The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Egypt’s Political Transition

7/29/2019 The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Egypts Political Transition

1/8

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Egypts

Political TransitionDr. Abdel Monem Said Aly and Karim Elkady

This Brief examines major political developments in Egypt inthe period between Hosni Mubaraks trial on August 3, 2011,and the civil disobedience that erupted in Port Said city in thewinter of 2012.1 It addresses one major question: To what extenthas this transitional period moved Egypt closer to a democratic

system of governance? And it argues that the path of Egyptspolitical transition remains uncertain. While Egypt experiencedpositive developments with respect to its political environment,the transition has also had negative manifestations thatmight obstruct Egypts path to democracy. Furthermore, veryunpleasant realities, which Mubaraks regime had suppressed,have resurfaced on the Egyptian political scene, impeding thepolitical transition. Accordingly, this Brief will consider thegood, the bad, and the ugly aspects of Egypts political transition.

The Good

Almost all Egyptian political factions have agreed that a democratic systemshould be the governing mode of the countrys second republic.2 Translatingthis dream into reality, however, remains a source of many disputesyet thesedisputes did not prevent the emergence of a number of positive developmentsthat might anchor Egypt on the road to democracy. These include the use ofelections as a mechanism for settling political disputes, progress toward acivilian state, the increasing role of judicial power, and the creation of a thirdalternative.

March 2013

No. 70

Judith and Sidney Swartz DirectorProf. Shai Feldman

Associate Director

Kristina Cherniahivsky

Charles (Corky) Goodman Professor ofMiddle East History andAssociate Director for ResearchNaghmeh Sohrabi

Senior FellowsAbdel Monem Said Aly, PhDKhalil Shikaki, PhD

Myra and Robert Kraft Professorof Arab PoliticsEva Bellin

Henry J. Leir Professor of the

Economics of the Middle EastNader Habibi

Sylvia K. Hassenfeld Professorof Islamic and Middle Eastern StudiesKanan Makiya

Junior Research FellowsPayam Mohseni, PhDAria Nakissa, PhD


2/82

Abdel Monem Said Aly isthe Chairman, CEO andDirector of The RegionalCenter for StrategicStudies (RCSS) in Cairo,

and Senior ResearchFellow at the CrownCenter.

Karim Elkady is a PhDcandidate in the PoliticsDepartment at BrandeisUniversity and the CrownCenter.

The opinions and findings expressed in thisBrief belong to the authors exclusively anddo not reflect those of the Crown Center orBrandeis University.

Elections in the Second RepublicDespite the unbalanced results of Egypts two referendums and twoparliamentary elections, Egypt experienced a successful season of relativelyfree and fair elections between November 2011 and May 2012. Elections therebybecame the mechanism for settling political disputes, such as those over theconstitutional amendments of March 2011, over who the new President of Egyptshould be, and over the substance of the new constitution. Twenty-nine partiesand a number of independent candidates competed for the 498 seats of the

Peoples Assembly in the elections that took place between November 28, 2011and January 11, 2012. Voter turnout amounted to 50 percent of the electorate.3

Unfortunately, however, the liberal and civic forces and the revolutionary groupswere less successful in these elections than the more organized and well-financedIslamist forces. The Muslim Brotherhood together with the El-Nur Salafi partywon 68 percent of the seats in the Peoples Assembly. Add to this tally the smallerIslamic parties, and the Islamist bloc accounts for 77 percent of the seats.4 And inthe elections to the Shura Council (the upper chamber of Parliament), which tookplace between January 29 and February 22, 2012, eight political parties competedfor 180 seats,5 and Islamists won 83 percent of the seats.6

In the presidential elections of May 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the MuslimBrotherhood candidate, won 51.7 percent of the votes. Ironically, the revolutionarygroups and civic forces supported Morsiin order to prevent the old regimerepresented by Ahmed Shafik, from winning the presidency.7

Finally, in the constitutional referendum of December 2012, the Islamist partieswho championed the new constitution won the approval of 64 percent of thevoters, though turnout had dropped to 32 percent.8

The Civilian StateIn June 2012, during the presidential elections final phase, the Supreme Councilof the Armed Forces (SCAF) attempted to consolidate its power in the Egyptianpolity. It issued a supplementary constitutional declaration that granted it vetopower over the new constitution and over decisions of war. In addition, it createdthe High Defense Council, to be headed by the President and to include the PrimeMinister, military leaders, the Chief of Intelligence, the Minister of Interior, andthe Minister of Foreign Affairs.9

But in the immediate aftermath of the August 5, 2012, terrorist attack on themilitary border post near Rafah on the Egyptian-Israeli border that left sixteenEgyptian soldiers dead, President Mohamed Morsi pushed SCAF out of thepolitical scene. On August 8, he dismissed the Chief of Intelligence along with thecommanders of the Republican Guard and the Military Police and the Governor

of North Sinai. A few days later, he also dismissed (and replaced) DefenseMinister Hussein Tantawi along with the Armys Chief of Staff, Sami Anan, aswell as other senior commanders of the Egyptian armed forces. He also canceledthe constitutional declaration that SCAF had issued in June of that yearwhichofficially ended SCAFs management of the transitional period.10

With these moves, Egypts new civilian president essentially precluded thepossibility that the military would interfere in Egyptian politics anytimesoon.11 For the first time since 1952, civilian power had taken control of Egyptspresidencya second important positive development in the political transition.


3/83

The Rise of the Judicial PowerUnder Hosni Mubaraks regime, the judiciary managedto preserve its relative autonomy and keep itself fromcoming under the domination of the presidency. Thus,the Egyptian Supreme Court (also referred to as theConstitutional Court) ruled three different times againstelections laws, forcing Mubarak to dissolve Parliamenton each of these three occasions. Since the January

revolution, the judiciary has continued to seek to expandits independence.12 The judges refused to be a tool forexacting revenge against members of the Mubarak regime.On June 12, 2012, the Constitutional Court ruled that thenew election law was unconstitutional, whereupon SCAFdissolved the Peoples Assembly; in the same month, theCourt annulled the law that prevented high-rankingmembers of the dissolved National Democratic Party(NDP) from running for public office.13 Additionally, intrials of members of the police force accused of killingEgyptian protesters, the criminal courts exonerated thedefendants for lack of evidence. And in January of 2013, the

Court of Cassation overturned the life sentence previouslyleveled against Mubarak and his Minister of Interior andordered a retrial.

The judiciary plays a significant role in the Egyptianpolitical process in that it checks attempts by one oranother political power to dominate the political system.The way the Judges Club responded to President Morsisconstitutional declarations on November 20, 2012, testifiesto the positive influence judges have exerted on thepolitical transition in Egypt. In these declarations, Morsiimmunized his decisions, the Shura Council, and theconstitutional assembly from judicial review. In addition,he appointed a new Prosecutor General, Talaat Ibrahim,to replace Abdel Megid Mahmoud, although Mahmoudstenure had not ended.14 Morsis decisions constituteda clear violation of the judicial lawso the judges indifferent courts went on strike and sustained their protestuntil Morsi canceled his decisions two weeks later.The Rise of the Third AlternativeThe so-called third alternative came to life duringthe presidential elections, when over 800,000 voters

deliberately annulled their votes, rejecting the choice forpresident between the Mubarak eras Ahmed Shafik andthe Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi. Thecivilian secular parties attempted to present Egyptianswith a third alternative that would be significantlydifferent from either re-creating the old regime oraccepting Muslim Brotherhood domination.

Three civilian blocs devised this third alternative. TheNational Conference Bloc, with a liberal orientation,was led by the Wafd party and headed by former Foreign

Minister Amr Musa. The Popular Front, a Nasseritemovement, was headed by Hamdeen Sabbahi. And theRevolutionary Democratic Alliance, a leftist bloc, was ledby the Tagmuu party and supported by smaller socialistparties. The three blocs have been working togetherto build a coalition to compete against the MuslimBrotherhood. After Morsis constitutional declarations inNovember 2012, the first two blocs combined to form theNational Salvation Front. (Later on, Mohamed ElBaradeisDostor Party also joined the Salvation Front.)

To what extent this coalition will succeed in balancingthe power of the Islamists remains uncertain; it is stillfragmented, and it is less experienced in the field ofpolitical action. Moreover, the parties it includes haveso far failed to reach out to the Egyptian silent majority. 1

Their message to the general public is complicatedcompared with the simplicity of the Islamists messagethat Islam is the solution. Still, its formation, providingthe Egyptian people with another political alternative

constitutes a third important positive development.

The Bad

Building on its electoral victories in the parliamentary andpresidential elections, the Moslem Brotherhood launcheda consolidation strategy that risks replacing one single-party system with another, thereby obstructing Egyptsdemocratization. In the absence of a truly competitiveparty system, the Brotherhood, through its Freedom

and Justice Party (FJP), has utilized its legislative andpresidential powers to dominate the political scenewhereas, as we alluded to above, Egypts secular partiesare fractured and lack human capital and organizationaresources.16

The consolidation strategy comprises several elementsOne is to exclude the previous regimes leadership, formermembers of Parliament, armed forces leadership, andstate security officers from participating in the politicalprocess and from holding high offices. Another is to co-opt potential resistance on the part of political groups

and institutions by winning their allegiance. Finallythe Muslim Brotherhood has begun a gradual policyof appointing its members to influential political andministerial positionsand to top positions at publiclyowned newspapers as well. This section will unpack thesethree elements.

ExclusionIn the first phase of the exclusion policy, the MuslimBrotherhood used its majority status in both chambersof Parliament to legislate the political isolation law


4/84

that barred former high state officials from running inparliamentary or presidential elections. The Brotherhooddrafted this law in order to block attempts by formerNational Democratic Party (NDP) members to infiltratethe electoral process so as to regain political power. Thisinitiative failed, however, because the Egyptian SupremeCourt ruled it unconstitutional.17

Through its majority in the Shura Council, theBrotherhood then selected new editors-in-chief andchairmen of the board at publicly owned newspapers. TheBrotherhood argued that these changes were necessarybecause the press in a democratic Egypt required a newleadership that was not involved in corruption and wasnot subordinate to Mubaraks regime. In truth, thesechanges also reflected a winner takes all approachandthe new appointees are known to be either sympathizersof the Muslim Brotherhood or loyalists to whoever is inpower.18

The second phase of the exclusion policy began in June2012, when Prosecutor General Abdel Magid Mahmoudreferred forty-one state security officers to the CriminalCourt for trial.19 The officers were accused of destroyingtop secret documents that belonged to the State SecurityInvestigation Service. These state security officersconstituted Mubaraks iron fist against the MuslimBrotherhood; in addition, they possessed credibleintelligence regarding the Brotherhoods organizationalcapacities. The step was also seen as the MBs revengeagainst state security officers for all the atrocities theycommitted against members of the Brotherhood duringthe Mubarak era.

After dismissing SCAF from the political process,President Morsi appointed a new young Defense Minister,General Abdel Fattah Alsisi, and a young Chief of Staff,General Sedki Sobhy. The new military leadership in turnbegan dismissing some seventy senior military leaderswho were considered loyal to Field Marshal Tantawi,most notably Tantawis assistants and close advisers.20 Atthe direction of the President, the ministerial cabinet alsodismissed the first layer of leadership from key ministries:

specifically, petroleum, electricity, civil aviation, andreligious endowments.

Co-optationWhile President Morsis changes in the apparatus of stategovernment were aggressive, they did not face internalresistance from the targeted institutionswho respectedthe Presidents decisions because they allowed for newgenerations within these institutions to assume positionsof leadership. The changes were considered especiallydesirable because none of the newly appointed leaderscame from outside these institutions.

Revolutionary political forces and parties, on the otherhand, greeted these changes with a mixture of applauseand suspicion. On the one hand, fighting corruptionwithin state institutions was one of the objectives of therevolution; on the other hand, these changes paved theway for the Muslim Brotherhoods domination of theEgyptian political system.

Morsi sought to co-opt the political forces that mighthave resisted his changes by appointing MahmoudMekki as his Vice President. Mekki is a judge who is wellknown and respected within the judicial community inEgypt because of his opposition to Mubaraks regime.During the transitional period, Morsi assigned him theresponsibility of effecting judicial reform and ensuringseparation of powers.21

As another part of his strategy of co-optation, Morsiappointed a presidential team of assistants and adviserswho represented an array of political forces. This

included twenty-one assistants and advisersincludingwomen, intellectuals, Copts, journalists, partisans, andbusinessmenfrom different political factions who hadparticipated in the revolution and in the election season.22Appointing this presidential team was part of a broaderattempt to engage these individuals in the politicalprocess and win their acceptance. But the strategy provedineffective and artificial: Morsi did not consult withhis presidential team on important matters and keptthem in the dark regarding his decisions. As a result, inNovember 2012 most of the presidential team resignedin opposition to Morsis constitutional declarations; andsoon thereafter, Vice President Mekki resigned as well.InsertionA final element of the Muslim Brotherhoodsconsolidation strategy was the insertion of their membersinto key political positionsmost importantly at theconstitutional convention. The Brotherhood insistedon translating its electoral victory into seats at theconvention; as a result, it took the largest bloc of seats inthis critically important body. The Brotherhoods blockaccounted for 22 seats out of 100. Morsi also appointed

members of the Brotherhood to the posts of ministersof information, youth, education, higher education,industry, housing, telecommunications, labor force, andinterior trade;23 and he appointed four members of theBrotherhood to be the new governors of Kafr Elsheikh,Asyut, Elmenia, and Elmonofiya.24 Though it is legitimatefor a winning political party to be significantly involvedin the processes of policy making and policy execution,without institutional checks against the President andin the absence of a strong party system, the MuslimBrotherhood consolidation strategy could lead to itsdomination of the political system.


5/85

The Ugly

While the political process continues to unfold and Egyptoscillates between good and bad developments, anugly face of Egypt has also imposed itself on the politicaltransition, creating pressure points relative to the Egyptianstate. These pressure points challenge the states limits and

may yet push it into a slow, gradual disintegration.

Four ugly manifestations erupted with the fall ofMubaraks regime: the rise of terrorism, the rise ofsectarian violence, the rise of organized crime, and therise of civilian violence. This does not mean that Egypt didnot experience terrorism, sectarian violence, or organizedcrime under Mubaraks regime. All of these problems havepersisted for a long time; but the political transition andthe disintegration of the interior ministry have paved theway for these chronic problems to manifest themselvesunchecked and without even minimal restraint.

TerrorismWith the collapse of the police forces after January 28,2011, some 23,710 prisoners escaped from eleven majorEgyptian prisons. Among those prisoners were jihadistoperatives belonging to different terrorist organizationsmany of whom took shelter in Northern Sinais JebelAlhalal Mountain. (The number of jihadist operatives whohave taken sanctuary in Sinai is estimated to be between1,600 and 6,000.25) Jihadists began once more to organizeand recruit for terrorist operations. They continue to

target police stations, the international forces in Sinai,government buildings, the Egyptian army, and the gaspipeline to Israel. The Egyptian armed forces and securityservices launched a military operation in Northern Sinai tocrack down on these terrorist networks which did succeedin degrading terrorist organizational capacities, but it isunlikely to end their presence in the Sinai.26

On another front, two major jihadist terrorist groupshave created political parties in Egypt to participate inthe political process. The first is the Construction andDevelopment Party, which is the political arm of Al

Jamaa Al-Islamiya. This party has gained thirteen seatsin the Peoples Assembly.27 The second is the Safety andDevelopment Party, which represents the Egyptian IslamicJihad organization, once led by the current head of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri.28 While the current leadersof these parties had denounced violence a few yearsbefore the revolution, in the revolutions aftermath theirrepudiation of violence came under question. First, someof their leaders retreated from past fatwas that forbadeusing violence against Muslim leaders; for example, duringthe presidential elections, both parties threatened to

use violence again if Omar Suleiman, Mubaraks formerIntelligence Chief, won the presidency. Second, theyrequested permission from the state to allow them to jointhe armed struggle against Qaddafis and Assads regimesAll of this suggests that Egypt may slip into another waveof terrorism.

Sectarian ViolenceSectarian violence between the Muslim and Copticcommunities has soared with the fall of Mubaraksregime. For example, on March 4, 2011, a group of MuslimEgyptians attacked a church in Helwan because ofallegations of an affair between a young Muslim man anda Coptic girl; the attack on the church caused the death oftwo people. The incident instigated an eruption of violencein other areas of Cairo, including Al-Muqqatam.

The frequency of sectarian violence kept increasing untilOctober 9, 2011, when a group of Copts protested in frontof the Egyptian TV and Radio Headquarters in Maspero

demanding the protection of Copts in Egypt. The protestswhich arose in response to the burning of a Coptic churchin Aswan in Upper Egypt, exploded into violence, causingthe death of twenty-four protesters and injuries to morethan two hundred civilians.29

The displacement of Coptic families became another formof sectarian violence that developed in the outskirts ofcities in Giza, Alexandria, and North Sinai.30 In January2013, Muslims raided the Al Marshada Church in thevillage of Al Marshada in the Qena Governorate as well asshops owned by Coptic Egyptians. The violence eruptedfollowing accusations that a Coptic shop owner hadmolested a six-year-old girl in the village.31

Sectarian violence is likely to continue in Egypt becauseof the Muslim Brotherhoods marginalization of CopticEgyptians, the increasing role of Salafist groups, and thestates weakened capacity to manage sectarian tensions.Organized CrimeIncreasing crime rates represent another ugly dimensionof the Egyptian political transition. The escapees from

Egyptian prisons were not only jihadist terrorists; theyincluded criminals and thugsand the number ofcriminals who escaped from police stations during thesame period is not known, even to the government. Duringthe revolution, ninety police stations were set on fire andbroken into by mobs.32 Unfortunately, criminal records inthose stations were burnt along with the buildings.

The collapse of internal security has allowed criminalsin Egypt to organize and take advantage of the resultingvacuum. Organized crime introduced new patterns ofcrime, such as illegal arms sales. It began targeting state


6/86

infrastructure such as electrical cables, which was oneof the main reasons for the power outages that Egyptexperienced in the summer of 2012. All these developmentsare likely to continue compromising the states capacityto maintain law and order, which will affect the quality ofEgypts political transition.

Civilian ViolenceSince Januarys revolution, Egyptians have witnessedviolence in their daily lives with unprecedented frequency.Mistrust of the police force has impelled citizens toresort to violence to settle their daily disputes. Egyptiannewspapers report regularly on vigilantes punishing thugsfor bullying residents of neighborhoods or punishingindividuals for moral misconduct in public.

Civil and labor unrest also often turns into violence.During just two weeks in September 2012, there weretwenty blockages of highways and railroads duringdemonstrations demanding fuel, electricity, employment,

or increases in wages.33

Egyptian ultrassoccer fansrepresent anotherdimension of the problem of increased civilianviolence. Ultras have become a strong force in politicaldemonstrations. They developed organizational skillsand became highly vocal with respect to political issuesespecially after the Port Said Stadium massacre of February1, 2012, at which seventy-four of the al-Ahly soccer fansdied.34

In a related incident that signifies the increasing resort toviolence in Egypt, protests erupted simultaneously in thethree Suez Canal cities to object to the death sentencesimposed by the Criminal Court against twenty-onedefendants in the trial resulting from the Port Said Stadiummassacre. The ensuing riots in Port Said city on January2627, 2013, left fifty-three people dead.35 On February 20,the ultras of Port Saids Almasry football club orchestratedcivil disobedience in the city to voice their opposition tothe court ruling as well as to President Morsis impositionof a curfew on the city.36

The Security ChallengeAll the ugliness described above requires prompt responsefrom the statebut three impediments still get in theway of an effective response. The first is the unresolveddispute between various political forces over the nature ofthe police force in the second republic. The revolutionarygroups argue that the revolution was in part a responseto police brutality and corruption; these groups demand anew police force that respects human rights. After Morsiwas elected, however, police reform dropped from hisagenda as he gave priority to another promise: to restoresecurity in his first hundred days in office.37

The second impediment is that President Morsi wouldhave to crack down on the Islamist jihadist groupsto prevent them from orchestrating terrorist attacksespecially in the Sinaiand these measures might inspirecounterattacks against the state from jihadist groups.

The third obstacle lies with the Egyptian police force itselfwhich has been working under the emergency law for morethan thirty years. With its repeal, the police force may notbe ready for the transition. The police force also lost itsmorale after the collapse of Mubaraks regime. Egyptianpolitical forces have blamed the interior ministry for all thefailures of Mubaraks regime, so the police force becamediscredited and disrespected by Egyptians. Consequentlyit became reluctant to restore security and less willing tocooperate with the new political regime.

A Final Note

Predicting the future of Egypt is very difficult, because thevarious political developments outlined here could lead tovery different outcomes. The positive developments wevedescribed may well take Egypt on a democratic path; thenegative ones may leave Egypt under the dominance ofa single party for a long period of time. Finally, the uglierrealities elaborated here may extend disorder in Egypt for alonger period of time, which might cause the disintegrationof state functioning in different parts of the republic.

How might the good, the bad, and the ugly aspects

of Egypts political transition continue to evolve, andwhat may prove to be their relative weight as Egyptsfuture unfolds? Will the positive developments in Egyptstransition survive the pressure exerted by the negativeones, along with the various forms of terrorism andviolence that now make up an important dimension of thistransition? Or will progress toward democratization inEgypt be set back by a reaction in the direction of a newform of authoritarianism and drown in a further escalationof violence? Only time will tell.


7/87

Endnotes

1 See Abdel Monem Said Aly, The Paradox of the Egyptian Revolution, Middle East Brief, no. 55 (Brandeis University: CrownCenter for Middle East Studies, September 2011)*; Abdel Monem Said Aly and Shai Feldman, Testing the Resilience of Egyptian-Israeli Peace, Middle East Brief, no. 56 (Brandeis University: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, November 2011)*; AbdelMonem Said Aly, State and Revolution in Egypt: The Paradox of Change and Politics, Crown Essay 2 (Brandeis University:Crown Center for Middle East Studies, January 2012)*; andEslam Omar, Protesters in Egypts Port Said Step Up CivilDisobedience Campaign,Ahram Online, February 20, 2013.*

2 Egypts first republic began after the Free Officers took power in July 1952, ending Mohamed Alis dynasty. This republiccontinued until the toppling of its third President, Hosni Mubarak, on February 11, 2011.3 Abdel Ghaffar Shukr, Electoral Alliances in the Peoples Assembly Elections 2012, in The Peoples Assembly Elections 2011/2012, ed.

Amr Hashem Rabie (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies, 2012), pp. 93114 [in Arabic].4 Amr Hashem Rabie, Elections Results of Peoples Assembly 20112012, in The Peoples Assembly Elections 2011/2012, ed. Amr Hashem

Rabie (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies, 2012), pp. 353400 [in Arabic].5 Yousri Elezabawi, Parties Participating in the Shura Council Elections, in The Shura Council Elections 2012, ed. Amr Hashem Rabie

(Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies, 2012), pp. 61-80 [in Arabic].6 Amr Hashem Rabie, The Indications and Results of the Shura Council Elections, in The Shura Council Elections 2012, pp. 26984

[in Arabic].7 Presidential Election Results 2012 [in Arabic].*8 Egypts Constitutional Referendum:A Dubious Yes, The Economist, December 22, 2012.*9 English Text of SCAF Amended Egypt Constitutional Declaration, Ahram Online, June 18, 2012.10 Morsi Retires Egypts Top Army Leaders; Amends 2011 Constitutional Declaration; Appoints Vice President, Ahram Online,

August 12, 2012.11 Egypts Morsi Issues New Constitutional Declaration,Ahram Online, August 12, 2012.12 Aly, State and Revolution in Egypt: The Paradox of Change and Politics, pp. 1617.13 Yasmine Fathi, Egypts Judicial independence: The Battle Continues, Ahram Online, Oct 14, 2012. The Islamist parties narrative

is that these rulings aimed to defend Mubaraks regime, since the judges were appointed by Mubarak himself. The rulingswere consistent with previous precedents of the Court, however; and the same constitutional and legal reasoning that theConstitutional Court applied against Mubaraks regime was applied in the two rulings against the Islamist-dominated PeoplesAssembly and its elections law. Not surprisingly, the Court ruled again against the new elections law that the Shura Councilapproved to regulate the parliamentary elections scheduled for AprilJune 2013. SeeShura Accepts Top Courts Reservations onEgypts Electoral Law, Ahram Online, February 21, 2013.*

14 English Text of Morsis Constitutional Declaration, Ahram Online, November 22, 2012.*15 Liberal, Leftist Forces Unite to Defeat Unrepresentative Constitution, Ahram Online, September 27, 2012.16 Ibid.17 Gamal Essam El-Din, Disfranchisement Law to Be Discussed in Parliament on Thursday, Ahram Online, April 11, 2012.

18 Abeer Tayel, Egypts Journalists Fear the Islamization of Press,Al Arabiya News, July 1, 2012.*19 Investigations: State Security Head Ordered Records Destroyed, Translated byAl-Masry Al-Youm, June 28, 2012.*20 Egypt Retires 70 Army Generals, BBC News Middle East, September 2, 2012.*21 Morsi Appoints Mahmoud Mekki as Vice President, Ahram Online, August 12, 2012.22 Zeinab El Gundy, Egypts Morsi Appoints Christian, Woman and Salafist to Presidential Team: Brotherhood TV Channel,

Ahram Online, August 22, 2012.23 Egypts Morsi Swears in New Cabinet,Al Jazeera English, August 2, 2012.24 Farhan Iqbal, Morsi Appoints New Governors from Muslim Brotherhood, Al Arabiya, September 8, 2012.25 Soliman Shafik, Will the Salafists Provoke War between Egypt and Israel? Rosa Elyousef, August 8, 2012 [in Arabic].*26 Sarah El-Rashidi, Egypts Sinai Peninsula: Fertile Ground for Discontent, Ahram Online, September 2, 2012.27 Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyas Party Hold First Press Conference in Aswan, Upper Egypt, Ahram Online, October 21, 2011.28 Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya and the Safety and Development Party, Islamopedia Online, visited March 13, 2013.*29 Remembering the Maspero Massacre: One Year On, Daily News Egypt, October 8, 2012.*30 Egypts Copts Abandon Sinai Homes after Threats, Attack, Reuters, September, 28, 2012.*

31 Violence Erupts after Muslim Protesters Attack Upper Egypt Church, Ahram Online, January 18, 2013.*32 Sarah Lynch, Cairo Clashes Highlight Tensions between Egyptian Police, Public, Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 2011.*33 The Egyptian Report on the Protest Movements (Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, September 20, 2012).34 Hatem Maher, Egypts Ultras Ahlawy Storm Cairos Media Production City,Ahram Online, September 25, 2012.35 Rana Muhammad Taha, Excessive Violence against Civilians in Port Said and Suez, Daily News Egypt, February 3, 2013.36 Eslam Omar, Protesters in Egypts Port Said Step Up Civil Disobedience Campaign.37 Egyptian Police Torture 88, Kill 34 under President Morsi: Rights Report,Ahram Online, October 15, 2012.

* Weblinks are available in the online versions found atwww.brandeis.edu/crown
http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb55.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb55.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb55.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb55.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb56.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb56.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb56.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb56.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/ce2.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/ce2.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/ce2.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/ce2.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/ce2.htmlhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/65219/Egypt/0/Protesters-in-Egypts-Port-Said-step-up-civil-disob.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/65219/Egypt/0/Protesters-in-Egypts-Port-Said-step-up-civil-disob.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/65219/Egypt/0/Protesters-in-Egypts-Port-Said-step-up-civil-disob.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/65219/Egypt/0/Protesters-in-Egypts-Port-Said-step-up-civil-disob.aspxhttp://presidential2012.elections.eg/index.php/round2-resultshttp://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568756-flawed-constitution-will-be-endorsed-argument-far-overhttp://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568756-flawed-constitution-will-be-endorsed-argument-far-overhttp://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568756-flawed-constitution-will-be-endorsed-argument-far-overhttp://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568756-flawed-constitution-will-be-endorsed-argument-far-overhttp://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568756-flawed-constitution-will-be-endorsed-argument-far-overhttp://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568756-flawed-constitution-will-be-endorsed-argument-far-overhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/65300/Egypt/Politics-/Shura-accepts-top-courts-reservations-on-Egypts-el.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/65300/Egypt/Politics-/Shura-accepts-top-courts-reservations-on-Egypts-el.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/65300/Egypt/Politics-/Shura-accepts-top-courts-reservations-on-Egypts-el.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/65300/Egypt/Politics-/Shura-accepts-top-courts-reservations-on-Egypts-el.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspxhttp://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/01/223742http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/01/223742http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/01/223742http://www.egyptindependent.com/staff/al-masry-al-youmhttp://www.egyptindependent.com/staff/al-masry-al-youmhttp://www.egyptindependent.com/staff/al-masry-al-youmhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19456182http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19456182http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19456182http://www.masress.com/rosaweekly/122227http://www.masress.com/rosaweekly/122227http://www.masress.com/rosaweekly/122227http://www.islamopediaonline.org/country-profile/egypt/islam-and-electoral-parties/al-jama%E2%80%99-al-islamiyya-and-safety-and-development-phttp://www.islamopediaonline.org/country-profile/egypt/islam-and-electoral-parties/al-jama%E2%80%99-al-islamiyya-and-safety-and-development-phttp://www.islamopediaonline.org/country-profile/egypt/islam-and-electoral-parties/al-jama%E2%80%99-al-islamiyya-and-safety-and-development-phttp://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/10/08/remembering-the-maspero-massacre-one-year-on/http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/10/08/remembering-the-maspero-massacre-one-year-on/http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/10/08/remembering-the-maspero-massacre-one-year-on/http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-egypt-sinai-copts-idUSBRE88R1A320120928http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-egypt-sinai-copts-idUSBRE88R1A320120928http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-egypt-sinai-copts-idUSBRE88R1A320120928http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-egypt-sinai-copts-idUSBRE88R1A320120928http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-egypt-sinai-copts-idUSBRE88R1A320120928http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/62769/Egypt/Politics-/Violence-erupts-after-Muslim-protesters-attack-Upp.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/62769/Egypt/Politics-/Violence-erupts-after-Muslim-protesters-attack-Upp.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/62769/Egypt/Politics-/Violence-erupts-after-Muslim-protesters-attack-Upp.aspxhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0629/Cairo-clashes-highlight-tensions-between-Egyptian-police-publichttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0629/Cairo-clashes-highlight-tensions-between-Egyptian-police-publichttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0629/Cairo-clashes-highlight-tensions-between-Egyptian-police-publichttp://www.brandeis.edu/crownhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crownhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0629/Cairo-clashes-highlight-tensions-between-Egyptian-police-publichttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/62769/Egypt/Politics-/Violence-erupts-after-Muslim-protesters-attack-Upp.aspxhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-egypt-sinai-copts-idUSBRE88R1A320120928http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/10/08/remembering-the-maspero-massacre-one-year-on/http://www.islamopediaonline.org/country-profile/egypt/islam-and-electoral-parties/al-jama%E2%80%99-al-islamiyya-and-safety-and-development-phttp://www.masress.com/rosaweekly/122227http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19456182http://www.egyptindependent.com/staff/al-masry-al-youmhttp://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/01/223742http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/65300/Egypt/Politics-/Shura-accepts-top-courts-reservations-on-Egypts-el.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/65300/Egypt/Politics-/Shura-accepts-top-courts-reservations-on-Egypts-el.aspxhttp://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568756-flawed-constitution-will-be-endorsed-argument-far-overhttp://presidential2012.elections.eg/index.php/round2-resultshttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/65219/Egypt/0/Protesters-in-Egypts-Port-Said-step-up-civil-disob.aspxhttp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/65219/Egypt/0/Protesters-in-Egypts-Port-Said-step-up-civil-disob.aspxhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/ce2.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/ce2.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/ce2.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb56.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb56.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb55.htmlhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/meb55.html


8/8

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of EgyptsPolitical Transition

Dr. Abdel Monem Said Aly and Karim Elkady

Recent Middle East Briefs:Available on the Crown Center website: www.brandeis.edu/crown

Dror Zeevi, The Transformation of Public Space in Turkey, No. 69

Aria Nakissa, Islamist Understandings of Sharia and Their Implications for the Post-revolutionary Egyptian Constitution, No. 68

Nader Habibi, The Economic Agendas and Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in Egyptand Tunisia, No. 67

Sarah J. Feuer, Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisias Ennahdha Nine Months In,September 2012, No. 66

Naghmeh Sohrabi, Reading the Tea Leaves: Iranian Domestic Politics and the PresidentialElection of 2013, July 2012, No. 65
http://www.brandeis.edu/crownhttp://www.brandeis.edu/crown

Documents

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Egypt’s Political Transition