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The Global South in EnvironmentalNegotiations: the politics of coalitionsin REDD+

JEN IRIS ALLAN & PETER DAUVERGNE

ABSTRACT During international environmental negotiations developing countrieshave commonly employed a unified strategy through the G-77 and China (G-77/China). Compared with other negotiations, such as those on trade and security,this strategy has been relatively successful in securing financial and technicalbenefits. Unity among developing states is not, however, a characteristic of allenvironmental negotiations. This paper analyses the case of Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation and Degradation plus conservation (REDD+), where unity hasbeen absent. It argues that the negotiation positions, strategies and coalition pol-itics from 2005 to 2013 have been a result of identifiable power asymmetriesamong developing states (shifting over time). Some states with vast forestresources have held an effective veto, while others have had considerable moralinfluence and expert authority. Coalitions have courted such relevant and reputa-tional leaders. At the same time some developing states have had enough diplo-matic capacity and economic power to stand alone in negotiations. Taking abroad, historical view of the diverse forest interests and power asymmetriesamong developing states helps to explain the recent stagnation in negotiations toestablish an international REDD+ mechanism to mitigate climate change.

Sometimes a small state emerges as a surprisingly powerful actor in globalnegotiations; other times a group of developing states secures an unexpectedlylarge amount of financial or technical assistance from developed countries.Neither outcome is common in global trade or military negotiations, wheredeveloped states dominate. Yet within global environmental negotiationsdeveloping states do sometimes have considerable influence—and even act asleaders.1

Often developing countries cooperate through the G-77/China. The G-77/Chinahas acted in negotiations over desertification and climate change, and in the manynegotiations during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED), including those on forests. Developing countries were

Jen Iris Allan and Peter Dauvergne are both in the Department of Political Science, University of BritishColumbia, C425-1866 Main Mall, Vancouver V6T 1Z1, Canada. Emails: jennifer.allan@alumni.ubc.ca; peter.dauvergne@ubc.ca.

Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 8, 2013, pp 1307–1322

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/13/001307-16

� 2013 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com

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unified during early ozone negotiations. During desertification negotiationsregional interests nearly fractured the G-77/China; and trade priorities variedconsiderably during negotiations for a biodiversity convention. Despite tensions,however, a fragile unity did prevail in both of these negotiations as well.2

On occasion the challenge of maintaining unity does prove too great for statenegotiators and the G-77/China fractures into smaller coalitions, with somestates choosing to act alone. When disunity arises, puzzling patterns of behav-iour can emerge among developing countries. Why, for example, would a stateeschew the strength and safety of a coalition and try to advance its interests uni-laterally? Why would some developing states with seemingly little to gainexpend resources in coalitions, while other more powerful states remain silent?Such actions and patterns have characterised negotiations on Reducing

Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation ‘plus conservation, the sustain-able management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks’ (REDD+),where the G-77/China does not represent developing countries. For those lookingto regulate climate change, as well as those seeking to curb deforestation, aninternational REDD+ mechanism would seem to offer a win-win opportunity.Developing countries are participating extensively in REDD+ negotiations, andhave initiated many proposals since the idea of reducing emissions from defores-tation began to take off in 2005. Since then small, less-forested countries havebeen actively involved, with some leading coalitions. Some of the more powerfuldeveloping states are acting alone in the negotiations, although most states havechosen to join one or more coalitions. The coalitions tend to be loose and mostlyregional, representing multiple interests. To date Latin America has been the leastcohesive negotiating group, even though states in the region have similar histori-cal deforestation rates and current forest cover. Common backgrounds, as thecase of Latin America reveals, are not necessarily the glue binding coalitions.Although most negotiation analysts emphasise common identities and

interests to explain coalition formation, this article emphasises the importanceof power asymmetries for influencing the negotiation strategies and the leader-ship capacity of developing states. Developing countries have a range ofbargaining resources, from controlling a critical resource to serving as a moralcompass. For REDD+ a wide variety of bargaining chips stratifies the G-77/Chinacoalition, exacerbating the challenge of managing unity. This article providesinsights into the importance of power asymmetries for the politics of coalitionswhen unity within the G-77/China is absent.Most analysts note the power that developing states wield in a given

negotiation process; on the other hand, we see power resources as accruing andchanging over time across multiple negotiation forums. Power resources shift asnegotiating parties gain expertise and reframe issues. Some states might gaininfluence because of their relevance to the issue at hand. Other states might gainmoral or expert authority over time. Still others might make gains in the worldeconomy, augmenting their diplomatic capacity and ability to act alone ininternational negotiations.Our analysis does not discount the political importance of the global South as

a negotiating unit. But it does shed light on the difficulty of achieving andretaining consensus in the G-77/China. For some issues, such as climate change,

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the G-77/China speaks as a group, even as some members offer dissenting opin-ions (eg the Alliance of Small Island States) or supportive, but distinct, views(eg the African Group and the Coalition of Like-Minded Developing States).Understanding how different power asymmetries interact helps to explain whydeveloping countries pursue various negotiation strategies, and at times gainsignificant influence in international negotiations.

Power asymmetries

Some of the power of developing states in global environmental politics stemsfrom global ecological interdependence, which reduces asymmetries amongstates. The North needs the South to preserve, maintain or repair the globalenvironment. Such natural interdependence can help the South gain concessionsfrom developed countries. Leverage is based on the threat to leave negotiationsor opt out of rules. Developing countries may even be able to veto proposals,such as a global forest treaty during the 1992 UN Conference on Environmentand Development.3

The concept of a ‘global South’ masks a wide range of economic, politicaland social differences among developing states, but also reflects shared materialcircumstances and common governance and economic concerns, especially his-torically. In part the G-77/China is a product of a common identity and desireto operate collectively.4 Beyond material circumstances the idea of aNorth–South divide provides a starting point for the South’s unity, as do sharedexperiences of colonialism, imperialism and globalisation. As Williams writes,‘developing countries thus tend to create and recreate a fragile unity inopposition to existing structures of power that leave its policy makers feelingvulnerable’. Yet, as Williams emphasises, shared interests do exist within theglobal South. Efforts to link environmental and development goals are commonduring environmental negotiations, as are calls for more financing, technologytransfers and longer timeframes to implement agreements.5 A desire to protectnatural resources can also create shared interests among developing countries.6

At the same time significant and growing differences and inequalities alsocharacterise the global South as a negotiating group. For climate change, Brazil,India, and China and states in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-tries (OPEC) often wield more influence over G-77/China policy formation than,for example, highly vulnerable countries within the Alliance of Small IslandStates.7 Often this diversity is manageable, particularly when speaking in a uni-fied voice can bring tangible benefits, including legitimacy. But, on occasion,developing countries are simply too stratified, and form smaller coalitions orundertake negotiations alone without the G-77/China umbrella. Understandingpower asymmetries helps to reveal why some developing states seek influencethrough coalitions while others resist working collectively.

Power asymmetries and coalitions

International negotiation analysts conceive of state power in a variety of ways.8

A tendency exists, however, to treat state power resources as given within the

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context of a particular negotiation, as bargaining chips that states bring to anegotiation. We see power resources and asymmetries as changing during thecourse of a negotiation (or sometimes in other negotiation forums). Also, for usa state’s weight in a negotiation process may change as broader political andeconomic conditions shift. We trace four types of power of particular impor-tance for the politics of coalitions: issue-specific, reputational, diplomatic andstructural.Issue-specific power stems from the different political structures characteris-

ing issue areas, with some, like forestry, less entangled in the world order thanothers (eg military issues).9 To hold issue-specific power, states need to be rela-tively important for the issue, regardless of their place in the world economy.10

Having significant tropical forests, biodiversity, deserts or other ecosystems canall confer issue-specific power in environmental negotiations. States holding thistype of power can make or break the success of an international negotiation.Issue-framing can alter issue-specific power over time and across negotiationforums. For example, if forests are conceived of in terms of timber, biodiversityor carbon storage, then Malaysia, Costa Rica and Indonesia emerge as relevantactors, respectively. Reframing can create new issue-specific power if the newframe privileges certain actors. Framing creates dynamism in issue-specificpower, although alone it cannot guarantee that a state will have power during anegotiation.States with issue-specific power, including ones gaining power under a new

framing of an issue, are valuable coalition members. Inclusion of such statesenhances the relevance of a coalition, and can increase a coalition’s negotiatingpower (and sometimes confer veto capacity). Those with issue-specific powercan secure financial or technical compensation, which could be shared among,or levied for additional resources for, members of a coalition. Issue-specificpower relates directly to the negotiation at hand. Other more intangible forms ofpower can also provide a developing country with a strong voice during negoti-ations. States may gain power through their expertise and reputation for envi-ronmental stewardship; states may also have a strong moral voice duringnegotiations when environmental change is disproportionately harming thecountry. During negotiations others at the table may view negotiators from suchstates as more knowledgeable or even inspirational. States with such expert ormoral authority can gain influence by reminding negotiators of the stakes, thecosts of failure, and the collective duty to future generations.Coalitions work to recruit—and retain—states with expert or moral authority.

Such states offer coalitions critical information as well as enhance the legiti-macy and status of the coalition among other negotiators. Coalitions with expertor moral authority, however, are not necessarily cohesive. Small island develop-ing states, for example, formed the Alliance of Small Island States in 1990 toenhance their capacity in climate negotiations. This grouping is a powerfulmoral voice for those states facing catastrophic future consequences of climatechange. Yet managing the diverse priorities and preferences within this coalitionis an ongoing challenge.11

Negotiations require developing states to research and prioritise interests andbargaining positions, a never-easy task during always complex and technical

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environmental negotiations. Negotiators can become buried by the concurrentmeetings, numerous proposals and many revised drafts. Without sufficient num-bers of delegates, and without a well informed diplomatic corps, negotiatorscannot participate fully, especially in informal processes.12 Joining a coalitionfor these states becomes a sensible—even necessary—way to pool diplomaticresources and gain the capacity to be more proactive.Coalitions can lower participation costs and increase the capacity and perceived

strength of a state’s negotiating team. Collective negotiation can also simplify thenumber of positions on the table.13 Other negotiating teams tend to see coalitionpositions as stronger (and perhaps more legitimate) than those of a single state.Nevertheless coalitions face great challenges. They can empower negotiators; yetdeveloping countries, even in large groupings, face a ‘structural imbalance ofknowledge’.14 Negotiating as a coalition pools resources, such as information, butcorralling states with diverse interests requires time and resources. Rapideconomic growth within some developing countries can further complicate themanagement and maintenance of coalitions.Over the past two decades China, Brazil and India have moved from the

margins of the world economy to centre stage, becoming major producers andconsumers of commodities, and reorienting global patterns of investment, aidand trade. This shift has coincided with expanding environmental markets, suchas for carbon. Today China, Brazil, Mexico and India have strong records ofattracting Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects (sub-Saharan Africa isa late and lesser player in the CDM market), enhancing their expert authoritywith more and more international environmental negotiations turning tomarket-based solutions since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change.Rapid economic growth is also increasing greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil,

India and China. Other states, both in the global North and global South, areincreasingly calling on these emerging economies to join in international envi-ronmental commitments, including reducing toxic chemicals, tropical timberconsumption and carbon emissions. Miller was already arguing back in 1995that a developing state’s status as a future emitter conferred power.15 Todayemerging economies are vital to solving global environmental problems. Ofcourse, these states do not always welcome calls for environmental leadership,particularly if taking action might impede national development priorities. Butsuch calls do confer power on these states during negotiations and within coali-tions. This does not mean these states can dictate positions after joining a coali-tion. To maintain a large and reasonably cohesive coalition, and prevent somemembers from exiting, compromise is necessary. As mentioned, coalition poli-tics in the absence of the G-77/China umbrella is not a matter of a simple orconsistent set of power resources, but rather involves ever-shifting combinationsof power resources within ever-shifting constellations of coalitions.Having issue-specific power or a positive reputation, then, can create demand

for a state to join coalitions; at the same time a state’s diplomatic capacity orstructural power can amplify or inhibit a state’s likelihood of joining a coalition.Predictably, weak diplomatic power tends to push states towards joining acoalition. A state possessing issue-specific power or a strong reputation, but

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with little diplomatic capability, is also more likely to join a coalition to extendits ability to influence negotiations. Having diplomatic capacity can free a statefrom the functional need of a coalition, yet this cannot buy relevance or reputa-tion. Those states with both the capacity to participate fully in negotiations andwith issue-specific power or a positive reputation may be less likely to join acoalition. It is by looking at the combination of these resources that we findclues to the behaviour of developing countries within coalitions. It is also withinthese combinations, evolving over time, that we see the influence of past eventsand negotiations on current negotiation strategies.

The political history of avoided deforestation

Reducing deforestation, and maintaining intact forests, has great potential as away to mitigate climate change. A 2011 study found that forests absorb about8.8 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide a year while tropical deforestation emitsabout 10.8 billion tonnes a year (compared to more than 28 billion tonnes ayear emitted from fossil fuel sources).16 As REDD+ negotiations progressedafter 2005, the scope of activities expanded from Reducing Emissions fromDeforestation (RED) to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degrada-tion ‘plus conservation, the sustainable management of forests, and enhance-ment of forest carbon stocks’. REDD+ negotiations, however, are in many waysentrenched in a longer history. For instance, some of the power resources thatsome developing countries have been drawing upon, such as reputation-basedleadership, emerged during deforestation negotiations held before REDD+.

Before REDD+: developing countries, forest management and climatenegotiations

States began to consider a global forest agreement seriously in the early 1990s.UNCED provided the initial soft law on forests in the form of chapter eleven ofAgenda 21 (combating deforestation) and the Statement of Principles for theSustainable Management of Forests. Since then the UN Commission on Sustain-able Development has convened an Intergovernmental Panel on Forests(IPF, which ran from 1995 to 1997) and an Intergovernmental Forum on Forests(IFF, which ran from 1997 to 2000). Combined the IPF and IFF produced around270 Proposals for Action, which states have rarely implemented. Similarly theUN Forum on Forests (UNFF), established in 2000 to advance ‘sustainable forestmanagement’, and which spawned the Collaborative Partnership on Forests in2001 to support its work, has to date produced few results on the ground.17

Today global forest policy revolves around the UNFF process and involves awide array of multilateral and bilateral agreements and initiatives;18 meanwhile,a binding international agreement remains elusive.Unity reigned within the global South for most of these forest negotiations,

with developing states framing negotiations within a North–South dichotomyand linking foreign debt and unequal terms of trade to deforestation.19 Despitediffering views on some important issues, the G-77/China managed to functionas a negotiating unit until tensions proved insurmountable during the IFF

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process. A dominant discussion question throughout was whether to proceed tonegotiate a legally binding forest convention.Polarised views on the need for a forest convention pre-empted any agree-

ment at UNCED in 1992. Afterwards some of the opposition from developingstates began to dissipate after some developed states began to link future devel-opment assistance with a forest convention. At the IPF and IFF support for a for-est convention was split among developing states, although the G-77/China didmanage to maintain a collective position. Some vocal opponents, notablyMalaysia, now supported continued negotiations; others, such as Brazil, Indone-sia and India opposed a convention.20 Far from being unique to contemporaryREDD+ negotiations, then, disunity among developing countries on global forestissues has a long history. With increasing disunity in the G-77, developingcountry positions largely dissipated into regional groups of the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Group, Central American coun-tries and the Amazonian Pact, led by Brazil. Within these groups opinions dif-fered on the need for a forest convention. Latin and Central Americancountries, joined by Malaysia, China and others, supported a convention. TheAmazonian Pact and Indonesia remained opposed.21

G-77/China unity would also not last during negotiations on Land Use, LandUse Change and Forestry (LULUCF) in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Under theKyoto Protocol forests have a narrow role governed by confusing, and at timesseemingly contradictory, rules. While Article 3.2 of the Protocol addresses emis-sions from deforestation, on methodological grounds, and because of sover-eignty concerns raised in particular by Brazil, the Marrakesh Accords of 2001excluded deforestation emissions from flexibility mechanisms. The LULUCF

limits projects to afforestation and reforestation under the CDM, setting asideemissions from deforestation.Not including emissions from deforestation within the CDM, however, did not

deter a few developing states from piloting REDD-style activities. In Bolivia theNoell Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project, created through a partnershipbetween the government of Bolivia and NGOs and corporations from the globalNorth, seeks to protect around four million hectares for 30 years. While the pro-ject aims to meet CDM standards for afforestation and reforestation, a significantpart involves avoiding deforestation by developing alternative income pro-grammes for local communities.Smaller coalitions and more unilateral actions continued to characterise global

forest negotiations in the 2000s. Differences remained within the global Southover the value of a global forest convention. Brazil was a vocal defender of itssovereign rights over its portion of the Amazonian forest basin; Costa Rica andBolivia emerged as leaders in forest conservation efforts. Developing countrieswith intact and extensive forests remained highly relevant to global forest nego-tiations. Reframing deforestation as a source of carbon emissions, however, fun-damentally altered the politics of forest and climate negotiations as more andmore developing states began to participate in different coalitions. Thereframing of negotiations, linking forests to climate, would intensify after thebreakdown of negotiations in the UNFF in 2005, when states again could notagree on whether or not to proceed to negotiate an international forest treaty.

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Already in 2004 during side events to the UN Framework Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, NGOs were highlighting the need toreduce carbon emissions from deforestation, and representatives from the(future) Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) were invited to the UN Forumon Forests. This laid the groundwork for an institutional link between forestsand climate, which became REDD+.

From RED to REDD+

In 2005 at the eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP11) for theUNFCCC, Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica and a handful of other developingstates, now united as the CfRN, reintroduced the idea of reducing emissions fromdeforestation (RED). The response of state delegates was surprisingly positive:RED gained traction in part because the idea of reducing emissions from defores-tation, rather than through changing lifestyles or energy systems or industrialproduction processes, seems like an ideal option for many states, simultaneouslymitigating climate change and improving forest management. Two years later, atCOP13 in Bali, RED was a standout issue and RED became REDD+. Extending thescope of RED to include conservation and the sustainable management of forestand carbon stocks was a victory for some coalitions, such as the Commissiondes Forêts d’Afrique Centrale (COMIFAC, Central African Forests Commission),as well as for some countries (eg India) with low current deforestation rates(and thus with little room to earn credits from reducing emissions from defores-tation), yet still having sizeable forest areas. The Bali outcome was a carefullycrafted compromise between COMIFAC, India and others with an interest in con-servation, and Brazil and others, which supported the original formulation. Theexpanded scope increased the number of possible activities, and therefore ofpossible beneficiary states.Indeed, many negotiators and analysts were expecting a REDD+ agreement at

COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009. This did not happen, however, although REDD+was the only mitigation option explicitly mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord.During 2010 proposed changes by Bolivia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia frustratednegotiations, including proposals to remove the word ‘emissions’ as well as thephrase ‘forest stock enhancement’.22 Some observers felt that progress wasstalled.23 States began to lower their expectations for COP16 in Cancun inNovember 2010.In Cancun states did take steps to move REDD+ forward. As agreed, develop-

ing states were asked to create national REDD+ strategies, including referenceemission levels and transparent monitoring and information systems to demon-strate how environmental and social safeguards would be respected, includingthe UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. National REDD+ strate-gies, it was agreed, would need to retain ecological diversity and should notconvert natural forests. By this COP decision, REDD+ should involve a three-phased approach: planning and capacity building; demonstration activities; andthen results-based activities with financial reimbursements. To qualify for emis-sion credits, states must fully monitor, report and verify results. Developedstates under the Cancun agreement are expected to provide assistance through

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multilateral and bilateral channels,24 thus temporarily side-stepping the thornyissue of long-term financing. The following year, at COP17 in Durban, the par-ties considered numerous financing options, such as designing REDD marketcredits, auctioning emission allowances, creating an intergovernmental fund andestablishing tropical forest bonds. Parties could not reach an agreement; how-ever, for the first time the door was opened to market-based mechanisms as theparties did agree that financing could come from both private and publicsources. Many state negotiators and NGOs were hoping for further progress onREDD+ at COP18 in Doha in 2012. This did not happen. Instead, the partiesremained far apart on whether to use a fund, a market mechanism or someappropriate mix.Since 2005 REDD+ negotiating coalitions have been shifting and evolving.

Three patterns, however, do stand out between 2005 and 2013. States withstrong interests have been increasingly leading coalitions; others with little for-est cover have been joining coalitions; and some states have been standing firmand alone.

The coalitions of REDD+

Since 2005 nearly 70% of the submissions to the UNFCCC outlining REDD+ posi-tions have been from developing states either forwarding a joint submission orproviding a unilateral opinion (author count, as of 2012). Potvin and Bovarnickfind a similar level of engagement, tallying 38 of the 55 submissions receivedfrom developing countries leading up to the Bali COP in 2007.25 Submissions tothe UNfCCC are a useful indicator of engagement in the negotiation process.Joint submissions mean signatories have reached consensus on positions. Mak-ing a submission, alone or with others, involves resources to collect and synthe-sise information, explain positions and propose policy options. Thesesubmissions are publically available and read by other parties to negotiations;reversing positions, correcting information or shifting allegiances inevitablyinvolves costs for a state. Those states and coalitions, such as Brazil and theCfRN, able to retain a consistent, cohesive voice have, not surprisingly, emergedas influential actors in the REDD+ negotiating process. Others, such as COMIFAC,have also played important roles, however.

COMIFAC

A subset of COMIFAC states is active as a coalition on its own, and as part of theCfRN. This group consistently includes the Central African Republic, Cameroon,Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, andGabon, representing the wider COMIFAC group of states. As a group thesestates have been able to leverage the importance of the Congo Basin forests forregulating the global climate. Individually none of these states controls enoughforests to ensure global-scale environmental gains or generate significant creditsfor a carbon market. Together they have considerable issue-specific power, giv-ing them the capacity to threaten a veto or thwart environmental progress. Todate COMIFAC has forwarded five joint submissions to the UNFCCC, although in

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recent years COMIFAC has not submitted a written document, choosing insteadonly to speak as a group during negotiations.Alone these states would not be able to participate actively in negotiations;

even identifying interests, researching options and proposing policy options isdifficult. COMIFAC’s structure has lowered cooperation costs and facilitated con-sensus building for joint submissions. Together COMIFAC states are able to pooldiplomatic and information resources and raise their profile within negotiations.COMIFAC submissions have also been able to draw on the support of the Partena-riat pour les Forêts du Bassin du Congo (Partnership for the Forests of theCongo Basin), which includes NGOs, development partners and Congo basincountries. Forest degradation is a critical issue for COMIFAC. Since its first sub-mission in 2006 COMIFAC has defined deforestation as both the loss of forestcover and forest degradation.26 As mentioned, adding degradation to the scopeof REDD+ (ie the second ‘D’) in Bali in 2007 was a strategic win for COMIFAC,further enhancing its issue-specific power.27

Latin American states

Central and South American states have been coordinating in rather loose andshifting ways since 2005. Some states have shown little (or variable) interest inREDD+, especially those with less forest cover or low deforestation rates; others,notably Costa Rica and Bolivia, with histories as leaders in forest conservation,have been, at times, at the forefront of REDD+. Costa Rica is at the heart of theCfRN, lending both moral and expert authority. Many CfRN submissions, as wellas submissions from coalitions of Central American states, cite Costa Rica’sexperience and provide extensive background on forest conservation in CostaRica.Early on Latin American countries articulated fairly clear views on REDD+.

Elaborated in 2007 and 2008 proposals, Honduras, Paraguay, Panama and Peru,at times joined by Argentina, Mexico and Ecuador, championed a ‘nestedapproach’, arguing that it was most effective to combine national and subnation-al methods of accounting and crediting.28 Such an approach would support anational-level accounting system, while allowing subnational projects to earncredits. Supporters see this as a way of including more local participation whilemaking monitoring and verification easier.29 Since 2008 the nested approachhas drifted to the sidelines as negotiators adopt national-level approaches to ref-erence emission levels and accounting (although it could re-emerge as negotia-tors struggle to reconcile a future international instrument with the manysubnational pilot projects now underway).Now and then other groups of Spanish-speaking Latin American states have

also made joint submissions on REDD+. For example, the Coalition of the Cen-tral American Integration System (SICA)—comprising Costa Rica, El Salvador,Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama (Belize is also a member of SICA,but is not listed on UNFCCC submissions)—has only made three joint submis-sions, all between 2006 and 2008. Overall the Latin American region and LatinAmerican coalitions have not managed to function in any lasting way duringREDD+ negotiations.30

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Latin American coalitions lack the REDD+ relevance of COMIFAC. Moreover,states in this region did not gain as much from the enlargement of the scope ofREDD activities. Other states, moreover, do not always seem to see many of theLatin American states as essential for REDD+. Without the threat of veto from aunified group, for states advocating certain policy options or wanting access tocertain markets, participating in Latin American REDD+ coalitions may incurmore costs than expected gains. Instead of working through Latin Americancoalitions, states like Costa Rica with strong interests in REDD+ have been work-ing through more global groupings, notably the CfRN.

Coalition for Rainforest Nations

The Coalition for Rainforest Nations brought emissions from deforestation backonto the climate agenda in 2005. CfRN wanted to provide a voluntary option fordeveloping countries to take climate action, while avoiding the optics of provid-ing an ‘escape clause for developed states’.31 CfRN describes itself as an inter-governmental organisation aiming for consensus among members on forestmanagement issues. Countries are not bound to CfRN’s positions. During negoti-ations CfRN representatives are careful to read the list of countries supporting agiven statement. This practice has two effects: it identifies who is in support;and it reminds other negotiators of the many states participating in CfRN.The 2005 founding group of CfRN states was led by Costa Rica, with its

excellent reputation for conservation, and by Papua New Guinea, holding largeprimary forests yet experiencing high rates of forest degradation. Other develop-ing states had to choose whether to join CfRN or present alternative views. Asthe preceding analysis shows, several states attempted both. After 2005 CfRNgrew appreciably, with as many as 28 states submitting a joint proposal, asTable 1 indicates. Many of these new states have relatively small forest areasand low deforestation rates, hence fewer emissions from deforestation and lessissue-specific power. These lesser forest powers now comprise roughly half ofCfRN’s membership. CfRN’s membership has evolved from a few economicallyweak states with significant REDD+ potential (or with strong reputations for for-est conservation) to a long list of minor REDD+ players. Some powerful foreststates, such as Indonesia, complement CfRN’s positions, although Indonesiaseems reluctant to lend its full support by joining a submission. Overall the coa-lition has considerable legitimacy, with some highly relevant, if small, states, aswell as a history of REDD+ leadership. It remains the most consistent voice inREDD+ negotiations.Despite not requiring consensus among all members, CfRN proposals do

accommodate the views of those listed. Coinciding with COMIFAC, degradationwas first included in CfRN’s 2007 submissions using similar language to that inCOMIFAC’s 2006 submission to the UNFCCC. In 2007 CfRN included the idea of‘intersectoral linkages’ (eg air transit user fees) and taxes on goods and services,similar to the earlier proposals of COMIFAC and some Latin American countries.CfRN also began to put more emphasis on forest management and carbon stockopportunities in countries with high forest cover and low deforestation rates.32

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States with limited ability to negotiate alone, and with little ability to veto aREDD+ agreement, seem to have found a voice within the coalition. The cost ofentry and participation for these states is low. At the same time they can access,with little cost, ideas, information and resources to improve forest management.In addition, visibility in REDD+ negotiations and organisations is creating newopportunities for these states. CfRN, meanwhile, has gained legitimacy by repre-senting developing states from all regions of the world—although it has notmanaged to bring on board powerful rainforest states like Brazil.

Brazil

Brazil has the ability to make or break negotiations for an international REDD+mechanism to mitigate climate change. Controlling about 60% of the Amazonrainforest, and with the capacity to fund research, support negotiating teams andimplement pilot projects, it has chosen to advance its REDD+ agenda alone,without compromise in coalitions. Submitting alone has not diluted the technicalsophistication of Brazilian proposals; in 2007, for example, it offered a detailed,step-by-step guide to constructing historical reference levels. Two years laterBrazil submitted a detailed overview of its remote sensing programme and the

TABLE 1. CfRN submissions, 2005–2012

Date (# of states onsubmission) States listed on submission

2005 (9) Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, supported by Bolivia, Central AfricanRepublic, Chile, Congo, DRC, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua

2006 (7) Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, supported by Central AfricanRepublic, Dominican Republic, Solomon Islands

2007 May (17) Bolivia, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, DRC, Dominican Republic, Fiji,Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua NewGuinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu

2007 Dec (28) Belize, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Congo, Costa Rica, DRC, DominicanRepublic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Liberia,Lesotho, Madagascar, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone,Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda, Vanuatu, Vietnam (addendum added Ghana,Singapore, Cameroon, Guyana)

2008 (22) Belize, Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, DRC, EquatorialGuinea, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama,Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda,Vanuatu

2009 (23) Belize, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, DRC, Ecuador,Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal,Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tanzania,Thailand, Uganda, Vanuatu, Vietnam

2011 (17) Belize, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC,Dominican Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Papua NewGuinea, Congo, Solomon Islands, Togo, Uganda

2012 (21) Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Costa Rica, Coted’Ivoire, DRC, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras,Kenya, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,Suriname, Uganda

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latter’s relevance for REDD+. The timing coincided with a Memorandum ofAgreement between the Food and Agriculture Organization and Brazil’sNational Institute for Space Research to make satellite monitoring available forREDD+ to interested developing countries. Capacity has not been an issue forBrazil; instead, the country has been emphasising its capabilities and offering toassist other states. Beyond monitoring methods, a top priority for Brazil duringREDD+ negotiations has been financing.While many other countries and coalitions support market mechanisms, or at

least some limited role for a REDD+ market, Brazil has said that it ‘[does] notenvisage any mechanism related to reducing emissions from deforestation indeveloping countries that could be used by Annex I countries to meet theirquantified greenhouse gas emission limitation and reduction commitments underthe Kyoto Protocol’.33 Instead it has proposed that developed countries establishand replenish an international fund to support REDD+ projects. Developing coun-tries would receive credits for emission reductions (exchangeable for funds).Such a fund-based mechanism would help Brazil use REDD+ emission reductioncredits towards its own national accounting, rather than selling the credits todeveloped countries. Given Brazil’s importance to the future success of REDD+,its position on REDD+ financing looks likely to remain influential even as REDD+gravitates towards multiple funding sources. Acting alone, Brazil has been, andwill surely remain, a powerful state in REDD+ negotiations.

Indonesia

Like Brazil, Indonesia is a REDD+ powerhouse. Multiple donors have pledgedfunding, including US$1 billion from Norway, to bring Indonesia and its forestscloser to a results-based REDD+ scheme. Indonesia also regularly submits itsviews unilaterally. Unlike Brazil, however, Indonesia consistently cites its needfor capacity building. While the potential to realise REDD+ in Indonesia is huge,its ability to implement projects requires assistance. To bolster its capacity,Indonesia has been building and leveraging its bilateral ties with developedstates to demonstrate that it can implement REDD+ initiatives, making it moreattractive to potential REDD+ investors and enhancing its expertise on REDD+policy options. Indonesia is a member of CfRN. But it has not, as of 2013, lentits name to a CfRN submission. Instead, Indonesia seems more comfortable exer-cising its considerable issue-specific power, and growing expert authority, alone,or in conjunction with developed states.Indonesia’s initial proposals were rather vague, expressing an openness to

explore market and non-market based mechanisms, as well as lamenting theslow development of CDM forestry projects. Over time, including in a submis-sion with Australia,34 Indonesia’s support for market mechanisms has grown.Keen not to repeat its negative initial experiences with the CDM, Indonesia hasbeen seeking to benefit from pilot funding and a post-Kyoto agreement with aREDD+ market mechanism. Leveraging bilateral ties, Indonesia has been able touse its high relevance and growing diplomatic capacity to negotiate REDD+ with-out resorting to joining a coalition.

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India

India has a long history of community-based forest management. On the surfaceIndia would not seem to be a strong potential beneficiary of REDD+, as it hasrelatively few emissions from deforestation. Yet India is active in negotiations,at times criticising Brazil for favouring states with high deforestation rates,causing tensions between these emerging economies.35 India’s main contributionto negotiations, bolstered by the inclusion of conservation in REDD+, is the ideaof ‘compensated conservation’, which seeks to reward states for maintainingand increasing forests as carbon sinks. Sceptical that voluntary compensationfrom developed countries could ever suffice, India repeatedly excludes conser-vation and sustainable management activities from market approaches, callingfor proportionate funding between the ‘REDD’ and the ‘plus’ activities.36 Indiaparticipates actively in REDD+ as part of its efforts to address climate change,but is not leading a group of similar states in terms of forest cover and defores-tation rates. India seems content, and able, to act alone, rather than joining orforming a coalition. It remains engaged, even as the submissions from othercountries decline.

Conclusion

REDD+ negotiations and coalition patterns are partly a product of the past 20years of deforestation negotiations and forest conservation in developing coun-tries. Some countries became relevant because they are forest stewards, whileothers, such as Papua New Guinea, only emerged as leaders in coalitions whencarbon became a central referent. REDD+ inherited divided views and old argu-ments masked in a new metric of carbon. As negotiations have progressed,many of the most active delegations have been from coalitions of developingstates, although in recent years these coalitions have become less active and lesscoordinated with the exception of CfRN. COMIFAC’s last submission was in 2009;Central and Latin American states stopped joint submissions in 2008. Some ofthese states continue to submit via CfRN, the last intact coalition, comprisedincreasingly of less powerful states. Some of these coalitions continue to speakas a unit during negotiations, but somewhat more reactively than proactively.These coalitions have helped to empower weaker states, including those

with less potential to benefit from REDD+. But these coalitions cannot overrideREDD+ powerhouses like Brazil and Indonesia, which have long track recordsof defending their national interests in global forest politics. Views amongdeveloping states on long-term financing are diverse and seemingly entrenchedamong the states and coalitions negotiating REDD+. With global climate nego-tiations stagnating, and with carbon prices low, few new ideas are emergingto break this impasse over long-term financing of REDD+. Technical work isprogressing. Developing states are continuing, with the support of the UN–REDD Programme created in 2008, to develop national REDD+ strategies andprojects to be ‘ready’ for a possible international REDD+ mechanism. Andsome state negotiators are still hoping that REDD+ can regain its lofty statusin climate negotiations during COP19 in Warsaw in November 2013. Yet with

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so much diversity and disunity within the global South, and with differingviews between developing and developed countries, REDD+ seems unlikely tofulfil its early promise as a major international mechanism to improve bothforest and climate governance.

Notes

1 See especially A Najam, ‘Dynamics of the Southern collective: developing countries in desertificationnegotiations’, Global Environmental Politics, 4(3), 2004, pp 128–154; M Miller, The Third World in Glo-bal Environmental Politics, London: Lynne Rienner, 1995; and S Sell, ‘North–South environmental bar-gaining: ozone, climate change, and biodiversity’, Global Governance, 2, 1996, pp 97–118.

2 On desertification, see Najam, ‘Dynamics of the Southern collective’. On climate change, see S Kasa, A TGullberg & G Heggelund, ‘The Group of 77 in the international climate negotiations: recent developmentsand future directions’, International Environmental Agreements, 8, 2008, pp 113–127; and M Williams,‘The Third World and global environmental negotiations: interests, institutions and ideas’, Global Environ-mental Politics, 5(3), 2005, pp 48–71. On UNCED, see A Najam, ‘The South in international environmentalnegotiations’, International Studies, 31, 1994, pp 427–464. On forests, see D Humphreys, Logjam: Defor-estation and the Crisis of Global Governance, London: Earthscan, 2006. On early ozone and biodiversitynegotiations, see Miller, The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, chs 4, 6.

3 See Miller, The Third World in Global Environmental Politics; and A Najam, ‘An environmental negotia-tion strategy for the South’, International Environmental Affairs, 7(3), 1995, pp 249–287.

4 A Najam, ‘The collective South in multinational environmental politics’, in S Nagel (ed), Policymakingand Prosperity: A Multinational Anthology, New York: Lexington Books, 2003, pp 197–240.

5 Williams, ‘The Third World and global environmental negotiations’, p 54.6 P Steinberg, Environmental Leadership in Developing Countries: Transnational Relations and BiodiversityPolicy in Costa Rica and Bolivia, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.

7 Kasa, Gullberg & Heggelund, ‘The Group of 77 in the international climate negotiations’.8 WI Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice, New York: Routl-edge, 2008, ch 2.

9 R Keohane & J Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Toronto: Little, Brown,1977, p 50.

10 Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management, p 100.11 P Chasek, ‘Margins of power: coalition building and coalition maintenance of the South Pacific island

states and the Alliance of Small Island States’, Review of European Community and International Environ-mental Law (RECIEL), 14(2), 2005, pp 125–137.

12 J Gupta, ‘On behalf of my delegation: a survival guide for developing country negotiators’, report for Cen-ter for Sustainable Development in the Americas (CSDA), Washington, DC, and the International Institutefor Sustainable Development (IISD), Winnipeg, Canada, 2000, p 59. See also J Gupta, ‘North–South aspectsof the climate change issue: towards a constructive negotiating package for developing countries’, Reviewof European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL), 8(2), 1999, pp 198–208.

13 Williams, ‘The Third World and global environmental negotiations’; and F Hampson, Multilateral Negotia-tions: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1999.

14 Gupta, ‘On behalf of my delegation’, p 54.15 Miller, The Third World in Global Environmental Politics.16 Y Pan et al, ‘A large and persistent carbon sink in the world’s forests’, Science, 333(6045), 2011, pp 988–

993. For a summary, see Rede Amazônica de Inventários Florestais (RAINFOR), ‘Forests absorb one-thirdof global fossil fuel emissions’, Leeds, 14 July 2011, at http://www.rainfor.org/pt/noticias/noticias/jul-11-a-large-and-persistent-carbon-sink-in-the-world-s-forests.

17 K Levin, C McDermott & B Cashore, ‘The climate regime as global forest governance: can reduced emis-sions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) initiatives pass a “dual effectiveness” test?’, Inter-national Forestry Review, 10(3), 2008, pp 538–549.

18 K Brown, ‘Cut and run? Evolving institutions for global forest governance’, Journal of InternationalDevelopment, 13, 2001, pp 893–905; Humphreys, Logjam; and P Dauvergne & J Lister, Timber, Cam-bridge: Polity, 2011.

19 Humphreys, Logjam; D Humphreys, ‘The politics of “avoided deforestation”: historical context and con-temporary issues’, International Forestry Review, 10(3), 2008, pp 433–442; and Najam, ‘An environmentalnegotiation strategy for the South’.

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20 RS Dimitrov, ‘Knowledge, power and interests in environmental regime formation’, International StudiesQuarterly, 47(1), 2003, p 136. See also Humphreys, Logjam.

21 Humphreys, Logjam, p 111.22 AGM La Viña, ‘The future of REDD-plus: pathways of convergence for the UNFCCC negotiations and the

partnership’, report for the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, London,2010.

23 ‘Summary of Tianjin climate change talks’, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, International Institute for Sustain-able Development, Winnipeg, 2010.

24 UNFCCC, ‘Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term cooperative action under theConvention’, p 4.

25 C Potvin & A Bovarnick, ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries:key actors, negotiations and actions’, Carbon and Climate Law Review, 2(3), 2008, pp 260–270.

26 UNFCCC, ‘Issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries and recommen-dations on any further process: Submissions from Parties’, Document code FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5,2006.

27 Potvin & Bovarnick, ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries’.28 UNFCCC, ‘Views on the range of topics and other relevant information relating to reducing emissions from

deforestation in developing countries: Submissions from Parties’, Document Code FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2. and /Add.1, 2007; and UNFCCC, ‘Views on outstanding methodological issues related to policyapproaches and positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in devel-oping countries: Submissions from Parties’, Document code FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4, 2008.

29 L Pedroni et al, ‘Creating incentives for avoiding further deforestation: the nested approach’, Climate Pol-icy, 9(14), 2009, pp 207–220.

30 M Banda & J Oppermann, ‘Building a Latin American coalition on forests: negotiation barriers and oppor-tunities’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 44(3), 2011, pp 527–588.

31 F Bietta, ‘From the Hague to Copenhagen: why it failed then and why it could be different’, in V Bosetti& R Lubowski (eds), Deforestation and Climate Change: Reducing Carbon Emissions from Deforestationand Forest Degradation, North Hampton: Edward Elgar, 2010.

32 UNFCCC, ‘Views on modalities and procedures for financing results-based actions and considering activitiesrelated to decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 68–70 and 72: Submissions from Parties’, Document code: FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.3, 2012, p 60.

33 UNFCCC, ‘Issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation’.34 UNFCCC, ‘Ideas and proposals on the elements contained in Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submis-

sions from Parties’, Document Code FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5, Add.1 and Add.2, 2008.35 Potvin & Bovarnick, ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries’.36 UNFCCC, ‘Views on modalities and procedures’.

Notes on Contributors

Jen Iris Allan holds a BA in International Studies from the University ofNorthern British Columbia and a MA in International Development from theUniversity of Guelph. She is currently a PhD candidate at the University ofBritish Columbia and a writer with Earth Negotiations Bulletin.

Peter Dauvergne is Professor of International Relations and Director of the LiuInstitute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. His booksinclude (with Jane Lister) Eco-Business: A Big-Brand Takeover of Sustainability(2013) and The Shadows of Consumption (2008), winner of the Gerald L YoungAward for the best book authored in 2008 in the field of human ecology.

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