The Future of Science & Technology Research under Defence

The Future of Science & Technology Research under Defence Controls: A Forum

on DTCB 2015

Date: 10 April 2015

Time: 4.15pm to 5.45pm

Location: Alan Gilbert Building G21 (Theatre 1) University of Melbourne

This forum will first briefly introduce the Defence Trade Controls Act and the amendments newly proposed by Chief Scien<st Ian Chubb's Steering Group (DTCB 2015) and how they will impact science and technology research. Speakers represen<ng a variety of viewpoints will respond, followed by a discussion open to the audience. Program: Dr Greg Adamson (IEEE SSIT): Introduc<on Dr Kevin Korb (Monash): An Overview of DTCA Dr Carlo Kopp (Monash): An Overview of DSGL Kris Browne (Dept of Industry): The Chief Scien<st’s Steering Group Tina Mathewson (Defence Export Controls Organiza<on [DECO]): DTCA 2012 & 2015 Dr Kevin Korb (Monash): Response to DTCB (Senate submission) Simon Wolfe (Blueprint for Free Speech): Response to DTCB (Senate submission) Panel Discussion & Audience Par<cipa<on

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The Future of Science & Technology Research under Defence Controls: A Forum

on DTCB 2015

Ground Rules: Speakers have their allo\ed <mes; I will enforce <me limits. Any saved <me will accrue to Q&A at the end. Ques<ons come at the end, whether from another speaker or the audience. If you think any factual error has been made, bide your <me. Program: •  Dr Greg Adamson (IEEE SSIT): Introduc<on [5 min] •  Dr Kevin Korb (Monash): An Overview of DTCA [15 min] •  Dr Carlo Kopp (Monash): An Overview of DSGL [15 min] •  Kris Browne (Dept of Industry): The Chief Scien<st’s Steering Group [10 min] •  Tina Mathewson (DECO): DTCA 2012 & 2015 [15 min] •  Dr Kevin Korb (Monash): Response to DTCB (Senate submission) [10 min] •  Simon Wolfe (Blueprint for Free Speech): Response to DTCB (Senate submission) [10 min] Ques<on & Answer Session with Audience Par<cipa<on

The Defence Trade Controls Act: 2012 & 2015

Stated Aim: Implement Australian obligations under the Wassenaar Arrangement on military & dual-use trade •  Btw US, UK, Australia and 38 other countries •  US-Australia Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, 2007 •  Bring regulation of trade into the Internet era Wassenaar

Arrangement: Military & Dual-‐Use Control

Lists

US: Interna<onal Traffic in Arms

Australia: DTCA & DSGL

UK: Export Control Act

The Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: Dual-‐Use Provisions

Criminalizes international “supply” to anyone of dual-use goods without prior permit from DECO. Supply included:

•  Publication of research •  Presentations at conferences •  Email •  Telephone conversations •  Educational programs •  Collaboration •  Supervision of students

Penalties: 10 years in prison + $400,000 fine To be at no risk:

•  Engage in no such activity •  Move overseas permanently •  Seek permits for communications in advance •  Switch out of dual-use areas


Criminalizes international “supply” to anyone of dual-use goods without prior permit from DECO. Supply included:

•  Publication of research •  Presentations at conferences •  Email •  Telephone conversations •  Educational programs •  Collaboration •  Supervision of students

RED = 2015 Act exempts; BLUE = 2015 Act affects this


Permit applications to DECO are required for every international communication or project (related series of communications). Permits may be denied. But more importantly if they are granted, then oversight provisions take effect: •  Records must be kept for five years •  Defence may inspect research premises, examine any records, documents,

electronic equipment at any “reasonable” time of day •  Defence may record or make copies of any documents

Defence Strategic Goods List: Dual-‐Use Goods

Targeted research includes:

•  optical communications & computers •  neural networks •  high-performance computing (grids, array processors) •  low-performance ICs (microprocessors) w clock > 40Mhz •  fault-tolerant computing •  cryptography •  bacterial and viral pathogens (e.g., foot-and-mouth disease) •  satellite technology •  image processing •  signal processing •  composites •  robotics

And any software “specially designed or modified for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of the above – e.g., much of Artificial Intelligence.

Defence Strategic Goods List: Exemp<ons

UK exemptions (Export Control Act): US exemptions are more complex, but similar in effect:

Ordinary science & education are exempt!

The communication of information in the ordinary course of scientific research; the making of information generally available to the public; or the communication of information that is generally available to the public!

Defence Strategic Goods List: Exemp<ons

There are three relevant exemptions within the DSGL itself: 1.  basic scientific research 2.  in the public domain 3.  minimum information for a patent application

Important caveats: 1.  Application must be strictly secondary, not primary. I.e., ARC Linkage

projects are not exempted; many ARC Discovery and NHMRC projects will also not be exempt.

2.  Institutions will have to vet all dual-use research for non-public domain aspects. Any mistake can lead to imprisonment. a.  DECO will likewise have to check research against the public domain. b.  è All institutions will need to greatly expand their bureaucracies.

The Defence Trade Controls Act 2015

Main changes to DTCA 2012 re dual-use goods: •  Publications/publication track communications are exempt

Ø  However, ministerial interventions possible •  Oral communications are exempt

Ø  Not written communications; not audio recordings Ø  Importantly: burden of proof reversed!

•  communications to and from APS, ADF, AFP are exempt Ø  Introducing a new class of citizenship

•  Offenses brought under the Criminal Code 1995 Ø  Proof of intent required for successful prosecution

The Defence Trade Controls Act 2015: Publica<on Track

Intangible supply of dual-use goods: Publication and pre-publication communications:

Electronic communica<on of controlled technology from an Australian to a person outside Australia

Making informa<on available to the public, including via subscrip<ons, and ac<vi<es necessary for that

The Defence Trade Controls Act 2015: Supply

Examples of supply criminalized from May 2016 (when not permi\ed): •  Teaching interna<onal students

Ø  MOOCs Ø  Remote supervision Ø  Interna<onal campuses

•  Conferences w/o publica<on. This is explicit in Chubb’s Guide. E.g., Ø  ABNMS 2014 (in New Zealand) Ø  Workshops affiliated w major conferences (UAI, IJCAI, etc.)

•  Interna<onal collabora<ons •  Invited talks around the world when using usb s<cks, etc.

There is a view about that a “verbal” exemp<on covers many of these ac<vi<es, but that rests solely upon a confusion about what “oral” means!

The Defence Trade Controls Act 2015: Rebu\al

What are the main remaining problems with DTCA after the 2015 amendment? 1.  Ordinary (necessary) international scientific activities remain

regulated: •  Collaborative research •  Education •  Seminars

2.  DSGL is overly broad & overly vague 3.  Australia is put at a competitive disadvantage re UK & US (and

everywhere else)


DSGL is overly broad & vague Headline topics cover perhaps 1/3 of high tech & related sciences •  Many qualifications further restrict it •  However, the result is highly complex and ambiguous Chubb: Criminal Code 1995 requires demonstrated intent for successful prosecution. However •  Malicious prosecution requires very little •  Malicious enforcement (oversight) requires nothing; victims

have no redress except the Minister •  Mistaken prosecution requires only confusion


Ordinary science is being criminalized International collaboration is necessary across these fields. •  But is now criminalized. What to do? 1.  Severing international ties would severely handicap research 2.  Regulating all this research will also severely handicap it 3.  Continuing as before puts researchers at arbitrary risk 4.  Publishing all communications in advance would be onerous and

risk plagiarizers taking advantage (e.g, Watson v Pauling on DNA) 5.  Leaving the research or leaving Australia seem the simplest options 6.  Write the UK exemptions into a further amendment


What are the likely social consequences of inaction? Will large number of researchers be thrown in prison? Not likely. But some will, and intimidation will infect everything: •  Researchers and companies will abandon Australia

Ø  This is already happening

•  Foreign students will stop coming to Australia Ø  This is already happening

•  Researchers will switch fields to “innocuous” problems Ø  This is already happening

Australia will pay a high price


What are the likely impacts on industry? Publish your way to safety is difficult for academics, but impossible for most companies. Multinationals are highly unlikely to accept Defence monitoring and control of their research. They will: •  Quarantine dual-use research projects within Australia if they can •  Move research programs out of Australian jurisdiction if they can’t SMEs and consultancies will: •  Shut down •  Move overseas


Chubb: there are ≈ 100 high tech companies affected The Australian Technology Showcase lists 100 high tech companies – beginning with the letter “A” or “B”

My AI company “Bayesian Intelligence Pty Ltd” is not listed, by the way.

A Scenario

Professor Joffrey Passer, a pacifist, researches the ethics of robo<c warfare. In doing so, he annoys many in the Defence establishment. But, as a philosopher, he’s immune to DTCA sanc<ons. His university doesn’t even bother venng his research. One day Prof Passer thinks of a new way to organize and deploy robots in warfare. Were he mercenary, he realizes, he could patent it. But he’s not; he’d rather try to find countermeasures before others think of it. In a pre-‐emp<ve strike, he decides to enlist help for a public campaign. He emails everyone he can think of who might help. In the morning, as he unlocks his office door, half a dozen AFP officers are wai<ng for him.

The Defence Trade Controls Act 2015

The End?

From Bill Rowlings, Civil Liber<es Australia, h'p://www.cla.asn.au/ : What Civil Liber<es Australia has learned from 14 years lobbying MPs and making submissions to parliaments on legisla<on: 1. MPs are not to be trusted. No ma\er what one, or even a few, MPs say, the ONLY way to get the changes you want is if they are wri\en into black-‐le\er law, that is, into new legisla<on. Nice words in an Explanatory Memorandum to a draq Bill are not binding, and are of no prac<cal use – the Chief Judge (Robert French) has said so in a public speech as recently as November 2014; Flowery words and promises in parliamentary speeches are of no value; Words in a media release are even less valuable than that; promises or statements made by MPs in private are not even worth recording. 2. Poli<cians seem powerful, but they are weak on issues like DTCA, because they don’t really know what they are talking about. This par<cularly applies to Ministers, who are usually given blinkers rather than briefings. MPs will change their minds if enough pressure is brought to bear. If 10% of the research and academic community rebelled against the DTCA law, that should be more than enough to make poli<cians see reason. The AAS, segments of CSIRO and a handful of uni would be enough to make MPs worried.

If each person opposed to this spent one hour a week for a month aler<ng their research/academic contacts in Australia and overseas, and asking them to write one small ar<cle or le\er to the editor or le\er to an MP each on the issue, the groundswell would be enormous. Given the various types of media outlets the various people would/could use, the impact would – of just one month’s ac<vity – would go on for 6 months. 3. Defence – and virtually the en<re federal public sector -‐– do not understand risk management. If they had to operate in the real world, where risk is inherent in every decision, they would go broke within a year. The ul<mate legisla<on needs to balance individual rights and research/academic rights with the na<on’s rights. The key word is “balance”. The current legisla<on is outrageously slanted towards a Defence Department: overwhelmingly, completely. Defence only understands total control, because that is how military command management operates: researchers operate in environments of uncertainty and risk at every step of the journey, from idea concep<on to product or service comple<on. Defence in Australia has to learn that real-‐life outside the ‘total ins<tu<on’ that is the military cannot be proscribed by law. Australia and Australians and not subject to Defence: it’s the other way around.

Some comments posted at slashdot in response to Rowlings’ ar<cle “Worse than TPP?” h\p://www.cla.asn.au/News/defence-‐pilloried-‐by-‐senate-‐test-‐pilot/: “I'm outraged by this law, sure. But I'm doubly outraged that I had to read on slashdot that this just passed the senate and there has been ZERO coverage of this in the mainstream media. Shame on you Fairfax, News Ltd and ABC. You went to sleep and betrayed us.” “If they criminalize research and communicaPon regarding IT security, they will soon be without it.” “This effecPvely criminalizes half of all science related acPvity at colleges. It's not just the best and brightest it's literally asking the Ark to sail ...” “The USA already did that for a while, hence RSA having to do their work offshore for many years due to u'erly insane export restricPons.” “The reason for the law "The DTCA is intended to simplify trade between Australia, the US and the UK" that being imports from the US and UK. So yeah, it basically kills research in Australia on purpose, to force it into import only mode ...” “What this law actually does is drive any serious research out of Australia to other countries. Like say, China. Well done.” “Australian geeks and scienPsts: The weather is also nice in Silicon Valley, and they pay be'er. Do you really need another reason to leave?”

Documents

The Future of Science & Technology Research under Defence