The G20, Emerging Powers, and Transatlantic Relations

8/6/2019 The G20, Emerging Powers, and Transatlantic Relations

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p a p e r s e r i e s

The G20, emerGinG Powers,and TransaTlanTic relaTions

Stefan A. Schirm Transatlantic Academy Fellow


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2011 ransatlantic Academy. All rights reserved.

No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means without permissionin writing rom the ransatlantic Academy. Please direct inquiries to:

ransatlantic Academy 1744 R Street, NWWashington, DC 20009

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Tis publication can be downloaded or ree at http://www.transatlanticacademy.org.

Transatlantic Academy Paper SeriesTe ransatlantic Academy Paper Series presents research on a variety o transatlantic topics by staf, ellows, andpartners o the ransatlantic Academy. Te views expressed here are those o the author and do not necessarily represent the view o the ransatlantic Academy. Comments rom readers are welcome; reply to the mailing ad-dress above or by e-mail to A@gm us.org.

About the Transatlantic AcademyFounded by the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF), the ZEI -Sti ung Ebelin und GerdBucerius, the Robert Bosch Sti ung, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the ransatlantic Academy serves as a orum or a select group o scholars rom both sides o the Atlantic and rom di erent academic andpolicy disciplines to examine a single set o issues. Working together rom a transatlantic and interdisciplinary perspective, Academy ellows use research, publications, and ideas to make policy-relevant contributions topolicy debates acing the transatlantic community. In addition, the Academy has received early support romthe ransatlantic Program o the Government o the Federal Republic o Germany through unds o the Euro-

pean Recovery Program (ERP) o the Federal Ministry o Economics and echnology. Te Compagnia di SanPaolo joined as a fnancial partner in May 2009.


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he G20, Emerging Powers, and ransatlantic Relations

ransatlantic Academy Paper Series

May 2011

S A. S *ransatlantic Academy Fellow

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he G20, Emerging Powers, and ransatlantic Relations 1

In light of the global crisis,the G20 isa necessary and innovativeachievement.

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The Global Economic Crisis

and the G201


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ransatlantic Academy2

Have the decadesof cooperationamong the G7countries tiedthem together

in the G20?

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The G20 hasmoved beyond thecushioning of thecrisis towards apost-crisis agenda.

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Efficiency and Legitimacy of the G202


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The G20sefficiency canbe enhanced

by transforming it into a Global

Economic Council.

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The specific G20criteria and thevoting procedureswill continue to stir controversies, butthe representationand, thus, thelegitimacy of theG20 would be

greatly enhancedby modeling itsrepresentational

structures similarly on thoseof the IMF.

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Emerging Powers and Transatlantic

Countries in the G203

On mostcontentious

issues, some of the industrializedcountries aligned

with some of the emerging

economies in adhoc groupings

on both sides of the respective

policy divide.


10/21


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While the UnitedStates resentedthat others wouldbenefit from its

stimulus, Germany,China, and Brazilwere especially concerned withthe U.S. policy of quantitativeeasing.


11/21


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The G7 countriesUnited Statesand Germany

were situated inopposing camps

[on the currency issue] in the sameway that the BRIC

countries Chinaand Brazil found

themselves onopposite sides.


12/21


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The watered- down substance,the elongatedimplementationdeadline, andthe questionablecompliance of participating countries,especially China,does not bodewell for the effectsof Basel III.


13/21


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The changes inthe executive

board led to arift between the

United Statesand European

member countries.


14/21


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The United Stateswould largely benefit in thelong-term from atransformationof the SDR into apossible reservecurrency.


15/21


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Transatlanticcountries found

themselves inopposing ad hoc

groupings inmost instances.


16/21


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Policy Recommendations

for the Transatlantic Countries4

Transatlanticcountries should

support a further integrationof emerging countries intoa rules-basedinternationaleconomicorder and usethis processto negotiateand expandthese rules.


17/21


18/21


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6, 9; W S J u N v 3, .

6

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S S 9 .

S W .

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Endnotes5


19/21


A C u ( ), D D v : C F R , W , DC.

B -Qu , A , J P -F , YuY ( ), R IM S : S C S ,B u P C bu / 3, M .

B , F ( ), W b u ,Financial imes F b 6, 8.

B , M k R. ( 7), Bu B k

BRIC W ? F U.S. F P S D bu P , Asian Perspective 3 :4, 5 - 75.

C , J G. ( ), N R P. W I u E P

H W u Hu G b G v ,Foreign Affairs 89: 5, S /O .

C , G R ku ( ), WC C Ru G b O ?,heWashington Quarterly 33:4, 9- 38.

G , ( ), G b v ,Financial imes, O 6.

H , N M Su ( 8),S C b : H US v P R ,heWashington Quarterly 3 :4, 43-57.

H , P A. D v S k ( ) ( .),Varieties of Capitalism. he Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage , Ox :Ox U v P .

H , A F. B u D. J ( ), HD R P R ?,Survival 5 :6, 63-88.

H , J ( ), A j b GOv u uransatlantic ake F b u 8, G

M Fu U S , WDC

H , J ( ), S v MuR v H u G b EG v C u ,Paper Series G M Fu U SW , DC, M .

Ik b , J G. ( 8), R C Fu u W : C L b

Su v v ?,Foreign Affairs, 87: , 3-37.

Ov D v I u (ODI) ( G : C BRICK

v ,Policy Brief , L , M .

P k, S ( ), G S : O u M EMu , A Century Foundation Report ,N Y k.

P -R I v ( ), R I M S : A CA F C u

:// . . / /bj / - 7.P -R _I

v _ _ _R -J _ 8.

N , Ab j A x A uk (BRICS b k -u

u , R u A 4.

R u M 3, , G SC G SDR, ://

u . / / / 3/3 / -USBJB 4 59 33

R , R ( ),he New Brazil , WDC: B k I u P .

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20/21


S , S A. ( ), V S :S I u B GR G b E C , Journal of Contemporary European Studies 9: ,47-6 .

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The G20, Emerging Powers, and Transatlantic Relations