The future of democracy in Melanesia: What role for outside powers?

Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 44, No. 3, December 2003ISSN: 1360-7456, pp225–241

© Victoria University of Wellington, 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing.

The future of democracy in Melanesia:

What role for outside powers?

John Henderson

Abstract:

This paper critically examines the role of outside powers,particularly Australia and New Zealand, in meeting the challengesto democracy in Melanesia. The shortcomings of the Westminsterpolitical system in the fragmented societies of Melanesia arecontrasted with the possible advantages of a Presidential system.The ‘good governance’ requirements of aid donors are considered,along with more direct forms of intervention – including armedforces in the case of the Solomon Islands. The paper concludes thatdemocracy cannot be imposed, and that attempts to do so makesnonsense of the term.

Keywords:

Bougainville, democracy and governance, Fiji, militarycoups, Melanesia, Solomon Islands, Westminster system

In recent years Pacific Island states have experienced a growing level of polit-ical instability. Melanesia is the part of Oceania where democracy has beenmost directly challenged. It has experienced the region’s only military coups– two in Fiji in 1987, and again in Fiji and the Solomon Islands in 2000.Papua New Guinea has been disrupted by army mutinies, and in 2002 wentthrough a particularly violent election. Vanuatu continues to face internal ten-sions that could produce further rebellions and political unrest (See Ewins,1992; Ambrose, 1996; Dobell, 2000; Kabutaulaka, 2000).

This high degree of regional conflict has given rise to concern about the‘Africanisation’ of the Pacific, and the prospects of ‘failed states’ (seeShearer, 2000; and Reilly, 2002). The inference – much of which is question-able – (see Fraenkel, 2000) is that the Pacific states are the authors of theirown misfortune. This paper seeks to widen the analysis by consideringthe following factors: the difficulty of defining democracy; the creation bycolonial powers of ‘artificial states’ with inappropriate political systems; theimposition of the ‘good governance’ conditions by aid donors; and the response

Author: John Henderson, Political Science Department, University of Canterbury, Christ-

church, New Zealand. Email: [email protected]

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by Australia and New Zealand to the challenge to Pacific island democracybrought about by political instability, the breakdown of law and order, andmilitary coups. The focus is on Melanesia, with particular attention beingdirected at Fiji and the Solomon Islands. The overall objective is to look atthe role of outside powers, especially Australia and New Zealand, in both con-tributing to, and helping resolve, the growing wave of political uncertainty andchallenges to democracy in Melanesia.

This analysis draws on the approach developed by the Stockholm basedInternational Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) whichwas established in 1995 with the overall objective of promoting ‘sustainabledemocracy’. Its members include governments, international organisationsand NGOs. IDEA’s method for assessing the state of democracy broadens theconcern from constitutional and institutional arrangements to focus on howdemocratic values and principles influence the way political systems operatein practice. The focus is on both the processes and outcomes of government,and it seeks to avoid any bias against non-Western forms of government(International IDEA, 2001). For IDEA the two key concerns are accountabil-ity and equality – popular control over public decision making and decisionmakers, and equality between citizens in the exercise of that control. Theapproach stresses that democracy is not an all-or-nothing process but a matterof degree: the extent ‘to which people can exercise a controlling influenceover public policy and policy-makers, enjoy equal treatment at their hands andhave their voices heard equally’ (Beetham, 2002: 4). Democracy is consideredto be on a continuum, rather than in ‘black or white’ terms. The questionsasked by IDEA about key democratic principles are: ‘how much? how far?to what extent?’ rather than making a judgement on whether the country isdemocratic or not.

In Oceania much attention has been focused on the degree to which cultureimpacts on the form and style of the democracy. In this regard, the definitionoffered by Ron Crocombe is worth noting. Democracy is a political system inwhich:

1) The leaders are selected, by processes appropriate to that context, by thosewhom they lead; and

2) That the leadership is responsive to the wishes of the people led. Thatresponsiveness should include appropriate systems of accountability foreffective performance (Crocombe, 1992: 9).

As with the IDEA approach, this definition puts the emphasis on accountabil-ity, and has the advantage of enabling an assessment to be made of both thetraditional and modern state.

In many traditional systems the ideal of consensus decision-making has beenhighlighted (for a selection of Pacific views of democracy see Ravuvu, 1991;Crocombe, 1992b; Helu, 1994; and Ewins, 1998). Of course there were (andare) also more hierarchical and authoritarian chiefly systems – particularly inPolynesia. The IDEA and Crocombe definitions call for an assessment on the

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degree to which traditional chiefs and other leaders can be held accountablefor their actions. To this day there is a need to ensure that chiefly appeals totradition and culture are not used to form a respectable veneer for authorit-arian rule (see Lawson, 2002). While it can be argued that a particular form ofdemocratic government – such as the Westminster system is a ‘foreign flower’in the Pacific (Larmour, 1994), the same argument cannot be made foraccountable government. There is a need for further research on the variety ofways different cultures have for achieving political accountability. The keypoint is that to be ‘democratic’ a political system must require leaders to beanswerable for their actions – or inactions.

Whatever can be said of the colonial era, it did not provide an effectivetraining ground for democracy. Power rested in the hands of the colonial power,and was only tentatively shared in the period leading up to independence.Furthermore, arguments that independence was granted too early assume thesystem being ‘trained’ for was appropriate to the new states’ circumstances.

ARTIFICIAL NATIONS

The most lasting legacy of the colonial era, and which has directly contributedto the region’s political instability, has been the artificial nature of nationalboundaries. This is especially the case with Papua New Guinea, and theSolomon Islands. In some cases – most notably Fiji – this was further com-plicated by the importation of foreign labour that then settled and changedthe population mix.

Some sense of belonging to a state is an essential first step towards achiev-ing democratic government. That is why the International IDEA frameworkmakes it one of their first sets of democratic assessment questions. These coversuch issues as the sense of nationhood and consensus on state boundaries andconstitutional arrangements (see Beetham, 2002: 7). In the Pacific this issue ofnationhood – or rather the lack of it – helps explain the political vulnerability ofseveral island states (on weak states in Melanesia see Larmour, 1998).

Colonial borders were established to reflect the interests of the Europeanpowers, and paid scant regard to local culture or geography. Especially inMelanesia, this has resulted in ethnic conflict that has done much to under-mine democratic government. The origins of the bitter decade of Papua NewGuinea’s civil war in Bougainville in the 1990s, and the more recent internalstrife in the Solomon Islands, can be traced to the drawing of boundarieswhich ignored local culture, and in which the indigenous people had no sayuntil the eve of independence.

Pacific island states have had to make do with their inherited boundaries.There are some rare exceptions. Britain agreed that the two island groupings mak-ing up the Gilbert and Ellice Islands could part at independence and becomethe separate nations of Kiribati and Tuvalu – reflecting their Micronesian andPolynesian cultures respectively. In Micronesia the Federate States of Micronesia,the Marshall Islands and Palau were able to end the Congress of Micronesia,and become states freely associated with the United States.


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The problem of ‘artificial nations’ is more severe in Melanesia than inPolynesia. In the hierarchical chiefly systems of Polynesia authority extendedover whatever territory could be secured through battle or other means, and inthis way more closely resembled Western nations. This contrasts sharply withthe diffuse and local nature of political authority in Melanesia where, as aresult, sentiments of nationhood have been much slower to develop.

In addition to paying scant regard to culture the colonial boundaries gaveinsufficient consideration to the establishment of states that could one day beviable economic entities. In this regard the larger and resource rich Melanesianstates are more fortunate than their much smaller Polynesian neighbours. Butpolitical instability has prevented these Melanesian states from being able toreap the benefit of these resources.

Any attempt to redraw national boundaries would be likely to create moreconflict than it would resolve. However, there is considerable scope to devolvepower to local authorities within these borders, and in this way help meet localaspirations. This effectively has been the negotiated ‘solution’ to the Bougainvilledispute and could, given time, also help resolve strife in West Papua and theSolomon Islands.

INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL SYSTEMS

One of the problems of moving to more devolved political systems is that itclashes with the centralised nature of the inherited Westminster political system.This raises the question of whether the Westminster system, which formedthe central part of the independence constitutions, is itself a major part of theproblem of political instability.

The notion of a ‘written’ Westminster constitution is itself paradoxical.The original Westminster systems – such as in the United Kingdom and NewZealand – do not have formal written constitutions. The essence of the systemis that parliament remains the highest court in the land, and is ultimately ableto act unrestricted by a constitution. The scope for judicial review remains verylimited, and related to process, not substance.

All the former colonial territories in the Pacific administered by Britain,Australia and New Zealand were provided with formal written constitutions.The detailed nature of these constitutions – book length in the case of PapuaNew Guinea – seemed to reflect a naïve expectation that if the rules of gov-ernment were written down they could be made to work. Tradition and culturewere not ignored, but generally confined to the pre-amble. The hard questionsof reconciling traditional and Westminster practices were generally leftunresolved.

Samoa is a notable exception. Allowance was made for it to retain its

matai

system, which allowed only the

matai

heads of families to vote or stand forelection to parliament. Universal suffrage was not introduced until it wasendorsed by a 1990 referendum, and the restriction of parliamentary can-didates to

matai

remains. It has been argued (Tcherkezoff, 2000) that theSamoan system ‘enhances’, rather than restricts democracy. This is because

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matai

are held accountable to the extended families they are responsible for,and which selects them for their leadership role. Nevertheless cases of

matai

loosing their authority for non-performance are rare. While the

matai

systemhas provided stability accountability has been poor.

A number of Pacific Island constitutions provide for matters of tradition,culture, land and language, to be the responsibility of Councils of Chiefs. Themost visible of these is the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs – the Bose Vakaturaga– ironically created during the colonial era. Other chiefly bodies, which inpractice have little effective political authority, are the House of Ariki in theCook Islands, National Council of Chiefs in Vanuatu and Council of Iroij inthe Marshall Islands.

There have been calls for the ‘burden’ of the independence constitutions tobe removed and a greater role to be given to traditional authority. Ongoingresearch by this author found competing evidence for the proposition that themore traditional the political system (or the less the outside influence) themore stable it is. This is a proposition that those sympathetic to the Tonganmonarchy like to argue (e.g. Campbell, 2001). But stability can stifle demo-cracy. Furthermore, in Tonga stability may be put under pressure followingthe reign of the present monarch. The experience of Samoa gives further cred-ence to the proposition. However change, by its nature, can be destabilising.Greater democracy may mean more, not less, instability. There are implica-tions here for outside states concerned about regional political instability toconsider.

What is wrong with the Westminster system?

Given the very different cultural and historical settings in which the West-minster political system evolved, it is not surprising that difficulties have beenexperienced in transplanting it to Pacific environments (Larmour, 1994). Forinstance, problems have arisen with the fundamental Westminster divisionbetween government and opposition Members of Parliament. This confronta-tional approach clashes with the Pacific ideal (seldom achieved in practice atthe national level) of consensus decision making. The government/oppositionsplit is considered to be divisive and wasteful of scarce financial and humanresources. It seems strange to be paying politicians to challenge the govern-ment; hence the yearning that emerges from time to time for governments ofnational unity. It makes sense in small societies to work together to promotethe common good. But this has proved extraordinarily difficult to achieve inpractice. Politics is by its nature a competitive vocation.

Deviations from the Westminster system to promote unity may create a wholenew series of problems. The 1997 Fiji constitution sought to ensure powersharing between ethnically based political parties by requiring that any partygaining 10 percent or more seats in the House of Representatives is entitled torepresentation in the Cabinet. At the time of writing in mid 2003 the matterhad been referred to the Supreme Court for resolution. Outside critics, includ-ing the governments of Australia and New Zealand might reflect on how they


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would respond to a requirement to have key Opposition members in theirCabinet. New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff, has been a harshcritic of Fiji’s deviations from democracy, but has acknowledged that hewould find it difficult to work under such a system.

The problems with power sharing arrangements go beyond competingpolitical agendas and personality clashes. The greater the emphasis on con-sensus, the less the vigilance of government that opposition MPs ideally shouldmaintain. The Westminster system gives the parliamentary opposition thejob of keeping the government honest. But procedures such as parliamentaryquestion time and the committee system (and particularly public accountscommittees) are only poorly established in most Pacific parliaments. Theissue of integrity is the key to government holding or regaining the trust ofthe people they represent. Governments cannot do this alone. An effectiveOpposition is essential to make accountability work.

Political parties and electoral systems

Political parties are widely regarded as vital ingredients of Westminster demo-cracy through linking the rulers and the ruled. But parties have proved to be aparticularly divisive factor in the Pacific context. Some of the smaller states –such as Niue and Tuvalu – have at times sought to run non-party systems. Butin order to work the Westminster system requires strong stable parties –ideally just two in number – to form the Government and the Opposition.These should in theory be provided by the first-past-the-post (FPP) majoritarianelectoral system. But the Pacific has proved to be the exception to one of thefew ‘golden rules’ of the discipline of political science: that FPP will producea stable two party system. The left / right ideological division that reinforcesthe two party system is generally not relevant in the Pacific. Proportional rep-resentation (PR) electoral systems, on the other hand can be relied upon toproduce multi-party systems. But the Pacific experience has been for FPPto produce weak ‘unbounded’ multi-party systems more characteristic of PRsystems (Steeves, 1996).

This has particularly been the case in Melanesia where a weak party systemhas become weaker. In recent elections the trend has been for an increasingnumber of parties (40 in the 2002 Papua New Guinea [PNG] election) andindependent candidates (about half of those taking part in the PNG election).Party allegiance may be established after rather than before the election.While Papua New Guinea can be considered an extreme case, it is the direc-tion in which the rest of Melanesia, and to a lesser extent the wider region, isheading.

Of course it can be argued that the ‘problem’ is an excess rather than adeficit of democracy. The argument can be made that it is better to electindependent representatives who are not dictated to by a party. However, theissue is that without parties it is very difficult for voters to know what, inpolicy terms, they are voting for. The vote tends to be made for candidates, notgovernments or particular policies. The problem becomes more difficult as the

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number of candidates increases – further evidence of an ‘excess’ of demo-cracy. As happened in the 2002 election in PNG, up to 60 candidates maycontest one constituency – giving victory to a candidate who has gained just10 per cent (or even less) of the deeply divided vote. In these cases the electedmember in effect represents only their clan.

These types of problems have given rise to plans for PNG to go back to thepreferential voting system it used prior to independence. But the controversialuse by parties of the distribution of preferences in the most recent Fiji elec-tions demonstrates that there is no simple solution. Practicing democracy isdifficult. There is no perfect electoral system (as New Zealand is finding outafter moving from FFP to the proportional Mixed Member Proportional[MMP] system). Proposals to limit the number of parties and politicians arecriticised as being undemocratic.

Having too many parties and candidates is certainly preferable to havingtoo few. The long dominance in Samoa of the Human Rights Protection Party(HRPP) has caused concern about one-party rule, although elections havedemonstrated no lack of Opposition candidates and parties. The governingparty has made maximum use of the power of incumbency. The net result isthat arguably Samoan suffers from too little rather than excessive instability.

In most Pacific states research by this author has found that elections pro-duce around 50 per cent turnover of MPs. This makes it difficult to build upa body of experienced MPs from which a Westminster type Cabinet can beformed. It is not surprising that problems arise when a high proportion ofMinisters have no previous parliamentary experience, limited education andunderstanding of their responsibilities. Of course ‘experience’ can be bothpositive and negative – as is seen the reluctance of some corrupt politicians tochange their ways.

The weakness of the party system is particularly evident in the growingtendency of MPs to change their party following an election. This is knownas ‘party-hopping’ – or ‘waka (Maori canoe) jumping’ in New Zealand. Notsurprisingly, MPs want to join the ‘winning’ side – and take up opportunities ofpolitical and personal enrichment they could not achieve from the Oppositionbenches. A number of countries (including New Zealand, Papua New Guineaand Fiji) have adopted laws to prevent ‘party hopping’ – but with mixed results.Opponents of this type of legislation argue that elected MPs should be free tofollow their individual conscience (although the nature of the ‘conscience’ isopen to question).

The issue of ‘party-hopping’ is particularly relevant to the wider problemof maintaining political stability. Under the Westminster system the PrimeMinister remains in office for as long as they can enjoy the confidence oftheir party and a majority of MPs. Where disciplined party systems operate thiscan generally be taken for granted. But this is not the case in weak multi-partysystems, where a Prime Minister must constantly work to maintain the coali-tion that forms their support base. They are at all times vulnerable to votes ofno confidence, and Prime Ministers and governments may change outside ofgeneral elections.


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Would a presidential system be better?

The key difference between the Westminster and Presidential systems is theseparation of powers between the three branches of government, the execut-ive, legislature and judiciary. The President is directly elected, rather thanchosen from the legislature. Both the legislative and executive branches areelected for fixed terms of office. The Courts ensure the actions of the othertwo branches are in accord with the constitution.

There are several possible advantages to be gained from the Presidentialmodel. In parts of the region, particularly in Polynesia, it would be closer totraditional chiefly systems than parliamentary systems. The fixed term ofoffice avoids (short of impeachment) the instability created by votes of noconfidence. The need for the President to campaign nation-wide to achieveelection could ideally have a unifying effect. The requirement for the Presidentto choose their cabinet from outside parliament opens up a greater range ofexperience and expertise. The division of powers helps ensure accountability.

It is interesting to observe that in Micronesia, where the U.S. presence hasbeen influential, there are several kinds of political ‘hybrids’ that sought tocombine the best features of both Westminster and Presidential systems. Forinstance, in Kiribati those aspiring to be President must first gain election tothe legislature, and then that body’s nomination for the Presidency. A nationwide poll follows. In the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) the Presidentis elected by Congress from amongst the four ‘at large’ members elected torepresent the states, but the one chosen to be President must resign from thelegislature in order to maintain the division of powers. Two other Micronesianstates, the Marshall Islands and Nauru, use Presidential terminology, butfollow Westminster practice, including the selection of the President by thelegislature, and the ability to move votes of no confidence.

Presidential systems are closely associated with federal forms of govern-ment, and this raises the question of whether federalism would deliver moreeffective government to Pacific countries troubled by ethnic and regionalconflict. Only Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia are full federalsystems. In Melanesia Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are pro-vincial systems, but ultimate power remains with the central government. Acase can be made that the problems of ‘artificial nations’ referred to earliermay have been better met if more powers had been delegated to state levelgovernments. There are proposals for the Solomon Islands to adopt a federalsystem. A confederal system of strong state and weak central government mayhelp lower tensions in divided nations. Ideally the confederal approach couldencourage not fragmentation but a coming together, for instance, of a newconfederal state of Melanesia.

There is no perfect system. But it would help for the former colonial powersof the region to recognise that Pacific political systems, like their own, needto evolve. It is not surprising that problems have occurred with transplantedsystems. These problems rest in good part with the former colonial power –which should give encouragement, not criticism, to creative Pacific ways to

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modify imported political systems to enhance effective and accountable gov-ernment. There is scope here for pro-active action to explore alternatives.

‘GOOD GOVERNANCE’: WHOSE GOOD?

The first part of this paper has examined the lasting influence on PacificIsland politics of two legacies of the colonial era: national boundaries and theWestminster political system. Attention will now turn to what some Pacificleaders regard as a second wave of colonialism what has become the ‘creed’of ‘good-governance’ insisted upon by aid donors (Larmour, 1998b). Thissupposedly universal template for effective government is part of the widerinfluence of globalisation – which is making the influence of boundaries andparticular political systems less relevant. However, there are ‘motherhood’elements to ‘good governance’. Who could be against it? No one advocates‘bad’ governance (although some practice it).

‘Good governance’ was defined at the 2000 Kiribati Forum in the Biketawadeclaration as the practice of open, transparent, accountable, participatory,consultative, and decisive but fair and equitable government. The same declara-tion referred to the ‘inalienable right’ of all citizens to participate in thepolitical process, and the need to uphold democratic principles and institu-tions which reflect national and local circumstances, including the peacefultransfer of power, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Theimportance of respecting and promoting indigenous rights and cultural valueswas also recognised (Pacific Island Forum, 2000). The significance of civilsociety and role of non-government organisations is stressed (Iati, 2000). Theselaudable principles are clearly uncontroversial – but, as critics have pointedout, (Macpherson and MacPherson, 2000) – they are more easily stated thanattained or interpreted in the Pacific context.

Problems arise between aid donors and recipients when the adoption ofparticular good governance reforms considered important by the donor aremade a condition of receiving aid. It is at this point that accusations of neo-colonialism arise and questions are asked about whose good is being pursued.(For a critical analysis of good governance see Macdonald, 1998; and Leftwich,1993.) From the donors’ point of view, the lack of good governance pro-vided the answer to the ‘Pacific paradox’ – why large amounts of aid had notproduced economic development. The answer was poor governance (whichconveniently put the blame for non-achievement on the aid recipients). Adirect link was made between the two ‘goods’ of democracy and economicdevelopment. What was good for democracy was good for development andvice versa. While not disagreeing with the laudable goals of good governance,Pacific Island states have been quick to cite other factors (such as small size,remoteness, limited products, transport costs) as the reasons for low levels ofeconomic growth.

There is a great irony in linking certain Western principles of democraticgovernance to the granting of aid. Donor nations that seek to force democracyand honest and efficient government on recipients by imposing conditions on


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aid are clearly themselves guilty of an undemocratic act. In a true democracygovernments will choose their own economic policy, and then be subject tothe judgement of their own people – the voters – not by outside donor powers.It is not surprising that aid recipients protest at what appears to them to beunjustifiable interference in their domestic affairs. It seems to be the mostrecent attempt by outside powers to try and remake aid recipients in their ownimage. Aid donors are of course free to decide what they do with their ownmoney. But there is, as International IDEA’s assessment framework high-lights, a need for aid donors to reflect on their own democratic actions‘beyond the state’ – on the degree to which their external relations are con-ducted in accordance with democratic norms.

A brief analysis will now be made of four key concerns of ‘good govern-ance’ – legitimacy, accountability, respect and competence – to assess theextent to which they reflect aid donor and/or recipient concerns. In Westernstyle democracies the

legitimacy

of a government comes from periodic freeand fair elections that provide their mandate to govern. But the degree towhich Western-style elections confer legitimacy can be questioned. Forinstance, in recent US Presidential elections only around half the eligiblevoters cast a ballot – a much lower rate than in most Pacific island states.Furthermore, in the Pacific the introduction of outside political systemswould challenge rather than support the legitimacy of the state. This couldarguably be the case if Tonga was ‘forced’ to democratise.

The governance literature (e.g. World Bank, 1992, 1994) gives considerableattention to the notion of

accountability

– the holding of politicians and offi-cials accountable for their actions and inactions. To achieve this there must be,in the buzzword of the governance literature,

transparency

. There is no dis-agreement by either aid donors or recipients that these are desirable goals.There is clearly a direct link between accountability and the exposure ofcorruption. The media have a central role to play in ensuring accountability.This can be a difficult task in small, tightly knit societies, where the actions ofthe media can be branded divisive and culturally insensitive.

Nevertheless, as the earlier Crocombe definition of democracy highlighted,there is a need to recognise that accountability demands did not originate inmodern day governance requirements and formal leadership codes. There is astrong Pacific tradition that chiefs who do not fulfil their obligations will bestripped of their right to hold leadership positions. In traditional times ineptleadership could be literally fatal. As noted, there is a need for further researchto establish just how often ‘failing’ leaders were replaced.

The governance literature stresses the need to respect and uphold humanrights and the rule of law. From a Pacific perspective the emphasis on indi-vidual human rights clashes with more traditional concerns for collective –or family, community or village – rights. There is also an understandableconcern that equal attention should be given to economic and social rights.Nevertheless there is also general agreement that the rule of law is important, notjust for reasons of justice and humanity (including the removal of discrimina-tion against women and minority groups) but also because it is essential for

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economic development that commerce knows the rules in advance, and can beconfident that they will be fairly administered and enforced.

The early governance focus was on economic reform, and improving thecompetence and effectiveness of the government. But this can directly clashwith democratic values. Economic reforms required by the structural adjust-ment process may be highly unpopular. For instance, there has been a particu-larly high political cost for leaders of small states where the government isthe main employer, and ‘structural adjustments’ have required severe cuts inthe size of the public service.

There is no doubt that a better standard of governance is required in Oceania.But there is also a need for donor states to recognise that part of this need arisesfrom the ‘disconnection’ between traditional and Western forms of governance.To be effective there needs to be a Pacific solution to the governance issue.

REGIONAL RESPONSE TO DEMOCRATIC COLLAPSE

The new democracies of Melanesia have faced a range of security challenges– including secession struggles, military coups and the breakdown of law andorder. A brief examination follows on the regional responses to these securitythreats. Possible responses vary widely from doing nothing, on the grounds ofnon-interference in the internal affairs of island states, to armed interventionto restore law and order and uphold democratically elected governments.

Secession struggles are not surprising, given the artificial nature of theMelanesian states. Indeed, it is surprising that there have not been moreattempts to break up existing states (see Migdal, 1998). At the time of inde-pendence the island of Santo sought to secede from Vanuatu. It was preventedfrom doing so by Papua New Guinean forces transported by the AustralianAir force. Earlier, in 1975, Papua New Guinea’s island of Bougainville alsoattempted to break away on the eve of independence. Political negotiationsprovided a temporary solution, but in 1990 Bougainville unilaterally declaredits independence. A bitter civil war followed before peace talks hosted byNew Zealand in 1997 brought an end of the fighting. An unarmed peacemonitoring force was initially provided mainly by New Zealand. Australiatook over this task in 1998, with the assistance of forces from New Zealand anda number of Pacific island states, including Fiji and Vanuatu. In June 2003 asmaller civilian Bougainville Transitional Team replaced the Peace Monitor-ing group. Bougainville has been granted a high degree of autonomy, and areferendum on independence is expected to be held between 2012 and 2015.Although there remain problems associated with the collection of weapons, theBougainville settlement is an example of how the region can work togetherto resolve a serious security issue.

Military coups

Compared with other regions, the Pacific has experienced relatively few milit-ary coups. The reason is the absence of armed forces (which are maintained by


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only Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu). However, as the SolomonIslands uprising in June 2000 demonstrated, police forces may also assistinformal militia in deposing an elected government. Furthermore Papua NewGuinea and Vanuatu have experienced army mutinies.

Although the New Zealand and Australian governments harshly condemnedthe 1987 Fiji coups, and introduced sanctions, armed intervention was nevera serious option. Nevertheless a powerful myth has emerged in Fiji, and evenwithin sections of the New Zealand military, that New Zealand planned toinvade and reverse the coup (Crocombe, 1992c: 210; Harmon, 1998). How-ever, although the deposed democratically elected Prime Minister TimociBavadra managed to smuggle out a request for assistance, armed interventionby New Zealand or Australia was not contemplated. To use military forcewould, as New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange repeatedly stressed, be areturn to the colonial era of gunboat diplomacy (Lange, 1987: 8–9; Lange,1990: 162).

The military preparations made by New Zealand and Australia related to theprotection of their citizens and diplomatic personnel in Fiji. For New Zealandthe hijacking of an Air New Zealand aircraft complicated the situation. Thiswas resolved without the need to use New Zealand Special Forces, which inany case would only have been deployed with the agreement of the Fiji militaryauthorities (Henderson, 1998).

At the time of the May 2000 Fiji coup there was much less speculationabout a New Zealand or Australian military response. While the coup itselfwas more violent than in 1987, foreign nationals were not considered to beunder threat. This time the emphasis was on ‘smart’ sanctions that targetedthose involved in the coup, and avoided adding to the hardships of ordinaryFijians. It should be noted that in both 1987 and 2000 most Pacific islandgovernments, in contrast to Australia and New Zealand, were sympathetictowards the Fiji position. For Pacific states indigenous rights were rated morehighly than democratic ones.

Although the 2003 Australian led interventionist force – which is discussedfurther below – was not related to a military coup, it nevertheless sent a strongmessage that outside intervention could be triggered by future coups. TheSolomon Islands force is evidence that in future Australia, in particular, willbe taking a harder, and more interventionist, stance against regional instability.

Solomon Islands, 2000 and 2003

The extent of the change in attitudes by Australia, and to a lesser extent NewZealand, towards armed intervention in Melanesia is evident in the differentresponses to the requests made for assistance by the Solomon Islands in 2000and 2003. In 2000 Prime Minister Bart Ulufa’alu made repeated requests forAustralian and New Zealand security assistance in the six months leading upto the armed takeover. His pleas fell on deaf ears. This failure to respond tothe Solomon Island plea for help to resolve the law and order problem in thefirst half of 2000 meant that the disintegration of democratic government went

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unchecked. It is the only case of a Pacific Island state being refused helpdespite repeated requests for assistance from the friendly governments ofAustralia and New Zealand. It is not possible to assess what difference a pos-itive response might have made. But there is a strong possibility that it couldhave prevented the armed takeover by militia in June 2000.

During the next two years limited help was provided by Australia and NewZealand to disarm the militias, but widespread lawlessness continued. Anelection held in December 2001 changed little. As has been observed it wasa case of: ‘The operation succeeded. The patient died’ (Roughan, pers. comm,2003). The government failed to provide basic law and order, and warlordswent unchecked. Public servants were paid only intermittently. Former militia,in contrast, were made special constables, and used their weapons to ensurethey got paid.

The reluctance of both Australia and New Zealand to intervene in 2000was the lack of a credible ‘exit’ strategy. The fear was that having intervenedit would not be possible to get out of the ‘quagmire’ of the Solomon’s manypolitical, economic and security problems. But, as has been pointed out (Dobell,2003), Oceania is the region of the world where Australia and New Zealandare located and cannot escape.

It took the October 2002 terrorist bombing in Bali, Indonesia, which killed88 Australians, to drive home this point and bring about a radical change inAustralian policy. In June 2003 the Australian Government announced that itintended to lead a regional intervention force of over 2000 police and militarypersonnel to restore law and order in the Solomon Islands. Expertise was alsoto be provided to reconstruct government services and the economy. While themilitary part of the operation was expected to last only months, the police andadministrative support may be in place for the next decade (as the interventionwas taking place at the time of writing it was not possible to assess its outcome).

In an effort to counter criticism that the action was ‘neo-colonial’ theAustralian Government coined the term ‘cooperative intervention’. The processof consultation is important, as it is likely to form the basis of future regionalinterventions. A formal request, backed by Parliamentary agreement, wasrequired by Australia from the Solomon Island government. Furthermore, theagreement and active participation of the Pacific Island Forum was obtained ata special meeting of Forum Foreign Ministers held in Sydney. While the forceremained predominantly Australian, New Zealand made a contribution of 140,and Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Kiribati and Tonga all made smallcontributions of police and (if they had them) military personnel.

In effect the Biketawa declaration, agreed upon at the Kiribati Forum in2000 to provide for collective action to resolve regional security problems,was given teeth. While the declaration did not refer to armed intervention, itdid provide for a special regional meeting to ‘consider other options’ (PacificIsland Forum, 2000). Although the precedent of regional consultation hasbeen established, future unilateral intervention by Australia – where regionalagreement is sought after the event – cannot be ruled out. Australian ForeignMinister Alexander Downer has spoken of the ‘strong message’ of the Solomon


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intervention: ‘There is a point where we can’t sit by. There is a point wherewe want to engage with these (Pacific Island) countries and get the problemfixed’ (

Weekend Herald

, New Zealand, June 21–22, 2003). Prime MinisterJohn Howard has warned that the ‘sovereignty’ of a number of Pacific Islandstates was now at ‘risk’ because of ‘corruption and lawlessness’, and suggestedthat further interventions might be necessary (Radio Australia, 2 July, 2003).

The South Pacific looks north

The reasons for a regional response to the Solomon Islands’ many problemsextended beyond the moral obligation of being a good neighbour. If there wasnot an effective response from within the region outsiders may be drawn in.Indeed, one of the reasons for the timing of Australian intervention may havebeen reports that, having failed to get assistance from Australia and NewZealand, the Solomon Islands were making overtures to Indonesia.

There are limits beyond which external pressure which is designed to rein-force democracy and good governance may prove to be counter productive.The foreign policy dynamics of the region are changing, and the influence ofAustralia and New Zealand is declining. All the Commonwealth Pacific Islandstates are now members of the European Union aid grouping, the ACP. Pacificislands are increasingly looking north to Asia and gaining a receptive response(Pettman, 2001). For instance, Japan is the major regional donor and hostssummits every three years with Pacific Island Heads of Government.

There are other countries along the outer rim of the Oceania region that donot share Australia and New Zealand’s commitment to the Western values ofliberal democracy. China is becoming increasingly active in the region andoffered sympathetic assistance to Fiji following the coups. Its rival, Taiwan,has bankrolled the Solomon Islands following the collapse of its economybrought on by ethnic conflict. Island states have praised China’s attitude of‘non-interference’ in the affairs of its aid recipients. The ‘lack of strings’attached to Chinese aid has been favourably contrasted with alleged ‘bullying’by Australia and New Zealand (Henderson and Reilly, 2003: 103). Fiji PrimeMinister Laisenia Qarase returned from a 2002 visit to China praising hishosts for not criticising or imposing sanctions on Fiji after the coups (as didBritain, Australia, New Zealand the European Union and the US). Indonesiacan also be expected to play a greater role in Pacific affairs, and has recentlyopened a mission in Fiji.

CONCLUSION: ENHANCING PACIFIC DEMOCRACY

Enhancing democracy presents aid donors with a delicate challenge. There aretwo actions it is important to avoid. Trends to date suggest that it is not in theinterests of democracy or regional stability to provide military assistance. Theisland states do not face direct external military threats. In the few island statesthat possess armed forces there has been a disturbing tendency for the militaryto become involved in politics.

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It is also wise for aid donors to avoid ‘megaphone’ diplomacy. Lectures onthe virtues of democracy and public rebukes delivered by outside powers arelikely to be resented and be counter productive. So too is the apportioning ofblame. While statements on what – for instance – Australia and New Zealandconsider to be human and democratic rights issues, are of course appropriate,a demand that Pacific Island states share these beliefs is not. Lecturing is seenas hectoring.

What might be helpful would be a public recognition from Western powersthat transplanting a ‘foreign’ system of government into countries of vastlydifferent cultures and circumstances was bound to run into difficulties. Not allthe ‘blame’ for democratic shortcomings rest with the Island states. As thispaper has pointed out, they did not determine their borders, or constitutionalsystems. Furthermore, as International IDEA likes to stress, democracy is anideal that is only more or less achieved. The aid donor states are themselvesfar from perfect, for instance in regard to their treatment of indigenous peoples(as has been pointed out by Pacific states).

There needs to be recognition that there are other ways beyond the West-minster route towards achieving accountable government – which is theessence of democracy. At the same time, fancy constitutional engineering –such as the power sharing required in the Fiji cabinet – cannot work if they areoutside the realms of political reality. The unpleasant reality of Fiji is that if anIndo-Fijian again becomes Prime Minister there is likely to be another coup.

Democratic and good governance values cannot be imposed. Signing loftydeclarations is much less important than the practical implementation ofdemocratic ideals, particularly those relating to accountability. To be effectivedemocratic principles must be believed and come from within rather than beimposed from without. The only form of democracy that will flourish in Fiji,the Solomon Islands and other Pacific islands will be home grown. Attemptsto force a country to be ‘democratic’ make a nonsense of the term.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Parts of this paper were presented to the Preparatory Meeting of the 2002Round Table of Heads of Government of Commonwealth Pacific IslandCountries on the Challenges to Democracy in the Pacific, Nadi, Fiji, 15–20August 2002, and to the Workshop on Fiji and the Solomon Islands, PacificStudies, Victoria University of Wellington, 29–30 August, 2002. The financialassistance of the Commonwealth Secretariat is acknowledged with gratitude.The author wishes to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful com-ments and suggestions, many of which have been included in this article.

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