THE GRIFFITH-TSINGHUA ‘HOW CHINA SEES THE WORLD’ · 21st Century Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng Introduction In contrast to the contention and discussion surrounding China’s economic

griffith.edu.au/asiainstitute imir.tsinghua.edu.cn

THE GRIFFITH-TSINGHUA‘HOW CHINA SEES THE WORLD’Working Paper Series, No 2 (2016)

To Ally or Not to Ally:Debating China's Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century By LIU Ruonan and LIU Feng

To Ally or Not to Ally?

Debating China’s Non-Alliance Strategy in the 21st Century

Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng

The Griffith-Tsinghua Project “How China Sees the World” Working

Paper Series No. 2 (2016)

Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University

Griffith was the first University in Australia to offer Asian Studies to undergraduate

students and remains a pioneer in this field. This strong history means that today the

Griffith Asia Institute can draw on the expertise of some 50 Asia-Pacific-focused

academics from many disciplines across the university. Our Strategic Vision is to

promote greater interest in and awareness of Australia’s changing region and its

importance to Australia among the public, universities, policy makers and the media.

The Griffith Asia Institute produces innovative, interdisciplinary research on key

developments in the politics, economics, societies, and cultures of Asia and the South

Pacific. By promoting knowledge of Australia’s changing region and its importance to

our future, the Griffith Asia Institute seeks to inform and foster academic scholarship,

public awareness, and responsive policy making. The Institute’s work builds on over

40 years of Griffith University tradition of providing cutting-edge research on issues

of contemporary significance in the region.

Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University

Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations (TUIIR) is a university-level

academic institution with a strategic goal of becoming a leading international research

think-tank in China. TUIIR concentrates on both research and instruction. Currently,

there are seven research centers, three research programs, and two editorial departments.

The faculty of the institution acts as both instructors and researchers. The TUIIR

organizes a variety of academic activities every year, such as forums, seminars and

lectures. We have held the Community Conference of Political Science and International

Relations eight times, in which more than 700 scholars participated each year. Also,

TUIIR has held the Tsinghua International Security Forum 15 times, the Theory

Seminar Youth International Relations Scholars four times, and the Summer School

of the International Relations Research Methods and Arms Control Seminar nine

times. In 2012, TUIIR successfully organized the first World Peace Forum, which

made a major impact globally.

This project is supported by a research Grant (No.16-1512-150509-IPS) from the

John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

Project Introduction

How to understand China’s rise and its implications for Asia and the world is an

imperative task for both scholars and policy makers. China has become the second

largest economy next to the United States since 2010. China is also the major trading

partner for over 140 countries in the world. As United States-China relations will

define the next century, it is essential to build mutual understanding for policy

makers. If strategic distrust is a major obstacle in US-China relations, as Kenneth

Lieberthal and Jisi Wang have suggested, deepening our understanding of Chinese

perceptions and views on international relations will be a crucial task for bridging

the perception gap and mitigating the strategic distrust between the two nations.

This project aims to make sense of China’s rise in world politics through examining

Chinese International Relations (IR) scholars’ perceptions and debates on key issues

in international relations and Asian security. This project will deepen our understanding

of Chinese scholars, especially regarding how they perceive world politics and how

they can impact Chinese policy making via internal debates. There are two parts in this

project. First, we organize and conduct onsite surveys of IR scholars at the annual

conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies

in Beijing. Second, we examine the internal debates among Chinese scholars over

international politics, Asian security, and Chinese foreign policy.

With generous support from the MacArthur Foundation (grant No.

16-1512-150509- IPS), the Griffith Asia Institute is able to successfully

collaborate with Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations to carry

out the survey research as well as conduct the research project on the Chinese IR

debates through expert conferences and other academic exchanges. This working

paper series will feature major Chinese scholars’ analyses of internal debates and

our survey findings.

We appreciate your comments and suggestions very much.

Kai He and Huiyun Feng (Co-Chief Investigators, Griffith University)

Xuetong Yan (Lead Project Collaborator, Tsinghua University)



Abstract As China’s rise continues to shape its role in international affairs, Chinese international

relations scholars are engaging in a lively debate about its grand strategy, especially

whether China should abandon the non-alliance strategy adopted since the early 1980s.

Some scholars contend that a non-alliance strategy cannot safeguard China’s national

interests in the face of the United States’ security alliance network throughout East

Asia, and without allies, China’s rise will be contained by the US. To that end, pro-

alliance scholars are especially favorable towards a formal alliance with Russia.

However, orthodox scholars, in favor of supporting the official position of non-alliance,

argue that a formal alliance deviates from the fundamental principles of independence

and self-reliance that have historically guided China’s foreign policy. Moreover, a

number of alternative strategies have been proposed to replace or complement the

non-alliance strategy; among them are quasi-alliances, coalitions and strategic

partnerships. In practice, whether China will form alliances with other powers and

neighboring countries depends on its self-defined role within the current international

system as well as its perception on external security threats. Considering both external

and internal constraints it faces, China is highly likely to maintain the non-alliance

stance while pursuing other desirable approaches to making friends and partners.

About the Authors:

LIU Ruonan is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Politics,

University of International Business and Economics. She was a visiting scholar at

the University of Groningen (2014) and the University of California, San Diego

(2014-2015). Her research mainly deals with international relations of Southeast

Asia, with a special focus on the security strategies of the Southeast Asian States and

China-ASEAN relations.

LIU Feng is Associate Professor and Vice Chair at the Department of International

Relations, Nankai University. His research focuses on international relations theory,

international relations in East Asia and China’s foreign policy. He is the author of

The Logic of Balancing: Systemic Pressure, Hegemonic Legitimacy, and Great Power

Behaviour, and the translator of several books, among them including Realism and

International Politics, Unanswered Threats, and Rational Theory of International

Politics.

*The authors would like to express their sincere appreciation to Antonio Douglas for

his excellent assistance, and to Li Mingjiang, Zhao Kejin, and other particpants at the

Griffith-Tsinghua Conference on “Chinese Scholars Debate International Relations”

for their helpful comments.

This Working Paper Series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to

stimulate debates and discussions among scholars and policy analysts. The views

expressed are entirely the authors’ own.



Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng

Introduction In contrast to the contention and discussion surrounding China’s economic and

social policies among economists and sociologists, Chinese international relations

scholars rarely openly debate the government’s foreign policy choices for long.

Instead, the government’s stance on foreign policy is usually adopted by Chinese

scholars and analysts as the orthodox view. However, in the last few years, particularly

after the recent leadership transition in 2012, Chinese international relations scholars

become more active in debating China’s foreign policy. China’s ascension to the

international stage has caused many in Chinese academia to openly voice their

opinions on which policies might best serve China’s national interests, leading many

scholars to debate the necessity of the recent policy shift from the traditional principle

of ‘keeping a low profile’ (Tao guang yang hui), to a more proactive foreign policy

(feng fa you wei) (Zhu 2010; Xu and Du 2015; Lynch 2015). This is a broad debate

that engages many different schools of thought, and among the most contentious

issues, is whether China needs to ally with other states. China’s alliance posture is an

important part of the overall discourse surrounding China’s foreign policy.

Forming alliances has been an essential instrument that states have used to

achieve security in an anarchic system since ancient times. In essence, alliances are

mutual security commitments between two or more states (Osgood 1968: 17; Walt

1987: 12). Throughout history, alliances between international actors have formed,

collapsed, and reformed. Although Chinese history is rich with examples of the

successes and weaknesses of the alliance system, this paper will focus on contemporary

China, and how its current policies are informed by its recent past.

The People’s Republic of China rose amidst the Cold War, an era that saw the

United States and Soviet Union attempt to divide the world into two opposing

ideological camps. As a newly-formed nation, and unable to be completely

self-reliant, it was unlikely that China would be able to remain neutral. The United

States’ heavy presence throughout East Asia, and China’s ideological adherence to


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Marxism led China to formally ally with the Soviet Union during the 1950s.

However, border disputes and ideological rivalry caused Sino-Soviet relations to

gradually deteriorate, and by the 1970s China had tilted to the US-led bloc. During

this period of rapprochement the United States and China were “tacit allies”, bonded

by their mutual desire to check the Soviet Union’s power. Upon observation, it is

clear that the first 30 years of modern China’s foreign policy primarily consisted of

playing the superpowers against each other as national interest dictated.

However, the early 1980s saw China tire of being caught between the geopolitical

confrontation of the world’s two superpowers, instilling the sentiments that would

become the foundation of the non-alliance policy. When the second generation of

Chinese leaders designed a new “reform and opening-up” strategy, China decided

not to ally with any other states. It is widely believed that the non-alliance policy

first gained formal recognition when Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping articulated

the strategy to a foreign guest in 1983 (Ling 2013: 21). Since Deng Xiaoping,

successive Chinese presidents have maintained the non-alliance principle, and

during the 14th Party Congress Committee in 1992, Jiang Zemin reiterated the policy

by stating that China “will not enter into

alliance with any country or group of

countries and will not join any military

bloc” (Jiang 1992). The principle has

since been quoted at various at times in

Party speeches and government reports.

For example, a 2011 government White Paper titled “China’s Peaceful Development”

states that China, “does not form alliance with any other country or group of

countries, nor does it use social system or ideology as a yardstick to determine what

kind of relations it should have with other countries” (Information Office of the

State Council 2011). Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government has

viewed alliances as an archaic, entangling system that only increases the chance of

costly military conflict.

The non-alliance policy has provided measurable benefits to China, even though

China’s changing security environment has caused a debate amongst Chinese

academia about the policy’s relevance. Under the non-alliance policy, China has

maintained a relatively benign regional environment, allowing the government to

focus on the central task of economic development and power accumulation.

However, in the post-Cold War era, China is once again under the scrutiny of

dominant powers, particularly the United States. China’s continued economic and

military rise has given the Chinese populace high expectations of the government’s

foreign policy, especially in maritime affairs. These factors have led many to believe

Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government has viewed alliances as an archaic, entangling system that only increases the chance of costly military conflict.


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that China cannot afford to be passive in its foreign affairs. The implications of an

assertive China have caused heated debate among academics both for and against

the non-alliance policy (Zhang F. 2012; Xu 2016).

This paper aims to compile and analyze the mainstream arguments made by

Chinese scholars as they debate China’s foreign policy, as well as answer the

following questions: Which schools of thought have gained the most prominence in

this debate? Are there alternatives to these schools of thought? What significance

does this debate have in understanding China’s foreign policy? This paper concludes

with an evaluation of the relationship between this debate and China’s policy shifts

in practice.

Three Schools of Thoughts in the Debate The current debate on whether China should abandon its non-alliance stance is

emerging under the context of changing international and regional realities, as well

as China’s own shifting policy objectives. It should be noted that most international

relations scholars and foreign policy analysts in Chinese academia do not have a

well-defined theoretical position, although some prominent scholars do have clear

preferences on IR theories (Shambaugh 2011; Feng and He 2016). For example, Yan

Xuetong is a self-proclaimed realist, though it is rare for most Chinese scholars to

describe themselves as realists, liberalists,

or constructivists. Therefore, scholarly

positions on whether China needs to

abandon its non-alliance principle do

not tend to fit the traditional theoretical

framework found in international relations literature.

In this paper, We divide scholarly positions into three approximate groups based

on their core arguments: (1) the orthodoxy, which generally accepts the view posited

by the Chinese government, primarily defending the official standpoint on this question

in addition to extant policy issues. In short, this argument assumes that non-alliance

has been, and will continue to be an optimal choice for China to realize its national

interests; (2) the revisionists, by contrast, challenge the official standpoint and advocate

an alliance policy to attract security allies and partners in order to extend China’s

influence and (3) the moderates, who take a middle ground between the extremes of

orthodoxy and revision, and attempt to find alternative measures that overcome the

shortcomings of both alliance and non-alliance positions. For moderates, it is better to

find more flexible and effective ways to develop security cooperation with other states.

The Orthodoxy: The Continuing Relevance of the Non-Alliance Principle

Orthodox scholars generally support the existing policies that have been designed by

scholarly positions on whether China needs to abandon its non-alliance principle do not tend to fit the traditional theoretical framework...


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the Party, and implemented by the government. From this perspective, the idea of

forming alliances deviates from the fundamental principles of independence and self-

reliance that have historically guided China’s foreign policy. Some specific reasons

for adhering to the non-alliance principle have been proposed by different scholars.

First, orthodox scholars argue that traditional alliances are fundamentally flawed

because they force nations into a dilemma of security and independence. Every alliance

has a cost, and that cost is inevitably a nation’s ability to act independently of its

alliance partners; therefore, under an alliance system nations gain security at the

expense of flexibility on the international

stage. Non-alignment supporters refer to

this problem as the “alliance dilemma”.

Orthodox scholars propose that in light

of the alliance dilemma, it is far better

for a nation to preserve its independence.

This allows a state the flexibility and diplomatic space needed to implement a

comprehensive foreign policy that can react as needed, as opposed to being entangled

in an alliance where a nation can both unwillingly and inadvertently be thrust into an

international crisis (Xu 2010; Jiang 2012).

Second, non-alliance scholars often believe that an alliance system is beyond

China’s capabilities. Alliance candidates are few, and of those available, many are

poor or developing nations with which an alliance would cost more than it is worth.

Sun Ru warns that allying with underdeveloped states would only give China

motivation for abandoning the partnership soon after its formation (Sun 2015). In

addition, orthodox scholars argue that a Chinese alliance system could very well

heighten tensions in East Asia, by forcing regional neighbors to band together to

balance against China through political and military means (Zhang 2000).

China’s non-alliance policy has been its primary foreign policy principle for

nearly a decade. Although a newly-formed China allied itself with the Soviet Union

for survival, it only served to limit China’s international flexibility while at the same

time not meeting the strategic interests of either party. It wasn’t until after China

abandoned its alliance with the Soviet Union that the Chinese strategic environment

started to improve. China extended its relations beyond socialist nations, and normalized

relations with the West. The consistent implementation of the non-alliance policy

has allowed China to avoid being restricted in international affairs due to the actions

of others, in addition to allowing China to contribute to global security and stability

(Liu 2000).

Third, a major factor in the debate surrounding the non-alliance policy is

US-China relations. Since the end of the Cold War, China and the United States have

orthodox scholars argue that tradi-tional alliances are fundamentally flawed because they force nations into a dilemma of security and independence.


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been neither friends nor enemies. However, even some pro-non-alliance scholars are

starting to admit that the United States poses a threat to some of China’s national

security aspects, especially when considering the US-led security alliance system in

East Asia. Since 2009, when the Obama administration announced its “pivot to

Asia” strategy, the US has strengthened its military commitments with its formal

allies and informal partners throughout the region, while also getting involved in the

territorial disputes in both the East China and South China Seas. These actions are

interpreted by scholars in both camps as efforts to contain China. However, orthodox

scholars still emphasize the importance of maintaining a low profile and moderate

conflicts with the United States, largely in recognition of China’s relative weakness

when matched against the United States

(Li and Shi 1999). From this angle, Zhu

Feng questions the feasibility of an

alliance. He points out that few states

would like to ally with China at the

expense of confronting the US. In addition, the likelihood of an alliance changing

the current balance of power is very low; therefore, there is no need to establish an

alliance (Zhu 2012).

Finally, orthodox scholars argue that the utility of military alliances in the modern

era is continuously diminishing (Liu J. 2012). Traditional military alliances are narrow

and only allow for limited types of aid and cooperation between nations. These

kinds of alliances are unfit to respond to the increasingly varied threats of the 21st

century, particularly threats posed by non-state actors such as piracy, terrorism, and

nuclear proliferation. Non-alliance scholars propose that the best way to realize China’s

interests is to maintain a defensive national security posture, while contributing to

the construction of a new multipolar world order with a neutral security environment

(Ling 2013; Wang C. 2012). This would allow China to maintain its independence

and satisfy its national security requirements while adhering to the non-alliance

policy. Orthodox scholars do not believe that China’s current security problems stem

from a lack of allies, they argue that they are instead due to the complex interaction

of domestic and international politics. An alliance system would not address the root

cause of China’s security challenges, it would only exacerbate regional tensions.

Therefore, orthodox scholars maintain that China’s foreign policy should continue to

be based on non-alliance.

The Revisionists: Forming Alliances to Defend China’s Rise

Revisionist views are best expressed in a quote from Professor Yan Xuetong: “[the]

international order is decided by the balance of power between great powers, and an

alliance policy would help China increase its strategic partners” (Yan 2013a).

An alliance system would not address the root cause of China’s security challenges, it would only exacerbate regional tensions.


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History has only rarely seen a great power rise or expand without allies, and

whenever states did employ a non-alliance policy, it was always temporary. China’s

long-term implementation of a non-alliance policy is a historical aberration.

Revisionists argue that the non-alliance strategy is only suitable for weak nations,

and if China does not abandon its non-alignment posture, it will only lead to more

security challenges (Yan 2013b).

Many scholars believe that China’s security environment is already facing large

challenges that would be helped by an alliance. First is the eastward expansion of

NATO, and the increased scope of the United States-Japan security partnership, both

of which threaten the relevance of China’s non-alliance strategy. Second, the United

States’ pursuit of interventionist policies

threatens China’s growth, as well as

undermining China’s support of non-

interstate intervention as a core tenet of

the international order. Finally, the role

and impact of Third World nations in international affairs are steadily declining as

the influence of developed nations increases. Given that a significant portion of

China’s non-alliance strategy relies on developing nations having a sizeable role in

international affairs, the ever-increasing gap between rich and poor nations makes

the continuation of a non-alliance policy challenging (Ye 2000). At the same time,

there is broad domestic support for a formal alliance, as evidenced by recent

reflections over the dissolution of the USSR-China alliance. Alliances are not a relic

of Cold War antagonism, instead they are a way for nations to gain partners, and

foster good relations (Li 2012). China’s current security environment should be what

informs China’s foreign policy, and in light of the dangers posed to China’s national

security by the United States, revisionist scholars believe that China needs alliances.

Revisionist scholars hold that the “alliance dilemma” mistakenly reduces alliances

to zero-sum relationships. In fact, revisionists argue that China’s unwillingness to

give regional neighbors security guarantees through alliances has already caused

neighboring states to view their relationship with China as zero-sum, and dominated

by fear. Therefore, a China which continues to implement a non-alliance strategy

will increasingly find itself surrounded by nations that distrust it, and turn to the

United States for security guarantees (Yan 2013b).

Revisionists argue that a rising China needs friends (Yan 2012a; Yan 2012b; Yan

2015). Even though the current international order has been beneficial to China’s

economic and military rise, it has not aided China’s strategic relationships. The United

States is still the most allied nation in the world, while China has no significant allies.

The United States’ alliance structure has become a significant obstacle in China’s

Many scholars believe that China’s security environment is already facing large challenges that would be helped by an alliance.


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efforts to improve relations with its neighbors. After the Obama administration

adopted “smart power” as a foreign policy principle, the United States consolidated

and strengthened its strategic partnerships. If China does not ally with other nations

soon, it will lose the ability to realize interests in its own backyard.

Revisionists believe non-alignment theories misunderstand alliances. An alliance

does not automatically equate to Cold War mentality. The Cold War was an

ideological confrontation between superpower blocs wherein alliances were merely

a peripheral method superpowers used to achieve victory. Therefore, alliances are

not inherently a step towards confrontation. Defensive alliances that encourage

international cooperation on security concerns do not threaten regional security.

Second, revisionists argue that alliances do not bind a nation’s hands and feet, but

instead bind two or more nations together

in a mutually restrictive agreement in

order to achieve shared interests. Alliances

are a system of disparate parts that work

together to be mutually binding and

beneficial to their members. Alliances also contribute to global stability by

dis-incentivizing allied nations to act against each other’s interests. Finally, since

ancient times, Chinese history has recognized the value and utility of alliances. From

the Flame and Yellow Emperor’s alliance against Chiyou, to Mao Zedong and

Chiang-Kai-Shek’s alliance against the Japanese, Chinese leaders have used alliances.

It is time for modern China to abandon its antiquated model of understanding

alliances and align with nations that will contribute to the common good of a new

world order (Tang 2010).

The Moderates: Seeking Alternatives

Aside from pro- and anti-alliance scholars, are moderates who seek a solution to

China’s security dilemma that rests between a formal alliance and the non-alliance

policy. Moderates believe that the United States is employing various aspects of its

hard and soft power to obstruct China’s growth and peaceful development, and that

by itself China is unable to stop US containment. However, realists believe complete

abandonment of the non-alliance strategy is unrealistic as potential alliance partners

are few and any alliance formed would not only be weak, but likely to provoke a

strong response from the United States. Therefore, realists propose that as China

rises in a changing international environment, it needs to develop a certain degree of

security cooperation with other countries. This would fulfill the dual purpose of

liberating China from its isolationist position whilst also gradually allowing for a

discourse about alliances to evolve. Three main alternative strategies have been

proposed: coalitions, strategic partnerships, and quasi-alliances.

Revisionists believe non-alignment theories misunderstand alliances. An alliance does not automatically equate to Cold War mentality.


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Coalitions In international politics, states understand that some interests are better realized

through coalitions. Coalitions allow for nations to discuss and reach a consensus on

specific issue areas and are also suitable for solving a number of disputes outside of

national security. Although there are few cases of prominent coalitions in international

relations history, it is an avenue that has not been duly explored. Unlike alliances,

coalitions emphasize specialized and informal cooperation to solve particular issues.

This kind of informal cooperation certainly can include national security, but can

also extend to politics, economics, and atypical security concerns. Furthermore,

coalitions rely on cooperation with relevant international institutions to solve

international crises and conflicts. Alliances tend to form in times of peace, and

generally target a third party. Juxtaposed

with alliances, in the event of armed

conflict, coalitions of like-minded parties

temporarily form to respond to a common threat, and dissolve afterwards. As

coalitions are inherently less cohesive and more flexible than alliances, member

states focus more on negotiating a fair cost and interest system than on creating

binding rules (Liu F. 2012).

Moderates believe that coalitions possess more utility than alliances, and that by

using coalitions to develop diverse methods of cooperation and engagement, arguments

over the non-alliance policy can be superseded. Coalitions will allow China the

flexibility to analyze the significance of a particular issue area and then decide

whether it merits cooperation. Ultimately, coalitions sustain the premises of a non-

alliance strategy while still enabling China to partner with nations on a variety of

issues.

Strategic Partners Modern China has pioneered the use of strategic partners as a mainstay of the

foreign policy toolkit. Strategic partnerships do not target a third party, and lack an

antagonistic connotation. Moderates like Tang Shiping argue that partnerships

between nations are fairly common and are based on mutual interest (Tang 2010).

Although collaboration between partners is often intense, the states themselves do

not need to have an intimate relationship; within a strategic partnership, states are

relatively autonomous. This independence enables actors to abandon, change, or

modify partnerships as needed. Strategic partnerships are allowed to be devoid of

military commitments, as represented by the current partnership between China and

Russia. Zhao Huasheng believes that the Chinese-Russian partnership best fits the

current geopolitical landscape; though Sino-Russian cooperation does not reach that

Moderates believe that coalitions possess more utility than alliances


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of a formal alliance, the current level of cooperation between the two nations fits

their capabilities while satisfying their respective domestic audiences (Zhao 2013).

Years of implementation verify the feasibility of strategic partnerships. China has

already partnered with 67 other countries, in five different global regions, and has

organized or established at least 72 different kinds of strategic relationships (Su

2015; Men and Liu 2015).

Quasi-alliances Beyond those two alternatives, Sun Degang believes quasi-alliances are an informal

method of collaboration between states. He posits that, “two or more states form an

informal arrangement that targets an

opponent’s security system” (Sun 2011,

61). There are key differences between

a quasi-alliance and an alliance in

foreign policy. Alliances are based on

stringent contracts with binding legal restrictions, while quasi-alliances are based on

informal contracts with lax legal conditions. Formal alliances depend on static

security arrangements while quasi-alliances possess a dynamic quality to their

agreements, thus avoiding the rigidity of traditional alliances. Furthermore, alliances

are often very exclusive by nature, whereas quasi-alliances have fluid membership

with a low barrier-to-entry. Finally, traditional alliances are structured around the

conformity of interests and values, whereas quasi-alliances can be comprised of

nations with differing values but common interests.

Sun Degang believes China should pursue a quasi-alliance-based foreign policy

termed “Three-Ring Quasi-Alliance Diplomacy” (Sun 2012). The first ring is forming

quasi-alliances within multilateral organizations. The second is building quasi-alliances

with key nations in East Asia based on a new model of cooperation, and the third

is maintaining the model of friendly diplomacy. “Three-Ring Quasi-Alliance

Diplomacy” will promote China’s rise from a great power to a dominant power by

eliminating China’s isolation within the international system. Aside from Sun

Degang, there are other scholars in China who have proposed the quasi-alliance

strategy. For example, Yu Zhengliang believes that Russia is the ideal candidate for

establishing a quasi-alliance strategy, as Sino-Russian core national interests

increasingly require cooperation in order to break the United States’ global hegemony

(Yu 2012). Wang Haiyun has proposed a quasi-alliance strategy that rests upon three

strategic aims: continue to declare, “non-alliance, non-antagonistic, and non-third

party directed” foreign policy. This policy is referred to as “The Three Nons”. Wang

Haiyun further advises that China should not form any alliances in the near future

... quasi-alliances possess a dynamic quality to their agreements, thus avoiding the rigidity of traditional alliances.


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and instead strive to create a series of “belts” for nations on its periphery: “The belt

of friendly relations. The belt of strategic stability and the belt of economic

cooperation.” The three belts will promote China’s image as a reliable partner with

nations on its periphery while also increasing its hard and soft power (Wang H.

2012).

Should China and Russia Ally? A Specific Focus of the Debate It is commonly believed that China and Russia might form an alliance, and Chinese

scholars continue to debate its feasibility. This case provides us with a specific focus

for the broader debate over China’s non-alliance policy.

Pro-alliance scholars suggest that there are common interests in a China-Russia

alliance. In regards to their national security, both nations are unable to completely

integrate into the Western-dominated international system, and both nations contend

with antagonism from the United States. Particularly after the start of the Ukrainian

Crisis, Western nations have increased their pressure against Russia, inadvertently

creating a situation where China is an increasingly attractive military and economic

partner. Neither Russia nor China can

individually match the United States’

military prowess; however, together the

two nations are a formidable force.

Furthermore, China and Russia’s economies are naturally complementary, and with

coordination, the two nations could avoid American market restrictions and obtain

economic independence. Russia and China have the world’s second and third

strongest militaries respectively, and as two nuclear powers, their alliance could

attract other nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and even some countries in mainland

Europe. Were China and Russia to achieve such an expansive alliance network, the

United States, even with NATO, would not be able to reasonably contain it. With

Russia as an ally, China need not fear being drawn into an unnecessary war. Russia’s

nuclear arsenal greatly dis-incentivizes large-scale warfare, and in any small-scale

conflict Russia would not need to rely on China’s military.

Yan Xuetong points out that US unipolarity has intensified rather than relaxed in

recent years. China and the US are competing for international leadership while

Moscow is in strategic competition with Washington. Neither Russia nor China is

able to alleviate pressure from the United States alone. Since alliance making and

annexation are common strategies in history to compete for dominance, as long as

China regards national rejuvenation as its policy goal, it has to abandon the principle

of non-alliance and ally with Russia (Yan 2014). Yan Xuetong also notes that “the

United States’ unwillingness to accept China in the international arena, Russia’s

Pro-alliance scholars suggest that there are common interests in a China-Russia alliance.


11

potential as an ally, and China’s continued rise as a military power, make it increasingly

clear that the benefits of a Sino-Russian alliance would greatly outweigh the costs”

(Yan 2012, 25). Dai Xu also advocates a Sino-Russia alliance from the perspective

of geopolitical competition with the US in Eurasia (Dai 2012).

Luo Yuan and Zhang Wenmu hold more moderate attitudes on China’s alliance

strategy, although both of them point out the need to build alliances. Luo posits that

Sino-Russia security cooperation could take the form of a quasi-alliance, while

Zhang emphasizes the defensive objectives of the alliance through which both the

legitimate interests of China and Russia can be preserved. Other than the need to

cope with US pressure, Zhang points out that China has traditional experience

managing alliances. Tang Shiping, a moderate proponent of the alignment policy,

has mentioned China’s alliance history and further noted that the history of

Sino-Soviet alliance should not be the burden of contemporary foreign policy. Any

strategic tool effective in promoting national interest should be on the list for

consideration. Aside from Russia, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and North

Korea are all potential Chinese allies (Yan and Qi 2012; Yan 2011).

Anti-alliance academics suggest that there simply is not enough to be gained from

a Sino-Russian Alliance. These scholars believe that the current level of multi-tier

cooperation between Russia and China already satisfies their mutual interests.

Although both nations face similar

security challenges, neither faces the

threat of large-scale invasion, lessening

the need for a military alliance. Second,

there is a large disparity between the

two nations in regards to their ideology

and respective security challenges. It is unlikely that the two nations would be able

to form a consensus on many issues, let alone give each other military support. The

aftermath of the 2008 Georgian-Russo War provides a good example. The Russian

State Duma passed a resolution recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia. The reaction from China was muted, and certainly did not align with

Russia’s policies. China’s reticence was fueled by its own domestic issues with

Taiwan. There is no guarantee that a Sino-Russian alliance would not be fraught

with as much, if not more conflict than the current US-China relationship. Li Kaisheng argues that the nature of geopolitics makes competition between

Russian and China hard to avoid, whereas China and the United States, already being separated by thousands of miles, have no fundamental security conflicts (Li K.

2012). A Sino-Russian alliance would still be subject to the alliance dilemma, with

There is no guarantee that a Sino- Russian alliance would not be fraught with as much, if not more conflict than the current US-China relationship.


12

both nations concerned about being abandoned in time of need, or being entangled in conflicts decoupled from national security interests (Zhao 2013). Neither Russia

nor China has the political foundation needed to resolve the security dilemma. At the

same time, once allied nations find that they cannot reach an accord with one another, they will find it more difficult to set aside their own interests for the sake of

the alliance (Jiang 2012). Wang Jisi, a professor from Peking University, argues that

the proposal of allying with Russia is based on the view that the US is China’s main adversary. He acknowledges that the United States does pose certain challenges to

China, but proposes that there is no need for the US to be treated as a threat or

enemy if China does not want military confrontation (Wang 2011). China’s continued economic success needs a cooperative partnership with the United States. Moreover,

few countries, if any, would want to join China in an anti-US alliance (Wang 2011). Anti-alliance scholars argue that from an economic perspective, Russia and China

are not suitable allies. Sino-Russian trade volume falls far below that of the China-US relationship; neither Russia nor China wish to harm trade relations with the United States, the European Union or any large trading partner, as both nations rely on these trading partners for economic exchange and investment (Yu et al. 2015). The unrest caused by a

Sino-Russian alliance would inevitably spread to trade relations, needlessly harming both nations’ economies. Finally, the core interest of a Sino-Russian alliance would be resisting Western powers and establishing a new international order that is fair to both middle and developing nations. Since 1992, both Russia and China have emphasized transparency in bilateral relations. Their commitment to the three “nons” (non-alliance, non-confrontation, non-third-party directed policy) has been the foundation for a new style of relations between the two nations. In 2001, both nations signed the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, further embedding the three “nons” into the bedrock of their relationship. China and Russia have jointly promoted peace and international stability through cooperation, consultation, dialogue, mutual respect, and compromise; anti-alliance scholars believe an alliance would in no way affirm these principles.

Feng Huiyun points out the current problems in Sino-Russia relations which prevent them from allying with each other. Although both countries employ foreign policies that challenge Western legitimacy and weaken US dominance, China and Russia compete for geopolitical influence in Eurasia through arms sales. Their trade imbalance and divergent interests on sovereignty issues are also obstacles to deepening strategic coordination (Feng 2015).

Sino-Russian trade volume falls far below that of the China-US relationship; neither Russia nor China wish to harm trade relations with the United States, the European Union or any large trading partner


13

Aside from the pro- and anti-alliance scholars, there is another group of scholars

who believe that the conditions for a Sino-Russian alliance have yet to be met. Were

the conditions for an alliance to be met in the future, this group of scholars would

not necessarily support or oppose the alliance. For example, scholar Zhao Huasheng

(2013) does not completely reject the possibility of a future Sino-Russian alliance,

but he maintains that if both governments do not make the necessary preparations,

and force an alliance simply on the pretense of Sino-Russian cooperation, the

alliance would only bring harm to both countries (Wang and Wan 2013; Huang

2008). Therefore, as long as there remains no major changes to the international

arena for the foreseeable future, moderates propose that China and Russia maintain

their strategic partnership.

When assessing the possibility of a China-Russia alliance, the Russian position

must also be taken into consideration. A few Russian scholars do support a Sino-

Russian alliance. For example, Alexander Korolev argues that a formal alliance

should be expected (Korolev 2015). In contrast, Xie Chao, a student of Yan Xuetong,

provides a dissenting answer. Based on a systematic study of Russian strategic

consideration, Xie Chao finds that Russia does not have much incentive to form a

military alliance with China. As he

articulates, “from Russia’s point of view,

it has the necessary state power to

respond to regional security pressures,

and as such, Russia will opt to maintain

the present alliance structure, and will

not attempt to expand its alliances. In the coming years, establishing an alliance with

China is neither important nor necessary” (Xie 2016, 44).

As noted above, only a few Chinese scholars have a clear theoretical orientation,

elaborating their policy positions from one or another theoretical perspective.

However, putting the debate roughly into the spectrum of international relations

theories may give us a better understanding of the differences of these positions.

Three broad policy preferences surveyed in the sections above reflect at least five

theoretical positions. The first group is in essence non-theoretical and located in the

orthodox camp. These scholars do not rely on any theoretical concepts or logics, but

only defend the official positon. In the current situation, they tend to defend the

non-alliance policy. But if the Chinese government was to shift to another side, they

would also move to that side. Second, there are some defensive realists, for example,

Zhu Feng and others, who generally prefer non-alliance or other alternatives to

alliance. Third, the advocates of the alliance position can be put into in the camp of

hard or offensive realism, with Yan Xuetong and some military academics as leading

as long as there remains no major changes to the international arena for the foreseeable future, moderates propose that China and Russia maintain their strategic partnership.


14

scholars. Fourth, some widely recognized Chinese liberalists, including Wang Jisi

and Wang Yizhou, are advocating a non-alliance strategy mainly because it

emphasizes the importance of interdependence and a non-conflictual relationship

with the United States. Finally, Qin Yaqing, a prominent constructivist in China,

explains China’s non-alliance strategy from an idealist perspective. For him, China’s

foreign policy is shaped by the background knowledge, more specifically the

Chinese dialectic, the zhongyong, which assumes the inclusiveness of two opposite

extremes as indispensable parts of an organic whole (Qin 2014).

Policy Implications of the Debate over Non-Alliance Strategy In the international relations scholarship, the linkage between academic research and

policy making is a controversial issue. In US academia, a mainstream consensus

seems to have emerged that the gap between these two worlds needs to be bridged,

stressing the importance of policy relevant research (George 1993; Nye 2008; Avey

and Desch 2013). In contrast, the relationship between Chinese academia and the

policy making circle is quite different from its US counterpart, which is

characterized by a revolving-door mechanism. Chinese IR scholars seldom have

systematic and institutionalized approaches to infiltrating into foreign policy making.

Therefore, the separation between theory and policy is even more evident in China.

However, Chinese IR scholars’ role in foreign policy making has recently been

enhanced. As the Chinese government has become more and more active in

international affairs, a lot of new issues and challenges have emerged. In this context,

both public and academic opinion have

been collected and studied by various

institutions and bureaucracies at different

levels to provide consultation for policy

design. At the same time, Chinese

scholars now strive to supply knowledge

and advice to the policy circle. It should

be noted that the patterns and effects of Chinese IR scholars’ influence on the actual

policy making process are largely dependent on the individual scholars’ personal

relationship with specific officials and bureaucracies.

In their insightful analysis on the role of Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy,

Huiyun Feng and Kai He propose four ideal models: epistemic community, free

market, policy signaling, and mirroring policy (Feng and He 2016). As far as the

subject of discussion is concerned, the “free market” model seems to make more

sense than the others because the Chinese government has a strong preference for

maintaining the established non-alliance strategy at this stage, but also tends to

... the patterns and effects of Chinese IR scholars’ influence on the actual policy making process are largely dependent on the individual scholars’ personal relationship with specific officials and bureaucracies.


15

tolerate alternative voices. As can be seen in official media commentaries and other

sources, the central authority also needs to respond to the academic debates over

some strategic issues, particularly when the official guidelines and principles have

been challenged. For example, Fu Ying, an experienced Chinese diplomat and

former vice minister of foreign affairs, recently published a piece in Foreign Affairs,

in which she responds to the debate on “the nature of the Chinese-Russian

partnership” and “whether it will evolve into an alliance” (Fu 2016). Based on a

comprehensive analysis of the China-Russia relationship, she clarifies that these two

countries will not enter into a formal alliance (Fu 2016). This is a very authoritative

response to the debate on China’s non-alliance policy in general, and the envisioned

China-Russia alliance in particular. In this case, Chinese policy makers have a clear

sense of the different views that have emerged.

Although a complete policy shift in the short term, Chinese leaders also recognize

the importance of making friends and recruiting support in international politics. In

his address at the Chinese Communist Party’s the Central Conference on Work

Relating to Foreign Affairs in November 2014, Xi Jinping called on China to

“develop a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting its role of a major country”

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2014). Building and cultivating partnership

relations with major powers, neighboring countries, and developing countries is

central to China’s aspiration of being a

great power. Xi said that China should

“make more friends while abiding by the

principle of non-alignment and build a

global network of partnerships” (Ministry

of Foreign Affairs of China, 2014).

Partnership diplomacy is not a new

concept in Chinese diplomacy. According

to official statements, China has established partnership relations with 67 individual

countries and five regions or regional organizations until the end of 2014 (Wang

2014). Moreover, the strong emphasis placed on partnership diplomacy in recent

official discourse is unprecedented and leads to the assumption that partnerships

might play an even bigger role in the restructuring of China’s external relations in

the years to come (Swaine 2015; Wu 2014).

The newly proposed “global network of partnerships” can also be interpreted as

an official response to the scholarly debate on non-alliance. Compared to China’s

partnership diplomacy of the past two decades, President Xi Jinping has expanded

understandings of strategic partnerships by defining them with different characteristics,

... the strong emphasis placed on partnership diplomacy in recent official discourse is unprecedented and leads to the assumption that partnerships might play an even bigger role in the restructuring of China’s external relations in the years to come ...


16

especially seeking to establish a global network with China at its center. The emphasis

on global partnerships in President Xi’s speech shows that Chinese leaders and

policy makers are aware of the discourse surrounding the non-alliance policy. They

are also aware that there are not many nations that can be relied on to defend China’s

strategic interests; therefore, continued adherence to non-alliance is not due to its

efficacy, but because the government does not see many desirable alternatives.

It is easy to see that the dilemma of a rising power lies at the core of most of the

above debates. For those who call for a

change of China’s strategy, allying with

other nations is necessary and urgent,

while those who advocate adhering to

non-alliance emphasize the cost and

consequences of alignment. In practice,

China’s official stance on non-alliance has changed little. The Chinese government

has clearly stated in the Peaceful Development White Paper, published in 2011, that

its foreign policy is based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and that it

does not form alliances with any other country or group of countries (Information

Office of the State Council 2011). Beyond diplomatic rhetoric, however, Beijing’s

foreign policy has indeed become more proactive.

Whether China will form alliances with other powers and neighboring countries

depends on its self-defined role within the current international system. More

specifically, there are two important considerations for China: whether China can

continue to benefit from the current US dominated international system, and whether

China can bear the costs of challenging US dominance. Only if China views the

current international system as more of a constraint to its legitimate national

interests than an enabler of power and influence, will it choose to ally with other

nations that view the United States as a threat to their national interests.

Alliances have played a central role in international politics since ancient times.

Alliances form, collapse, and transform in response to changes in the security

environment. China will not change its position in the near future, but in the long

term China may ally with other countries again, when external conditions permit and

internal strategic calculations change. As Xu Jin sharply argues, “China should not

give up the option of alliance in the future, but it must change its traditional mindset

before altering its policy stance” (Xu 2015). It is necessary to note that the Chinese

government tends to articulate its foreign policy principles and strategies using

absolute and negative terminology such as, “China will never enter in any military

alliance”. For foreign audiences, such terminology is unpalatable because it conveys

an aggressive and uncompromising posture. For domestic audiences, these negative

Whether China will form alliances with other powers and neighboring countries depends on its self-defined role within the current international system.


17

absolutes are misleading as they deny the reality of dynamic actors operating in

international relations. The absolute discourse the Chinese government employs in

international relations severely harms China’s reputation and prestige. In fact, some

Chinese policies are simply propaganda and have no actual bearing on China’s

foreign policy. When China does make changes to its foreign policy, i.e. shifting

from a non-alliance strategy to an alliance strategy, this inconsistency undermines

China’s strategic reputation. Wise politicians understand that policy choices are

designed to serve temporary aims, which need to be adjusted in accordance with

changes in the international system. Absolutes unnecessarily limit foreign policy

choices and show a lack of foresight. China’s foreign policy aims would be better

served by employing flexible terminology that enables China to operate dynamically

in response to changes in the international system.

Conclusion Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has firmly maintained a non-alliance

policy. Wary of getting unnecessarily entangled in interstate conflicts, China has

implemented this policy mainly in reaction to unpleasant experiences with Cold War

allies such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and North Korea. As China continues to

rise, scholars and strategic analysts are beginning to question whether a non-alliance

policy should be maintained. Some scholars contend that a non-alliance strategy

cannot safeguard China’s national interests in the face of the United States’ security

alliance network throughout East Asia, and without allies, China’s rise will be

contained by the US. To that end, pro-alliance scholars are especially favorable

towards a formal alliance with Russia.

However, orthodox scholars, in favor

of maintaining China’s non-alignment,

argue that a formal alliance deviates

from the fundamental principles of

independence and self-reliance that

have historically guided China’s foreign policy. Furthermore, few of the remaining

options would even be considered trustworthy. A number of alternative strategies

have been proposed to replace or complement the non-alliance strategy; among them

are quasi-alliances, coalitions and strategic partnerships. Although it will not lead to

dramatic policy change in the short-term, the debate surrounding the non-alliance

strategy has significant implications for understanding China’s foreign policy

behavior as well as its relations with other major powers and its neighboring

countries.

China’s foreign policy aims would be better served by employing flexible terminology that enables China to operate dynamically in response to changes in the international system.


18

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Institute of International RelationsTsinghua University304 Ming ZhaiBeijing, 100084 China

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Documents

THE GRIFFITH-TSINGHUA ‘HOW CHINA SEES THE WORLD’ · 21st Century Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng Introduction In contrast to the contention and discussion surrounding China’s economic