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7/23/2019 The Group: Successes and Failures of the United States Special Operations Campaign in Vietnam
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TheGroup
SuccessesandFailuresoftheUnitedStates
SpecialOperationsCampaigninVietnam
AndrewMullikin
PreparedforDr.PhillipKarber
GOVT451GeorgetownUniversity
7December2012
Contact:[email protected]
Figure1:TheunofficialSOGinsignia,
designedbymenassignedtotheunit.
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Mullikin1
Youveneverlivedtillyouvealmostdied
Forthosewhofightforit,
Lifehasaflavor
Theprotectedwillneverknow.
SOGmotto1
Introduction
Anofficial1988studybytheJointChiefsontheconductofthewarinVietnam
simplynotesthattheMilitaryAssistanceCommand-VietnamsStudiesand
ObservationsGroup2providedadviceandassistanceintheareasofresearchand
development,combatdevelopment,andclandestineactivitiesinadditiontoevaluatingSPARreports[SignificantProblemsAreaReport]andrecommending
coursesofactionand/ormethodswhile[coordinating]and[monitoring]
clandestineactivities,suchascross-borderreconnaissanceandoperations3
However,SOGwasafarmoredynamicandimportantunitthansuchabland
descriptionwouldseemtoindicate,conductingsomeofthemostdangerous
reconnaissancemissionsintheVietnamWar.Thefollowingpaperexaminesthe
Groupsantecedents,formation,structure,personnel,andtacticsindetail;the
GroupscontributionstothewarinVietnam,anditseffectivenessinachieving
operationalandstrategicgoals,areanalyzedthroughoutthepaper.
ThewarinVietnamwasacomplicatedaffair,andforthatreasontheSOG
operationsdiscussedherearepaintedinbroadstrokes.TheworkofProjectsDelta,
1
As written by Larry Trimble, Jim Lamotte, and Ricardo Davis. Quoted in John L. Plaster, SecretCommandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG, Simon and Scheuster, NewYork, NY. 2004, p. xi.2
When SOG was founded, the acronym stood for Special Operations Group; it was changed tothe Studies and Observations Group for purposes of operational security in the summer of1964.3Records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam: Part 1. The War in Vietnam, 1954-1973,
MACV Historical Office Documentary Collection, ed. Robert E. Lester, (Bethesda, MD: UniversityPublications of America, 1988).
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Sigma,andOmegapriortotheirmergerwithSOG,4forexample,isnotcoveredhere,
despitethesimilaritiesbetweentheirmissionsetandthatoftheSOGreconteams.
Itsalsoimportanttonotethatthescopeoftheactivitiesoftheseunitsremains
largelyclassifiedtothisdaythosegovernmentdocumentsthathavebeen
declassifiedare,ingeneral,redactedsoheavilythatprecisenumbersandother
concretedataforSOGsoperationsisvirtuallynonexistent.TheJointChiefsstudy
referencedabove,forexample,includesonlytwoadditionalreferencestoSOG,both
ofwhicharepubliclyunavailable.Forthatreason,muchofthefollowingtextrelies
heavilyonpersonalmemoirsofthosewhoservedwithSOG,andanalyticaltextson
theeffortsofAmericanunconventionalwarfarespecialistsinVietnamandother
partsofSoutheastAsia.
TheStudiesandObservationsGroupwasanimportantassetintheAmerican
prosecutionoftheVietnamWar,anditspersonnelclearlyrankamongthemost
valorousofalltheunitsthatservedduringthatwar.UnfortunatelytheGroupwas
misusedbothoperationallyandstrategically,anditscombatandcommand
experienceinVietnamofferimportantlessonstomodernspecialoperations
missions.AsMajorDannyKelleynotes,
Determiningamoreeffectiveuseofmilitaryresourcestomeetthestrategic
goalofdefeatinginternationalterroristsandthenationswhosponsorthemisa
difficultproblem.Inthepast,policymakersfacedsimilarproblemsintryingto
determinehowtodefeatagrowingcommunistinsurgencyinSouthVietnam.TheUSemployedamixtureofDODclandestineoperations,CIAcovertaction
forces,andconventionalmilitaryunitsintheprosecutionoftheconflict.5
RecognizingwhereSOGanditshighercommandwentwrongisakeytaskin
developingamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofmodernspecialoperations
missionsatthetactical,operational,andstrategiclevels.
4
Programs similar in design to SOG but operating under the authority of the 5th
Special ForcesGroup. For more information, see Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces1961-1971. Washington: Department of the Army, 1973. Print.5
MAJ Danny M. Kelley, The Misuse of the Studies and Observations Group as a National Assetin Vietnam, 2005, at , p. 4.
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Origins
SOGgrewfromrootsintheU.S.ArmySpecialForces,whichinturnowedits
earlyexistencetoveteransoftheWWIIOfficeofStrategicServices(OSS)andotherguerrillacampaignsinboththeEuropeanandPacificTheatersofthewar.Menlike
BrigadierGeneralDonaldBlackburn,Col.ArthurBullSimons,Col.AaronBank(an
OSSveteranwholaterbecamethefirstcommanderofthe10thSpecialForces
Group),andotherswhogainedhard-wonunconventionalwarfareexperience
fightingbehindenemylinesduringWWIIandtheKoreanWarwerethefoundersof
awholenewtypeofunconventionalwarfightingdoctrinewithintheUSmilitary.
RecognizingtheArmysneedforapermanentunconventionalwarfarecapability,
GeneralRobertMcClure(thentheheadoftheArmysOfficeoftheChiefof
PsychologicalWarfare)establishedaSpecialOperationsDivisionin1951.That
organizationwaseventuallyrenamedtheSpecialForcesDivisionandwas
dedicatedtosupportingpartisangroupsinoperationssimilartothoseoftheOSSin
WWII.Fiveyearslater,thegrouphadagainchangednames,becomingtheUSArmy
SpecialWarfareCenter,andwasdeployingunitsaroundtheworld.6
ThefirstArmySpecialForcesdeploymentstoSouthVietnamarrivedinJune
1956,whenadvisorsfromthe14thSpecialForcesGroupweresenttotrainSouth
Vietnamesetroops.WithAmericaninvolvementinVietnamescalatingin1961,
attentionturnedtoSpecialForcesPresidentKennedysfavoritemilitary
organizationasawaytoprovidemoretangiblesupporttoSouthVietnamslargely
ineffectivearmywithoutthepoliticalramificationsoflarge-scaleconventionaltroop
deployments.7WhiletheSpecialForcesteamstrainedSouthVietnamesetroops,
notablyincludingtheelite1stObservationGroup,theKennedyadministration
taskedtheCIAwithprovidingthemanpowerandresourcesforacovertwar
6Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of UnconventionalWarfare. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Print, pp. 54-57. Note: this brief history of the Army SpecialForces does not do justice to the innovative men who founded the organization. For moreinformation on the Green Berets, Adams text is an excellent place to start.7
Ibid, p. 78.
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againsttheNorth,formalizingtheseordersinNationalSecurityAction
Memorandum(NSAM)52,signedbyPresidentKennedyon11May1961. 8
OperationWhiteStar
ThemodelforSOGoperationsdevelopedoutofanotherSpecialForces
deploymenttoSoutheastAsia,inwhichtwelveeleven-mantrainingteamsweresent
toLaosunderthecommandoftheMilitaryAssistanceAdvisoryGroupLaos,
formallyestablishedon19April1961. 9WhiletheseSFoperatorshadbeenquietly
trainingthegenerallyineptLaotianmilitaryalongsideCIAoperativeforseveral
years,theprogramwassignificantlyexpandedandmadeofficialbythe
establishmentofMAAG-Laos.Initially,theSFsoldiersservedalmostexclusivelyinatrainingrolewhilealsogatheringintelligencefortheCIA.Eventually,teamsbegan
deployingintothefieldwiththeirunits,servingasfullcombatadvisorsand
executingthefirstAmericancombatassignmentinSoutheastAsia.Stantonnotes
thatthisdeploymentwasimportantbecauseoftheSpecialForcesnewroleasan
instrumentofAmericanstrategy:
ByvirtueofPresidentKennedysbeliefinitsindividualandcollectiveexcellence,
theSpecialForcesbecametheprinciplecounterinsurgencyforceoftheUnited
States.ThewartimeSpecialForceswasforgedinthejaggedLaotianmountainsandforestplateausindirectcontrasttoitsintendedwartimemissionasguerrillacadre.InLaos,asinVietnam,SpecialForcessoldiers
wereemployedaselitetroopstoexecutelong-rangespecialmissions,tolead
normalinfantry,andtotrainremote,indigenousminorities.Actualmissions
againsttrueenemyguerrillabandswererare,andtheSpecialForceswasnever
allowedtopenetratedeniedareastoestablishguerrillaunits.10
Interestingly,theWhiteStarteamsinLaosenjoyedexcellentrelationshipswith
theCIAoperativesworkinginthecountry,allowingthemtooperateeffectively
withoutworkingthroughthebureaucracyestablishedbytheMAAGcommand.
8
Robert M. Gillespie, Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG, (Annapolis,MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), pp. 4-5.9
Shelby L Stanton. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 19561975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Print, p. 22.10
Ibid, pp. 30-21.
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UnfortunatelythisrelationshipwouldchangeinVietnam,probablyinpartdueto
thefailureofCIAcovertoperationstherepriortotheGroupsestablishment.
OperationLeapingLena
By1963,theCIAhadfailedtodeliverpositiveresultsfromitscovertwarfare
campaignagainstNorthVietnam.DespitePresidentKennedysinitialorders,the
CIAhadfocusedmostofitseffortsintheSouth,fearingthattheirintelligence
networkswouldbedegradedwithoutconstantsupervision.WhileCIAoperationsin
SouthVietnamincludedparamilitaryandcounterterrorismcampaigns,operations
inNorthVietnamwerelimitedtoagentteaminfiltrationforintelligencecollection
andpsychologicaloperationsincludingleafletdropsandradiobroadcasts.SuchoperationswereafarcryfromKennedysorderstobuildaninsurgentmovement
againsttheCommunists.GiventheshortcomingsoftheCIAprogram,
responsibilitiesforcovertandclandestineoperationswereslowlytransitioned
awayfromtheAgencyandassignedtothenewlyformedStudiesandObservations
Group.Thetransitionbetweentheseprogramstookroughlyayear,duringwhich
timetheCIAstilltooktheleadonallblackoperationsinSoutheastAsia.
Itwasduringthisperiodthatthefirstcross-borderreconnaissancemissionswereemployedintheVietnamWar.Recognizingthatwhateverwashappeningin
Laosaerialreconnaissancehadfailedtodeliverreliableintelligencerequiredthe
seriousattentionofAmericanstrategists,DefenseSecretaryRobertMcNamara
resolvedtosendteamsdrawnfromtheArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam(ARVN)
andtrainedbyUSSpecialForcestroopsonreconnaissancemissionsacrossthe
Laotianborder.Despitewarningsfromasenior-rankingSpecialForcesofficerthat
themissionswouldfailunlessGreenBeretswereassignedtoleadtheunits,
McNamaraorderedtheteamsformedandreadytodeploywithinthirtydays.
Thesereconnaissanceoperations,codenamedLeapingLena,wereadministered
bytheCIAandtrainedbySpecialForcessoldiersfromthe5thSFGroup.Theeight
teamswereeachmannedbyfiveVietnamesecommandos,andwereinsertedinto
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dropzonesalongHighway92inLaosbetween24Juneand1July1963. 11
Unfortunately,alleightteamswereinterceptedbyNVAtroopsoperatinginside
Laos,withthemajorityoftheirmemberseitherkilledorcaptured.Onlyfourofthe
originalfortymenescapedbacktoSouthVietnam.12IntheaftermathofLeaping
Lenasfailure,itwasclearthattheNVAhadasubstantialpresenceinLaos,butno
onecouldbesureexactlywhattheCommunistforcesweredoinginthearea.The
taskoffindingoutwouldbehandedtoSOGanditsnewcommander,WWII
unconventionalwarfarespecialistCol.DonaldBlackburn.
FormationandOrderofBattle
TheinitialdemandforanenhancedspecialoperationscapacityinVietnamstemmedfromhigh-rankinggeneralsdisapprovaloftheunconventionalwarfare
tacticsthenemployedbySpecialForcesunitsinVietnam.Ratherthantrainingthe
VietnamesetofightthehallmarkofunconventionalwarfareMajorGeneral
WilliamB.Rossoninparticulararguedforanexpansionoftheater-wideU.S.covert
operations.ThisresultedinOperationsPlan34A,whichcalledfor:
1. AnexpansionoftheVietnamese1stObservationUnit,whichtasked
indigenoustroopswithcovertandclandestineoperationsagainstNorth
VietnamwithsupportfromtheCIAandArmySpecialForces.
2. CIAandSpecialForcestrainingofreconnaissanceteamstobeinfiltrated
intosouthernLaos,wheretheyunitswouldlocateandattackNVAbases
andlinesofcommunication,allunderlightciviliancover.
3. Establishmentofcompany-sized(100-150man)Vietnameseassaultunits
fordeploymentagainsttargetstoolargeforthereconnaissanceteams.
11
The exact number of men assigned to these units is unclear in the literature. The numberspresented here are from Mike Guardia. Shadow Commander: The Epic Story of Donald D.Blackburn - Guerrilla Leader and Special Forces Hero. Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2011. Print, p.166. Unfortunately even Guardias text has some discrepancies regarding the Leaping Lenateams; I have reported his most consistent numbers.12
Ibid.
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4. ThedevelopmentoftheSouthVietnameseArmyscapabilitytolaunch
light-infantry(Ranger)raidsintoNorthVietnam.
5. RegularflightsoverCommunist-heldareasforthedisseminationof
propagandamaterialstobothharassNVAforcesandhelpmaintain
moraleofanti-CommunistresidentsofNorthVietnam.
PresidentJohnsonapprovedOpPlan34AinJanuary1964,andon24JanuarySOG
wasbornoutofGeneralOrder6fromtheMilitaryAssistanceCommand-Vietnam
Headquarters.AccordingtoAdams,MACV-SOGwastobeajointunconventional
warfaretaskforceresponsibleforspecialoperationsinBurma,Cambodia,Laos,
NorthandSouthVietnam,andborderareasofChinaitwastobethejointservice,
unconventional-wartaskforceforSoutheastAsia13GiventheCIAsfailureto
expanditsoperationalmandateunderNASM52beyondSouthVietnam,theSOG
operationswerethefirsttrulytheater-wideAmericancovertandclandestineduring
theVietnamWar.
UnfortunatelythenewcommandsrelationshipwithMACVheadquarterswas
rockyfromthestart.DespiteSOGsdirectsubordinationtoMACVheadquartersin
Saigon,thecommandsmissionsrequiredapprovalfromtheJointChiefsofStaff.In
practicethisapprovalwasdelegatedtotheSpecialAssistantforCounterinsurgency
andSpecialActivitiesatthePentagon,andresultedinasignificantlagbetweenthe
openingofawindowofopportunityforadecisivecovertoperationandtheactual
approvalandexecutionofthatoperation.Severalsourcesalsoindicatethatthe
MACVcommandstaffwashesitanttoplaceitsfullconfidenceinthepoorly
understoodspecialoperationsunitsassignedtoSOG.Asaresult,SOGwasnever
constitutedasaformal,independenttaskforce.14
Perhapsevenworsethanthiscommandrelationship,staffofficersassignedto
SOGdidnotenjoythesupportandcooperationoftheCIA,despitetheAgencys
13
Adams, p. 118.14
Ibid, p. 119.
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previousexperiencerunningcovertoperationsinthetheater.ThefewCIAofficers
assignedtoSOGwererestrictedtothePsychologicalOperationssection,wherethey
hadlittleimpactonthemajorityofSOGmissions.Evenmoreproblematic,the
positionofSOGdeputy,or01,wasreservedforaCIAliaisonofficer,butLangley
neverassignedanofficertothepost.Somesourcesevengosofarastosuggestthat
theCIAwantedtokeepitsdistancefromSOG.15Thecombinationofthesetwo
factorsmeantthatthenewSOGcommandwasforcedtobeginitsoperationsin
SoutheastAsiawithoutsignificantsupportfromitspredecessororitshigher
headquarters.
Organization
TheSOGcommandwasinitiallyassignedsixofficersandtwoenlistedmen,led
byCol.ClydeR.Russell,whohadservedwiththe101stAirborneDivisionduring
WWII,butlackedrealexperiencefightingunconventionalwarfare.Drawingfrom
15
Adams, p. 119-120.
Figure2:SOGOrganizationalStructure.TheGroundStudiesGroup,SOG35,wasthebranchresponsible
forcross-borderreconnaissanceoperations.
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hisconventionalbackground,RussellorganizedSOGalongtraditionalmilitarylines,
withseparatedivisionsforvariousadministrativeactivities.
Asthecommanddeveloped,itsforcestructureeventuallyincludedan
assortmentofspecialoperationsunits,includingArmySpecialForces(Green
Berets),NavySEALs,ReconnaissanceMarines,andCIAagents,inadditiontoalarge
complementofindigenousmercenariesincludingVietnamese,ChineseNungs,
Montagnards,andCambodians.Giventheclandestinenatureoftheunititishardto
tellhowmanyoperationalpersonnelwereworkingforSOGatanyonetime,butin
1970thecommandhad383authorizedpersonnel(downfrom394attheendof
1969).However,totalcontributionsfromtheArmy,AirForce,MarineCorps,CIA,
andindigenousgroupsbroughtupthetotalto10,210personnelreportingtothe
SOGchiefinSaigon.16AccordingtoAdams,thevastmajorityofthesepersonnel
whichtheauthorreferstoas2,000Americansand8,000Vietnamesewerefrom
theUSArmyandVietnameseSpecialForcesunits.ThepersonnelassignedtoSOG
frombranchesotherthantheArmyasidefromsmallnumbersofUSNavySEALs
andtheirVietnamesecounterpartswereprimarilysupportstaff,includingtheair
andmaritimetransportationcomponentsofSOG.17,18
16
Gillespie, p. 197.17
Adams, p. 119.18
According to Col. Francis J. Kelly, the US Marine Corps contribution to special operationsmissions in Vietnam came largely before the creation of SOG, running from 1962-1964. (See,Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971. Washington:Department of the Army, 1973. Print, p. 162.)
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SOGeventuallyestablishedthreeoperationalheadquarters:Commandand
ControlNorth(CCN)inDaNang,CommandandControlCentral(CCC)inKontum,
andCommandandControlSouth(CCS)inBanMeThuot(seemapabove).Theseheadquarterswereservicedbyforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)strategicallylocated
withinashorthelicopterrideofinsertionsitesclosetotheCambodianandLaotian
borders.19Allofthesesiteswerecloselycompartmentalized,withstrongcover
storiestokeeptheircovertoperationssecret.TheCCCinsertionsiteatDakTo,for
example,washometoanAmericanengineerbattalionandemergencymedical
bunker,providingplausibledeniabilitytoitssecondaryroleasabasetorefueland
rearmhelicoptersflyinginsupportofSOGscross-bordermissions,andasastaging
groundforthoseinsertions.TheinsertionsitesalsohousedBrightLightunits:
reconteamsstagedforemergencyextractionsandpersonnelrecoverymissions
19
By the end of the war SOG operated six FOBs throughout South Vietnam (Guardia, p. 170).
Figure3:MapofthreeoperationalSOGheadquarters.
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behindenemylines. 20ThusSOGteamsrotatedfrommajorSOGinstallationsdirectly
tothesecovertinsertionsites,executingmissionsandreturningbacktotheir
headquarters,sometimesafteronlyafewhoursontheground,butoccasionally
afterweeklongoperationsinenemyterritory.
Figure4:AerialviewofCommandandControlNorth,DaNang.
Combatforcesattheregionalcommandandcontrolhubswereorganizedinto
reconnaissanceteamswhenJohnPlasterarrivedatKontum,eighteenteamswere
fullymannedwithanadditionalsixauthorizedbutwithoutsufficientmanpowerto
gointothefield.EachteamwascomposedofthreeAmericanoperatorsin
Plasterscase,allGreenBeretsandnineindigenoussoldiers,andnamedforan
Americanstate,forexample,RTTexasorRTCalifornia.OtherSOGregional
commandcentersuseddifferentnamingsystems;reconteamsfromCCSatBanMe
Thuotwerenamedfortools,whilethosebasedatCCNwerenamedforpoisonous
snakes,likeRTCopperhead,ledbyRicardoDavisuntilhisdeathinCambodia.
20
Plaster, p. 46.
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RecruitmentandTraining
JohnPlastersmemoirofservicewithSOGprovidesareadyexampleofthe
dedicationshownbythemenwhovolunteeredforservicewiththeunit.After
enlistingintheArmyatage18,freshoutofhighschool,PlasterattendedAirborne
SchoolatFortBenning,GeorgiabeforebeingselectedtoattendSpecialForces
training,followingasimilarpipelinetomodern18Xenlistees.21Afterintensive
trainingwiththeSpecialForcesTrainingDetachmentatFortBragg,Plaster
deployedtoVietnamwiththe5thSpecialForcesGroup,initiallyassignedtoaSignals
Company.Atthebehestofanoldfriend,Plasterfakedhisordersandvolunteeredto
gotoCommandandControlNorth,hopingtofindhiswayintoSOG.Uponarrival,
PlasterandtheothernewmenwerebriefedbytheCCNcommander,Lt.Col.Jack
Warren,whomadetheimplicationsofrunningcovertoperationsinVietnamcrystal
clear:
Youwillnotkeepadiaryorjournal,[Warren]ordered.Yourlettersare
subjecttocensorship.Youareforbiddentotellanyoneoutsideherewhatyou
aredoing.WetrainVietnameseandMontagnards,thatsall.Onpaperwe
belongtothe5thSpecialForcesGroup.Inreality,weworkforSOG.22
Unfortunately,themenwhofinallymadetheirwayeitherbyselectionor
accident,asinPlasterscasetojointheranksofSOGwereingeneralill-prepared
forcovertwarfare.Pre-missiontraining,likealmosteveryotheraspectofservice
withSOG,wasinformalandlargelybasedonthewhimsandpastexperiencesofthe
teamsOne-Zero.23Reconteamsweregenerallyallowedoneortwoweeksto
21
The U.S. Army 18X programalso referred to as direct entry or Initial Accessionsprovidesyoung men the opportunity to enlist specifically to attend the Special Forces Assessment andSelection program.22 Plaster, 29-30.23
One-Zeros were recon team leaders, in charge of two other Americans (referred to as One-Ones and One-Twos, denoting their rank in the team hierarchy) and several indigenousmercenaries, usually Vietnamese, Montagnard, or Cambodians recruited and funded by SOGmoney. Plaster explains that rank was irrelevant in the choice of a One-Zero: Some One-Zeroswere not their teams highest-ranking man Here in SOG, rank did not determine leadership;experience and ability meant far more than the stripes or bars a man wore. (Plaster 37). Theauthor offers several examples of SOG officers, including a lieutenant colonel in charge of
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prepareformissions,butthetrainingtheyconductedatleastaccordingto
Plasterrarelyprogressedbeyondbasicimmediateactiondrills.Newly-
constitutedteams,orteamsreformedwithonlyoneortwoveteransremainingfrom
theirpreviousiterations,weregivenabriefthreeweekstobringtheirindigenous
soldiersuptospeed,formingamission-ready,greenteamdespitesignificant
languageandculturalbarriers.24
Equipment,Weapons,andLogistics
MuchlikemodernAmericanspecialoperationsforces,SOGunitssucceededin
partduetothetoolstheycarriedintocombat.Inadditiontobasicsmallarms
(whichsometimesperformedpoorlyinthefield)SOGcommandersleveragedsignificantexternalassetstomovetheirunitsaroundtheunitssecretbattlefieldsin
LaosandCambodia.
PlasterencounterstheSOGtransportationnetworkearlyuponhisarrivalin
SouthVietnam,whenheisorderedtoboardaplanetoKontum,thenaforward
operatingbaseunderthecommandofCommandandControl-North,butlaterhome
toCommandandControl-Central.HedescribestheC-130,normallyastandard
transportcraft,butspeciallymodifiedinthiscaseforSOGoperations:
NicknamedaBlackbirdbecauseofitsdistinctblackandforestgreenpaintscheme,theplanesnoseboreafoldedyoke,partofaspecialapparatusfor
extractingsecretagentsfromtheground.ItsU.S.insigniawerepaintedon
removablemetalplates,sotheyeasilycouldbetakenoff.InsidetheC-130,the
cargocompartmentsforwardthirdwascurtainedoffwithawarning:TOP
SECRET.Squeezedintotheremainingseatswasasmorgasbordofpassengers
reconnaissance units at Kontum, going into the field under the command of young StaffSergeants serving as One-Zeros.24
While almost all indigenous recruits to SOG had previously served with and been extensivelytrained by other U.S. forcesgenerally Special Forces teams operating throughout SouthVietnamtheir ability to serve effectively with SOG recon teams left much to be desired. Plasterrecounts using toy soldiers to teach basic infantry tactics to Montagnard mercenaries who weregenerally illiterate, learning tasks by rote, and lacking basic mathematic skills, which theyovercame by counting one, two, three, many (Plaster, 162).
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Chinese,Vietnamese,Americansincivilianclothes,armedandunarmedGreen
Berets,andnondescriptAsianswhosenationalityIcouldnotevenguess.25
Withconcernsoverdeniabilityrelaxedbyaround1970,SOGalsohadahandin
developingcloseairsupporttactics,specificallyfortheAC-130gunship,aheavily
armedgroundattackaircraftthathasbeendeployedbyUSSOCOMforcloseair
supportmissionsinAfghanistanandIraq,andaspartoftheNATOinterventionin
LibyainMarch2011.
Intermsofpersonalfieldkit,SOGunitswereinitiallyhighlyrestrictedinterms
oftheweaponsandgeartheycouldcarryintothefield.Inordertomaintainthe
UnitedStatesplausibledeniabilityofsendingtroopsintotechnicallyneutralLaos
andCambodia,reconteamsdeployingacrosstheborderweresterilethey
carrieduntraceablegear,woreAsian-madeuniformswithoutnametapesorrank
insignia,andcarriedno
identificationcardsor
dogtags.SOGteams
oftendeployedwith
foreignweapons,
includingAK-47sandBritishandSwedish
silencedsubmachine
guns.Iftheunitscame
intoheavycontactonthe
ground,theywere
essentiallyontheirown;
earlySOGmissionswere
notallowedaccesstotacticalairsupport,acriticalfeatureofmodernsmall-unit,
especiallyspecialoperations,tactics.Theserestrictionswerelaterrelaxed,allowing
moreandmoreSOGoperatorstocarryAmerican-madeweaponstheCAR-15,a
25
Plaster, 28.
Figure5:RTMaine,1970.DressedinNVAfatiguesandcarryingmostlyforeign
weapons,thisreconteamisreadytodepartfromCCC.
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forerunnertothemodernM4carbine,wasareconfavoriteandtorelyon
helicoptergunshipandfightersupportinextremeemergencies,providedthe
limitedassetsdedicatedtocross-bordersupportwereavailable,andnotoccupied
withotherteamsemergencies.
Tactics
Between1967andApril1972,OPS-35[thereconnaissancegroupresponsible
forcross-bordermissions]conducted1,398reconnaissancemissions,38platoon-
sizedpatrols,and12multi-platoonoperationsinCambodia.Duringthesame
period,itcaptured24prisonersofwar.26Giventhesizeoftheunit,andthecombat
attritionthatconstantlykeptmanpoweratsub-optimallevels,thesheernumberofmissionsrunbySOGisextremelyimpressive.SOGteamsinthefieldalsodisplayed
uncommonvalor;JerryMadDogShriver,forexample,oncefamouslyrepliedtoan
officerconcernedthathewasabouttobeoverrunbycalmlystating,Nosweat.Ive
gotemrightwhereIwantemsurroundedfromtheinside.27
Despitetheseextremecasesofbravado,SOGoperationswereamongthe
deadliestinthewaraccordingtoMeyer,Theunitexperiencedanincredible
casualtyrateofexceeding100percent-meaningthatatonetimeoranother,every
manservinginthatunitwaswoundedatleastonce28Thedangerassociatedwith
serviceinSOGcamelargelyfromtheunitshighoperationaltempoandwidespread
areaofoperations,whichwas,forthemostpart,restrictedtoaustere,deniedaccess
areasbehindenemylines.SOGteamsconductedland,sea,andairoperationsin
NorthVietnam,Laos,andCambodiaareasforbiddentomostotherAmericanunits.
Furthermore,SOGteamshadaroleineverymajoreventoftheconflict,including
26
Capturing an NVA soldier was the ultimate coup for a SOG recon team, providing highercommand with a rare opportunity to interrogate a prisoner, and earning the returning team aweeklong R&R in Taiwan. Unfortunately the act of securing a prisoner was incredibly difficult;prisoners were often killed in the inevitable run and gun firefight that erupted after a recon teamsecured its prize.27
Plaster, p. 21.28
John Stryker Meyer,Across the Fence [Kindle Edition], SOG Publishing, 2011.
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theGulfofTonkinairoperationsoverNorthVietnamtheTetOffensivethe
secretbombingandgroundincursionintoCambodia,thePhoenixProgram,andthe
SonTayRaid.29Whileindividualunitsweregivenaweekofstanddowntime30
afteramission,thelimitednumberofteamsavailabletoSOGcommandersmeant
that,atanyonetime,multipleteamsfromeachregionalheadquarterswere
deployedbehindenemylines.Atanoperationallevel,sheerweightofnumbers
madeSOGoperationsextremelydangerous.
Thesituationwasmorecomplexatthetacticallevel.Duetodemandsfrom
higherheadquartersinSaigon,officiallymission-readyteamsteamsthatwere
sometimespoorlypreparedandlackinginsufficientunitcohesionwereoftensent
intothefieldwithdireconsequences.AccordingtoPlaster,Youcouldsaytheydied
frombadluckorbadfieldcraft,butIthoughttheydiedfromtoolittletime,not
enoughchancetolearnfrommistakesinSOG,justonemistakeandyoucouldbe
dead.31Whilethisstatementislikelytrueforanycombatoperationinanywar,the
isolationofSOGteamsoperatingoutsideSouthVietnamraisedthestakesofthe
game.ForSOGoperators,especiallyreconmen,deathwasnotadistant
afterthought,butastatisticalinevitability.Onaverage,areconteamleaderaOne-
Zerohadbeenonroughlyeightmissionspriortotakingcommandofateam.
GiventhehighcasualtyrateofSOGreconnaissanceunits,fivemoremissionsandthe
youngsergeantwasaseniorteamleaderandalmostastatisticalanomaly.
AccordingtoPlaster,bythetimehehadtwentymissionsbehindhim,itwasa
wonderthathewasstillalive.32ThebestavailablestatisticsforSOGcasualtiesnote
29
Gillespie, 258.30
Post-mission stand down times were good for both informal discussions of effective recontactics and blowing off steam from the stress of recon missions. SOG operators had access toseemingly endless beer and hard liquor at their base NCO clubs, which were funded by sellingalcohol illegally to underage American troops. While these rowdy weeks off perpetuated thestereotype of SOG men, and Special Forces soldiers as a whole, as undisciplined and unreliable,the process of hot washing missions immediately after their conclusion has been formalizedamong modern American special operations units, especially Delta Force and the Naval SpecialWarfare Development Group (SEAL Team Six).31
Plaster, p. 48.32
Plaster, p. 51.
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thatoverthecourseofnineyearsofcovertoperations,163menwerekilledin
actionwithanadditional80listedasmissing.33,34
ThedangerofSOGmissionslaynotonlyinthejobstheywereexpectedtodo,
butalsointhelogisticsofinsertingandextractingmenbyhelicopterdeepbehind
enemylines.Teamswerefrequentlyinsertedonlytoimmediatelycomeunder
heavyfire,aswasthecasewithJerryMadDogShriversfinalmission,inwhichhis
reconteamwasinsertedtoalandingzoneonlytomeetimmediateoverwhelming
fire,leadingtothedeathsofthreeAmericansoldiers.35
HopingtominimizethecasualtiesincurredwhenreconteamswereinPrairie
FireemergencysituationsindangerofbeingoverrunbyNVAforcesSergeantMajorCharlesT.McGuire,aninstructorattheMACVRecondoSchool,developedthe
McGuireHarnesstorapidlyextractmenfromlandingzoneswithoutneedingto
actuallypullthemupinto
ahoveringextraction
helicopter.Essentially
Swiss-stylerappelling
seats,McGuireHarnesses
wereusedeffectivelyin
thefieldinemergency
scenarios.Unfortunately,
thetimespentdangling
beneathhelicopterswhile
stillsubjecttoNVA
groundfireexacteditstoll
33
Gillespie, p. 258.34
If these statistics seem grim, consider them from the NVA perspectiveby 1969 SOG hadachieved a kill to loss ratio of 150:1 (Guardia, p. 177).35
Plaster, p. 127; Jack Murphy, The Legend and Truth of Jerry Mad Dog Shriver, SOFREP (1October 2012) [Accessed 2012.11.20].
Figure6:SOGsoldierspracticeanotherextractionmethod-climbingouton
ropeladders.
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onSOGreconmen;PlastertellsthestoryofRTVermontsattemptedrescueofa
missingSOGoperatoronthegroundinLaos,whenFirstLieutenantJimBirchimwas
lostafterflyinginaMcGuirerigforanhourandahalf.36
TheextremevalorshownbySOGoperatorsinthefieldensuredthatPurple
Heartswerenottheonlymedalswonbymenassignedtothereconteams.Sergeant
(laterColonel)BobHowardaccordingtoPlasterthemostdecoratedU.S.soldier
sinceWWIIwasnominatedfortheMedalofHonortwicebeforefinallywinning
theawardonhisthirdnomination;healsowontwoDistinguishedServiceCrosses,a
SilverStar,fourLegionofMeritawards,fourBronzeStars,andeightPurpleHearts.
Operations
SOGoperationsunderthefirstChief,Col.Russell,werelimitedinscopeand
failedtogenerateanynewintelligenceonNVAoperationsoutsideSouthVietnam.
Col.DonaldBlackburnimmediatelyexpandedRussellsoperationsupontaking
commandofSOGinMay1965,twomonthsafterthefirstAmericancombattroops
36
Plaster, p. 57.
Figure7:BobHowardcarriesanNVAprisonerofwarcapturedbyRT
Texasawayfromthehelicopterlandingpad.
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weresenttoSouthVietnam,andalmostayearafterthefailureofthefirstUS-
sponsoredreconnaissancemissionsintoLaos.
OperationShiningBrass37
Blackburnimmediatelyorderedastudyforcross-borderoperationsdesigned
tofocusonamoreimmediateproblemtheinfiltrationcomingdownfromthe
North.38Blackburnsplancalledforsmalltrainingteamstobeinsertedacrossthe
LaotianbordertoreconnoitertheHoChiMinhtrailatthetimeunderstoodtobe
littlemorethanamountainpath.EventuallyBlackburnsplanbecameknownas
OperationShiningBrass,anditwastobeexecutedinthreephases:first,
reconnaissanceteamswouldlocateNVAlogisticalcorridorsinLaosandreportbackwiththatintelligence;acompany-sizedexploitationforcewouldthenbedeployed
intotheareatoeliminatethecriticaltargetsidentifiedinPhase1;inthethirdphase,
AmericanandindigenouspersonnelassignedtoSOGwouldinfiltrateLaosand
organizeunitsofLaotiannativestofightagainsttheNVA.39WhiletheJointChiefs
werehesitanttoapproveoftheplan,ShiningBrasswaseventuallygivenagreen
lighton21September1965.Afterestablishingtheparametersoftheoperation,
BlackburnsfirstreconnaissanceteaminsertedintoLaoson18October1965.40By
theendoftheyear,eightmissionshadbeenlaunchedintoLaos,sixofwhichhad
returnedwithsignificantintelligenceonNVAmovementsinthearea.
WhileBlackburnwasforcedtorelinquishcommandofSOGon1July1966SOG
commanderswereonlyallowedtoserveone-yeartourshelaterstatedIdont
thinktheresanyquestionastotheeffectivenessoftheShiningBrassOperationIt
37
Later renamed Operation Prairie Fire.38
Col. Donald Blackburn, quoted in Guardia, p. 167.39 Guardia, pp. 168-169.40
The US Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, was wary of the political ramifications ofAmerican soldiers operating inside Laos. Sullivan initially restricted the movements of SOGteams to boxes of roughly ten to fifteen square kilometers, and tried to prevent SOG teams fromutilizing round-trip helicopter insertions. By sheer force of personality, Blackburn convincedSullivan of the necessity of helicopters, but it wasnt until the intelligence value of the reconmissions had been substantiated that Sullivan allowed an expansion of their area of operationsinside Laos. Guardia, pp. 169-170.
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identifiedandlocatedtheso-calledHoChiMinhtrailnetworkalongwhich,in
October1965,theNVAhaddeployedroughly30,000logisticalandsupporttroops,
notincludingtheroughly4,500NVAcombattroopsinfiltratingSouthVietnamalong
thetraileachmonth.41Gen.Westmoreland,theMACVcommander,wasequally
impressed,andSOGoperationsweresignificantlyexpandedin1966andafterward.
OperationDanielBoone42
By1967theGroupssuccessesinShiningBrasshadbeensowellreceivedthat
theprogramwasexpandedtoincludeCambodiainmissionsinitiallyknownas
OperationDanielBoone.Forroughlyayear,ProjectsSigmaandOmegahadbeen
runningmissionsintoCambodia,resultinginsignificantdisputesbetweenthe5th
SpecialForcesGroupandSOG.InpitchestotheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,
theJointChiefs,andtheStateDepartment,bothorganizationsclaimedtheyshould
taketheleadinrunningreconnaissancemissionsinCambodia.SOGwonout,
claimingthatthe5thGroup,operatingundertheauthorityoftheMilitaryAssistance
Command-Vietnam,lackedauthorizationforoperationsoutsideSouthVietnam.
SOGtookoverSigmaandOmegaon3September1967. 43
SeveralnewSOGbaseswereestablishedtomanagethemissionsinCambodia,includingCommandandControlSouthatBanMeThuot.AccordingtoTurkoly-
Joczik,From1967throughApril1972,OPS-35conducted1,398reconnaissance
missions,38platoon-sizedpatrols,and12multi-platoonoperationsinCambodia.
Duringthesameperiod,itcaptured24prisonersofwar.44
Stand-DownandOperationCommandoHunt
The1968TetOffensiveleftNVAandVietCongforcesoperatinginSouth
Vietnamdecimated,andtheoperationwasanundeniablemilitaryvictoryfortheUS
41
Guardia, pp. 171-177.42
Later renamed Operation Salem House.43
Gillespie, pp. 122-123.44
LTC Robert L. Turkoly-Joczik, "SOG: An Overview." Special Operations.Com. N.p., n.d. Web.2012.11.20. .
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andSouthVietnam.UnfortunatelythepoliticalfalloutintheUnitedStateswas
considerable,leadingtoamajorturningpointinthewar.Whileofficersassignedto
MACVuniversallyagreedthatthecommunistsshouldbepushedtothewallby
intensifiedbombingcampaigns,assaultsintoNVAsanctuariesinCambodiaand
Laos,andpossiblyeventhreateningtheNorthwithagroundinvasion,theJoint
ChiefsandPresidentJohnsondisagreed.InreturnforanagreementfromHanoito
seriouslynegotiateWashingtonterminatedthebombingcampaign;allofSOGs
northernoperationswereterminatedaswell.45
Withthebombingcampaignsuspended,NVAforcesweresendingmoretroops
andmaterieldowntheHoChiMinhtrailthaneverbefore.Withanincreasing
numberofaircraftavailableforbombingmissions,AirForceunitsweregiven
permissiontolaunchmoresortiesagainsttheNVAtargetstravelingalongthetrail
aspartofOperationCommandoHunt.SOGunitsweretaskedwithassessingthe
resultsofthesemissions,resultinginasignificantincreaseintheunitsoperational
tempo.Themenassignedtothesebombdamageassessment(BDA)missions
eventuallycametodespiseandevenfearthem;often,theaerialviewoftheeffects
ofthismassivebombingwasdeceiving,andreconteamswerefrequentlygreeted
withwell-organized,functionalfightingunitsupontheirinsertion.Theresultsof
thesecontactsoftenresultedinheavycasualties,aswasthecasewitha24April
1969raidontheheadquartersoftheCentralOfficeforSouthVietnam(COSVN),
whichAmericanstrategistsunderstoodtobethemaincommandofcommunist
forcesoperatingintheSouth.Inthisraid,SOGlostatleastthreemenandsuffered
dozensofwounded.46
OperationLamSon719
TheintelligencegatheredbySOGreconnaissancemissionsconclusivelyproved
thatthelogisticalsupportofNVAunitsoperatinginLaosandCambodiawasakey
45
Gillespie, pp. 132-133.46
Those killed on this raid included SOG legend Jerry Mad Dog Shriver. Gillespie, pp. 181-182.
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reasonbehindthecommunistssuccessinSouthVietnam.BothAmericanandSouth
VietnamesestrategistsagreedthatanattempttointerdicttheNVAsupplylines
acrosstheborderhadtobemade.Theinitialplansforanattackacrosstheborder
todisruptthecommunistsafehavensweredevelopedatMACVheadquartersin
SaigoninearlyDecember1970.
SOGteamswerebarredfromparticipatingintheattack,however,fortwo
reasons:theUSSenatesCooper-ChurchAmendmenttothe1970ForeignMilitary
SalesAct,47whichprohibitedUSgroundforcesfromparticipatinginthemissionat
all;andthefactthatallavailablehelicopterassetsinthetheaterweretiedupin
supportoftheconventionalSouthVietnameseattack.
Unfortunately,LamSon719wastoolittle,toolate.Withoutthesupportof
Americangroundtroops,theSouthVietnameseoffensive(launchedon8February
1971)stalledandwaseventuallyrepelled,forcedtowithdrawon25March.Despite
SOGsexhaustiveeffortstoreconnoitertheTrail,andCol.Blackburnsinitialplanto
sendSOGtroopsintotheareatocuttheTrailwiththehelpofindigenousguerrillas,
theGroupnevergotthechancetoexecutethatmission.48
TransitiontoStrategicTechnicalDirectorateandWithdrawal
InanticipationoftheUSdisengagementfromthewar,boththeMACVstaffand
seniorSouthVietnamesemilitaryleadersbegantransitioningtheburdenofcombat
operationstoSouthVietnameseforces.SOGoperationsinparticularwereslowly
drawndownin1970-1971,withoperatorscontinuingtoperformBDAs,gather
intelligence,anddirectairstrikesuntilthefinalSOGreconmissionwaslaunched
intotheAshauValley(oneoftheHoChiMinhTrailskeyentrypointsintoSouth
Vietnam,andtheprimarytargetoftheOperationLamSon719)inDecember1971.
47
The original amendment passed in the Senate, but was defeated in the House. A revisedversion was passed by both houses and enacted on 5 January 1971. 48
Gillespie, pp. 227-228.
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Inanattempttokeepupintelligence-gatheringoperationsbasedontheSOG
model,theGroupwasreplacedbytheVietnameseStrategicTechnicalDirectorate
(STD),aunitmannedbyVietnameseSpecialForcessoldiersandsupportedbya
groupof155SpecialForcessoldiers.Unfortunatelyseveralmembersofthe
minorityethnicgroupsthatservedalongsidetheAmericansinSOGrefusedtowork
withtheVietnamese,resultinginasignificantlossofinstitutionalknowledgeof
runningcross-borderreconnaissancemissions.WhilemanyformerSOGoperators
remainedinVietnamworkingwiththeSTD,themajorityofthosewhohadrun
reconnaissancemissionswiththeGrouptransitionedelsewhere.Unfortunatelythe
STDgenerallystruggledtoexecuteoperationsontheSOGmodel,andcollapsed
whenthelastSFsoldierswithdrewinMarch1973.49
PresidentialUnitCitation
TheStudiesandObservationsGroupwasawardedthePresidentialUnitCitation
(Army)on4April2001.TheceremonyhostedalltheformercommandersofSOG
stillalive,andallformermembersofSOGremainingonactiveduty.Portionsofthe
citationarereproducedbelow:
TheStudiesandObservationsGroupiscitedforextraordinaryheroism,greatcombatachievementandunwaveringfidelitywhileexecutingunheraldedtop
secretmissionsdeepbehindenemylinesacrossSoutheastAsia.Incorporating
volunteersfromallbranchesoftheArmedForces,andespecially,USArmy
SpecialForces,SOGsground,air,andseaunitsfoughtofficiallydeniedactions,
whichcontributedimmeasurablytotheAmericanwareffortinVietnam.[]
Despitecasualtiesthatsometimesbecameuniversal,SOGsoperatorsneverwavered,butfoughtthroughoutthewarwiththesameflair,fidelity,and
intrepiditythatdistinguishedSOGfromitsbeginning.TheStudiesandObservationsGroupscombatprowess,martialskillsandunacknowledged
sacrificessavedmanyAmericanlives,andprovidedaparagonforAmericas
futurespecialoperationsforces.50
49
Adams, p. 127.50
Qtd. in Gillespie, p. 264.
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Strategy:theGroupsOverallImpactontheWar
SOGreconnaissancemissionswereessentiallytaskedwithdeveloping
intelligenceanddisruptingtheNVAsafehavensinLaosandCambodia,wherecommunistforceshadevictedlocalinhabitantsandsetupmassiverear-area
logisticalsystems,whichwereusedtoresupplyandreinforceNVAcombatunits
fightinginSouthVietnam.AccordingtoaretiredU.S.ArmyLieutenantColonel,
DepartmentofDefenseanalysisclaimsthat:
SOGoperationsprovidedaconsiderableamountofintelligencedatato
WashingtonandSaigononNorthVietnamesetroopmovementsalongthose
portionsoftheHoChiMinhTrailthatwerepatrolledbytheOPS-35forces.
Becauseofthesereconnaissanceefforts,U.S.plannershadafairlyclearpictureofenemyforcesinthesanctuariesandalongthetrailbyearly1969.51
Unfortunatelyhighercommandoftenmisinterpretedtheintelligencesupplied
bySOGreconteams,usingtheinformationtojustifytheexpansionofoperations
thathadlittlepositiveeffectontheground.Aperfectexampleofthisphenomenon
weretheinitialbombdamageassessment(BDA)missionsfollowingtheNixon
Administrationscommencementofstrategicbombingmissionsalongsegmentsof
theHoChiMinhTrailinCambodia.AfterinsertingwithRTIllinoistoperformaBDA
ofthethirdsitetargetedbyOperationMenu,Plastertellsofbeingoverwhelmedby
enemyfiredespitetheobvioussignsofamassiveaerialbombardment.Inthe
teamsdebrief:
Allwecouldsaywasthatthesehard-coreNVAwererighttherewherethe
bombshadhit,whichapparentlypleasedtheAirForceandtheNixon
administration.Asaresult,thesecretbombingwouldbeexpanded,sothatby
yearsendnearly1,000B-52sortieswouldhavedroppedalmost27,000tonsof
bombsinnortheastCambodiaalone.52
InsteadofquestioningtheeffectivenessofthebombinggiventhefactthatNVA
troopsmanagedtonotonlysurvive,butalsoretaintheirfightingcapabilitiesdespite
heavyaerialbombardment,thePentagonandmembersoftheNixonAdministration
51
Turkoly-Joczik.52
Plaster, p. 130.
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chosetouseRTIllinoisassessmentasproofthattheirtargetingwascorrect,and
thusthebombingwasachievingitsgoalofdestroyingNVAlogisticalinfrastructure.
Furthermore,SOGcommandershandsweretiedwhenitcametousingtheir
unittoitsfullpotential.BeginningwithCol.Blackburnin1965,SOGcommanders
petitionedthePentagontogiveSOGpermissiontocreateandsponsorafront
organizationwithinSouthVietnamthatwouldmirrorthatofthecommunist-
dominatedNationalLiberationFrontsuchanorganizationcouldbeusedasa
springboardforarealresistance[guerrilla]movementintheNorth.53Despitethe
incrediblepotentialsuchamovementmighthaveofferedAmericanstrategists,
Washingtonrepeatedlyrefusedtherequests.Apparently,seniorAmericandefense
officialscouldneverseemtocomprehendthat[they]couldcarryoutcovert
operationsononehandwhiledenyingthemontheother.54Thisisjustone
exampleofthewayconventionalmilitarystrategistsandciviliannationalsecurity
officialsfailedtorecognizethefullpotentialofSOGasanassetforunconventional
warfare.
Theepisodesrecountedabovearecasestudiesinthestrategiceffectivenessof
theStudiesandObservationsGroup;whentheirmissionswereeffectivein
gatheringintelligence,thatinformationwassubjecttomisuseand
misinterpretation.Despitethestrengthsofthemenassignedtotheunit,especially
intermsofforeigninternaldefense,conventionalcommanderswereunwillingto
considerthepotentialbenefitsofunconventionalwarfare.Thisblatantmisuseof
themenandtheresultstheyproducedspeakstoasignificantproblemwiththe
Vietnam-eraU.S.militaryatthestafflevel.Thus,despitetheextremebraveryshown
bythemenassignedtoSOG,theunitsoverallimpactonU.S.behaviorduringthe
warwasnegligible.AccordingtoGillespie:
MACSOGanditsoperationsfailedtoachievethegoalsthatitsmasterssetforit.
Thisoccurrednotbecauseofalackofeffortorinitiativeonthepartoftheunit
53
Gillespie, p. 42.54
Ibid.
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oritspersonnel,butbecauseoftheinherentflawsinU.S.political/military
strategyduringtheconflict.OtherproblemswereexemplifiedbyMACVsand
SACSAsinabilitytoadaptMACSOGtofittheirstrategy.SOGcouldhave
servedasbothpathfinderandspearheadforanattackontheTrailsystemby
largerconventionalforces.Thankstounchangingpoliticalrestrictions,however,thatwasnevergoingtohappen.
Intheend,despitethesignificantintelligenceSOGdeliveredtostrategicplannersin
SaigonandWashington,andtheeffectivenesscommandoraidshadininstilling
fearinNVArear-echelontroops,SOGfailedtofullyexploititssuccessesinthefield.
ThereisnoevidencethatanydecisiveactionsweretakenbySOGitself,orby
conventionalforcesbasedonintelligencegatheredbySOGreconnaissancemissions,
todestroytheNVAsupplyroutesalongtheHoChiMinhTrail.Giventhatdisrupting
anddismantlingthatlogisticalinfrastructurewasakeyobjectivefortheGroup,we
mustchalkupSOGseffortsasadmirable,butultimatelyafailure.
TheGroupsImpactonModernSpecialOperationsUnits
SOGwasthefirstAmericanjointcommandwithaspecialoperationsmissionset,
makingitinsomewaysatheater-specificforerunnertotheU.S.SpecialOperations
Command(SOCOM)established16April1987afterthefailureofOperationEagle
Claw.TheStudiesandObservationsGrouppursuedtheater-wideoperationsby
deployingvariousspecialoperationsunits,inadditiontocoordinatingthe
cooperationofthoseunitssuchasSpecialForcesreconteamsandthespecialAir
Forcetaskunitsthat
insertedthembehind
enemylinesinthe
executionofthousandsof
small-unitmissions.Atthe
commandlevel,then,SOG
beganwritingtheblueprint
forthekindofoperations
Figure8:BillyWaugh(left)andanunnamedpilotpriortoaHALO
jumpintoenemyterritory.
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runwithsuchhighsuccessratesbySOCOMandtheJointSpecialOperations
Command(JSOC)inAfghanistanandIraq.Fortunately,manystalwartSOGveterans
werestillservingwhenAmericanspecialoperationswereformalizedunderSOCOM
andJSOC,helpingtoguidethoseorganizationsintheireffortstoformalizeAmerican
specialoperations.Attheunitlevel,theestablishmentofDeltaForcein1977and
SEALTeam6in1980reliedontheadviceofmanymenwhomadetheirbonesin
SOG,especiallythefamousAmericancovertwarriorBillyWaugh.55,56Others,
includingCol.CharlieBeckwith(thefounderofDelta),Col.JerryKing(founderofthe
IntelligenceSupportActivity),57andCommanderRichardMarcinko(founderof
SEALTeam6)alsocuttheirteethonspecialoperationsworkinSoutheastAsia,
makingthewarriorsservingwithmodernSOFunitssomethinglikethemilitary
grandchildrenofthosethatfoughtwithSOG.
SOGalsobegantheinitialdevelopmentoftactics,techniques,andprocedures
thathavecometodominateAmericanspecialoperationsdeployments.Inhis
conclusion,Gillespienotes,Themethodsandtechniquesdevelopedandutilizedby
SOGinSoutheastAsiawereadoptedbyDelta[Force]andhavebecomestandard
operationalpractices.Forexample,SOGcommanderinchiefCol.JohnSadler
authorizedthefirstcombatHALOjumpon28November1970,orderingSpike
Team58Virginia,composedofthreeAmericannon-commissionedofficersandthree
Montagnardfighters,toinsertbehindenemylinesbyjumpingfrom14,000feet.
Whiletheteammemberswerescatteredsixmilesfromtheirplanneddropzone,
55
Gillespie, p. 260.56
Billy Waugh retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Sergeant Major in 1972, and laterwent on to serve in the CIAs Special Activities Division. He served in the wars in Korea,Vietnam, Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom). WithSOG, Waugh had a role in the first and last combat HALO insertions in Vietnam. Waugh was oneof the first CIA paramilitary officers to deploy to Afghanistan where, at age 71, he worked withNorthern Alliance leaders to topple the Taliban and appeared at the Battle of Tora Bora. Betweenhis Special Forces and CIA careers, he has spent more than 50 years running covert operationson behalf of the United States. He is the recipient of a Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, fourBronze Stars, eight Purple Hearts, and four Army Commendation Medals.57
For more information on this important human intelligence-gathering special mission unit, seeMichael Smith. Killer Elite. New York, NY: St. Martin's, 2007. Print.58
Another term for a recon team.
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theysurvivedfivedaysonthegroundwithoutalertingNVAunitstotheirpresence,
andweresuccessfullyextractedfromfourlocationson2December.59Additionally,
SOGteamsvirtuallywrotethebookonsmall-unitsearchandrescueoperationsand
strategicreconnaissance.Withthesehistoricdevelopmentsinmind,wecanclearly
saythatdespitetheGroupsfailuretostrategicallyimpactthewarinVietnam,its
roleintheformationofmodernspecialoperationsunitsisunparalleledand
criticallyimportantfortodaysunconventionalwarfighters.
Conclusion
ThemenassignedtotheStudiesandObservationsGroupinVietnamfought
courageously,buttheirhandsweretied,tacticallyandoperationally.Inthefield,thestringentrequirementssetoutbyWashingtontokeepSOGmissionsdeniable
andcovertlefttheoperatorsthemselvesalone,withlittleoutsideaid.Operatingin
smallunits,SOGreconteamswereconsistentlyoutnumberedandoutgunnedfor
themenontheground,simplysurvivingthemissionunscathedcountedasavictory.
Unfortunately,statisticallyspeakingeverySOGoperatorsufferedseriousinjuries,
callingintoquestionthestrategicnecessityofsuchcostlymissions.
Attheoperationallevel,MACVstrategistsfailedtotakeadvantageofthe
potentialforcemultiplierofferedbySOG.Byrelyingonindigenousforcesto
conductthemorediplomaticallyuntenableoperationsofthewar,SOGtroopswere
neverallowedtodeliveradecisiveblowtotheNVAlogisticsinfrastructuretheyd
surveyedoverhundredsofreconnaissancemissionsessentiallytheexactmission
theywereinitiallymeanttoexecuteunderCol.Blackburnsvisionforthethird
phaseofOperationShiningBrass.Furthermore,MACVofficersfailedtorecognize
thepotentialbenefitsofunconventionalwarfare,remainingdistrustfulofimportant
tacticsthatcouldhavedrasticallychangedtheoutcomeofthewar.
59
Gillespie, p. 210.
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Instrategicterms,theGroupsfailurelaymorewiththoseoutsideitscommand
thanwiththoseservingasseniorleadersofSOG.Theorganizationwasan
unconventionalforceoperatingwithinahighlybureaucratized,conventional
militarythatwasdistrustfulofspecialoperationsunitsingeneral.Despitethe
effortsoftheGroupsadmirableenlistedmenandofficers,itfailedtohaveamajor
impactontheoutcomeofthewar.AsKelleynotesinhisconclusion,
TheabilitytomaneuverandconductbattlesbytheNorthVietnamesewasnot
impactedtoanygreatdegreebySOGsactivitiesTheunconventionalwar
effortwasmoreorlessanuisancetotheNorthVietnamese.Historyshowsthat
theycontinuedtomaintaincontroloftheirrearareaandmovesuppliesand
personneltofightthewarinSouthVietnam.Theywerestillstrongenoughto
mountamajoroffensivein1972andagainsuccessfullyin1975.HadSOGoperationsbeenlinkedtotheconventionalfightandrestrictionslessenedor
dropped,theunconventionalwareffortmighthavebeenmoreeffective.60
UnfortunatelytheGroupnevergotthechancetoproveitsfullcapabilities.
Itisimportanttonotethatthescopeofthisstudydoesnotallowforafull
investigationofallaspectsoftheStudiesandObservationsGroup.Primarilydueto
alackofinformationontheotherunitsmannedbySOGincluding,forexample,the
largerHatchetandMikeForces61thispaperhasfocusedonthecontributions
madebySOGreconnaissanceteamsintheircross-bordermissionsintoLaosand
Cambodia.Moreresearchmustbedonetopaintacompletepictureoftheimpact
SOGhadontheAmericanwarinSoutheastAsia.Withthatsaidtheinformation
presentedhereissufficienttounequivocallysaythatSOGfailedtohaveadecisive
impactonthewar.However,asanySOGmemoirwillindicate,thatwasnotinany
waythefaultoftheoperatorsthemselves.
60
Kelley, p. 66.61
Company-sized units deployed on relatively infrequent cross-border missions, often to striketargets identified by small-unit reconnaissance missions. These units also sometimes served asquick-reaction forces, similar to modern Ranger units support of other SOF missions. Forexample, in the five years that SOG units operated in Cambodia, full Mike/Hatchet Forcecompanies deployed across the border only twelve times, compared to 1,398 recon teamdeployments in the same period.
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Finally,giventhesimilaritiesbetweenmodernAmericanspecialoperations
forcesandtheirgrandfathersinSOG,itisimportantthatmodernstrategicplanners
takecareintheirrelianceonspecialoperationstroopsandthecapabilitiesthey
offer.WhilethemenwhofilltheranksofmodernSOCOMunitsarejustas
remarkableasthosewhofoughtwithSOGintheSixtiesandSeventies,theexample
ofMACVsmisuseofSOGprovesthatthetacticalexpertiseofSOFunitsisno
substituteforsoundstrategy,operationalplanning,andawell-grounded
understandingoftheenemyonehopestodefeat.
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Bibilography
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Kelley,MAJDannyM.,TheMisuseoftheStudiesandObservationsGroupasa
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Images
Figure1:WikipediaCommons,2009.09.04.Availableat
.Accessed2012.11.20.
Figure2:FromGillespie,BlackOpsVietnam,2011.
Figure3:Greene,Larry.CCNCompound2.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,n.d.Web.2012.11.20..
Figure4:Newton,John.RTMaine,70@CCC,takenatFOB,NVADressed.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,1970.Web.2012.11.20.
.
Figure5:Carrell,Tom.RopeLadder,FOB2.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,1967-1968.Web.2012.11.20.
.
Figure6:Nowak,Richard.PrisonerCaughtbyRTTexas.Note:Howardcametothe
helicopterpadwhenthereconteamretuned,hepickedupandcarriedtheprisonerfromtheHuey.Howardwasnotonthemissionthatcapturedthis
prisoner.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,1969.Web.2012.11.20.
.
Figure7:Waugh,Billy.Pre-CombatHALOInsert.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,
1971.06.22.Web.2012.11.20..