ARCHIVESCGSC FT LEAVENWO TH KtiK4

APR 7 1953 ir

MONOASSIG PH

MONOG PHi~

ACCESSION NOPO Ri.G.iSTRY.

THE GERMANS OPPOSITE lI CORPS

IN SEPTEMBER 1944

BY

LUCIAN HEICHLER

DISTRIBL

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THIS MONOGRAPH MAY NOT

BE REPRODUCED, EITHER

IN WHOLE OR IN PART,WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF

THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY

The. German opposite VII Corps in Sep 44.Chi of- f-s 1--1-t -ib€>y -B -52

CGSC Form 16013 Mar 51

Army-CGSC-P3-1966-20 Mar 53-5M

• UNqCLASSIFI[Q

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This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTIONLIBRARY SERVICES

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO. R-16436.3oB COPY NO.STORY,

Nomp 7,"7 _ a-l:

1

pga pt: M

CHAPTER III

TrH GLE1ANS OPPOSITE VII CORPS IN SEPTEMBER 1944

Part of a Study of the German Side Undertaken inSupport of The Siegfried Line by Charles B. MacDonald

(OCMH: In Progress)

Based Entirely on German Records, This Chapter is Intendedto Complement Charter III of The Siegfried Line:

""VII Corns Penetrates the Line"

by

%2VL )~a c~,

Lucian Heichler

Research SectionOffice of the Chief of Military History

Washington, D. C.December 1952

~~ ,;SSFED

UTabe A Sof Con s

Table of Contents

Introduction ...................

Defense of Aachen and the Stolberg Corridor ..

The DXXXI Corps Situation in Mid-September 1944

LXXXI Corps: Counterattack and Stalemate . . .

LXXIV Corps: Defense of the Lammersdorf Corridorand the West VIall ................

Page

..... 1

. . . . . 41

S. . . . 50

..... 87

APPENDIX: Map of the West Wall in the LXXXI and LXXIV Corps sectors

UNCLASSIF IED

Introduction

In the early years of World War II the German Army amply

demonstrated its ability to exploit victory to the fullest.

After the tide had turned against the Germans, it became ap-

parent that they also possessed the more outstanding ability

to quickly recover from a defeat before their opponents could

thoroughly exploit their success.

The German Seventh Army exemplified this faculty late in

the summer of 1944. Less than a month after suffering an

apparently decisive defeat in which it was crushed and battered

beyond recognition, Seventh Army established a coherent front

line from the Maas River to the Sohnee Eifel Range in September

1944. Committed in this wide are and supported by a motley

conglomeration of last-ditch reserves, the army's remaining

elements successfully defended the approaches to the Reich.

During its withdrawal from Falaise to the West Wall,

Seventh Army passed through three distinct phases. In the

first stage -- the rout following narowly averted annihilation

in the Falaise Pocket -- Seventh Army ceased to exist as an

independent organization. Its shattered remnants were attached

to Fifth Panzer Army until 4 September 1944. On that date

Seventh Army was apparently reconstituted under the command

of General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger. The army

then passed through the phase of delaying action while it

U~rsa~$

UMC lED 2

reorganized its forces and re-established the semblance of a front

line. Despite persistent orders from above to defend every foot

of ground, General Brandenberger realized that a fairly rapid with-

drawal was called for, if his forces were to reach the West Wall

ahead of American spearheads.*

MS # B-730 (Brandenberger).

The delaying action ended officially on 9 September 1944 when

Seventh Army was charged with the defense of the West Wall in the

Maastricht - Aachen - Bitburg sectors. Along with the fortifications

the army took over all headquarters and troops stationed in this

area.

Of Seventh Army's three corps, LXUXI Corps was assigned the

northern sector of the West Wall, from the Herzogenrath - Dueren

switch position to the Rollesbroich - Huertgen Forest sector.

LXXIV Corps was committed in the center, from Roetgen to Ormont,

and I SS Panzer Corps was to defend the West Wall in the Schnee

Eifel sector, from Ormont to the boundary with First Army at Diekirch.*

Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 9 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB,Anlagen, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw. [Orders: Army Group,

Army, etc.], 5.VIII. - 21.X.44. Referred to hereafter as LCXXI Corps

KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.See also Appendix, map of the West Wall.

With this transition from the second to the third phase of

operations -- from delaying action to firm resistance based on the

u~~L~s~'INN

~i~e~SYI

fortified cositions of the WVest Wall -- the withdrawal from France

came to an end, and the defense of Germany began.

When U.S. VII Corps launched its reconnaissance in force on

12 September 1944, Seventh Army was in the midst of this process

of transition. While some of its elements had already occupied

their assigned West Wall so~tors, others were still fighting a de-

laying action well forward of the bunker line.

UNCLASSIFIEDB

h fit.i

Defense of Aachen and the Stolberg Corridor

On 12 September 1944 the forces of LJ I Corps, under the

command of Generalleutnant Friedrich-August Schack, were committed

from Breust on the Maas River eastward to Hombourg and Moresnet,

thence south along the West Wall to the boundary with LXXIV Corps

(Eupen - Roetgen - Zuelpich - Bonn).*

Noon Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Anlagen ,

Tagesmeldungen [Daily Sitreps], 6.VIII. - 21.X.44. Referred tohereafter as LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

Four badly mauled, understrength divisions were committed in

the LXXXI Corps front line. In the northwestern sector, between

the Maas River and the Aachen area, 275th and 49th Infantry Divisions

held the line against U.S. XIX Corps.* In the southeastern half of

For an account of these two divisions, see Lucian Heichler,Chapter IV, The Germans Facing XIX Corps, OCMH (in progress).

the LUXI Corps zone, opposite U.S. VII Corps, 116th Panzer Division

and 9th Panzer Division faced the U.S. 1st Infantry and 3d Armored

Divisions.

The sector of 116th Panzer Division was defined in the northwest

by the boundary with 49th Infantry Division: Hombourg - Schneeberg

Hill - along the West Wall to Bardenberg. In the southeast the

boundary with 9th Panzer Division extended from Welkenrath via Hauset

U CLASSFIED

1111 "5

and Brand to Stolberg.* The organic strength of 115th Panzer Division,

Order, LTJXI Corps to all divs, 2230 on 12 Sep 44, LXXI CorpsKTB, Anlagen, Befehle an Dive, [Orders to Divs], 3.VIII. - 21.X.44.Referred to hereafter as LCX=I Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.

und:r the command of Generalleutnant Graf Gerhard von Schwerin, was

organized in two armored regiments -- 60th and 156th Panzer Grenadier

Regiments -- the 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, and the

116th Panzer Artillery Regiment.

Commanded by Generalmajor Gerhard Mueller, 9th Panzer Division

had only arrived in the LXXXI Cors zone on 11 September 1944. Its

sector extended from the boundary with 116th Panzer Division to the

boundary with LXXIV Corps (see above). According to General

Brandenberger its first wave had consisted of but three companies

of panzer grenadiers (advance detachment of either 10th or 11th

Panzer Grenadier Regiment), an engineer company, and two batteries

of artillery. General Schack amalgamated these elements with the

remaining forces of 105th Panzer Brigade (Major Volker). Since

its attachment to LXXXI Corps on 3 September 1944 this tank brigade

had lost most of its armored infantry battalion and all but ten of

its tanks. Instead of committing the weak elements of 9th Panzer

Division in the West Wall, L'I Corps had found it necessary to

send these forces into the front line. Badly mauled on their first

day of action -- as was to be expected -- the remaining elements

of Kampfgruppe 9th Panzer Division had assembled in Eynatten during

the night from 11 to I± September. They were to fight a delaying

N LA .iAIED

action back to their West Wail sector while all other elements of

thle division still enroute from their assembly area at Kaiserslautern

were to be committed immediately in the West Wall upon arrival.*

MS # B-730 (Brandenberger).

In addition to the units enumerated above, IXXDI Corps also

commanded 353d Infantry Division (Generalleutnant Paul M-ahlmann).

This division was exhausted and possessed very few organic con-

tingents. Far too weak to be committed in a front line sector,

its headquarters and remaining elements were moved to the assigned

W'est Wall sectors of 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions to establish

liaison with the various headquarters and local defense units in

the rear of LXXXI Corps.

On 9 September 1944 Seventh Army had attached to LXXXI Corps

the Wfehrmachtbefehlshaber [Military Governor] for Belgium and Nortnern

France with his staff and troops, the Kampfkommandant* of Aachen

A term whicn is difficult to translate. Literally, it means

"combat commander" but is used to describe a military officer ap-

pointed to organize the defense of a city or rear area.

See ivS # T-121 (Zimmermann et al.), pp. 1820ff.

(Colonel von Osterroth), the 253d Grenadier Training Regiment of

526th Reserve Division,* and a strange assortment of independent

The other two regiments of 526th Reserve Division, 416th and

536th Grenadier Training Regiments, were attached to LXXIV Corpswhile the division headquarters at Euskirchen remained directlysubordinated to Seventh Army.

UriLAS H[ED

battalions representing the proverbial bottom of the barrel. Some

of these were "Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions";* others were called

Luftwaffe ground troops hastily organized in infantry batta-

lions usually without sufficient training, poorly armed, and oflittle combat value, according to German postwar accounts, such asM.S # B-730 (Brandenberger).

Landesschuetzen Battalions (the termra is vaguely equivalent to "home

guard") which were quite inadequately armed, without heavy weapons,

and composed of men "as old as the hills".*

Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 9 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,

Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.; Quotation from ETHINT 18(Schwerin).

Landesschuetzen Battalions were usually composed of men fifty

to sixty years old.

The situation in the LXXXI Corps area was canplicated further

by tne presence of police and Hitler Youth detachments who attempted

to make themselves useful by doing such work on the 'West WVall

fortifications as they saw fit, but refused to co-operate with the

military.

The various independent battalions described above were sub-

ordinated to 353d Infantry Division prior to their commitment with

the front line divisions. By order of Field Marshal Model (Commander

in Chief, Army Group B) the newly arrived 8th, 12th, and 19th Luftwaffe

Fortress Battalions were attached to 353d Infantry Division on con-

dition that they would be employed only in defense of the West Wall.

The division reported that by 1800 on 12 September 1944 the Schill Line --

eastern and more strongly fortified bunker belt of the West Wall --

would be occupied by the 19th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion, com-

mitted in the area northwest of Wuerselen (northeast of Aachen),

3d Landesschuetzen Battalion in the area northwest of Stolberg,

12th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion in the vicinity of Stolberg, and

2d Landesschuetzen Battalion south of Stolberg. The 8th Luftwaffe

Fortress Battalion was designated 353d Infantry Division reserve.*

Tel Conv, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 0110 on 12 Sep 44, andMng Sitrep, 353d Inf Div, 12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Anlagen,Kampfverlauf [Operations), 2.VIII. - 21.X.44. Referred to hereafteras ULXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Tabulation of Troop Trains Ar-rived 9 Sep - 31 Oct 44, Seventh Army KTB, Anlagen, Semi-AnnualReport of Seventh Army Transport Officer, 1.VII. - 31.XII.44.

General Schack learned on 12 September that the first of three

full'strength divisions (12th Infantry, 183d and 246th Volks Grenadier

Divisions) destined to reinforce the Aachen area during September

1944 would arrive in the LXXXI Corps sector in a few days. Hitler

had ordered 12th Infantry Division (Colonel Gerhard Engel), just

rehabilitated in East Prussia after service on the Eastern Front,

to begin entraining for the Aacnen sector at 0001 dn 14 September.*

Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 12 Sep 44, OB VEST KTB (Text), 1. IX. - 30.IX.44. Referred to hereafter as OB WEST KTB.

For additional order of battle data, such as strength information,see The LXXXI Corps Situation in Mid-September 1944, pp.4lff.

Southwest of Aacnen the forces of 116th Panzer Division enjoyed

an uneventful night from 11 to 12 September 1944. This enabled them

U 'NLA 5 [SFE 9

FIEU9

at 0800 on 12 September to occupy positions along the railroad

from Hombourg to Moresnet, and from Moresnet along the Gueule Creek

via Hergenrath to Hauset.* The object was to establish a coherent

Eng Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 12 Sep 44, and Daily -Sitrep, 116thPz Div, 1900 on 12 Sep 44, LIXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

defense line which, based on a railway tunnel and a creek, would

facilitate antitank defense. The division committed the 156th

Panzer Grenadier Regiment on the right, between Hombourg and

Moresnet, and the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment on the left along

the Gueule. The 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion was dis-

engaged and recommitted at daybreak north of the Gueule with the

mission to establish contact with 9th Panzer Division at Eynatten.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0810 on 12 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

The forces of 116th Panzer Division found their mobility

greatly restricted by the work of over-eager German demolition

engineers who had destroyed all Gueule Creek crossings from Moresnet

to north. of Eynatten and had blocked all roads leading to the West

Wall with the exception of the Moresnet - Gemmenich - Aachen road.*

TVlX, 116th Pz Div to L=XXI Corps, 0155 on 12 Sep 44, LIX ICorps KTB, Anlagen, Meldungen der Divisionen [Division Sitreps],25.VIII. - 1.X.44. Referred to hereafter as LXXXI Corps KTB,Meldungen der Div.; Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0810 on12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

on~ew~ifsL

C IE 10

These obstacles seriously interfered with General von Schwerin's

intention to withdraw to the West Wall on 12 September. But during

the morning General Schack ordered von Schwerin not to occupy his

West Wall sector before receiving special orders from IXXXI Corps,

and to hold out in front of the West Wall generally as long as

possible. *

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1000 on 12 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

The lull enjoyed by 116th Panzer Division was shattered at

noon on 12 September when American tanks probed German defenses

north of Montzen and Hombourg.* Shortly thereafter the storm

Rad, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1155 on 12 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

broke over the heads of the Germans. The American reconnaissance

was followed up by a tank attack toward Hombourg. At the same time

American armor crossed the railway between Hombourg and Moresnet.*

Sitrep, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1200 on 12 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

American infantry pushed up the road from Hombourg to Voelkerich

and Bleyberg. While the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment fell back

before these attacks, American troops crossed the Gueule Creek be-

tween Moresnet and Hergenrath in the early afternoon and infiltrated

a3~: SDsE

UNC A SS IFthe lines of the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.* General von

Sitrep, 116th Pz Div to LXXI Corps, 1330 on 12 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

Schwerin was forced to withdraw about 1530 in a northwesterly

direction from Moresnet along the Gueule Creek.* The peculiar

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 1900 on 12 Sep 44, LT; I CorpsKTB, Kampfverlauf.

direction of this withdrawal was probably necessitated by the fact

that German engineers had blocked the roads leading northeast.

While the U.S. 1st Infantry Division launched its drive on

Aachen and broke through the lines of 116th Panzer Division, the

U.S. 3d Armored Division jumped off from Eupen toward Eynatten and

Roetgen in the sector of 9th Panzer Division. West of the Eupen -

Aachen road the Americans took Lontzen and Walhorn; east of the road

tney pushed into Raeren.* From Walhorn they launched a tank attack

Sitrep, 353d Inf Div to LXXXI Corps, 1200 on 12 Sep 44, IXXXICorps KTB, Kampferlauf.

toward Eynatten, which fell into American hands at 1345. Elements

of Kampfgruppe 9th Panzer Division tnere withdrew northeastward.*

TWX, 9th Pz Div (105th Pz Brig) to LXXXI Corps, 1417 on 12 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.; Sitrep, 9th Pz Div toLXXII Corps, 1425 on 12 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

INGLASIED

12

These elements and the local defense units under the command of

353d Infantry Division were unable to interfere seriously with

American operations. Later in the afternoon General Schack was

disturbed by a civilian report that American forces had occupied

Rott at 1800, conveying the impression that they had broken througn

the Wvest "Wall south of Rott.* The rumor that the Americans were

KTB Entry, 1800 on 12 Sep 44, TLXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

just south of Rott caused panic among the men of a Luftwaffe anti-

aircraft artillery unit committed at Rott. The 3d Battery (889th

Regiment) of the 7th Flak Division smashed the optical equipment

of their three 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, abandoned their positions,

guns, equipment, and belongings, and fled.* The cause of the false

Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXJCI Corps, 0050 on 22 Sep 44,UCOXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.

alarm seems to have been an American armored reconnaissance patrol

on the Aachen - Monschau road.*

Tel Cony, LX.KII Corps to 353d Inf Div, 2150 on 12 Sep 44, L3IXICorps KTB, Meldunge n der Div.

In the evening of 12 September 353d Infantry Division reported

American armor converging on Roetgen from the west. Elements of

the 253d Grenadier Training Regiment observed American tanks and

jeeps, followed by strong infantry detachments on personnel carriers

"m L 31 ie

U u 13

moving along the Raeren - Roetgen road.* Two American tanks and

Ibid.

four armored cars accompanied by infantry pushed into Roetgen. One

platoon of the security company in Roetgen (328th Replacement

Training Battalion of 253d Grenadier Training Regiment) was pushed

into the southern part of the town. Intensive infantry fighting

developed as American armor advanced to the northern periphery of

Roetgen. Keeping out of the range of German entitank weapons, the

tanks fired into West Wall bunker embrasures, while American in-

fantry guns laid down a heavy barrage in front of the obstacle wall.

Low-flying aircraft attacked the obstacles and defense positions.

By 1900 the volume of American artillery and tank fire began to

dwindle. The Germans remained in possession of all West Wall

fortifications. An hour later German reconnaissance found that

the Americans had left Roetgen.*

Sitrep, 328th Repl Trng Bn to LXXXI Corps, 12 Sep 44, L~C; ICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2230 on12 Sep 44, LXIXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

At 2000 on 12 September American tanks and infantry advancing

between the Hergenrath - Aachen and the Eupen - Aachen roads tcward

the Scharnhorst Line -- the first (western) band of West W1all

fortifications -- captured Bunker 161 at Brandenberg Hill, two

miles north of Hauset. Forces under the Kampfkommandant of Aachen

were immediately committed in a counterattack to wipe out this

UNC LA SII[ED

14

American penetration of the West Wall. They failed in this endeavor

but were able to stop the American attack. temporarily.* At the

Eng Sitrep, 353d Inf Div, 0445 on 13 Sep 44, and Tel Conv,Seventn Army to LXXXI Corps, 1140 on 13 Sep 44, LXCXI Corps KTB,Kaapfverlauf; ihg Sitrep, LXXI Corps, 0555 on 13 Sep 44, Lm=ICorps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

same time American armored cars and a few tanks also reached the

West Wall about half a mile southeast of Schmidthof and apparently

decided to laager there for the night.*

Ing Sitrep, 353d Inf Div, 0445 on 13 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB,Kampfverlauf.

Late in the evening of 12 September General Schack issued an

order to his divisions which defined their assigned West Wall sectors

and outlined the further conduct of operations.

The 116th Panzer Division was charged with defending the city

of Aachen. The Kampfkiommandant of Aachen with attached troops was

subordinated to 116th Panzer Division, as were all elements of

353d Infantry and 526th Reserve Divisions in the sector: 8th, 12th,

19th Luftwaffe Battalions and the 453d Grenadier Training Battalion

(253d Grenadier Training Regiment).* The armored elements of 116th

TWX, A Gp B to OB WEST, 2350 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Anlagen3Operations-Befehle [Operational Orders], 1.IX. - 30.IX.44. Referredto hereafter as A Gp B KTB, Operations-Befehle; Daily Sitrep, 116thPz Div, 1925 on 21 Sep 44, LI~XI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

U L A 8 3 FIE

lG L, S[D 15

Panzer Division were to fall back to the West Wall only in the face

of superior American pressure while the attached forces would move

into the fortifications ahead of the main body in order to complete

the improvement of the positions.*

Order, LXXI Corps to all divs, 2230 on 12 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Befehle an Div.

The 9th Panzer Division, with attached remaining elements of

105th Panzer Brigade, was assigned to the defense of the-sector

between 116th Panzer Division and the boundary with LXXIV Corps --

the Stolberg Corridor and northern Wenau Forest. All elements of

353d Infantry and 526th Reserve Divisions in this sector of the

West Wall were attached to 9th Panzer Division. These were Headquarters

253d Grenadier Training Regiment (Colonel Feind) ana the 328th and

473d Replacement Training Battalions.* The division was authorized

Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1500 on 15 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to IXXXI Corps, 16 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

The geographic location of the 9th Panzer Division sectorfated this division to bear the brunt of the Battle of the StolbergCorridor. Never possessed of organic elements sufficient for anadequate defense, the division also sustained very heavy lossesin this action. Thus it had to be shored up regularly by all kindsof reinforcements, sometimes of a very dubious value. The designation"9th Panzer Division" became a collective term for a veritablehodgepodge of unrelated armor, antitank, infantry, and artilleryunits.

to withdraw its organic elements to the West Wall only in the face

of overwhelming American attacks. In the West Wall the main effort

U CLASSIFIED 16

of resistance would center around the roads leading toward the

fortifications from the south and south'est.

The divisions were ordered to station strong outposts forward

of the MLR, equipped with heavy infantry weapons and antitank guns,

who were to do all in their power to delay the American advance.

In the sectors of 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions this outpost line

was to extend from west of Germenich - west of Hauset - east of

Raeren to west of Roetgen.

The 353d Infantry Division received orders to relinquish con-

trol of the Scharnhorst Line and all elements committed tnere to

116th and 9th Panzer Divisions. Three Landesschuetzen Battalions

(1/9, 11/6, and III/6) remained temporarily attached to 353d Infantry

Division for special assignments.*

Landesschuetzen Battalions I/9 and III/6 were attached to 9thPanzer Division two days later.

Following its arrival in the LXXI Corps zone the anxiously

awaited 394th Assault Gun Brigade (six or seven assault guns) was

to assemble in the vicinity of Brand. In corps reserve, this assault

gun brigade would be ready to participate on snort notice in counter-

attacks with both 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions.

Artillery Group Aachen, composed of the artillery regiments of

116th Panzer and 353d Infantry Divisions and the Flak Gruppe Aachen*

Antiaircraft Artillery Group Aachen, a reserve antiaircraftregimental headquarters.

INCL ASSFI E 17

was placed under the command of Colonel Pean (Commander, 116th

Panzer Artillery Regiment) and received orders to collaborate closely

witn 49th Infantry, 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions in co-ordinating

its fire with the main effort of defense.*

Order, LXII Corps to all divs, 2230 on 12 Sep 44, LX3XI CorpsKTB, Befehle an Div.

The night from 12 to 13 September passed quietly. During the

small hours of the morning the 8th, 12th, and 19th Luftwaffe Fortress

Battalions were attached to the Kampfkommandant of Aachen in order

to be committed at daybreak in a counterattack against the American

penetration of the Scharnhorst Line at Brandenberg Hill south of Aachen.*

Mng Sitrep, 353d Inf Div, 0445 on 13 Sep 44, D~UXI Corps KTB,Kampfverlauf.

At 0600 on 13 September 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions assumed

command of their new West Wall sectors. 'With some local defense

units in the front line, General von Schwerin disengaged the organic

forces of 116th Panzer Division -- badly in need of regrouping and

some rest -- in order to assemble them in the Richterich - Yuerselen

area northeast of Aachen. That move made it impossible to commit

these forces against the penetraticn at Brandenberg Hill before

afternoon. "In addition, if the enemy continued to advance and

exploit his success, which had to be expected in any event, he could

not be prevented from entering the town [of Aachen] from tne south

U Lt LA iUt

18

by noon. " *

ETHINT 18 (Schwerin); Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 13 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

During the night from 12 to 13 September the city of Aachen

had been in the grip of chaos. Since General von Schwerin was to

assume control on 13 September, he drove into Aachen the evening

before on the way to his command post at Laurensberg. He found

the population in panic. It was the picture Hitler had made all

too familiar in Europe -- but now, for the first time, the shoe was

on the other foot. "Women, with small children and babies, had

loaded their last possessions on small hand carts and prams and

walked into the night without having ahy idea where to go; they

were driven only by fear and the threats of the Party that every

person who did not leave the town would be shot as a traitor...."*

EThINT 18 (Schwerin).

Stirred by humane motivations and worried about the effect of

the panic and the jammed roads on the morale and mobility of his

troops, von Schwerin decided to put an immediate stop to the dis-

organized flight. When he sent his officers out to contact the

police with orders to halt the evacuation, they returned to him

with the shocking news that the entire police force and all govern-

ment and Party officials had left Aachen; not one police station

SGLASSBI~ED•ra~

19

was occupied.* Thereupon General von Schwerin took matters into

Ibid.; Report, MIodel to 0B3 VST, 2230 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; Ltr, Gen Mattenklott to Reichsfuehrer SS HeinrichHimmler, 15 Sep 44, LX II Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

General der Infanterie Franz TMattenklott commanded Wehrkreis VI,the military district which included the Aachen area.

his own hands. He sent his officers out once more to persuade the

frantic populace to return to their homes. In so doing he exposed

himself to the grave charge of having countermanded a Fuehrer order

commanding the evacuation of Aachen. In the morning of 13 September

the city was nearly calm again; for the time being all signs of

panic had disappeared. All buildings housing the Party and municipal

administration were deserted.

South of the city Kampfkommandant Colonel von Osterroth launched

another 'counterattack against the American penetration at Brandenberg.

Osterroth's attempt of the night before to restore the situation

had failed. The Americans were now in possession of Bunkers 160

and 161 and were feeding additionalforces into their salient. All

morning attempts by the weak forces under the command of Colonel

von Osterroth to seal off the penetration remained inconclusive.*

ETHITT 18 (Schwerin); Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LJ=I Corps,1140 on 13 Sep 44, LXX!I Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep,

116th Pz Div, 13 Sep 44, LEXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

As mentioned above, General von Schwerin's organic forces

were executing a maneuver which prevented them from participating

~LhI ILDa

UNCLASSIFIE20

in the fighting southwest of Aachen before late afternoon. He be-

lieved that the American penetration at Brandenberg Hill would

develop into a main effort attack against the city, and he knew

that the Luftwaffe battalions would be no match for their opponents.

Convinced that the Americans would have Aachen occupied in a matter

of hours, von Schwerin privately thought this the best solution for

the old city.* After much searching through empty public buildings,

ETmTT 18 (Schwerin). In desiring to spare Aachen the terrorsof becoming a battleground, von Schwerin deviated sharply fromHitler's avowed determination to turn the city of Charlemagne intoa fortified stronghold where each house would be fanatically de-fended to give the Allies a foretaste of what to expect insideGermany.

von Schwerin finally found one man still at his post, an official

of the telephone service. To him General Schwerin entrusted a letter,

written in Ehglish, which the official promised to take to the com-

manding officer of the American forces as soon as they had occupied

Aachen. The letter read as follows:

I stopped the absurd evacuation of this town; therefore, Iam responsible for the fate of its inhabitants and I ask you, inthe case cf an occupation by your troops, to take care of theunfortunate population in a humane way. I an the last GermanCommanding Officer in the sector of Aachen.

Signed: SC.F7BRIN*

Ibid.; Rpt, Model to 03 IEST, 2330 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle.

Consequences to Count von Schwerin arising from his interferencewith the evacuation of Aachen and the discovery of this letter bythe Nazis will be discussed later in this study.

rtean. vhile, however, the tactical situation had changed.

Gradually it dawned on the Germans that the Americans were not going

UtLA~ffl0

UO CLASSFIEP-1 21

to exploit their opportunity to walk into Aachen but that they

intended, rather, to envelop the city by driving up the Stolberg

Corridor in the direction of Esdaweiler. By noon on 13 September

von Osterroth's men had finally succeeded in sealing off the American

salient south of Aachen. Colonel von Osterroth thought he could

hold the line against the American tanks if the assault guns of

394th Assault Gun Brigade just detrained at the Aacnen-Nord Railway

Station could be committed against them.* LXXXI Corps ordered

T17X , Col von Osterroth to 116th Pz Div, 1315 on 13 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Meidungen der Div.; Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div,13 Sep 44, LIXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

116th Panzer Division to wipe out the American penetration at

Brandenberg Hill at all cost.* Unwillingly von Schwerin ordered

Rad, LeXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1230 on 13 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

his division, which had just arrived in the Richterich - Wuerseien

assembly area, to turn around, march back to the other end of

Aachen and assemble there for the counterattacc,. Although some re-

placements had arrived in the morning, and the battalions had an

average strength of about three hundred men, the fighting power of

the division was stiil low. Only about thirty tanks and assault

guns were operationally fit, and the troops were tired and battlewearyo*

ETHINT 18 (Schwerin).

UNCLASSIF E

U9t4(N '' I & -

Von Schwerin ordered the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to march

through the city while the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment bypassed

Aachen on its soutnern periphery. At 1600 the division jumped off

against the American salient at Brandenberg Hill.* It made some

Ibid.; Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 13 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB,Kamnfverlauf.

headway against American armored reconnaissance which had advanced

to the outskirts of the city. The armor withdrew to the break in

the German MLR, and 116th Panzer Division was able to close the

gap, without attempting to recapture the American-held pillboxes

after darkness had set in.*

Ibid.; Rad, 116th Pz Div to IXXI Corps, 2235 on 13 Sep 44,MLXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.; Daily Sitrep, A p B, 0100 on14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Anlagen, Tagesmeldungen, 1.IX. - 15.X.44.Referred to hereafter as A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

Shortly after noon on 13 September U.S. 3d Armored Division

resumed its drive up the Stolberg Corridor. South of Rott the

Americans cracked a number of bunkers and at 1225 achieved a

penetration in the MLR. American armor advanced up the road toward

Rott, filling in the antitank craters in its path.* Less than an

Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to LIXeI Corps, 1225 on_13 Sep 44, LDOXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

hour later U.S. forces were within one mile of Rott, and 9th Panzer

jMCLA r IE P

22

(

Division mustered all its available forces for a counterattack to

be launched from Kornelimuenster. General Mueller asked the

LXXXI Corps Operations Officer to move all available corps reserves

to Xornelimuenster.* Realizing that the Stolberg Corridor, rather

Tel Conv, Gen Mueller to LXXXI Corps, 1340 on 13 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

than the Aachener Stadtforst [Aachen Municipal Forest south of

Aachen], was the scene of the VII Corps main effort in his sector,

General Schack ordered 116th Panzer Division to transfer half the

assault guns of 394th Assault Gun Brigade to 9th Panzer Division

at Kornelimuenster. *

Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1420 on 13 Sep 44, andLXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1430 on 13 Sep 44, LXXCI Corps KTB,Kampfverlauf.

The 3d Armored Division drive up the Stolberg Corridor wasin

two-pronged, with one group attacking/the direction Schleclheim -

Kornelimuenster, the other toward Rott and Mulartshuette. At 1630

ten American tanks appeared before Rott while other U.S. forces

had already bypassed the village and were located east thereof.*

Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1630 on 13 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

Headquarters and headquarters company of 9th Panzer Division sped

.y^^^^^SH^H~tt^

unc - I

to Rott in an effort to hold the line there.* Other forces of

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1730 on 13 Sep 44, LXICICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

the division attempted to screen off at ziulartshuette by means of

obstacles and demolitions.

In the early afternoon American tanks and infantry penetrated

a German strongpoint south of Schleokheim and continued /their ad-

vance toward that village.* A race was now on between U.S. armor

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1420 on 13 Sep 44, LXKXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

and three assault guns of 394th Assault Gun Brigade driving on

Kornelimuenster from different directions. At 1600 eight American

tanks were observed on the road from Nuetheim to Kornelimuenster.

The German assault guns were expected in Kornelimuenster at 1800.*

Ibid.

They arrived on schedule, and a battalion of 9th Panzer Division,

reinforced by these three assault guns and a few 75-mm. antitank

guns which the division had picked up, began to establish a line

of resistance from the northern periphery of Schleckheim via the

northern edge of Nuetheim to the southern periphery of Kornelimuenster.

Of the first eight U.S. tanks, four were knocked out by Panzerfaust,*

Hand-operated antitank grenades.

llNC1ASSHIED

24

25

but fifteen more tanks wheeled off to right and left in an effort

to roll up the 9th Panzer Division line.*

Tel Conv, LIXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1830 on 13 Sep 44, LXIKICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 13 Sep 44, L XICorps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

At 1845 fifteen U.S. tanks broke through the line of bunkers

and 'dragons teeth at Oberforstbach, while American infantry advanced

along the road north of the Aachen Reservoir (Langfeld - Nuetheim -

Kornelimuenster). Five American tanks attacked Bunker 109 on this

road about halfway between the reservoir and Nuetheim.* Somewhat

Tel Conv, LXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1915 on 13 Sep 44, IX0XICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

later the Germans reported American forces before Kornelimuenster,

near Mulartshuette, and in Hahn. At Rott Headquarters Company of

9th Panzer Division and 105th Panzer Brigade launched a counter-

attack in an effort to halt the American drive on Mulartshuette.*

Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 13 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Tages-meldungen.

German engineers hastily began to demolish all crossings over the

Vicht River between Stolberg and Zweifall.*

Tel Cony, LXCrXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 2030 on 13 Sep 44, LIXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

At LXXXI Corps headquarters American intentions emerged more

... I E

26

clearly. The corps operations officer called General Mahlmann of

353d Infantry Division to inform him that "... the enemy will probably

launch a drive bypassing Aachen from the penetration area near

Kornelimuenster and Hahn ... toward the second band of defenses

[Schill Line]." The three Landesschuetzen battalions under the

command of 353d Infantry Division were alerted to stand by for

action.* I=KXI Corps also ordered 116th Panzer Division to transfer

Tel Cony, LXXI Corps to Gen Mahlmann, 2040 on 13 Sep 44,LIXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

the 8th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion and one battery of artillery

to 9th Panzer Division.*

Tel Conv, L XXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2320 on 13 Sep 44,UXOXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

As 13 September 1944 drew to a close, the American advance

against the LXXCI Corps sector had been checked temporarily. The

salient north of Hauset was wiped out. The penetrations on both

sides of Walheim had been sealed off in the line Kornelimuenster -

Hahn. The southern prong of the 3d Armored Division attad which

had advanced across Rott, had been checked at Iulartshuette.*

Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0100 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

The night from 13 to 14 September 1944 passed quietly in the

entire LXXXI Corps sector. The Germans observed strong American

UNL IED27

infantry and armored forces assembling in the Schleckheim - Walheim

area but found Oberforstbach unoccupied.*

Lag Sitrep, LXI I Corps, 0650 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

In the southern outskirts of Aachen American reconnaissance

in the morning of 14 September probed the 116th Panzer Division

front line at "Bildcnen" toward Bunker 189 and Grenzhof. Then

American infantry with strong artillery support jumped off against

the entire division front and broke through the bunker line in many

places. The bunkers were bypassed singly and fought down from

flank and rear by U.S. infantry while American tanks followed up

the attack.* After noon the bunkers at "Bildchen" and "Koepfchen"

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz -Diy,'C14Sep 44, L XI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

(southwest and south of Aachen respectively) were in American hands.

The 116tn Panzer Division forces were now defending a semicircle

around Aacnen, from Vaelser Quartier west of Aacnen to the boundary

with 9th Panzer Division southeast of the city. Their intentions

were to defend this line and to counterattack southward whenever

possible. *

Rad, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1255 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

Iy 4A1 HE liBN a n^^ I§

A short time later the division was forced to admit that all

attempts to regain the belt of bunkers had failed because the

densely wooded terrain (Aachen Municipal Forest) made adequate

tank support and artillery observation impossible.*

Rad, 116th Pz Div to LeXXI Corps, 1340 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

As American forces drew closer to the city, the panic in Aachen

reached a new high. According to General von Schwerin conditions

were "catastrophic." No police or civil authorities had yet re-

turned to Aachen. The old museum director of Aachen, accompanied

by a few city officials who had stayed at their posts, came to see

von Schwerin to tell him that a group of leading citizens had chosen

him, the museum director, to form a provisional city government.

The general gave orders for the evacuation to proceed, provided rail

and motor transport were available, but emphasized that it would

only result in clogging up vital thoroughfares.

In addition to having to cope with the frantic civilian

population, 116th Panzer Division, which on 14 September assumed

direct command of all German elements in its sector, also had

trouble with the Luftwaffe. In totaldisregard of the division

commander's orders the Luftwaffe attempted to pull its ~iatiaircraft

batteries out of Aachen. Field Marshal Gerd von Rtndstedt (Commander

in Chief West) himself had to interfere, reminding Luftwaffe anti-

aircraft troops that they were to take orders, like everybody else,

iaLu&iH[D

LwiL~ly

Sae29

from the superior headquarters to which they were attached. General

von Sonwerin also complained that his Luftwaffe fortress batta-

lions had a tendency to desert their positions in the face of

even minor attacks.*

Tel Cony, LXXI Corps to Gen von Schwerin, 0930 on 14 Sep 44,LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Rpt, A Gp B to OB WEST, 1200 on 14Sep 44, OB VWEST KTB; Rad, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1310 on 14Sep '44, L XK Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.; ETBINT 18 (Schwerin);MS # B-058 (Voigtsberger).

Generalmajor Heinrich Voigtsberger commanded the 60th PanzerGrenadier Regiment. When Count von Schwerin was relieved of thecommand of 116th anzer Division on 15 September 1944, GeneralVoigtsberger became acting division oommander until the new com-manding officer, Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg, arrived on19 September.

Early in the afternoon of 14 September strong American infantry

and armored forces rolled up the bunker line from tne direction

of Brand, Niederforstbach and Oberforstbach. By 1500 they had

gained a line extending from Beverbach Creek via "Linzenshaeuschen"

(on tne Eupen - Aachen Road) to Friedrichsberg Hill. The 116th

Panzer Division, attempting to hold the line from the West Wall to

south of Vaelser Quartier, from there to north of Friedrichsberg

Hill - "Linzenshaeuschen" - Beverbach Creek, had lost contact with

9th Panzer Division on its left, southeast of Aachen. The Germans

noted that their opponents were employing new tactics to crack

West Wall bunkers: the Americans would launch strong infantry

attacks covered by smoke screens while the tanks followed to back

up the attack and to support the infantry in knocking out the bunkers

u« 'y ^ i l ^^j^

.30

one by one. The Americans made heavy use of artillery and smoke

screens.*

Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1500 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 14 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

Southeast of Aachen in the sector of 9th Panzer Division the

American combat commands resumed their drive up the Stolberg Corridor

in the morning of 14 September. Having taken Oberforstbach and

Niederforstbach, they captured Kornelimuenster at 1030 and Breinig

at 1100.* American tanks were observed shortly after noon con-

Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

tinuing northeastward from Kornelimuenster toward Buesbach.* About

TWX, 116th Pz Div to LEXxI Corps, 1250 bn 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

the same time the Germans reported an American tank driving from

Mulartshuette northeastward toward Zweifall.* A few hours later --

Rad, 116th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 1420 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

at 1715 -- American infantry, tanks, and armored cars entered

Zweifall. After fifteen minutes the infantry had captured the

first four bunkers (Bunkers 330, 334, 335, and 336) in the second

ANN 0sfl E

UMCL + rFIE

band of West Wail fortifications, and the task force continued

eastward through the breach in the direction of Vicht and Mausbach.*

Tel Convs, LXXI Corps to 353d Inf Div, 1715 and 1720 on 14Sep 44, and LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 2000 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 14 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

In view of the American breakthrough at Zweifall LXXXI Corps ordered

9th Panzer Division to take command of the second band of the West

Wall along with the Landesschuetzen battalions (III/6 and 1/9) com-

mitted there. Headquarters 353d Infantry Division would be dis-

engaged to receive another assignment.* Reinforced by the three

Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div and 353d Inf Div, 1740on 14 Sep 44, IXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

assault guns of 394th Assault Gun Brigade, 9th Panzer Division married

these assault guns to a company of motorized infantry and committed

these forces in a counterattack against the American tasK force

driving on Mausbacn.* LXXXI Corps issued strict orders to 9th

Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1745 and 1810 on 14 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

Panzer Division to throw back the Americans before the end of the

day and to regain full controlof the second belt of West Wall bunkers.*

Tel Cony, L EXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 2000 on 14 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

4ier IE

32

The front line of 9th Panzer Division now extended from the

southern edge of Brand - southern edge of Buesbach - east of Zweifall

to. the West Wall east of Roetgen.* At 1800 the Germans reported

Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1930 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Anlagen,Letzte Meldung [Final Sitreps], 10.VIII. - 30. IX.44. Referred tohereafter as A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.

that at least two hundred American tanks had assembled in

Kornelimuenster. Additional columns were seen moving north fron

Walheim. Up front the American spearhead reached the southern

outskirts of Stolberg at 2000. Apparently the Americans then de-

cided not to continue their advance toward Stolberg and Eschweiler

that evening.* Instead, they worked on their encirclement of Aachen

Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 2030 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,KanpFverlauf.

in the area between Aachen and Stolberg.

Late in the afternoon American forces broke through the 116th

Panzer Division line between Beverbach Creek and Lindert, two miles

west-southwest of Brand, and stabbed into the flank of the 60th

Panzer Grenadier Regiment. The 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion

was committed in support of the division's flank southeast of the

Aachen Municipal Forest.*

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 14 Sep 44, LXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldun gen.

.as H[L Af~

American tanks and armored cars driving north from the

Walheim - Oberforstbach - Niederforstbach area pushed through

Brand at 1830.* Less than an hour later -- at 1915 -- American

Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to LXI Corps, 2030 on 14 Sep 44, LXXXI

Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

tanks captured Eilendorf and the steel plant at Rothe Erde ["Red

Earth"] east of Aachen.* The city was now ringed on three sides.

Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 14 Sep 44, IEI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

LWXXI Corps received reports that sizeable elements of 116th Panzer

Division, Antiaircraft Group Aachen. and the Kampfkommandant were

withdrawing to the northeast, supposedly in line with an order

issued by Colonel von Osterroth. General Schack immediately ordered

that all withdrawing elements be rallied and committed in a counter-

attack from the u''erselen area southward toward Rothe Erde.

Contact between 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions was to be re-established

at all cost through the efforts of all able officers of the 116th

Panzer Division Headquarters. A rear area fortress engineer head-

quarters received orders to block the Autobahn to Cologne.*

Rpt on Situation in Aachen area, Gen Schack, 2145 on 14 Sep 44LXXI Corps KTB, Kamnpfverlauf.

By special repeat order from Hitler Aachen was to be evacuated --

if necessary, by force' The 116th Panzer Division was ordered to

S34

support the evacuation measures by regulating traffic. The police

would also be available after 0100 on 15 September. They were

finally returning to Aachen.*

Tel Conv, L~ I Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2345 on 14 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

The mission of 116th Panzer Division on 15 September was to

hold the Schill Line at all cost and to make an effort to wipe out

the American' penetrations at Rothe Erde and Eilendorf. In spite

of General Schack's orders the projected counterattack against this

salient had not yet been launched at daybreak.*

NLg Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 0550 on 15 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

The semicircular front around Aachen remained intact from

Vaelser Quartier to Steinebruect in tne morning of 15 September

but buckled just east of Steinebrueck when American infantry and

armor pushed the 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion back to

the railroad leading out of Aachen northeast of Burtscheid. Re-

inforced by the 34th Machine Gun Battalion, which had been rallied

after an earlier attempt to withdraw, the reconnaissance battalion

established a defense line along this railway embankment.* The

Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0100, 0840 and 1130on 15 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

U~gtLArIH

UN; I l ED 35

attackers did not immediately attempt to breai through this line.

The Americans devoted a large part of the day to the concentration

of strong forces in the area south of Burtscheid. Judging from

the movements they observed and from American artillery fire, the

Germans estimated that at least one infantry division was assembling

south of Aachen.*

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 2100 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXI CorpsKTB, Tagesmeldungen.

East of the city, in and south of Eilendorf, American tanks

and motor transport also continued to assemble until, according to

German estimate, U.S. forces there had been brought up to the

strength of about one armored division. In view of the American

build-up the Germans expected that VII Corps would launch its all-

out attack against Aachen on 16 September.* Although ground operations

Ibid.

seem to have been limited to reconnaissance while this build-up south

and east of Aachen was in progress, American artillery subjected

Aachen and suburbs to heavy fire. The West Wall bunkers north andthe

south of/Aachen - Stolberg road in particular received strong rocket

projector fire.*

Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0915 on 15 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

U1NCLASSIF FiI $36

At 1530 on 15 September American infantry began to infiltrate

the bunker line south of Rothe Erde in the direction of Geisberg

Hill. The Landesschuetzen battalion there abandoned its positions,

but seven German assault guns held the line behind the pillboxes.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1540 on 15 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1700 on 15 Sep44, LIXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

At 1700 American forces jumped off in simultaneous attacks from

the "Buschhaus" toward Burtscheid, and from Eilendorf north and

northeast in the direction of Verlautenheide and Geisberg Hill.

The defenders were able to repulse both attacks. Thirty American

tanks rolling northward from Eilendorf were forced towithdraw in

the face of concentrated German artillery fire; the Germans claimed

the destruction of two U.S. tanks.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1718 on 15 Sep 44,iXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 2100on 15 Sep 44, LXIXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

In turning back the American drive on the Aachen suburb of

Burtscheid, the Germans had narrowly prevented the invader from

venturing into the streets of tne old Imperial City for the first

time. To 116th Panzer Division General Schack relayed the Hitler

order demanding the fanatic defense of "Fortress Aachen": "In the

event of an enemy penetration of Aachen, each and every house will

be defended. A strategic withdrawal from the southern to the

northern periphery of tne city is out of the question."*

ddLAJRN lE

- 37

TWX, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 1718 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Befehle an Div.

Shortly after midnight on 15 September General Schack had re-

peated his order to 9th Panzer Division that the Americans must be

forced out of the second band of West Wall bunkers near Iausbach

at all cost. During the remaining hours of darkness 9th Panzer

Division made ~such preparations for the counterattack as it was

capable of. One replacement battalion was en route to the division;

in addition ten tanks were moving up to the front. In the small

hours of the morning the Landesschuetzen battalion committed on

the division's southern wing (probably 1/9) abandoned its positions;

it was necessary to move up another battalion (probably 328th Re-

placement Training Battalion) from Scheveriuette in order to plug

the gap.*

Tel Cony, IXOXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0015 on 15 Sep 44, L XIICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Rad, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 0353 on15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Meldungen der Div.

The division launched its attack against the American salient

at dawn and was able to drive away U.S. armor south of Mausbach.

Some bunkers were apparently recaptured in the first assault; two

bunkers remained in American hands.* Two hours later the division

TWX, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 0534 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

U CLASSIFI ED37

headquarters had no news on the outcome of the counterthrust toward

Vicht and Zweifall otner than the report that the two bunkers

south of Mausbach had not been captured yet.* For the third time

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0740 on 1.5 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

LXXXI Corps ordered: "9th Panzer Division armor will attac the

enemy and throw him back behind the West Wall. There is no time

to lose'"*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0925 on 15 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

In the early afternoon the division was able to report that

as a result of its counterattack all bunkers of the MHR from northeast

of Buesbach to Zweifall were once more in German hands. An American

attack on Buesbach had been repulsed by four tanks of 105th Panzer

Brigade and four assault guns of the division's antitan cmnpany

committed there earlier in the day.* The German success, however,

Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0015 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1400 on 15 Sep 44,A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.

was very shortlived. Throughout the day 9th Panzer Division had

watched the American build-up with growing apprehension. In the

early morning the division had expressed concern about the assembly

of two hundred U.S. tanks in Kornelimuenster to which more were

steadily being added. At 1500 a German runner reported a con-

centration of eighty U.S. tanks in Breinig.*

Tel Convs, LXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0015 and 1500 on 15 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps K'B, Kampfverlauf.

In the early afternoon the German attack bogged down in the

face of the American artillery preparation. Under the heavy American

artillery, tank, and mortar fire the division sustained serious

losses and was unable to execute any movements. The Germans sensed

that the American attack was imminent.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1655 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 1910 on 15 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

At 1550 on 15 September American tanks and infantry jumped

off from their assembly area at Breinig and headed for Mausbach.

A furious battle ensued in which the Americans lost six tanks, but

were finally able to capture Mausbach and Weissenberg Hill. An

attempt to continue the drive was stopped by a German counterattack

launched from Gressenich.*

Tel Convs, IXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1600 on 15 Sep 44, andLXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2045 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 1910 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

At 1600 the Americans threw a second punch against 9th Panzer

Division. Forty tanks jumped off from the Eilendorf - Brander

r E 0

ICLS FID 39

Forest assembly area and rolled east. Fifteen minutes later they

faced the German obstacle wall. Although they were unable to achieve

a penetration there, 9th Panzer Division- had to report that "our

infantry was smashed in the Mausbach area as well as east of

Eilendorf. "*

Tel Cony, LI~CI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1650 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kempfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1700 on 15 Sep44, Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 1910 on 15 Sep 44, LEXXI Corps KTB,Tage sme ldun gen.

On the extreme left [southern] wing of 9th Panzer Division,

where the 328th Replacement Training Battalion had occupied the

Scharnhorst Line, American forces also achieved a penetration at

1730 and captured one strongpoint. In the right and central sectors

of 9th Panzer Division weak organic elements of the division,

105th Panzer Brigade, and two training battalions (473d Replacement

Training Battalion and March Battalion Zorn) held the second belt

of West Wall fortifications except for the American penetrations

east of Eilendorf and at Mausbach.*

Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 1910 on 15 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep,LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 15 Sep 44, -KXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

In the 116th and 9th Panzer Division sectors the front lines

had not changed mucn over the previous day. Nevertheless, fighting

had been extremely bitter on 15 September, and botdsides had suf-

fered heavy losses. The 9th Panzer Division alone had accounted

&&LM SIHFEDU L 8

4 P 8WA SFH P

for forty-two U.S. tanks.*

Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1345 on 16 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, LetzteMeldung.

The Germans had also sustained serious casualties. Army Group B

issued an order for all battleworthy elements of 9th Panzer Division

still in the assembly area at St. Wendel to move up. to the front

immediately. *

Order, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps (relaying Order, A Gp B toSeventh Army), 2340 on 15 Sep 44, L I Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeres-gruppe, Armee, usw.

ULINtA rIU10

UiIN~i

The LXEXI Corps Situation in Mid-September 1944*

The following study of the German situation in the LXKI Corssector omits mention of 275th and 49th Infantry Divisions. Althoughsubordinate to LXXXI Corps, these divisions did not participate inoperations against U.S. VII Corps at this time. Several days later275th Infantry Division was shifted to the southern wing of LX XICorps to plug a gap between LXXXI and LXXIV Corps. The divisionwill ie described when it enters into this story. See below, p. 73

On 16 September 1944 the organic fighting forces of 116th

Panzer Division consisted of the 50th and 156th Panzer Grenadier

Regiments and the 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion: a total

of five battalions with a combat strength* of roughly 1,600 men.

The term "combat strength" is employed here in translationof the German Kampfstaerke, defined to include only men actuallyengaged in the fighting or in immediate support of front line fightersforward of a battalion command post. The term Gefechtsstaerke,rendered as "fighting strength," applies to all men who fight orsupport fighters forward of a regimental headquarters. See:Gen Order Nr. 1/2000/44 g., 25 Apr 44, OKI/Gen St d H/Org Abt.

In addition the 12th and 19th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions, the

453d Grenadier Training Battalion, and possibly other elements were

attached to the division. The 302d Infantry Training Battalion,

en route to the front, was about to join these forces under the

command of 116th Panzer Division.

Division armor on 16 September was reduced to two Mark IV

tanks and one Panther (Mark V). The division had one assault gun

left; four assault guns of 394th Assault Gun Brigade were attached.

Five assault guns of 217th Assault Gun Brigade and elements of 902d

6 LA ~ IIC

Sf I

42

Assault Gun Brigade were en route to the division. In other anti-

tank weapons the division possessed nine 75-mm. antitank guns, of

whLich one was self-propelled. Five additional 75-mm. antitank

guns were said to be en route from Koenigsberg in East Prussia.

The 116th Panzer Artillery Regiment had three batteries of

150-mm. howitzers and one battery of 105-mm. howitzers. Two other

150-mm. howitzer batteries were attached -- 2d Battery, 992d

Artillery Regiment and 3d Battery, 997th Artillery Regiment.*

Tabulation of Armored Vehicles, 116th Pz Div, 16 Sep 44, andT ~ [Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 16 Sep 44], LXXXI Corpsto Seventh Arpy, 22 Sep 44, LXX I Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.;Tabulation of Tanks and Antitank Weapons, IXII Corps, 2200 on 17Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Report on Trip, GenBrandenberger to A Gp B, 16 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, BefehleHeeresgruppe, !rmee, usw.; Tel Cony, FM Model to CofS, SeventhArm , 1350 on 16 Sep 44, and Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to Cmdr, 13thLuftwaffe Fortress Bn, 1850 on 17 Sep 44, and Entry, 17 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

The 116th Panzer Division also expected the 13th LuftwaffeFortress Battalion and tne 107th Panzer Battalion. The latter,though intended for the Aachen sector, was shifted instead to theArnhem - Nijmegen area when Operation MARKET-GARDEN got underway.As for the 13th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion (645 men), it waseither never attached to 116th Panzer Division despite orders, orremained with that division for only a few days before appearingon the roster of units of 9th Panzer Division.

Since its arrival in the LXXXI Corps area General Mueller's

9th Panzer Division had been reinforced by additional rganic units

as well as by the attachment of miscellaneous other forces. On

15 September 1944 the committed organic strength of 9tbPanzer Division

consisted of the Battalion Schemm* made up of the remaining elements

Schemm seems to have been the commander of 11th Panzer GrenadierRe giment.

C L 'A F~f

UN E43

of 10th and 11th Panzer Grenadier Regiments. This battalion had

a combat strength of 5 officers and 136 enlisted men.

Between 11 and 15 September 1944 the following'infantry batta-

lions had been attached to 9th Panzer Division:

Headquarters of 253d Grenadier TrainingRegiment with 328th Replacement TrainingBattalion and 473d Replacement TrainingBattalion;

Landesschuetzen Battalion I/9;Landesschuetzen Battalion 11I/6;8th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion;Replacement Battalion Nagel;Replacement Battalion Zorn;Remaining Elements of 547th Security Battalion.

Of organic armor and. antitank forces 9th Panzer Division had

the 2d Company, 33d Panzer Regiment, with fifteen Panthers (of

which only eight were operationally fit), and elements of 50th

Antitank Battalion with six assault guns and about fifteen 75-mm.

antitank guns. Attached were remaining elements of 105th Panzer

Brigade with five Panthers and three assault guns, the 105th Panzer

Grenadier Battalion, and three assault guns of 394th Assault Gun

Brigade. In addition 9th Panzer Division expected six assault guns

of the 217th Assault Gun Brigade and ten tanks which were supposedly

en route to Dueren.

The organic artillery of 9th Panzer Division consisted of two

batteries of 150-mram. howitzers, the 2d Battalion, 102d Panzer

Artillery Regiment with three batteries of five 105-mm. howitzers

each, and one reinforced battery of the 287th Flak Battalion with

one 88-mm., three 37-mm., and three 20O-mm. antiaircraft guns, two

of which were quadruple-mounted.

ULnilEU "" I f

U r:AiSf rFr 44

Attached to 9th Panzer Division artillery were one battery

of 12th SS Panzer Division with five 105-mm. howitzers and the

490th Heavy Howitzer Battalion* -- three batteries with a total of

The Germans call 150-mm. howitzers "heavy howitzers" [schwereFeldhaubitzen ].

nine 150-mm. howitzers.

As for engineer forces, the 2d Company, 16th Panzer Engineer

Battalion was attached to 9th Panzer Division.*

Strength Rpts, 9th Pz Div to X~ I Corps, 16 and 21 Sep 44,and Comments on Strength Report of 9th Pz Div, LXXXI Corps G-3 Off,16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldingen der Div.; Tabulation of Tanksand AT Weapons, LXXXI Corps, 2200 on 17 Sep 44, DJXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Report, Gen Brandenberger to A Gp B, 16 Sep 44,LXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.; Tel Conv,LXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1500 on 15 Sep 44, and Tel Cony, FMModel to CofS, Seventh Army, 1350 on 16 Sep 44, and Entry, 17 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; TWX (Weekly Strength Report asof 1200 on 16 Sep 44), LXXiI Corps to Seventh Army, 22 Sep 44, andTabulation of Armored Vehicles, LXXXI Corps, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI CorpsKTB, Befehle an Div. usw.; TWX, A Gp B to OB lEST, 2350 on 22 Sep44, A Gp B KTB, Operations-Befehle.

To sum up: on 15 September 1944 9th Panzer Division with

attached units had an infantry combat strength of roughly 2,500

men, approximately 200 machine guns, 13 Panther tanks, 12 assault

guns, about 15 75-mm. antitank guns, 15 150-mm. howitzers, Zu 105-mm.

howitzers, 1 88-mm., 3 37-mm., and 3 20-mm. antiaircraft guns.

As a result of the highly inadequate signal communications,

the frontage of 9th Panzer Division had proved too wide for effective

exercise of command. To remedy this condition LXXXI Corps committed

LE1E[1lflE

iNCLBSSITIED 45

Headquarters 353d Infantry Division with two companies of Landes-

schuetzen (possibly Landesschuetzen Battalion II/6) in the southern

half of the 9th Panzer Division sector. The new boundary between

9th Panzer and 353d Infantry Divisions extended from Schevenhuette -

Jaegerfahrt (north of Zweifall) - Vennwegen - Hahn - Schmidthof to

Raeren. In the south the new sector of 353d Infantry Division was

defined by the boundary between LXXXI and LXXIV Corps.*

Tel Convs, LX CI Corps to 353d Inf Div, 2310 on 14 Sep 44,and 1510 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep,LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

For the defense of this sector some elements of 9th Panzer

Division were attached to 353d Infantry Division: Headquarters of

253d Grenadier Training Regiment under Colonel Feind with the 328th

Replacement Training Battalion, Replacement Battalion Nagel, re-

maining elements of the almost completely smashed Landesschuetzen

Battalion I/9 and of the 547th Security Battalion, a heavy weapons

company, about eight 75-mm. antitank guns and one battery of three

150-mm. howitzers. With these forces the combat strength of 353d

Infantry Division rose to roughly seven hundred men. The 9th Panzer

Division was left with a combat strength of 56 officers and 1,941

enlisted men, organized in two Kampfgruppen under the command,

respectively, of Major Volker and Colonel Max Sperling (presumably

commander of 33d Panzer Regiment).*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Divi,-1500 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf;TWX (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200

uJiLLAf HEP

UNCLASSFI IE 446

on 16 Sep 44), A Gp B to OB WEST, 2400 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 16 Sep 44,and Report, Maj Volker to 9th Pz Div, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Meldungen der Div.

The rear area functions of 353d Infantry Division were assumed

by Gruppe Jungklaus, a rear area headquarters subordinate to LEXXI

Corps, with orders to rally all stragglers in the communications

zone and to begin work on a blocking line between the Geilenkirchen -

Rheydt Rail Line and the left boundary of LXXXI Corps -- the Roer

Position or Schlieffen Line.*

Order, LXXI Corps to Gruppe Jungklaus, 1830 on 15 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.

Late in the evening of 15 September General Schack received

the cheering news that the first elements of 12th Infantry Division

would arrive at Juelich and Dueren during the night and. that the

transport of the entire division would be completed some thirty

hours later.* LJXXI Corps ordered the division to assemble in the

Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 2015 on 15 Sep 44,LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

Aldenhoven - Pattern - Inden - eamersdorf - Eschweiler - Laurensberg

area. As elements of the division arrived, they were to be readied

immediately so as to be available at any time for counterattacks

in a southerly and southwesterly direction. Corps, however, assured

mnessF~

UNCLASSiFiED47

Colonel Gerhard Engel* that there was no intention to commit his

Colonel Gerhard Engel, Commander of 12th Infantry Division,was military adjutant to Hitler from 1937 until 1944. In 1944 hejoined the 12th Infantry Division to command the 27th FusilierRegiment and then rose to the position of division commander. Atwar's end he had attained the rank of brigadier general.

division before it was fully assembled, unless developments compelled

a piecemeal commitment of these forces.*

Order, IXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2300 on 15 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Befehle an Div.

Arriving among the exhausted and understrength forces of

LXXXI Corps, 12th Infantry Division made a deep impression on both

military and civilian population. Here was the first full-strength,

rested and fresh division, composed of young, healthy and well-

trained men, that the Germans in the West had seen in a long time.

The appearance of this division greatly boosted the morale of the

troops and the civilians in the area.

Organized along the lines of a "Type 1944 Infantry Division",

12th Infantry Division numbered 14,800 men, of whom roughly one

quarter (about 3,800 men) were combat strength. This infantry

strength was divided among the 27th Fusilier Regiment, the 48th

and 89th Grenadier Regiments, and the 12th Fusilier Battalion.

The division was fully equipped except for its twenty authorized

assault guns (Field Marshal Model ordered seventeen assault guns

of 102d Assault Gun Brigade attached to 12th Infantry Division).

UC LASSIFI 48

. ~48

The 12th Artillery Regiment had its authorized strength of nine

batteries of 105-mm. howitzers and three batteries of 150-mm.

howitzers. The division's antitank battalion possessed twelve

75-mm. antitank guns.

In view of the desperate situation in the Aachen area, Field

Marshal von Rundstedt had requested they 12th Infantry Division be

moved at top speed. Thanks to this priority and the prevailing

misty, rainy weather the division had been able to travel across

Germany (from East Prussia to the Aachen area) undetected and un-

attacked by Allied aircraft and had thus maintained intact the

all-important element of surprise.*

Report, A Gp B, 1335 on 14 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB; Tel Conv, FMModel to Seventh Army, 1350 on 16 Sep 44, LX0CI Corps KTB, Kampf-verlauf; TWX (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 16 Sep 44), "IXI Corps, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.; DailySitrep, A Gp B, 0230 on 17 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen; MS# A-971 (Engel).

In his "Order for the Conduct of Operations and Order of

Battle in the West Wall" of 16 September 1944 General Brandenberger

wrote: "The enemy is expected to continue to make his main effort

in the penetration area east of Aachen.... Seventh Army will de-

fend the positions from northeast of Maastricht to Aachen and the

West Wall to the last man and the last bullet. The penetrations

achieved by the enemy will be wiped out. The forward line of

bunkers [Scharnhorst Line] will be regained...."*

Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 16 Sep 44, UC=K I Corps KTB,Befehle: Heeresgrupoe, Armee, usw.

49

Specifically the mission of LXXXI Corps was twofold. First,

its forces were to wipe out American penetrations of the Schill

Line east of Aachen. This achieved, the Germans would counter-

attack on a large scale to throw U.S. forces out of the area east

and south of Aachen and to regain full control of the Scharnhorst

Line. For this purpose 12th Infantry Division had been attached

to LXXXI Corps. For greater effectiveness the LIXI Corps sector

was shortened: 353d Infantry Division with attached elements was

now subordinated to LXXIV Corps so that the new boundary line be-

tween the two corps extended now from Eupen via Zweifall and Dueren

to Cologne.

Thus on 16 September opposite U.S. VII Corps General Schack

had at his disposal 116th and 9th Panzer Divisions and the elements

of 12th Lnfantry Division now arriving in the area. After 1Eth

Infantry Division was fully committed, intentions were for 116th

Panzer Division to be disengaged and assembled around Eschweiler

as-corps reserve. Then 9th Panzer Division also would be relieved

and assembled in the area southeast of Dueren at the disposal of

Seventh Army.*

Ibid. As matters turned out, this relief did not take placeuntil 246th Volks Grenadier Division arrived on the scene.

L i; ASSF IFED

gt A LASSIFIF $

LCXXI Corps: Counterattack and Stalemate

After a strong artillery preparation during the night from

15 to 16 September American forces infiltrated the 116th Panzer

Division lines south of Verlautenheide in ,the morning of 16

September and achieved a penetration by capturing several bunkers

just south of the village. The division charged bitterly, "Local

defense units and stragglers committed in West Wall fortifications

have no combat value, no ability to stand their ground...."* While

MAng Sitrep, LIXXI Corps, 0520 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Mng Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 0545 on 16 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

the Americans pushed into Verlautenheide and captured the village,

another U.S. armored force jumped off from south of Eilendorf and

drove eastward into Atsch at 0515.*

Noon Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1445 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Tel Cony, CILXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0550 on 16Sep 44, LXKXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

In the Stolberg Corridor American tanks and infantry assembled

during the night between Mausbach and Diepenlinchen while heavy

American artillery fire hit the area north of Mausbach and the

vicinity of Eschweiler. The Germans also reported American tanks

southwest of Schevenhuette and at a hunting lodge south of Zweifall

(LXXIV Corpo). From these signs the Germans predicted "a very wide

push north and northeastward" at daybreak aimed toward Eschweiler.*

' ib

51

U " L ?1 I I E B

Tel Conv, L;XCI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0325 on 16 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Mg Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 0520 on16 Sep 44, L.KXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

At Mausbach and Weissenberg Hill there was little American

ground activity during the morning. The Germans stopped some re-

connaissance patrols probing northeastward from Mausbach toward

IWerth and Gressenich.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 1400 on 16 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Noon Sitrep, LXXI Corps, 1445 on 16Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; TVX, 9th Pz Div to LXXXICorps, 2100 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

Early in the morning of 16 September the eagerly awaited first

elements of 12th Infantry Division arrived. The situation was now

too critical for LXXXI Corps to keep its promise to Colonel Engel

to give him an opportunity for assembling his entire division before

it was committed. In view of the American penetration in the

Verlautenheide - Atsch area and the imminently expected drive on

Eschweiler, General Schack ordered the 27th Fusilier Regiment to

go into action straight from the railroad station. As soon as its

1st Battalion and antitank company had detrained at Juelich, they

were moved to the Verlautenheide area by all military and civilian

means of transport available -- personnel carriers, mail trucks,

buses, and the like. The 3d Battalion, arriving in Dueren, 're-

ceived orders to move from Eschweiler to the edge of the woods

southwest of Schwarzenbruch (Wuerseler Forest). The 12th Infanty

.3 5 f. 9 <r g ^ .

AUS]FIFP 52

Division artillery was not expected until 2200 on 16 September.

Until then the 27th Fusiliers had to rely on co-operation with

9th and 116th Panzer Division artillery.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0850 on 16 Sep 44, andOrder, LIXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1015 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI CorpsKTB, Kampfverlauf.

In the sector of 116th Panzer Division the counterattack of

the 27th Fusilier Regiment took U.S. VII Corps forces by surprise

and was successful. The 1st Battalion pushed the American spear-

head out of Verlautenheide and captured the strategically important

high ground around this village. The battalion continued its drive

toward Eilendorf and recaptured most of the bunkers along the

Verlautenheide - Eilendorf road. Before reaching Eilendorf,

however, the attack bogged down in the face of American resistance.*

Tel Conv, ULXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1800 on 16 Sep 44, andTel Conv, IX!XI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2130 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

Shortly after noon on 16 September the Americans resumed their

drive toward Eschweiler. A two-pronged attack from west and south

converged on Buesbach, capturing the village. American forces

exerted pressure against the Stolberg area with attacks on Hamm,

Schneidmuehle, Muensterbusch and the southern outskirts of Stolberg

itself.

From the salient at Mausbach and VYeissenberg Hill U.S. armor

jumped off in a northerly and northeasterly direction. In bitter

U CLASS F ED

tV.iI

tank battles which lasted throughout the afternoon VII Corps forces

achieved their deepest penetration of the Stolberg Corridor to

date when they captured Diepenlinchen and Gressenich, Krewinkel and

Schevenhuette. *

Evg Sitrep, LKXXI Corps, 1700 on 16 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep,L XXI Corps, 2140 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen;T'X, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 16 Sep 44, IXXXI Corps KTB,Meldungen der Div.

The 3d Battalion of 27th Fusilier Regiment had moved rapidly

through Escbweiler toward the endangered Stolberg area. The batta-

lion captured Atsch at 1330.* Continuing south, the battalion was

Evg Sitrep, LDXXXI Corps, 1700 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

able to regain control of Buesbach -- but only for a few hours.

By evening Buesbach was once more American. In the face of the

strong American assault in the Stolberg Corridor the forces of

27th Fusilier Reginnt did not suffice to re-establish a coherent

German front from Stolberg to Zweifall and to wipe out the American

bridgeheads across the Vicht River. The big German countertnrust

had to wait until 12th Infantry Division could move its own artil-

lery and its other two infantry regiments into the combat area.

In the meantime 27th Fusilier Regiment could do no more than seal

off the latest American penetrations with the aid of the remaining

elements of 9th Panzer Division. In view of the very critical

&" vuA fl E

54

situation in this sector German forces were consolidated under

one coTrland.

Renamed Kampfgruppe Sperling, the remaining elements of 9th

Panzer Division temporarily lost their division status. Effective

2000 on 16 September, Kampfgruppe Sperling was attached to 12th

Infantry Division with the proviso that its forces would be re-

leased once 12th Infantry Division was fully committed.*

Tel Cony, XXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1725 on 16 Sep 44,-L I I Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Order, LXXXI Corps to all divs,2000 on 16 Sep 44, LX..XI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.; Report, GenBrandenberger to A Gp B, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle:Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.

There was another motive for attaching the elements of 9thPanzer Division to 12th Infantry Division. In the morning of 16September 1944 General Brandenberger had visited the 9th PanzerDivision command post and had asked routine questions regardingthe German G-2 estimate of the American situation in the divisionsector, the location of the 9th Panzer Division front lines, dis-position and strength of 9th Panzer Division forces, etc. Inattempting to answer these auestions General Mueller revealed him-self as ignorant of the situation in his own sector, whereuponGeneral Brandenberger relieved him of his command on a charge ofincompetence.

The senior regimental commander, Colonel Max Sperling, assumedcommand of 9th Panzer Division until evening of 16 September.

In this study the designation 9th Panzer Division will con-tinue to be used in reference to these units.

Colonel Engel now commanded the former sector of 9th Panzer

Division from the Verlautenheide area to the LDXXI Corps southern

boundary. By capturing the strategic high ground of Verlautenheide,

12th Infantry.Division had established a coherent front on its

right and had firm contact with 116th Panzer Division. On the left,

however, the German flank lay exposed all the way to Schevenhuette.

L~eSS~ h

The most important immediate task was to establish contact with the

northern wing of 353d Infantry Division in the Zweifall - Huertgen

area. The combat mission of 12th Infantry Division .was to launch

a major counterattacx from the Eschweiler - Wenau line to regain the

second band of West Wall fortifications from Geisberg Hill to Zweifall.*

Order, LXI Corps to all divs, 2000 on 16 Sep 44, LXXXI CorpsKTB, Befehle an Div.

South of Aachen, minor American attacks toward the city on 16

September were warded off by the 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.

A small American penetration south of Steinebrueck was wiped out

when the 453d Replacement Training Battalion counterattacked late

in the day and recaptured two bunkers.*

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 16 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tages-meldungen; Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 2350 on 16 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

Police and Party had returned to Aachen during the night from

14 to 15 September, and the evacuation was once more in full swing.

General von Schwerin was in big trouble. When U.S. forces had failed

to capture the city contrary to his expectatior( his compromising

letter to the American comrander had fallen into the hands of Nazi

officials. Because of boththis letter and his effort to stop the

chaotic exodus from Aachen, von Schwerin was relieved of his command

and ordered to stand trial before Hitler's "People's Court." Rather

I N AS S IF I

56

than comply, von Schwerin decided to remain with his division until

the fall of Aachen. He felt that his men would know how to protect

nim against Nazi henchmen. While his senior regimental commander,

General Voigtsberger, assumed the duties of division commander until

the arrival of General von Waldenburg, von Schierin hid out in a

farmer's home in Kohlscheid, northeast of Laurensberg. The recon-

naissance platoon of 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment s~urrounded the

farmhouse with a cordon of machine guns. No police detachment

trying to arrest their division commander would have escaped alive.

WVhen the capture of Aachen did not materialize, General von Schwerin

finally decided to present himself at Seventh. Army headquarters to

appear before a military court.*

Report, FM Yodel to OB 1VEST, 2330 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; Tel Cony, G-1 to G-3, IXXI Corps, 1045 on 16Sep 44,. and Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 1945 on 17 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; 201-File on Generalleutnant GrafGerhard von Schwerin; ETHINT 18 (Schwerin).

Apparently Field Marshal von Rundstedt interceded on Generalvon Schwerin's behalf and even proposed -- in vain -- that the latterbe reinstated as Commanding General of 116th Panzer Division. Aftersome months in the OK Officer Pool [doghouse], von Schwerin wasappointed Commanding Officer of 90th Panzer Grenadier Division andlater Commanding General of LX~II Panzer Corps in Italy.

Early in the morning of 17 September the 27th Fusilier Regiment

of 12th Infantry Division, committed in the Verlautenheide - Stolberg

area, resumed its attack to regain the West Wall positions southeast

of Eilendorf. In this endeavor the regiment failed. After gaining

insignificant ground and recapturing a few bunkers, the regiment

bogged down in the face of heavy American artillery fire and suffered

U#GLF ° IED

57

UNCLASSIFIED

considerable casualties. It also ran short of ammunition and was

forced to assume a defensive role for the rest of the day. In the

defense it was more successful. Its 1st Battalion strengthened the

contact with 116th Panzer Division at Verlautenheide, while the 3d

Battalion, on the left, came to the aid of the remaining elements

of 9th Panzer Division and 105th Panzer Brigade who had orders to

hold Stolberg at all cost. Between Verlautenheide and Stolberg the

27th Fusilier Regiment, 9th Panzer Division and 105th Panzer Brigade

repulsed all American attacks launched from the Eilendorf area on

17 September and thus enabled the other regiments of 12th Infantry

Division to carry out their counterthrust against the Mausbach salient

without danger to their right flank.*

Tel Convs, LXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0845, 1150, 1340, and1610 on 17 Sep 44, L2MXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, C CXICorps, 1620 on 17 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2145 on 17Sep 44, LKXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; MS # A-971 (Engel).

During the morning hours of 17 September first the 48th and

shortly afterwards the 89th Grenadier Regiments detrained in Dueren.

With these forces 12th Infantry Division was supposed to recapture

Mausbach and to restore a coherent German front from Stolberg to

Zweifall.*

Tel Cony, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 1150 on 17 Sep 44, LXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

The 89th Grenadier Regiment received orders to assemble southeast

of Eschweiler and to launch its attack via Hastenrath - Scherpenseel

PAC~ 'ITD

II t

toward Werth, Weissenberg Hill and Diepenlinchen. The mission of

48th Grenadier Regiment was to move through Heistern - Venau - Hamich,

and to jump off from Hamich toward Gressenich and Krewinkel, capture

Mausbach and reach the Stolberg - Vicht road.*

MS # A-971 (Engel).

According to orders the 48th Grenadier Regiment jumped off from

Hamich and captured Gressenich, holding it against immediate American

counterattacks from the direction of Schevenhuette.* The battalion

Evg Sitrep, tLCXI Corps, 1620 on 17 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep,LXXXI Corps, 2145 on 17 Sep 44, LXWXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

on the left attacked toward Krewinkel but ran into determined re-

sistance and developed a temporary ammunition shortage so that it

was forced to halt its attack.* The battalion on the right, driving

Tel Conv, IXKXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1305 on 17 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

toward the Mausbach - Diepenlinchen line, had a stroke of unusually

good luck. At a point halfway between Mausbach and Diepenlinchen

it smashed into the flank of an American attack launched from Mausbach

apparently in the general direction of Eschweiler. Coming from an

unexpected direction the assault took the Americans by surprise.

The 48th Grenadier Regiment was able to knock out nine U.S. tanks

and to capture fifty-seven Americans including one colonel (a

4NLAASSJtFEP

}

59

regimental commander, according to German sources). But after

achieving this success the German attack bogged down just east of

Diepenlinchen in the face of tenacious American resistance.*

Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2145 on 17 Sep 44, LEXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; MS # A-971 (Engel).

The 89th Grenadier Regiment had meanwhile launched its attack

from the Hastenrath - Scherpenseel area. Instead of waiting foronly

all its forces to assemble there, it umped off at noon with/one

battalion in order to meet the threatening American drive on Eschweiler.

The battalion pushed south through ,Werth; in exceedingly bitter

fighting it captured Weissenberg Hill at 1330 and reached the eastern

periphery of Diepenlinchen an hour later. There it also encountered

such strong American resistance that its attack bogged down.*

Sitrep, 12th Inf Div to LXXI Corps, 1340 on 17 Sep 44, and TelCony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1535 on 17 Sep 44, LXX{I CorpsKTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, ILXII Corps, 1620 on 17 Sep 44, andDaily Sitrep, LXI Corps,2145 on 17 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; MS # A-971 (Engel).

In view of strong American pressure from Krewinkel and probably

also the threat to its left flank from Schevenhuette and the 1Wenau

Forest (U.S. 9th Infantry Division), 12th Infantry Division decided

to shift its weight from right to left and to make its main effort

through Krewinkel rather than through Diepenlinchen. Permission was

asked and granted to call off the attack while the German forces

U CLASS IFt 60

regrouped.*

Tel Convs, IXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1610 and 1730 on 17Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

By this time the second battalion of 89th Grenadier Regiment

and additional artillery and antitank forces had arrived on the

battlefield.* Thus reinforced the Germans resumed their attack

Tel Cony, 3DOL I Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1940 on 17 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXCXI Corps, 2145 on 17 Sep44, I~OI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

at dusk. The main effort drive on the left pushed through the

Krewinkel woods into Krewinkel, while on tne right the forces pressing

south from Veissenberg Hill and the vicinity of Diepenlinchen

penetrated the northern part of Mausbach. This achieved, 12th Infantry

Division halted for tne night.* On 18 September 27th Fusilier

Tel Cony, L~I Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2230 on 17 Sep 44,LXCI Corns KTB, Kampfverlauf.

Regiment was to continue its efforts to capture additional bunkers

near Muensterbusch, while the 89th Grenadier Regiment, which had

suffered heavy casualties, would regroup and hold its line.*

MS -# A-971 (Engel).

The day's events proved that 12th Infantry Division would not

find it easy to dislodge the Americans from their salient beyond the

3s rs

61

Schill Line, Once tney had recovered from tne initial surprise of

being nit by unexpectedlyr formidable German forces, the Americans

lost no time before launching powerful, well-supported counterattacks.

After American artillery had shot the Germans out of Mausbach and

Diepenlinchen during the night, two American task forces launched

an attack at midnight from tne M.ausbach area toward Stolberg.

,'hile a hail of artillery fire pounded the 1st Battalion of 48th

Grenadier Regiment east of Tausbach with apparent intent to secure

the American right flank, U.S. forces advanced to tne southern and

southeastern outskirts of Stolberg. They captured Hamn.erberg Hill,

Burghoizerhof, and the W'est 5Wall bunkers along the Vicht River as

far as Dinsfeld at 000 and continued their drive toward Donnerberg

Hill.*

Tel Conv, LLXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0400 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXICorrs KTB, IFampfverlauf; Mng Sitrep, LX2XI Corps, 0605 on 18 Sep44, 1DX.I Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 19 Sep44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

Another U.S. combat command jumped off toward Stolberg frca

the Brander Forest and drove as far as the church in Muensterbusch,

just west of Stolberg.* Perceiving the threatening double envelopment

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1500 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kanpfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, LCXXI Corps, 1625 on 18 Sep 44,DOO Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

of Stolberg, Colonel Engel decided not to continue the Mausbach -

Krewinkel attack (which no longer looked like an easy thing, anyway)

ii:>IHF

62

in the morning of 18 September, but rather to shift his main effort

against the Americans driving on Stolberg. LXXI Corns irnediately

approved his new intentions.*

Tel Convs, LXXXI Coros to 12th Inf Div, 0400 and 0425 on 18Sep 44, LXJDI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

As a result German resistance in the Stolberg area stiffened.

Though the Germans were unable to gain more than insignificant

ground, they successfully stopped all American attacks. During the

morning the 27th Fusilier Regiment repulsed a minor American attack

against Verlautenheide, while German artillery hit U.S. positions

on Geisberg Hill. The American drive on Donnerberg Hill was thrown

back with heavy losses; the German counterattack recaptured two

bunkers on Hammerberg Hill. The Germans in Stolberg also repulsed

an American attack against the southern periphery of the town at

1200, but not before some streets of Stolberg had become a battle-

ground for the first time.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1500 on 18 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, L=0XI Corps, 1625 on 18Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

Near Diepenlinchen on 18 Septemberlmerican forces badly mauled

the 89th Grenadier Regiment. Its 1st Battalion had orders to attack

through Diepenlinchen and penetrate the woods west of that village.

Earlier in the morning strong American forces had moved into

UNC IF 63

Diepenlinchen after U.S. artillery had swept the Germans out of

there. The Ist Battalion suffered very heavy casualties in the face

of the American batteries. After a bitter battle the Germans suc-

ceeded in capturing Diepenlinchen again, but under murderous artil-

lery fire their attack bogged down just west of the village. Relentless

American fire reduced the 1st Battalion of the 89th Grenadier Regiment

to one hundred men -- about a fifth of its initial combat strength.*

Mng Sitrep, LKXII Corps, 0605 on 18 Sep 44, and Evg Sitrep,LXXXI Corps, 1625 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; TelCony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1500 on 18 Sep 44, LXIXI CorpsKTB, Kampfverlauf.

At 1730 an American counterattack was able to capture Diepenlinchen

once more. An American attack from Schevenhuette tovward Gressenich

was repulsed.*

Daily Sitrep, LXXI Corps, a 00 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 19 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Tagesme ldungen.

According to MSS # A-971 (Engel) and B-816 (Schack) the 2dBattalion of the 48th Grenadier Regiment launcned an attack towardSchevenhuette just before dawn on 18 September and surprised Americantroops there just as they were being relieved by new forces. Thusthe Germans were able to capture Schevenhuette in furious house-to -house and hand-to-hand fighting. By an immediate counterattack,however, the Americans surrounded the two German companies inSchevenhuette; the Germans dug in but were unable to hold out. Aftersuffering heavy losses, they finally fought their way back to their

own lines. By evening Schevenhuette was in American hands againand continued to threaten the flank of 12th Infantry Division.

The story of the above operation has been relegated to thisfootnote because the writer entertains serious doubt as to whetherit ever took place. It seems highly probable that Generals Schackand Engel, on whose postwar accounts this story is based, confusedit with a very similar operation which definitely took place on 22

~~~LA6 6ME

Ei 1 ) &6# F

September. The German contemporary documents contain no record ofany German operations in Schevenhuette on 18 September beyond onesolitary hint, in one document, of a later date, which speaks of"... losses sustained in Schevenhuette on 18 September...." Butfor this single straw, the writer would have simply dismissed thestory as one of many historical inaccuracies to be found in theGerman postwar accounts -- and it may well be just thatL

In the evening of 18 September the 12th Infantry Division front

line extended from the southern periphery of Verlautenheide - Harmm -

western edge of Stolberg - Hammerberg Hill - Niederhof - Weissenberg

Hill - Gressenich.* By evening the division had also assembled its

Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2100 on 18 Sep 44, LIXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

fusilier battalion and its engineer battalion. The attack on

Diepenlinchen would continue -- "perhaps a regrouping period of

twenty-four hours will be required first...."*

Tel Cony, LXXI Corps to Col Engel, 2045 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf. /

Late in the evening of 18 September the Germans outlined their

plan for further operations against the Mausbach salient. Since

Stolberg was the key to 12th Infantry Division operations, all

elements of 9th Panzer Division would be comnitted against the

American forces w"ich had penetrated the factory areas north and

west of Stolberg. After careful reconnaissance the 12th Infantry

Division engineer battalion would jump off at daybreak on 20 September

1944 through the woods toward Schevenhuette.

MOW.~lSE

UNCLASSIFE B65

With both flanks (Stolberg and Schevenhuette) thus secured,

both battalions of 89th Grenadier Regiment were to attack south-

westward across Diepenlinchen. The Fusilier Battalion supported by

ten PAnthers would proceed southeast from the Stolberg area and

wheel into the West Wall toward Mausbach. Then all forces were to

converge and attack along the West Wall (Vicht River) toward Zweifall.*

Tel Cony, LXXII Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2230 on 18 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

On the Aachen front American forces made no serious attacks

toward the city on 17 and 18 September. Aside frema minor attacks

at Steinebrueck and Burtscheid, which were repulsed by 116th Panzer

Division, they contented themselves with an almost ceaseless barrage

of artillery fire against German positions in and around the city.

The scene of American operations against 116th Panzer Division was

shifting northward where U.S. XIX Corps was engaged in its effort

to envelop Aachen from the north [Cf.: Chapter IV]. The division's

armor situation was improved on 18 September by the addition of

fifteen assault guns of the 902d Assault Gun Brigade. The division

also counted a new American jeep among its vehicles -- a German

prisoner of war had escaped his captors in the stolen jeep. No

doubt the man was cock of the walk in his company that day.*

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 17 Sep 44, and 1925 on 18 Sep 44,IXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

U CLASSFIE

66

The events of 19 September 1944 -- similar to many days of

fighting on the Western Front -- were shaped by the fact that the

Germans were in the habit of attacking early in the morning, while

the Americans chose the afternoon to launch their operations.

The main actions of the day took place in the Stolberg area.

At 1100 forces of 9th Panzer Division and 12th Infantry Division were

able to recapture the factory belt west of Stolberg as well as three

bunkers on Hammerberg Hill southeast of that town. Sporadic fighting

in the area continued past noon.*

Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1200 on 19 Sep 44, LMXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Evg Sitrep, LXXI Corps, 1620 on 19 Sep 44,LXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

Shortly thereafter the Americans began the usual very heavy

artillery preparation signalling their impending attack. The American

operation in the afternoon of 19 September was two-pronged and aimed

at an envelopment of Stolberg. On the [American] left strong infantry

and armor jumped off from a Muensterbusch - Buesbach base line in

a northeasterly direction toward Stolberg. This attack succeeded

in recapturing the factory area and in achieving some penetrations

in the western part of Stolberg proper. On the [American] right

other U.S. forces launched their attack from the woods northwest

of Mausbach and captured Niederhof, Burgholzerhof, and some buners

on Hammerberg Hill. In the face of heavy American artillery fire

ranging as far as Hastenrath elements of one 12th Infantry Division

battalion and six Panthers launched a flanking counterattack from

~M@%BSI LU

INCLASSFIED

the woods southwest of Hastenrath and drove down the road via

Hochwegerhof toward Niederhof.*

Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1800 and 2010 on 19Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Knmpfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps,2215 on 19 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

This counterattack apparently was less than successful, for

during the night American troops supported by five tanks were able

to extend their gains northeastward when they captured Hochwegerhof

(about one mile north of Diepenlinchen) at 0200 on 20 September.*

Mng Sitrep, LXXI Corps, 20 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

West of Stolberg, on the other hand, the see-saw battle con-

tinued: late in the evening of 19 September German troops managed

to retake three bunkers. Two of these were located near the rail-

road running along the southeastern edge of the W'uerseler Forest

(just east of Hamm and Kohlbusch) while the third was at the western

end of that forest.*

Ibid.

sectorThe Aachen/was rather quiet on 19 September. Early in the morning

116th Panzer Division reported increased American reconnaissance

activity northwest of Rothe Erde, but aside from that the Americansartillery

limited themselves to harassing/fire against the German MLR and rear

iL L HA

68

areas for the remainder of the day.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div, 0415 on 19 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kanpfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 2215 on19 Sep 44, 3X1 Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

All day on 19 September the fate of the 12th Infantry Division

counterattack, planned for the morrow, hung in the balance. For

one thing, the division faced a serious ammunition shortage.

Delivery of at least 6,100 rounds of 105-mm. ammunition was essential

before the division could carry out its projected attack. Since

LXKXI Corps was unable to supply this ammunition, it turned to

Seventh Army for help. The army transport officer reported that

an ammunition supply train was expected at Dueren during the night

fran 19 to 20 September, but that its contents were unknown.*

Tel Conv, LX:XXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0200 on 19 Sep 44, andTel Convs, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps, 0310 and 04)0 on 19 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

It is not clear whether or not this train evetually helpedto ease the shortage, since the attack was called off, anyway, andthe reasons are complex, involving, among other factors, a changein command at the corps command level.

To complicate matters further, 9th Panzer Division, whose forces

were needed to help restore the situation around Eilendorf, was

short of fuel. Nevertheless, in the evening of 19 September plans

still called for 12th Infantry Division to go ahead with its attack,

although General Schack remarked that "the attack by 12th Infantry

Division tomorrow morning will have little success."*

UNCLASS SEC

69

Tel Convs, Gen Schack to CofS, LXXXI Corps, 1100 and 2230 on19 Sep 44, and LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2010 on 19 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

In addition to its other problems 12th Infantry Division already

faced a personnel shortage. In the morning of 20 September Colonel

Engel oriented his new corps commander, General der Infanterie

Friedrich J. M. Koechling* about the situation. In stressing the

On 20 September 1944 General Schack was relieved as commanderof LYJKI Corps (in connection with the Schwerin affair) and was re-placed by General Koechling.

gravity of his situation, Colonel Engel stated that only four

hundred men of the 89th Grenadier Regiment were still available for

the defense of the sector east of Stolberg. One engineer company

of 12th Infantry Division, intended to close the gap near Duffenter

(American salient at Hochwegerhof) had not arrived and its where-

abouts were still unknown.

In view of the critical operational and logistical situation

the new corps commander countermanded General Schack's order for a

large-scale 12th Infantry Division attack on 32 September and stated

that, "in view of the heavy losses sustained and the mightymaterial

superiority of the enemy, he will, in the future, order an attack

only when it promises more success; aside from that the main mission

will be to hold the line and to avoid unnecessary losses."*

Tel Cony, Gen Koechling to. Col Engel, 0700 on 2u Sep 44, LXXIICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

K, 6 L lEPE

UN ~iiPFEDf 70

All nignt long American medium and heavy guns shot harassing

fire against the entire LXXI Corps sector. In the sector of ll6th

Panzer Division an American combat patrol, favored by the early morning

mist, attached the German MLR south of Burtscheid at 0800 on 20

September and was repulsed. Aside from that, action in the Aachen

sector was again limited to an artillery duel which lasted all day.*

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 20 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

Between Muensterbusch and Gressenich the forces of 12th Infantry

Division spent a very busy day trying to defeat American endeavors

to envelop Stolberg and to push further up the Stolberg Corridor

toward Es chwe ii er.

American operations on 20 September began with an armored in-

fantry drive from Diepen±inchen northeastward toward Werth. Fearing

a penetration at the boundary between 89th and 48th Grenadier Regiments,

Colonel Engel ordered an immediate counterattack. This attack,

launched at noon on a fairly broad front, succeeded not only in

turning back the American attack toward Werth but also in closing

the gap between Stolberg and Duffenter and sealing off the American

penetration at Hochwegerhof east of Duffenter. The 12th Infantry

Division established a coherent front line from the southern edge

of Stolberg - Duffenter - eastward on tne Duffenter-Werth road as

far as Hochwegerhof - southward to Weissenberg - southern periphery

of Gressenich - northern periphery of Schevenhuette.*

UJJ U L AlED

IIEC LAS-SltL1

Tel Convs, LXXXI Carps to 12th Inf Div, 1140 and 1400 on 20Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps,2155 on 20 Sep 44, I3XI Corps KTB, Tsgesmeldungen..

Later in the afternoon American forces embarked on the inevitable

daily assault on Stolberg. Again they attacked on both sides of the

German-held town. West of Stolberg American forces achieved a

penetration at the site of the Stolberg Gun Factory. Driving north-

ward from the Buesbach area American tanks and infantry attacked

Donnerberg Hill, held by one and a half companies of the 12th

Engineer Battalion.* The engineers were able to halt the American

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1845 on 3) Sep 44, DIXICorps KTB, Kampfrerlauf.

attack at first, but soon U.S. forces had thrown a ring around

Donnerberg Hill. Two German combat patrols, one from the northwest,

the other from the northeast tried to crack this ring but failed.

American forces fanned out from Donnerberg Hill: U.S. infantry at-

tacked from Donnerberg Hill westward toward Stolberg while U.S.

tanks sat on the western slope of the hill spewing fire at the city

below.*

Tel Cony, .XXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2010 on 20 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

In the meantime other American forces had driven north from

the vicinity of Muensterbusch and soon their tanks were plowing up

6, L A IS'E

72

the small vegetable gardens west of the Stolberg factory belt.* As

Tel Conv, LIXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 2010 on 20 Sep 44,LXKII Corps KT B, Kampfverlauf.

The gardens mentioned were in all likelihood smal "Victory"type gardens cultivated by factory workers and owned communally.This institutuon is found all over Germany in peace and war and iscalled "Schrebergarten."

the day changed to night, American troops entered Stolberg, and the

situation developed into confused, disorganized house-to-house

fighting in the city.*

Ibid.

At dawn on 21 September American armor was observed assembling

south of Donnerberg Hill preparatory to a renewal of the attack.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 0700 on 21 Sep 44, LiXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

When it came the Germans were ready and stopped the American attack,

launched mostly by infantry with some tanks in support, at 0800.*

Ibid.; Noon Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1120 on 21 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

Two hours later U.S. forces in battalion strength attacked

northeastward toward Duffenter. In conjunction with this drive

American troops captured the remaining bunkers on Hammerberg

CU NLA SS fIE

Hill.* With this strategic height in American hands, southern

Noon Sitrep, LXXXI Corps, 1120 an 21 Sep 44, LIXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Tel Conv, LXXXI Corps to Col Engel, 1530 on 21 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Kampf erlauf.

According to the 9th Panzer Division official report on theBattle of Stolberg, 23 September 1944, IXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungender Div., U.S. forces on 0- September 1944 had knocked out eight ofthe twelve bunkers on Hammerberg Hill by means of demolition chargesand heaviest caliber artillery fire. In most instances the bunkershad had to be destroyed along withtheir garrisons, which had refusedto surrender.

Stolberg was extremely vulnerable to a U.S. assault from the east.

In the event that the southern half of the town could not be held,

the German forces in Stolberg (9th Panzer Division with attached

units) proceeded to establish a switch position across the center

of the town, from the Stolberg Mill west of Stolberg cutting across

tne town to the road junction southwest of Duffenter.

The Germans were able to repulse one attack against the southern

edge of Stolberg and knocked out two U.S. tanks in the process.

Late in the afternoon the expected major attack came out of the east,

and came so fast that the forces of 9th Panzer Division (Kampfgruppe

Volker) in the southern part of Stolberg were cut off before they had

had a chance to withdraw northward to the switch position. In very

bitter fighting in the streets of Stolberg these elennts finally

battled their way out of the pocket and joined Kampfgruppe Schemm

at the defense line cutting across Stolberg.

Half of Stolberg was now in U.S. hands and the attacks, mounting

in intensity, continued into the evening. West of the town strong

L A L U~sE

I NO P. L A S I F I F ;

74

American forces achieved new penetrations in the factory belt while

to the east the Americans gained the western slope of Donnerberg

Hill -- as on the previous day -- and immediately wheeled northwestward

to attack the switch position which barred their way into northern

Stolberg.

American successes on both sides of Stolberg threatened to

envelop the Stolberg .ill - Duffenter Line, and the Germans feared

the final collapse of their Stolberg front. Later in the evening

the American envelopment (especially the prong west of Stolberg)

forced them to withdraw to a new switch line cutting across the

northern sector of Stolberg from the vicinity of Schneidmuehle-Atsch

soutneastward to the village of Donnerberg.*

This account of operations in the Stolberg area on 21 September1944 is based on the following sources:

Tel Convs, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1530 and 2015 on 21Sep 44, LUXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, IXXXI Corps,21 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Off Rpt on Battle ofStolberg, 9th Panzer Div, 23 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungender Div.

South of Aachen the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 116th

Panzer Division consolidated its defense line on 21 September to

free some reserves. The front line of the regiment was re-establishe d

to extend from Vaelser Quartier (probably point of contact pdth

60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment) - half a mile north of Hill 321 -

half a mile north-northeast of the Steinebrueck railroad station.

This move disengaged the 453d Replacement Training Battalion which

was to take over a part of the 12th Infantry Division sector in

accordance with LXXXI Corps orders. In relieving the 1st Battalion

of 27th Fusilier Regiment, 453d Replacement Training Battalion of

116th Panzer Division took over the sector from Verlautenheide to

the railroad overpass one mile west-southwest of Verlautenheide in

the evening of 21 September. From there the LXXI Corps front line

continued past the northern edge of the Stolberg factory belt, along

the switch position across northern Stolberg to the northern edge

of Donnerberg Hill; from there via Duffenter along the Duffenter-

Werth road to half a mile west of Werth - Weissenberg Hill - western

and southern edge of Gressenich - nortnern edge of Schevenhuette.

The new boundary line between 116th Panzer and lath Infantry

Divisions extended, in the combat zone, from Eschweiler (12th Infantry

Division) via the railroad overpass one mile west-southwest of

Verlautenheide to Brand (116th Panzer Division*

TMng Sitrep, LIXXXI Corps, 0525 on 21 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep,116th Pz Div, 1925 on 21 Sep 44, and Daily Sitrep, LIXXI Corps, 21Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; TVX, LKXXI Corps to 116thPz Div, 1520 on 21 Sep 44, and TRX, LXXXI Corps to all divs,1515 on 21 Sep 44, L=XXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.

Immediately following its relief by the 453d Replacement Training

Battalion, the 1st Battalion of 27th Fusilier Regiment was moved by

motor transport to Eschweiler where it was to assemble for a counter-

attack, to be launched out of movement with intent to close the gap

between Stolberg and Donnerberg. During the night considerable

reconnaissance activity took place on both sides. The Germans spottedin

numbers of U.S. tanks everywhere and noted much digging/and improvement

'I CLA S IFIE D

tiSM B A 76

of positions in the vicinity of Hochwegerhof and Niederhof.* At

Daily Sitrep, 12th Inf Div, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Report, 12th Inf Div to ICXXI Corps, 0430 on 22 Sep44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

0330 12th Infantry Division repulsed an attack by five U.S. armored

cars against Bunker 708 on Donnerberg Hill. Panzerfaust destroyed

two. of the armored cars.*

Mng Sitrep, LXXI I Corps, 0505 on 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tage smedungen.

At 0730 on 22 September one American armored company (one tank

and a few armored cars) was able to exploit the early morning fog

to bypass the Stolberg switch position between Stolberg and Donnerberg

and to push north as far as Zinkhuette (zinc mine) and Birkengang

east of Stolberg.*

Noon Sitrep, 12th Inf Div, 1120 on 22 Sep 44, and aily Sitrep,12th Inf Div, 22 Sep 44, LIXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Off Rpt,Battle of Stolberg, 9th Pz Div, 23 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungender Div.

At the same time, U.S. forces launched repeated attacks with

about fifty tanks from the south, southwest, and southeast toward

Duffenter and the southern slope of Donnerberg Hill. After the un-

successful attempt earlier in the morning to capture Bunker 708, ten

U.S. tanks lumbered up to tne bunker and surrounded it. They stayed

there for several hours without being able to crack the pillbox.

U L ASIFIEP

NAL ASSIf IE 077

Massed German artillery fire finally destro.red one tank and forced

the rest to withdraw. German fire was also effective against

American assemblies south and southwest of Donnerberg Hill.*

Ibid.

The Germans who had but one Panther and one assault gun on

Donnerberg Hill this morning were afraid the counterattack of 1st

Battalion, 27th Fusilier Regiment, would come too late to plug the

gap. The 9th Panzer Division cried for antitank weapons. This

division, which had been promised relief days ago, was still de-

fending the battered ruins of Stolberg as best it could; it took a

terrible beating in the process. In only forty hours -- from 1800

on 20 September until 1200 on 22 September 1944 -- the division had

lost 841 men, 18 of whom were officers.*

Tel Cony, LXXI Corps to 9th Pz Div, 0850 on 22 Sep 44, LXXXICorps K B, Karnpfverlauf; Sitrep, 9th Pz Div to LXXXI Corps, 22 Sep44, LXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen der Div.

At noon on 22 September the factory belt west of Stolberg was

once again in American hands. With its last reserves 9th Panzer

Division established an antitank defense line facing west and running

parallel to the main streets of Stolberg. American attacks at

Don nerberg and southwest of Duffenter continued.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1230 on 22 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

w LV

SSIHi78

In the nick of time the reinforced 1st Battalion of 27th

Fusilier Regiment arrived from its assembly area at Eschweiler and

in a surprise attack descended on the U.S. forces which had penetrated

to Zinkhuette and Birkengang early in the morning. Attacking at

1300 the German battalion jumped off from the woods east of Birkengang

on a broad front toward Birkengang and the village of Donnerberg.

Despite heavy American fire the Germans were able to recapture these

places rapidly and to continue their attack against the Americans

on the western slope of Donnerberg Hill.* Once more 12th Infantry

Evg Sitrep, CLXXI Corps, 1630 on 22 Sep 44, L;KI Corps KTB,Tagesmeldungen; Daily Sitrep, 12th Inf Div, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI CorpsKTB, Tagesmeldungen.

Division defended a coherent front line.

All through the afternoon American forces continued to hurl

themselves against the German line, but in vain. Jumping off at

1430 U.S. forces attacked from the south into the city at Stolberg.

The exhausted elements of 9th Panzer Division were able to repulse

them in bitter street fighting. At 1700 twelve U.S. tanks renewed

their efforts to break through the switch position in the city and

achieved a local penetration. But on the whole the Germans held

fast. On that day they inflicted on the Americans the loss of ten

tanks, two armored cars, and two 210-mm. self-propelled guns in the

Stolberg soctor.*

Daily Sitrep, 12th Inf Div, and Daily Sitrep, LXXXI Corps,22 Sep 44, ;II Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B,0315 on 23 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

'1Bek~~sEm.

79

While the battle for Stolberg reached a climax in intensity,

the central sector of the 12th Infantry Division front was quiet

except for a German artillery barrage aimed at smashing U.S. con-

centrations in the Diepenlinchen - Mausbach area.* At the eastern

Tel Conv, DLXI Corps to 12th Tnf Div, 1230 on 22 Sep 44,LIXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

end of the front, however, fighting was as bitter as in Stolberg,

with the difference that here the Americans, on the defensive, also

demonstrated the ability to stand their ground and to inflict

terrific punishment on the attacking enemy.

Before dawn on 22 September the 2d Battalion of 48th Grenadier

Regiment had jumped off from Gressenich on a mission to wipe out

the American bridgehead at Schevenhuette.* Following a thorough

See footnote, pp. 63 - 64.

artillery preparation the two German infantry companies executed

an elaborate enveloping maneuver and attacked Schevenhuette from

the northeast and southeast. The American outposts on the eastern

perimeter of the village offered such tenacious resistance that the

Germans had to kill them to the last man. Upon penetrating the

eastern part of the village, the Germans were immediately engaged

in such bitter and bloody fighting that they sustained murderous

losses. VT.hen all efficers of the battalion had been killed or wounded,

the Germans were forced to discontinue the attack and to withdraw

CLASSFE 0~

ufc 3ass .IFED 80

from the eastern part of Schevenhuette, which they had briefly

captured. Back in Gressenich the survivors reported that U.S.

forces had converted Schevenhuette into a veritable fortress, fully

secured by minefields and barbed wire and tenaciously defended by

600 - 700 men.*

Daily Sitrep, 12th Inf Div, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB,Tage smel dungen.

On the basis of this experience General Koechling decided that

the gap between Gressenich and the boundary with LXXIV Corps merited

special attention. The arrival several days earlier of 183d Volks

Grenadier Division and its commitment in the Geilenkirchen area on

the northern wing of LXXXI Corps made it possible to disengage the

remaining elements of 275th Infantry Division and to commit them,

somewhat reinforced, to close the gap on the corps' southern wing.*

Tel Conv, Seventh Army to L=XXI Corps, 1130 on 17 Sep 44, L0XICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Daily Sitrep, L=XI Corps, 22 Sep 44,LXXXI Corps KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

The 275th Infantry Division (Generalleutnant Hans Schmidt) spent

the night from 22 to 23 September in disengaging its forces from

the front and moving them to Dueren for assembly. These elements

consisted of about 1,800 men combat strength, eleven 75-mm. antitank

guns, one organic batter;r of 105-mm. howitzers and three attached

batteries of 105-mm. howitzers.* In its new sector in the Wenau

TWX, (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 16 Sep 44), LXXXICorps to Seventh Army, 22 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div..J h ii

Forest the following forces were to join the division: one SS

guards company, one battalion of Flemish troops, formerly attached

to Gruppe Jungklaus, Ka.pfgruppe Riedl, and the personnel of 668th

Heavy Antitank Battalion.* The 275th Division artillery was reinforced

Having lost its weapons, this battalion was to be equipped withshort-range antitank weapons (bazookas and Panzerfaust) until thearrival of new guns. No information is available about the com-position of Kampfgruppe Riedl.

Divisionby the so-called "Russian Artillery Group" of 49th Infantry con-

sisting of two batteries eqUipped with Russian 76.2-mm. infantry

cannon and one battery with Russian 122-mm. guns.

The division received orders to commit its organic troops and

Kampfgruppe Riedl in the front line to plug the gap between 12th

Infantry Division and 353d Infantry Division (LXXIV Corps) while the

troops attached from Gruppe Jungklaus were to improve the bridge-

head positions at Dueren. The new boundaries of 275th Infantry

Division were: in the north with 12th Infantry Division --

Arnoldsweiler - Birkesdorf - Schlich - Schevenhuette - Vicht; to the

south with LXXIV Corps:: south of Dueren to south of Zweifall.*

Order, LXXXI Corps to 275th Ihf Div, 1730 on 22 Sep 44,LKXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.

On 23 September 1944 275th Infantry Division established its

command post at Dueren and occupied its new sector. Late in the

afternoon its troops had all but closed the gap, having secured

UNCLASOFE l

U CLASS FI[U82

contact with 12th Infantry Division, but were still marching the

Wenau Forest for contact with elements of 353d Infantry Division.*

TrX, 275th Inf Div to XXXI Corps, 1930 on 23 Sep 44, LXXXICores KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

The day brought localized fighting in the Aachen and Stolberg

sectors, as did the days to follow, but all actions remained in-

conclusive. The German front, as established on 22 September, held

against all attacks.

The crescendo at Stolberg on 22 September in fact marked the

end of the VII Corps "reconnaissance in force" in the DCKI Corps

sector. The Americans had deeply penetrated both bands of the West

YWall, especially in the Stolberg Corridor, but on the whole the

Germans had scored a defensive success in denying VII Corps a de-

cisive breakthrough via Eschweiler to Juelich, Dueren and Cologne.

The Germans had both emotional and materialistic incentives for

offering such tenacious resistance in this particular area. They

were defending the famous Virest 'rall, their ow nome soil and such

historic cities as Aachen. At the same time the contested area

was highly industrialized and contained many vital war production

plants. For instance, a plant in the little town of Weisweiler

(two miles east of Eschweiler) produced 40% of the national output

of an alloy essential tcfthe entire German steel production. "From

this point of view also the situation demands that the enemy penetration

east of Aachen be wiped out...." wrote General Brandenberger in a

VNLASSIFIED

83

report to Field Marshal Model.*

TV X, Gen Brandenberger to A Gp B3, 1100 on 29 Sep 44, A Gp BKTB, Anlagen, Lagebeurteilungen - Viochenmeldungen [SituationEvaluations - Weekly Sitreps], 15.V. - 11.X.44.

1Much of the credit for the German defensive success undoubtedly

belongs to German communications and logistics. Had the exhausted

elements of ICOI Corps vtich fell back to the West 'tall about mid-

September been left to shift for themselves, there can be no doubt

that American forces would have broken through to Cologne in a very

short time. But in spite of the extremely heavy losses the Germans

suffered, their situation on 23 September was actually much better

than it had been one week earlier.

In the space of that week the Germans had accomplished the

extraordinary feat of moving three full-strength divisions to the

Aachen area. Of these divisions, the 12th Infantry and 183d Volks

Grenadier Divisions had arrived and been committed. A third, the

246th Volks Grenadier Division, entrained on 23 September in Bohemia

with the mission to relieve -- at long last -- 116th and 9th Panzer

Divisions.* This relief was scheduled to get under way on 23 September,

Order, A Gp B to Seventh Army, 1315 on 23 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operaticns-Befehle.

even before the arrival of 246th Division, with replacement units

going into the line. The 116th Panzer Division received orders to

assemble in the Juelich - Dueren area as Army Group B reserve.

84

Thanks to the relative quiet in the sector of 116th Panzer

Division during the week from 16 to 23 September, this division had

not sustained any appreciable losses and had been rehabilitated to

some extent while still in the line. Attachment of six battalions

had more than doubled its organic combat strength. There were five

times asmany tanks and assault guns as there had been a week earlier.

The fuel situation, on the other hand, was critical, with division

reserves down to about five hundred gal Ions; as a result divisi on

armor and motor transport were nearly immobilized.*

T\" (Weekly Strength Report), ILE I Corps to Seventh Army, 1200on 23 Sep 44, [LXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.; TWX, 116th Pz Divto LXXI Corps, 2300 on 22 Sep 44, IXXXI Corps KTB, Meldungen derDiv.

On 23 September 9th Panzer Division also received orders to

disengage its forces but to leave its armor with 12th Infantry

Division.* The 9th Panzer Division, with 105th Panzer Brigade and

Tel Conv, LXXMI Corps to 12th Inf Div, 1330 on 23 Sep 44, LXXXICorps KTB, Kampfverlauf.

miscellaneous attached units, had taken the worst beating of all

the German divisions in the area. In one week -- from 14 to 22

Seotember -- the division had lost 21 officers and 1,040 enlisted

men. These casualties made up over two thirds of the combat strength

of Kmnpfgruppe Sperling (9th Panzer Division less forces attached

to 353d Infantry Division on 15 September 1944 On 22 September 1944

the combat strength of the Kampfgruppe was down to 35 officers and

.,Y L

796 enlisted men. These forces were exhausted and suffered from

severe combat fatigue, as evidenced by the fact that they abandoned

their positions frequently even when supported by armor, and were

quite impervious to dire threats from their superiors. The out-

standing factor responsible for the heavy Geran casualties and the

shattered combat morale of the survivors, according to German

observers, was the murderously efficient American artillery fire.

Some units had been wiped out almost completely in three weeks of

fighting. Thus, for example, the 105th Panzer Grenadier Battalion

had gone into the line on 3 September 1944 with 22 officers and 716

enlisted men. Most of this strength -- 11 officers and 611 enlisted

men -- had been lost from 3 to 22 September, leaving the battalion

with 11 officers and 105 enlisted men.*

TWX, (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 23 Sep 44), IOXXICorps to Seventh Army, 24 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.;Rpt, Maj Volker to 9th Pz Div, 22 Sep 44, LXXI Corps KTB, Meldungender Div.

The 12th Infantry Division had also taken terrible punishment

during the week from 16 to 23 September. In that single week the

division had lost half of its combat strength: from a combat strength

of 3,800 men it was down to about 1,900. According to General Engel

the heaviest casualties had been incurred during the first two days

(17 and 18 September) on the Aachen front. In those two days of

German counterattack the 89th Grenadier Regiment had lost one third

of its combat strength. The 2d Battalion of 48th Grenadier Regiment

UWL ~I IE

ED 85'J rJL

86

lost half of its strength in Schevenhuette. The heavy losses were

due chiefly to the massed and well-directed American artillery fire

and to the bloody street and house-to-house fighting in Verlautenheide,

Stolberg, and Schevenhuette.*

TX (Weekly Strength Report as of 1200 on 23 Sep 44), LXXICorps to Seventh Army, 24 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.;IMS f-A-971 (Engel).

In summing up his division's first week of action on the

Western Front General Engel writes that the division adjusted

rapidly to the different conditions in that theater. He finds the

reasons for the relatively successful defense in the high morale

and physical fitness of 12th Infantry Division.*

IMS 7 A-971 (Engel); Tel Cony, Seventh Anmy to IX=I Corps, 0940on 21 Sep 44, LEXXI Corps KTB, Befehle an Div.

~nkss~~

LXXIV Corps

Defense of the Lammersdorf Corridor and the West Wall

Although the Battle of the Stolberg Corridor definitely con-

stituted the VII Corps main effort from 12 to 23 September 1944,

this study of tne German side would not be complete without an

account of the forces facing U.S. 9th Infantry Division and 4th

Cavalry Group in the Lamnmersdorf - Monschau - Elsenborn area.

This sector of the West Wall had been assigned to LXXIV Corps,

under thie command of General der Infanterie Erich Straube.* VThen

Order, Seventh Army to all corps, 9 Sep 44, ILXXI Corps KTB,Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee, usw.; MS # B-730 (Brandenberger).

VII Corps launched its reconnaissance in force on 12 September, the

elements subordinate to LXXIV Corps were still fighting forward of

the West Wall fortifications. These forces consisted of the ex-

hausted remnants of two divisions, 89th Infantry Division commanded

by Colonel Roesler, and 347th Infantry Division under Generalleutnant

Wolf Trierenberg.

The 89th Infantry Division had hardly any organic forces left.

Its 1055th Infantry Regiment had been completely destroyed in France.

Of the 1056th Infantry Regiment about 350 men were all that remained.

The division had lost its entire artillery in France. The artillery

men, engineers, signal and service troops had long ago been absorbed

into the infantry.

Shortly before 89th Infantry Division reached the West Wall,

LveSSFL

ug s8

a so-called "Ost-Bataillon" [East Battalionj of Russian "volunteers"

was attached. This battalion consisted of 400 - 500 men, was well-

trained, fairly well equipped and possessed four Russian 122-mm.

howitzers. In addition a Landesschuetzen battalion vhich had done

railway guard duty in Belgium was attached to the division. Like

all such battalions it was composed of middle-aged, untrained, and

poorly armed men.

A little later the division also received two companies

composed of stragglers and one platoon of military police.

The West Wall sector assigned to the division lay in the

northern half of the LXXIV Corps sector. The division boundary in

the north was identical to the LXXIV Corps boundary with LXXI Corps:

Zuelpich - Schmidt - Roetgen. In the south the 89th Division

boundary with 347th Infantry Division extended from south of

Schleiden via Arenberg to about Camp d'Elsenborn. Until the arrival

of 89th Infantry Division the West Wall was occupied by the 416th

Grenadier Training Regimnent (526th Reserve Division). This regiment

consisted of 1,200 - 1,500 infantry replacements of all shades of

value and fitness. Its artillery situation wasso poor as to appear

comical. The regiment boasted one German 105-mm. howitzer and one,

Italian medium (ca. 150-mm.) hcwitzer. There was only one prime

mover to pull both guns. After two days in action the Italian piece

ran out of ammunition and from then on served psychological warfare

as a "phanton gun". Whenever the prime mover was nct needed for

more important rurposes, the Italian howitzer was hitched on and

dragged around the front to be shown off to the enemy.

i t 89

When 89th Infantry Division took over the West Wall sector, the

416th Grenadier Training Regiment was attached to the division.*

Intent on building up its strength to two infantry regiments-again, 89th Infantry Division maintained the regiment as a unit andlater made it organic. On that occasion the 416th Grenadier TrainingRegiment received the designation of the late 1055th Infantry Regiment.

In addition to this regiment, the 5th, 9th, and 14th Luftwaffe Fortress

Battalions were attached to 89th Infantry Division. In antitank

weapons the division had fourteen 75-mm. antitank guns.*

TVaX, A Gp B to OB V5EST, 2350 and 2400 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; _S I B-793 (Neitzel).

Colonel Hasso Neitzel was Operations Officer, 89th InfantryDivision.

The southern half of the LXXIV Corps sector was assigned to

347th Infantry Division. The remaining organic combat strength of

this division consisted of one hundred men of the 860th Infantry

Regiment and thirty men of the 861st Infantry Regiment. On 10

September 1944 this little band was reinforced by forty men of a

bicycle company. These elements were organized into a Kampfgruppe

under the connand of Colonel von Rochow, probably commander of 860th

Infantry Regiment. After reaching the yest +Wall, Kampofruppe von

Rochow was redesignated 3d Battalion, 860th Infantry Regiment, and

was gradually rehabilitated to serve as nucleus for a full-strength

regiment. Besides these infantry elements 347th Infantry Division

still possessed two organic self-propelled 150-mm. infantry cannon.

ICA S F E

SNCLASSIF o90

When 347th Infantry Division took over its West 1Wall sector,

the 536th Grenadier Training Regiment (526th Reserve Division) with

about 1,200 infantry replacements, the 7th Luftwaffe Fortress Battalion,

and the "Stomach Battalion"* were attached to the division. It also

All officers and men of the Stomach Battalion suffered fromailments of the digestive tract and received a special diet.German testimonies regarding its value in combat differ so widelyas to contradict one another.

received additional artillery with the 76th Artillery Reserve Battalion

(six 105-mm. howitzers and three 150-mm. howitzers). In antitank

weapons 347th Infantry Division possessed seventeen 75-mm. antitank

guns. *

KTB Entry, 1320 on 12 Sep 44, LOXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf;TW~, A Gp B to OB 'EST, 2350 and 2400 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Operations-Befehle; IJS 7- B-563 (Trierenberg).

The 347th Infantry Division may be dealt with very briefly here

because it saw very little action during the last half of September

1944. On 14 September Kampfgruppe von Rochow was able to break out

of an American encirclement near Camp d'Elsenborn, throw American

forces out of Rocherath, and assume command of its West -Wall sector.

Aside from reconnaissance and combat patrol activity centering

around Losheimergraben, the sector remained quiet enough for the

division to devote itself to the urgent task of rehabilitation and

reorganization. *

Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen;MS # B-563 (Trierenberg).

UIULWSSIFIE

91

The sector of 89th Infantry Division was the scene of U.S. 9th

Infantry Division's effort to drive through the Lammersdorf Corridor

and gain the Roer River in September 1944. On 12 September the

elements of 89th Infantry Division, split up in isolated groups, were

committed from west of Muetzenich to southwest of Kalterherberg.

Both flanks of the division were exposed but American pressure was

so minor that Colonel Roesler saw no compelling reason to withdraw

to the YWest YWall.* On 13 September the division reported that

MS j B-730 (Brandenberger).

American armored spearheads advancing along the Eupen - Monschau

road toward Monschau had reached the edge of the woods north and

south of Neu-Hattlich.* The next day other U.S. forces pushing north

Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0100 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen

from Buetgenbach in the sector of 347th Infantry Jivision reached

the southern periphery of Kalterherberg at 1100. Elements of 89th

Infantry Division established a screening line in Monschau and Hoefen*

Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1400 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.

Vrhile fighting began in Kalterherberg, 89th Infantry Division repulsed

an American attack on Lammersdorf.*

Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1930 on 14 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.

MUMASlsE

ui A,

The U.S. 9th Infantry Division's push had begun. Konzen fell

into American hands, and along the Eupen - Muetzenich road American

armored units attacked toward the Zollhaus [customs house] at

Muetzenich.*

Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0a)0 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

An American pincer movement aimed at the capture of Monschau

emerged clearly, with one prong driving east on the Eupen - Monschau

road while the other pushed up on the Buetgenbach - Kalterherberg

road. Both drives made progress on 14 September. In the evening

of 14 September American forces captured the customs house at

Muetzenich and crossed the German border. U.S. infantry captured

Kalterherberg and continued in a north-northeasterly direction toward

Monschau while behind them American tanks and armored cars rumbled

up the winding road from Kalterherberg to Monschau during the night

from 14 to 15 September.*

Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 0800 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B iTB, Letzte Meldung.

On 15 September 89th Infantry Division decided to withdraw all

its elements to the West Wall. The 416th Grenadier Training Regiment

(later redesignated 1055th Infantry Regiment) was committed in the

northern half of the division sector -- Lammersdorf - Monschau area --

while the remaining elements of the 1056th Infantry Regiment were

committed in the Hoefen - Alzen sector. The Russian battalion secured

i

a ,: a;, t~ ~~P

P ' IIL~t

d TL ASS rF- 93

the division's northern flank and boundary with 353d Infantry Division.

The Landesschuetzen were committed on the southern flank and boundary

with 347th Infantry Division. The Luftwaffe Fortress Battalions

were not considered battleworthy and, hence, were employed to man

the Schill Line, at this time still well to the rear of the division

combat zone.*

MS # B-793 (Neitzel).

The American pincers continued to close on Monschau. Late in

the afternoon on 15 September American forces which had advanced

up the road from Kalterberg entered Monscnau. While a battle

ensued in the town, American armor on the Eupen - Monschau road

crossed the railroad tracks east of Muetzenich and headed for a

juncture with U.S. forces in Monschau.*

Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1400 on 15 Sep 44, and Evg Sitrep, A Gp B,1900 on 15 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.

The town fell to the Americans during the night from 15 to 16

September, and 9th Infantry Division achieved its first penetration

of the West Wall when its forces thrust northeastward from Monschau

toward Lmgenbroich. Then the Germans rallied to the defense. They

recaptured Konzen and Bicierath and reported that they had knocked

out one American tank at Muetzenich.*

Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 0810 on 16 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.

LLASSIFIED

94

On 16 September 353d Infantry Division with its sector was

attached to LKXIV Corps.* In the sector of 89th Infantry Division

Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1345 on 16 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, LetzteMeldung. See above, p. 45.

the day was uneventful except for an American attack west of

Lammersdorf which the Germans repulsed. In the Monschau area the

Americans were apparently busy consolidating their gains and con-

tented themselves with continuous and very heavy artillery fire on

the German MLR (West Wall).*

Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1915 on 16 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung;MS # B-793 (Neitzel).

During the night U.S. forces renewed their attack in the northern

sector of 89th Infantry Division and this time succeeded in penetrating

Lammersdorf. In the south American troops entered Hoefen. The see-

saw fighting -vhich now began lasted for several days. In the small

hours of the morning on 17 September the Germans launched counter-

atcacks to wipe out these penetrations.* In both areas they achieved

Mng Sitrep, A Gp B, 0730 on 17 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung.

initial successes.

By morning on 17 September their counterattack had regained

the first line of bunkers near Larersdorf.* At noon, however, the

Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1300 on 17 Sep 44, OB WEST KTB.

_tLHs NY

-95

Americans renewed their drive north of Lamnersdorf with strong in-

fantry and armor and achieved fresh penetrations in the Scharnhorst

Line. Another U.S. attack, at Pa-stenbach south of Lamnersdorf, was

repulsed. *

Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0400 on 18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

At Hoefen fighting was very bitter. The village changed hands

several times during the day. By evening elements of 89th Infantry

Division had captured the southern part of Hoefen. Their counter-

attack continued: on 18 September in the morning only one bunker

north of Hoefen remained in American hands; by noon the Germans had

regained the complete bunker line at Hoefen and had captured four-

teen Americans.* But their success was shortlived. At 1600 on 18

Ibid. Noon Sitrep, A Gp B, 1530 on 18 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Letzte I eldung.

Sc:ptember fifteen to twenty American tanks broke through the MLR at

Hoefen from the north and achieved a penetration east and south of

Hoefen. The Germans were able to seal off this penetration byevening.

In the north of the 89th Infantry Division sector two American

battalions supported by tanks launched an attack about 1700 and

broke through the West Wall at Lammersdorf, penetrating three miles

in a south-southeasterly direction to the Kall River valley. There

this penetration also was sealed off.* The Americans renewed their

Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0230 on 19 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

A 6LAjf I Er

UGASS I FI E96

attack southeast of Lammersdorf at 0930 on 19 September but ran

afoul of a German fortified road block established during the night

at the road junction half a mile southeast of Lammersdorf. Here

this attack ground to a halt,. Another American attack at Paustenbach

was also repulsed. There 89th Infantry Division destroyed two U.S.

tanks and recaptured a ounker.*

Noon. Sitrep, A Gp B, 1420 on 19 Sep 44, and Evg Sitrep, A Gp B,2045 on 19 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte ieldung.

The Germans noted that the Americans were building up their

strength in Monschau. Additional forces including fourteen tanks

had moved into the town.*

Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 2045 on 19 Sep 44, A Gp 3 KTB, LetzteVMeldung.

The Germans were very well-informed about what was going on be-hind the American lines in this sector. In S NS B-793 Colonel Neitzelgives a rather amusing account of the constant traffic across tneGerman MLR into and out of American-held territory. German soldiersin civilian clothing paid regular visits to Rbet en and Monschau.From the American prisoner collecting point at Roetgen these visitorsusually managed to bring back one or two German prisoners of waralong with some American rations. From Monschau every move theAmericans made was reported back to the G-2 section of 89th InfantryDivision.

On 20 September U.S. 9th Infantry Division launched two armored

attacks against Paustenbach. The Germans repulsed both and inflicted

heavy losses on the attackers.* Action in the LXXIV Corps sector

Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1800 on 20 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung;Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 21 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

dJ tdiU"F97

shifted to the north where tne Battle of the Stolberg Corridor fanned

out southward to draw 353d and 89th Infantry Divisions into its

orbit.

At 1630 on Z0 September American tanks jumping off from south-

west of Zweifall penetrated to the monument located about three miles

east of that village. Both 89th d 353d Infantry Divisions immediately

launched a counterattack against this salient.* The Americans,

Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 21 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen.

however, were not to be dislodged easily. On 21 September a U.S.

tank attack in the woods east of Zweifall threw the Germans back to

the Weisser-Veh Creek one mile west of Huertgen. A few American

tanks reached Germeter.

To help restore the situation as soon as possible, Seventh Army

ordered 341st Assault Gun Brigade shifted from LCKXI Corps to 353d

Infantry Division. During the night from 21 to 22 September the

division intended to move this assault gun brigade, one infantry

and one engineer battalion, one artillery battery and five 75-rm.

antitank guns to the area with plans to counterattack on 22 September.*

Tel Cony, LJXXI Corps to 353d Inf Div, 1720 on 21 Sep 44,LIXXI Corps KTB, Kampfverlauf; Order, Seventh Army to LXXXI Corps,1940 on 21 Sep 44, LXXXI Corps KTB, Befehle: Heeresgruppe, Armee,usw.; Evg Sitrep, A Gp B, 1840 on 21 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, LetzteMeldung; Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0110 on 22 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB,Tagesme ldungen.

ifwll U0L A.' S~

I CLASSiFIE98

The German counterattack to wipe out the first American

penetration of the Huertgen Forest apparently did not make any

spectacular headway on 22 September. On the second day of the attack

(23 September 1944) the forces of 353d Infantry Division pushed the

Americans back. to within three miles southeast of Zweifall and re-

captured one bunker. Three American tank attacks lauocned in the

Rollesbroich - Huertgen Forest three miles northeast of Larmersdorf

were beaten back. As for the Russian "Volunteers" comrmitted here,

the first encounter with U.S. tanks proved to be too much -for them.

After an appeal by several Russian deserters who rode American tanks

into the Rollesbroich Forest and broadcast to their countrymen over

a public address system, two thirds of the Russian battalion went

over to the Americans in a body. This incident decided the Germans

that they were through experimenting with "Osttruppen" [Eastern Troops].

The remaining Russians were moved to the rear where they were disarmed

and employed as laborers.*

1'rIg Sitrep, A Gp B, 0830 on 23 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Letzte Meldung;Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0200 on 24 Sep 44, A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldungen;MS # B-793 (Neitzel).

During the last week of September American combat activity

gradually died down in the LXXIV Corps sector. The first American

drive for the Roer had been stopped. No one -- friend or foe -- as

yet anticipated the tragic significance which the name "Huertgen

Forest" would acquire in the bloody battles for the Roer River Dams

of October and November 1944.

GPO 83.50397

GERWVAWYM

THE WEST WALL IN THE LXXXI A]LXXIV CORPS SECTORS

1st Band of West Wall"SCHARNHORST LINE"

2d Band of West Wall"S CHILL LINE"

Roer Positioni""SCHLIEFFEN LINE"

0. Switch Positions

N NationalBoundaries

%a~ 'Cai,J) 'Ee 66#_n..

MB\SSEt - \E / 1: =50,QO0 *1