-96.• Smith, J. (1989). Variation in Music and Thought: A Critique of Factualism. Understanding the

Musical Experience. J. Smith. New York, Gordon and Breach: 209-227.