The Gulf: Shifting alliances in quest for supremacy filefirst spoke of the ‚Shia crescent™, followed by Hosni Mubarak, who in 2006 asserted that the Arab Shia were more loyal to

A GREEK REVIEW OF MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS

/// November 2008 Issue 13

U n i v e r s i t y o f P e l o p o n n e s e

Middle East BulletinΙ.I.R.Study Group for the Middle East and Islamic Affairs

The Gulf: Shifting alliances The Gulf: Shifting alliances in quest for supremacyin quest for supremacy

The Iranian project of "Shiite proselytism" page 02

Qatar: a neutral mediator? page 06

Iran: The unwanted hegemon page 09

Al Jazeera's role in the regional system page 12

Is Turkey looking eastwards? page 15

The Gulf states in the Palestinian - Israelipeace process page 18Special Report: Somali piracy and the Arabian Peninsula page 20

Book Review: Brynjar Lia: "Architect of Global Jihad" page 23

contents

www.idis.gr



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T he Shia Protocols: The Iranian project of Shiite proselytism

Marina Eleftheriadou

Lately there has been a heated debate about Iranian efforts to spread Shiism to Sunni countries.Many Sunni religious and political figures have contributed to this latest addition of anti-Iranianrhetoric, exaggerating the actual extent of the phenomenon of Shia conversions. It seems thatonce again Iran�s rising regional status challenges Sunni predominance in the region. However,although politically more prolific, religiously, the Iranian example, at least for now, flourishes onlyunder very specific circumstances.

In September 2008 one of the mostprominent Islamist scholars -perhapsthe most creative of the Muslim Brother-

hood trend- Yusuf al-Qaradawi, con-demned the Shiite �attempts to invade theSunni community� [through] missionarywork�. From inside the Sunni front somemore or less discreetly nodded theirheads, while others in turn dismissedQaradawi�s remarks in abhorrence usuallyattributed to someone still evaluating thesituation. Qaradawi�s warning was the lat-est ring in a chain of similar statementsstarting from Jordan�s king Abdullah who

first spoke of the �Shia crescent�, followed by Hosni Mubarak, who in 2006 asserted that the Arab Shia weremore loyal to Iran than to their own countries. Saudi king Abdullah said in this context that the Shia were tryingto convert Sunnis, while assuring at the same time that �the dimensions of spreading Shiism� were under theclose scrutiny of the Saudi regime. Furthermore, Qaradawi himself accused the Shia of trying to exploit Hezbol-lah�s victory against Israel in order to penetrate Sunni societies.


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In the meantime newspapers and figures of lesser influence and with no real interest in the official political-correctness preserved the issue by adding drama to the debate. The editor-in-chief of Al-Ahram linked Iran�sproject of �spreading Shiism� to the desire to �revive the dreams of Safavid� (a Persian dynasty that in 16th cen-tury established Shiism as the official religion of the Persian Empire). Accordingly, the Jordanian newspaper, Ad-Dustour, identified that the project�s plans were to expand Shiism from India to Egypt. However, nothing wasmore indicative of the Sunni community�s low spirit than the moan of wounded pride in the article published inAl-Siyassa (Kuwait), written by its editor-in-chief Ahmad al-Jarallah. In his article, Jarallah pleaded the �leadersof all Arab countries [to] hold a summit to prevent Iran from stealing Arab issues�.

The Middle East witnesses Iran�s second 1979 and the Sunni regimes are alarmed by it, more so since theSunni community perceives an ongoing transformation of this threat from a political into an existential one.

Iran�s current rise might lack the revolutionary charm of 1979; however, quite contrary to the heydays of theIranian Revolution it is now characterized by firmer foundations. The inexperienced leadership of 1979 enteredIslamist and generally Middle Eastern affairs like a bull into a china shop, stirring up the whole region but in theend �grabbing� more than it could hold. Nowadays, the Sunnis argue that Teheran takes one step at a time,sneaking into the former�s open wounds and letting its defiance of regional and global norms of conduct attractfollowers. A message, which was proven inadequate in the post-1979 �shia expansion�, has been �surrounded�now by an entire -conspiracy- strategy in order to support its validity and consistency. In the past Iran merelymanaged briefly to mobilize the Gulf Shia: civil unrest in the oil-rich Shia-populated eastern provinces of SaudiArabia erupted in December 1979 but soon died out although one has to say that its products remained activeeven after the revolution (e.g. the Saudi Arabian Hezbollah and its attack on the Khobar towers in 1996). TheIranian Revolution also inspired the creation of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and created its star product theLebanese Hezbollah. Finally, it gave a note of militancy to the Sunni Islamists which however in their majoritypreferred to use the Iranian example without adopting its dogma. Soon the Sunni militants would either turnindifferent in the face of the new Islamic ideal in Afghanistan or applaud Saddam as he was bleeding out Iran.Briefly, Iran�s final balance-sheet was far from positive.

Nonetheless, in 2008 as the Sunni regimes failed to cope with the mounting crises, they saw their cherishedcontainment of Iran evaporate. On Iran�s east, the Taliban-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia axis might remain strong andpotent, however, it has been transformed while additionally the Pakistani and Saudi Arabian link have been high-ly volatile and therefore less manageable. On Iran�s west the Iraqi bulwark disappeared into thin air, openingthus the gates of the Middle East. As the great force multiplier (nuclear power) is coming into being, Iran is scor-ing victories in Iraq, Lebanon (via the other Shia player, Hezbollah) and Palestine (through its direct or Syria-inter-mediate relations with Hamas and smaller rejectionist Palestinian groups, e.g. Islamic Jihad and PF-GeneralCommand).

In other words, Teheran is stealing the Arab issueswhile the Arab elites want to secure the Sunni soul. In1979 Saudi Arabia battled Shia expansionism by high-lighting Iran�s Shia particularity as directly linked toPersian nationalism. Today, it is not anymore onlyabout more assertive Shia communities inside Sunni-dominated states but also about losing followers tothe Shia. What can seem more threating compared tothe image of scores of Shia converts in �Egypt, Sudan,Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and other non-Arab coun-tries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sene-gal�even the Gulf States and Syria, but of course,Syria, Iraq and Lebanon have Shia communities andtherefore, unlike countries where there was no Shia,conversion to the Shia sect does not stand out� (Yusufal-Qaradawi). Actual figures which would allow estima-tions are lacking and Sunni alarmism blurs the pictureeven more. However, conversions, although far lesscommon than asserted, seem to occur mostly in pre-dominately Sunni regions, which share some kind of

acquaintance with Shia culture. On the contrary, in regions of mixed populations and Shia minority status (ArabGulf) or in regions of increased Shia assertiveness and tensed Sunni-Shia relations (Iraq and Lebanon) the Sunniidentity seems more solid and resistant. An exception to this pattern is Syria which due to the political leverageexerted by Iran and the peculiar sectarian nature of its regime forms the most interesting case. One could alsoadd Jordan. However, Amman�s increasing preoccupation with Shia converts is most probably connected withthe social upheaval created by the arrival of thousands of well-off Iraqi Shia refugees.

In this context, conversions occur in North African countries, including Egypt, which acquired their religiousfolk familiarity with Shia practices from the time of the Fatimid rule. When Qaradawi highlighted the case ofEgypt: �I left Egypt 47 years ago, it had not a single Shiite and now there are many... who took them to Shiism?Egypt is the cradle of Sunnism and the country of Al-Azhar�. However, he overlooked that Al-Azhar was found-ed during the Fatimid era or as Qaddafi said: �Cairo cannot escape its Fatimid destiny�. Although Shia in Egyptare said to represent less than 1% of the population (and any sporadic conversions can hardly change that), theauthorities, in order to rally the people around the flag vis-a-vis Iran, look worried. So are the Algerians, theSudanese and the Moroccans. Two years ago the Algerian Ministry of education suspended eleven teachers asthey were accused of conducting Shia missionary work. While in Algeria primarily Shia expatriates from Iraq,Syria and Lebanon were held responsible, in Morocco the �messengers� were Moroccans working in Europe



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where they were approached by Iranian charitable organizations. In Sudan the accusations have been directedtowards the Iranians themselves who allegedly took advantage of Khartoum�s friendly disposition towards theIranian revolution. According to the Sudanese �Supreme Council for Coordination among the Islamic Associa-tions�, through the proselytism of the Iranian Cultural Center in Khartoum, �whole villages have been convertedto Shiism, and Shi'a mosques have proliferated in Khartoum�.

While these predominately Sunni countries are more susceptible to Shia proselytism, the Gulf countries onthe other hand, which are home to large Shia communities (20% in Saudi Arabia, 30% in Kuwait, 70% howev-er politically subordinated in Bahrain), are more vulnerable to the prospect of militant Shiism rather than prose-lytism as the Sunni community, threatened as it feels, is heavily entrenched behind its sectarian identity.

This is even more explicit in Lebanon and Iraq. Not only, as Nasrallah, said would it be cheaper simply toproduce more children (as the Shia in Lebanon have been doing for the last decades), but also the possible can-didates for conversion are more probable to turn to militant Sunnism to safeguard their political position ratherthan change camp.

Syria�s Sunnis present a different situation. Not only have they been indoctrinated for years in a Ba�athist-Alawi regime and subjected to significant Iranian political and economic penetration, but they have also beendeprived from a rallying point since the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is disputed whether conversionspredominately affect the Alawi or the Sunni community (official statistics point to the former, while the Sunnisclaim it is the latter under the regime�s blessing). However, in any case, both of them are subjected to the sameset of powers. Iran�s and Hezbollah�s achievements are multiplied via Iran�s political, economic and culturalinroads into the country. Dozens of Shia shrines have been built or restored, hundreds of hawzas (Shia semi-nary) and cultural centers have been established and several hundreds of thousands religious Shia tourists(mostly Iranian) flood the country every year. At the same time, Iran�s huge investments engulf the Syrian econ-omy. If the state sector is earmarked for the close circle of Assad�s Alawi loyalists, the private sector is not lesscliental, but in this case it is the Iranians who occupy the HR positions. It is exactly the combination of Iranianpolitical and economic involvement and the doctrinal-sectarian proximity of the two regimes that allowedTeheran to establish an enormous mechanism of cultural influence. This explains why for example in Palestine(Gaza), despite the defamatory �Shiites� increasingly attributed to Hamas by Fatah, there is no such phenome-non.

In the final analysis, as a Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia said: �People in the region always complain about aShiite crescent...That's just a crescent. What about the full Sunni moon?� The exact extent of the �Shia inva-sion� little matters. It is more interesting and important to see if the Sunni world and especially Saudi Arabia iscapable to recuperate from 9/11 setbacks and put again in motion its extensive counter-Iranian mechanism thatworked so effectively in the 1980s.



In May 2008 an agreement was brokered betweenthe government and the main opposition inLebanon, with the intervention of Qatar's ruler.

Since 2006, Qatar has also been making a bid tomediate in the conflict between the warring factionsin Sudan. Amongst others, Qatar has tried to act as abroker in several other regional conflicts, including arebellion in Yemen and the civil strife in the Palestin-ian territories.

Emir Hamad al-Thani is able to pursue such a rolefor his country since Qatar is perhaps the only stateof the region which is not a part of these conflicts and-even most importantly- it is trusted by all the region-al powers. Additionally, the emir is willing to commitmoney and effort to guarantee the implementation ofagreements.

In all these cases, Qatar is believed to be using�checkbook diplomacy� to gain influence. Qatar pro-vided funds to the Palestinian Authority when theAmerican-European-Israeli embargo against Hamaswas implemented in 2006, while it has been a majorinvestor in Sudan�s impoverished economy. Regard-ing the Lebanon deal, Qatar has been able to provideconfidence over the past two years between the twosides of the Lebanese divide by assisting in the

reconstruction of Lebanon. Under Qatar's $300 mil-lion operation in Lebanon, Shia-majority towns wererebuilt, compensation cheques totaling more than US$30 million were handed out, hospitals, schools, reli-gious buildings -including the Grand Mosque at theheart of Bint Jbeil's Old City- were repaired. Havingsecured Hizbollah�s reluctant acquiescence to assistLebanese people in need, Qatar facilitated theLebanese government�s attempt to block the imple-mentation of Iran�s major reconstruction aid toLebanon (an estimated budget of over US $100 mil-lion), which would would have upgraded Hizbollah�sinfluence.

Rents from rich energy resources, abundant inQatar, allow the emir to pursue his ambitious diplo-macy. Apart from its large oil reserves, Qatar has thethird largest natural gas reserves in the world, laggingonly behind Russia and Iran. In the last few years,Qatar has become the largest liquefied natural gasexporter globally (destined mostly for Japan).

This tiny emirate with a very small population(900,000 inhabitants) has the largest head annualincome in the world (almost $40,000)

Following this kind of policy, Qatar has estab-lished working relations with all the states in the



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A neutral mediator? An overview of Qatar�s diplomacy

Ilias Tasopoulos

Over the last few years, Qatar has been trying to assume an enhanced status in the region as thechief mediator for regional conflicts. Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, coming to power in1996, is trying to take advantage of the benefits that the role of the peacemaker carries or implies.


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region. Despite the tensions between the status-quoand the revisionist states, the emir has maintained abalance between both sides. For the last 12 years, anIsraeli commercial interests office has been located inDoha, the capital of Qatar, staffed with two diplomats.Representatives of both countries meet regularly,however there are no official relations between Qatarand Israel. At the same time, Qatar holds tight finan-cial and diplomatic relations with Iran -the two coun-tries share the biggest natural gas field in the world-and Syria, where Qatar has invested heavily. The levelof relations with the US is quite good as well.

A large US base is located in Qatar, which playeda crucial role in the 2003 military operations againstIraq. The Al Udeid Air Base, hosting a hi-tech com-mand centre for the American operations in Iraq andAfghanistan, is the biggest American military base inthe world � excluding the bases in the NATO coun-

tries. Almost 5,000 American soldiersand personnel staff the base.

According to reports in main-stream British media, Qatar seems tohave even established contacts withIslamic extremist organizations, suchas al-Qaeda. The London Times report-ed that Qatar and al-Qaeda had closeda deal prior to the 2003 intervention inIraq. The agreement involved millionsof dollars channelled via spiritual lead-ers sympathetic to al- Qaeda, in orderto prevent terrorist attacks against theemirate.

Qatar�s relations with its neigh-bouring countries are not cordial as theemirate has been accused of exerting

influence on the -often provoking- Al Jazeera channel.Programs critical to the Arab governments broad-casted on Al Jazeera are directly connected to theregime�s policy. Several analysts argue that althoughQatar denies any liability for the programs of AlJazeera, it has agreed to work on moderating thefierce rhetoric typical of Al Jazeera against the otherArab regimes, to secure Saudi Arabia�s consent topursue its ambitious diplomacy through the ArabLeague.

Being a mediator in regional crises allows Qatarto leverage against far more powerful states and per-haps even become their partner. Having the supportof the great powers is highly important for Qatar, asits ultimate aim is to diversify its economy before itsnatural resources run out.

There are strong indications that Qatar is follow-

ing Dubai�s example, attempting to enter the Euro-pean money markets and to become the dominantfinancial centre of the Middle East. Recently, Qatarsigned a billion dollars deal with NYSE Euronext tocreate a leading financial market in its capital Doha,while having a significant stake in the London StockExchange.

Simultaneously, the building program that theregime has implemented shows its desire to rival thatof Dubai in order to become a tourist attraction aswell. The nearly four million square meters luxuriousartificial island that is being completed in Doha, Pearl-Qatar, will be the first place that will be available forfreehold ownership by foreigners.

However, its reputation for the very opposite ofcosmopolitan living seems to destroy any suchhopes. Doha has still not acquired Dubai�s extendedluxurious tourist infrastructure; an International Her-ald Tribune columnist characterized it as an �ugly andboring� city where businessmen dread their trips and,usually, lower-level staff of big companies are sent.

However, poor score in important cultural eventsin Doha lessens Qatar�s possibilities to take part inthe Western elites� discussions and thereby beingable to lure rich and middle-class tourists to Doha.The attempt to host the 2016 Olympic Games and theconstruction of the world�s first underground stadiumcould be a first step in hosting events that attractworldwide interest.



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Iran�s relations with the Gulf States:The unwanted hegemon

Anna Apostolidou

In order for Iran to acquire the status of a regional power, it has to accommodate the GulfStates. However, the nature of the Islamic Republic, its manifest regional hegemonic aspira-tions, the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons and its hostility towards the West are suf-ficient reasons for its neighbours� discontent. In the lack of other footing, Tehran tries to gainacceptance via the economic route; and so far, it has achieved to maintain the balance.

Iran could not contrast more with its Gulf neighbours. Persian, Shiite, revolutionary and anti-Western, it marksout of the Arab, Sunni, conservative and US-allied states of the Gulf. The cost of this incompatibility becameevident during the first years of the Islamic Republic and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), when Tehran found itself

with no allies in the Gulf, as its neighbours either supported Iraq financially (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar)or remained neutral or ambivalent (Oman, Bahrain). Additionally, the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC), only a year after the outbreak of the war, was greeted by Iran, with great suspicion, as the promulgatedobjective for �unity� could be interpreted as the formation of a common front against the remaining Gulf coun-try, Iran.

Nowadays, Iran�s ties with the Gulf States have been restored; nevertheless, their relations are not freeof resentments or suspicions. First of all, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain have respectable numbers of Shi�itepopulations; given past Iranian incitements to overthrow their rulers, as well as Tehran�s role in the Iraqi Sunni-Shi�a conflict and its ties with Hizbollah, the perception of Iran as a threat to internal stability can be justified.Furthermore, Riyadh and Tehran are competing not only for the title of the vanguard state of Islam, but also forregional status. On the surface, the two countries have friendly relations; nevertheless, discrepancies betweenthem are still palpable in regions away from the Gulf, as in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, wherethey support opposing sides. Moreover, their interests are conflicting: Riyadh is the key ally of the U.S. in theregion, while Tehran�s strategy aims at diminishing the American influence there.

Iran faces more obvious problems with two other Gulf States: the UAE and Bahrain. Abu Dhabi accus-es Iran of occupying illegally three islands of the Persian Gulf (Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb); an articleof the UAE newspaper Al-Ittihad, where Iran is equated with Israel since both of them occupy Arab soil, epito-mises the discontent. On its part, Tehran, through the Majlis speaker Ali Larijani, has downgraded the issuecharacterising the territorial disputes as �simple differences�, which are fuelled by the U.S. in an attempt to

destabilise the region. Similarly, Manama is disquieted by unofficial Iranian claims that Bahrain is an Iranianprovince, illegally separated from the motherland during the Shah regime. Tehran has officially renounced thisclaim, which was quite popular during the first years of the Islamic Republic, however in 2007 a statement byHussein Shari�atmadari, advisor of Khamanei, almost fuelled a diplomatic crisis between the two states.

The crisis was resolved. Nonetheless, one cannot be affirmative that Tehran has escaped new threatsof isolation. For example, though the GCC has officially declared that every country, including Iran, has the rightto develop nuclear power, most Gulf states feel insecure by this prospect and turn to the USA for support. In2007, Washington discussed new arm deals, which would reach approximately $20 billion, with Saudi Arabia,Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. Furthermore, security analyst Richard Russell from the National DefenceUniversity in Washington does not rule out an informal cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel in order tocontain a nuclear Iran. The two countries do not have diplomatic relations, but an altered balance of powers inthe regional system, as a possible consequence of Iran acquiring nuclear capabilities, would menace both coun-tries� security interests: Tel Aviv would face the possibility of a war and Riyadh would lose leverage in the region.Therefore Russell, invoking the saying �the enemy of my enemy is my friend�, deduces that Saudi-Israeli coop-eration, probably under US mediation, is a possibility. However, it should be mentioned that so far there are noindications of such a development.

Likewise, it is argued that the Bahraini Foreign Minister�s proposal for the establishment of a regionalorganisation that would include the Arab countries, Iran, Turkey, and Israel, aimed from the beginning at theexclusion of Iran. The Chief Editor of the Palestinian-owned newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi expressed the opinionthat the proposal was designed on Tehran�s anticipated refusal to negotiate with Israel, which would clear theway for an Arab-Turkish-Israeli alliance against Iran. The proposal did not proceed, mainly because it provokedtensions within the Bahraini parliament. However, an examination of each party�s (Arab world, Turkey, Israel andIran) reaction to the Bahraini Foreign Minister�s initiative demonstrates that the argument in question is notunreasonable. Arab League Secretary General Amr Mousa spoke favourably of the proposal; Ankara generallytries to cultivate stronger links to the Middle East (e.g. the recent Turkish-Bahraini declaration on cooperation ina variety of domains, such as security, politics and economics); Tel Aviv did not officially respond, probablybecause it considered the proposal to be unrealistic. Tehran, on the other hand, hastened to condemn the pro-posal as expected.

Realising that it has failed to dispel its neighbours� concerns over its regional aspirations, Tehran haschosen the economic path so as to forge stronger ties with them. The last 8 years, the volume of trade betweenIran and the GCC countries has increased from $1.7 (2000) to $8.7 billion (2007). 12% of Iran�s total importscome from the GCC countries. The reasons for improved economic relations are two-fold. Firstly, it was a choiceof necessity, as Iran was subsumed to US-sponsored financial and economic sanctions. Secondly, there werereasons of expediency. Solid economic ties function as an inducement to the Gulf States to refrain from furthereconomic sanctions and act as a counterweight to the US economic influence in the region. The rationalebehind Tehran�s strengthening economic ties with the Gulf may be that in case of a war involving Iran, its neigh-bours would be more hesitant to back the opposing country. In other words, since the historical experience has



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demonstrated that it cannot capitalise on the common Islamic faith, it has turned into non-ideological adhesivemechanisms, such as economic cooperation, in order to escape the threat of isolation.

Strangely enough, Iran maintains excellent economic tieswith the UAE, despite the territorial disputes. The overwhelmingmajority of imports comes from the Emirates, while Iran is amajor contributor of private investment capital in Dubai. Apartfrom the UAE, Iran exports natural gas to Oman and is expect-ed to reach a similar natural gas agreement with Kuwait, while ithas already signed a joint Iranian-Bahraini gas project. In 2008,Iran, Qatar and Russia reached a consensus for the establish-ment of a �natural gas OPEC�, which would further consolidateTehran�s regional status. So far, Iran�s manoeuvres have servedthe goals in question: the effects of the US sanctions may nothave been neutralised, but certainly reduced, and the GCC gov-ernments are more reluctant to sever economic ties with theIslamic Republic. Though some financial institutions in Bahrainand the UAE cut off cooperation with Iranian banks after Ameri-can pressures, the official position of the Gulf states remainsthat they will abstain from future sanctions on Iran.

The 2007 negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)between Iran and the Gulf states fall into the same strategy. Nei-ther Iran nor the Gulf states, with the exception of the UAE, cangain essential economic benefits from a FTA, since every coun-try in the region is an energy exporter and manufactured goodsimporter. The motives are rather political: for Tehran it is anattempt to create a regional framework with no American pres-ence; for the Gulf countries with Shi�ite populations, the FTA canfunction as a political tool, so as to appease Iran. For the rest,participation in the Agreement is a relatively costless way to

strengthen regional ties. It appears that Iran has learned from the past. It has abandoned the flamboyant rhetoric regarding its neigh-

bours� regimes, and has pragmatically put emphasis on economic cooperation instead. Probably it will neverbecome essentially accepted as a member of the Gulf family; but at this point, avoiding isolation is an achieve-ment by its own.



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Al Jazeera�s role in the regional system: �All of this noise�from a tiny matchbox?�

A. Karal



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A l Jazeera owes its existence to Sheikh HamadBin Khalifa al Thani, who seized power ofQatar from his father in 1995 after a bloodless

coup. The establishment of the Arab satellite newsnetwork was the realization of his vision to lead hiscountry towards democratizationand to develop his own foreign poli-cy agenda, rather than echoingSaudi policies. Aiming at freedom ofpress, he abolished the Minister ofInformation, inaugurating the end ofgovernmental censorship on newsreporting. Al Jazeera, launched inNovember 1996, was the very essence of the new erain the Arab media.

A $140 million subsidy granted by the Qatari Emirfor the first five years of broadcasting was the van-guard of editorial independence and objective broad-

casting. Host to several talk shows and debates, AlJazeera tackled issues previously considered tabooin Arab societies, such as the role of women, educa-tion, corruption, human rights and Islam, and gavedissidents from across the political spectrum a fair

hearing.Al Jazeera�s popularity grew

rapidly during the second Palestin-ian Intifada coverage in 2000.Exclusive live footage ofAfghanistan�s battlefield andOsama Bin Laden�s interviews dur-ing the US invasion in 2001 ren-

dered it �the CNN of the Arab World�, while the Iraqwar in 2003 gave it again a considerable boost. How-ever, the war coverage bred high controversy overthe objectiveness of its reporting. The US govern-ment argued the war coverage of 2001 and 2003 sup-

No better phrase captures the controversy of Al Jazeera than that of Egyptian President HosniMubarak during his visit to the Doha headquarters. From the offset, Al Jazeera rapidly gained Arabviewers owing to its independent coverage, analysis and presentation that offered an Arab per-spective. It lent the small emirate of Qatar global fame, improving the position of its regional andinternational status. Its transborder leverage in shaping public opinion has raised concern amongArab regimes regarding their legitimacy in the interior and the maintenance of the regional balanceof power.



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portive of the insurgents. The airing of war atrocitiesin Iraq in 2003 reduced the wrath of the Iraqi interimgovernment. One year later, Al Jazeera�s reportingfrom within the besieged city of Jenin in spring 2002,evoked Arab sentiment. Addressing the Palestinianfighters as �martyrs� invited fierce Israeli criticism andaccusations of being both biased and sympathetictowards the Palestinians and their cause. Yet with itsobjective reporting equally being questioned byPalestinians who referred to it as the �bastion of Zion-ism� as Israeli officials were invited to comment on.

The Arab states have criticized the network forgraphic and emotional news presentation, dissemi-nating dreadful war images from within the theatre ofmilitary operations. However, it is the network�s influ-ence on its audience and its purported role as a toolin Qatar�s foreign policy that has really rendered bothArab leaders and the US rather apprehensive. It hasto be noted that the station has appeared at the TIMEmagazine as �one of 100 of the world�s most influen-tial people�. Acerbic criticism against the Arabregimes and their political decisions has been athorny issue between the Qatar leadership and theother Arab states. From the perspective of Arabstates, such �unrestrained� reporting could have adestabilizing effect or harm their regimes� legitimacy.Qatari diplomats have received over 400 official com-plaints about Al Jazeera�s commentaries. Tunisia,Morocco and Libya have gone further and recalledtheir ambassadors as a direct consequence of AlJazeera�s broadcasting.

In May 2002, Bahrain prevented Al Jazeera frombroadcasting by claiming that the channel was delib-erately trying to harm the state and damage its rela-tions. These accusations and actions resulted fromthe airing of images of Bahraini nationals protestingagainst the war in Afghanistan, which the government

considered insulting as it was and remains host to theUS Navy�s Fifth Fleet. Since the headquarters of theUS Navy�s Fifth Fleet are located there, the protestswere considered insulting for the country. It wasspeculated that the inflammatory broadcast wasprompted by Qatar due to the dispute with Bahrainover the control of the Hawar Islands, finally given toManama.

Similarly, the relations between Doha and Jordanfaced problems in 2002, when Al Jazeera aired a pro-gram that criticized what it saw as Jordan�s weakMiddle Eastern policy, especially towards Palestineand Iraq. As a response, the Jordanian pressaccused Qatar of facilitating the US attack againstIraq by conceding its air base, converting the mutualaccusations into a matter of regional politics.

The station�s emissions have further created seri-ous tension between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Theproblem is traced back to the network�s establish-ment as a successor of the BBC World Arabic Ser-vice. The latter, a joint venture with Saudi Arabia, wasshut down due to a documentary that was found tobe offensive by the Saudi regime, yet Al Jazeeramaintained this critical editorial line regardless. In2002, the bilateral relations became exceedinglyaggravated beginning with the withdrawal of theSaudi Arabian ambassador from Qatar in September,owing to an earlier documentary that had questionedthe Kingdoms policy on the Israeli � Palestinian con-flict. In December, Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Azizabstained from the Gulf Cooperation Council meetingheld in Qatar expressing its indignation with AlJazeera�s coverage. Moreover, Saudi Arabia hadalready used advertising boycott as a means of inter-cepting the station�s liberal programs. By preventingSaudi companies buying airtime, Riyadh attemptedto deprive the channel gaining revenue and maintain-



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ing its editorial independency. In February 2003, AlArabiya, the Saudi-controlled 24-hour news channelbased in Dubai, was introduced as an antidote to AlJazeera.

According to a station�s employee, there is delib-erately some flatness in Al Jazeera�s coverage in rela-tion to Saudi Arabia, since September 2007. The lead-ing channel has purportedly eased its acerbic criti-cism when it comes to Saudi policies. The results ofwhich became apparent in December 2007 throughthe reappointment of a Saudi Arabian ambassador toQatar and Saudi Arabia�s participation in the GCCSummit in Doha, both moves that signaled the nor-malization of relations. This rapprochement is largelyattributed to Qatar�s rethinking of regional securitysystem in view of Iran�s nuclear program, which canpotentially pose a threat to Qatar.

Despite this reported reconciliation, in February2008, another effort to halt turbulent satellite broad-casting was made during the meeting of the ArabMinisters of Information in Cairo, where they adopteda Code of Conduct for TV channels. According to the�Charter of Principle�, Arab media should not levelany attacks to political and religious leadership of theArab world. However, Qatar and Lebanon were thetwo member states opposed to these rules.

Qatar itself has described Al Jazeera as a �per-petual headache�, but it has refuted the allegations ofshutting down the station. Qatari officials have statedthat Al Jazeera is not a governmental channel andthus, it does not represent any of the state�s deci-sions. Qatar runs a more moderate political direction.It hosts regional meetings and forums and tries toestablish itself by acting as a mediator during region-al crises. On the contrary, the renowned network hasrather been a thorn in the Emirate�s bilateral relations.Therefore, it is clear that it follows its own agenda -at

least to a large extent- while enjoying tolerance of theQatari regime.

New York Times� Thomas Friedman proves to beright when claiming that �Al Jazeera is not only thebiggest media phenomenon to hit the Arab Worldsince the advent of television, it is also the biggestpolitical phenomenon�. On April 2008, Israeli ForeignMinister Tzipi Livni visited Doha in an effort to con-vince the Arab moderate leaders of the necessity ofcooperation with Israel in order to achieve regionalpeace. Despite having already stopped cooperationwith Al Jazeera a month earlier, Livni now asked theTV station to lessen what she considers biased-reporting towards Israel, recognizing the influence itexerts on the Arab audiences.

Overall, Al Jazeera is a mixed blessing to Qatar.The worldwide reputation of the station has acted asa means of publicity for the Emirate, helping the pro-motion of its regional and international status. How-ever, publicity has not always been positive as theQatari government repeatedly receives other Arableaders� complaints due to the station�s behavior.Though Qatar may be found in a difficult position, thisshould not reduce the network�s significance. On thecontrary, its effectiveness should rather be evaluatedwithin the context of its establishment, than in termsof regional politics.



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In his interview with the Dubai newspaper Khaleej Times, in March 2008, Turkey�s President Gul stressed the factthat the basis of the Turkish � GCC cooperation is founded on two principals: economic and security policy. Further-more, he emphasized that, in relation to the Middle East, an alternative path of soft power should be developed

instead of U.S. hard power projection. On the one hand, the Arab Gulf has shown a great interest for the emerging Turk-ish market, in order to invest its surplus revenues that have been created by the oil boom price since 2005. On the otherhand, Turkey welcomes Arab investment that will boost an already flourishing business sector. Economic cooperationbetween Turkey and the GCC states has been developing in the past decade, both bilaterally and within the confinesof the Arab organization.

On a bilateral level, three states of the Arab Gulf: the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait enjoy strong economic rela-tions with Turkey in terms of private investments, while President Gul revealed in February 2008, during his visit toQatar, his intension to enter into negotiations with Qatar�s government about a natural gas agreement. In an effort todiversify its energy providers beyond Russia and Iran, Turkey is looking for ways to extend its energy agreements tothe Arab Gulf. Among other states in the Gulf, the UAE have been investing steadily in the Turkish sectors of privatebusiness, real estate, banking and telecommunication, while they have increasingly opened their markets to Turkishexports. The two states estimate that bilateral trade should have reached up to $10 billion by 2010. Additionally, tradevolume with Saudi Arabia is assumed to have reached around $3.3 billion by 2007, while the two states hope to

Turkeyy and the Arab GGulff : Is Turkey looking eastwards?

Chrysoula Toufexi

Since the Iraqi invasion, the Middle East has experienced a new regional order. Iran and SaudiArabia have emerged as the two powers competing for supremacy in the Middle East, whileTurkey seems willing to adopt a mediating and balancing role between the state actors in theregion. In the eve of the new millennium, Turkey and the Arab Gulf have been working closertogether to foster economic ties and have been engaged in identifying commonalities in thechallenges they face. Against this background, one has to consider if regional threats signalthe beginning of a new era of a strategic partnership between Turkey and its Arab neighborsleading to a genuine turn in Turkish foreign policy from West towards East?



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increase bilateral trade at a volume of $7 billion within the next years. Talks with Saudi Arabia in 2006 revealed the coun-try�s intention to further investments in the privatized Turkish banks, an increase of Saudi textile imports, as well as thenegotiation of trade and energy agreements. Moreover, the two governments agreed in 2007 to eliminate double tax-ation on the income of dual citizens, in order to facilitate ongoing foreign investments and labor.

On a multilateral level, the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the GCC and Turkey in Septem-ber 2008, in Jeddah, has been considered to lead to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) by 2010, while negotiations havebeen taking place since 2005.

Furthermore, closer cooperation is precipitated through common regional security challenges and a continuousU.S. neglect of Ankara�s national interests in the Middle East. Security concerns in the Middle East have brought Turkeycloser to the GCC states, which share for different reasons a mutual interest in Iraq�s territorial integrity. In other words,Turkey attempts to form strategic alliances with the GCC states in order to face the ongoing challenges which haveemerged after the Iraqi invasion. Turkey�s denial to facilitate the U.S. invasion in Iraq in March 2003, by using its north-ern part as a base, might have temporarily undermined its relationship with its U.S. ally. However, it has improved itsimage in the Middle Eastern world.

On the one hand, Turkey favors a unified Iraq as it attempts to prevent the Kurds from declaring autonomy in thenorthern Iraqi front. However, the ongoing Kurdish separatism has been supported by its western allies, particularly theU.S. and Israel, as a counterweight to the �ambitions� of the Sunni and Shiia Iraqis, while ignoring Turkish concerns ofPKK terrorist attacks from Northern Iraq to its soil. The turn in Turkey�s rapprochement of the Arab Gulf states becameobvious in the deterioration of its relations with Israel, when the latter was implicated in convert military operations in

North Iraq. According to a report of the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronothin 2005, Kurdish fighters in Northern Iraq were receiving counter-terrorismtraining and intelligence support from former Israeli intelligence members,while it is further stated that Israel has been cooperating with the Kurdssince 2003 in an effort to improve surveillance and intelligence access inIran and Syria. Turkey seems to have realized that it needs to rely less onits western allies and diversify its alliances among the Middle Easternworld, in order to promote its security interests in Iraq.

On the other hand, the GCC states fear that a possible U.S. withdraw-al from Iraq in the future will lead to sectarian divisions between the Shiitesand Sunnis of the country. Iranian nuclear ambitions and Teheran�s region-al hegemonic aspirations reinforce Arab regime insecurity towards theprospect of a �Shiia crescent� that could trigger popular uprisings of Shiiapopulations among the Arab Sunni states of the Gulf.

In this spirit the Saudi King Abdullah paid a historic visit to Turkey inAugust 2006 which was characterized by the media as the offset of closercooperation between Ankara and Riyadh. Talks involved, among othermatters, the ongoing Israeli bombing of Lebanon that was strengthening

popular sentiments in favor of Hezbollah. As R. Olson notes in his paper published in the Mediterranean Quarterly(2008, 19:3), King Abdullah was interested in ensuring the Turkish support of the effort to contain a Shiia strengtheningin Iraq and Lebanon via Hezbollah and Syria. In his interview with the Turkish newspaper Milliyet during his visit, theSaudi King foresaw the beginning of a strategic partnership, emphasizing Turkey�s role in promoting the Middle Easternsecurity dilemmas towards its western allies.

His second visit to Turkey took place one year later in November 2007. During that time a Turkish military strikeagainst Kurdish fighters in Iraq was a sensitive issue of the government�s foreign policy agenda. A few days after thevisit of the Saudi King, the Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas and the Israeli President Shimon Peres were about toarrive in Ankara in order to sign an agreement for the construction of a joint industrial zone in the southern West Bankon the borders with Israel, aiming at the economic development of the region. It has to be noted though, that a similarproject in Erez between Gaza and Israel was abandoned. Thus, it seems as if this project will have a similar fate, unlessa genuine peace process initiative takes place to end hostilities on both sides.

For Mustafa Kibaroglu, foreign affairs analysts at Bilkent University, Turkey�s Middle Eastern policies go as far asto constitute �public diplomacy�, unless it develops a more comprehensive foreign policy, especially regarding thePalestinian-Israeli conflict and the Iranian nuclear issue. Turkey and the Arab Gulf do not form a united front with theirU.S. ally to confront Teheran. They reject in this matter a possible U.S. scenario for military action towards Iran and aremore willing to rely on soft power, in order to prevent Iranian nuclear build-up. Moreover, they do not oppose, contraryto Israeli and U.S. diplomacy, Teheran�s desire to acquire nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

However, in contrast to Kibaroglu�s analysis, the importance attached to Turkey for the stability of the region bythe Arab Gulf, is illustrated in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) declaration, which was signed in 2004 and wasadopted by Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE two years later. A significant aspect of the declaration is the role of theNATO in the Middle Eastern regional security and the emerging cooperation between the organization and the ArabGulf states. GCC countries acknowledge that Turkey is a fundamental constituent of this relationship, as it is perceivedas the West�s Muslim wing.

Indicative of the necessity attached to a security framework between Turkey and the Arab Gulf was the GCC min-isterial meeting held in Jeddah, in September 2008, where a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between theforeign ministers of the GCC states and their Turkish counterpart Ali Babacan. In the meeting the foreign ministersacknowledged the emergence of a strategic partnership between Turkey and the Gulf, expressing their desire to buildmechanisms in order to facilitate the institutionalization of their annual cooperation in economy and security.

Common regional challenges combined with a lack of U.S. sensitivity towards Turkish and Arab national securityinterests might precipitate a security alliance framework, which would rely according to Gul�s prognosis on two dimen-sions of soft power: economic cooperation and strategic dialogue between Turkey and the GCC members. Neverthe-less, analysts have to ask themselves whether Ankara�s steps towards the Middle East constitute genuine acts ofengagement in regional security, indicating the start of a new Turkish foreign policy, more sensitive to its Middle Easternneighbors, or if these diplomatic steps are just mere acts of impression? If negotiations for a strategic framework provefruitful, Turkey�s initiatives might be transformed from acts of public diplomacy into acts of active engagement in powerbalance and mediation, signaling the end of Ankara�s neglect towards the Middle East.



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Most conflicts are often far more complex thanthey appear on the surface and involve multipleactors rather than simply two warring sides; the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not an exception. NumerousArab countries, whether actively or not, play a major rolein the persistence of this conflict as do many foreignpowers, in particular the United States. This multilateralinvolvement is predominantly due to individual intereststo secure stakes in energy resources and issues con-cerning regional security.

The Palestinian question is arguably the MiddleEast�s most pressing issue in need of resolution, and ithas long been argued that the continuation of this crisisunderpins the regions inability to achieve stability. There-fore, it is imperative that a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should constitute a fundamental part ofneighboring states� regional policy. Among these neigh-boring countries, the Arab states of the Persian Gulfincreasingly play an important role in the peace process.

The relationship between the Arab Gulf States andthe Palestinians dates back to the Nakba, when the cre-ation of the state of Israel marked the beginning of thePalestinian exodus. Many of the Palestinians who foundrefuge in the Gulf States were highly educated andworked in the domain of education, medicine, engineer-ing and administration. Rather than being completely

marginalized from society, as was and largely remainsthe case in Lebanon, they contributed to the develop-ment of the Gulf.

The independence of many Gulf States (1960s-1970s) coincided with the beginning of the Palestinianliberation movement, while shared objectives encour-aged the development of transnational solidarity. Sym-pathetic to the Palestinian struggle, the Gulf states pro-vided substantial economic support to the territories�governing parties, which increased significantly post the1973 oil embargo crisis.

The roleof the Arab Gulf States in thePalestinian-Israeli Peace Process

Nada Ghandour-Demiri

Recently, the Arab Gulf States are taking a more active role in the Palestinian-Israeli peaceprocess, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar now acting as mediators between the Palestinian fac-tions by hosting talks and facilitating agreements. However, to view such developments asan act of benevolence on behalf of these countries would be misleading, and rather interestsin recalibrating the regional balance of power would more accurately appear to be the drivingforce behind these efforts.



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Yet, the relations between the Gulf States and thePalestinians deteriorated during the 1990 Iraq-KuwaitWar, in which Yasser Arafat, influenced by the Palestinianguerillas, did not oppose Saddam Hussein�s invasion ofKuwait. As a consequence, the Gulf States stopped sup-porting the Palestinian Liberation Organization both eco-nomically and politically, which led to a severe econom-ic crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Nevertheless, since the 1993 Oslo Accords, rela-tions between the Palestinian authority and the Gulfstates have ameliorated and the last few years in partic-ular have seen individual states or collectively, throughthe Gulf Cooperation Council, increasingly active in pro-moting peace initiatives. Complementing its increasedinvolvement, the GCC has become more vocal and nolonger sits on the fence as it openly condemns the Israelioccupation and transgressions of Palestinian humanrights, and holds that Israel should withdraw to the pre-1967 borders.

Among the GCC member states, Qatar and SaudiArabia in particular have invested more energy than oth-ers have, in shaping the peace process. Over the last sixyears, Saudi Arabia in particularly has been at the fore-front of many of the peace initiatives. Consistently stress-ing the importance of a peace accord during ArabLeague summits, Saudi Arabia was willing to normalizethe diplomatic relations of the Arab League with Israel onagreement that Israel withdraw from all occupied territo-ries and accept the creation of a viable Palestinian statewith East Jerusalem as its capital. More recently, inFebruary 2007, the Saudi King Abdullah Ben Abdul Azizhosted and facilitated the Mecca Agreement betweenHamas and Fatah. Although this agreement was the cat-alyst for the formation of a Palestinian national-unity gov-ernment, its significance is to be found in the regionalbalance of power. However, as stated previously, benev-olence is rare and interests more often account forinvolvement; thus a more critical examination of SaudiArabia�s Mecca Agreement would reveal the kingdomslack of concern with the pact�s content, and rather itsunderlying interest to counter Iran�s regional growingpower, through securing a primary role in the Palestinianquestion.

The past year has also seen a notable increase inQatar�s desire to play a key role in the negotiations for apeace process and maintain a critical stance regardingthe Israeli occupation at the risk of damaging relationswith the U.S. and Israel. The first important and oldercontribution by Qatar to the Palestinian question is AlJazeera channel, which was an innovation in the Arabmedia world. Al Jazeera is supporting the Palestinianstruggle and disseminates a lot of �untold stories� aboutit. More recently, the Emir Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani has increased financial support to the Palestinians.For example, the government-owned Qatar Diar RealEstate Investment Company is going to build a new vil-lage of 5000 houses in the West Bank. Yet, here againthe motivations behind Qatari aid are not merely philan-thropic as they stand for the competition between influ-ential powers, such as Iran.

In October, Qatar tried to be a mediator betweenHamas and Fatah, unfortunately without success. Untilnow, no mediation efforts by Qatar and Saudi Arabiahave been successful. Nevertheless, those effortsshould continue in order to foster the peace process.Moreover, financial support by the Gulf states is very cru-cial for the highly damaged Palestinian economy due tothe occupation.

The synthesis of players in this conflict is far fromsimple. There are many conflicting interests and opinionsbetween a dozen of players, starting from Palestinians(Hamas versus Fatah) and Israelis to Americans andother regional players (e.g. Iran). We are faced with ahighly complex matrix of overlapping interests. More-over, the next couple of months will be difficult for anypeace initiative given that the political setting is chang-ing; Barack Obama has been elected president of theU.S., there is going to be a new Israeli prime minister andpossibly new Palestinian and Iranian presidents. It seemsthough that the G.C.C. and Egypt will try to make surethat Mahmoud Abbas remains president in order tomaintain a certain order, until the political settingbecomes more fertile -for instance, once PresidentObama�s agenda for the Middle East has been present-ed- for negotiations.



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All in a sudden, Somali piracy has become one of the major topics in the news while havingstunned the international community. The reason for this sensation is the threat to global sea-ward systems while the inhuman living conditions of Somalis are not desirable to be disclosedto the external public. However, it is necessary to understand that the increase in piracy andthe appalling situation in Somalia itself are inextricably linked to each other.

On November 15 Somali Pirateshijacked the Saudi supertanker SiriusStar � carrying $100 million worth of

oil � and took it to Harardhere, 300 kilometersnorth of lawless Somalia�s capital Mogadishu.This event marks the biggest act of piracy yetand has focused world attention on untamedpiracy off the Horn of Africa country. The inter-national community is bewildered, the Saudiforeign minister called piracy a �disease� andequated it with terrorism, while the pirateshave claimed that any attack would have �dis-astrous� consequences. It seems as if lawless

and atavistic people are fighting against the �modern (Arab) world� symbolized by an oil tanker which was on its wayto the West. However, it would be lopsided to conceive piracy -a phenomenon that has gained sizeable visibility overthe last three years- as an act carried out by irrational, uncompromising actors. Pirates are an organized networkand do not hijack in an unplanned manner while being embedded in a political context which influences their pro-ceeding. Hence, in order to find a positive solution to the problem of piracy and to grasp its dynamics it has to beput into a larger context.

While most experts and politicians call for greater security cooperation in order to improve the situation (a meanswhich should not be dismissed), they do not understand that it will be idle in the long term. According to Jason Alder-

Special reportSomali piracyand the Arabian Peninsula

Styliani Saliari



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wick, a maritime defence analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, �maritime security operations in thatarea are really only a sticking plaster, they are addressing the symptoms not the causes�. Thus, it is not only about com-bating the pirates but about fighting the root cause which led to the emergence of piracy in the first place.

Since the end of 2007, pirates have relocated their operations away from the Mogadishu port area and into theGulf of Aden which is passed by nearly 20,000 ships every year, since it constitutes the most important trade route fordry and manufactured goods between Asia, Europe and the Americas. Moreover, according to Lloyd�s Maritime Intel-ligence Unit seven per cent of the world�s oil production passes through the area. Thus, one of the main trade routesis suddenly threatened by the long-standing instability of Somalia which is experiencing an Islamic insurgency and hasnot had an efficient government since the 1991 misappropriation of President Mohammad Siad Barre. During his man-date, Barre strengthened particular tribal factions while provoking tensions between others, which led to a division ofsociety into various factions and sub-factions. Hence, after Barre�s ouster, Somalia�s population was full of hatredwhich resulted in the tragic civil war. Even now, fighting between various clans, Islamist groups, Ethiopian troops andSomali interim government forces is a daily occurrence, while pirates are taking part in this since they are basically fight-ers for Somalia�s several warlord factions. The pirates share a part of the ransom with warlords while the latter keepthemselves in the background. Experts assume that the ransom is being used for arm purchase. In other words, thestatehood of Somalia has been a grim and failed issue since 1991 with 8 million of its population being dispersed amongfive different countries and territories. Merely, during the six months of rule by the Islamic Courts Union in the secondhalf of 2006 piracy almost disappeared. However, after the courts had been removed piracy recurred. Therefore, itseems as if the transitional federal government (TFG) is not able to fulfil its state responsibilities in order to sustain theintactness of its own territorial waters since it has no real authority outside Mogadishu.

According to Roger Middleton, a consultant researcher for the London-based think-tank Chatham House, Soma-lia represents the ideal environment for the thriving of piracy due to its hardly functioning government, long and isolat-ed beaches and a population which is not only desperate, but additionally used to war. Related to this observation, isthe fact that the widely lawless coasts of Somalia and its semi-autonomous region of Puntland in the north-east ofSomalia embody the base for the majority of pirates. This region is characterized by extreme poverty which facilitatesthe recruitment of pirates since piracy is linked to financial improvement. The rewards the pirates obtain are rich in acountry with no real job opportunities and nearly half of the population dependent on food aid after 17 years of ongo-ing conflict. Suddenly, villas have been built along the coast and new vehicles can be seen in the streets, enabledthrough the payment of ransoms which have improved the economy at a time when public institutions have crumbled.Moreover, the pirates themselves justify their actions by stating that foreign fishing trawlers are plundering their waters.Precisely, a man calling himself Daybad said: �Our fish were all eradicated so we can�t fish now so we�re going to fishwhatever passes through our sea because we need to eat�.

According to Dr. Tawfic Sayf, a regular columnist for Saudi Arabia�s pro-government newspaper Okaz, the Arabcountries could play a major role in stabilizing the situation in Somalia instead of waiting for the U. S. to fill the vacuum.Precisely, it should be in the Arabs� interest to do so, since piracy is threatening their national security and economy.Actually, there have been reports of Arab nations which express the will to find an �Arabian solution� since the elevatedpresence of foreign naval forces near their coasts without political, legal and security cooperation and coordination is

not appreciated anymore. For instance, during the meeting of theArab Peace and Security Council (APSC) in mid-October, possibleways to combat Somali piracy were discussed. The APSC empha-sized that the protection of the Arab Sea was the responsibility of theArabs and hence should not be internationalized. The formation of apan-Arab peacekeeping naval force was one of the different sugges-tions discussed at the meeting.

Related to this development, is the emergency Arab Leagueanti-piracy summit in Cairo on November 20, attended by represen-tatives from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Sudan and Somalia todiscuss the escalating problem. The meeting aimed at forging astrategy to fight piracy in the Red Sea, while various options such asthe establishment of joint operations by Arab navies and the intro-duction of a piracy monitoring center and warning systems for shipswere discussed. Yemeni officials stated that an Arab mechanism for

action and coordination is absolutely necessary, while Saudi Arabia said that its country is ready to join an internation-al effort on piracy. Additionally, Egypt expressed fears as piracy might lead to a downturn in revenues from the water-way. The participants agreed to form committees to study the situation and meet again in January. According toexperts this conference had been past-due, since the 2.5 million square miles of water cannot effectively been con-trolled without the cooperation and participation of these states.

Probably, meetings like this might be a first step into the right direction and therefore absolutely justified. Nonethe-less, it is disputable if the international community and particularly the Arabs have realized that a holistic approach,which includes improvement within Somalia and not only the allocation of naval forces, is required here since every-thing else would merely be a �quick fix�. This doubt is further underlined in statements like the one by the Saudi foreignminister mentioned above and the one made by Ali Taheri, Iran�s deputy transport minister, after the hijack of an Iran-ian-chartered ship in the mid of November, where he stated that �Iran�s view is that such issues should be confrontedstrongly�. Hence, if the Arabs are genuinely interested in finding a permanent �Arabian solution� to the problem of pira-cy they have to find means which improve the anarchical situation in Somalia. For instance, states of the Arabian Penin-sula could start helping Yemen to destroy the illegal arms trade and human trafficking which takes place betweenYemen and Somalia. Yemen is struggling with internal problems that are considered by various analysts as a furtherpotential threat to security in the region, while it is unable due to ill-equipment to patrol its waters. Moreover, the so-called �criminal networks� which are mainly based in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kenya and circulate information aboutships that represent a possible target for the pirates, should be identified and eliminated.

All in all, it has become clear that as long as Somalia continues to be a state with no powerful government recog-nized as legitimate by its population, piracy will be fostered. �Piracy is a symptom of the real crisis, which is the disin-tegration of Somalia since 1991� said Aymen Abdelaziz Salaama, professor of international law at Cairo University. �Thesolution isn't to send foreign navies to combat piracy, but to end the long-standing civil war in that country�.


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/// May 2008 Issue 11



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BOOK REVIEW

Under different circumstances Abu Mus�ab al-Suri could have been anestablished academic as he is characterized by strict methodologicaladherence, intellectual arrogance, inclination to self-citation, strained rela-tions with colleagues and thirst for recognition. Nevertheless, the currentinternational situation renders his candidacy for a university chair out ofquestion. Hence, he rightfully occupies a position in the unofficial intelli-gencia of militant jihadi Islamism and he holds the undisputed chairman-ship in the �department of strategics. However, more than that andbesides his intellectualism, he is an �adept� heir of the tradition of fieldguerrilla warfare theoreticians. If unconventional warfare is doomed toirrelevance in the face of superior technology, organization and intelli-gence of the modern armies, Suri appears to give it a new breath.

Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008


Suri�s centrality in the jihadi movement and hisimportance as a guerrilla theoretician is acknowl-edged by Brynjar Lia who does not hesitate to call

him the �architect of global jihad�. In his book the Archi-tect of Global Jihad he embarks on a thorough researchin order �to find the man behind the writings�. In doing so,he presents an extended well-documented account ofSuri�s life from his days in the 1980�s Islamist insurrectionagainst the Syrian regime, through his disenchantmentwith the Muslim Brotherhood, his experience as an Arab-Afghan and his nomad adventures in Europe until his

return to Afghanistan and finally his alleged arrest in Pak-istan in 2005. While going through Suri�s rich biography,Lia sheds light on the process and dynamics of the for-mation and evolvement of the jihadi current including itsrifts, false starts and shortcomings. The reader, havingbecome familiar with the general context of the jihadi cur-rent inside the Islamist movement and any possible sub-jective admixtures as part of Suri�s personality, is in aposition to assess al-Suri as a writer through the keyexcerpts of his magnum opus �The Global Islamic Resis-tance Call� available in the last chapter of the book.



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Suri�s theoretical formation and personal idiosyn-crasy as a �strategist, pragmatist and born critic� is adirect product of his experience in the realms of the Syr-ian Muslim Brotherhood, where as a member of theCombatant Vanguard he had the opportunity to witnessthe rise and the fall of the Islamists and their failure in top-pling the Syrian regime. This negative outcome led to hisinquiry about the possibility of a different approach. Ashe wrote later, the achievements of the secret, hierarchi-cal, military organizations (tanzimat), such as the MuslimBrotherhood, were a complete disappointment. Defeaton the military sphere, defeat in terms of security, defeatin regards to the agitation provoked, defeat on the levelof educating current or prospective members and defeatin political goals. However, the Islamist circles failed todraw lessons from those experiences and carried onorganizing in this pattern. Several failures followed withalmost identical course of events. The only differencebetween older similar (hierarchical) organizations and themore recent ones rested on the life span of the strugglebefore the final collapse. Earlier it could have lasted adecade, while later, after the arrival of the new worldorder (placed somewhere in the middle of the 1990�s), ata time with narrowing security margins, it might havebeen just a matter of days.

Suri�s involvement in Muslim Brotherhood�s politicsdid not only render him disillusioned with the organiza-tion�s model of action but also its general strategy.Through his stays in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and SaudiArabia he might have gained a first-class training fromthe movement�s respective security services. However,what he lost was far greater. It was his confidence in theaccommodationist Muslim Brotherhood since the organ-ization was eager to play the game of the regional rival-ries. Abhorred, as Lia quotes, by �how other Arab states,which initially provided assistance and training to theinsurgency, had stood idly by as Syrian fighter jets andartillery bombarded [Hama, which signaled the end ofIslamist insurgency in Syria]� and not being able to�endure the suffocating atmosphere and harassment[from loyalists MBs] in Saudi Arabia [where he went withthe intention to follow his studies]� he opted for a volun-tary exile in Europe. There he dedicated himself to study-ing and writing until his desire for field experiencebrought him in 1987 to the then bustling Afghanistan.Having completed his first book on the �Syrian Experi-ence�, where he already outlined his methodologicalapproach of �learning from past experiences in order toformulate new practical theories�, he had the chance toexperience the waging of jihad in what he later called�Open Fronts� � places where overt confrontation linkedto permanent bases occurs. This experience had a deepimpact on his thought. On the one hand, his time as a mil-itary instructor and lecturer made him notice great politi-co-ideological shortcomings in the cadres and recruitshe dealt with. This made him realize the need for an inte-grated theory of jihad to include political, organizationaland military aspects of struggle. On the other hand, hewitnessed the transformation within the Islamist circlesand he came close to the jihadi current represented bythe Egyptian Islamic Jihad cadres and prominentlyAyman al-Zawahiri. As Lia argues, �this period was thetime when the global character of the duty of jihad �became apparent to him in earnest�. It should be notedthat at that time - although the US had been identified as



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the �great Satan� or in other words the so-called �other� -the emphasis was on the struggle against the nearenemy (the local regimes) that had subjected to the wish-es of the former, or the invading or occupying forcesinside the dar al-Islam.

The net product of the changing realities inAfghanistan (where the infighting between the variouswarlords began) and the international system was Suri�sfirst version of the �Global Islamic Resistance Call�where he outlined his new idea of creating a �phantomorganization� to inspire and supervise from a particulardistance the spread of �individual action� through thecreation of autonomous jihadi cells operating under thebanner of this organization. Suri sustained that theIslamist struggle would be pointless unless theysketched out a grand strategy which would include theaspects of financing and propaganda and not merely amilitary strategy. Moreover, as long as the various jihadigroups share a common final goal -no matter who theirimmediate enemies are- there should be a networkwhich, although it would not have a direct role in theoperational matters (of these groups) due to securityrisks, it would support the particular groups throughmedia work and financing. Suri�s return to Europe in1992 preoccupied him with spreading the word of the�jihadi tide� by doing media work and promoting his ideasin order to support the jihadi cause. He wanted to build anetwork of contacts with the �caravan of the nomads ofthe Afghanistan jihad� and young people interested injihad. His main interest was Algeria (until his disillusion-ment with the atrocities committed by GIA).

However, as Lia highlights, �[these] concepts andideas were [only] later espoused by al-Qaeda leader-ship�. In the meantime, the years Suri spent in Europeproved to be a disappointment for him. Islamist insurgen-cies were crushed one after the other, while his efforts tocreate a media center to unite the media efforts of all jiha-di groups ended in a failure as the latter preferred to man-age their media profile by themselves. Additionally, hefailed to compete with the gifted preachers of Islam,

such as Abu Qutadah al-Filastini, who had gathered in�Londonistan� at that time. Thus, he did not manage tocreate a circle of followers matching his ambitions whilequite to the contrary; his highly critical attitude broughthim more enemies than supporters. As Lia notes, �hisstyle was not that of a firebrand preacher�even thoughhe was a good classroom teacher, he did not reach outto his listeners emotionally�. Disappointed by these out-comes, especially the Algerian struggle in which he putso much hope and the increased harassment by the Bri-tish security services, Suri saw a last glimmer of hope inthe developments in Afghanistan where Taliban man-aged to establish an Islamic Emirate in most of the coun-try. Moreover, al-Qaeda leadership, which (much toSuri�s liking) already showed the first signs of directingthe struggle against the far enemy, decided to relocatethere from Sudan. After visiting Afghanistan in mid-1997he decided to move there permanently in 1998 where hestayed until the fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001.

In Afghanistan, his tendency for criticism turned theolder sporadic disagreements with al-Qaeda and bin-Laden into direct conflict. The underlying cause was thepharaonic attitude of Al-Qaeda�s leadership towards themultifaceted mosaic of Islamists situated at that time inAfghanistan. At this point Lia offers a rare insight into thepoorly-documented, often misunderstood and tenserelations among Islamists in Taliban�s Afghanistan.According to Suri, bin Laden�s complete disregard of thepressure put on the Taliban due to Bin Laden�s high pro-file media campaign, which already led to the US bom-bardment in 1998, was detrimental to their general causeand it jeopardized the fundamental prerequisite for everyguerrilla, that is to preserve a sanctuary. While most ofthe Afghan-Arabs regarded the Taliban as inferior in cul-tural and Islamic terms, Suri as a pragmatist and far frombeing a dogmatic Salafi thought that their rule, althoughnot perfect was a legitimate Islamic Emirate which forideological and utilitarian reasons had to be preserved.

The cataclysm of 9/11, the subsequent US invasionin Afghanistan and the �international war against terror-

ism� confronted Suri directly with the implications of theNew World Order, strengthening thus his conviction thatthe great imbalance of capabilities between, on the onehand the US and their allies, and the jihadi forces on theother, made the latter�s only chance for survival and vic-tory dependant on their ability to turn into an elusive tar-get. Particularly, it meant that fighting in �Open Fronts�should be postponed for better days. Even in places likeAfghanistan or Iraq, where there were plenty opportuni-ties for traditional guerrilla war, the fighting method wasto be detached from semi-regular to more terrorist-like.Fixed positions were a certain recipe for defeat. More-over, this dictum was supposed to apply to training andorganization. Being a �sitting duck� had to be avoided infavor of more flexible, security-conscious models. Neverbefore was the creation of �global Islamic resistanceunits�, linked to each other with nothing but a commoncause and common strategy, more essential. The cellsformed on their own initiative were supposed to be (self)-trained in safe houses or small secret camps in order toexecute small scale (operationally) terror acts whichwould target the economic interests, the infrastructureand the people of the West and their Muslim collabora-tors all around the world and which would be selected viaa clear-cut cost/benefit evaluation.

The organizational pattern of the jihadi movement inthe years after the 9/11 proved the validity and accuracyof Suri�s analysis. This outcome was probably caused bythe non-permissible (for hierarchical structures) condi-tions that prevailed rather than influenced by Suri�s theo-

ries as only few, mostly among the elite as Lia notes,were familiar with them. However, this was to changeafter the US put a $5 million bounty on Suri. If the enemypriced him so high it meant that he was important. Want-ed and later arrested by the US, Suri finally got his long-awaited recognition. The �Global Islamic ResistanceCall� as well as older booklets and audiotapes of his lec-tures are widely distributed and can be downloaded atIslamist websites, while western analysts and intelli-gence-related officials pay increasing attention to his writ-ings (for more on that see p. 10-26). Lia�s exceptionalbook, the first fully dedicated to the analysis of this per-sona, definitely is going to stir further interest. It came toolate, but at least it offers Suri some comfort in the tediousand humiliating life at a CIA detention center.



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A. Karal

Styliani SaliariChrysoula Toufexi

Ilias Tasopoulos

English Language Editing

Styliani Saliari

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U n i v e r s i t y o f P e l o p o n n e s eIn assos iat ion with

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Documents

The Gulf: Shifting alliances in quest for supremacy filefirst spoke of the ‚Shia crescent™, followed by Hosni Mubarak, who in 2006 asserted that the Arab Shia were more loyal to