The False Hopes of 1950: The Wafd's Last Hurrah and the Demise of Egypt's Old Order

The False Hopes of 1950: The Wafd's Last Hurrah and the Demise of Egypt's Old OrderAuthor(s): Joel GordonSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1989), pp. 193-214Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163074 .

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 21 (1989), 193-214. Printed in the United States of America

Joel Gordon

THE FALSE HOPES OF 1950: THE WAFD'S LAST HURRAH AND

THE DEMISE OF EGYPT'S OLD ORDER

In January 1950, in the first free election held in nearly eight years, Egyptians went to the polls to return a Wafdist government to power. After having been banished from office for five years, Egypt's majority party assumed office aware that it shouldered a heavy burden of responsibility. Between October 1944, when the King dismissed the war-time government of Mustafa al-Nahhas, and January 1950, eight minority governments governed, or tried to govern, Egypt. Escalating political violence marked a period of increasing disillusion with parliamentary rule that encompassed all sectors of Egyptian society. Indeed, it might be argued that Egypt's ancien regime survived until 1950 only because the minority governments marshaled the coercive powers of the state to control the streets, campuses, and factories, where dissidence was most manifest. At the time, many sensed that if the political establishment failed to achieve the evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil, contain rampant inflation, and narrow the gap between rich and poor, martial law could not save the liberal order from collapse. What would follow was uncertain, but talk of revolution, fearful or hopeful, filled the air.

The assumption of power by the Wafd in 1950 sparked renewed hope that the parliamentary order might right itself. Majority rule, many felt, would bring a welcome degree of political stability, the restoration of civil liberties, and, it was hoped, produce an agreement with Great Britain that would end the occupation. The emergence of new, fresh faces in the Wafd's leadership ranks engendered hopes that the majority party would initiate a program of social and administrative reform and rise above the traditional political bickering that brought so many into the streets denouncing the political parties. Yet the promises of Wafdist rule went unfulfilled. Corruption at all levels of government, internecine feuding, the heavy-handed treatment of political opponents, and a policy of appeasing the Palace undermined the Wafd's popular base, reinforced Egypt's malaise for liberal institutions, and fostered a growing tolerance for nonconstitu- tional rule.

The Wafd's failure to rise to the challenge of 1950, a challenge it recognized so clearly, requires closer examination. Most accounts of the 1950-1952 period, looking ahead to the Free Officers' coup of July 1952, portray the government's collapse as a foregone conclusion. The works of Egyptian historians, in particular,

? 1989 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/89 $5.00 + .00



194 Joel Gordon

influenced by Nasserist critiques of the liberal era or reflecting the viewpoint of nonparliamentary opposition forces, treat the government's downfall in a rather perfunctory manner. They dismiss the Wafd as a shadow of its former self, sated with corruption and nepotism, and increasingly under the sway of those least inclined to exert the forward, reform-minded leadership that Egypt so desperately sought.1 While much of this may be true, such a perception of the Wafd fails to explain the hopes that the 1950 government inspired and, consequently, the critical importance of its rule in paving the way for the military takeover.2

Of the myriad reasons cited for the Wafd's failure, the most compelling relate to inner turmoil-the personal and ideological rivalries which rent the majority party. Personal disputes and factionalism plagued the Wafd throughout the parliamentary era. Wafdist history is, in part, one of schism, defection, and expulsion of key party leaders who, in turn, formed a series of minority parties. Popular faith in the majority party had been shaken in the 1940s. Nahhas' willingness to lead a government forced upon the King by a British ultimatum in February 1942, the publication shortly thereafter of Makram 'Ubayd's Black Book-a compendium of party corruption-and 'Ubayd's subsequent ouster tarnished the Wafd's image. Nevertheless, until the postwar years these battles remained confined to the party's upper echelons. Wafdist rank and file remained loyal to party leadership.3

By 1950, the situation within the party had become more volatile. If the Wafd was a dying relic of a dying age, there were forces within trying to revive the party, and a struggle for the Wafd's soul ensued. Although historians of the period have recognized this fact, they have placed inordinate importance on the rift between the left and right wings of the Wafd. While this division certainly bears import for the history of the parliamentary era, in 1950 the cabinet was the crucial battleground. There, aspirants to party leadership sparred for position in a contest that proved fatal to government and party, crippling policy making and drawing the Wafd toward abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, a popular but politically disastrous act. While internecine feuds cannot be separated from the specific persons involved, rivalries within the cabinet point up funda- mental problems-both structural and attitudinal-within leadership ranks of the Wafd that checked the influence of new ideas and new party members when this was precisely what the party and the country so desperately needed.

SURPRISING VICTORY, UNEXPECTED PROMISE

In January 1945, three months after being dismissed by royal decree, the Wafd opted to boycott parliamentary elections administered by Sa'dist rivals. For the next five turmoil-filled years, the majority party watched from the sidelines as four ex-Wafdist leaders, at the head of minority coalitions, tried to contain political violence and social unrest. To a great extent they succeeded in checking the spread of extraparliamentary forces-communists, socialists, and Muslim Brothers.4 But the minority governments failed to reach an evacuation accord with the British and did little to address the social ills which fueled opposition in the streets. In 1946, Isma'il Sidqi returned from London with a draft treaty



The Wafds Last Hurrah 195

which met nearly all Egypt's demands, but Wafdist opposition blocked ratifica- tion. The following year, Mahmud al-Nuqrashi took Egypt's grievances to the United Nations with no result.5 The increasingly vocal call for social reform, spurred by the spiraling cost of living and a surge in unemployment following the Second World War, went largely unanswered.6 Sidqi railed against com- munism, Nuqrashi outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood (for which he paid with his life in December 1949), and Ibrahim CAbd al-Hadi imposed martial law. Still, by mid-1949, those who ruled Egypt reached a consensus, however disagreeable, that martial law alone could not preserve order.

In July 1949, with upcoming elections promised, the Wafd joined a national unity government led by Husayn Sirri, a Palace loyalist and former prime minister. Disputes over electoral redistricting polarized the cabinet, isolating the four Wafd ministers. On November 3, Sirri stormed out of a deadlocked cabinet meeting and delivered his resignation to the King. Reluctant to resist Wafdist calls for elections, Faruq charged Sirri to form a caretaker government to administer the voting.7 Expecting that the Wafd would be unable to capture an absolute majority, the King and his advisers aimed to bring about a new coalition. Wafdist leaders, however, rejected all talk of another unity cabinet. "Nahhas is in a fighting mood," the British ambassador reported a week before the vote. If the Wafd could not form a government, Nahhas would lead a vigorous parliamentary opposition.8

The extent of the Wafd's victory in January 1950, came as a surprise not only to the Palace but also to Wafdist leaders who expected the contest to be rigged against them. The British ambassador judged the election "probably as fair as any ever held in Egypt." His American counterpart agreed.9 The Wafd polled 54.5 percent of the popular vote, down from 58.3 in 1942, but captured 228 of 319 seats, attaining an absolute majority. Faruq, furious at the outcome, chastised his advisors for neither foreseeing the results nor taking the proper steps to influence the vote.'? The Wafd celebrated its triumph with a passion bred by five years of banishment from power. Al-Misri, Egypt's largest daily and pro-Wafdist, proclaimed the victory a "peoples' revolution." For ten days, despite repeated entreaties by Nahhas to disperse, Wafd supporters paraded the streets between the new prime minister's Garden City villa and parliament. When Nahhas opened the new parliament on January 16, he and other ministers were forced to abandon their vehicles and wade through the throng.1

Surprise and joy quickly gave way to more sober assessments of the situation at hand. Nahhas and his colleagues recognized the immensity of the task they faced. Echoing the language of the royal rescript charging him to form a government, Nahhas pledged to follow a policy of unification, to direct his efforts towards "achieving the nation's aims, prosperity and stability, in an atmosphere of liberty, justice and equality."'2 After its first meeting, his cabinet promised to end martial law and open the doors of political prisons. Two new cabinet portfolios, national economy and rural and municipal affairs, pointed to a commitment to address domestic problems.13

In the Speech from the Throne, delivered before parliament at its opening session, Nahhas outlined his government's goals. British evacuation and the



196 Joel Gordon

recognition of Egypt's sovereign rights over the Sudan headed the list. Nahhas spoke next of Egypt's relations with its Arab neighbors, the need to rejuvenate the Arab League and not to lose hope for an Arab Palestine. The remainder of the speech focused on domestic peace and social reform. The government, which had already lifted censorship of the press, promised to take immediate steps to end martial law. The new government would initiate measures "for the good of all classes, especially underprivileged peasants and workers." Nahhas pledged steps to lower the cost of living. The government proclaimed primary, secondary, and technical education to be free. A social security bill was in the works. Nahhas promised legislation to mandate a reorganization of the government bureaucracy. Civil service would be based solely on merit; government employees would no longer fear a loss of post to political appointees.14

The government that Nahhas formed raised hopes that the Wafd would indeed follow through on these promises. Of Nahhas' seventeen ministers, six had no previous cabinet experience; of these, most were more technically qualified to hold office than was usually the case in a system in which political weight within the party counted far more than professional ability. In an unprecedented move, Nahhas entrusted four portfolios to men with only marginal ties to the party. These four ministers inspired hope in reformist circles, Wafdist and non-Wafdist alike. The "professors"-Zaki 'Abd al-MutCal (finance), Hamid Zaki (state), Ahmad Husayn (social affairs), and Taha Husayn (education)-all held a Ph.D. Each could boast, if not governmental experience, expertise in his field.

The cabinet reflected a compromise between traditional party interests and a recognized need for new faces and younger blood. Leading Wafdists retained their grip on important cabinet posts. Fu'ad Sirag al-Din, party secretary and power broker, took charge of the interior ministry. cUthman Muharram ran the public works ministry, the post he had held in every Wafd cabinet since 1930. Muhammad al-Wakil (national economy) had been president of the Senate. 'Abd al-Fattah al-Tawil (justice), Zaki al-'Urabi (communications), Mahmud Ghannam (public health), Ahmad Hamza (agriculture), and other party elders sat in the cabinet. At the same time, Nahhas brought into the government two proteges, Muhammad Salah al-Din and Ibrahim Farag. Salah al-Din, the foreign minister, had served as Nahhas' private secretary and as an undersecretary in the foreign ministry; Farag had worked his way up from the Wafdist student movement and served as an undersecretary in the interior ministry. The professors all owed their appointments to their association with Ahmad Nagib al- Hilali, a member of the Wafd executive committee, known as a reformer with a stubborn independent streak.

Despite his aloofness from party affairs, Hilali wielded considerable influence in the formation of the 1950 government. A professor of civil law who had served in a minority government from 1934 to 1936, Hilali joined the Wafd in 1938. Close to Makram 'Ubayd, Hilali chose to remain with the Wafd after the former's ouster in 1942 and came closest in the public eye to replacing him as the conscience of the party. Dedicated to administrative reform and bitterly opposed to party patronage networks, Hilali gathered around himself a coterie of young academics and technocrats through whom he hoped to impress a reform agenda



The Wafd's Last Hurrah 197

on the Wafd. He had become increasingly disillusioned with Wafdist leadership and withdrew from active participation in party matters. He refused to run for parliament in 1950, and Nahhas could not entice him to join the cabinet.15 Hilali did suggest alternative candidates; that four posts went to men who received his blessing underlines the grudging respect with which his colleagues held him.

Of the four, the appointment of Zaki 'Abd al-Mut'al was the most surprising. Traditionally, the finance post had been held by a leading party figure; Makram 'Ubayd, before his expulsion, had run the ministry in three previous Wafd cabinets. As professor of economics and finance and a former legal advisor to the commerce and finance ministries, 'Abd al-Mut'al carried strong credentials. He had been Hilali's student and professed Wafdist sympathies, but had never joined the party. Hamid Zaki's appointment also raised eyebrows. Hilali sug- gested Nahhas name Zaki, a respected professor of civil and international law, as his private secretary.16 Instead, Nahhas named him minister of state, intending him to serve as his right-hand man and political troubleshooter. Zaki had no previous government experience and, like CAbd al-Mut'al, only indirect ties to the party. Ahmad Husayn, in contrast, brought considerable expertise to his post. A shining star in reformist circles, he had already made a name for himself as an energetic and ethical undersecretary in the ministry he now headed.7 Taha Husayn, Egypt's beloved litterateur, had served as adviser in the education ministry and had earned a reputation as a progressive spokesman for educational reform.

With popular backing and a stated commitment to reform, the 1950 government seemed poised to break old patterns that had tainted the liberal establishment. The British foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, stopped over in Cairo for two days in late January on his way to a Commonwealth meeting. Official talks convened in March, after Labour retained its majority in February elections. But negotiations quickly bogged down. The British rejected Egypt's preconditions of evacuation and unity of the Nile valley; the Egyptians, in turn, rejected British proposals for a joint command of the Suez Canal base. Nonetheless, talks plodded along throughout the year as each side ignored the other's position.'8 On the domestic front, the government followed up its promises to cut the cost of living by legislating wage raises and subsidizing basic foodstuffs; it also allocated significant increases in funding for education and social services, under- took the building of new schools and hospitals, and passed a social security bill which provided old-age and disability benefits for families without a bread- winner.19 In keeping with the rhetoric of the times, and so as not to be outdone by more progressive opponents, Fu'ad Sirag al-Din boldly proclaimed all 228 Wafdist deputies "socialists."

IN LEAGUE WITH THE PALACE

Soon after the government's inauguration, however, it became apparent that the presence of reformers and technocrats in the cabinet would prove to be largely a facade. Party elders continued to practice politics as usual. Patronage was rampant, and one scandal followed another. The Wafd had no monopoly on



198 Joel Gordon

corruption, but public patience grew thin. Too many works projects seemed to benefit government officials, their business associates, and relatives. The cotton exchange, Egypt's economic lifeline-accounting for 80 percent of the country's exports-was a playground for speculators, some of the largest affiliated with leading government ministers.20 Despite Sirag al-Din's self-proclaimed socialism, parliament buried a proposal raised by Socialist deputy Ibrahim Shukri to restrict landholding to 50 feddans. In the Autumn of 1951, the Senate, to its credit, passed illegal gains legislation. Yet, because the bill disallowed retroactive prosecution and retained ministerial immunity, it proved woefully insufficient.

Its heavy-handed treatment of opponents in parliament and in the streets isolated the Wafd from potential allies and spurred anti-regime activity. The government released scores of political prisoners in early 1950, but did not fulfill promises to raise martial law until the following year. When it finally ended the state of emergency, it tried to pass a series of laws limiting freedom of expression. The extraparliamentary opposition waged a vigorous press campaign against the government that the authorities could never successfully repress.21 Despite early indications that it would lift the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, the Society remained outlawed. When the government introduced legislation to regulate political associations, the Brotherhood declared itself legal.22 Communists remained underground, but set about reorganizing. The Socialist Party vice- president sat in parliament, but he and the party president were both arrested in mid-1951.

Promises of a government bureaucracy based on merit proved particularly spurious. Upon assuming office the Wafd did what all ruling parties do; it initiated a full-scale purge of civil servants. The government first tried to force the resignation of CAbd al-Raziq al-Sanhuri, president of the State Council and a Sa'dist, but had to back down on constitutional grounds.3 Over an outcry of minority opposition, however, parliament did legislate "exceptional promotions" or reinstatement with back pay for scores of officials-all party loyalists-who had been dismissed, demoted, or bypassed for promotion by the Sa'dist government after the Wafd's fall in 1945.24

Most damning in the public eye was the government's policy of appeasing the Palace. Three of Nahhas' new ministers-'Abd al-Mut'al, Zaki, and Ahmad Husayn-created a small sensation at their inauguration when they refused to kiss the King's hand. Yet, Nahhas' willingness to do so set the tone for his cabinet.25 Rather than come out fighting, the new government adopted a con- ciliatory stand towards the Palace. Banished to the political wilderness for five years, the Wafd now resolved to avoid any confrontation with the King that would give him an excuse to dismiss the government. Almost immediately the public perceived the Wafd's primary goal to be the retention of power at all cost: "They have put a little water in their wine," Husayn Sirri remarked, with evident relief, to the American ambassador two weeks after the Wafd assumed power.26 Nahhas' public statements exuded deference to his monarch, which at times bordered on the ridiculous.27 The Wafd's policy of servility was deliberate and cynical, and, coming at a time when the behavior of Faruq and his coterie threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution, it undercut the Wafd's claim to popular support.




The government quickly found itself in an uncomfortable and embarrassing position. In his first showdown with Faruq, Nahhas managed a compromise. The King insisted upon appointing a Palace favorite as war minister. Nahhas refused, but accepted his appointment as chief of staff with protocol rank equivalent to a cabinet post.28 There followed a policy of blatant obsequiousness. In February, the government allotted ?E 1,320,000 to refit the Mahrusa, the royal yacht (which, ironically, would later take Faruq into exile).29 In June, the cabinet resisted calls for a parliamentary enquiry into alleged improprieties by Palace insiders in the years prior to Wafdist rule. In a grand comic opera, the minority parties, which had tolerated the abuses they now sought to investigate, carried the banner of reform while the Wafd defended the most corrupt political elements in the country.30

The parliamentary opposition, united against the Wafd, raised an outcry and forced the investigation. The Senate, in which the Wafd held no majority, proved consistently troublesome. In July, the government summarily ousted twenty-nine senators and replaced most with Wafdists, thus gaining a majority. The government insisted it acted to restore the balance of the 1942 Senate, overthrown by minority coalitions. However justifiable its claim-the British embassy judged it "unchallengeable"-the timing, as well as the seating of several royal favorites, trumpeted the likelihood that the government had again bowed to the Palace.31 The following month, parliament imposed a blackout on all news pertaining to the royal family except items issued by the interior ministry.32

A HOUSE DIVIDED

Before long the cabinet revealed the cracks in the compromise that had produced it. Squabbles behind closed doors, in the press, and on the floor of parliament disrupted policy-making and frustrated the designs of the government's most promising ministers. Of the four reform-minded professors, only Taha Husayn survived in office, and he just barely. Zaki 'Abd al-Mut'al and Ahmad Husayn collided head-on with party patronage. 'Abd al-Mutcal was fired outright in November 1950; Ahmad Husayn resigned nine months later. Hamid Zaki, who found himself increasingly isolated within the cabinet and shunted from one ministry to another, broke with the government in December 1951. When the reformers left the cabinet, old-line party loyalists filled their shoes, and business resumed as usual.

Beneath these rifts lay a common thread, the struggle for power within a moribund party. The symbol of the Wafd remained fixed for those who looked back with nostalgia to a day when the national question united a people, when issues seemed simpler, and the enemy stood clearer. But times had changed, and, as the foci of political discourse widened, forces within the party pushed for it to adapt. Party elders, who refused to yield power, resisted calls for change. Party structure and tradition thus defined the context of this conflict. CAbd al-'Azim Ramadan, Egypt's senior historian of the parliamentary era, has described the Wafd's ruling organization as a "strange mixture of liberalism and tyranny."33 According to party bylaws, ultimate power resided in the hands of the party



200 Joel Gordon

president. He, in turn, selected the executive committee (al- Wafd). Theoretically, the president ruled through the committee; in practice, real power rested with him, the party secretary, and key aides. As a result, young ambitious party members found their climb up the ladder painfully slow. Wafdist deputies and provincial representatives, who comprised the parliamentary organization (al- hay'a al-wafdiyya), had little say-younger Wafdists even less-in running party affairs and setting policy.

Because the Wafd was a party steeped in tradition and seniority, internal conflicts were fought to a great extent along generational lines. By the late 1940s, three generations vied for influence within the Wafd, each with its own style, its own vision, and its own set of political wounds. The old guard-Nahhas and his contemporaries, men in their late sixties and early seventies-dominated the party by virtue of their age more than their wits. Many had been present at the Wafd's creation and stood with Sacd Zaghlul in 1919. The tribulations of Egyptian politics-the majority party had been allowed to rule slightly under six years between 1924 and 1950-bred in time a bitter temper, a mixture of self- righteousness and cynicism, which steeled an unwillingness to surrender power, as well as a disposition to abuse it. They were the fathers of the modern nationalist movement, medium to large landowners or well-to-do professionals.34 Most had been awarded the title pasha, the highest mark of social status. They did not lack sympathy for society's less privileged; rather, with all attention focused on national liberation, most had failed to appreciate the danger of a growing disparity between haves and have-nots.

A second generation had its power base in the parliamentary organization. They were former student leaders who had worked their way up the ladder and were now in their late forties and just beginning to come of age-such as Muhammad Salah al-Din, Ibrahim Farag, and 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan; most had held their first cabinet posts in 1950-1951. Their perspective on politics differed little from that of the party elders. They came from a similar social class and professional background. Few held large tracts of land, but most continued the tradition of using the legal profession as a pathway into politics.35 They had not achieved the social status of their elders-most held the title bey. The heirs apparent, they anxiously awaited their chance to break into the higher echelons of party command.

The great exception to the rule was Fu'ad Sirag al-Din, the Wafd's secretary. By his rapid rise within party ranks, Sirag al-Din broke the pattern of slow advancement that frustrated so many of his contemporaries. He was the Wafd's boy wonder. He held his first cabinet post in 1942 at the age of 32 and was named party secretary six years later.36 By 1950, he had established himself as the clear front-runner to succeed Nahhas. He founded his power base upon his own patronage network. This included his family (three brothers sat in parliament, one as president, the others chairs of the financial and foreign affairs committees), his wife's family (he had married into the Badrawi family, one of the largest landowning families in Egypt), and business associates (including Madam Nahhas). Nor did Sirag al-Din ignore the potential support of outside allies. The Wafd's policy of appeasing the Palace grew, in part, out of Sirag



The Wafd ' Last Hurrah 201

al-Din's own personal endeavors to cultivate ties with members of Faruq's inner circle-in particular Karim Thabit, the King's press attache, who was implicated in the parliamentary investigations of June 1950, that the Wafd tried to obstruct.37

As one of Egypt's wealthiest landowners, Sirag al-Din had little appetite for social change, particularly land reform. As interior minister, he battled forces which sought to redistribute wealth. "I own 8,000 feddans," he told the American ambassador in 1951, "do you think I want Egypt to go communist?"38 He referred specifically to foreign relations, but the statement summed up his assessment of domestic reforms as well. Anyone to the Pasha's left, particularly younger Wafdists, he deemed red.

By the late 1940s, a third generation of Wafdists were agitating persistently for a greater role in shaping policy. Students and young professionals radicalized in the years after the Second World War heralded the cry for "social justice" that marked the period. In league with other leftists, Wafdist students formed a series of campus coalitions and combined worker-student fronts to agitate for national liberation and for worker and peasant rights. Rebuffed by party leaders, they organized a self-styled Wafdist Vanguard (al-tali'a al-wafdiyya) that advocated, in addition to social reform, a revision of Wafd bylaws to allow their group more say within the party. The most visible, and in many ways most influential, members of this generation were a group of slightly older, respected intellectuals that included CAziz Fahmi, Muhammad Mandur, and Ahmad Abu al-Fath, the editor-in-chief of al-Misri. This latter group articulated the Vanguard position in the press and the Wafd's parliamentary organization.39

Young Wafdists waged a running battle with the 1950 government. They decried the policy of appeasing the Palace and agitated, not without success, against efforts to curb civil liberties and muzzle the opposition press.40 Party leaders, failing to coopt them, roundly denounced the Vanguard as a communist front. Although they collaborated with communists (some of whom had infil- trated the Wafd's student movement), the charges reflect more the mindset of Sirag al-Din and similar party elders. The party secretary, who had tried unsuc- cessfully to name his brother Yas leader of Wafdist students in the early 1940s- even though Yas had not been a student at the time-moved to oust several young guard leaders in early 1951 on grounds they were communists.41

The rift between left- and right-wing factions within the Wafd has dominated traditional accounts of the party during this period. It is fair to conclude, as Tariq al-Bishri and others have, that under Sirag al-Din's lead the right-wing asserted control over the party in the late 1940s and the left-wing fought to steer the party on a reformist course, but found itself effectively locked out of power within the party hierarchy.42 But to place the left-right rift in proper perspective it must be emphasized that the struggle was fought between generations. The left was locked out of power because, with only rare exceptions, its representatives came from the youth ranks of the party. Party bylaws allowed the elders to dominate the Wafd executive and, thus, the party. Many second generation leaders waiting to replace the elders shared their caution for reforms that aimed to redistribute land or wealth. The party did not move to the right so much as it remained fixed in place.



202 Joel Gordon

Furthermore, while the battle between the Wafdist Vanguard and party leaders certainly weakened the government, internal cabinet politics proved more decisive. Here the second generation Wafdists exerted far greater influence on the course of events. The heirs apparent to party leadership fought a battle that raged simultaneously on two fronts. Those with ambition to succeed Nahhas as Wafd chief sniped at their rivals. Because they held the highest positions in government, the feuding proved crippling. Concurrently, veteran second generation Wafdists competed with reform-minded newcomers-who were progressives but by no means leftists-for influence with party elders. At this juncture, the story of the four professors represents far more than the failure of four individual ministers.

THE DEATH WATCH

Mustafa al-Nahhas' days as party leader appeared numbered. He was 71 years of age in 1950, and his health was rapidly declining. According to the rumor mill he worked only several hours a day and spent most of time attending to his toilet. Both British and American officials regarded him as "nearly senile," and many Egyptians judged him similarly.43 Under these circumstances, political ambition could not avoid being an issue in the Wafd. Yet, while Nahhas lived and chose to preside over the Wafd, no one challenged his position. Nahhas did not have to actively lead the party in order to rule. As Sa'd Zaghlul's sole successor, he served a symbolic role. Those who decried party corruption from within Wafdist ranks excused him and focused their attention on others deemed more unscrupulous, such as Fu'ad Sirag al-Din, 'Uthman Muharram, and Nahhas' wife, Zaynab al-Wakil. Those waiting in the wings to succeed Nahhas maneuvered against each other and angled for his blessing.

If Nahhas remained the Wafd's spiritual leader, Fu'ad Sirag al-Din had become the party boss and power broker. The relationship between Nahhas and Sirag al-Din is not easy to discern. While today Sirag al-Din, as leader of the Wafd, portrays himself as Nahhas' chosen heir, it is not clear that in 1950 Nahhas envisioned him as such. When forming his government, Nahhas surrounded himself with several men whom many considered personal proteges and potential successors. Muhammad Salah al-Din, the high profile foreign minister, had been his personal secretary, and Nahhas felt a particular fondness for Ibrahim Farag, who came from the chief's home town. Hamid Zaki emerged as another possible candidate. Nahhas' appointment of an independent financial minister, 'Abd al-Mut'al, against Sirag al-Din's advice also signaled a greater degree of independence, at least at the outset, from his party secretary than is usually recognized.44

Sirag al-Din, having risen to the top, jealously guarded his position from potential rivals. Those with political ambition, for either personal advancement or social and party reform, had to contend with his grip on the reins of power within the Wafd. When 'Abd al-Mut'al, in particular, tried to run an independent finance ministry, Sirag al-Din acted quickly to undermine his position. In 1950, Sirag al-Din confronted two clear challengers to his leadership ambi-




tions: Muhammad Salah al-Din and Nagib al-Hilali. Salah al-Din operated initially with a great degree of autonomy, much to Sirag al-Din's displeasure. As Anglo-Egyptian negotiations foundered, the Foreign Minister's influence on Nahhas began to wane. Sirag al-Din sat on an inner council for foreign affairs along with Nahhas, Salah al-Din, an Ibrahim Farag (and for a time Hamid Zaki). He appears to have adopted a passive stance, giving his rival enough rope to hang himself. Nonetheless, the three-way sniping between Sirag al-Din, Salah al-Din, and Zaki, with Farag caught in the middle, contributed to the disarray of the government's foreign policy and the inability to head off a decisive break with the British.45

From the outset Hilali refused to participate in the fracas. His presence, reinforced by the actions of his surrogates, loomed large on the sidelines; however, he did nothing to support them in their struggles with party insiders. Reportedly despondent at the turn of events and revolted by the government's subservience to the Palace, he sat in his suburban Ma'adi home, in contact with only a few old friends.46 Rumors of a nervous breakdown and a turn to religion floated through Cairo's tea rooms. Hilali rebuffed attempts by Nahhas to contact him and refused to attend a crucial series of executive committee meetings in September 1951, one month prior to the treaty abrogation.47 By late 1951, Hilali had lost all faith in the Wafd and looked beyond the party for avenues through which he might exert influence on the course of Egyptian politics. Palace insiders approached him and indicated that the King, eager to dispose of the Wafd, but fearful of arousing a nationalist backlash, considered him the best alternative. Hilali increasingly came to see himself as a man of destiny.48

THE PROFESSORS DROP OUT

Hilali's despondency derived in large part from the failure of his proteges in the cabinet to exert any meaningful influence on the government. The importance of the four professors-reform-minded technocrats with limited, if any, previous links to the Wafd-has been noted by most historians of the period. Yet, those who point to the animosity between the newcomers and party regulars tend to portray the reformers more as part of the problem-a warring faction within the Wafd-than as an alternative, even a solution to the party's rigid adherence to hierarchy and patronage. Moreover, such accounts implicitly question the reformers' loyalty to the party. By doing so, they reflect, however unintentionally, a Wafdist perspective common to first and second generation party leaders. The reformers' presence becomes further proof that the Wafd had changed, without the crucial question being posed: was this perhaps a change for the better?49

The newcomers' vision of the Wafd differed fundamentally from that held by born and bred loyalists. As contemporaries of the second generation Wafdists who had worked their way up the party ladder, the professors who catapulted into the cabinet respected the nationalist legacy and popular appeal of the majority party. Yet, to them the Wafd was simply that, a political party. Like other factions, they hoped to influence government policy and strove for a greater say in internal party affairs. They were not radicals, but proponents of an



204 Joel Gordon

activist government role in promoting social welfare and in raising the standard of living in rural areas and among the growing industrial working class. They were technocrats and academics, and they scorned the inefficiency of the government bureaucracy. Their disregard for party patronage, in particular, alienated old-line Wafdists, both elders and second generation. To the veterans, the Wafd represented a sacred ideal; to speak of it as a mere political party smacked of insolence; to interfere with party favoritism smacked of treason.50

It is important to note that at the outset the reform-minded newcomers did not betray any loyalty to the Wafd in its struggle with political opponents. Nor were they unwilling, on occasion, to yield to pressures for favoritism. Pressed almost from the day he took office to grant financial favors to the King, such as the funds to refit the royal yacht, Zaki CAbd al-Mut'al initially acquiesced. The finance minister also supported the government's unsuccessful attempt to unseat Sanhuri, the Sa'dist president of the State Council. Because of his own non- partisan background, CAbd al-Mutcal accepted the argument that the position should not be held by a member of any party. As a former law faculty colleague of Sanhuri, 'Abd al-Mut'al agreed to approach him with the government's request.51 Hamid Zaki backed government efforts to control the opposition press and supported controversial legislation proposed in 1951. Ahmad Husayn agreed to promote three in-laws of the Prime Minister, but did so only with the understanding that one would be transferred, one retired, and the third appointed an honorary secretary.5

Nor did the professors comprise a lobby within the cabinet. Each went his own way. CAbd al-Mut'al, trying to tighten purse strings, drew protests from both Ahmad Husayn and Taha Husayn despite increasing their budgets. When Nahhas fired cAbd al-Mut'al in November 1950, rather than protest, Hamid Zaki simply noted that his colleague's downfall, although regrettable, was inevitable.53

CAbd al-Mut'al's failure was both the most significant and the most predicta- ble. The finance minister collided almost immediately with Sirag al-Din, his former student, who had opposed his appointment. 'Abd al-Mut'al quickly justified Sirag al-Din's reservations when he took steps to stifle speculation and price fixing on the cotton exchange. In April 1950, he arranged to put government stocks of low-grade cotton on the open market. Sirag al-Din leaked the finance minister's plan to the press, prompting him to issue a public denial before acting. In June 1950, 'Abd al-Mut'al resigned, then reversed himself under pressure from Nahhas, who feared a cabinet crisis. His antagonists then tried to woo him. Ahmad 'Abbud, the pro-Wafdist financier, put his brother-in-law on a company payroll, then fired him soon after the finance minister's ouster. In

August, Elias Andraos, director of Bank Ahli and a Palace favorite, indicating that he spoke on behalf of the government, offered CAbd al-Mut'al a lucrative post on condition he resign his ministry. Bribery failing, the cotton lords tried blackmail, but CAbd al-Mut'al remained steadfast. Yet, by the Fall of 1950, for reasons that will be discussed later, the tables had turned. In November, Nahhas asked the finance minister to resign; when he refused, Nahhas sacked him. Fu'ad Sirag al-Din assumed responsibility for finance in addition to the interior ministry.54




Ahmad Husayn stood much farther from the center of political battles for supremacy within the Wafd. Yet, because of his reputation as an achiever, his failure produced the most resounding repercussions. In his eighteen months as minister he justified his reputation, embarking on a major reform agenda, highlighted by the social insurance program passed in 1950. He surrounded himself with colleagues dedicated to him and his agenda. His sin was ignoring party interests in the assignment and promotion of officials. In June 1951, while Husayn was attending the International Labour Organization (ILO) conference in Geneva, the acting minister, CAbd al-Latif Mahmud, minister of agriculture and a Sirag al-Din ally, nullified a series of appointments approved by Husayn. In place of Husayn's nominees, the acting minister promoted less qualified and ethically suspect party loyalists. Upon his return from abroad, Husayn sought redress from Nahhas. Fail- ing to attain a clear promise from the prime minister, he resigned.55

Hamid Zaki squandered what some perceived as great promise for personal advancement and influence in the Wafd. Zaki simply failed the test of politics. Inopportune statements and a general lack of political savvy made him a target of the opposition and left him vulnerable to the intrigues of shrewder party rivals. Because of Zaki's proximity to Nahhas and responsibility for Sudan affairs, Muhammad Salah al-Din, in particular, viewed Zaki as a threat to his ambitions. In March 1950, Zaki went on record suggesting that the government exert less pressure on the British to enter treaty negotiations immediately. Salah al-Din capitalized on the remarks, blasting him as soft on the national question. Nahhas disavowed Zaki's remarks and the latter backed down. In November 1950, Zaki was reassigned-appointed minister of national economy-scoring a victory for the foreign minister.56 Zaki's vocal support for the unpopular press bill of 1951 further diminished his political value to Nahhas. He finally broke with the government in December 1951, over abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, an act he opposed.57

Little remained to testify to the achievements and struggles of the departed ministers. Hamid Zaki left only a legacy of untapped potential. With Sirag al- Din in command of the finance ministry, action against the cotton lords promptly ceased and cotton prices soared. The projects undertaken by Ahmad Husayn stalled because of inefficient administration and a lack of morale among the staff he had groomed. After two months of interim leadership, 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan, Sirag al-Din's protege, landed the finance post. Inheriting a ministry torn by dissension and disillusion, he promptly set about his own housecleaning.58

When they found themselves unable to pursue their agendas within the Wafd, the professors left the party and became some of its bitterest opponents. As prime minister from March 3 to June 29, 1952, their mentor, Hilali, dissolved parliament, extended martial law, placed Sirag al-Din and 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan under house arrest, and ordered a purge of the government administration directed solely at Wafdist appointees.59 Hilali dropped out of sight after the Free Officers' coup (the officers detained him briefly as part of a general roundup of old regime leaders in September 1952), only to reemerge in December 1953, to testify against Fu'ad Sirag al-Din before the Revolutionary Tribunal formed to try old-guard politicians for treason. Zaki 'Abd al-Mut'al appeared as the star



206 Joel Gordon

witness against his cabinet rival. In his testimony, which lasted some twenty-one hours, far longer than that of any other witness in the eight week trial, he blasted the Wafd's policy of appeasing the Palace and the defendant's endeavors to control the cotton market.60

Others collaborated with the military regime, lending the officers an aura of respectability as well as technical expertise. In the months immediately following the coup, Taha Husayn served as emissary between Nahhas and the officers. He played a crucial role in negotiating Nahhas' resignation as official president of the Wafd in October 1952, when the regime legislated the reorganization of political parties, and remained on good terms with the officers even after they abolished the parties in January 1953.61 Ahmad Husayn (who after his resignation founded the Peasants' League, an association to promote rural reform) served as Egypt's ambassador in Washington after the coup. He remained there, a staunch champion of Egyptian-American friendship, until the Suez crisis. Deputies of his in the social affairs ministry, consigned to meaningless work after his ouster, rose to prominence in the bureaucracy. At least one, 'Abbas 'Ammar, attained cabinet rank.

Their willingness to treat with the officers earned the professors and others like them the excoriation of fellow Wafdists and opponents of the Nasser regime. It reinforced questions about their ultimate loyalty to the Wafd and to the 1950 government. Because the professors were outsiders trying to promote change, questions about their party loyalty had been present from the start. The Wafd was simply not ready for reform. Suspect because of their lack of Wafdist pedigrees, the professors all collided with internal party politics. Ahmad 'Abbud spoke for many Wafdist associates when he complained to the British ambassador in March 1950, of the "loose rein" which Nahhas allowed these ministers. Egypt, he asserted, could not afford their "youthful enthusiasms." Reporting to London, the British ambassador noted, "the expensive reform proposals to which Abboud objects may represent a trend which should be kept going."62 'Abbud, however, did not speak for Egypt, but rather for those who for so long had profited from public service. The latter felt most acutely the challenge of reformers in the cabinet; they would be the ones to insure that the reins were tightened.

CRISIS AT THE TOP

Without a steady hand at the helm, the Wafd, like the nation, drifted aimlessly. Rumors of Nahhas' senility were perhaps exaggerated. His health was a cause of concern, but he lived another decade and a half. In moments of crisis he often rose to the occasion. But, in general, Nahhas provided only minimal leadership. He played a peripheral role in daily party and governmental matters. Save for one weekly cabinet meeting and occasional state functions, he rarely left his home. There he remained, cloistered by his wife, Zaynab al-Wakil and by Sirag al-Din. Madam Nahhas, to the dismay of many, made her presence known and her interest in government affairs very clear. Callers at the Nahhas villa often first encountered Sirag al-Din in an antechamber, with Zaynab conspicuously within earshot.63




Nahhas rarely took any policy initiatives. He failed to head off problems and, on occasion, ran from them. In the Summer of 1950, with the cotton scandal, the Senate realignment, and loud calls for an investigation into Palace corruption all backing the government against the wall, he and Zaynab sailed for Europe, ostensibly for health reasons. When internal party and cabinet disputes threatened his government, he stepped in to quell the furor. When ministers resigned, he contacted them and usually persuaded them to stay. On the other hand, Nahhas let trusted aides carry out the more unpleasant tasks. He sent 'Uthman Muhar- ram to ask 'Abd al-Mut'al to resign in November 1950. Rightly indignant, CAbd al-Mut'al, who only days before had conferred with Nahhas about finance matters without a hint of his imminent ouster, refused to even consider stepping down until approached by the party chief. Instead, Nahhas simply announced his dismissal, which 'Abd al-Mut'al learned of from the press.64

Nahhas' personal responsibility for much of the corruption that flourished around him appears to have been indirect, but as party president he must bear responsibility. His wife's business practices and personal spending habits con- stantly linked his name to scandal. Nahhas seemed to do little to either dissuade her or impress her with the political damage she wreaked. At best, he turned a blind eye to Zaynab's indiscretions; at worst, he shrugged his shoulders and colluded with her. When the couple returned from Europe in October 1950, a trip for which the government awarded the prime minister a ?E 300,000 spending allowance, someone unloaded eighty suitcases and trunks on the offside of their liner. Nahhas paid the grand sum of ?E 5 for those few bags that passed through customs.65

If his own personal gain amounted to far less than some, Nahhas nonetheless shared the view-widespread among the parliamentary elite-that party members, friends, and relatives deserved rewards for their loyalty, incompetency notwithstanding. Relatives of the prime minister, as well as other cabinet members, netted great benefit from the "exceptional promotions" legislation passed in the Spring of 1950.66 Both CAbd al-Mutcal and Ahmad Husayn ran afoul of Nahhas for their roles in cases involving members of his family. The former, whom Madam Nahhas had on occasion referred to as "minister of my finances," refused to slash an income tax assessment levied on her dressmaker or to block the promotion of an official suspected of denouncing Nahhas' brother-in-law to Makram cUbayd in 1945, when cUbayd was finance minister in a minority cabinet. Nahhas reportedly made his wishes explicit in both cases.67 Ahmad Husayn, as previously noted, did tolerate the promotion of three of Nahhas' relatives. His conditions, however, remained unfulfilled; all three stayed on the job long enough to play a hand in plotting his downfall. If Nahhas did not meddle directly in the social affairs ministry while Husayn was abroad, he nonetheless appointed a colleague hostile to Husayn as acting minister and sanctioned the interim minister's meddling.

Nahhas offered little to a country emerging from a period of unrest and political violence, but still trapped in an economic crisis. His political statements following the first Speech from the Throne, full of platitudes for his people, his party, and his King, addressed none of the major issues facing the nation. His



208 Joel Gordon

flattery amused Faruq, who allowed Nahhas minor breaches of protocol and showered the Wafd chief with petty gifts.68 But Faruq never lost sight of the game and often played it, at least in the short term, to his advantage. He never hesitated to threaten the prime minister with deposition, the latter's great fear. When nominating new members to an expanded Senate in 1951, Faruq appointed enough Palace men to block a Wafdist majority. Reformers who sought to confront Egypt's ills foundered in the tempest of internal party politics. For them, as well, Nahhas had kind words and empty promises.69

The tragedy of Mustafa al-Nahhas-and it is the tragedy of his generation-is that after years of struggle his political vision remained frozen in the past. Old wounds still festered. Banishment from the power that should rightfully have been theirs fostered a refusal to countenance dissent within party ranks, a tolerance for corruption, and, most damning in 1950, a willingness to compromise ideals in order to rule. Stubbornness and intolerance characterized Wafdist leadership throughout the parliamentary era, but by 1950, the stakes were greater and demands for power sharing within the party louder and more compelling. The Nahhas-Sirag al-Din policy of appeasing the Palace, a cynical pose deliberately adopted to cool royal tempers and prevent a precipitate break in relations, served its purpose in the short run. By defending Palace interests, however, the Wafd cheapened its own image, even as it prolonged its hold on power. Nahhas and his colleagues may have considered the cost a small price to pay. But their timing was bad.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION: TOWARDS THE INFERNO

As early as March 1950, within weeks of the opening round of renewed negotiations, the British ambassador warned that, "Unable to produce bread the Wafd may well produce, for popular applause, a nationalist circus." The same report expressed the British embassy's disillusion with Salah al-Din and Hamid Zaki, their two primary contacts, both of whom reaped praise in January.70 The talks achieved nothing. With both sides stalled, the Egyptian government fell into a trap of escalating rhetoric. In his November 1950 Speech from the Throne, Nahhas threatened unilateral annulment of the 1936 treaty. As the year ended, the government faced mounting public pressure to follow through on this threat, a step it hesitated to take. In July 1951, fearful of a breakdown of public order, the authorities forbade demonstrations to mark the sixty-ninth anniversary of the British bombardment of Alexandria, a prelude to the occupation. Finally, in October Nahhas acceded to vocal popular demand and asked parliament to abrogate the treaty.71

Nahhas' speech of October 8 marked the onset of his government's final tragic hour. For a moment the old fighter recaptured the enthusiasm of his people. "It is for Egypt that I signed the 1936 Treaty," he told the assembly, "and it is for Egypt that I ask you to denounce it."72 The government succeeded in marshaling popular support for abrogation, but thereafter it followed rather than led public opinion. The opposition pressed the Wafd to take more drastic steps against the British. The government found itself in a dilemma: it was compelled to publicly




support armed resistance, but feared the consequences of unleashing the forces that bore arms. Nahhas, reportedly bitter at Salah al-Din for backing him against the wall, left matters to him.73

Publicly, Sirag al-Din had supported the Wafd's drive toward abrogation; few Egyptian political figures felt they could not. In private, however, he maintained his Palace ties. Through the Palace he maintained contact with the British and American embassies. He did not denounce the foreign minister to Nahhas, but quietly waited for the prime minister to lose confidence in his protege.

Now, having outplayed his rival, Sirag al-Din engaged in a desperate and dangerous game to save his party. He maintained contact with the British and American embassies, as well as with the Palace. More than anyone, he knew the truth of the charge later brought against the government by the military regime: that it had embarked on a collision course with Britain totally unprepared for the consequences. In private, he advanced a moderate line, looking ahead to a future when he would lead the Wafd, hostilities would end, and negotiations resume. He encouraged popular gatherings, but ensured they were peaceful, and acted to stifle all public mention of irregular "liberation squads" engaged in sabotage against British bases and personnel in the Canal Zone. Then, unable to restrain the guerillas, the government tried to control them.74 Sirag al-Din's attempt to juggle all sides culminated when, on January 25, 1952, he ordered the commander of the Ismailia gendarmerie to resist a British order to surrender their arms. In the ensuing battle some fifty Egyptians died and approximately one hundred were wounded. The following day, angry mobs rioted in Cairo, in part incited by Sirag al-Din's protege, 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan. At the end of "Black Saturday," downtown Cairo lay smoldering. The next day, the King dismissed the government.75

POSTSCRIPT: "A COUNTRY OF FAILURE"

Was there still a chance to save the old regime in 1950? Perhaps not, but there are indications that, despite the throng in the street, decrying the behavior of the political parties cynicism did not reign supreme. For many, parliamentary rule remained a viable option. The Socialist Party captured its first seat in January 1950. A handful of Muslim Brothers ran as independents. The largest communist movement in the country instructed its members to vote Wafdist. Reform- minded independents, who had stood aloof from party politics, now joined the Wafd and took cabinet posts in a government that highlighted new faces and fresh blood and, for a moment, inspired hopes of reform and honest administration.

Internal party dynamics played the major role in the Wafd's failure in its last term of rule. Internecine conflicts turned the Wafd and, in turn, the government into a battleground, sapping the party's strength at a time when it lacked an active, authoritative leader. Feuding between party leaders revolved around two primary struggles, the first between rivals who hoped to succeed Mustafa al- Nahhas as party chief, the second between veteran Wafdists and newer party members who sought greater influence and championed a program of reform. A less direct bid for power, but in the long run a greater threat, the exuberance of



210 Joel Gordon

the reformers challenged the complacency of a party rooted in patronage and tradition. When the Wafd refused to budget, it forfeited its claim to public trust and paved the way for its own demise.

The Wafd's failure to meet the challenge it faced shattered public confidence in its ability to lead the nation and further undermined the legitimacy of the liberal order. In July 1951, a disgruntled Ihsan CAbd al-Quddus, editor-in-chief of the influential independent weekly, Ruz al- Yusuf, proclaimed Egypt a "country of failure." "We in Egypt believe in failure and worship those who fail," he wrote, pointing specifically to Nahhas and his chief ministers. "Woe to the man of talent who looks at matters with a serious eye and works with determination to succeed.... Woe to him, for the doors are shut in front and in back of him, oppressive power pursues him wherever he settles and false charges follow him every day."76 Even as the "popular struggle" raged in the Canal Zone, reform- minded technocrats and intellectuals began to argue that Egypt needed to set its internal affairs straight; to amend, if not rewrite, the entire constitution and purge the administrative apparatus before the nation could hope to achieve independence. Their slogan became "purification before liberation" (al-tathir qabl al-tahrir). Some, like CAbd al-Quddus, lost all faith in parliamentary rule, at least for the immediate future. These reform-minded technocrats entertained notions of a "just tyrant," a benevolent strongman who could force political and social reform without facing the constraints of party politics.77 Many, like Ahmad Husayn, simply resigned themselves to the recognition that things would get much worse before they would improve.78

Because of the immensity of the problems that faced Egypt, it is questionable whether even a united Wafd that sought to comprise the interests of all factions could have stayed in power, proceeded with initial steps, however faltering, to raise standards of living, and avoided the catastrophic showdown with the British. Nonetheless, the speed with which the Wafd shattered public trust, and its own blatantly cynical approach to politics, hastened an important attitudinal change within a key sector of the population, one that would greet military rule with apprehension, but collaborate for lack of a better alternative.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

SKIDMORE COLLEGE

NOTES

'The standard work for the period is Tariq al-Bishri, al-Haraka al-siyasiyyafi Misr min 1945 ila 1952, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1983). Yunan Labib Rizq, Tarikh al-wuzarat al-misriyya, 1878-1953 (Cairo, 1975) shows the marked influence of Bishri. An important source for details of the Wafd government is the transcript of Fu'ad Sirag al-Din's trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal in December 1953-

January 1954. Much of the most important testimony has been published and annotated by Salah 'Isa, Muhakamat Fu'ad Siraj al-Din (Cairo, 1983). Volume three of the memoirs of Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mudhakkirat fi al-sivasiyya al-misrivya (Cairo, 1978) provide great insight, albeit from a minority position, of conflicts within parliament.

For the history of the Wafd and the national movement, see Marius Deeb, Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and its Rivals: 1914-1939 (London, 1979); cAbd al-'Azim Ramadan, Tatawwur al-haraka




al-wataniyya fi Misr, 1918-1936, 2nd ed. (Cairo, 1983); idem, Tatawwur al-haraka al-wataniyya fi Misr min sanat 1937 ila sanat 1948, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1968); Zaheer Masood Quraishi, Liberal Nationalism in Egypt (Delhi, 1967).

2Wafdist historiography, contemporary to the party's brief reformation in 1978 and return to

parliament in 1982, is largely apologetic. The Wafd, according to such accounts, was misunderstood. The party really represented the vanguard of liberal progressivism, and, when all else is considered, was certainly far more beneficial for Egypt than the Nasserist state which followed. See Fu'ad Sirag al-Din's 1977 speech before the Egyptian Bar, published as Limadha al-hizb al-jadid (Cairo, 1978). For the context of the speech, see Donald M. Reid, "The Return of the Egyptian Wafd, 1978," The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 12, 3 (1979), 389-415. Also important are the memoirs of two members of the 1950 government: 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan, Dhikrayat siyasiyya (Cairo, 1974); Ibrahim Farag, Dhikrayati al-siyasiyya (Cairo, 1984).

3For the 1942 incident, see Muhammad Anis, 4 fibrayir fi tarikh Misr al-siyasi (Cairo, 1982); Charles D. Smith, "4 February 1942: Its Causes and its Influences on Egyptian Politics and on the Future of Anglo-Egyptian Relations," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10, 4 (1979), 453-79. For Makram 'Ubayd, see Yunan Labib Rizq, al- Wafd wa-al-kitab al-aswad (Cairo, 1978); 'Ubayd's al-Kitab al-aswad, which has recently been reprinted (Cairo, 1984).

4For the Left in this period, see Rif'at al-Sa'id, Tarikh al-munazzamat al-yasariya al-misriyya, 1940-1950 (Cairo, 1977); idem, Munazzamat al-yasar al-Misri, 1950-1957 (Cairo, 1983); Selma Botman, "Oppositional Politics in Egypt: The Communist Movement: 1936-1954," Ph.D. Disserta- tion, Harvard University, 1984. For Young Egypt, James P. Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels: "Young Egypt"' 1933-1952 (Stanford, 1975). For the Muslim Brothers, Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London, 1969). Also see relevant chapters in Bishri, Haraka.

5William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1984), pp. 244-48; Isma'il Sidqi, Mudhakkirat (Cairo, 1951).

6Robert Tignor, "Equity in Egypt's Recent Past: 1945-1952," in Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Robert Tignor, eds., The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt (New York and London, 1982), pp. 20-54, summarizes socioeconomic conditions in the country and growing call for reform. Also see Tignor, State, Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952 (Princeton, 1984), chs. 6-7; Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution (New York, 1972), pp. 583-99, 616-29, 641-46.

7Al-Ahram, 4 November 1949; Rizq, Tarikh, pp. 498-99. 8Ronald Campbell (British ambassador) to Hector McNeil (minister of state), 28 December 1949,

Foreign Office (FO) 371/80347/JE1016/1 (all FO documents are from the Public Records Office, London).

9Campbell to McNeil, 25 January 1950, FO 371/80347/JE1016/23; Jefferson Caffery (American ambassador) no. 18, Department of State Records, 774.00/1-650 (all State records, unless indicated otherwise, are from the U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.).

'?Caffery to Dean Acheson (secretary of state), no. A-30, 774.00/1-950. Also see the memoirs of Hasan Yusuf, al-Qasr wa-dawruhufi al-siyasa al-misriyya, 1922-1952 (Cairo, 1982), p. 270.

Election results were as follows: Wafd: 228 seats (54.5 percent); Sa'dists: 28 (16.3 percent), Liberal Constitutionalists: 27 (11.8 percent), Nationalists 6 (1.5 percent), Socialists 1 (.7 percent), Indepen- dents 31 (14.6 percent); see cAli al-Din Hilal, al-Siyasa wa-al-hukm fi Misr: al-'ahd al-barlimani, 1923-1952 (Cairo, 1977), pp. 303-4.

1"Al-Ahram, 8 and 9 January 1950; The Times (London), 16 January 1950. 12Al-Ahram, 13 January 1950. '3Ibid., 14 January 1950. For a brief summary of Egypt's economic woes at the time, see The

Economist, 28 January 1950, pp. 205-6. 4Al-Ahram, 17 January 1950. 5'Isa, Muhakamat, pp. 65-66, 76 (Hilali testimony). 16Ibid., p. 76 (Hilali testimony). 17" . . . [H]e is young and keen and has a good grip of the work of his department which in the past

has suffered too much from having been in the charge of unimaginative politicians," wrote Ronald Campbell of Husayn upon the latter's appointment; Campbell no. 54, 13 January 1950, FO 371/ 80347/JE1016/13. Husayn was a member of the Pioneers (al-Ruwwad), an association of reformist technocrats formed in the late 1940s. See Berque, Egypt, p. 641.



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'8For the negotiations, see Louis, British, pp. 691-720; Amin SaCid, Tarikh Misr al-siyasi (Cairo, 1959), pp. 323-25.

9Al-Ahram, 22 January 1950; The Times, 18 May 1950; Egypt News (published by the Egyptian embassy in Washington, D.C.), July 1950.

20A series of corruption trials initiated by the military junta in 1953, point to the areas of greatest abuse. The government pressed charges against works minister cUthman Muharram for ten separate cases, two of which involved Madam Nahhas as a codefendant. The court, which found Muharram innocent in two cases, stripped him of all political rights for five years and fined him ?E 12,000, a fraction of what the prosecution sought (see al-Ahram, 21 October 1953). Sirag al-Din, whose trial

quickly became a full-scale indictment of the Wafd and Wafdist rule, initially faced charges for

conspiring to fix cotton prices, accepting bribes, allowing the King to transfer state funds abroad, and using public funds to pave private roads. The court sentenced him to fifteen years and

sequestered his assets (ibid., 31 January 1954). 21As hard as it tried, the government could not destroy the opposition press. Tariq al-Bishri

(Haraka, p. 408) estimates that between 1950 and 1951 the circulation of Socialist Party papers rose from several hundred copies to 50,000-100,000. American embassy officers reported that the circulation of the Muslim Brothers' al-Da'wa reached 80,000 by its second issue in early 1951; see U.S.

Army Military Attache (hereafter USARMA) no. 161746Z, 774.00(W)/2-1651. By late summer, the British estimated the total circulation of all opposition papers at 150,000; see Stevenson to Morrison, 8 September 1951, FO 371/90124/JE10114/7.

22See al-Ahram, 6 February 1950; The Times, 28 October 1950; Mitchell, Society, pp. 80-84. 23Sanhuri could only be legally dismissed by a majority of the State Council. After gaining the

King's vote of confidence, Sanhuri brought the matter to the Council, which voted confidence in his leadership. See al-Ahram, 2 February 1950 and following days.

24Haykal, Mudhakkirat, p. 87. 25cIsa, Muhakamat, p. 23 (Husayn Sirri testimony). 26Caffery no. 124, 774.00/1-3050. 27See, for example, al-Ahram, 12 February and 3 October 1950. In late April, Nahhas, marking the

fourteenth anniversary of the death of Faruq's father-something he had never done before-spoke of FuDad as a great constitutional monarch. The American ambassador noted the prime minister's "interesting and amusing revision" of history. Caffery desp. 920, 774.00/4-2850.

28Bishri, Haraka, pp. 309-10. 29The amount, as Ibrahim Shukri noted in parliament, nearly equaled the entire naval budget. The

use of royal yachts remained a hot issue. See the article by Mustafa MarCi, "Fakhr al-bihar," in al-Liwa' al-jadid, 17 April 1951, also reprinted in Hilmi Salam, Ayyamuhu al-akhira (Cairo, 1972), pp. 253-54. In the article, Nahhas, as well as Faruq, is accused of misusing government property. The title refers to a second royal yacht.

30Haykal, Mudhakkirat, pp. 90 if. 3"Stevenson to Kenneth Younger (minister of state), 8 July 1950, FO 371/80349/JE1016/48. Also

see Haykal, Mudhakkirat, pp. 196 ff. Haykal, who lost the Senate presidency in the process, organized a minority boycott of one session.

32Prompting this bill was scandal in the Palace surrounding the King's order to nullify the marriage of his sister Fatiha to their mother's political secretary, a Copt, in the United States. When the princess and queen mother refused to accede and return home, the Royal Cabinet seized their assets and deprived them of official titles and privileges. Faruq's own liaison with his future queen, Narriman Sadiq, also generated spates of rumors, most of which proved accurate. Rumors that Nahhas sought to block their wedding out of personal dislike for Narriman's family undoubtedly contributed to his government's willingness to muzzle the press. See New York Times, 26 April, 17 May, I and 9 August 1950.

33cAbd al-'Azim Ramadan, 'Abd al-Nasir wa-azmat mars (Cairo, 1975), pp. 51-53. Also see Bishri, Haraka, pp. 306-7.

34Deeb, Party Politics, pp. 68-70. 35Farhat J. Ziadeh, Laxwyers and the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt (Stanford,

1968); Donald M. Reid, Lawyers and Politics in the Arab World, 1880-1960 (Minneapolis, 1981). 36Sirag al-Din's age has been an issue of dispute. He has been accused of falsifying his birthdate in

order to meet the minimum age requirement for serving in parliament in 1936. Donald Reid




estimates his birthdate as 1910. For a brief but valuable political biography, see his "Fu'ad Siraj al-Din and the Egyptian Wafd," Journal of Contemporary History, 15, 4 (October 1980), 721-44.

37For a summary of Thabit's role in the scandal, see Caffery no. 1245, 774.00/5-3150. 38Caffery desp. 1153, 641/74/11-1351. 39Raoul Makarius, La jeunesse intellectuelle d'Egypte au lendemain de la Deuxieme Guerre

Mondiale (Paris, 1960); Bishri, Haraka, pp. 156-58. 40Ibrahim Tal'at, "Ayyam al-wafd al-akhira," Ruz al- Yusuf, 14 February 1977, pp. 24-31. 4 Quraishi, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 172-75. 42Ibid., pp. 134-35; Bishri, Haraka, pp. 305-6; Rizq, Tarikh, pp. 503-6. 43Edwin Chapman-Andrews (first secretary, Cairo) to Michael Wright (superintending under-

secretary, FO African Dept.), 25 March 1950, FO 371/80348/JE1016/39; Caffery no. 1096, 9 Novem- ber 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. V (Washington, D.C., 1978), p. 323.

44The popular perception that Sirag al-Din was the real power in the Wafd, expressed vividly by editorial cartoons in Ruz al- Yusuf as early as the Autumn of 1944, as well as rumors of a liaison between him and Nahhas' wife possibly contributed to the latter's reluctance to fully embrace the

party secretary as his successor. See Reid, "Fu'ad Siraj al-Din," pp. 728-30. Old Wafdists, on the other hand, friends and foes of Sirag al-Din, credit Nahhas with getting the most out of his associates by playing them off against each other.

45Stevenson minutes, 13 September 1951, FO 141/1433/JE1011/26/51; 17 September 1951, JE1011/27/51.

46Stevenson minutes, 10 May 1951, FO 141/1433/JE1011/20/51. In August, amid debate over the government-sponsored press laws, Hilali complained to an al-Ahram reporter, "Instead of curbing liberties we should curb our desires." Yusuf, Qasr, p. 282.

47 Isa, Muhakamat, p. 65 (Hilali testimony). 48Stevenson minutes, 15 October 1951, FO 141/1433/JE1011/30/51; Caffery no. 781, 774.00/

11/2751; 'Isa, Muhakamat, p. 65 (Hilali testimony). In the Summer of 1951, according to Bishri (Haraka, p. 570), Hilali tried to recruit Wafdist leaders who were disgruntled with the government to form a new political party. Bishri names CAbd al-Salam Fahmi Gum'ah, Sirag al-Din's predecessor as party secretary, and CAbd al-Fatah al-Tawil, minister of justice, as his prime candidates.

49Bishri, Haraka, pp, 307-8; Rizq, Tarikh, p. 503; Quraishi, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 169-70. 5?Asked at his trial if he supported the "exceptional promotions," legislation passed in early 1950,

Sirag al-Din replied simply, "It's not a matter of agreeing or not. It was a common policy since 1928." 'Isa, Muhakamat, p. 256.

51Ibid., pp. 141-43, 170 ('Abd al-Mut'al testimony). 52Stevenson to Herbert Morrison (foreign secretary), 31 July 1951, FO 371/90115/JE10110/23. 53Campbell to Bevin, 14 March 1950, FO 371/80348/JE1016/36. Although the British initially

praised Taha Husayn's reform measures, the British ambassador later described him as "oblivious or disdainful of practicality." Stevenson to Bevin, 5 October 1950, FO 371/80349/JE1016/55.

54eIsa, Muhakamat, pp. 122-27 ('Abd al-Mut'al testimony); pp. 183, 209 (Sirag al-Din rejoinder to CAbd al-Mut'al).

55Stevenson to Morrison, 31 July 1951, FO 371/90115/JE10110/23; Caffery desp. 223, 774.00/ 7-3151.

56Campbell to Bevin, 14 March 1950, FO 371/80348/JE1016/36. 57As a cabinet member, Zaki, a staunch defender of the widely unpopular press legislation, bore

the brunt of criticism against the proposal. See the column by Ihsan 'Abd al-Quddus in which the author called upon the government to resign over the press issue. Ruz al- Yusuf, 6 August 1951, p. 3. Also see al-Sha'b al-Jadid, 19 August 1951, p. 3; 6 December 1951, p. 6.

58K. H. Clucas, 17 October 1951, FO 371/90119/JE10110/90. 59While many applauded his initiative, Hilali's myopic focus on the Wafd as the sole source of

corruption and misadministration produced widespread skepticism. See Ihsan 'Abd al-Quddus' columns in Ruz al- Yusuf, 3 and 24 March 1952, p. 3. A Free Officer pamphlet written at the same time echoes many of these ideas. See Kamal al-Din Rif'at, Harb al-tahrir al-wataniya (Cairo, 1968), pp. 173-75.

60For a summary of all who testified, see al-Musawwar, 22 January 1954. 61For a bitter recollection of Taha Husayn's relationship to the Wafd, see Farag, Dhikrayati,

pp. 110-11.



214 Joel Gordon

62Campbell to Bevin, 14 March 1950, FO 371/80348/JE1016/36. 63CIsa, Muhakamat, pp, 117, 153-54 (CAbd al-Mut'al testimony). 64Al-Ahram, 11 November 1950; 'Isa, Muhakamat, p. 131 (CAbd al-Mut'al testimony). 65Stevenson to Bevin, 6 October 1950, FO 371/80349/JE1016/58. Zaynab al-Wakil faced the

Revolutionary Tribunal in February 1954. She was charged with conspiracy to fix cotton prices, smuggling jewels and currency out of Egypt, avoiding customs duties, and gross misuse of public funds. Found guilty, the court sequestered illegally acquired assets, but spared her imprisonment due to poor health (al-Ahram, 8 March 1954).

66At least fifteen relatives of Nahhas, and probably more, benefited from the law. Caffery no. 1126, 774.00/5-1850.

67Stevenson to Bevin, 23 November 1950, FO 371/80349/JE1016/69. 68Caffery desp. 1441, 774.00/6-2150. 69CAbd al-Fattah Hasan, citing several instances in which Nahhas stood up to Faruq, tries to

rehabilitate the prime minister's subservient image; Dhikrayat, pp. 30, 85-86.

70Campbell to Bevin, 14 March 1950, FO 371/80348/JE1016/36. 7'Al-Ahram, 17 November 1950, for the Speech from the Throne. See The Times, 15 January 1951,

for demonstrations in favor of breaking off negotiations; and 12 July 1951, for the ban on demonstrations.

While the British certainly share an equal portion of the blame for the deadlock, Tariq al-Bishri (Haraka, p. 478) accepts the British assessment that domestic politics pushed the government into taking dramatic action. He writes: "It was necessary for the government, if it wanted to regain the public trust it had lost, as a party and as a government, to adopt a public stance by which it could rally the masses to it. In this regard the only available option was the national cause and the only tactic was abrogation of the treaty." Also see Louis, British, pp. 717-18.

72Records of Conversations, Notes and Papers Exchanged Between the Royal Egyptian Govern- ment and the United Kingdom Government, March 1950-November 1951, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cairo, 1951), p. 179.

73For Nahhas' lack of faith in Salah al-Din, see the citation for note 44. The British held the foreign minister largely to blame for the breakdown in negotiations that led to abrogation, an act which, because it was so often threatened, caught them by surprise. See Stevenson no. 119 saving, 26 October 1951, FO 371/90109/JE1016/36.

74Caffery no. 575, 26 October 1951, Foreign Relations, 1951, Vol. V (Washington, D.C., 1982), pp. 410-11; Caffery no. 689, 12 November 1951, Foreign Relations, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 421-22; USARMA no. 567, 774.00(W)/11-1051; USARMA no. 572, 774.00(W)/11-1751. Stevenson to Anthony Eden (foreign secretary), 6 December 1951, FO 371/90121/JE10110/167.

75See the "Report of the British Embassy Committee of Enquiry into the Riots in Cairo on the 26th of January," FO 371/96873/JE1018/86. The report's concluding section, along with other relevant British documents, are reprinted in the appendix of Gamal al-Sharqawi, Asrar hariq al- Qahira (Cairo, 1985).

76Ruz al- Yusuf, 8 July 1951, p. 3. 77Western, particularly American, assessments of the potential threat of a revolution influenced this

group. See, for example, a column by Stewart Alsop, translated and printed in Ruz al- Yusuf, 27 November 1951, in which the author cites Egypt's need for despotic rule. Bishri, Haraka, pp. 564-67.

78Caffery desp. 882, 774.00/10-551. Husayn's disillusion led him to refuse cabinet posts in the post-fire governments formed by cAli Mahir and Hilali; the first because Mahir sought to make peace with the Wafd, the second because Hilali buckled to Palace pressure in the appointment of his ministers. Bishri, Haraka, pp. 566-67, 569.



Documents

The False Hopes of 1950: The Wafd's Last Hurrah and the Demise of Egypt's Old Order