The Growing Complexity of Sino-Indian Ties

8/12/2019 The Growing Complexity of Sino-Indian Ties

1/59


2/59

The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTERfor

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIPand

DEVELOPMENT

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for serviceat the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduateswho are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a think factory for commandersand civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engagein discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achievingnational security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes nationalsecurity and strategic research and analysis to inuencepolicy debate and bridge the gap between militaryand academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Developmentcontributes to the education of world class seniorleaders, develops expert knowledge, and providessolutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Instituteprovides subject matter expertise, technical review,and writing expertise to agencies that develop stabilityoperations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency programsupports the United States Army War Colleges lines of

effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-beingeducation and support by developing self-awarenessthrough leader feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategicleaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdomgrounded in mastery of the profession of arms, andby serving as a crucible for educating future leaders inthe analysis, evaluation, and renement of professionalexpertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,conserves, and exhibits historical materials for useto support the U.S. Army, educate an internationalaudience, and honor Soldierspast and present.

U.S. Army War College

SLDRSenior Leader Development and Resiliency


3/59


4/59


5/59

iii

Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

THE GROWING COMPLEXITYOF SINO-INDIAN TIES

Harsh V. Pant

June 2014

The views expressed in this report are those of the author anddo not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) andU.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy fullacademic freedom, provided they do not disclose classiedinformation, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent

ofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them tooffer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the inter-est of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be

copyrighted.


6/59

iv

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and shouldbe forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 AshburnDrive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army WarCollege External Research Associates Program. Information onthis program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil , at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army WarCollege (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded freeof charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report mayalso be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placingan order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quotedor reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriatecredit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army WarCollege Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to updatethe national security community on the research of our analysts,recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming confer-ences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also providesa strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If youare interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on theSSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-630-1


7/59


8/59


9/59

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

HARSH V. PANT is Professor of International Rela-tions in the Defence Studies Department at KingsCollege London, United Kingdom. He is also a Fel-low (Non-Resident) with the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, Washington, DC, and a VisitingFellow with the Observer Research Foundation, NewDelhi, India. He has been a Visiting Professor at theIndian Institute of Management, Bangalore; a VisitingFellow at the Center for the Advanced Study of India,University of Pennsylvania; a Visiting Scholar at theCenter for International Peace and Security Studies,McGill University, Montreal, Canada; and an Emerg-ing Leaders Fellow at the Australia-India Institute,University of Melbourne, Australia. His current re-search is focused on Asian security issues. Dr. Pants

most recent books include The US-India Nuclear Pact:Policy, Process and Great Power Politics(Oxford Univer-sity Press, 2011), The Rise of China: Implications for India(Cambridge University Press, 2012), and The Rise ofthe Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Chal-lenges(Ashgate, 2012). Dr. Pant is a graduate of DelhiUniversity, and holds an M.A. and an M.Phil. fromJawaharlal Nehru University and a Ph.D. in politicalscience from the University of Notre Dame.


10/59


11/59

ix

SUMMARY

According to most political observers, the globalpolitical architecture is undergoing a transformationwith power increasingly shifting from the West to theEast, in what has been called the Asian Century. Thetwo most populous nations on the earth, China andIndia, are on their way to becoming economic power-houses and are shedding their reticence in assertingtheir global proles, all of which makes their relation-ship of still greater importance for the internationalsystem. The future of this Asian Century will, to alarge extent, depend upon the relationship betweenthese two regional giants, and the bilateral relation-ship between them will dene the contours of the newinternational political architecture in Asia and theworld at large. This monograph examines the evolu-

tion of Sino-Indian ties over the last few decades andthe constraints that continue to inhibit this relation-ship from achieving its full potential before delineat-ing the implications of this for the United States andthe wider international system.


12/59


13/59

1

THE GROWING COMPLEXITYOF SINO-INDIAN TIES

INTRODUCTION

According to most political observers, the globalpolitical architecture is undergoing a transformationwith power increasingly shifting from the West to theEast, in what has been called the Asian Century. Thetwo most populous nations on the earth, China andIndia, are on their way to becoming economic power-houses and are shedding their reticence in assertingtheir global proles, all of which makes their relation-ship of still greater importance for the internationalsystem. The future of this Asian Century will, to alarge extent, depend upon the relationship betweenthese two regional giants, and the bilateral relation-

ship between them will dene the contours of the newinternational political architecture in Asia and theworld at large. The importance of their relationshiphas not been lost on either country. In one of his meet-ings with the Indian Prime Minister, at the 2004 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), former Chinese PremierWen Jiabao is reported to have remarked that whenwe shake hands, the whole world will be watching, asentiment repeated by Indian Prime Minister Manmo-han Singh during his visit to China in October 2013.As of today, however, the trajectory of the Sino-Indianrelationship remains as complex as ever to decipher,despite some positive developments in the last fewyears. This monograph examines the evolution ofSino-India ties over the last few decades and the con-

straints that continue to inhibit this relationship fromachieving its full potential before delineating the im-plications of this for the United States and the widerinternational system.


14/59


15/59

3

tual noninterference in each others internal affairs;equality and mutual benet; and peaceful coexistence.

These were the hey-days of Sino-Indian ties, with theHindi-China bhai-bhai(Indians and Chinese are broth-ers) phrase a favorite slogan for the seeming camara-derie between the two states.

But that was not to last long. Soon the border dis-pute between China and India escalated and led tothe 1962 Sino-Indian war.3Though a short war, it wasto have a long-lasting impact on Sino-Indian ties. Itdemolished Nehrus claims of Asian solidarity, andthe defeat at the hands of the Chinese psychologicallyscarred Indian military and political elites. It led toChina developing close ties with Indias neighboringadversary, Pakistan, resulting in what is now widelyconsidered an all-weather friendship. China sup-ported Pakistan in its 1965 and 1971 wars with India

and helped in the development of its nuclear weap-ons arsenal. Meanwhile, the Indian nuclear weaponsprogram was accelerated in light of Chinas testing ofnuclear weapons in 1964.

The border issue remains a major obstacle in Sino-Indian ties, with minor skirmishes at the border con-tinuing since 1962. As China and the United States be-came closer after their rapprochement in 1972, Indiagravitated to the former Soviet Union to balance theChina-U.S.-Pakistan axis. It was in 1988 that then In-dian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi turned a new leaf inSino-Indian ties when he went to Beijing and signed anagreement that aimed at achieving a fair and reason-able settlement while seeking a mutually acceptablesolution to the border dispute.4The visit saw a Joint

Working Group (JWG) set up to explore the boundaryissue and examine probable solutions to the problem.


16/59


17/59

5

states. India and China also decided to expedite theprocess of demarcation of the Line of Actual Control

(LAC), and the JWG on the boundary question, setup in 1988, has been meeting regularly. As a rst stepin this direction, the two countries exchanged bordermaps on the least controversial Middle Sector of theLAC. More recently, both nations agreed on PoliticalParameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of theIndia-China Boundary Question (2005), broad principlesto govern the parameters of any dispute settlement.China has expressed its desire to seek a fair resolutionto the vexed boundary issue on the basis of mutualaccommodation, respect for history, and accommoda-tion of reality.7

Diplomacy of Declarations.

Former Indian Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpay-ee visited China in June 2003, the rst by an IndianPremier in a decade. TheJoint Declarationsigned dur-ing this visit expressed the view that China was nota threat to India.8 The two states appointed SpecialRepresentatives in order to impart momentum to bor-der negotiations that have lasted now for more than20 years, with the Prime Ministers principal secretarybecoming Indias political-level negotiator, replacingthe India-China JWG. India and China also decided tohold their rst joint naval and air exercises. More sig-nicantly, India acknowledged Chinas sovereigntyover Tibet and pledged not to allow anti-China politi-cal activities in India. For its part, China seems to havenally acknowledged Indias 1975 incorporation of

the former monarchy of Sikkim, by agreeing to opena trading post along the border with the former king-dom and later by rectifying its ofcial maps to include


18/59

6

Sikkim as part of India.9After being closed for 60 years,the Nathu La pass, a traditional trading post between

Tibet and Sikkim, was reopened in 2006. High-levelpolitical interactions have continued unabated sincethen. The two states have set up institutionalized de-fense consultation mechanisms to reduce suspicionsand identify areas of cooperation on security issues.

Soon after assuming ofce, the Manmohan Singhgovernment made it clear that it desired closer tieswith China and would continue to work towards im-proving bilateral relations with China. Indias formernational security advisor, J. N. Dixit, wrote that theCongress will continue the process of normalizing,strengthening and expanding Indias relations withChina, which is the most important factor affectingAsian security and stability.10In his rst address tothe nation, Prime Minister Singh also emphasized the

carrying forward of the process of further develop-ment and diversication of Sino-Indian relations.11

When Singh visited China in 2008, the two statessigned A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the Peo-ples Republic of China and the Republic of India declara-tion: to promote the building of a harmonious worldof durable peace and common prosperity throughdeveloping the Strategic and Cooperative Partnershipfor Peace and Prosperity between the two countries.12Support for the earlier Agreement on Political Param-eters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of theChina-India Boundary Question (2005) was reiterated.The two sides have decided to elevate the boundarynegotiations to the level of a strategic dialogue, withplans for a hotline between the Indian Prime Minister

and the Chinese Premier as a means to remove mis-understanding and reduce tensions at the earliest pos-sible instance. Their public vision suggested that this


19/59


20/59

8

slavia in 1999, and the U.S. campaign against SaddamHussein, arguing that these violated the sovereignty

of both countries and undermined the authority ofthe UN system.14China and India share an interest inresisting interventionist foreign policy doctrines ema-nating from the West, particularly the United States,and display conservative attitudes on the preroga-tives of sovereignty.15

China and India have coordinated their efforts onissues as wide-ranging as climate change, trade ne-gotiations, energy security, and the global nancialcrisis. Both nations favor more democratic interna-tional economic regimes. Sino-Indian coordinationon climate change, global trade negotiations, as wellas in demanding a restructuring of nancial institu-tions in view of the world economys shifting centerof gravity has had a signicant impact on the course

of international politics over the last few years. It isbeing argued that the forces of globalization have ledto a certain convergence of Sino-Indian interests in theeconomic realm, as the two nations become even moredeeply engaged in the international trading economyand more integrated in global nancial networks.16The two have strongly resisted efforts by the Unit-ed States and other developed nations to link globaltrade to labor and environmental standards, realizingclearly that this would put them at a huge disadvan-tage in relation to the developed world, thereby ham-pering their drive towards economic development,the number one priority for both countries. Both havecommitted themselves to crafting joint Sino-Indianpositions in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and

global trade negotiations in the hope that this mightprovide them greater negotiating leverage over otherdeveloped states. They would like to see further liber-alization of agricultural trade in the developed coun-


21/59

9

tries, tightening of the rules on anti-dumping meas-ures, and ensuring that nontrade related issues such

as labor and environment are not allowed to come tothe WTO. Both have fought carbon emission caps pro-posed by the industrialized world and have resistedWestern pressure to open their agricultural markets.

It is against an increasingly complex strategic back-ground that states such as China and India are tryingto shape their own energy policies. Their approach to-ward their energy predicament remains rather tradi-tional insofar as it is largely state-centric, supply-sidebiased, mainly reliant on oil, and tends to privilegeself-sufciency.17 It is toward an aggressive pursuitof energy resources, particularly oil, across the globethat China and India seem to have focused their diplo-matic energies in recent years, with some far-reachingimplications.

Both China and India are feeling the pressure of di-minishing oil discoveries and at-lined oil productionat a time when expansion of their domestic economiesis rapidly increasing demand for energy. They havemade energy the focal point of their diplomatic over-tures to states far and wide. More signicantly, facedwith a market in which politics has an equal, if notgreater, inuence on price as does economics, the twohave also decided to coordinate their efforts to secureenergy resources overseas. In essence, China and In-dia plan to work together to secure energy resourceswithout unnecessarily bidding up the price of thoseresources, thereby agreeing to a consumers cartel rep-resenting 2.3 billion potential consumers. Together,their combined markets and purchasing power offers

an extremely attractive partner to energy-producingstates, especially the ones that face Western pressureover their human rights records or the nature of theirpolitical institutions.


22/59

10

It has been argued by many that cooperation be-tween China and India on energy issues is the only

way ahead if both states want to gain economies ofscale and negotiation muscle. In many ways, bothstates face similar constraints in achieving energy se-curity and a coordinated approach would benet themboth. Competition only ends up driving up the costs ofacquisition, thereby diminishing future returns. Therehas been a recognition of this at the highest levels ofthe government in both states.

China and India have signed a range of memoran-da on energy cooperation that covers a full scope of ar-eas, including upstream exploration and production,the rening and marketing of petroleum products andpetrochemicals, the laying of national and transna-tional oil and gas pipelines, frontier and cutting-edgeresearch and development, and the promotion of

environment-friendly fuels.18

The two states have agreed to strengthen the ex-change of information when bidding for oil resourc-es in a third party country in order to realize mutualbenet. China has pledged to promote cooperationwith India in civil nuclear energy and to view thiscooperation in the context of climate change and in-creasing nonpolluting sources in the energy mix. Theformer Indian petroleum minister, Mani Shankar Ai-yar, made it clear that he thought that India and Chinajoining hands to bid jointly for oil and gas assets un-der a monopsonistic arrangement was much betterthan the two states competing in their quest for energyresources.19He had even oated the idea of an Asianenergy grid that might follow the trajectory of the Eu-

ropean Coal and Steel Community, which grew intothe European Union (EU). According to Aiyar, Indiaand China dont have to go through fratricide in order


23/59

11

to arrive at the conclusion that it is better to cooperateon energy security.20

From Global to Bilateral: Without Much Success.

The attempt on the part of China in recent yearshas been to build its bilateral relationship with Indiaon the basis of the larger worldview of internation-al politics on the part of both nations. As New Del-hi and Beijing discovered a distinct convergence oftheir interests on the world stage, they have used it tostrengthen their bilateral relations. They have estab-lished and maintained regular reciprocal high-levelvisits between political leaders. There has been a seri-ous attempt to improve trade relations and China hassought to compartmentalize intractable issues withIndia that make it difcult for their bilateral relation-

ship to move forward.At the global level, the rhetoric is all about cooper-

ation, and indeed the two sides have worked togetheron climate change, global trade negotiations and de-manding a restructuring of global nancial institu-tions in view of the global economys shifting centerof gravity.21 At the bilateral level, however, mount-ing tensions reached an impasse in 2009, when Chinatook its territorial dispute with India all the way tothe Asian Development Bank. There China blockedIndias application for a loan that included money fordevelopment projects in the Indian state of ArunachalPradesh, which China continues to claim as part of itsown territory.22The suggestion by the Chinese to theU.S. Pacic Fleet commander in 2009 that the Indian

Ocean should be recognized as a Chinese sphere ofinuence also raised hackles in New Delhi.23Chinaslack of support for the U.S.-India civilian nuclear en-


24/59

12

ergy cooperation pact, which it tried to block at theNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and its obstructionist

stance about bringing the terror masterminds of theNovember 2008 Mumbai attacks to justice have fur-ther strained ties.

Sino-Indian frictions are growing, and the poten-tial for conict remains high. Alarm is rising in Indiabecause of frequent and strident Chinese claims aboutthe Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh andSikkim, where Indians have complained of a dramaticrise in Chinese intrusions into Indian territory overthe last few years, most along the border in ArunachalPradesh, which China refers to as Southern Tibet.China has upped the ante on the border issue. It hasbeen regularly protesting against the Indian PrimeMinisters visits to Arunachal Pradesh over the lastfew years, asserting its claims over the territory. What

has caught most observers of Sino-Indian ties by sur-prise, however, is the vehemence with which Beijinghas contested recent Indian administrative and po-litical action in the state, even denying visas to Indiancitizens of Arunachal Pradesh. The recent rounds ofboundary negotiations have been a disappointing fail-ure, with a growing perception in India that China isless willing to adhere to earlier political understand-ings about how to address the boundary dispute.

The possibility of an intimate U.S.-India militaryrelationship has generated fears of encirclement inBeijing. Indias position astride Chinas key maritimeshipping lanes has made the prospect of a Washing-ton-Delhi axis particularly worrisome. Pakistan, ofcourse, has always been a crucial foreign policy as-

set for China, but with Indias rise and U.S.-Indiarapprochement, its role in Chinas grand strategy isbound to grow even further. Not surprisingly, recent


25/59

13

revelations about China shifting away from a 3-de-cades old cautious approach on Jammu and Kashmir,

increasing its military presence in Pakistan, planninginfrastructure linking Xinjiang and Gwadar, issuingstapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir andsupplying nuclear reactors to Pakistan, all conrm anew intensity behind Chinas old strategy of usingPakistan to secure its interests in the region. China hasgone even further than Pakistan in dening the Kash-mir issue. While Pakistan insists that Kashmir is a dis-puted territory, recent Chinese positions have made itclear that Beijing believes Pakistan occupied Kashmir(PoK) is Pakistani territory with Indias Kashmir statebeing the only part of the province that is disputed.24Pakistan seems to have ceded responsibility for theGilgit-Baltistan area of PoK to China as the reportedpresence of 7,000-10,000 Peoples Liberation Army

(PLA) troops there underscores.25

The real concern forIndia, however, is the number of projects that Chinahas undertaken in these areas, and that footprint islikely to increase.26

Chinas economic transformation has given it thecapability to emerge as a major military power as itcontinues to announce double-digit increases in itsmilitary spending. Chinas military may or may not beable to take on the United States in the next few years,but it will surely become the most dominant force inAsia. As a consequence of its growing capabilities,China has started asserting its military prole moresignicantly than before. Since 2009, Chinese vesselshave been tackling Somali pirates in the Middle East,the rst time Chinese vessels operated outside Asia.

Beijing has also started sending combat troops abroadin support of UN peacekeeping efforts.


26/59

14

Chinas sustained military build-up will continueover the next few years and will pose a challenge to

Indian military planners as the Indian militarys mod-ernization program is fast losing momentum. As thepolicy paralysis post-Mumbai has revealed, Indiaseems to have lost even its conventional superiorityover Pakistan. The real challenge for India, however,lies in Chinas rise as a military power. India is speed-ing up its defense procurement but the process re-mains mired in bureaucratese and lacks any sense ofstrategic direction.27According to an estimate by theIndian governments own China Study Group, Chinanow possesses the capability to move more than 10,000troops to the Indian border in 20 to 25 days, comparedto 3 to 6 months a decade ago.28This is possible becauseof Chinas efcient border management, and it hasforced India into urgently constructing border roads.

By engaging in repeated, though controlled, provoca-tions, the Chinese military is carefully probing howfar it can push India. The new military restiveness onthe Sino-Indian border does not bode well for Indiaas the military balance along the long and contestedborder is rapidly altering in Beijings favor. It is notwithout reason that China has upgraded its militaryand civilian infrastructure in Xinjiang and Tibet. As aconsequence, Tibet has become a militarized zone.

CURRENT ISSUES

Chinas Naval Power Projection.

China is acquiring naval bases along the crucial

choke points in the Indian Ocean not only to serveits economic interests but also to enhance its strategicpresence in the region. There is enough evidence tosuggest that China is comprehensively building up


27/59

15

its maritime power in all dimensions.29 It is Chinasgrowing dependence on maritime space and resourc-

es that is reected in the Chinese aspiration to expandits inuence and ultimately to dominate the strategicenvironment of the Indian Ocean region. Its growingreliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is aresponse to its perceived vulnerability, given the lo-gistical constraints that it faces due to the distance ofthe Indian Ocean waters from its own area of opera-tion. Yet, China is consolidating power over the SouthChina Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India,something that comes out clearly in a secret memo-randum issued by the Director of the General Logis-tic Department of the PLA: We can no longer acceptthe Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians.. . . We are taking armed conicts in the region intoaccount.30

China has deployed its Jin class submarines at abase near Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan Islandin the South China Sea, raising alarm in India as thebase is merely 1,200 nautical miles from the MalaccaStrait and will be its closest access point to the IndianOcean. The base also has an underground facility thatcan hide the movement of submarines, making themdifcult to detect.31The concentration of strategic na-val forces at Sanya will further propel China towardsa consolidation of its control over the surrounding In-dian Ocean region. The presence of access tunnels onthe mouth of the deep water base is particularly trou-bling for India as it will have strategic implications inthe Indian Ocean region, allowing China to interdictshipping at the three crucial choke points in the Indian

Ocean. The choice of Hainan is poor, but no alterna-tives exist as other places are hemmed in by islands.So Chinas chief maritime nuclear base is also what is


28/59

16

for now her southernmost point. She would want thewaters around it clear so that, among other things, no

one can track her submarines.As the ability of Chinas navy to project power in

the Indian Ocean grows, India is likely to feel evenmore vulnerable despite enjoying distinct geographi-cal advantages in the region. Chinas growing navalpresence in and around the Indian Ocean region istroubling for India as it restricts Indias freedom tomaneuver in the region. Of particular note is whathas been termed Chinas string of pearls strategythat has signicantly expanded its strategic depth inIndias backyard.32

This string of pearls strategy of bases and diplo-matic ties include the Gwadar port in Pakistan, navalbases in Burma, electronic intelligence gathering facil-ities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construc-

tion of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, amilitary agreement with Cambodia, and building upof forces in the South China Sea.33Some of the Indianclaims relating to these developments are exagger-ated as has been the case with the Chinese naval pres-ence in Burma. The Indian government, for example,had to concede in 2005 that reports of China turningthe Coco Islands in Burma into a naval base were in-correct, and that there were, indeed, no naval bases inBurma.34Yet the Chinese thrust into the Indian Oceanis gradually becoming more pronounced. The Chinesemay not have a naval base in Burma but they are in-volved in the upgrade of infrastructure in the CocoIslands and may be providing some limited technicalassistance to Burma. Given that almost 80 percent of

Chinas oil passes through the Strait of Malacca, it isreluctant to rely on U.S. naval power for unhinderedaccess to energy and so has decided to build up its


29/59

17

naval power at choke points along the sea routesfrom the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea. China

is also courting other states in South Asia by buildingcontainer ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong and in SriLanka at Hambantota. Consolidating its access to theIndian Ocean, China has signed an agreement withSri Lanka to nance the development of the Hamban-tota Development Zone, which includes a containerport, a bunker system, and an oil renery. It is pos-sible that the construction of these ports and facilitiesaround Indias periphery by China can be explainedaway on purely economic and commercial groundsbut for India this looks like a policy of containment byother means.

Chinas involvement in the construction of thedeep-sea port of Gwadar has attracted a lot of atten-tion due to its strategic location, about 70 kilometers

from the Iranian border and 400 kilometers east of theStrait of Hormuz, a major oil supply route. It has beensuggested that it will provide China with a listeningpost from where it can monitor US naval activity inthe Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea,and future US-Indian maritime cooperation in the In-dian Ocean.35 Though Pakistans naval capabilitiesdo not, on their own, pose any challenge to India, thecombinations of Chinese and Pakistani naval forcescan, indeed, be formidable for India to counter.

China would certainly like to play a greater rolein the region, protect and advance its interests, espe-cially its commerce, as well as countering India. Butgiven the immense geographical advantages that In-dia enjoys in the Indian Ocean, China will have great

difculty in exerting as much sway there as Indiacan. Chinas assertion of its naval prowess, however,is raising vexing issues regarding the role of Indian


30/59


31/59

19

the sanctity of UN Resolution 1172, which calls for In-dia (and Pakistan) to give up its nuclear weapons pro-

gram and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state.38For the samereason, China refuses to discuss nuclear condencebuilding and risk reduction measures with India. It isinteresting that a large section of Chinas political andmilitary elite views Indias nuclear tests in 1998, not asan attempt by India to address its security concerns,but rather a U.S. attempt to contain China insofar asthe United States allowed India to go nuclear.39

The U.S.-India civilian nuclear energy cooperationpact came as a shock to Beijing. China made everypossible effort to scuttle the deal until the last minute.It made its displeasure with the nuclear pact clear byasking India to sign the NPT and dismantle its nuclearweapons. Since the U.S.-India deal is in many ways a

recognition of Indias rising global prole, China, notsurprisingly, was not very happy with the outcomeand quickly declared that it would be selling new nu-clear reactors to Pakistan. It was a not so subtle mes-sage to the United States that if Washington decidedto play favorites, China also retained the same right.

Beijing viewed the nuclear deal through the lens ofthe global balance of power and was perturbed aboutthe U.S. desire to build India as a balancer in the re-gion. China was opposed to an exemption for Indiafrom the NSG guidelines, even threatening to walkout of the NSG proceedings at Vienna in 2008 in itsattempts to derail negotiations at the 11th hour. TheChinese leadership refused to receive the Indian PrimeMinisters call during the crisis. Only when the other

states were persuaded by the United States to supportthe deal and China realized that it would be the laststate standing, did it back off from its obstruction-


32/59


33/59

21

The Pakistani nuclear weapons program is es-sentially an extension of the Chinese one. Chinas

crucial role in the development of Pakistans nuclearinfrastructure is well documented. Although Chinahas long denied helping any nation attain a nuclearcapability, the father of Pakistans nuclear weaponsprogram, Abdul Qadeer Khan, himself has acknowl-edged the crucial role China has played in his na-tions nuclear weaponization by gifting 50 kilogramsof weapons grade enriched uranium, drawings ofthe nuclear weapons, and tons of uranium hexauo-ride for Pakistans centrifuges. This is perhaps theonly case where a nuclear weapons state has actuallypassed on weapons grade ssile material as well asa bomb design to a non-nuclear weapons state. TheSino-Pakistani collusion on nuclear issues has contin-ued despite China being a signatory to the NPT.

Moreover, while both India and China have a no-rst-use nuclear doctrine, Chinas doctrine is not ap-plicable to India as India is not a party to the NPT.Chinas minimum nuclear doctrine has changed tolimited nuclear doctrine, suggesting a nuclear warf-ighting capability. It has been estimated that the Chi-nese nuclear arsenal of about 500 warheads comprises200 strategic warheads, while the rest are of a tacticalnature. Those tactical warheads are deployed at about20 locations in China, including Tibet, and are well in-tegrated at the operational level. On the other hand,Indias no-rst-use pledge and minimum deterrenceposture have precluded the possession of tactical nu-clear weapons, leading to a serious operational short-coming as well as depriving India of an appropriate

level of deterrence against China. India may well haveto attain parity with Chinas strategic nuclear forces inorder to successfully counter its aggressively coercivebargaining vis--vis India.


34/59

22

Among the ve nuclear powers, it is China thatis making the most dramatic advances in its nuclear

force with the introduction and deployment of newgeneration land-based ballistic missiles and nuclearsubmarines. Sino-Indian competition in the nucleararena is intensifying after China decided to upgradeits missile facilities near Tibet in 2007, bringing targetsin northern India within range of its forces. The IndianArmy is in the process of incorporating Agni-III, itsintermediate range missile, which is capable of reach-ing all of Chinas major cities, and has successfullytested the nuclear-capable, 5,000-kilometer range Ag-ni-V ballistic missile to bolster its deterrence postureagainst China. Indias no-rst-use nuclear doctrinerelies fundamentally on a credible second strike ca-pability. The Agni-V, by bringing the Chinese heart-land into Indias missile orbit, makes the Sino-Indian

nuclear dynamic more stable than before.India has also shifted a squadron of its most ad-

vanced multirole ghter aircraft, Su-30MKI, to a basejust 150 kilometers from the disputed Sino-Indianborder. New Delhi is considering missile defensesystems, including the U.S. Patriot-3 and Israels IronDome and Davids Sling, in response to the Chinesemilitarys plan to place Dongfeng-21 medium-rangeballistic missiles on the Tibetan plateau.41 Indias in-digenous ballistic missile defense (BMD) program hasbeen accelerated and is now considered ready for inte-gration into the nations air defense assets. Its DefenceResearch and Development Organisation (DRDO)has suggested that by 201314, the system would in-clude phase-I missiles, capable of neutralizing incom-

ing missiles at the 2,000-kilometer range. With an eyeon China, phase-II will be aimed at thwarting threatsfrom missiles up to 5,000 kilometers.42 After China


35/59

23

demonstrated its test-ring capability in space, Indiahas suggested that it remains open to extending the

BMD program to that arena, although its ofcial pol-icy remains one of staunch opposition to any attemptto place weapons in space.

Border Tensions.

China has vigorously asserted its old claims alongthe border with India and has combined the assertionwith aggressive patrolling. Violating the 1993 India-China agreement on peace and tranquility on the Lineof Actual Control, Chinese troops have been engagingIndian troops in verbal abuses, asking them to leavetheir own territory. Even as India considered the Sik-kim border issue settled, repeated Chinese incursionsin the Finger Area in northern Sikkim in the past few

years are aimed at opening a fresh front against India.Beijing has decided to put the historically undisputedborder with Sikkim back into contestation. Concernsare growing about covert Chinese intrusions into theIndian territory to strengthen its claims on the disput-ed border areas. Chinese forces are regularly intrudinginto Bhutanese territory at the tri-junction with Indiaand destroying Indian Army posts.43These incursionsare strategically aimed as they are precariously closeto Indias chicken-neckthe Siliguri corridor whichlinks the northeast passage. Chinese intrusions intothe nondelineated parts of Bhutans northern borderwith Tibet are also aimed at forcing Bhutan to settle itsboundary issue with China. In April 2013, a Chinesemilitary patrol set up camps several kilometers within

the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control. This wasthe rst time since 1986 that Chinese troops have re-fused to vacate their positions after being discovered.


36/59

24

After it emerged that the Chinese patrol had pitchedcamp in the Despang area of Ladakh, Indian media

reported that two Chinese helicopters violated Indianairspace in an attempt to provide air cover to the sol-diers. New Delhi summoned the Chinese ambassadorimmediately and sent military reinforcements to theregion. It took China 3 weeks to order the military togo back.

Chinas rapid expansion and modernization of itstransport infrastructure across the border is forcingIndia to respond though India is already decades be-hind. The build-up of infrastructure in Tibet shouldhave rung alarm bells in Delhi long back, but no re-sponse was forthcoming. Chinas transportation mod-ernization plans across the Himalayas had been evi-dent for decades. Yet India chose to be lackadaisicalin its approach without demonstrating a sense of ur-

gency that this critical national security requirementdemanded. Improved infrastructure helped China torapidly deploy troops in Tibet when riots broke outthere in 2008. The railway link between Beijing andLhasa further tightens Chinas grip on Tibet. Chinasambition is to extend the Beijing-Lhasa rail line to Ya-tung just a few miles from Sikkims Nathu La and sub-sequently extend this to Nyingchi, north of ArunachalPradesh, at the tri-junction with Myanmar. Chinasambitions about the development of its border areascontrast vividly with Indias tentative stance on infra-structure development.

Chinas transformation of the transport infrastruc-ture in Yunnan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, the provinces thatborder South Asia, and its decision to build road and

rail networks across the borders of these areas hastransformed geopolitics in Indias vicinity. India isstruggling to cope with the decay in its border infra-


37/59

25

structure.44It has only recently started building sever-al tactically important roads along the China border in

the eastern and western sectors. A number of airstripsare being upgraded so as to give India the ability todeploy a large number of troops in forward areas onshort notice. Myanmar has agreed to allow China touse its land to build a highway to connect Kunmingin its southeast with Chittagong in Bangladesh. Oncebuilt, the highway will allow China direct access tothe Bay of Bengal, and it will run very close to thenortheastern Indian states of Tripura and Mizoram.China has set up an in-house training facility for Su-30ghter aircraft pilots of the Indonesian Air Force atthe Hasanuddin Air Base where the unit is based. Asa result, Chinese pilots will be ying much closer toIndias Andaman Nicobar Islands.

The penetration of China into the Indian intel-

ligence apparatus is growing to the consternation ofmany. Indias premier National Informatics Centre,which governs and hosts all government websites aswell as computers of the Prime Ministers Ofce, theMinistry of External Affairs, several Indian embassies,the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and the DalaiLama were infected by GhostNet, a China-based cyberespionage network.45Though this came to light in ear-ly 2009, it has been going on for the last several years.China has been giving cyber warfare serious thoughtand has incorporated it into its military planning andstrategy by encouraging civilian computer hackers topenetrate the computer networks of key political andmilitary leaders in countries ranging from the UnitedStates to Japan, Taiwan, India and South Korea.


38/59


39/59

27

advisor and special envoy to China, M. K. Narayanan,has openly accused Chinese hackers of attacking

his website, as well as those of other governmentdepartments.49

An elite consensus is evolving in India that Chi-nas rise is posing problems for the country. We arefriends, not rivals, said the Chinese Premier in Indiain 2010.50But a growing number of Indians now seeChina as a competitor, if not a rival. A 2010 Pew pollsuggested that only 34 percent of Indians held a fa-vorable view of China, with four in 10 viewing theirneighbor as a very serious threat.51More damagingis the perception gaining ground in India that Chinais the only major power that does not accept India as arising global player that must be accommodated. Thediscord between the two countries thus remains en-trenched, and their increasing economic strength and

geopolitical standing has only underlined their rapid-ly growing ambitions. Though it is not entirely clearif China has well-dened policy objectives vis--visIndia, Beijings means, both economic and military,to pursue its goals are greater than at any time in therecent past. In response, a process of military consol-idation and build-up of key external partnerships isunderway in India.

Between 2010 and 2016, India is expected to spend$112 billion on capital defense acquisitions in what isbeing described as one of the largest procurementcycles in the world.52The Indian Army is raising twonew specialized infantry mountain divisions (35,000soldiers) and an artillery brigade for ArunachalPradesh aimed at redressing the imbalance on the

Sino-Indian border. It is also revising its conventionalwarghting doctrine that is aimed at deterring as op-posed to dissuading China though its meaning in op-


40/59

28

erational terms remains far from clear. The Indian mil-itary is currently rening a two-front war doctrine

to fend off Pakistan and China simultaneously. Bothfrontsthe northeastern one with China and north-western one with Pakistanare being given equalattention. If attacked by Pakistan and China, Indiawill use its new integrated battle groups to deal quickdecisive blows against both simultaneously.

The Indian Navy is aiming for a total eet of 140-145 vessels over the next decade, built around two car-rier battle groups: theAdmiral Gorshkov, handed overto India in November 2013, and the indigenous car-rier, the 37,500-ton STOBAR Air Defense Ship likelyto be completed by 2015. Indias ambition to equipits navy with two or more aircraft carriers over thenext decade as well as its decision to launch its rstindigenous nuclear submarine are seen as crucial for

power projection and to achieve a semblance of stra-tegic autonomy. Indias emerging capability to put acarrier task force as far as the South China Sea and thePersian Gulf has given a boost to the Indian Navysblue-water aspirations and India hopes to add a thirdaircraft carrier by 2017, ensuring that the Indian Navyhas two operational carriers at any given time.53Thedeployment of the Jin class submarine at Hainan byChina will also force India to speed up its indigenousnuclear submarine project that has been in the makingfor more than a decade now with the Indian Navy,rather ambitiously, aiming at the induction of ve in-digenous advanced technology vehicle (ATV) nuclearsubmarines. A submarine-based nuclear arsenal isconsidered critical by Indian strategists to retain a

second-strike capability.The Indian Navy took command in January 2012

from Russia of the nations rst nuclear-powered


41/59

29

submarine since Indias last such vessel was decom-missioned in 1991. With the induction into the Indian

Navy of the Russian Akula-II class submarine K-152Nerpanow known as INS ChakraIndia becomesthe worlds sixth nation to operate a nuclear poweredsubmarine.54

INSChakradoes not really add to Indias nuclearmuscle as it will not be armed with long-range nuclearmissiles. For that, the Indian Navy is still waiting forINSArihant, an indigenous nuclear submarine, whichis undergoing sea trials and is slated to become fully op-erational in 2014.55INSArihantwas formally launchedby the Indian Prime Minister in 2009. This highly se-cretive project took more than a decade to completeand will ll out Indias nuclear triad, with the subma-rines ballistic missiles giving India a second strikecapability.

What INSChakrawill do is to restore some muscleto Indias underwater combat capability, which hasbeen steadily depleting with only 14 conventional sub-marines holding forth. The Indian Navy has also lostcritical expertise in maintaining and operating nuclearsubmarines, and INS Chakra is expected to be usedfor training sailors as well. India had leased a Rus-sian Charlie-class nuclear submarine from the formerSoviet Union in 1988 for 3 years. Indian naval plan-ners are looking at nuclear attack submarines as animportant element of their denial strategy (aimingto deny opponents ability to use the sea, but withoutseeking to control it themselves), and as a response toany adversarys sea control strategy. Not only doesa nuclear submarine enhance Indias credibility as a

major global military power, it is also seen as crucialin cementing the Indian Navys blue-water status.


42/59

30

India is using its naval forces to advance its dip-lomatic initiatives overseas and in particular towards

shaping the strategic environment in and around theIndian Ocean. Indian interests converge with those ofthe United States in the Indian Ocean region, and itis trying to use the present upswing in U.S.-India tiesto create a more favorable strategic environment foritself in the region despite its historic sensitivities tothe presence of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean.56TheUnited States has also recognized the importance ofIndias role in the region as was evident in Secretaryof State Colin Powells 2001 contention that it wasimportant for the United States to support Indiasrole in maintaining peace and stability in the IndianOcean and its vast periphery.57 More recently, in itsrst maritime service strategy update in 25 years, theUnited States views its sea power as the primary in-

strument in the U.S. defense arsenal to deter conictwith China, and cooperation with other countries na-val services, including Indias, is recognized as crucialto fullling the strategic imperatives in the region.58The U.S. and Indian navies have stepped up their jointexercises, and the United States has sold India the USSTrenton (renamed INS Jalashwa), the rst of its classto be inducted into the Indian Navy and marking amilestone in the U.S.-India bilateral ties. The UnitedStates would like India to join its Container SecurityInitiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative(PSI) but India remains reluctant. PSI is viewed asa U.S.-led initiative outside the UN mandate whilethe CSI would result in the presence of U.S. inspec-tors in Indian ports, making it politically radioactive.

However, India has indicated that it would be will-ing to join the U.S.-proposed 1,000-ship navy effortto combat illegal activities on the high seas, given the


43/59


44/59

32

support in the building of Chahbahar port in Iran aswell as the road connecting it to Afghanistan is an an-

swer to the Chinese-funded Gwadar port in Pakistan.Indias air base in Kazakhstan and its space moni-toring post in Mongolia are also geared primarilytowards China.

Indias Look East policy, originally aimed atstrengthening economic ties with its Southeast Asianneighbors, has now led to naval exercises with Sin-gapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. The Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member stateshave joined the Indian Navy in policing the IndianOcean region to check piracy, trafcking, and otherthreats to sea lanes. Indian engagement of East Asiain the post-Cold War era has assumed signicant pro-portions and remains a top foreign policy priority forthe Indian leadership. The government of P. V. Nara-

simha Rao launched its Look East policy in the early-1990s explicitly to initiate Delhis re-engagement withEast Asia. Over the years, India has come to haveextensive economic and trade linkages with variouscountries in the region even as there has also been agradual strengthening of security ties. Present IndianPrime Minister Manmohan Singh has made it clearthat his governments foreign-policy priority will con-tinue to be East and Southeast Asia, which are poisedfor sustained growth in the 21st century.

India, too, has an interest in protecting the sea lanesof communication that cross the South China Sea toNortheast Asia and the United States. As Indias pro-le rises in East and Southeast Asia, it is asserting itslegitimate interests in the East Asian waters. As China

expands its presence in South Asia and the IndianOcean region, India is staking its own claims in EastAsia. Most signicant in this regard is Indias growing


45/59

33

engagement with Vietnam. India has decided to workwith Vietnam to establish a regular Indian presence in

the region as part of a larger Delhi-Hanoi security part-nership, with Vietnam giving India the right to use itsport of Nha Trang. Delhi and Hanoi have signicantstakes in ensuring security of sea lanes and prevent-ing sea piracy, while they also share concerns aboutChinese access to the Indian Ocean and South ChinaSea. Indian strategic interests demand that Vietnamemerge as a major regional player and India is wellplaced to help Hanoi achieve that objective. It has beenargued in Indian strategic circles that just as China hasused states in Indias periphery to contain India, Delhishould build states like Vietnam as strategic pressurepoints to counter China.63A common approach on theemerging balance of power is developing with Indiaand Vietnam both keen on reorienting their ties with

the United States as their concerns about China rise.India has also accelerated its naval engagement

with a number of Persian Gulf states, making portcalls and conducting exercises with the navies of Ku-wait, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UnitedArab Emirates as well as engaging with the navies ofother major powers in the region such as the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom (UK), and France. It hasalso been suggested that to more effectively counterChinese presence in the Indian Ocean and to protectits trade routes, India will have to seek access to theVietnamese, Taiwanese, and Japanese ports for theforward deployment of its naval assets.64 India is al-ready emerging as an exclusive defense service pro-vider for smaller states with growing economies that

seek to strengthen their military capabilities in South-east Asia and West Asia, such as Vietnam, Indonesia,Malaysia, Singapore, Qatar, and Oman, providing it


46/59

34

access to ports along the Arabian coast, Indian Ocean,and South China Sea.65

India has moved to build strategic partnershipswith many states that share its apprehensions aboutChina: the United States, Russia, Japan, Vietnam, In-donesia, and South Korea. Indias Look East policythat started primarily as an attempt to try and inte-grate Indias newly liberalizing economy with that ofthe Asian tigers has now evolved into a more robustmilitary-to-military partnership with important statesin the region. India is providing support to Vietnamto enhance and upgrade the capabilities of its threeservices in general, and its Navy in particular. Indiais training Malaysias Su-30 pilots and the Singa-porean Army practices on Indian soil using canton-ments and ring ranges. Indian warships now regu-larly visit countries across the region from Australia to

Singapore and Indonesia.While economic ties between India and South

Korea have been diversifying across various sectors,defense cooperation between the two states has alsogathered momentum, reecting the rapid changes inthe Asia-Pacic regions balance of power caused byChinas rise. In 2005, India and South Korea signeda Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Coop-eration in Defense, Industry, and Logistics, which wasfollowed in 2006 by another MoU on cooperation be-tween the two countries coast guards. South Koreais one of the worlds leaders in naval ship-buildingtechnology, and India would like to tap into South Ko-rean naval capabilities to augment its own. As a result,naval cooperation is rapidly emerging as a central

feature of bilateral defense working together with thetwo navies cooperating in anti-piracy operations inthe Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden.66Both


47/59


48/59

36

Ignoring pressures from Beijing, India also decid-ed to take part in the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for

Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in Oslo, Norway, in No-vember 2010. Beijing asked several countries, includ-ing India, to boycott the ceremony or face its displeas-ure, describing the prize as open support for criminalactivities in China. India was among the 44 states thatdecided to participate, even as states such as Pakistan,Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq were among thenations that did not attend. There were suggestionsthat the Chinese Premier might cancel his India tripin response, but nothing of the kind happened. Like-wise, after Beijing began issuing stapled visas to theresidents of Jammu and Kashmir and then denied avisa to the head of the Indian Armys Northern Com-mand, New Delhi reacted forcefully and hinted thatit was ready to review its long-standing Tibet and

Taiwan policies. India also declined to endorse theone China policy during Wens visit to India, a de-parture from past statements.70 These developmentsare further evidence that India is reassessing its policytoward China as the latters faster-than-expected risehas challenged the fundamentals of New Delhis tradi-tional approach to Beijing. Indias robust partnershipwith the United States, its burgeoning ties with Eastand Southeast Asian nations as part of its Look Eastpolicy and its military modernization are all aimed atmanaging Chinas dramatic rise.

Indian policy trajectory toward China is evolvingas India starts to pursue a policy of internal and exter-nal balancing more forcefully in an attempt to protectits core interests. The government is trying to fashion

an effective response to the rise of China at a time ofgreat regional and global turbulence. Though it is notentirely clear if there is a larger strategic framework


49/59

37

shaping Indias China policy, Indias approach towardChina is indeed undergoing a transformation, the full

consequences of which will only be visible a few yearsdown the line.

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE SINO-INDIAN MATRIX

With Sino-Indian friction growing and the po-tential for conict remaining high, the challenge toIndia is formidable. India is increasingly bracketedwith China as a rising or emerging poweror evena global superpowerthough it has yet to achievethe economic and political prole that China enjoysregionally and globally. Indias main security concerntoday is not the increasingly decrepit state of Pakistanbut rather an ever more assertive China, whose ambi-tions are likely to reshape the contours of the regional

and global balances of power with deleterious conse-quences for Indian interests.

Indias ties with China are thus gradually becomingcompetitive, with a sentiment gaining ground amongIndian policy elites that China is not sensitive to In-dias core security interests and does not acknowledgeits status as a global player. India is rather belatedlygearing up to respond to Chinas rise with a mix ofinternal consolidation and external partnerships. Themost important element in this matrix is Indias emerg-ing strategic partnership with the United States. NewDelhi has looked to Washington for support as bothSino-Indian and Sino-U.S. competition has come intosharper relief in recent years. As Sino-Indian ties passthrough a phase of turmoil, Washington will have to

play the critical role of a balancer with even greater -nesse than before. The United States has a key stake inthe trajectory of Sino-Indian ties in view of the chang-


50/59

38

ing balance of power in Asia and Chinas growing as-sertiveness. As a new balance of power takes shape,

India will be an indispensable element in that archi-tecture, even as the United States remains a key playerin managing the Sino-Indian dynamic. New Delhi willnot be part of an explicit alliance framework with theUnited States against China but instead will look tothe United States to manage the power transition inAsia and its attendant consequences.

The dichotomy between China and Indias globalconvergence and their growing bilateral divergencehas allowed India to collude with China as a powerbloc against Western positions at the global level, evenas at the bilateral level New Delhi is not averse to le-veraging its relationship with Washington in order toconstrain China. Indias burgeoning relationship withthe United States gives New Delhi some crucial stra-

tegic room to maneuver. Chinas rapid global ascentwill bring the United States and India even closer, butIndias traditional desire to retain strategic autonomywill preclude the emergence of any formal structuredening this bilateral relationship. India is beginningto receive attention from Washington as a rising pow-er on a par with China. This process should continuewith U.S. policymakers viewing Asia as a single re-gion whose future will to a large extent be shaped bythe trajectory of Sino-Indian ties. Americas defenseties with India should be mature enough to deal witha range of problems in the Indo-Pacic. For this, thedefense establishments in both states need to be awareof each others requirements. That process has onlyjust begun and needs greater political direction.

The United States faces the prospect of an emerg-ing power transition in Asia, and a robust partnershipwith India will go a long way towards stabilizing the


51/59

39

strategic landscape in the region. This is especiallytrue at a time when Chinas faster-than-expected rise

is generating widespread apprehensions. The UnitedStates should encourage New Delhi to enhance itspresence further in East and Southeast Asia. Thatprocess is already underway, but India needs to do abetter job of articulating its readiness to emerge as acredible actor in the region. The United States can helpby encouraging its allies and partners in the region toengage with India more substantively.

Although it is clearly in the interest of both Chinaand India to stabilize their relationship by seeking outconvergent issue areas, a troubled history, coupledwith the structural uncertainties engendered by theirsimultaneous rise, is propelling the two Asian giantson a trajectory that they might nd rather difcult tonavigate in the coming years. Pursuing mutually de-

sirable interests does not inevitably produce satisfac-tory solutions to strategic problems. Sino-Indian tieshave entered turbulent times, and they are likely toremain there for the foreseeable future.

ENDNOTES

1. M. Krasna, Three Main Stages in the Development of Sino-

Indian Contacts During the Indian Freedom Movement, ArchivOrientalni,Vol. 49, No. 3, 1981.

2. India-China, Agreement between the Republic of India andthe Peoples Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse Between Ti-bet Region of China and India, April 29, 1954, available from www.commonlii.org.

3. For a detailed account, see S. Hoffmann, India and the China

Crisis, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990. Also anearlier account by N. Maxwell, Indias China War, London, UK:Jonathan Cape, 1970, is quite critical of Nehru and his ForwardPolicy.


52/59

40

4. India-China, Joint Press Communiqu, December 23, 1988,available from www.fmprc.gov.cn.

5. China is Threat No.1, Says Fernandes, Hindustan Times,May 3, 1998.

6. A. B. Vajpayee, Letter [to William Clinton], The New YorkTimes, May 13, 1998.

7. A. Joseph, When to Seek Resolution of Border Dispute,Indian Express, March 15, 2005.

8. India-China, Declaration on Principles for Relations and Com-prehensive Cooperation Between the Peoples Republic of China and theRepublic of India, June 23, 2003, available from www.fmprc.gov.cn.

9. A. Baruah, China Keeps Its Word on Sikkim, The Hindu,May 7, 2004.

10. J. Dixit, A New Security Framework, The Telegraph (Kol-katta), May 17, 2004.

11. M. Singh, Address to the Nation, June 24, 2004, avail-able from meaindia.nic.in.

12. India-China,A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the Peo-ples Republic of China and the Republic of India, January 15, 2008,available from www.fmprc.gov.cn.

13. Ibid. It also had something of particular interest to India:

The Indian side reiterates its aspirations for permanentmembership of the UN Security Council. The Chinese sideattaches great importance to Indias position as a majordeveloping country in international affairs. The Chineseside understands and supports Indias aspirations to play agreater role in the United Nations, including in the SecurityCouncil.

14. India-Russia-China Axis Hinted at After Kosovo Strikes,The Associated Foreign Press, March 28, 1999. Also see Russia,China, India Pile up Pressure on West over Kosovo, The IndianExpress, New Delhi, India, March 26, 1999.


53/59

41

15. James Clad, Convergent Chinese and Indian Perspectiveson the Global Order, Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding,eds., The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs toKnow, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 267293.

16. Ibid.

17. Edward R. Fried and Philip H. Trezise, Oil Security: Retro-spect and Prospect, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,1993, p. 1.

18. Siddhartha Varadarajan, India, China Primed for EnergyCooperation, The Hindu, Chennai, January 13, 2006.

19. Pranab Dhal Samanta, N-energy, UN: China and IndiaSignal Friendship, Not Rivalry, The Indian Express, New Delhi,India, January 15, 2008.

20. Vandana Hari, India and China: An Energy Team? Busi-ness Week, December 6, 2005.

21. For a broad discussion about the Sino-Indian convergenceon global issues, see Harsh V. Pant, The

China Syndrome: Grap-pling With an Uneasy Relationship,New Delhi, India: HarperCol-lins, 2010, pp. 15-36.

22. China Blocked Indias ADB Plan over Arunachal, Con-rms Krishna, Indian Express, July 10, 2009.

23. Yuriko Koike, The Struggle for Mastery of the Pacif-ic, Project Syndicate, May 12, 2010, available from www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/koike5/English.

24. C. Raja Mohan, A New Challenge, Indian Express,August 31, 2010.

25. Selig S. Harrison, Chinas Direct Hold on PakistansNorthern Borderlands, International Herald Tribune, August26, 2010.

26. Pranab Dhal Samanta, More than Troops, Chinese Proj-ects in PoK Worry India, Indian Express, September 5, 2010.


54/59

42

27. On the problems confronting Indian defense policy,see Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aim-ing: Indias Military Modernization, Washington, DC: BrookingsInstitution, 2010.

28. SandeepUnnithan, Indian Army not Ready for War withChina, India Today, October 29, 2011.

29. Thomas Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power,London, UK: Frank Cass, 2002, p. 139.

30. Youssef Bodansky, The PRC Surge for the Strait of Ma-lacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US, Defense and For-eign Affairs Strategic Policy, Washington, DC, September 30, 1995,pp. 6-13.

31. Manu Pubby, Chinas New N-Submarine Base Sets OffAlarm Bells, Indian Express, May 3, 2008.

32. Bill Gertz, China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes, TheWashington Times, January 18, 2005.

33. For a detailed explication of the security ramications ofthe Chinese string of pearls strategy, see Gurpreet Khurana,Chinas String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and Its SecurityImplications, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 2008,pp. 1-22.

34. For a nuanced analysis of this, see Andrew Selth, Chi-nese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth, Re-gional Outlook Paper No. 10, Brisbane, Australia: Grifth AsiaInstitute, 2007.

35. Ziad Haider, Oil Fuels Beijings New Power Game, YaleGlobal Online, available from yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/oil-fuels-beijings-new-power-game.

36. Manu Pubby, Indian Submarine, Chinese Warships TestEach Other in Pirate Waters, Indian Express, February 5, 2009.

37. Ben Bland and Girija Shivakumar, China Confronts IndiaNavy Vessel, Financial Times, August 31, 2011.


55/59

43

38. China Against India, Pakistan Joining Nuclear Club,Press Trust of India, June 29, 2004.

39. Andrew Scobell, China and Strategic Culture, Carlisle, PA:Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002, p, 19,available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/down-load.cfm?q=60.

40. Mark Hibbs, Pakistan Deal Signals Chinas GrowingNuclear Assertiveness, Nuclear Energy Brief, Washington, DC:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 27, 2010,available from www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/04/27/pakistan-deal-signals-china-s-growing-nuclear-assertiveness/4su.

41. Dai Bing, India and Chinas Great Game in Full Swing,China.org.cn, October 22, 2010.

42. Siddharth Srivastava, India Hones Its Missile Shield,Asia Times, April 16, 2011.

43. Nirmalya Banerjee and Amalendu Kundu, ChineseTroops Destroy Indian Posts, Bunker, Times of India, December1, 2007.

44. See C. Raja Mohan, Drawn In at the Borders, South AsiaMonitor, September 18, 2010.

45. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Chinas E-Espionage, IndiaToday, March 30, 2009.

46. For a good typology of Indias China debate, see MohanMalik, Eyeing the Dragon: Indias China Debate, Special As-sessment, Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacic Center for Security Studies,December 2003, available from www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/ChinaDebate/ChinaDebate_Malik.pdf.

47. PM Warns on Chinas South Asia Foothold, IndianExpress, September 7, 2010.

48. Rajat Pandit, Assertive China a Worry, says Antony,Times of India, September 14, 2010.


56/59

44

49. Chinese Hacked PMO Computers, says Narayanan,Indian Express, January 19, 2010.

50. Jim Yardley, In India, Chinese Leader Pushes Trade, TheNew York Times, December 16, 2010.

51. For details of this poll, see Key Indicators Database:Opinion of China, Percent Responding Favorable, All Years Mea-sured, Washington, DC: Pew Global Attitudes Project, availablefrom pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=12&response=Favorable&mode=table.

52. Opportunities in the Indian Defence Sector: An Over-view, KPMG, May 1, 2010, available from www.kpmg.com/IN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ThoughtLeadership/Opportunities_in_the_Indian_Defence_Sector.pdf.

53. Manu Pubby, 3rd Aircraft Carrier to be Inducted by 2017:Antony, Indian Express, May 17, 2007.

54. INS Chakra Inducted into Navy, The Hindu, April4, 2012.

55. K. V. Prasad, INS Arihant on track, The Hindu,December 3, 2011.

56. On the recent trends in U.S.-India ties, see Harsh V. Pant,Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: IndiaNegotiates Its Rise in the International System, New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2008, pp. 19-38.

57. Colin Powell, US Looks to Its Allies for Stability in Asiaand the Pacic, International Herald Tribune, January 27, 2001.

58. United States: New Naval Strategy, International HeraldTribune, October 25, 2007.

59. Sandeep Dikshit, Join Global Policing of Sea Lanes, USAsks India, The Hindu, April 19, 2007.


57/59

45

60. On India-Japan maritime cooperation, see GurpreetKhurana, Security of Sea-Lanes: Prospects for India-JapanCooperation, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 1, January 2007,pp. 139-150.

61. On Indias strategic priorities in the Asia-Pacic, see HarshPant, India in the Asia-Pacic: Rising Ambitions with an Eye onChina,Asia-Pacifc Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, May 1, 2007 pp. 54-71.

62. Yevgeny Bendersky et al., Indias Project Seabird and theIndian Oceans Balance of Power, Power and Interest News Report,July 20, 2005.

63. Bharat Karnad, Good Morning Nam, Asian Age, July7, 2011.

64. Mohan Malik, Chinese Strategy of Containing India,Power and Interest News Report, February 6, 2006.

65. Pranab Dhal Samanta, Start Getting Used to DSP: De-fence Services Provider, Indian Express, January 1, 2008.

66. Siddharth Varadarajan, As Trade Soars, India and KoreaPush Strategic Side to Ties, The Hindu, March 25, 2012.

67. Indrani Bagchi, Japan, India Can Restore Peace, Stabilityin Asia-Pacic Region, Times of India, April 28, 2012.

68. Anubhuti Vishnoi, MEA Gives Nod to IGNOU for Doc-torate to Dalai Lama, Indian Express, April 24, 2011.

69. Pleasing Beijing, Govt Tells its Ministers Dont AttendDalai Lama Honour Function, Indian Express, November 4, 2007.

70. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Chinas Flip-Flop on Kashmir,Hindustan Times, April 15, 2011.


58/59

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo IIICommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTEand

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Steven K. Metz

AuthorDr. Harsh V. Pant

Editor for ProductionDr. James G. Pierce

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil


59/59

Documents

The Growing Complexity of Sino-Indian Ties