The Gains From International Trade Once Again

8/6/2019 The Gains From International Trade Once Again

1/14

The Gains from International Trade Once Again

P. A. Samuelson

The Economic Journal, Vol. 72, No. 288. (Dec., 1962), pp. 820-829.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28196212%2972%3A288%3C820%3ATGFITO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

The Economic Journal is currently published by Royal Economic Society.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/res.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

http://www.jstor.orgSat Mar 29 17:38:37 2008
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28196212%2972%3A288%3C820%3ATGFITO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Bhttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.htmlhttp://www.jstor.org/journals/res.htmlhttp://www.jstor.org/journals/res.htmlhttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.htmlhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28196212%2972%3A288%3C820%3ATGFITO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B


2/14

T H E G AIN S F R O M IN T E R N A T IO N A L T R A D E O N C E A G A I N 1

IN 1939 I wrote a paper that showed how some international trademakes a society potentially better off than it would be if restricted toa ~ t a r k y . ~Although this paper has received a flattering amount of notice,I had always regarded it as somewhat incomplete and had long planned tofollow it with a more definite companion piece. For it was written withtwo purposes in mind other than to say all that can be said about the gainsfrom international trade.

First, it was an attempt to show how the new theories of revealed prefer-ence could be used to demonstrate important theorems in welfare economics.And second, it was intended to mediate the dispute between two of myfamous teachers, Jacob Viner (then of Chicago) and Gottfreid Haberler(Harvard), over the doctrine of opportunity cost in international trade andvalue theory: my 1939 article was shaped to show how the eclectic doctrineof general equilibrium could take changes in factor supplies in its strideand by the index-number methods of revealed preference illustrate how theHaberlerian transformation curve could be generalised.

Even after the passage of twenty years, the final chapter seemed stillto be lacking in the literature. And an interesting 1958 Danish criticismof my earlier paper's treatment of income distribution by Mr. Erling Olsenled me to defend the argument and at long last take up the thorough com-pletion. This time there was no need to worry about the obsolete doctrineof opportunity cost; nor to use index numbers of revealed preference, sincefor better or worse this approach had already won its place in the literatureof economic theory. Good fortune, however, brought Dr. Murray Kempto M.I.T. as a visiting professor in 1959-61 on his way from Canada to achair at the University of New South Wales. For, in discussing the presentpaper, Professor Kemp showed that my alternative approach of 1939 couldindeed be carried through all the way to achieve the same final goals.4In a real sense, therefore, our two papers are complementary and benefitfrom simultaneous publication.

Grateful acknowledgement is made to the Ford Foundation for research assistance.a P. A. Sarnuelson, "The Gains from International Trade," Canadian Journal of Economics and

Political Science, Vol. V (May 1939), pp. 195-205. Reprinted in the Readings in the Theory of Inter-national Trade of the American Economic Association.


3/14

DEC. 19621 T H E G A I N S FROM I NTER NATI ONAL TR ADE ONC E AGAI N 82 1

On the special assumption that our country under consideration is toosmall to affect its terms of trade, and on the assumption that the price ratiosabroad differ from those that would prevail at home under autarky, Fig. 1'sheavy line EUF represents. our " consumption possibility frontier " with

Q F xWith no trade, we end up at D. With free trade, production ends up a t U, consumptionat V , with UV the vector of algebraic imports.

some trade. With autarky the consumption possibility frontier is given bythe production locus PDUQ. Since the trade frontier lies everywhere lnorth-east of the autarky frontier, our society can have more of all goods(and less of all irksome inputs) with some trade. I t is in this sense that trademakes us potentially better off.

III. AN IMPORTANT ENVELOPE I wish to increase the generality of my 1939 argument by now dropping

the assumption that our country is small. Let us be large enough to affectour terms of trade as we move along Fig. 2's Marshallian offer curve of therest of the world for our two-goods.

At U itself the frontiers coincide. Thus, if there were some distribution of income whichbrought us under autarky to U ather than D, opening up trade would at that point (1) in factbe followed by no international transactions taking place, and hence would (2 ) represent thelimiting case where trade neither helps nor hurts us. (If individuals' tastes and endowmentshappen to be much alike at home there might be no redistribution of income that would, under


4/14

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL

FIG.2. AOB is the familiar Marshallian offer curve of the rest of the world, but plotted in termsof our algebraic imports.

FIG.3. The important Baldwin envelope E F is generated by sliding AO B along P Q in such a wayas to trace out the frontier of consumable product. The slopes at Ware necessarily equal tothe slope at 0'.

Now draw up the envelope frontier of Fig. 3 by sliding the origin ofthe AOB offer curve along the domestic production possibility locus PQ insuch a way as to trace out the maximal amount of each good that is available

See R. E. Baldwin, Equilibrium in International Trade: A Diagrammatic Analysis?"'Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXII (1948), pp. 748-62; "The New Welfare Economics and


5/14

19621 THE GAINS FR OM INTERNATIONAL TRADE ONCE AGAIN 823for given amounts consumed of the other g0od.l The resulting envelopemay be called society's cum-trade consumption possibility frontier. LikeFig. 1's EUF, of which it is a generalisation, the new consumption frontierlies uniformly (save for one point like U) outside the autarky consumptionfrontier. Hence our society is potentially better o f in the sense that there i s a wayof reallocating the enlarged totals o f goods so as to make every person better o f .

I t may be noted that the envelope frontier could be attained by anoptimal Mill-Bickerdike tariff or by more direct means. The Kahn-Graaffpara do^,^ that the size of the optimal tariff depends only on foreigners'demand elasticity and not on home consumers' demand, is easily resolvedas follows: the envelope's slope at any point like W is related to the slopeof O'W as determined by the AOB curve alone; but never forget that homedemand must tell us which W will be the equilibrium one.

IV . THEUTILITYPOSSIBILITYRONTIERPractical men and economic theorists have always known that trade

may help some people and hurt others. Our problem is to show that tradelovers are theoretically able to compensate trade haters for the harm donethem, thereby making everyone better off. The ordinal utility diagram ofFig. 4 is the natural tool to use for this p ~ r p o s e . ~The horizontal axis represents ordinal utility of one of our citizens. Thevertical axis represents ordinal utility of a second citizen. And for sim-plicity I suppose there are only two citizens, or two classes of identicalcitizens in our country. A point represents the simultaneous position ofboth men: because utility need not be numerically measurable, only northand south and east and west relatioilships count.

The point d corresponds to point D of Fig. 1. The broken locusd'dd" represents the utility possibility frontier if the fixed goods totals of Dare allocated in favour of man 1 or man 2 by ideal-sum transfers so that

I t may help the reader to imagine the offer curve as being cut out from Pig. 2 with scissorsand then being carefully transposed over to Fig. 3 so as to trace out the envelope of its outlyingtangents. At a point like W not only is the offer curve tangential to the envelope but in additionif we go back to the corresponding pivot point 0' the slope of the production possibility schedulethere will also necessarily be the same. This follows from the geometrical properties of an envelopeand has the important economic interpretation that at an optimal point production substitutionratios must be equal to trading substitution ratios (as well as to consumption substitution ratios).

If the autarky point D will in fact become outmoded by the opening of trade, then D and Ucannot coincide and we know that-by going north-east from D-everyone can be made betteroff than they were under autarky.

SeeJ. deV. Graaff, Theoretical We lfare Economics (Cambridge, 1957), Chapter IX.Pareto's economics would have been better understood had he explicitly used the utility

frontier concept. I may refer the reader to my Foundations of Economic Analysis, Chapter 8 ; to


6/14

824 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [DEC.there is no " inefficiency " or deadweight loss involved in the transfers.On the other hand, the envelopepp is generated by treating every point onPQ the way we have treated D and then drawing in the north-east frontier.

What is the envelope ef? I t is the frontier traced out by all the pointson EF. Thus, it is tangential at v to the broken locus v'm" representing the

FIG.4. The e f social utility frontier lies outside the autarky frontier pq. But the vv' frontiercorresponding to reallocation of the actual post-trade totals may well loop inside the autarkypoint. (Utilities being ordinal not cardinal, the curvatures of the loci are of no definite signs.)

ideal reallocation of the goods at the post-trade point V. Since EF liesnorth-east of PQ, e must obviously lie north-east of pq.'

Now let us carefully compare the pre-trade point d with a post-tradepoint v. Since v is south-east of d, it would be dangerous to say that tradehas made the world better off: man 1 is better off, man 2 is worse off. Butlet us ideally reallocate the goods of v, moving north-west on vv ' to com-pensate man 2. Can we in this way make both men better off? Mr.Olsen's reply would be: Not necessarily. If I may translate his analysisinto my terminology, he argues: The v'v locus of reallocation may passnorth-east of the autarky point d, or it may pass south-west of that point.

As mentioned in footnote 1 on p. 821, efmight touch pq a t one or more points (indeed in thelimiting case where trade is always indifferent, at all points). I t would be wrong, though, tothink that ef must somewhere touch pq: as already indicated, the point u corresponding to U mightnever touch thepq frontier; and in that case ef would lie everywhere north-east ofpq. If efrefersto a country large enough to affect its terms of trade, we can define a new frontier midway, so to


7/14

19621 THE GAINS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE ONCE AGAIN 825I have no dispute w ith this last possibility. I n fact, Fig. 4 is draw n with

vv ' passing below d so tha t the gainers from tr ad e can not (by reallocatingthe given totals) bribe the losers into acquiescing to trade.But nothing in my 1939 or present argument required that the com-pensation or bribing be possible ou t o fj x e d totals. W h at I was concernedto argu e was that the cum-trade uti lity envelope frontier ef-not vv'-layoutside the au tark y frontier pq. A nd this is true despite th e Olsencontention.As a matter of fact, imagine compensation beginning to take place atv and V. This will automatically change the pattern o imports, moving v north-westward on ef and moving V north-westward on EF. Where will theprocess e n d ? If the losers ar e fully compensated-and my arg um en t provesconclusively th a t they can be-the points v an d V will be moved so far north -westward as to cause the Olsen effect to disappear necessarily. Th us, weend up north-east of d.I hope no one will think that I advocate: (1 ) compensation, or (2) non-compensation. W e need a Bergson social-welfare function to answer thesequestions, and I have always pointed out the illogic of those new welfareeconomists who used to try to rea ch normative conclusions on th e basis ofinsufficient norms.

I n 1939, two years before Professor T ib or Scitovsky a introduced hiscollective indifference curves, I, of courseidid no t use them in my exposition.Nor have I yet used them here. But in th at Olsen .has used them, 1 oughtto mention them briefly.Through D in Fig. 1 (o r as well in Fig. 3) , Olsen would dra w a Scitovskyindifference curve: this gives the m inim um require d totals of the goodsneeded to keep all me n as well off as they actu ally were und er autark y.Olsen then argues that the after-trade point V could conceivably lie underthis Scitovsky curve, not above it. Th is I freely admit (as in my Fig. 4'spassing of vv ' below d).But what do I need for my argument that some trade makes a societypotentially better off in the sense of making it possible for all men to bem ad e better off, the gainers being able to mo re th an comp ensate the losers?Not that V lie above the D Scitovsky indifference curve. But rathe r theweaker, and inevitable, condition that the EF envelope frontier somewhere

See Robert E. Baldwin, "A Comparison of Welfare Criteria," Review of Economic Studies, Vol.


8/14

826 TH E ECONOMIC JOURNAL [DEC.pass above the Scitovsky indifference curve. Fig. 5 shows how inevitablethis is, an d how irreleva nt the crossing of the V and D Scitovsky curves is.

FIG. 5. The Scitovsky community indifference curve of the actual post-trade configuration 17 maywell pass above the community indifference curve of the actual autarky configuration D.But for the winners to be able ideally to compensate the losers requires only that UE cutsomewhere above the autarky community indifference curve-as is always the case. Thefact that the post-trade community indifference curve always passes above the autarky pointmeans that trade satisfies the 1941 Scitovsky test for an improvement-namely, the losers fromtrade can never afford to bribe the trade gainers into unanimously repealing all trade.

VI. INDEXNUM BER OMPARISONSFinally, let me review and extend the index-number type of argument

used in my 1939 pa pe r. Fo r simplicity, I shall revert back to Fig. 1's casewhere the country is too small to affect its terms of trade.l I n Figs. 1 an d 5the tangent line of the equilibrium point V contains U inside of it, andafortiori because of the strong curva ture of PQ it must contain D inside of i t :in terms of index nu m ber comparison^,^ this means

If only a single individual or a " representative man " standing foridentical citizens were involved we could, from the familiar economictheory of index number^,^ deduce that the post-trade point was "better

Since convexity of PQ makes the EF envelope convex too, I believe the argument could be


9/14

19621 THE GAINS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE ONCE AGAIN 827th a n " the autarky point. Most of my 1939 pap er dealt with this one-person case; an d the remainder, to which M r. Olsen's remarks all apply,was well advised not to use the index-number method.What does the above index-number comparison mean when there aredifferent men in our economy so that it must be written

and when we observe only the totals in parentheses?Professor Hicks stated in 1940 a beautiful theorem that gives a partialanswer. By it, the index-n um ber comparison alone will tell us tha t thepost-trade point v in Fig. 4 necessarily lies outside the autarky loci pq ordd". Th us, Mr . Olsen's conclusion-which he derived in his last pa rag rap hby perceiving that the Scitovsky collective indifference curve through Vwould have to lie outside the p oint D (an d indeed outside all auta rky pointsof PQ)-follows: Th ose h u rt by trad e ar e never able to bribe the trad ewinners into going back to autarky.I n terms of welfare economics, M r. Olsen has proved th at t he post-tradesituation satisfies the 1941 test ad de d by Scitovsky to supplem ent th eKaldor-Hicks 1939 test th at the gainers from trade-or an y improvement-be capable of bribing the losers. Th ou gh M r. Olsen has proved th at theScitovsky test holds, I believe he has not thereby shown that my proof ofthe Kaldor-Hicks tests' hold ing is faulty. Actually, my proof I deemsatisfactory, and by it I establish som ething stronger-that a n inznity oftests or comparisons between the pre-trade and post-trade utility frontiersshow the latter to be the frontier farth er out. (All this is specified a t aglance in F ig. 4.)In this sense trade makes a country potentially better off.

V II . A WAR NING BOUTFEASIBILITYW ha t in the w ay of policy can we co nclude from the fact tha t trad e is apotential boon? As I pointed o ut in my 1950 pape r, we ca n actually con-clude very little.T o see this tur n to Fig. 6, which is much like Fig. 4. Suppose the socialwelfare function, if we knew it, " favoured " the man hu rt by t rade, man 2-as shown by th e Bergson con tours of welfare indifference. And suppose ,as is the simple truth, that ideal lump-sum redistributions are never reallyavailable to us. Ins tead the only feasible redistributions must cause harm fulsubstitution an d other effects. T h en the feasibility locus upo n which we

'J. R. Hicks, " The Valuation of Social Income," Economica, New Series, Vol. VII (1940),


10/14

828 TH E ECONOMIC JOURNAL [DEC.are free to move looks like the dotte d curve in Fig. 6, vg, looping inside theef frontier. Now i t is qu ite possible th a t this feasibility locus mig ht evenloop inside the a utark y point d. I t evidently follows that, w ith the givenBergson contours, a uta rky is preferable to t he p ost-trad e situation-showinghow difficult must be any rigorous interpretation of " potential "improvement .l

\/\ \\ p f a r contours

f6. If lump-sum transfers are not feasible, so that vg rather than ef is the feasibility frontier,the highest social-welfare contour obtainable from free trade might be lower than thatobtainable under autarky.

VIII. CONCLUSIONSRather than summarise what has been a lengthy argument, I shallsimply stan d by m y earlier position a nd jot dow n some truth s th at a reperh aps bette r understood to-da y th an tw enty years ago.2

1 Perhaps some situation very near to autarky, but involving a little trade, could be proved togive points north-east of d. This is suggested by the fact that small redistributions will usuallyinvolve small deadweight distortions of a higher order of infinitesimals. For the theory offeasibility-sometimes called the theory of the second best-and still in its infancy, see F. P.Ramsey, " JOURNAL,Contribution to the Theory of Taxation," ECONOMIC Vo1. XXXVII (1927),pp. 47-61 ; M. Boiteux," Sur la question des Monopoles Publics astreints A 1'Cquilibre budgktaire,"Econornetrica, Vol. 24 (1956), pp. 22-40; R. G. Lipsey and R. K. Lancaster, "The General Theoryof the Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XXIV (1956-57), pp. 11-32; I. M. D. Little,A Critiqnce of We lfa re Economics (Oxford, 1957), 2nd edition, Appendix IV; J. de V. Graaff, loc. cit.,


11/14

8299621 THE GAINS FROM IN T E RN A T IO N A L T RA D E O N CE A G A IN1. If the laws of returns were appropriate for perfect competition (noexternal effects, indivisibilities, monopolies, dynamic uncertainties, learningprocesses, etc.), free trad e a n d ideal transfers could be used to give m axim alworld production in the sense of a farthest out world production possibilityfrontier.2. Free trade and ideal transfers could give a similar maximal worldutility frontier for a ll individuals.3. Free tra de will not necessarily maximise the real income or consump-tion and utility possibilities of any one country-even though by ideal bribesthe intern ation al winning countries could bribe th e losers into a un anim ousvote for free trad e.4. Free trade will not necessarily maximise the income, consumption

and utility possibilities of a subset of persons or factors within a country.5. If all b ut one c oun try will always tra de freely it (almost) always paysthat one country to behave monopolistically, imposing optimum Mill-Bickerdike tariffs or other interferences to take advantage of less-than-infinitely-elastic international demand.6. Whatever the fixed pattern of tariffs abroad, it usually pays onecoun try to introduce a n optim um d uty unilaterally. Some countries maythen end u p better off th an un der free trade; or perhaps none will end upbe tter off. But never ca n all countries end up better off; an d indeed, thelosers from the tariff pat tern ca n always theoretically offer the winners largeeno ugh idea l bribes to get rid of all tariffs a n d interferences with free trade .7. Only at a point reachable by free trade would an internationalindividualistic social welfare fu nc tio n-b e a t its maximum maximorum.8. For a given country, autarky cannot be optimal if ideal transfers arepossible. Some trade is better than no trade in the sense of making thenation better off, with a farther out consumption-possibility frontier andfarther out utility-possibility frontier.If ideal lum p-sum reallocations of income are not feasible the above con-clusions need serious mo dification an d qualification. T h e same is tru ewhen we introduce imperfections of competition, uncertainties, inducedchanges of an irreversible type and game-theoretic struggles for power andwelfare.

P. A. SAMUELSONMassachusetts Institute of Technology.Other devices, such as perfect planning or perfect discrimination, might accomplish the same

result.


12/14

You have printed the following article:

The Gains from International Trade Once Again

P. A. Samuelson

The Economic Journal, Vol. 72, No. 288. (Dec., 1962), pp. 820-829.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28196212%2972%3A288%3C820%3ATGFITO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from anoff-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Pleasevisit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

[Footnotes]

2 The Gains from International Trade

Paul A. Samuelson

The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economique et deScience politique, Vol. 5, No. 2. (May, 1939), pp. 195-205.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0315-4890%28193905%295%3A2%3C195%3ATGFIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L

1 Equilibrium in International Trade: A Diagrammatic Analysis

Robert E. Baldwin

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Nov., 1948), pp. 748-762.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28194811%2962%3A5%3C748%3AEIITAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L

1 The New Welfare Economics and Gains in International Trade

Robert E. Baldwin

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 66, No. 1. (Feb., 1952), pp. 91-101.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195202%2966%3A1%3C91%3ATNWEAG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 1 of 3 -

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28196212%2972%3A288%3C820%3ATGFITO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0315-4890%28193905%295%3A2%3C195%3ATGFIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28194811%2962%3A5%3C748%3AEIITAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195202%2966%3A1%3C91%3ATNWEAG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195202%2966%3A1%3C91%3ATNWEAG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28194811%2962%3A5%3C748%3AEIITAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0315-4890%28193905%295%3A2%3C195%3ATGFIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28196212%2972%3A288%3C820%3ATGFITO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B&origin=JSTOR-pdf


13/14

1 On the Geometry of Welfare Economics: A Suggested Diagrammatic Treatment of SomeBasic Propositions

Peter B. Kenen

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 71, No. 3. (Aug., 1957), pp. 426-447.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195708%2971%3A3%3C426%3AOTGOWE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0

4

Evaluation of Real National IncomePaul A. Samuelson

Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 2, No. 1. (Jan., 1950), pp. 1-29.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%28195001%292%3A2%3A1%3C1%3AEORNI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V

4 Social Indifference Curves

Paul A. Samuelson

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 70, No. 1. (Feb., 1956), pp. 1-22.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195602%2970%3A1%3C1%3ASIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

1A Comparison of Welfare Criteria

Robert E. Baldwin

The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2. (1953 - 1954), pp. 154-161.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%281953%2F1954%2921%3A2%3C154%3AACOWC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M

1 The Valuation of the Social Income

J. R. Hicks

Economica, New Series, Vol. 7, No. 26. (May, 1940), pp. 105-124.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427%28194005%292%3A7%3A26%3C105%3ATVOTSI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

1 A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation

F. P. Ramsey

The Economic Journal, Vol. 37, No. 145. (Mar., 1927), pp. 47-61.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28192703%2937%3A145%3C47%3AACTTTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K



http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195708%2971%3A3%3C426%3AOTGOWE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%28195001%292%3A2%3A1%3C1%3AEORNI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195602%2970%3A1%3C1%3ASIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%281953%2F1954%2921%3A2%3C154%3AACOWC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427%28194005%292%3A7%3A26%3C105%3ATVOTSI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28192703%2937%3A145%3C47%3AACTTTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28192703%2937%3A145%3C47%3AACTTTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427%28194005%292%3A7%3A26%3C105%3ATVOTSI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%281953%2F1954%2921%3A2%3C154%3AACOWC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195602%2970%3A1%3C1%3ASIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%28195001%292%3A2%3A1%3C1%3AEORNI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28195708%2971%3A3%3C426%3AOTGOWE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0&origin=JSTOR-pdf


14/14

1 Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints a l'equilibre budgetaire

M. Boiteux

Econometrica, Vol. 24, No. 1. (Jan., 1956), pp. 22-40.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28195601%2924%3A1%3C22%3ASLGDMP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

1The General Theory of Second Best

R. G. Lipsey; Kelvin LancasterThe Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1. (1956 - 1957), pp. 11-32.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%281956%2F1957%2924%3A1%3C11%3ATGTOSB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

2 Welfare Economics and International Trade

Paul A. Samuelson

The American Economic Review, Vol. 28, No. 2. (Jun., 1938), pp. 261-266.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28193806%2928%3A2%3C261%3AWEAIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1



http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28195601%2924%3A1%3C22%3ASLGDMP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%281956%2F1957%2924%3A1%3C11%3ATGTOSB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28193806%2928%3A2%3C261%3AWEAIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28193806%2928%3A2%3C261%3AWEAIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%281956%2F1957%2924%3A1%3C11%3ATGTOSB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2&origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28195601%2924%3A1%3C22%3ASLGDMP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C&origin=JSTOR-pdf

Documents

The Gains From International Trade Once Again